Aspects of European Political Culture

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It is with great pleasure that we present you this collection of texts. This publication is one in a series of studies by the Junior Visiting Fellows of the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna that come to the Institute from various academic disciplines for half a year long fellowship. The aim of the IWM is to allow young researchers to work alongside senior researchers in a diverse and progressive environment. This publication captures the wide scope of interests that researchers share at IWM.

This volume is organized around a broader understanding of the subject of political culture, defined as a set of norms, values, attitudes, spiritual, and emotional features of a society or a social group, that are related to the distribution and utilization of power in or among societies. General aim of this collection is to examine selected aspects of political culture in relation to economic, social and historical components of the (mostly Eastern) European societies.

Reader will have no difficulty finding his or her way through the texts. The volume begins with an article from a broader, philosophical point of view, emphasizing ethics of human rights as a culture of thinking. It is followed by an article that examines in comparative perspective how political and economic cultural values contribute to the Central and Eastern European Countries’ economic convergence to the EU. In the third article we begin descending to a micro-level examination, looking at a case study of an Austrian imperial bureaucracy attempt to transform Galicia during the second half of the eighteenth century. After that, we move about 150 years ahead to discuss the nationalist right under communism in Poland. We end the manuscript with two articles addressing the role of the historical and political memory in Central Europe. The first examines the politics of city-image in contemporary Budapest, while the second follows usage of historical memory and historic amnesia on the Slovak political scene.
All the papers have abstracts attached. For a matter of convenience, we aggregate them together and present them below.

**Sophie Loidolt. Notes on an Ethics of Human Rights: From the Question of Commitment to a Phenomenological Theory of Reason and Back.** One of the challenges for our culture is how to think human rights in a way that does not fall prey to cultural relativism, but remains open to intercultural dialogue and alert to historical contingency. This is why we need an ethics of human rights as a culture of thinking for which this paper will try to outline two basic threads. Loidolt will focus on man not as the bearer of human rights but as the being that can adjudge (zusprechen) and constitute ‘right’ at all. Hence, Loidolt will rather concentrate on human accomplishments and responsibility than on human needs. The philosophical background of the argument is a phenomenological one. With this approach Loidolt will try to embrace both a universal, transcendental level and a level of cultural awareness that tries to face the other as other. In this approach, universality remains something aspired after that keeps being constituted from the outside and that asks for a practical performative attitude.

**Shai Moses. Operationalizing Political and Economic Culture in Eastern Europe.** The completion of the first wave of Eastern enlargement determined the European Union (EU) to become more heterogeneous in terms of living standards. All ten new Member States (NMS) are below the average EU’s GDP per capita. Furthermore, since the contemporary gap between the enlarged EU and the rest of Central and Eastern European (CEE) region is even greater in terms of living standards, questions of regional security and stability are already present. This short paper aims to shed some light on this subject through a comparative examination of some aspects of political and economic cultural competences that affect the economic convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU.

One of the problems in dealing with economic culture and its effects on wealth is that it is a broad definition, and that it is not quite obvious how we can operationalize it. In response, Moses suggests narrowing the discussion to a particular aspect of economic culture, by examining specifically libertarian and entrepreneurial values. Arguments presented here are that the libertarian values, that is philosophical mindset that emphasizes the responsibility of the self and the maximization of liberty...
for every individual, and in particular, the need for high economic and personal freedoms, do exist to various degrees in CEECs and have a significant impact on entrepreneurial values. The second argument is that these entrepreneurial values, as reflected in the support for competition, private business ownership and which put emphasis on innovation, do have a positive and significant contribution to CEECs’ convergence.

Iryna Vushko. Enlightened Absolutism, Imperial Bureaucracy and Provincial Society: Austrian Project to Transform Galicia, 1772-1815. The paper analyzes the bureaucratic modernization of Galicia, the formerly Polish territory annexed to the Habsburg Empire in 1772. The attempted transformation of Galicia was part of a larger reform project of the second half of the eighteenth century, uniting an Enlightened spirit of centralization with the reality of Austria’s territorial enlargement. The Austrian bureaucrats were responsible for the integration of a new province into imperial structures. By focusing on the Austrian state bureaucracy and its interaction with local population – Poles, Jews, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) - Vushko analyzes the general transformation of Galician political culture through the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

Mikolaj Kunicki. The Nationalist Right under Communism: Bolesław Piasecki and the Polish Communists, 1944-1979. Based on a doctoral research project, this article introduces to the readers Bolesław Piasecki (1915-1979), a prominent Polish nationalist politician. A fascist in the 1930s and a pro-communist Catholic activist in postwar Poland, Piasecki was the leading advocate of the reconciliation of nationalism with communism. By narrowing the scale of historical observation to an individual case, the article discusses the role of nationalism in twentieth-century Polish political culture, analyzes the entanglement of communism and fascism, and presents an example of the ideological affinity between communism and nationalism. It explores Piasecki’s postwar career against the background of the nationalization of the Polish communist party culminating in the 1967-1968 anti-Semitic campaign. It argues that under certain conditions, not only did the communists utilize nationalism, but – as Piasecki’s case proves – they also prolonged the existence of the nationalist right. In broader terms, Piasecki’s story points to the fact that the adoption of nationalism by
Eastern European communist leaders accelerated the ideological de-legitimization and erosion of the system in the region.

Emilia Palonen. Constructing Communities: From Local to National, Transnational and "Activist" Politics of Memory in Europe. Within the European Union at least since the failed referenda on the EU constitution, there has been a strong realisation that nationalism has been strengthened in the European countries, even in Western Europe, which has been seen as the civilized counterpart of the nationalistic Eastern Europe. Palonen looks at the construction of political communities through processes of memory and the politics of memory. Palonen seeks to highlight that there are politics of memory on different levels of political community building, not only the national or the European federal level. This invites us to think forward the way in which the overlapping and competing levels of political memory – and not only the interaction between different groups or nations – have an impact on the memory processes and the articulation of key signifiers such as the nationhood or Europe. In the final instance, it should enable us to see how the multiplicity of levels is an ever-present issue, even if certain groupings and actors would want us to focus our collective imaginary, or the imagining of the collective, on only one level of political community.

In this paper, Palonen will offer a brief look on the politics of memory at the European federal and national level, on the national and metropolitan level, on the metropolitan municipal and local district level, as well as lead the analysis towards the politics of memory in the activist - often anti-(state)-institutional - level. The last move highlights the existence of memory building in the activist communities, which shows the importance of memory for political communities, and the function as a creator of continuity and even institutional base. It also highlights the multi-level character of these memory projects and community, which are, crucially to their political character, not without conflict.

Dagmar Kusá. Je Me Souviens…Historic Memory and Historic Amnesia in Central European Politics. Sixteen years after the wave of the revolutions that toppled half a century of communist rule in Central Europe Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary are members of the European Union with fully consolidated democratic regimes. Yet their domestic political scenes are still split along the ethnic lines and
latent ethnic conflict is palpable within as well as across the borders. This paper focuses on one of the main factors that feed the continuing ethnic tensions in politics, and that is the manipulation with historical history by the political figures. National elites often use references to the events in ethnic groups’ past as ready-made weapons against representatives of other ethnic groups, or as a lure to attract voters within their own community. My research shows, that the level of awareness and interpretation of events and eras highlighted in historical memories of this or that ethnic group varies by nationality, but also by the function of belonging to the ranks of national or local elite. ‘Common’ people, simply put, seem to have more pedestrian priorities than linking ancient histories to current political squabbles.

In this brief paper, Kusá looks at the theoretical background of ethnic mobilization under the elite leadership, and tools utilized to further political agendas, with a focus on the manipulation with historical memory. To deeper illustrate these tensions, a case study from southern Slovak town of Komárno is examined.

The main aim of this publication is to foster collaboration and mutual understanding among researchers of very diverse backgrounds, brought together as Junior Fellows. We believe that the interdisciplinary nature of this collection will enrich our understanding of the societies we live in.

Finally, over this semester, many people have assisted us in running our various projects. We would like to thank the members of the IWM staff. Although we cannot name them all, we owe special thanks to the Director of the IWM Suzanne Frosch, to the Fellows’ Coordinator Mary Nicklas, to the Network Administrator David Soucek, to the Public Relations Manager Sabine Assmann, and to IWM Permanent Fellows János Kovacs, Klaus Nellen and Cornelia Klinger.

Shai Moses and Dagmar Kusá.
Notes on an Ethics of Human Rights: From the Question of Commitment to a Phenomenological Theory of Reason and Back

By Sophie Loidolt

Abstract

One of the challenges for our culture is how to think human rights in a way that does not fall prey to cultural relativism, but remains open to intercultural dialogue and alert to historical contingency. This is why we need an ethics of human rights as a culture of thinking for which this paper will try to outline two basic threads. Loidolt will focus on man not as the bearer of human rights but as the being that can adjudge (zusprechen) and constitute ‘right’ at all. Hence, Loidolt will rather concentrate on human accomplishments and responsibility than on human needs. The philosophical background of the argument is a phenomenological one. With this approach Loidolt will try to embrace both a universal, transcendental level and a level of cultural awareness that tries to face the other as other. In this approach, universality remains something aspired after that keeps being constituted from the outside and that asks for a practical performative attitude.

1. The Issue: Why Do We Need an Ethics of Human Rights?

In thinking human rights, Europe can claim a certain political and philosophical culture. As much as this is a historical fact, it is a complication on a theoretical level: The inherent claim for universalism in the concept of human rights demands legitimization beyond cultural and historical boundaries.

However, also within our boundaries, one can find very diverse attitudes towards the question, or behind the support of human rights. Besides a diverse tradition of philosophical legitimization and criticism, political theory and revolution, religion also still serves as a medium for thinking and identifying with human rights. But reasons and motivations why people support human rights are not contingent because of their universal claim. Especially, as soon as these reasons become official theoretical or political positions with the aim to make them plausible and acceptable
to everybody, they should reflect on their own cultural impact and try to cope with it. If we want human rights to be universal, we should try to target this universality also in our culture of thinking, identifying and legitimizing human rights – we should try to get to a theoretical and practical responsibility for this universal claim: an ethics of human rights.

In the ongoing discussion on universality and cultural relativism of human rights (Gosepath & Lohmann, 1998), some authors like e.g. Otfried Höffe (1998) have tried to present a minimalist concept with the aim to be as culturally neutral as possible. Höffe refers to ‘transcendental needs’, i.e. needs that constitute the conditions of the possibility of living a human life. Thus, as they are crucially essential, the claim for these needs has to be equally exchanged between humans – Höffe speaks about ‘transcendental exchange’ (transzendentaler Tausch). It is easy to recognize that this idea is influenced strongly by the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’. It is however one of the paradigmatic attempts to boil down the sometimes overloaded concept of human rights to a version that can be accepted in different cultures.

What I would like to propose in this essay is a very different kind of the transcendental in thinking human rights. The aim is not to elaborate a set of indispensable needs, but to get to the core responsibility of meeting these needs through an analysis of the structure of subjectivity as such. These will be very basic thoughts that should just serve as a background theory for a certain political and ethical culture. I will try to focus on man not as the bearer of human rights but as the being that can adjudge (zusprechen) and constitute ‘right’ at all. Hence, I will rather concentrate on human accomplishments than on human needs.

The philosophical background of my argument is a phenomenological one. With this approach I will try to embrace both a universal, transcendental level, and a level of cultural awareness that tries to face the other as other. Universality thus remains something aspired after that keeps being constituted from the outside (Butler, 1996) and that asks for a practical performative attitude. The challenge for our culture is how to think human rights in a way that does not fall prey to cultural relativism, but remains open to intercultural dialogue and alert to historical contingency. I will try to outline two threads that could show basic guidelines for such an ethics of human rights as a culture of thinking.
2. Two Threads for a Possible Groundwork for an Ethics of Human Rights

The first thread I would like to follow is a certain understanding of law and right in our culture. I will sketch out two versions of thinking the relation between man and right, and propose a critical revision of both from a phenomenological1 viewpoint. From that perspective I will try to emphasize the transcendental importance of legitimization and justification for having a meaningful world at all. This should serve as a basis for an ethics of human rights that acknowledges the following: because our normative interpretation of the world is a universal and necessary one, a right is not an existing entity apart from our (subjective and intersubjective) accomplishments, but only depends on our responsibility of adjudging it.

The second thread will follow the question of how to face the appeal of the other2. It tries to think the adjudgement of ‘right’ from a phenomenological first-person perspective instead of the classical, ‘objective’ third-person perspective of reciprocity. This intends to show how we are constituted by the appeal of the other and called to answer to this appeal as originally responsive (Waldenfels, 1994) and responsible beings. As it is always an appeal of many others, reason has to measure the immeasurable and compare the incomparable in order to deliver the urgently demanded judgement and justice. The question will be what kind of a practical attitude is required in this case of constant overstrain when human rights are thought as the right of the other. This thread should also help in understanding cultural and historical contingency and coping with it.

These two basic outlines form a phenomenological framework for constituting an ethics of human rights3. They should function as a sketch of the groundwork that would have to be done to formulate a new state of nature under the guidance of responsibility that would be a state of nature of consciousness.

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1 I focus on the works of Edmund Husserl that I try to make fruitful for my question within the realm of a genesis of reason. In this paper I concentrate on Husserl’s ‘Phenomenology of Reason’, the last part of the Ideas and Husserl’s genetic phenomenology in Experience and Judgement (EJ).

2 My second phenomenological emphasis lies on the work of Emmanuel Lévinas and his philosophy of alterity, mainly as it is elaborated in Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (Lévinas, 1978 [1998]). I will also refer to two of several essays where Lévinas has touched the question of human rights and has proposed to think them as the ‘rights of the other man’ (Lévinas, 1987), (Lévinas, 1991 [1995]).

3 An excellent study with similar intentions and background has been done by Alfred Hirsch (2005).
2.1 Legitimization as a Condition for a Meaningful World

In our culture, there are two dominant attitudes towards rights within the realm of law. I want to argue that they are both not useful for a substantial and responsible grounding of intercultural ethics of human rights.

The first attitude is one that derives from the legacy of legal positivism: Legal positivism has put an end to the search for an absolutely justified legal order by declaring that law has nothing to do with morals and justice, and moreover, that science could not say anything about these rather irrational decisions. With this move to theoretically eliminate the trace of justice and justification in the notion of law, jurisprudence or ‘legal science’ has accomplished a process of self-differentiation from morals and has achieved a state in which non-reflected ideological biases in its judgements are to be avoided. However, the often discussed problem is that it cannot judge or criticize the legal system it is analyzing (Horster, 2002. Radbruch, 2003). It leaves the content of law totally to an unquestionable and un-criticizable legislator and just pays attention to the coherence of the normative system. Thus, laws and rights in legal positivism are regarded as an assembly of contingent compulsory rules within a coherent system of norms. This strong aspect of contingency puts man in an arbitrary and external relation to the notion of law, regarded as a “social technique” (Kelsen, 1934 [2000]) that is dependent on the respective power relationships and the customary irrational moral decisions. Only a theory of democracy and intersubjective decision-making can supplement and thus sustain such a concept of law (as contingent rules) with political legitimacy. The question is however if it is sensible to ‘outsource’ the idea of complete legitimization and justification out of the notion of law and right altogether – or if we should not better keep an idea of ‘right’ that corresponds to the intention of complete comprehensible legitimization.

It seems that the common understanding of human rights – the second attitude I would like to refer to – provides exactly this idea of a ‘right’. However, it is remarkable that these positions, derived from natural law, often embrace a just as unquestioned and un-criticizeable authority that moreover claims to be in possession of the absolute truth: God, a certain ‘insight’ in the nature of man, or a certain political system or historical tradition. It is also remarkable that, not only in the

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4 I am especially referring to Hans Kelsens theory of legal positivism in *Reine Rechtslehre* (Kelsen, 1934 [2000]).
common understanding of human rights, but also in a couple of theories there is a
tendency to refer to the notion of dignity as something rather self-evident (Horster,
2002). Man is imagining himself and his ‘dignity’ as a sort of a substance that is the
carrier of an innate originary right that belongs to him just as, for example, his body.
To claim an innate right for every human being creates a very internal and substantial
relationship of man and right (and of course also of man and law, because the view of
an independent existence of something like an innate right claims correspondence in
legal systems, and sustains the old theory that law has something to do with morals
and justice). This very internal and substantial relationship between man and right/
law is grounded by the conviction that everyone, thanks to his belonging to the human
race (that is blessed by reason and dignity), has a right coming directly and
independent from anything else with his own person. I would like to call this the
metaphysics of human rights.

So, on the one hand we have a theory that suggests a very external, contingent
relation of law and man; on the other hand we have a very strong internal conjunction
between a human being and its human right. The problem is that one side is totally
expelling the trace of (moral) justification from the notion of law and that the other
side is imagining a total justification and legitimization that is never given without
accepted authority. Both attitudes are not so useful to ground an ethics of human
rights that reflects on our cultural situation. The first one cannot promote the idea of
just and non-contingent human rights at all, and the second one has the self-perception
of an absolute truth that just needs to be exported to those who obviously have not had
that insight. To achieve cultural awareness and maintain a claim for universality, a
more open attitude has to be achieved.

The responsibility I would like to outline goes all the way back to our basic
structure of consciousness. Phenomenology seems to be very appropriate to guide this
reflection: In its fundamental intentions it is a transcendental philosophy which
investigates consciousness as the epistemological and ontological grounding par
excellence. Husserl pointed out that consciousness is always consciousness of
something – this means that the correlation between an act and its content which
Husserl calls an intentional correlation – marks the very essential characteristic
feature of consciousness. The insight that all reality is through Sinngebung within this
correlation leads to the transcendental turn in Husserl’s philosophy. If we take a step
back and look at consciousness itself, we find that it is that correlation and thus the
domain of meaning. We can also see that this ‘step back’ is not a step out of the world, but consciously into it with the realization that everything we can mean by ‘world’ is already conscious and thus within consciousness. In short: Not consciousness is within the world, but the world itself is conscious. This view opens up a whole new sphere, where the accomplishments of consciousness that make our world a meaningful world can finally be visible – and these accomplishments go to the very basic point of perceiving and thus constituting the category of ‘reality’ itself. The eidetic structures and correlations Husserl has sketched out, work as a perfect ‘map’ of that normally hidden sphere of consciousness which is mainly a sphere of accomplishments (Husserl: Ideen I).

To get to the question of how to think ‘right’ in a phenomenological view, we have to broaden the context from an only morally understood right to a wider comprehension of a meaning of right: Of course this meaning goes far beyond the realm of ‘law’, where a right designates a claim or a competence of a subject (of law) within a legal system. But ‘right’ is not only used in the sense of ‘a right’ but also as ‘the right action’ or ‘the right result’, so either in the sense of moral (recht) or of logical (richtig) correctness. My thesis is that this ‘equivocation’ is not by chance, but that a certain structure is employed not only in moral and legal reasoning, but also in theoretical reasoning. There is an intentional ‘strategy’ of justification which essentially employs a notion of right, and which is at work all the time in (philosophical and non-philosophical) argumentations. It needs to be reflected on to find out where it originates from and how it shapes the features of our understanding.

Husserl himself has a strong notion of legitimization in his own phenomenology, where he understands ‘originary intuition’ and ‘evidence’ as legitimizing grounds (Rechtsquelle)⁵. Without getting too deep into Husserlian phenomenology, it seems quite plausible that something completely clear has more of a ‘right’ to be acknowledged than something which is cloudy and inarticulate. But this naturally understood integration or involvement in a system of adjudication is

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⁵ The ‘Principle of all Principles’, section 24 of Ideen I, reads like the ‘constitution’ (in a political sense) of phenomenology: the main legitimizing grounds that will be the measure for every investigation, are laid down by Husserl: “Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien: daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‘Intuition’ originär […] darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei […] kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen.” (Ideen I: 51) In the last part of the book Husserl develops a ‘Phenomenology of Reason’ where the correlation between original intuition, evidence and ‘right’ becomes even stronger and seems to be the movement of reason itself.
something that deserves our attention. Because: there is obviously an own form of intentionality which grasps evidence as a source of justification and thus interprets this lived experience (Erlebnis) within a frame of legitimization or justification. This has to be acknowledged as a particular accomplishment of consciousness – and if we take a closer look, it turns out that this particular accomplishment, which I would like to call legitimizing intentionality, is exactly the inner movement of reason itself.

Furthermore, if we look at the act that constitutes a meaning of right, we have to acknowledge the following: ‘a right’ is not something that appears or that is given originally (like e.g. sensual impressions), but it is a product of an intentional accomplishment. More precisely: the meaning that something is ‘right’ or has ‘a right’, is not something that is perceived, but something that is achieved through passing a judgement: By judging something, by the means of implementing a norm or any measure, the meaning of ‘right’ or ‘a right’ originates as the formal expression of an ‘accordingness’ (Gemäßheit). So far, one could call this a phenomenological version of what the legal positivist Hans Kelsen calls the ‘normative interpretation’ (normative Deutung) (Kelsen, 1934 [2000]: 3-25) of the world by man that constitutes the realm of law. Although I fully agree with Kelsen -- the difference of the phenomenological perspective is giving the take on ‘normative interpretation’ a transcendental turn: I would argue that not only morals and law derive from a normative interpretation of a given world, but that our whole way of thinking, arguing and justifying is itself a normalizing or normative movement that constitutes a world where truth at least becomes an issue. The difference to Kelsen is, that it is not as if a world was constituted and then we interpret it with norms, but that the process of constitution itself is a priori going on in a context of legitimization.

For the legal positivist Kelsen, a so-called ‘objective norm’ (Kelsen, 1934 [2000]: 2-3) is enough to guarantee the validity of a judgement: the movement of reason, however, demands a norm it itself regards as valid. This is how an interesting dynamic, that we know from our own argumentations and reflections, unfolds: If the parameter that guarantees that something is ‘right’ or has ‘a right’ comes into doubt, the question of validity is exceeding or transgressing into a higher level of a formerly accepted measure/ criterion. That the question ‘But is this right?’ can always transgress, and must always transgress if it is not fully and completely justified, is the main characteristic feature of the movement of reason or of the dynamics of the legitimizing intentionality. The interesting point about it is that it is a formal relation...
that expresses nothing else but the demand for accordingness and full validity. Husserl recognizes this tendency towards fulfilment in every kind of intentionality and calls it teleology. I would like to argue that as a structure of reason this teleology functions in a purely formal way and thus constitutes the condition of the possibility of a critique at all. It is a structure that involves a meaning of right (legitimacy = accordingness and validity) within a legitimizing intentionality and a certain formal dynamic in the demand of full validity. My crucial point is that this structure is not an accidental attitude, but constitutive of our apperception as such. That is why I would speak of a category of legitimization, which is a priori structuring our experience. The structure and the movement of reason are working in that formal category as well as in logical categories. It produces the sense of the regulative idea (in the Kantian sense) as a demand for total legitimization progressing into infinity.

Philosophers like Habermas, and especially Apel, have built up a whole ethics of communication from the idea of such a legitimizing category. Apel (1976) argues that we are bound to this category because of an intersubjective apriori of communication and argumentation. Methodological solipsism thus realizes that his real transcendental condition lies in the intersubjective community of communication. What I would like to do to get to a more phenomenological grounding of ethics, is to trace back this category of legitimization (which is at work in every subject) like Husserl traces back the origin of logical categories in *Experience and Judgement*: that means that a genesis or genealogy of reason itself and its structures of legitimization and justification is in question. The question of how and why reason works in the category of legitimization must lead us to corresponding prepredicative features in the receptive structure. I would argue that it is being receptive as such that makes us answer in a category of legitimization. Husserl himself speaks of “the responsive position-taking of the ego […] in predicative judgement” (EJ: 272f.) – this „responsive position-taking” to weave something into legitimizing structures at all is thus to be rated as an ‘answer’ to givenness as such, in its own appeal and an irrefutable claim. Consciousness must not be understood as a secluded sovereign

\[6\] In this late work Husserl is as inquiry into the genealogy of logic. As J. Churchill points out in the introduction, its guiding thesis is that “even at its most abstract, logic demands an underlying theory of experience, which at the lowest level is described as prepredicative […]” (EJ: xxii) “Part I begins with an analysis of the ‘passive’ data of experience […]. Starting from this level, Husserl exhibits the prepredicative conditions of predication as such. As underlying every act of objective experience, these structures found the specific forms of judgement encountered on the level of formal logic.” (EJ: xxii).

\[7\] In German: “antwortende Stellungnahme des Ich im prädikativen Urteil” (EU: 327).
entity, but as openness as such. What is given on a prepredicative sphere is thus never a \textit{right} (in the sense of an already legitimized and justified claim) but a pre-predicative passive \textit{appeal}. This appeal is thus comprehended and ‘answered to’ in the predicative structure and demand for legitimation.

Let me briefly summarize the thesis I am trying to argue on the basis of a phenomenological background: We have to comprehend ‘right’ (in the sense of a legitimized claim) not as something that appears, but as something that is adjudged. Here my position resembles more the one of legal positivism than that of natural law: Because the classical thesis of natural law states that ‘right’ appears together with the phenomenon or its evidence, and that it objectively belongs to it. However, in a phenomenological perspective, it is clear that something like a meaning of ‘right’, or of ‘legitimization’ can only be obtained through the act of a judgement. Thus we have to comprehend the whole ‘net’ of legitimizing structures that is spanned over our perceptions as an accomplishment of our structures of thinking (a ‘normative interpretation’, but on a transcendental level). This category of legitimization is answering to an essential state or a formation of consciousness itself: that it is being addressed, approached, appealed by givenness itself. This appeal calls for an answer – in position (\textit{Setzung}). Measurements like the relations of fulfilment (evident, originary given, given in space and time, etc.) are constituted and comprehended as legitimizing grounds. The search for these grounds is the ultimate movement of reason itself that has to be understood as an answering movement on a fundamental situation of being addressed.

If we go back to the basic structures of subjectivity, anything like ‘a right’ or a legitimizing entity has to be thought firstly as a predicative accomplishment and secondly as an accomplishment that is not completely random or due to the absolute freedom of reason but due to a spontaneous freedom that is demanded as an answer to an appeal. In other words: the subject considered as a phenomenologically reduced consciousness does not \textit{have} a right, but it \textit{is the source} of all attributions or adjudications of legitimation. This legitimation is bound to a demand of fulfilment that can be projected into infinity in the form of a regulative idea which is nothing else but a predicative answer to a call that cannot be put into finalizing measurements. I would thus call this legitimizing structure a responsive or responsible structure.

How can this rather epistemological theory of reason get to an ethical impact on the question of human rights? The very nature of the ethical appeal that confronts
the legitimizing structure with an excessive demand will be the main issue of the next chapter. So far we have remained in the realm of theoretical reason, where evidence can be described as the non plus ultra of givenness in the prepredicative sphere that is answered to in predication as a legitimizing ground. Only in the last paragraph there has been an idea of transgression of these measurements.

But still, the clarification of a meaning of right that is not lost or hidden in a contingent meaning of rules, can contribute to a more responsible attitude towards the question of right: That man is the source or the ground for this legitimizing pattern, however not in a contingent, but in a responsible or responsive way, creates a critical but more originary relation of man and right: neither that of an external contingency, nor that of an imaginary internal substance which carries something like an innate right. We have to comprehend the full dimension of being subjected to an appeal that we respond to in legitimizing structures: it means that right is not an existing entity apart from our (subjective and intersubjective) accomplishments but only depends on our responsibility of adjudging it. Acknowledgement of this critical relation can have three benefits: Firstly, to see the notion of law within a continuity of legitimization (which integrates subjective accomplishments into the ‘social technique’ and thus tries to build a subject-related bridge from the legal to the political and ethical). Secondly, to recognize the essential status of intersubjective discourses of legitimization (as otherwise a meaningful world would not be possible). Thirdly, to realize the intentional movement of reason towards complete legitimization: even if it cannot be achieved, legitimizing intentionality can not stop at an unjustified benchmark, but transgress it necessarily with critique.8

2.2 Urgency and Judgement: The Appeal of the Others as an Excessive Demand

The second thread for an ethics of human rights builds on the first one. It confronts a phenomenology of reason as legitimizing intentionality with the phenomenon of the ethical. For an ethics of human rights, it is necessary to realize that we are responsible for the right of others, whereas at the same time we cannot point to evident legitimizing grounds – and if we do, we know that they are never enough for the ethical appeal that confronts us.

8 This is a structure that Husserl already develops for the very basic pattern of perception. In Experience and Judgement, he speaks about Rechtfertigungsfrage (EJ: §§ 78-79), in Formal and Transcendental Logic about Richtigkeitsbewusstsein (FTL: §§44-46).
The philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas claims: “Se manifester originellement comme droits de l’autre homme et comme devoir pour un moi […], c’est là la phénoménologie des droits de l’homme.” (Lévinas, 1987: 169) With this statement Lévinas calls for a radical change of perspective; instead of the classical objective third-person perspective, where everyone is equal and right is adjudged through the reasonable balance of the free will, Lévinas takes his position from a first-person perspective. He practically conceptualizes a genesis of the meaning of human rights from the view of a single subject as a duty for every single subject. Instead of thinking right as the outcome of a radical objectivity, he thinks the ‘right of the other’ as an even more original experience of a radical subjectivity. Lévinas criticizes the basic understanding of human rights as it has been developed in a classical Kantian argumentation that refers exclusively to reason. This alone is not enough, says Lévinas, because a sort of justice that derives from the demarcation of many different free wills which are indifferent to one another would not be anything else but a bad compromise. This is why Lévinas tries to conceptualize human rights as the rights of the other for whom I am responsible.

For Lévinas, the radical other is the ethical phenomenon par excellence, as he is not at disposal for the measurements of reason – his main feature of being other and being transcendent to everything I know, does precisely not ‘show’ or ‘appear’ in the sense of all other phenomena, but confronts me with a radical excess and deprivation that cannot be understood in a concept (Marion, 2001). The other, who remains radically impenetrable or inaccessible as other, brings subjectivity into an anarchical and asymmetrical relation with his infinite and radical transcendence. Lévinas thinks the other as a radical figure of givenness, namely givenness of deprivation or

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9 « Mais dès lors, dans la défense des droits de l’homme, il conviendrait de ne plus comprendre ceux-ci exclusivement à partir d’une liberté qui, virtuellement, serait déjà la négation de toute autre liberté et où, entre l’une et l’autre, le juste arrangement ne tiendrait qu’à une réciproque limitation. Concession et compromis ! Il faut à la justice qui est incontournable, une autre ‘autorité’ que celle des proportions s’établissant entre volontés d’emblée opposées et opposables. Il faut que ces proportions soient agréées par les volontés libres en raison d’une préalable paix qui ne serait pas la non-agression pure et simple, mais qui comporterait, si on peut dire, une positivité propre […] S’en tenir, dans la justice, à la norme de la pure mesure – ou modération – entre termes qui s’excluent, reviendrait encore à assimiler les rapports entre membres du genre humain au rapport entre individus d’une extension logique, qui ne signifient, de ‘un à l’autre, que négation, additions ou indifférence. Dans l’humanité, d’individu à individu, s’établit une proximité qui ne prend pas sens à travers la métaphore spatiale de l’extension d’un concept. » (Lévinas, 1987).
excess. In that givenness itself lies an affective and prepredicative appeal, the appeal of the other which individualizes subjectivity in its responsibility. Moreover, the other is never alone. There are always many others (Lévinas calls this structure ‘The Third’), who demand my full responsibility. Here emerges the problem: What do I rightfully have to do? (Lévinas, 1978 [1998]) If we read this question within a genesis of reason, we can find the connection to our first thread.

The Third does not only make the urgency of the other’s appeal even more urgent, he demands a judgement, a measure. Lévinas reads this as the origin of judgement, reason and consciousness as such – the experience of the other is a sort of prepredicative experience that is trying to put itself into measures in the wake of the Third. Measures have to be constituted to be able to make a ‘just’ judgement – but they can never be totally adequate measures, as the others as others do not show themselves as measurable phenomena – the excess remains un-conceptualized and not at disposal; the ethical always calls for more – it is a situation of excessive demand.

The crucial difference between Lévinas’ concept of justice and the usual or conventional one is that Lévinas considers the sort of justice that is aware of its ethical responsibility beyond justice. It is not a self-assured calculation with symmetrical portions of free will, but an urgent conceptual reaction to an overwhelming appeal that can never be adequately responded to. Justice has to be reminded of its origin in the complete responsibility for the other. This is also how Lévinas wants human rights to be understood. They are primarily the rights of the other that lie in my responsibility.

In the previous paragraph I have sketched out a transcendental structure of legitimization that is referring to evidence as its legitimizing ground. Now it is clear that this benchmark is only a usable one in theoretical reasoning. Excess and deprivation which are the main features of the ethical make it impossible to refer to such a clear measure, as they transcend and withdraw from conditions of

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10 Deprivation corresponds to excess insofar the otherness of the other exceeds my grasping of it and shows itself as radical transcendence. That it is ‘more than enough’ turns that ‘more’ into something I am deprived of.

measurements as such. In this situation reason as the legitimizing category really has to become practical. And this means that it has to commit itself to its judgements with the awareness that even its own authority cannot guarantee or display something as an ultimate truth (Derrida, 1994 [1991]).

‘Getting practical’ as an imperative for reason itself is not to be understood in the sense that reason is providing the rules for the right action, but that reason is answering to its limitations. What also comes into play here is the issue of historicity which I could not cover in this essay. The appeal is shaped as well by historicity as by the response to it – it shows itself differently as well as it demands different responsibilities. We cannot claim that this, which has been considered as ‘reasonable’, has been the same – not even in the last two hundred years. But the reference to the formal structure in legitimization that gets its dynamic from something coming into doubt, something disturbing the order, guarantees the possibility of critique. Critique is also to be understood as an answer on the one hand to the disturbed order, on the other hand to the disturbing; the first one would be the ‘negative’, the second one the ‘positive’ attempt of critique. ‘Getting practical’ thus means that reason has to acknowledge its dynamics of critique (thanks to a transcendental intersubjectivity), but at the same time its limits of evidence; it has to recognize the urgency that demands to do the impossible: to compare the incomparable with a measure which is necessarily inadequate (Lévinas, 1978 [1998]: 345). How to differentiate it from pure decisionism? The ‘good will’ which is the crucial element of Kant’s ethics is probably one guidepost, and it involves all the criteria that are demanded of a critical relation to the constitution of human rights: commitment to human rights as rights of the others, commitment to equality, dignity etc., with the insight that it will have been dependent on that commitment, awareness of the imperfection and of the urgency of the case, thus alertness to the disturbing, responsivity to and responsibility for it, while being aware that it can never be fully incorporated; and finally openness to that universality in progress (or universality to come) that keeps being constituted from the outside.

Let me summarize this chapter: For Lévinas, subjectivity is essentially shaped by the relation to the other which is a relation of responsibility to an appeal that cannot be avoided (of course it is possible to deny it but that already is a form of answering to it). Subjectivity is through that appeal. Its responsible answer lies in comprehending the others’ appeal as their right and in constituting it (in the ambiguous sense of a political and a phenomenological constitution). This right
should not be regarded as something that exists independently of an entity of a ‘person’ or ‘dignity’ but as something that needs to be spontaneously ‘invented’ (Derrida, 1994 [1991]. Zeillinger, 2002). Subjectivity is, at the same time, free and spontaneous, but this freedom is not a sovereign one. It is bound back to a commitment that has not been actively given. Reason (that means freedom and structures of legitimization), is called upon in a passive situation of demand and urgency. Maybe this could also be a perspective on trying to re-think the classical ‘state of nature’ in a different way: as an even more original ‘state of nature’ of consciousness, which is that of intrinsic openness and of being responsive (or responsible) to an appeal – thus a ‘state of nature’ that is not stressing a fundamental hostility, but a fundamental responsibility. Instead of speaking of human entities that mutually exclude themselves and hold their rights in reciprocal confinement (a situation which Lévinas calls ‘mauvaise paix’ (Lévinas, 1987: 166), a different state of nature could be envisioned, where the one is responsible and stepping in for the other. This will not be a theory that can, or wants to give, an ultimate backbone to the human rights theory. It is rather a theory that emphasizes the challenge of judgement and that tries to get to a notion of right that implicates a way of actively undertaking an appeal which is not at disposal.

3. Conclusion: Ethics of Human Rights as a Theory of Engagement

It seems that an ethics of human rights has to renounce the universal evidence of human rights claimed via the concepts of dignity or equality – it must however endure this lack in the form of a commitment that is combined with an engagement for an inter-subjective discourse of legitimization and justification.

I followed two guiding threads: the ‘transcendental’ one, that should make clear that all forms of ‘right’ are due to our a priori normative interpretation, which is not an arbitrary one but oriented versus ‘truth’ or ‘evidence’, which means complete legitimization. It is the obligation to being receptive as such, to being open to givenness as such, that brings this appeal into conceptual, i.e. legitimizing structures. This sort of legitimization category, as a structure of our experience and an answer to an appeal, should emphasize our very own human responsivity and responsibility in constituting human rights. At the same time it is meant to show a meaningful connection (or: a connection of meaning) between man and right in the sense that it is not just a factor in a power game, but actually an intrinsic element of our apperception.
of the world. Moreover, it constitutes the source of critique that lies in the dynamic of that notion. The necessity of justification and legitimization for a coherent and meaningful world (corresponding to the existential of ‘understanding’) implies a sort of ethics of discourse: recognizing all potential partners in discourse, listening to all potential arguments etc.

The second thread dealing with ‘alterity’ combines the first argument with the excessive demand of an ethical experience. In this view, justice is reminded of its ethical obligations beyond justice – human rights are not thought as mutual confinements of mathematically proportioned, mutually disinterested beings of free will, but as responsible adjudgements of involved subjectivities: as a duty for an I and as the right of the other\(^\text{12}\). Now, this right of the other, which should give the ultimate grounding and measure of every right, is exactly one that will always remain ‘haunted’ by the appeal of excessive immeasurable terms (and this always includes the danger to treat the other wrongly, especially in his otherness). However, an ethics of human rights must not be paralyzed by such a situation. It must undertake the responsibility of an urgent judgement that proves its engagement by its openness for a universality to come. Reason, the faculty of legitimization and judgement, is thus not a sovereign one in this case. For an ethics of discourse this means that the community of argumentation must become a commitment, too, because it guarantees the possibility of a critique and the ongoing process of legitimization (which would be a strategy to cope with historical and cultural relativism). This could open a horizon, where responding to the ethical appeal of the other becomes conceivable as an attitude of commitment which resists the totality of having everything at disposal.

Sketching these guidelines for an ethics of human rights has thus led me more towards a theory of an engagement than to an ethical ‘proof’.

References

\(^{12}\) This could also be a perspective for a theory that can encounter the factual engagement of certain groups or people for human rights. Interestingly enough, the established theories on human rights totally ignore the phenomenon of an engagement for the other’s rights and do not try to give it a theoretical basement for its understanding.


Abbreviated: Ideen I.


Abbreviated: EU.


Abbreviated: EJ.


Abbreviated: FTL.


Operationalizing Political and Economic Culture in Eastern Europe

By Shai Moses

Abstract

The completion of the first wave of Eastern enlargement determined the European Union (EU) to become more heterogeneous in terms of living standards. All ten new member states (NMS) are below the average EU’s GDP per capita. Furthermore, since this contemporary gap in wealth between the enlarged EU and the rest of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region is even greater, questions of regional security and stability are already present. This short paper aims to shed some light on this subject through a comparative examination of some aspects of political and economic cultural competences that affect the economic convergence of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU.

One of the problems in dealing with economic culture and its effects on wealth is that it is a broad definition, and that it is not quite obvious how we can operationalize it. In response, Moses suggests narrowing the discussion to a particular aspect of economic culture, by examining specifically libertarian and entrepreneurial values. Arguments presented here are that the libertarian values, that is philosophical mindset that emphasizes the responsibility of the self and the maximization of liberty for every individual, and in particular, the need for high economic and personal freedoms, do exist to various degrees in CEECs and have a significant impact on entrepreneurial values. The second argument is that these entrepreneurial values, as reflected in the support for competition, private business ownership and which put emphasis on innovation, do have a positive and significant contribution towards CEECs’ convergence.

Introduction

The completion of the first wave of Eastern enlargement determined the European Union (EU) to become more heterogeneous in terms of living standards, i.e., all ten new Member States (NMS) are below the average EU GDP per capita. This has strengthened the core-periphery patterns across the Union. Given that economic prosperity is associated with the support for further integration, the process of enlargement raises the uncertainty of whether the enlarged Union could advance
Towards one European demos. Furthermore, since the contemporary gap between the enlarged EU and the rest of Central and Eastern European (CEE) region is even greater in terms of living standards, questions of regional security and stability are already present.

This short paper aims to shed some light on this subject through a comparative examination of some aspects of political and economic culture competences that affect the economic convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU. The main questions to be addressed are: How do political and heritage values contribute to the process of CEECs’ economic convergence? What is the role of economic culture in this story? And more specifically, why do some new Members succeed to converge closer than others?

While the impact of economic conditions on CEECs’ integration is well analyzed (Brenton and Manzocchi 2002; Dohrn et al. 2001; Hilpert 2003; Hunya 2000; Johnson and Rollo 2001; Kaminski 1999; Moses 2004; and Patrakos et al. 2000), the impact of economic culture, defined as the values, attitudes, and beliefs in a society, as reflected in material and mental constructs concerning different issues of society-market relations and income and wealth distribution have not yet fully developed (exceptions could be seen in: Barnes and Simon 1998; Kovács 2002; and Roderick 1999).

One of the problems in dealing with economic culture and its effects on wealth is that it is a broad definition, and that it is not quite obvious how we can operationalize it. At this point, I suggest narrowing the discussion to a particular aspect of economic culture, by examining specifically libertarian and entrepreneurial values. I wish to argue that libertarian values, that is, the philosophical mindset that emphasizes self-responsibility and the maximization of liberty of every individual, and in particular, the need for high economic and high personal freedoms, do exist to various degrees in CEECs, and have a significant impact on entrepreneurial values. The second argument I wish to make is that these entrepreneurial values, as reflected in the support for competition and private business ownership, and which put emphasis on innovation, do have a positive and significant contribution towards CEECs’ convergence.

But let’s begin with a discussion on what the actual problem is. The enlarged EU consists of a set of countries with a wide diversity of GDP per capita. As can be seen in Table 1, GDP per capita in countries like Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Austria is more than 20 percent higher than that of the EU-25 average. At the same time, countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia have less than 50 percent GDP per capita than the EU-25 average. This variation increases the probability that the Union will be affected quite differently by asymmetric shocks.

Table 1: GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), 2004, (EU-25 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-25 Members</th>
<th>CEE non-Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>208.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>130.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>120.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>120.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>118.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>116.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>115.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>113.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>110.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>106.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations)

Comparing GDP per capita between the EU and CEE non-Member countries reveals an even (astonishingly) greater dissimilarity. Croatia is the only country that exhibits similar wealth to that of the lowest-ranking new Members. But then, income values begin to descend progressively, positioning candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria at around 30 percent of the EU-25 average, and ending the list with Moldova with only 7% of EU average! As mentioned earlier, this gap in terms of living standards between the enlarged EU and the rest of CEE region may affect regional stability and security. For example, it can lead to uncontrolled migration flows to the
EU countries, to increased human trafficking in Eastern Europe, or to some other cross-border criminal activities.\(^2\)

To begin addressing what accounts for this gap, based on the existing literature, I wish to outline some of the values that are common and that vary among the CEECs. The initial classification of the countries is based on the distinction between civilizations drawn by Huntington (1996). Huntington postulated a historical cultural borderline within Europe that divides the Western-Christian peoples from the Muslim and Orthodox peoples. His definition is closely related to religion: Protestant and Catholic vs. Orthodox and Muslim. Hence, it is important to examine what the religious composition in each CEE society is. The second criterion is the different empires under which the concerned people lived for centuries, namely the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires. The links between these empires and specific religions (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim) are obvious, but it can also be assumed that the respective system of government had an independent impact on fundamental values. Thus, I follow Fuchs and Klingemann’s examination (2002) and present each country’s profile regarding the identity of the Empire that ruled in the past, and whether and how long a country had experienced a Leninist regime. At the end of the section, I show the correlations between the investigated values and the countries’ economic performance.

**Broad Identification of the CEE Region**

The CEE region bridges between the states as diverse as the relatively developed Slovenia in the South-West (just about two million inhabitants) and the developing Ukraine in the East with a population of 50 million, and which emerged in 1991 (upon the collapse of the Soviet Union) with a diverse national identity, profound economic problems, and a poor government (Batt 2003: 3-22).

There are religious divides between the mainly Roman-Catholic Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, and the Orthodox Russians, Belarusian and Ukrainians (see table 2). Although the region has been marked by long periods of peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence, there were also chronic fragmentations and conflicts between states and peoples. The disintegration of the Yugoslav Republic in the beginning of the 1990s, for instance, has brought about what is arguably the most intense European inter-

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\(^2\) For more details, see: Widgren et al. 2005.
ethnic conflict since World War II, especially in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first step in the search for commonalities might be to distinguish between the cultural heritages left by the ruling Empires. Table 2 shows the division of the region by the different Empires. While the Habsburg Empire ruled in the Central European countries, the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe were under the influence of the Russian empire, which left Southern-Eastern Europe under the rule of the Ottomans.

Table 2: Cultural heritages in CEE region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Empire</th>
<th>Leninst regime (LE)</th>
<th>%Protestant</th>
<th>%Catholic</th>
<th>%PC</th>
<th>%Orthodox</th>
<th>%Muslim</th>
<th>%OM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central European countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Habsburg</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Habsburg</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Habsburg</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Habsburg</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Habsburg</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Prussia/Habsburg/Russian</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>Baltic countries</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td><strong>South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Ottoman</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Empire and Leninist regime values are taken from Fuchs and Klingemann (2002) - originally from Reisinger (1999); Religious composition are taken from the World Values Survey 1995-1999; 4 PC=Protestant and Catholic; OM=Orthodox and Muslim

3 Poland has disappeared from the European map between 1795-1918, divided by Prussia, the Habsburg and Russian Empires.
4 See: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
Another commonality is the fact that all the states under discussion have had several decades of communist rule, ending with the dramatic changes of 1989-91. The communist system was a distinctive mode of dictatorship that was characteristic not only by the single-party monopoly of political power, but also by the expropriation of private property and the direct subordination of the economy and society to its political control. Table 2 also shows that there were variations in the periods of time these countries were subject to a more restricted Leninist regime, ranging from as long as 74 years in Eastern European countries and the Baltic countries, to as short a term as 18 years in Slovenia and other ex-Yugoslavia countries. Still, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, all countries have set on the path towards a transition to democracy.

Communism was an experiment in enforcing conformity in this highly diverse region of Central and Eastern Europe. When it proved to be a failure, all countries were heavily challenged with similar obstacles, such as establishing a new multi-party system, enhancing parliament competences for legislation, dismantling the pervasive secret police network, and in particular for our concern, re-privatizing the economy and establishing a functioning market (Batt 2003). In addition, all countries in transition suffered a prolonged period of recession, in contrast to the predictions made by early neo-classical studies (cf. Kolodko 1993).

Although many ex-Yugoslavian countries were distracted from dealing directly with these issues as a result of a decade-long inter-ethnic war, Slovenia managed to escape unharmed, and now stands alongside Hungary and the Czech Republic in the group of states that have moved ahead in political and economic transformation. Speaking of the Czech Republic, national conflicts between the Czechs and Slovaks were the main reason for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, establishing the Czech Republic alongside Slovakia as two independent states in 1993. Further East, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are showing a steady improvement. This stands in contrast to Ukraine, which has only recently began to show (however ambiguous) signs of escaping the economic and political chaos it had suffered since its celebrated independence.

Table 3 presents some political values that are considered to be important for the modernization of a country in the literature. It is taken originally from the World Values Survey database, and it is presented on the basis of Fuchs and Klingemann’s discussion (2002) about the relation between national identities of CEE countries and the future democratic identity of the enlarged Union. Perhaps surprisingly, the support
for democracy (as reflected in the citizens’ responses) positively crosses throughout the entire region. Even Albania or Belarus, which are both considered in literature to be ‘rogue’ countries, show a positive support. The support for autocracy seems to fade from Central European countries (Poland being an exception), while still remaining relatively strong in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Russia and mostly in Albania.

Table 3: Political indicators for CEE countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support of political system of one’s own country</th>
<th>Confidence in governmental institutions</th>
<th>Illegitimacy of violence</th>
<th>Law abidingness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central European countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern European countries (mainly Orthodox)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern European countries (mixed-Muslim)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Values Survey 1995-1999; cell entries are percent positive support; - missing values

The support for one’s own country's political system seems the highest in Croatia and the lowest in Russia. Similar results are given for the values of confidence in governmental institutions. Regarding illegitimacy of violence (IOV) and law

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3 In a recent publication of Inglehart and Welzel (2005), they show how contrary to what conceived, Muslim populations’ countries project as well extremely high results of support for democracy.
The geographical region group dummy (coefficient estimation -.761) indicates that the further the region is from Brussels, the lower its country’s wealth. Empire heritage (-.850) points out that countries that have been under the Habsburg rule are wealthier than the countries that were under the Russian rule, and that the countries that were under the Russian rule are wealthier than the countries that were under the Ottoman rule. Still, while the empire heritage does seem to play a role in contemporary wealth of CEECs, the period of time in which these countries were under a more restricted...
Leninist regime does not correlate significantly. In turn, this implies that empire heritage may be a stronger indicator than the rule of the Soviet Union in determining path-dependencies economic developments.

Examining the composition of religious groups reveals that the bigger the Catholic/Protestant-Catholic groups in a country are, the higher the standard of living is, while for Orthodox/Orthodox-Muslim population, the bigger these groups are within the society, the lower the country’s wealth is. It is worth noting that the religious’ composition of ‘Protestant only’ does not show significant results, in what is a somewhat contradictory manner to Weber's protestant ethic argument.  

Surprisingly, the political values do not show at all significant results, with the exception of the support for autocracy regime. Support for democracy, support of one’s own country's political system, confidence in governmental institutions, or even illegitimacy of violence - all do not correlate significantly with standards of living. Although liberals have long argued that there is a necessary relationship between capitalism and democracy (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1994), we cannot consider these values as a direct contribution to augmenting wealth, at least not in CEE region during the 1990s. They might, however, play an indirect role (as will be examined later on) by affecting other, more direct values, which would contribute to wealth.

All in all, heritage values offer a fair picture of the varied development of CEECs. Yet, as these values are regarded as ‘constant’, i.e. as being a part of history and therefore unchangeable, the search for identifying just what sort of ‘variable’ values affect convergence remains highly important. This is due to the fact that since only values that can be modified at present time could be considered par public polices to improve the society prosperity. The political values did not give us the expected answers, and this means that new values must be examined.

The Main Argument: Libertarian and Entrepreneurial Values Do Matter

So far I presented a broad historical-cultural values outline that could have explained convergence. Nevertheless, it is now clear that those reasons, as strong as they might

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6 Weber argued that protestant ethic broke the hold of tradition while it encouraged men to apply themselves rationally to their work. Wealth was taken as a sign in Protestantism that they were of God’s elects, thereby providing encouragement for people to acquire wealth. The protestant ethic for that reason provided religious sanctions that fostered a spirit of rigorous discipline, encouraging men to apply themselves rationally to acquire wealth (see Weber 1902[1958]).

7 A country’s religious composition may change of course, but it could change significantly only in a very long term.
seem, do not in fact provide us with a deeper understanding of why one society greatly differs from another.

At the end of the day, convergence cannot be fully explained without considering individual behavior in households, enterprises, education and other social interaction occurrences. This paper suggests that a deeper social reason can be found by carrying out a comparative examination of libertarian and entrepreneurial values between CEE societies. The following arguments states that by exhibiting, for instance, how people regard the responsibility of the self, or how they regard the economic interaction with others, can help us better understand the variation in the economic performance within the region.

Libertarianism is a political philosophy that advocates the maximization of liberty for every individual. In its ideal type, this position entails that no individual may act to diminish the liberty of any other individual, and so, that every individual possesses an equal amount of liberty. This is usually taken to mean that each person should be permitted by all other persons to act as they please, so long as they do not initiate physical force (this includes persons acting on behalf of governments) (Haworth 1994: 38-58).

Libertarianism stresses high economic freedom and high personal freedom (see figure 1 - the Nolan chart). This approach postulates that the only legitimate use of force, whether public or private, is to protect these rights. For libertarians, there are no 'positive rights', such as governmental guaranty of food, shelter or health care; only 'negative rights', such as the right not to be assaulted, abused, robbed or censored (cf. Maddox and Lilie 1984).

Figure 1: The Nolan chart: positioning libertarianism on a two-dimensional axis
Libertarianism differs significantly from both conservatism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{8} Libertarians claim that conservatives approve of economic freedoms but reject personal freedoms, whereas liberals, inversely, approve of personal freedoms but reject economic freedoms. Libertarians claim all of these freedoms. As figure 1 illustrates, libertarianism is positioned as far as possible from the power-concentrated paradigms such as communism and fascism. The liberal model varies from the libertarian mainly by emphasizing the equality of opportunity between individuals in the economic and political markets as a criterion of justice (Rawls 1993). Equality of opportunity can be guaranteed only through governmental control, i.e., through legislated regulation and redistribution. Governments play a crucial role in the liberal community in shaping the life of an individual. On the other hand, the moral values of a libertarian community demand as small a government as possible and as comprehensive a market as possible. Both models differ from the socialist community, which strives for a wide ranging welfare state and a limited market. The liberal community thus occupies an intermediate position between a libertarian community and a socialist community (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002: 24).

Thus, libertarian values encompass the need for a more competitive market approach and the vitality of institutions’ efficiency. This approach puts an emphasis on the behavior of decentralized, non-governmental economic agents that know how to augment welfare. However, as these libertarian values reflect a more philosophical mindset, it should also be translated into more concrete form of behavior. This can be done by operationalizing libertarian values par entrepreneurial ones.

\textbf{Entrepreneurial Values}

The concept of entrepreneurship has a wide range of meanings. On the one extreme of definitions, an entrepreneur is a person of a very high aptitude who pioneers changes, possessing characteristics found in only a very small fraction of the population. On the other extreme, every person that wants to work for him or herself is considered to be an entrepreneur. The word 'entrepreneur' originates from the French word, ‘entreprendre’, which means, "to undertake". In a business context, it means to start a

\textsuperscript{8} As these terms are used in the United States’ discourse.
business. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary presents the definition of an entrepreneur as "one who organizes, manages, and assumes the risks of a business or enterprise."\(^9\)

An entrepreneur can also be regarded as an individual who takes on certain tasks based solely on his or her perception of market opportunities as well as the ways these might be exploited. This person is a risk taker, but also an innovator and arbitrager. Entrepreneurship is not planned by groups or corporate decisions, but by the exploitation of perceived opportunity by individuals, based solely on personal judgments and visions that others either don’t see or can’t bear the risks of acting upon (Wennekers and Thurik 1999). Hence, the entrepreneurial attitude is always emphasizing the ability of an individual (rather than of the system) to influence his or her own economic situation. This goes straight in line with the libertarian attitude discussed earlier.

Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter's definition of entrepreneurship (1968) placed an emphasis on innovation, such as new and innovative products, production methods, markets, and alternative forms of organization. Wealth is created when such innovations result in new demand. From this viewpoint, one can define the function of the entrepreneur as one of combining various input factors in an innovative manner to generate value to the customer, with the hope that this new value will exceed the cost of the input factors, thus generating superior returns that result in creation of wealth (Schumpeter 1968).

Schumpeter emerged from the Austrian tradition, and his ‘business cycle theory’ was influenced by previous work in that tradition. It was Austrian school founder Menger who first elaborated on that paradigm’s view of entrepreneurs. According to Menger, entrepreneurs acquire information, make economic calculations, and bear risks due to the uncertainty inherent in all human undertakings (cf. Kirzner 1973 and 2000).

Thus, it is entrepreneurs who coordinate economic activity, bring new processes to fruition and combine labor and capital in new or proven ways. This ultimately affects the economy’s overall and aggregated direction. Another important, however often overlooked, advantage to having decentralized entrepreneurs who control the economy’s overall direction lays in the fact that decentralized decisions minimize the harm that poor (governmental) choices can do to the entire economy.

Central planning has no such advantage. When national planners are wrong, the entire economy suffers. Thus, entrepreneurial attitude requires a circumstance of market competitive and decentralized environment. It connects strongly to libertarian values by emphasizing the competitive relations between individuals within a society.

Another relation between libertarian values and entrepreneurship can be extracted from the classical problem in political philosophy regarding the legitimacy of property. Libertarians often justify personal property on the basis of self-ownership. This means that the results of one's own work are the sole property of that same individual, who then can exchange them through trade, or give them as a gift or inheritance. This is exactly the requirement for entrepreneurship, since without acknowledging these rights, the incentives for an individual to bear risk and to act in a market are diminishing. Thus, \textit{Libertarian values as a philosophical mindset possessed by individuals enhance the ‘real’ entrepreneurial attitude of those individuals.}

After establishing the first connection between libertarian and entrepreneurial values, the second issue to resolve is: why is entrepreneurship so important to economic convergence? In the field of economic geography, new attention has recently been called to the study of the cultural impact on regional economic development. The literature on regional clusters progressively lays more emphasis on the role of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial culture in explaining the economic success of regions (Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven 2003; Georgellis and Wall 2000; Kangasharju 2000; and Wennekers and Thurik 1999).

Wennekers and Thurik (1999) inspected the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth extensively. Using a wide range of dimensions, such as macro theory, historical analysis, and industrial economics, they synthesized these insights to provide a broad picture of how economic growth is linked to entrepreneurship. In their view, entrepreneurship is a behavioral characteristic of individuals. As they put it: ‘…linking entrepreneurship to economic growth means linking the individual level to the aggregate level’ (Ibid., p. 46). They stressed that culture that is conducive to entrepreneurship may have higher start-up rates and more innovation. This, in turn, may influence economic growth.

Entrepreneurship is not only associated with the formation of new businesses, but also with action in the sense of starting something new and innovative. It could be
associated with developing new product-market combinations (cf. Formaini 2001). According to Penrose (1959), entrepreneurs are important for the growth of firms, as they provide the vision and imagination necessary to carry out opportunistic expansions. Entrepreneurial values thus may yield advantages in efficiency, which results in better economic performance on the aggregate level.

In sum, entrepreneurial culture influences convergence by pushing for an increased start-up rate of new firms and by yielding efficiency advantages within existing firms. Social structures may then influence the absorptive capacity and promote the degree to which countries are able to adopt and adapt to new technologies. The second argument then states: the more the society encompasses entrepreneurial values, the higher the country’s standard of living is.

These specific cultural values are regarded therefore as the explanatory reason for a better convergence towards the EU standard of living. The fruits of integration are only tasty when the society in question is conscious and aware of how to use integration for augmenting its welfare. This is exactly what entrepreneurs can contribute to the society. ‘Rule of law’ or simply establishing formal institutions are by themselves not enough. What is important is the transformation of the economic-cultural attitude in the society - the ‘cognitive evolution’ as Adler (2002) puts it. What remains now is the challenging task of operationalizing economic culture. In the next section I will use data from World Values Survey (WVS) to try to overcome this difficulty.

The Quantitative Inquiry
As this research is addressed to quantitative but also qualitative scholars, I will outline step-by-step just how I constructed the empirical examination. The first variable to be developed was the index of entrepreneurship. This was composed by the values of support for competition, support for private business ownership and openness to new ideas. In order to create it, I have built a new variable named ‘Entrepreneurship index’, which is the arithmetical average score of the three selected variables. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of those values. All values were taken from WVS. We can see that on average there is a high score for support for competition in CEE region that contributes to the entrepreneurship index, while the values of support for private ownership of businesses and openness for new ideas exhibit lower scores.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics: entrepreneurship index and its components for CEE region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship index</td>
<td>6.0522</td>
<td>1.78102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Competition</td>
<td>7.5323</td>
<td>2.50331</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Private ownership of businesses</td>
<td>5.6625</td>
<td>2.97829</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness for new ideas</td>
<td>4.8000</td>
<td>2.745</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once we have the new index, we can observe the impact of libertarian values on entrepreneurship. I used an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method in three different layers. The first model is composed only of standard socio-demographic control variables, namely age and gender. In the second model, I added the ‘country specification’ variable in order to capture the variance of each society, alongside with political and social capital values. The third model is composed of variables taken from all the previous models, with the supplement of libertarian values.

Table 6 shows the results of the investigation. The effects are quite evident. All libertarian values are statistically significant, meaning they contribute strongly and positively to entrepreneurial attitudes. R square has increased from .082 in the first model to .158 in the third model. Income equality is positively related to entrepreneurship (coefficient estimation .096), meaning the more it is assumed that income equality is only preferable and not obligatory, the higher the entrepreneurship index is. The variable that measures responsibility is positively significant (.113), meaning the more people take self-responsibility rather than looking to the government for solutions, the higher the entrepreneurship index is. Furthermore, the more the society believes that hard work leads to better life rather than in sheer luck (.087), the higher the entrepreneurship index is. Looking at libertarian personal freedoms’ performance, the more people accept sexual freedom (.051), the more they support flexible immigration policy (.063), and the more they regard people in need as lazy (.048), the higher the entrepreneurship index is.
Table 6: Coefficient estimates (Standardized) derived from OLS regression predicting *Entrepreneurship* in CEE Members (standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I (N = 14200)</th>
<th>Model II (N = 14200)</th>
<th>Model III (N = 14200)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.209**</td>
<td>-.198**</td>
<td>-.166**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.094**</td>
<td>-.093**</td>
<td>-.078**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and social capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>.140**</td>
<td>.173**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>.183**</td>
<td>.163**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in national government</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in people</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.016*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libertarian values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Equality</td>
<td>.096**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>.113**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Ethic</td>
<td>.087**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual freedom</td>
<td>.051**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration policy</td>
<td>.063**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why people in need</td>
<td>.048**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>6.279**</td>
<td>7.191**</td>
<td>7.275**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Test</td>
<td>316.887</td>
<td>264.709</td>
<td>205.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.082**</td>
<td>.115**</td>
<td>.158**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin-Watson</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIF (min-max)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.009-1.136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The coefficient is significant, \( \alpha < 0.05; ** the coefficient is significant, \( \alpha < 0.01.\)

Concerning the socio-demographic variables, age and gender (male as the reference mark) are significantly negative, meaning young people tend to hold a more entrepreneurial attitude than old people (-.166), while women tend to possess less entrepreneurial attitude than men (-.078).

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10 Big values (10 or more) for Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are regarded as trouble of collinearity. The finding reveals this model is clean from such an effect.
Concerning political and social capital values, it appears that support for democracy is contributing relatively high to entrepreneurship. Recall that we have not found a direct contribution of support for democracy to wealth. But here we can observe its indirect effect. Support for democracy enhances entrepreneurial behavior, which in turn may contribute to wealth. On the other hand, confidence in national government does not show significant results, meaning it does not affect (statistically speaking) entrepreneurial behavior. Trust in people, however statistically significant, exhibits relative little contribution to entrepreneurship.

**Hypothesis II**

In order to observe how entrepreneurship affects the convergence of CEECs to the EU, I pulled out the mean of the entrepreneurship index for each CEE country. Table 7 presents those results. At the top of the list we find Croatia and the Czech Republic, while Russia and Moldova are situated at the bottom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEE Members</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>7.0723</td>
<td>1.38729</td>
<td>1120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic*</td>
<td>7.0652</td>
<td>1.42208</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>1.71552</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.56582</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.6036</td>
<td>1.61160</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.1209</td>
<td>1.71493</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.0552</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.78102</strong></td>
<td><strong>19302</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Surveys were conducted during the years 1990-1993.
For the next step I used OLS regression curve estimation in order to observe the impact of entrepreneurship on CEECs’ standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita of 2004. I used 2004 GDP per capita, because it captures how the level of entrepreneurial attitude at an initial point in time (1995) has affected henceforth the development of CEECs’ economic convergence. Figure 2 shows the results. Entrepreneurship does contribute positively and significantly to convergence. As can be seen in the figure, a positive linear line can be observed, indicating that the higher the entrepreneurship index, the higher the standard of living. It discloses that, on average, an increase of one point in the new index contributes to an increase of 18.3 percent in GDP per capita.

Figure 2: Curve estimation derived from OLS regression predicting GDP per capita (2004 values) in CEE countries by entrepreneurship index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation</th>
<th>Coefficient estimate (B1)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>F-Test</th>
<th>R Square</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>18.374</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>5.424</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 thus reveals that in contrast to the political variables (which were not correlated significantly with wealth\(^\text{11}\)), the entrepreneurial index exhibits a positive and significant contribution to the standard of living. And so, although we cannot claim causality between entrepreneurship and wealth in the formal sense, the lack of

\(^{11}\) Again, with support for autocracy as the exception.
significant correlations of the other variables indicates that they do not fulfill even the first criterion of causality, granting the new index superiority.

Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper was to seek out a deeper explanation behind the relative success of some CEE countries to converge closer than others to the EU standard of living. I argued that such a deeper reason relates to the libertarian and entrepreneurial values that are constituted within a society. The more these values are acknowledged and implemented by the citizens, the more their country converges closer.

While historical heritage values in Central and Eastern Europe, such as geographical distance, empire heritage and the composition of religious groups, do show significant correlations with the current standard of living, the political-cultural values do not show such significant results at all, with the exception of the support for autocratic regime.

Yet, the new arguments proved to be significant. By using a comparative research to illustrate cross economic-cultural variation between the national arenas, libertarian values were found to exist to various degrees in the CEE societies, as well as to have a significant impact on entrepreneurial values. The philosophical mindset that emphasizes the responsibility of the self and the maximization of liberty for every individual proved to be directly connected to entrepreneurial values. These entrepreneurial values, as reflected in the support for competition and private business ownership, and which put emphasis on innovation, have been found to have a positive and significant contribution to CEECs’ convergence.

References


Enlightened Absolutism, Imperial Bureaucracy and Provincial Society: Austrian Project to Transform Galicia, 1772-1815

By Iryna Vushko

Abstract
The paper analyzes the bureaucratic modernization of Galicia, the formerly Polish territory annexed to the Habsburg empire in 1772. The attempted transformation of Galicia was part of a larger reform project of the second half of the eighteenth century, uniting an Enlightened spirit of centralization with the reality of Austria’s territorial enlargement. The Austrian bureaucrats were responsible for the integration of a new province into imperial structures. By focusing on the Austrian state bureaucracy and its interaction with local population – Poles, Jews, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) - I intend to analyze the general transformation of Galician political culture through the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

“My family is truly Austrian, in a sense that ... it does not belong to any nationality, but...like other families of imperial bureaucrats and military personnel is a mix of different Austrian nationalities... My father, Johann Nepomuk von Sacher, born in Bohemia, early became a state bureaucrat, knew Czech as well as German; he, like many other imperial bureaucrats of his time, after the first partition of Poland, when Austria acquired Galicia, came to the province to work on the organization of the new regime here.” (Hofrath von Sacher-Masoch 1882: 104)

Introduction
The piece cited above was published in 1882 in Leipzig in the collection/periodical, edited by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. Signed by Hofrath (the easiest translation is just “counselor”) von Sacher-Masoch and published by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, it seems to be written by Leopold’s father, who himself occupied an important post in Galician administration and together with his family resided in Lemberg, the capital of Galicia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yet the memoirs are composed in a very special way. Instead of sharing his own experience, Hofrath von Sacher Masoch recounted the experience of his father, Johan Nepomuk von Sacher.

Johan Nepomuk von Sacher, a grandfather of the famous (or notorious) Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, came to Galicia in 1772, right after the annexation of the province by the Austrian empire, and served as a Hofrath in the city of Lemberg.
Johan Nepomuk and his descendants traced the origin of their family to Don Mathias Sacher, a member of the Spanish lower nobility (Ritter) during the time of Kaiser Karl V in the early sixteenth century (Hofrath von Sacher –Masoch 1882: 104). Don Mathias married a Bohemian woman and the family resided in Bohemia. Johan Nepomuk von Sacher, almost two centuries later, retained his Spanish family name but also had a specifically Bohemian first name – Johann Nepomuk. More important, by the eighteenth century the Sachers had “…German, Italian, Czech, and Hungarian blood in their family”, and thus, formed, in Sacher-Masoch’s words, a typical example of the family of a supra-national Austrian bureaucrat (Hofrath von Sacher – Masoch 1882: 104).

Johan Nepomuk, along with others, was chosen for service in Galicia because of his knowledge of the Czech language. Like many others, he considered the appointment a rather unlucky development in his career. Galicia and its capital, Lemberg, did not enjoy great reputation among Austrian officials. The saying that “In Pohlen ist nichts zu holen” [there is nothing to get out of Poland] reflected common attitudes to the new Austrian province (Hofrath Sacher –Masoch 1882: 104). Unquestionably loyal to the Habsburg dynasty, Johan Nepomuk was unhappy with Polish nobles in Galicia in particular. Uneducated and rude in their behavior, Polish nobles, in his view, were primarily responsible for the decline and disintegration of the old Polish Republic (Hofrath von Sacher –Masoch 1882: 115). Happy or unhappy with his new appointment, the older Sacher was to reside in Galicia for the rest of his life.

Johan Nepomuk’s son, Leopold’s father, followed the family tradition and held an important administrative position as a city counselor in Lemberg. He also served as a head of the city’s police (Leopold von Sacher-Masoch 1985: 18). Born in Galicia, the second Sacher married to Lotte von Masoch. The origin of her family is unclear. Leopold, who does not say much about his mother comments more on his aunt, the mother’s sister. Aunt Zenobia, in Leopold’s words, “die femme terrible of the family”, was “the prettiest girl in Galicia”, and a true Pole, “.. with all the charms and flaws of her race, full of spirit and temperament” (Leopold von Sacher-Masoch 1985: 23). While fighting with Polish conspiracies, Leopold’s father, however, already seemed to integrate into high Polish noble society much in contrast to Johan Nepomuk von Sacher, Leopold’s grandfather, who two or three decades earlier ridiculed local Poles and kept the distance from them, to say the least.
Leopold himself, born in Lemberg in 1836 and a third generation member of a family of Austrian bureaucrats in Galicia, exemplified even stronger family and societal transformations. German, French, and Polish were equally spoken at home. Yet it was Ruthenian (contemporary Ukrainian), which Leopold identified as his first language (Leopold von Sacher-Masoch 1985: 23).

In 1846, Hofrath von Sacher-Masoch got a promotion to Bohemia, where he was to occupy a position of the city counselor in Prague. The family moved to Prague, and 1846 marked the end of the 70 year Galician story of the Sachers, becoming the Sacher-Masoch family. Leopold von Sacher Masoch is perhaps the representative of the most famous and also a quite typical family of Austrian bureaucrats in Galicia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The records we have – the memoirs of Leopold’s father, and Leopold’s own autobiography – are very valuable historical sources, which allow us to trace societal transformations in the region based on the example of three generations of the family of Austrian bureaucrats. The Galicia of Jan Nepomuk von Sacher in 1772 and the Galicia of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch in 1846 were two different regions.

This paper traces the transformation of Galicia through the early period of Austrian rule, 1772-1815. The region which in the eighteenth century underwent Austrian centralization and Germanization reforms and Metternich’s reactionary policies in the early nineteenth century expressed strong national affiliations, which became especially obvious in the 1830s, and in 1848 and its aftermath. My paper analyzes these transformations using the example of Austrian bureaucrats, who were most responsible for the implementation of Austrian reforms, and, in my view, best exemplify societal transformations in Galicia—both successes and failures of Austrian policies, as well as the reaction of local society, Galician Poles, Jews, and Ruthenians.

The Annexation of Galicia
Galicia was annexed to the Habsburg monarchy in 1772, after the first partition of Poland. With its boundaries, Galicia was about to become the largest province of the empire. The region was unofficially divided into Western and Eastern Galicia. Poles predominated in the Western part. Ruthenians formed a large part in Eastern Galicia, with its center in Lemberg (Łódź). Galicia had a large Jewish minority; the region, in some calculations, had the densest Jewish population of the entire empire (Andlauer
Galicia was also famous for its numerous and strong Polish nobility. Both in the east and in the west, Poles and Jews formed the majority of the city’s residents; Ruthenians were predominantly peasants, and resided mainly in the east.

After the annexation, the Austrians were looking for an example of a successful administrative apparatus, which could serve as a model for the organization of Galicia. After some deliberation, it was decided that Galicia should not be modeled after any old province, but should receive a new, and thus, better state and administrative apparatus than any of those currently under reform in the empire. Austrian centralization reforms in Hungary and Bohemia encountered strong opposition from local societies. Galicia was a new province and the reform strategy was to be totally different here. The goal was to dismantle everything left over from the Polish republic, and in its place create a new, and supposedly, perfect, administrative state apparatus.

The idea of establishing a new and unprecedented administrative apparatus in the province was voiced for the first time by Johan Pergen, a few months before the first governor dispatched for Galicia. In his memorandum to the empress, Pergen emphasized his intentions to create a new rather than reform the old government and administration in the region. (Pergen’s Pro Nota, 30 August 1772. VA. Hofkanzlei, II A 6: 229). The plan was approved by the empress, and Maria Theresa was very explicit about her intentions. The flaws of old constructions should not impact the building of a new one (Maria Theresa to Kaunitz, 2 September 1773. HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Vorträge: 113). Moreover, the intention was to turn Galicia into a model-province (Musterprovinz) for other Habsburg territories. This rhetoric reflected the spirit of the age: the Enlightenment, the power of reason, and the vitality of reforms. It was the Austrian state bureaucracy— supra-national, rational, loyal to the monarchy, educated, and endowed with the Habsburg reformist spirit— which had to carry out the changes.

How these rather optimistic and positive attitudes of the Habsburg reformers turned out in practice is a subject of my further discussion. Only one reminder here: in the first half of the nineteenth century, Galicia indeed transformed in a significant way, and the Sacher-Masoch family is one illustration of this. Yet this transformation was not the one which the Austrians eighteenth century reformers envisioned.
Austrian Bureaucracy at Work in Galicia

The annexation of Galicia coincided in time with the emergence and development of the Austrian state bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was to serve the needs of a centralized state. In the late eighteenth century, Macartney argues, the bureaucracy emerged as a distinct class. Before, most work was done by local nobles, who often advocated their estate rights or local interests. Joseph’s bureaucracy was “… a centralized civil service”, promoting the interests of the state (Macartney 1969: 124).

Top administrative positions in Galicia, the governors especially, were selected from experienced Austrian personnel, who occupied important positions in Austrian administration before coming to Galicia. Count Anton Pergen, the first governor during 1772-1774, count Auesperg, and count Brigido, who governed the province during 1774-1790s, all exemplify this trend. Waclaw Tokarz, a Polish historian of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is obviously biased to Austrian reformers in Galicia. Yet he does acknowledge Austrian efforts in organizing the top bureaucracy in Galicia, and admits that this part of administration was indeed not as bad as it could be, and that many top Austrian officials in Galicia were reasonable and intelligent people (Tokarz 1909: 62). It was the lower bureaucracy, both in the Gubernium and in Galician districts, which caused the main concern for the Viennese Court, and the major dissatisfaction of local Galicians.

Who these bureaucrats had to be, how to select them, and what to do with the mainly Polish officials occupying the posts in old administration proved to be another difficult dilemma, which had to be resolved by the Habsburg right after the annexation. Austrian state chancellor Kaunitz was directly responsible for new appointments and the organization of the bureaucratic apparatus in Galicia.

Kaunitz and Maria Theresa agreed that the key administrative posts should be filled with new-coming Austrian officials, foreigners to the region. The Poles could be employed only at minor posts and occupy subaltern levels of Galician administration (Vortrag des fürsten Kaunitz, 2 Septmeber 1772. HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Vorträge: 113). The first governor, Pergen, in contrast to Kaunitz, favored a milder position on Galicia. Without the authorization of the Court, he appointed quite a large number of Poles. Maria Theresa agreed that some Poles could hold minor positions, yet they should be given smaller salaries than the officials from the Habsburg hereditary lands (Kaunitz on Maria Theresa, 11 November 1772. HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Vorträge: 110).
In September 1773, Kaunitz finally provided Pergen with a list of preferable personnel, altogether about 50 persons. Kaunitz, in his report from September 2, 1773, explained, first, his intentions as to the organization of the bureaucratic corpus in Galicia, and also complications with the selection of candidates. The largest province of the empire required a great number of bureaucrats, and, as Kaunitz emphasized, this was not an easy task to achieve. Determined not to hire Poles, Kaunitz and other top Austrian officials were still looking for people who either knew the region or had potential to get to know the province within a relatively short time. Language, thus, came to play a key role. Kaunitz was very explicit about his intentions, stating that he preferred the candidates who knew Polish; the knowledge of at least one related language – in most of the case this was Czech – was absolutely mandatory (Kaunitz to Joseph II, 2 September 1773. HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Vorträge: 113). Yet these people were difficult to find and, when available, sometimes did not have other qualifications necessary for officials occupying relatively high positions (only top posts were administrated by Kaunitz). Kaunitz himself admitted that he was not able to achieve a perfect selection, yet strove to pick the most suitable out of the candidates (Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, 2 December 1772. HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Vorträge: 110).

Such a strict Austrian position on non-employment of Poles for key administrative posts, however, started to change as early as 1772. Galician looming financial collapse was the main problem. Even simple transportation of the masses of people from the Austrian hereditary territories required large financial investments, not to mention that the province’s reconstruction was already proving to be more financially burdensome than originally envisioned. The combination of Austrian central investments and local contributions did not suffice to cover even preliminary reconstruction. The employment of German-speaking Austrian personnel in Galicia was financially burdensome and not always beneficial for either the province itself or for the central Austrian government.

In November 1772, in his report to Maria Theresa, Kaunitz insisted on retaining, at least temporarily, the old Polish judicial system in Galicia. Moreover, Kaunitz advised that the members of top Polish noble families – Zamoyski or Jablonowski -- be appointed to the key positions in the judicial system. (Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, 18 November 1772. HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Vorträge: 110). The never-ending row of these exceptions eventually turned into the reversal of the Austrian policies in Galicia in the late 18th century.
The language, after the judicial system, was another important Austrian concession to the Poles, already in an early stage. The decree of the Galician Gubernium from 1783 allowed the use of Latin simultaneously with German in administration (VA. Hofkanzlei III A 4: 322). Latin was proposed as an intermediate language, a compromise between German and Polish. All official decrees had to be translated either into Polish or Latin. This, however, did not solve the problem. Latin was more familiar to Poles than German, yet very few of them knew the language well enough to efficiently use it for practical administrative purposes. Many German-speakers were also not sufficiently proficient. Some administrative branches had a position of a translator in their staff. Nevertheless, it appeared that Galician administration remained handicapped through the late eighteenth century at least. Language was one but not the only problem.

**Lower Bureaucracy**

Already in the early 1780s some Austrian inspectors were dispatched to Galicia to check on the functioning of its administration and filed the reports on why the situation there had not improved since the annexation (Systematische Verbesserung der Galizischen Landsregierung: HHStA. Staatskanzlei, Pohlen III: 13). The Austrian administration, both in Vienna and Lemberg, were also overloaded with Polish complaints. The picture, as presented by many dissatisfied Poles and Austrians inspectors, is one of the multiple failures of the Austrian administration and bureaucracy starting from the lowest level up to the very top of the Galician Gubernium. Many Austrian officials employed in local administration in Galicia, due to their educational level and previous employments, were not capable of fulfilling their basic functions, not to mention the maintenance of order, proper processing of acts, and sustained communication with other branches of Galician administration.

Waclaw Tokarz analyzes Margelik’s inspection mission in Galicia, 1783 to 1784. Tokarz identifies several groups of Austrian officials. The first was formed by ardent Germanizers who strictly followed Austrian orders and disregarded local circumstances. Another group was formed mainly by young people for whom Galicia was a kind of internship, necessary for their further promotion (Tokarz 1909: 68). Most of them only pursued their own interests and, considering their Galician job as a temporary, however necessary, step in their own careers, did not care about the development of the region and Austrian interests there.
Tokarz describes some provincial governments in Galicia as disastrous in terms of personnel. Tokarz’s implications that Galician districts administrated by Poles fared much better than those administrated by Austrian German-speakers is biased, yet perhaps contains a grain a truth. While Austrian bureaucrats were underpaid throughout the empire, the situation was especially severe in Galicia (Tokarz 1909: 56). The assumption in Vienna was that the costs and standards of living in a new and a relatively backward province were lower than in the empire in general. This assumption was false; it took a while, however, until the Austrians adjusted the salaries to the average imperial standards. In 1787, the governor count Brigido finally admitted that low salaries were one of the causes of the poor quality of Galician administrative personal (Brigido, Die Mangel und die dagegen einzuleitende Abhilfe. VA. Hofkanzlei, III A 5: 402 A). People were not willing to take up strongly underpaid administrative positions.

Corruption, along with administrative malfunctioning, also resulted from the poor quality of the personnel and underpayment. The problem was acknowledged by Austrians from the very beginning of their work in Galicia. Tokarz indicates that in 1790 the Gubernium considered 44 complaints of Polish nobles on the malfunctioning of Austrian officials in the region (Tokarz 1985: 44). Anonymous denunciations became very common.

Austrian officials, not very trustful of Polish nobles, who in most of the cases filed the complaints and denunciations, at some point started to pay closer attention to what once was considered ungrounded and biased complains of local population on the misgivings of the foreign administration. Some slow changes in the organization of Austrian administration began already in the 1770s. In 1783, the commission investigating the complains and denunciations in Galicia proposed to replace German-speaking foreign officials in Galicia with local Polish nobles. The most radical proposition was to dismiss all currently employed foreigners and in their place hire relatively rich Polish nobles who would not depend on Austrian salaries and, thus, would not resort to bribes or support corruption (Extractus Protocoli Der Kaiser. Koenigl. Oberste Justiz Stelle von 24 December 782. VA. Hofkanzlei III A 4: 321).

A special commission on Galician matters was established in Vienna in the early 1790s. The aim of the commission was to check on the functioning of Galician administration. Investigation of complaints and denunciations was part of the commission’s work (VA. Hofkanzlei III A 3: 309a). The very foundation of the
commission seemed to be the result of this never-ending flow of complains, in a situation when the Viennese government already did not fully trust the Gubernium administration in Lemberg, and was looking into what indeed was happening in Galicia.

The mid 1780s witnessed several very important changes in Austrian policies. The governor Brigido more and more favored the Poles, “the nationalists”, as they were termed in contemporary documents, over the foreigners. In 1785, again on the insistence of Brigido, Galician Gubernium recommended to the Viennese court to equalize the salaries of the Austrian bureaucrats in Galicia with those in Bohemia (24 April 1785, VA. Hofkanzlei III A 4: 322).

In 1787, the united Austrian and Bohemian Hofkanzlei issued one of the most important decrees concerning Galicia of the last decade. It was decided not to hire foreigners into any important administrative posts in Galicia unless these foreigners were especially experienced and reliable people (VA. Hofkanzlei, III B 1: 423). This was 180 degree turn from the 1770s and Kaunitz’s policies of not admitting any Poles into important administrative posts.

Afterwards: Polish Nobles and Austrian Bureaucrats

To hire Poles, “the nationalists” as they were termed in Austrian acts, meant to hire the Polish nobles, who were the only social group suitable to do administrative work. From the very beginning, the Austrians were eager to attract some major Polish families. The Poles occupied the key positions in the judicial system, and were not only allowed, but also encouraged to do so. The Poles retained many administrative posts, which they occupied before the partitions. Already in the 1780s, the Austrians abandoned their initial determination of not hiring Poles and reversed it. They needed the Polish nobles to fill up the positions previously occupied by unsuitable foreigners.

The Austrians, however, did not always receive a welcome response from the Poles. While not openly opposing the Austrian government, many of them retreated into some kind of inner-circle life. Living in the country-side, many of them could compete with the Polish king in wealth and prosperity. Social and financial resources allowed many to lead a quite independent and prosperous life, interacting with the Austrian administration as little as possible.

Some used French as a way to distance themselves from German bureaucrats, who used German and did not understand Polish. Many families also favored home
education for their children, where they typically used French or Italian teachers and did not have to attend German-language schools (Grodziski 1982: 153). Most of them were more than unhappy about the partitions, cherished hopes for the restoration of the Polish state, wrote multiple letters to the court, explaining the situation in the province, complained about forceful Germanization, and almost always listed recommendations on how to improve the situation in the region. Yet it also seems that many Polish magnates lived as if very little, if anything, changed after the partitions.

The still existing Polish republic outside the border, with its capital in Warsaw, was the main focus of attention, hopes and aspirations. Warsaw was a usual place of visit, and until 1795 only relatively few Polish magnates directed their attention to Vienna. Few, if any, Poles made careers during this earlier period of Austrian rule (Grodziski 1982: 153).

The situation changed dramatically after the disintegration of Poland in 1795. The Austrians became stricter on the mixed subjects, who had properties in different parts of partitioned Poland, pressing them to choose their permanent residence. The main concern was that the Poles, moving between different parts of divided Poland, caused money to flow out of the province.

With the final disintegration of the Polish republic in 1795, Warsaw, now part of the Prussian empire, was becoming less and less attractive. The Polish Republic was naturally preferred over the Austrian empire. With the Russian empire across the border, the situation became more complicated. Some Poles preferred Austria over Russia or Prussia as less oppressive.

In the mid and late 1790s, the Austrians made strong efforts, eventually successful, to engage Polish nobles in the Viennese government (Mencel 1985: 51). Vienna was becoming a more typical place of visit and a commonplace residence for Polish nobles. A number of grand Polish nobles received direct access to the Viennese court, not only promoting Polish interests there, but also to a great degree shaping Austrian policy on the Polish question (Mencel 1985: 51-52).

While the Austrians made additional efforts to attract the Poles, the Polish attitudes also warmed significantly, not so much because they developed specific affections for the Austrians, but rather because the international and domestic conjuncture left them little choice. Stanislaw Grodziski identifies these more cooperative Poles as the
second generation of the Polish intelligentsia under Austrian rule. In the years between 1791 and 1810, more and more Polish nobles became involved in Austrian public services. More and more attended the universities in Lemberg/Lwow, Krakow and Vienna. Many permanently resided in Vienna (Grodziski 1982: 158).

The third generation of Polish intelligentsia already formed an important and dominant group of “Austrian” officials in the region. Yet while the Poles were becoming the Austrian bureaucrats, the Austrian bureaucrats also integrated into Polish noble society. The descendants of the Austrian bureaucrats from the late eighteenth century in the early nineteenth century spoke predominantly Polish. Once German-speaking supra-national Austrians, in the second and third generation some of them turned into Polish speaking Galician patriots.

Negative attitudes of Polish nobles to the new-coming German officials, some contemporaries claimed, determined to a great degree the outcomes of Germanization policy and eventual results of the Austrian reforms in Galicia. Hofrath von Sacher and Hofrath von Sacher Masoch were nobles in many generations and occupied important positions in Galician administration. This, however, was not the case with many other lower officials. The social and economic status of many Polish nobles in Galicia was much higher than that of some Austrian officials, even provided that many of them were nobles and many had a law degree from one of the Austrian universities (Heindl 1990: 96-102). Austrian bureaucrats were eager to integrate into the higher noble society, notwithstanding that this society was predominantly Polish and sometimes French-speaking. In the second generation, many of them already identified themselves as Poles, and in third some already did not speak German.

The 1830s witnessed even more dramatic transformations. The 1831 uprising and its suppression in Russian Poland shaped new developments in Galicia. Many Polish nobles emigrated from Russia to Austria. The Austrian government took a rather strict position of not letting Polish migrants settle in Galicia. As so often before, this position was not strict enough; besides, the Austrians realized the potential threat of this mass influx of Polish nobles relatively late, after many of them already settled in Galicia.

Some of the richest Polish families emigrated to Galicia, and the 1830s also witnessed the influx of financial resources and the revival of Polish life in the province. Count Leon Sapieha, one of the most prominent Polish Russian émigrés, played an especially important role in the Polish revival in Galicia. The first Polish
bank in the province was founded in the region on his money in the 1830s (Sapieha 1863). Several Polish associations and a credit association followed suit.

In the 1830s, and more so in 1848, Galicia was already Polish - yet in a different sense than before the partitions. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as one memoirist indicated, the Poles were Poles, because they could not be anything else. Local patriotism was not complemented with any kind of national feelings (Kaczkowski 1899: 25). French, and not Polish, was the main language of communication among the Polish nobles. The Austrian period marked the transition from “traditional” to “modern” Polishness. A combination of different factors shaped these developments. The enlightened reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, I would argue, formed the basis for these transformations, even though the results were the opposite of what was anticipated. In the mid nineteenth century, Galicia, like many other Habsburg provinces, was more “national” than before the launch of the Austrian centralization reforms.

**Abbreviations:**

VA – Verwaltungsarchiv, Vienna (Administrative Archive)
HHStA – Haus-, Hof- and Staatsarchiv, Vienna (Family-, Court and State Archive)

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The Nationalist Right under Communism: Bolesław Piasecki and the Polish Communists, 1944-1979

By Mikołaj Kunicki

Abstract
Based on a doctoral research project, this article introduces to the readers Bolesław Piasecki (1915-1979), a prominent Polish nationalist politician. A fascist in the 1930s and a pro-communist Catholic activist in postwar Poland, Piasecki was the leading advocate of the reconciliation of nationalism with communism. By narrowing the scale of historical observation to an individual case, the article discusses the role of nationalism in twentieth-century Polish political culture, analyzes the entanglement of communism and fascism, and presents an example of the ideological affinity between communism and nationalism. It explores Piasecki’s postwar career against the background of the nationalization of the Polish communist party culminating in the 1967-1968 anti-Semitic campaign. It argues that under certain conditions, not only did the communists utilize nationalism, but – as Piasecki’s case proves – they also prolonged the existence of the nationalist right. In broader terms, Piasecki’s story points to the fact that the adoption of nationalism by Eastern European communist leaders accelerated the ideological de-legitimization and erosion of the system in the region.

“Most of my friends in present-day Poland, both communist and non-communist, consider Piasecki a simple and straightforward rogue who is used by cynical men to do their dirty work for them. They believe that he betrayed everything for which he was supposed to stand in his past, and that he is a mere agent of forces which never show themselves in the light of day (Blit 1965, 14).”

Lucjan Blit

Introduction
The British journalist Lucjan Blit’s observation, which opens my essay, illustrates the popular opinion about the politics of Bolesław Piasecki (1915-1979), a prominent Polish nationalist politician, who started his career as a fascist and ended it as a pro-Communist Catholic activist. This widely held belief identified him as a political chameleon – the arch-villain of Polish politics and a turncoat who used Machiavellian tactics to get to the top. Later, for anti-communist dissidents in the 1970s, Piasecki was a fascist turned Soviet agent, a perverse phenomenon (Michnik 1993, 40). I find
these allegations unconvincing – in fact, I did not find any evidence suggesting Piasecki’s recruitment by the Soviets. More importantly, I believe that these explanations grossly trivialize the nature of Piasecki’s cooperation with the communists, by ignoring motives on both sides as well as his ideological consistency. Piasecki was not a chameleon. Indeed, he was the man of the right and his Catholic PAX Association constituted the nationalist right under communism.

In this paper I introduce to the readers one of the most fascinating figures in the history of the twentieth-century Poland and the communist world, a broker between the brown and the red currents of totalitarianism, and the spiritual father of those Polish communists and non-communists alike who called for a system communist in its form and nationalist in its content. I will examine Piasecki’s relationship with the communist regime as an example of the ideological affinity between nationalism and communism. I will assess it through the prism of Piasecki’s ideology and actions against the background of the ideological metamorphosis of the Polish Communist Party. I argue that his postwar career should not be read as a radical departure from his fascist beginnings, but as their logical outgrowth. In broader terms, I propose that under certain conditions, not only did the communists utilize nationalism, but – as Piasecki’s case proves – they also prolonged the existence of the nationalist radical right. In an attempt to legitimize their rule, they gradually employed the nationalist canon. One of the outcomes of this process was the “Polonization” or “nationalization” of the communist party, which culminated in the 1967-1968 anti-Semitic campaign, in which Piasecki played a significant role.

This essay is based on my doctoral dissertation, for which I used formerly classified materials from Polish archives – including the files of the former security police, communist party and government files, and PAX collections – political pamphlets, memoirs, press sources, and oral interviews. Western scholarship on Piasecki is thin and poorly researched. In Poland, he always provoked vicious exchanges between his supporters and followers. There are but few historical studies and all these works suffer from a lack of access to archival materials. In addition, their authors demonstrated a lack of emotional distance to their subject (Dudek and Pytel 1990; Micewski 1978; Rudnicki 1985). Very little has been written about nationalist-communist affinities in Poland.¹ The reasons are several: first, the Poles’ self-ascribed

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anti-communism was shared by many Polish historians; secondly, western scholars focused on those countries where – like in Hungary and Romania – the fascist right formed mass movements; finally, there has been an on-going shift from a political to social, cultural, and intellectual history among the young generation of American scholars working on Poland and Eastern Europe. There are two outstanding books examining the entanglement of nationalism and communism and Romania – Katherine Verdery’s *National Ideology under Communism* and Vladimir Tismaneanu’s *Stalinism for All Seasons*. However, a similar study on Poland is still to be written. Although my research project is not a history of nationalism under Polish communism, it attempts to respond to this demand.

**An Overview of Piasecki’s Politics Prior to 1945**

Before World War II, as a leader of a small fascist movement, the National-Radical Movement, Piasecki envisioned Poland as a proto-totalitarian state, integrated on the basis of ethnicity, Catholicism, and mass organization. The cornerstones of his doctrine were the notions that God was the highest destiny of man and that striving to increase the might of the nation was the path to God (Piasecki 1935, 36). This formula made religious salvation practically contingent on participation in the nationalist community. Like his Hungarian and Romanian fascist counterparts, Piasecki regarded the expulsion of Jews as a necessary precondition for the modernization of the country (Piasecki 1937; Ruch Narodowo-Radykalny, 1937). Yet Left and Right are elusive concepts in modern Poland and Eastern Europe, and Piasecki’s program is a perfect illustration of this point. His prewar ideology included ideological ingredients of the right, such as xenophobia, an exaltation of the ethnically homogenous community, religious fundamentalism, and a paramilitary movement led by a charismatic leader, on the other hand, he shared anti-capitalism with the extreme left – here overlapping with the rejection of the West – a glorification of a centralized state, a cultivation of collective identities, and historical determinism. More importantly, both Piasecki and the communists viewed their mission as constructing a new society.

Piasecki’s vehement radicalism along with his totalitarian designs for a one-party state differentiated him from the Polish nationalist mainstream National Democrats, who dubbed Piasecki a national communist (“Komentarz,” 1937). For the

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1 A significant exception here is Marcin Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm* (Warsaw, 2001).
center and the left, Piasecki’s organization, with its uniformed storm troopers, the tactic of street violence, and savage anti-Semitism, represented an indigenous Nazism (AAN, Komisariat Rządu Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, 297/I-1, “Akcja zbiorowa przeciwko kolporterom Falangi przez bojówki socjalistyczne w dniu 2.VIII. 1936.”). His relationship with the sanacja authoritarian regime was more complex. Although Piasecki deplored Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s camp for being a friend of Freemasonry and Jews (Piasecki 1932), in 1937, he entered a short-lived alliance with the very same regime he had opposed so far. The pact did not survive due to the opposition of some government officials to the flirting with the notorious nationalist radicals. Nevertheless, the whole venture demonstrated Piasecki’s ability to make a bargain with a stronger opponent in the hope of dominating him in the future – a pattern he followed throughout his political career.

During the war, Piasecki joined the Polish resistance movement and gained the control of a right-wing combat group, the Confederation of the Nation, which in 1943, merged with the Home Army. Following the merger, Piasecki served as the commander of a partisan detachment operating in the eastern Poland, where Polish underground units battled with the Germans and the Soviets. Arrested by the communist authorities in November 1944, Piasecki faced execution charges for fighting the red partisans and participating in the underground after the liberation (IPN, Teczka osobowa Bolesław Piaseckiego, IPN 0259/6, “Postanowienie o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności karnej,” Warsaw, May 19, 1945). However, he was released after less than a year and soon founded a pro-communist movement of progressive Catholics, later known as PAX (Latin word for “Peace”).

**Under the Cross and the Red Flag: Piasecki’s Alliance with the Communists, 1945-1967**

There was a certain logic in the seemingly paradoxical decision of the communists to exonerate and support the man whose credentials consisted of extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Communism. While it is true that Piasecki gambled everything on the powers of persuasion to convince his captors of his value, the communists were clearly prepared to experiment with nationalism and its right-wing
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t. As they faced a predominantly hostile country with a strong right and a powerful Roman Catholic Church, they needed allies from outside their ranks – people who, while not Marxists, would support their cause. Therefore Piasecki’s value lay precisely in the fact that he was not a communist. Although the communists excluded the possibility of legalizing the National Democrats, they knew that the right still commanded considerable support in Polish society. In this respect, the activation of Piasecki’s group could channel nationalist-Catholic clientele into the government’s camp. In addition, they decided to test Piasecki’s usefulness on the Catholic front.

For Piasecki, postwar Poland had much to offer. The old classes had vanished from the scene. There were almost no Jews left. Poland had become an ethnically homogeneous and predominantly Catholic country. Had not that been Piasecki’s goal? Most importantly, for Piasecki the pact with the communists provided an opportunity to be at the center of power. He knew that the Soviets were there to stay. But he also believed in the gradual erosion of communism and the eventual bankruptcy of its ideology. Piasecki estimated that the Soviet Union would fall after 50 years. He was not so badly off! “We must elaborate a broad strategy” – he confessed to a friend – “which will undermine the Soviet ideology (Reiff 1993, 215-216).” Thus he allied himself with the communists in the hope of dominating them in the future. Asked by one of his collaborators, for what he hoped in this gamble, Piasecki replied, “I am counting on Providence and their (the communists’) errors (Zabłocki 1989, 10).”

While still jail, in 1945 memoranda addressed to Władysław Gomułka, Secretary General of the communist party, Piasecki pointed to social radicalism and revolutionary goals as the ideological features that he had always shared with the communists. He offered to mobilize the young generation – the former right radicals, for cooperation in the establishment of “truly democratic and free Poland (IPN, Teczka osobowa Bolesława Piaseckiego, IPN 0259/6, “Osobiste oświadczenie Bolesława Piaseckiego,” May 22, 1945).” After his release, Piasecki pledged to work toward the creation of the common Catholic-Marxist front (Archiwum Katolickiego Stowarzyszenia Civitas Christiana, I/91, Piasecki’s letter to Gomułka, August 18, 1946).

Following his arrest, Piasecki was moved to the headquarters of General Ivan Serov, the chief of the NKVD units operating in Poland (IPN 0259/6, “Protokół dochodzenia,” November 15, 1944. Serov asked Piasecki to elaborate on the following issues: the political situation in Poland in 1944, the arsenal of methods that should be used to increase the influence of the communist government, and Piasecki’s ideas about his cooperation with the communists (IPN 0259/6, “Osobiste oświadczenia Bolesława Piaseckiego,” May 22, 1945). In the spring of 1945, Piasecki was handed over to civilian authorities.
By pointing out to the common ideological ground between the communists and prewar fascists, Piasecki hit the nail on the head. Indeed, both movements adhered to socio-economic radicalism and contempt for traditional ruling classes, and they viewed their destiny as constructing a new man. They disdained the West as well as home-grown democrats. Finally, as a staunch ideologist fully committed to the realization of proto-totalitarian utopia, Piasecki recognized the communists as kindred spirits. He was not the only fascist who reinstated himself in Eastern European postwar politics. In Hungary, the communists permitted thousands of fascist “small-fry” to join the party. In Romania, the new regime adopted the “don’t tell, don’t ask policy” toward former low ranking members of the Iron Guard. But these men were small “Nazis,” whereas Piasecki had been a fascist leader. Moreover, while these former fascists joined the communist parties, Piasecki was allowed to create his own organization.

On the surface, PAX was a lay Catholic association. In reality, it aspired to become a fully-fledged political party, a junior coalition partner. As Piasecki exclaimed on one occasion, Pax had to become “a real movement, the party’s ally of authentic strength, not an ornamental institution (AAN, Biuro Prasy KC PZPR, 237/XIX-171, “Załącznik Nr.5. Z wypowiedzi Bolesława Piaseckiego,” February 27, 1960).” In 1977, two years before Piasecki’s death, PAX claimed 15,000 disciplined members (IPN, DSA 1656, “Informacja dot. aktualnej sytuacji w środowiskach katolików świeckich,” Warsaw, August 30, 1977). The association ran the Catholic publishing house and the “INCO” commercial company, one of the biggest private enterprises behind the Iron Curtain. It published five newspapers and periodicals. Five of its most prominent activists sat in the Polish parliament. Starting in 1971, Piasecki also served as a member of the Council of the State. He turned his organization into a safe haven for rightists and anti-communists admitting veteran nationalists and former non-communist resisters. Until Piasecki’s death, PAX remained under the command of the old national radical guard. With war veteran meetings, an economic empire, and occasional outbursts of chauvinism, when allowed, Piasecki successfully preserved the spirit of the radical right.

In his cooperation with the communist regime, Piasecki vowed to take the position of an ally from the outside. To quote his long-time associate Ryszard Reiff, Piasecki intended to modify or perhaps even to civilize the communist system by enriching its spiritual non-materialistic elements (Reiff, interview, June 18, 2001). In
his postwar doctrine, developed under the name of pluralism of worldviews (wieloświatopoglądowość), he proposed the creation of a dual political system embodied by a communist-Catholic ruling coalition. Piasecki expected the communists to moderate their approach toward the Catholics in order to strengthen their appeal to the largely Catholic Polish society. On the other hand, Catholics had to relinquish their resistance or indifference toward socialism if they wanted to participate in sharing power, of course, under the leadership of PAX. This modus vivendi would ideologically reinforce both sides. According to Piasecki, communism and Catholicism as Promethean doctrines worked for the transformation and the good of humanity. However, Piasecki’s concept of the common Marxist-Catholic front did not eliminate nationalism because he always regarded Catholicism as the cornerstone of national identity. The ultimate logical step for Piasecki would be the conversion of the communists into “patriots,” socialist nationalists. Under the ideological guidance of PAX, Catholics, communists, and nationalists would be united in the service of God, socialism, and nation (AAN, Urząd do spraw Wyznań, 129/10, “Referat wygłoszony przez Przewodniczącego Stowarzyszenia Pax na zebraniu Zarządu w dniu 3 maja 1968;” Piasecki 1954).

The advent of Stalinism forced Piasecki to put a curb on nationalist rhetoric and focus his activities on the Catholic front. He vowed to act as a mediator between the bishops and the communists. Admittedly, he had some successes in bringing the government and the Polish Episcopate to the negotiating table. Although Piasecki favored a subservient church, he did not want to see it destroyed because with the elimination of the clergy from the political scene, his own position would dwindle. In addition, although loyal to the communists, Piasecki was also a devout Catholic. However, he did not have the power to moderate the regime’s assault on the church that culminated in the arrest of the Polish Primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, in 1953. Furthermore, Piasecki’s pluralism of worldviews was condemned by the Holy See, which placed his publications on the Vatican index of forbidden books in 1955 (“Dekretum” 1955). After the end of Stalinism in Poland, the Catholic hierarchy regained its powerful position in society, dashing Piasecki’s hopes for being an arbiter between the weak church and the strong state. Wyszyński, who held a grudge against

3 Due to his negotiating skills, Piasecki was one of the architects of the 1950 Accord, the first agreement ever signed between a Roman Catholic Church and a communist regime (AKS CC, Piasecki’s letter to Primate Stefan Wyszyński, January 13, 1950; Wyszyński’s letter to Piasecki, January 21, 1950).
Piasecki since the time of his arrest, viewed the leader of PAX as a communist stooge. De-Stalinization also ended Piasecki’s monopoly on the political representation of lay Catholics. Not only did the regime make concessions to the church, but it also provided outlets for the Catholic intelligentsia – the Catholic groups of ZNAK and Więź. Consequently, by the late 1950s Piasecki’s role on the Catholic front was practically over.

During the political upheaval in 1956 which terminated Stalinism in Poland and brought Gomułka – previously purged from the party and jailed – back to power, Piasecki opposed democratization, which he believed could lead to the Soviet military intervention or a coup d’etat staged by hardliners (Piasecki 1956). But contrary to the widely spread opinion, he did not oppose Gomułka’s return. Showing considerable insight, he believed that Gomułka would stabilize the political situation and discipline society (IPN 0648/53, t.2, “Doniesienie agenturalne,” October 17, 1956). While party reformers and other liberals sought to democratize socialism in Poland in accordance with Marxist doctrine, Piasecki argued that “in future Poland, Marxism would be replaced by national-radical socialism, based on the historical traditions of the Polish nation (IPN 0648/53, t.2, “Doniesienie agenturalne,” May 3, 1956).” As for who represented this political option, that was a rhetorical question. For Piasecki it was his own PAX movement.

Here I would like to emphasize the similarity between Piasecki and Gomułka: while the former attempted to reconcile his nationalism with socialism, the latter tried to reinforce communism with nationalism. Hence their political cooperation should come as no surprise. Known for his opposition for the dogmatic thinking of many prewar communists, Gomułka was a pragmatist hoping to consolidate communist power on the basis of a “coalition” rather than on repression and ideological unanimity (Iazhborovskaia 1997). He might have scorned Piasecki’s idea of enriching Marxism by Catholicism, but otherwise he sympathized with his other observations, namely the opposition to the omnipotence of Soviet advisors as well as the

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4 During his visit to Vatican in 1966, Wyszyński described Piasecki as a “thief secretly opening the doors [of the church] to the communists” (Hoover Institution Archives [HIA], Peter Raina Collection, Box 3, Folder 1, “Notałka,” November 3, 1966).

5 Although supportive of Catholic-Marxist dialogue, members of ZNAK (Sign) and Więź (Bound) groups were not tainted by Stalinism. They adopted less compromising stance than Piasecki on the issue of church-state relations and during the subsequent pitched battles between the church and the regime tended to side with the former.
We also know that at the time of Gomułka’s downfall in 1948, Piasecki sympathized with the party leader (IPN 0648/155, “Relacja agenta,” December 11, 1949). As a result, despite the calls for the liquidation of PAX coming from the liberal intelligentsia and party reformers in 1956, Gomułka refused to sacrifice Piasecki. In exchange, Piasecki remained Gomułka’s staunch ally for a number of years. Shortly after the 1956 crisis he advised the First Secretary to crack down on the pro-reform movement, which in his view favored the social democratic model and intended to break away from the Soviet bloc. Gomułka could count on PAX, which would join him in the struggle for the victory of socialism in Poland (AKS CC, Piasecki’s memorandum to Gomułka, September 30, 1957).

Piasecki named this coalition “the patriotic-socialist formation.” It was to combine communism with a nationalist ethos, and it would not shy away from disciplining society should such demand occur. Piasecki had no doubts that Gomułka would adhere to nationalism: “As the ideological vitality of socialism declines we will witness the growth of nationalist tendencies [within the party].” At the same time, he regarded ideology as the Gomułka group’s Achilles heel: “Instinctively they feel that socialism and patriotism are one and the same, but they have difficulties in formulating this thesis.” But he claimed to know the remedy: PAX had both intellectual resources and enough political vision to provide the party leadership with a new ideological synthesis (AAN, Biuro Prasy KC PZPR, 237/XIX-171, “Wyjątki z materiałów pomocniczych na zebraniu PAX w marcu 1960,” March 1960).

The political system envisioned by Piasecki was an authoritarian national communist state loyal to the Soviets. At the heart of this program was the notion of the specifically Polish ideological experiment paving the way to Piasecki’s own access to power. Piasecki’s opposition to Marxist revisionism followed naturally from his doctrine of the pluralism of worldviews, which defined Catholicism and Marxism as the two pillars of national identity. As a result, an assault on Catholicism – and admittedly revisionists displayed a strong anti-church bias – constituted the attack on Polishness. In private, Piasecki equated party liberals with the “Jewish comrades (IPN

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6 When Stanisław Staszewski, a party liberal, tried to convince Gomułka that the dissolution of PAX would win the church to the side of the regime, the first secretary snapped at him, “I know that, you would like to leave me alone with Wyszyński, but I am not going to do that: I am not going to make the rope to hang myself with (Torańska 1987, 183).

However, in the early 1960s, Piasecki’s plans to pursue a nationalist-communist alternative were clearly premature. During the congress of PAX in December 1960, he continuously persisted on the transformation of PAX into a political party and the implementation of his program. But Gomułka would have none of this. When he met Piasecki in January 1961, he snapped: “These are absurd demands. PAX intends to reform Marxism...but only Marxists can enrich Marxism and in this they do not need anybody’s help.” He went on mocking Piasecki. “PAX cares about the party’s mistakes. The party will take care of its errors without...the help of revisionists because what you are doing is revisionism.” When Piasecki tried to defend his views, Gomułka cut him off, “The problem with you is not your worldview but your aspirations to build a Catholic party and we would have to fight against such a party (AAN, Urząd do spraw Wyznań, 129/11, “Rozmowa Tow. Gomułki z przedstawicielami PAX-u,” January 27, 1961).”

For Piasecki, it was a humiliating spectacle. Yet he was far from capitulating. He knew that the First Secretary’s rule would not last forever; nor was the Polish party a monolith. By the mid 1960s, Gomułka’s regime grew more authoritarian, nationalist, and anti-Semitic. The roots of anti-Semitism among Polish party leaders lay in the history of the Polish communist movement. Gomułka and his closest associates represented the second generation of the Polish communists. Unlike their predecessors they were largely plebeian and ethnically Polish. They made their way to the party elite during the war, which they spent in occupied Poland. Accused of “nationalist errors,” they were purged in 1948. There is no doubt that Gomułka

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7 The Jewish share in the membership of the prewar party was about 22 to 26 percent. However, the majority of the party leaders were of Jewish origin (de Weydenthal 1978, 25-27).
blamed the “Jewish comrades” for his past misery. By the time of his return to power in 1956, some of the men whom the First Secretary considered his tormentors, became revisionists. As the party struggled to present itself as truly “Polish” the purge of the Jews was only a question of time.

General Mieczysław Moczar’s party faction of “Partisans” represented an even more aggressive brand of communist nationalism. The Partisans were high-ranking security and military officials who during the war had served in the communist resistance movement, and afterwards had languished in second-rate government posts. By the 1960s, they were joined by power-hungry middle-age apparatchiks whose careers stagnated under the Gomułka regime. The Partisans’ ideological platform consisted of fanatical nationalism, anti-Semitism, military ethos, and the opposition to liberalism of all kinds. They contrasted themselves, the “home communists,” with the “Muscovites” and “Jews” who had entered the country with the Soviets (Lesiakowski 1998, 222-223). The Partisans’ position dramatically improved after Moczar’s promotion to the post of Minister of Interior in 1964.

Piasecki had been aware of Moczar’s growing prominence since the late 1950s. Soon he came to believe that the Partisans had been at the forefront of the struggle against the revisionists, and he very much hoped for their success. Yet, he also knew that the key figure to the resolution of the internal divisions within the party was Gomułka. Here Piasecki showed a considerable foresight believing that the First Secretaty would ultimately side with Moczar’s Partisans (IPN 0648/46, t.3, “Doniesienie,” September 12, 1962). He also detected that the struggle against revisionists could evolve into an offensive against the Jewish communists. When his long-time friend and associate, Alfred Łaszowski, warned him that numerous people interpreted his opposition to party liberals as anti-Semitism, Piasecki did not show any sign of discomfort. “When people say ‘revisionists’ they mean ‘Jews,’” Łaszowski indicated. “But the whole Politburo speaks this way,” Piasecki replied. There is little doubt that some of Łaszowski’s arguments might please him too. Consider the following opinion: “You know that there is a group in the party, which is fed up with the Jews, a group that tries to recruit you saying: ‘You will crystalize

8 In 1948, Gomułka complained to Stalin about the large presence of Jews in the party and their hostility toward him. Anastas Mikoyan reminded Gomułka of this episode in October 1956 (HIA, ANEKS Collection, Box 7, Gomułka’s notes from the meeting with Khruschev, October 19, 1956).
Although Piasecki supported Moczar, he never formed a close bond with the General. The plebeian roots and appeal of the Partisans stood in contrast to Piasecki’s elitist background and grand political aspirations. All in all, the affinity of goals and the identity of enemies, but not the alliance of minds, made the two men potential allies. Given his ideological pretensions, Piasecki stood closer to Gomułka’s chief ideologues, such as Zenon Kliszko and Andrzej Werblan, who by 1965-1966 ended a taboo against the use of nationalism in the Polish Marxist discourse (“Dyskusja na książką Adama Schaffa 1965). The message was not lost to Piasecki. In 1966, he vehemently criticized in public the overrepresentation of Jews in the upper level of political elite, described the liberals’ warnings against anti-Semitism as exaggerated, and observed that nationalism and socialism were not in conflict. Furthermore, he insisted that the critique of Jewish over-presence in the party was a patriotic duty of all citizens (AAN, 237/XIX-353, Bolesław Piasecki, “Nietkóre zagadnienia socjalistyczno-patriotycznego ruchu w Polsce,” transcript of Piasecki’s speech, October 28, 1966). In February 1967, Piasecki labeled the Jews and liberal intellectuals as the opposition, which succumbed to Zionism and the support for the Federal Republic of Germany. By being pro-Israeli and pro-German, they were quintessentially anti-Polish. He also called for the ideological campaign for the union of patriotism and socialism; the modification of the party system – a clear reference to PAX’s greater involvement; ideological tolerance other worldviews (another point promoting Piasecki’s organization); and the separation of the government from the party. Piasecki described his program as “the critical continuation of the system (IPN, MSW II 31145, Bolesław Piasecki, “O twórczą kontynuację Polski Ludowej,” February 1967).”

Critical perhaps, but hardly a continuation, Piasecki’s alternative constituted a communist-nationalist hybrid, authoritarian, and ideologically neutral but within the narrow choice between Marxism and nationalistic Catholicism. By advocating social discipline, strong rule, and anti-Semitic purges, Piasecki was setting up the rhetorical

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standards for the future witch-hunt. Within months, his message would suddenly acquire a new relevance to the political situation in Poland.

**The Anti-Zionist Campaign, 1967-1968**

The Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria began on June 5, 1967. By June 11, the Israeli forces won a stunning victory. The conflict in the Middle East had serious repercussions for the Soviet bloc as the Arab armies had been trained and equipped by the Soviets. On June 10, the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Israel. Poland followed suit on June 12.

In Warsaw, the public sympathized with the Israelis because the Arabs were supported by Moscow. “The prevailing mood in our society is satisfaction that ‘Our’ Jews were beating ‘Russian’ Arabs,” one observer commented (Rakowski 1999, 63).

In his address to the congress of trade unions, furious Gomułka denounced “the Zionist circles among Polish citizens,” and compared them to “the Nazi fifth column.” He also articulated the following warning: “Let those people to whom I address my words...draw appropriate conclusions. It is our stance that each Polish citizen should only have one fatherland – People’s Poland (Stola 2000, 274).”

Gomułka’s speech divided the Polish public: while the liberal intelligentsia reacted with disbelief, numerous party and security officials as well as ordinary anti-Semites were in a state of euphoria. Behind the doors of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Moczar’s henchmen prepared the list of some 400 journalists, intellectuals, state officials, and managers suspected of pro-Israeli sympathies. The security police also began collecting files on the people of Jewish origin employed in the state and party institutions, academia, and mass media. Although Gomułka did not believe in the existence of the Zionist conspiracy, he authorized these actions. To see the anti-Zionist campaign only as the result of Moscow’s anti-Israeli line is too trivial. In all probability, the Polish leader decided to get rid off the people who had stabbed him in the back in 1948. He also might vow to win legitimacy for his party by cutting off Polish communism from its association with the Jewish comrades.10 Equally important was Gomulka’s distrust for the liberal intelligentsia. In the end, his mind

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10 In June 1967, one of Gomulka’s close associates told his colleagues: “After the twenty three years of people’s power it is time to solve this delicate problem...At last the party will cleanse itself of an undesirable element (Zarembe 2001, 367). Gomułka’s ideological watchdog, Werblan argued that the Jewish-dominated prewar Communist Party of Poland had ignored the nationalist aspirations of the Poles. Thus the Jewish communists were anti-Polish (Andrzej Werblan, “Przyczyny do genezy konfliktu,” *Miesięcznik Literacki* 6 (June 1968), pp.61-71).
might generate a coherent image of the enemy, the hydra with three heads – a revisionist intellectual, more often than not, of Jewish origin.

The on-going purge of Jews from the party and army, a state of ferment among intellectuals and students, an aggressive mood in the party and security apparatus, and the impact of democratic reforms in Czechoslovakia – all these factors produced a situation in which a little spark could set off major political crisis. As it often happens in history, the final eruption was caused by a seemingly marginal event. In November 1967, the National Theater in Warsaw staged a production of *The Forefathers* by the great 19th-century Polish romantic, Adam Mickiewicz. The play contained anti-Russian undertones that provoked enthusiastic reactions among the audience. The regime decided to ban the production. After the last performance, on January 30, 1968, some 300 students marched to Mickiewicz’s monument where they were assaulted by police units. The organizers of the demonstration were students and young faculty members from Warsaw University. Strongly influenced by revisionist intellectuals, they were leftist and hostile to nationalism. Some were the children of prominent communist officials of Jewish origin. Their protests gained the support of the writers’ union, whose Warsaw chapter called for the democratization of cultural policy and the termination of anti-Jewish purges (Friszke 1994). Following the expulsion of two student leaders, Adam Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer, from the university, their followers organized a demonstration on March 8, 1968. The students came under the brutal attack of police and party thugs. A number of people were beaten and arrested. Although demonstrations spread to other academic centers across Poland, the regime broke the student protests in late March.

Yet police brutality was only one face of March 1968. The fact that many demonstrators were the children of Jewish communists enabled the government to portray the protests as the evidence of a Zionist plot. But the party had to be free from the odium of anti-Semitism. To make anti-Semitic attacks more credible and spontaneous, the regime decided to use old non-communist nationalists. Piasecki was the best candidate for this task. His anti-Semitism was well-known. He also enthusiastically supported the purges. Within hours of the outbreak of March demonstrations, Piasecki learned the names of leading protesters. He called the chief editor of his daily newspaper, ordered him to write an article about the

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demonstrations, and instructed him on the text’s content (Jan Engelgard’s letter to the author, December 14, 2003). The unsigned article “To the Students of Warsaw University” presented the student protests as the outcome of an Israeli-West German plot to overthrow socialism in Poland. The Polish agents of Tel Aviv and Bonn were former Jewish Stalinists, who, having adopted Zionism, had tried to derail the party’s “patriotic-socialist” course. Through the use of their children they had infiltrated and incited intellectuals and youth against people’s power. The article also listed student leaders’ names followed by their family connections: daughters and sons of party and government dignitaries, all of them Jewish (“Do studentów Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego,” 1968).

The text provided a blueprint for the escalation of the anti-Semitic campaign. Combining the old fascist constructs with the rhetoric of communist propaganda, it discredited Jewish communists and isolated the opposition from society by presenting it as Jews and Israeli-German agents. The classic opposition of “them” versus “us,” the Jews versus the Poles, provided the regime with national legitimization. Attacks in the mass media were followed by rallies, further purges, and the exodus of Jews from Poland. Between 1967 and 1971 some 13,000 Polish Jews left the country (Stola 2000, 213). Although Gomułka did not manage the crisis, he ruled through the crisis, pursuing his goals. Having eliminated Jewish communists and other party reformers, he marginalized Moczar whose position in the apparatus had become too powerful. By the end of the summer of 1968, the First Secretary halted the anti-Semitic campaign.

The article in _Słowo Powszechne_ was not Piasecki’s only contribution to the state-sponsored pogrom. At his speeches given in parliament and PAX meetings in April and May, Piasecki even accused the government of tolerating the Zionist subversion for years. He pushed for more. In Piasecki’s words, what was also needed was the thorough modification of Poland’s political system. He proclaimed that the purge of the ruling elite should lead to the advancement of PAX, competent, disciplined, and unconditionally devoted to the alliance of patriotism and socialism. His organization had to be transformed into a political party and invited to the government. Equally striking was Piasecki’s patronizing tone toward Gomulka whom he hailed for successes on some fronts but criticized for mistakes on others (Piasecki 1971; AAN, Ud/sW, 129/10, Piasecki’s speech at the PAX meeting, May 3, 1968).
Indeed, Piasecki counted on major changes within the party leadership. Knowing that Moczar’s star was fading, he saw Edward Gierek, the party boss of Silesia, as a new key player, perhaps’s even Gomułka’s successor. But if he expected the replacement of Gomulka, he lost his bet. Although the Party congress of 1968 showed the influx of new faces to Politburo, Gomulka was still number one for another two years. The end result of Piasecki’s involvement in the anti-Semitic campaign was not too impressive: politically he gained nothing, morally he only lost. However, there was small consolation to him. Poland was a Jew-free and ethnically homogeneous country. “This is an achievement which our society sees and fully accepts,” he said in November 1969 (Piasecki 1971, 425).

Conclusions
As Leszek Kołakowski has observed, “in 1968, communism ceased to be an intellectual problem (Kołakowski 1981, 467).” The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that buried the Prague Spring coupled with the anti-Zionist campaign in Poland discredited Eastern European communism in two ways. Firstly, the system was incapable of reforming itself from within. Secondly, having withdrawn themselves from the struggle for the realization of millenarian utopia, the regimes embraced aggressive nationalism and reduced their ambitions to retaining their monopoly on power. As the Italian socialist Ignazio Silone remarked on one occasion, “the first thing the communists nationalize is socialism (Kemp 1999, XI).” It was a dangerous game since they had to find a middle ground between their adherence to Moscow and obligations to nationalism at home. Only two Eastern European communist leaders, Tito and Enver Hoxha, could afford to bypass this dilemma. In the Soviet bloc, it was Nicolae Ceausescu, who came closest to the implementation of national communism, or as Vladimir Tismaneanu proposes, “national Stalinism,” independent of Moscow (Tismaneanu 2003, 32-35). Elsewhere, all attempts to win popular support by using nationalism led to severe political crises: the revolution in Hungary in 1956, ideological bankruptcy and the birth of Solidarity in Poland, or Todor Zhivkov’s loss of face in Bulgaria following his campaign against the Turkish minority in the 1980s.

Ironically, by participating in the March pogrom, the nationalist Piasecki contributed to the ideological decay of communism. Yet the fusion of nationalism and communism did take place on his terms. Indeed, his ideas largely anticipated Gomulka’s shift to nationalism and harmonized well enough with the nationalist and
authoritarian rhetoric of the Partizans. Yet once the communists gave up ideological pretensions, Piasecki the ideologue, who could only thrive in the fire of political mobilization, was losing the reason of his own existence. Having welcomed the downfall of Gomułka in 1970 and his replacement by Edward Gierek, he soon discovered to his dismay that the new party leader sacrificed ideology to economic prosperity. In Gierek’s mindset, consumerism alone would guarantee social compliance and political legitimation. As a result, Piasecki’s doctrinaire obsessions turned him into a political fossil, while his PAX movement lost any political relevance. But the ideological demobilization of communism was not the only development that sealed Piasecki’s failure. Equally important was the birth of the democratic opposition and the rapprochement between the Catholic Church and the non-communist left (which formed the backbone of the dissident movement in the 1970s). Piasecki had launched his postwar career on the simple but brilliant premise that the church would never make peace with the left. This paradigm proved correct for almost thirty years, but in the 1970s it collapsed. Piasecki died a broken man in 1979.

Both Piasecki and veteran communists were ideology-driven revolutionaries who belonged to the prewar era, a battleground of ideologies. Their red-brown kinship, which fully manifested itself in 1968, backfired. At the end of the day, they were overtaken by the advocates of civil society.

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Constructing communities: From National to Transnational and Activist Politics of Memory in Europe

By Emilia Palonen

Abstract

Within the European Union at least since the failed referenda on the EU constitution, there has been a strong realization that nationalism has been strengthened in the European countries, even in Western Europe, which has been seen as the civilized counterpart of the nationalistic Eastern Europe. In my paper I look at the construction of political communities through processes of memory and the politics of memory. I seek to highlight that there are politics of memory on different levels of political community building, not only the national or the European federal level. This invites us to think forward the way in which the overlapping and competing levels of political memory – and not only the interaction between different groups or nations – have an impact on the memory processes and the articulation of key signifiers such as the nationhood or Europe. In the final instance, it should enable us to see how the multiplicity of levels is an ever-present issue, even if certain groupings and actors would want us to focus our collective imaginary, or the imagining of the collective, on only one level of political community.

In this paper, I will offer a brief look at the politics of memory at the European federal and national level, on the national and metropolitan level, on the metropolitan municipal and local district level, as well as lead my analysis towards the politics of memory in the activist – often anti-(state) institutional – level. The last move would highlight the existence of memory building in the activist communities, which shows the importance of memory for political communities, and the function as a creator of continuity and even institutional base. It also highlights the multi-level character of these memory projects and community, which are, crucially to their political character, not without conflict.

Introduction

Within the European Union, at least since the failed referenda on the EU constitution, there has been a strong realization that nationalism has been strengthened in the European countries, even in Western Europe, which has been seen as the civilized counterpart of the ‘nationalistic’ Eastern Europe. One of the problems in the existing literature and prevalent conceptions on politics of memory – a flourishing field since the research initiated by seminal work of Pierre Nora – is that the community is

1 This research was initiated during a Körber Junior Fellowship History and Memory in Europe and, while drawing from the author’s earlier research, it initiates a larger postdoctoral project on politics of memory in community building. The author wishes to thank the IWM, Vienna, the Körber Foundation, Hamburg, and, recently, the Collegium Budapest for their support.
imagined to be singular, and the conflict is perceived as occurring on the single level, such as the nation, or between two levels, such as the European federal and national ones. Looking at the construction of political communities through processes of memory and the politics of memory, I seek to highlight that conflicts and politics of memory occurs on different levels of political community building. This encourages reflection on the overlapping and competing levels of political memory – not only the interaction between different groups – and their impact on the memory processes and the articulation of key signifiers such as the nationhood or Europe. Finally, it should enable us to see how the multiplicity of levels is an ever-present issue, even if certain groupings and actors would want us to focus our collective imaginary, or the imagining of the collective, on only one level of political community.

In this piece, I will consider the competition over politics of memory at the European federal and national level, the national and metropolitan level, the metropolitan municipal and local district level, as well as lead my analysis towards the politics of memory in the activist – often anti-(state) institutional – level. The last move would highlight the existence of memory building in the activist communities, which shows the importance of memory for political communities, and its function as a creator of continuity and even institutional base. It also highlights the multi-level character of these memory projects and community, which is, crucially, not without conflict.

**Memory and Discourse**

Memory processes, such as commemoration, constantly articulate the ‘us’ and ‘them’, (temporally) fix values, and ultimately (re)produce the community. Following Ernesto Laclau (1990), political communities as totalities are impossible, yet there are constant attempts to articulate the ‘impossible community’ as a totality. Borders and fixed through nodal points, the moves towards its sedimentation are totalizing (hegemonizing), but also constantly in flux rearticulated, which offers the democratic ethos to the community: it is ultimately not fixed and contested. In a Carl Schmittian as well as Laclauian vain, I argue that politics is about the construction of us and them. Political frontiers are also at stake in politics of memory.

My aim here is to show that there are overlapping projects of memory in Europe, which compete over this ‘total identification’. As political communities exist through their difference to other such communities, moving to a multi-level analysis,
it becomes clear that there is not only contestation between the different groups on one level but also between different levels. Furthermore, same nodal points – such as symbolic homelands, heroes or key events – are contested between levels. The cross-level contestation also marks the nodal points, such as the perceptions of the past and uses of it, in the debates within one level, because the elements now carry traces of the articulation process on the other levels. Similarly as the events would carry different meanings when tied to the discourse of particular parties, also in the contestation between levels nodal points may contain different meanings.

**Nation and Europe**

In contemporary (Western) Europe, while national institutions continue to produce ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995), the more pronounced nation-centered projects are usually carried out by political parties and groupings (see e.g. Du bist Deutschland, http://www.du-bist-deutschland.de). The state institutions themselves, as these, as members of the union, also often produce identifications with Europe, or join the two levels in commemorations. For instance in Hungary, the year 2000, which marked the establishment of the Hungarian ‘statehood’ was also celebrating the joining of Hungary in the European cultural sphere, as the Hungarian kings chose the Western Catholic Christianity as their religion.

The European Union for its part tries to create its own history, in the same way as it has been creating its own symbols. At it webpage it presents a chronological history of key events (http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm). As the memory project of the European Social Forum (ESF) process shows (see below), the EU memory building has a practical aim: an archive. The Historical Archives of the European Communities opened in 1986 after three years of planning. But besides acting as a depository, it also tries to create a legacy of conduct, and even a canon of heroes. The archives of the European Union, located in Florence, contain documentation even of key personalities – a canon of great men – of the history of unification. In their declaration on the 20th anniversary of the Archives, Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission, and Yves Mény, the president of the European University Institute, stress the importance of the archive for a coherent history of the European construction (see http://www.iue.it/ECArchives/pdf/dc.pdf). In their usage, calling for a “mémoire communautaire”, archives blend with memory in the same way they do in the activist project. In both cases, the pragmatic aims
conceal a target of permanence, duration and coherence (in the case of the ESF this is linked to projects on translation, vocabulary, and politics of linguistic difference, such as the Babels group, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babels, and Boeri and Hodkinson 2005), and thereby to community building.

There is a worry that the model of EU (‘European’) history, similarly to EU political symbols, draws from nation-statist ideals, the Cold War experience of simple homogeneous units, and the U.S. experience. Much of the rhetoric on ‘European history’ is totalizing, trying to cover differences in the ‘European experience’ (is it feasible, for example, to try to find out what really happened in the Second World War to cover over national or sub-national perspectives to the war?). In this picture, the actually existing plurality of political experience and communities in Europe are wiped out as ‘noise’ to the unison sound of the community (e.g. the experiences of the EFTA countries, and the Central Eastern European member states). The transnational memory projects, such as that of the EU, should be highlighting their transnational character – without overemphasizing the national.

Nation and Metropolis

Most of the observed politics of memory occurs on the national level, there is a competition between various political groups over what should be commemorated or forgotten, how and why. In a short paper like this, I refrain from the discussion of this well known issue, and rather highlight the national vs. sub-national debate. The beyond-the-transnational character of the EU has given prominence to the regions and cities, which allows us to contest the singular role of the national states in the formation of the political community, while at the same time the EU policy on regions can also create space for totalizing regional identifications with imagined fixed borders to substitute national states rather than compliment them and reveal the de facto layered character of these regions. Instead of regions, I will here look at two metropolitan cities.

I start with the case of London to highlight the tension and frontier-building between the national and metropolitan levels. Perhaps the most prominent recent case of politics of the past in London was the proposed removal of two Victorian military heroes from Trafalgar Square in 2000. I draw here on my MA thesis (Palonen 2000), where I argued that the London Mayor Ken Livingstone’s proposal to remove the two statues in the space which he was governing and through which he was projecting his
vision of London was a way to make a break with the past, to contrast the ‘old’ imperial Britain with ‘new’ multicultural London. Besides creating the political frontier to the past and the conservative Britain, which prevails in the whole discourse of Livingstone, this act highlighted the role of London in the world. The support for the Nelson Mandela statue and the Euro raised the status of London as an international player in Europe and the world even in contrast to the UK and the New Labour government of Tony Blair, while Livingstone still was expelled from the Labour Party.

Similar cases can be seen elsewhere, such as in Budapest and Hungarian politics (Palonen 2005). Here, both the metropolitan leader and the conservative government in 1998-2002 imposed their own views on the cityscape. The Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government was building a frontier between the nation and the city, run by a left-wing coalition and a left-liberal mayor. This is visible not only in the rhetoric of the party, drawing on an old urban-rural cleavage, in the economic policy favoring the regional towns over Budapest, but also in the way in which politics of the past was done with publicly funded architectural projects. For example, once in power, the government halted the construction of the National Theatre, which had started under the previous left-wing government. This building of the National Theatre had been a long-term project to replace its 19th century predecessor. The conservative government wanted the glory of its construction for themselves and expressed a clear preference for a different, ‘more national’ architectural style and they built the theatre out of the center on state owned land, on the location where the Budapest Expo 1995/6 had been planned (until it had been cancelled by the left-wing government in 1994). Here the ownership and choice of the legacies of the past was under political debate in a way in which also constructed the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ on the national level, as well as the positions of the nation(al government) and the metropolis. The city and the past emerged in both of these cases as the fields of inscription of the political discourses and the frontier of the community.

Local Districts and the Metropolis

The case of Budapest also revealed that politics of memory appears on the contestation between different levels of local government. The city has twenty-four districts and a weak municipal structure, an umbrella of the municipal council and the Mayor, who take care of certain issues related to the infrastructure of the city – here
statues, memorials and commemorative street names are relevant. The municipal council has been lead by left-wing parties, and the Liberal Democrat Mayor Gábor Demszky has been in the office for the whole post-communist period, since 1990. In terms of the politics of memory the biggest debate has been over the statues and street names between the conservative or right-wing districts and the municipality. These numerous cases of contestation include the returning the name of the interwar authoritarian leader Admiral Horthy on the main street of a district, when the municipal council made a reservation for a smaller street to be named after him, but not the replacement of the street named after the composer Béla Bartok. The conservative districts also were fighting over the right to remove statues of the state socialist period and to erect those for the interwar period (see Palonen 2006).

The most recent debate is about the four and a half meter wide memorial to the victims of the WWII erected by the XXII district without the consent of the municipality or the Budapest Gallery granting the permission to erect statues in the public space. It features a Turul bird, an old Hungarian symbol which was used in the interwar period by the Hungarian fascists. Thus it had been tainted with the meanings of the previous era, which it still carries to the debate and hardly acts as a ‘neutral’ symbol, and the left wing parties, particularly the Liberal Democrats carrying the Jewish heritage, were holding protests against the statue. The city has ordered its removal after which it can be re-erected on private property, not, however, to the statue park of the state socialist statues run by the Budapest Gallery (see e.g. Népszabadság. Oct. 22, 2005; Magyar Hírlap. Oct. 24 and Nov. 21. 2005) This fight over the definitions, use and ownership of the past, but also a competition over public space, is also about the construction of the different political communities.

**Activist Memories**

This last part of my paper is devoted to the alternative political communities, which all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also try to constitute. These organizations build their own memory. Just like more recently private companies, the organizations write their own histories. They carry symbols and form their legacy with the reference to the past. This past building aims also to mark them apart from other organizations. The European Social Forum, a process rather than an institution, stands apart from the firmly instituted NGOs. Social Forums are loose collectives, networks of different groups and NGOs. Political parties and often trade unions are banned from these
networks, they aim at offering a regular point of contact for different groups, connected to or interested in anti-capitalist or global justice movements – and importantly offer an ‘embodied experience’ of the wider and diverse activist movement (e.g. Böhm, Sullivan and Reyes 2005). The social forums exist on different overlapping levels from the World Social Forums to the regional and local ones, which obviously would be interesting from the point of view of my analysis. I look briefly at the politics of memory of the European Social Forum process.

Memory appears in the SF process in many ways, mainly as systematization, archiving and openness, but also as the collection of experience. Mayo Fuster i Morelli (2004) writes about the memory projects as intersection of political action and investigation: ‘Their aim is to put archiving and research techniques at the service of the process of social mobilization and social change. […] It’s more a “network” of concepts that are growing together such as archiving, documenting, reporting, memory, systematizing, investigation and activist research.’

The ESF group proposed in 2004 a new ‘methodology’ for the organization of the fifth World Social Forum (WSF), which included the aim to ‘ensure that the Forum develops a systematic collective memory’. Part of method was to ‘accumulate a living memory’ or ‘the construction of the WSF’s memory, the “memoria viva” project’, including the NOMAD project (live streaming and archiving), collecting memory of cultural events, gathering the communication of the group working towards the Forum and documentation of the proposals discussed at the Forum. (Wainwright 2005) The ESF ‘memory project’ is an international working group launched at the Berlin preparatory assembly in June 2004. There was also the so called ‘French memory project’ which was initiated by a funding of 20 000 GBP left from the Paris ESF 2003, this money has been in part used for the Nomad project, in part for offering chances for the Southern (and Eastern) participants to access the ESF process (Minutes of ESF NGO Meeting. August 8, 2004). The two produced a document asking the UK organising committee to support memory collection. In 2005 the Systematize working group (the memory project) published its notes, criticizing the lack of ‘systematization and memory work’ and promoting archiving, recording and storing, as well as ‘action reserarching’ (Reference Text for Systematize Group. April 13, 2005. http://www.fse-esf.org/article.php3?id_article=86 ). These offered the initial framework for the memory accumulation, collection and protection.

The objectives of the memory project are:
preserving what happened for future memory; making accessible the knowledge spread at international meetings for people who cannot participate to them, which helps to turn them into parts of a process and not just single events; creating networking tools to enhance the effectiveness of the process itself; critical analysis that sheds light on the contradictions of the process, etc. (Fuster i Morelli 2004)

All of these point to politics of memory at stake in the SF movement: the continuity of the SF process, wider accessibility and socialization to the process, coherence of the process, and openness. The aim is to learn for the future from the techniques of the process, but also share the content of the SFs: ‘reporting of who did what in terms of the event [and] keeping alive what was discussed so that it gets into our collective consciousness.’ (Fuster i Morelli 2005) These aims bear similarity both to the documentation process of the EU – which, however, started significantly later than the process of unified Europe – and to the national state model of creating a community by enhancing national (here SF activist) consciousness.

In the issue of the conflicting levels, the point of openness is a tool of critique. It has two main targets: the WSF process, which is run by a selected group of people, the ‘wise men’, and the ESF in London 2004, which Fuster i Morelli’s, as so many others, critique of a concealed the process: for instance the materials from or access to meetings were not made publicly available. The debate over the ‘horizontals’ and ‘verticals’ was heated as the London ESF was dominated by the main sponsor of the event, London Mayor Ken Livingstone and his administration were accused of having run as a PR event (e.g. Panayotis 2004). For the purposes of a multi-level analysis, the realization of a potential conflict or repression between the horizontal and vertical – not only the different levels, such as the WSF and ESF – is important and should make part of a reflection on politics of memory. Nevertheless, as Reyes et al. (2005) have pointed out, these terms should refer to the mode of organization, not act as ‘total’ identifications (e.g. ‘us the horizontals’). Furthermore, the memory projects of the transnational Social Forum processes show that the memory processes are is an activity which involves a plurality of actors and a context where the memory-community is built through frontier building.
Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that since politics of memory deals with community construction in a conflictual terrain, one should look at different kinds of communities and processes of this, beyond the traditional unit of observation, the national one. The above examples show how community construction occurs through protected and centrally preserved ‘common memory’, from the local levels to the national one and further to transnational communities such as the European Union (EU) and the activist networks, such as the European Social Forum (ESF) process. From the discourse theoretical perspective of Ernesto Laclau, societies and communities exist through their constantly rearticulated and negotiated frontiers and nodal points, unifying elements. This process of content choosing, inclusion and bracketing out is part and partial to the politics of memory. Furthermore, the process is never done in isolation, but always in the context of others: community creation through politics of memory is therefore a trans-community, e.g. transnational, activity.

The examples above show that the politics of memory occurs on an uneven terrain, where meanings are not fixed but constantly negotiated. This contestation over the past, deals with its meanings and ownership is a political process, which also works to create political communities, points of identification that stand in contrast to others. The cases reveal also the function of memory in creating an impression of lasting legacies, setting example, socializing people to the ideals of the community in question and offering a ground of contact for the people. The politics of memory also enable us to articulate contents of our discourses and the sediment them through the difference to others, such as other priorities or readings of the past. The past as a ground for debate – and thus for political identification – is visible in the cases of national or local contestation.

In contrast, the systematizing process seems to assume that the past can be systematically written down and recorded. Even if it is clear that there is need in the SFs for transparency and documentation, there is a surprising lack of self-irony in this process. Surely, the postmodern era has as its ideal that a plurality of opinions takes us closer to the truth, but even this lack of the ultimate or reachable truth is not voiced out in the documentation of the SF memory project. Similarly, the case of EU deals merely with facts, documentation, chronologies and great men. There is no acknowledgement of a postmodern or pluralist character of the history or memory of the EU. Politics at the ESF is carried over the existence or non-existence of memory
(here, records). There is a lack of acknowledgement of the politics of memory, and the conflicts it implies, as such.

Given the above, my response to the situation of perceived ‘chaos’ between the national and EU identifications, is that the contestation between a multiplicity of political communities and the politics of memory should be seen as an asset to democratic politics and community-building, rather than a problem. The EU as a political community with its own memory, even an institutionalized ‘history’, can only exist in the network of these other political communities, through shared and ‘own’ memories, and memories of past international networks and periods of nation-state building.

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“Je Me Souviens”… Historical Memory on the Stage of Central European Politics

By Dagmar Kusá

Abstract

Sixteen years after the wave of the revolutions that toppled half a century of communist rule in Central Europe Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary are members of the European Union with fully consolidated democratic regimes. Yet their domestic political scenes are still split along the ethnic lines and latent ethnic conflict is palpable within as well as across the borders. This paper focuses on one of the main factors that feed the continuing ethnic tensions in politics, and that is the manipulation with historical history by the political figures. National elites often use references to the events in ethnic groups’ past as ready-made weapons against representatives of other ethnic groups, or as a lure to attract voters within their own community. My research shows, that the level of awareness and interpretation of events and eras highlighted in historical memories of this or that ethnic group varies by nationality, but also by the function of belonging to the ranks of national or local elite. ‘Common’ people, simply put, seem to have more pedestrian priorities than linking ancient histories to current political squabbles.

In this brief paper, Kusá looks at the theoretical background of ethnic mobilization under the elite leadership, and tools utilized to further political agendas, with a focus on the manipulation with historical memory. To deeper illustrate these tensions, a case study from southern Slovak town of Komárno is examined.¹

¹ I am finalizing the dissertation thesis for the Department of Political Science at Boston University and at the Ethnology Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Research has been supported by a number of grants. I owe my gratitude to the Open Society Institute that sponsored me through the Global Supplementary Support Grant, also to the Boston University for six semesters of teaching fellowships, numerous conference grants, and, last but not least, for currently supporting my Junior Visiting Fellowship at the Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna. My thanks also belongs to my thesis advisors in Boston and Bratislava alike, as well as to the colleagues at IWM for valuable feedback and inspiration.
Introduction

“They came on their ugly furry pony horses, pillaging our villages, slicing stomachs of pregnant women open with their knives….

…That was a statement of a Slovak nationalist politician Ján Slota, Member of the Slovak Parliament, during his speech that had to do with Hungary and Hungarian minority in Slovakia. “They” naturally referred to the Hungarian predecessors, Avars and Huns, who entered the Central European region more than one thousand years ago. We could have also recently read in the European media “of the geese whose honking woke the army when Vienna was under siege from the Ottoman Turks” around the time when chunks of America were still being discovered in connection to debates about Turkey’s accession to the European Union. There are more subtle and peaceful messages, too. Québec has provided me with inspiration for the title of this thesis: „Je me souviens“. It is the state motto, inscribed, among other places, on Québeccois license plates. This simple statement, “I remember, I recall”, harks back to the distant motherland and claims it as part of its own heritage.

\[2\] This reference is natural in popular use. Historical research proves no direct connection between Huns that dispersed throughout Europe after Attila’s death in 495, or Avars, arriving into Europe a few centuries later. It is a reference likewise present in Hungarian national imagination, where this claimed heritage is glorified as a sign of higher civilization of conquerors and rulers.
We are used to inflammatory remarks that draw historical parallels from our politicians or in the media. What drives public figures to dive deep into the past and pluck these references in order to throw them into the pot of current political issues? How successful are they in stirring masses through politics of memory? How do the ethnic mobilization attempts contribute towards perpetuation of ethnic conflict in Central Europe?

I have set out to explore these questions in my dissertation thesis of the same title as this short paper. Thesis analyzes four contributing factors towards ethnic mobilization by political elites. These include saturation of the political agendas with ethnic issues in dependence on the historical path of national formation. Different turning points inflicted the historical consciousness of the studied countries and thereby their national imagination. Another factor in play is the role of domestic and international institutions and of the media. Ethnic heterogeneity is often single-handedly blamed for ethnic conflict. Research however shows that tensions arise in ethnically homogeneous areas alike. The last factor in play is the formation and composition of elite groups in studied countries after 1989, level of elite circulation and political values and attitudes they adhere to. In the space below, I will focus on the theoretical background of the politics of memory in connection to ethnic identity, and illustrate some of the points on the basis of research carried out in southern Slovakia in the summer of 2003.

**Historical Memory within the Framework of Ethnic Identity**

What makes historical memory such a potent tool at times, stirring masses of people towards a shared sentiment, mobilize them towards action, sometimes driving them to mass violence? What makes it so personal, that it touches the core of our beings and brings out emotions of pride or righteousness, even willingness to die for a cause, or anger, hate, resentment, fear, or rage? Let us look at the theories of ethnic identity and instrumentalize its elements at work during the process of ethnic mobilization carried out by the political leaders. Special attention is paid to the role of emotions which link private identities of citizens to the national agenda and thus provide a handle which skilled political leaders can grab to warm their own soup.

Historical memory forms a part of our ethnic consciousness. That consciousness is in ethnology understood “as a feeling of originality of an ethnic group. This feeling of originality and uniqueness can be based on scientifically
founded facts, but may also be grounded in myths that cannot be proved by science or are false. Strong emotional charge is an ever-present feature of such imagination” (Kařavský, 2001:1).

Ethnic consciousness is composed of four elements: ethnonym, collective aspirations, social norms and customs, and historical memory. They all have potentially strong emotional charge, especially in time of perceived danger or threat. Ethnonym, or the name that the ethnic group claims, is an important part of an awareness of a group, especially if their existence is doubted or threatened. There is a strong emotional attachment to the label, and it always comes as rooted in the territory of homeland (Heimat) – whether real, or imagined one (Maalki, 1996). Ethnic groups are united through a common aspiration to continue their existence as a unique, original group. Many have dispersed throughout the human history. Emotional bond to their imagined entity, 3 as well as benefits that membership in ethnic community brings for individuals are instrumental in a group’s will to survive. Traditions, customs, social norms, cultural values and ‘way of life’ serve as a tool to identify a group of people, demarcate their physical and imagined boundaries in the world. These boundaries, concept brought about by Fredrik Barth (1969), are a fluid construct. Ethnic groups are not stagnant entities; they interact over these boundaries, yet keep their distinctiveness despite their permeability. Whereas the collection of social norms helps ethnic groups to transmit positive messages about themselves outwards (food and clothing, culture, traditions…), historical memory most often demarcates the group negatively, against other ethnic groups. It entails a selection of historical events deemed important to the group, even if their perception and evaluation by its members differs radically. Historical memory focuses on historical injustices committed against the ethnic group by others, struggles against invaders, defense of homeland, historical missions of a nation, etc. It justifies the existence and a right to self-determination of a group, and as such is a powerful trigger for emotions.

Historical memory is selective, and purposeful. Its goal is to unite, differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’, gloss over the unflattering parts, and exaggerate and mystify the good ones. Thus it is an entirely different animal from the ‘real’ past, which ‘honest’ historiography strives to uncover. “Its relationship to the past is like an

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3 Benedict Anderson describes nations as ‘imagined political communities’ that are limited in scope and sovereign in principle. As a community it provides a sense of belonging and comradeship, even if there are deep economic inequalities among its members (Anderson, 1991: 6).
embrace…. ultimately emotional, not intellectual”, said American historian Bailyn (In: Blight, 2002). Blight describes academic history as a secular exercise, striving to achieve maximum objectivity, while historical memory is like a church, where the nation and great stories about its heroism and suffering are put on a pedestal and worshiped as Deities. If anyone doubts them, things may become combustible.

Identity is not only assumed through socialization into community, but also ascribed by others. Traits and actions attributed to an ethnic group become personal. Just as stereotypes and prejudices about qualities of members of some ethnic groups can be perceived as personal threats and insults, so can different perceptions of historical events launch feelings of antipathy. Memory is thus a ready-made tool that provides an intimate link between individual and society that is readily usable to move people towards believes or actions. Memory of suffered injustice reaches remarkably far into history, hundreds, sometimes even more than a thousand years back. They stack up on top of each other, packing up like snowballs, that politicians readily throw at each other when matters of ‘national importance’ are debated. It becomes all the more potent, if an ethnic group finds itself in a socially or economically marginalized position against another (or perceives it so), or feels discriminated or threatened by the other group’s rhetoric or action (Rotschild, 1981). These are often highlighted by the leaders in a historical light, stressing how “this has always been so”, and can and often do serve as launching pads for mass emotions of fear, hatred, resentment, or in extreme cases of violent conflict, rage (Petersen, 1996).

Historical memory has been discovered as a tool and used by politicians ever since the era of national revival movements, when ethnic and national identity became a moving force in politics. It has been instrumental in times of the breakdown of Empires and creation of small nation-states after the First World War, as well as in justification of the communist dogma after the Second World War. The post-1989 era has only seen an upsurge in national imagining and spinning.
Central Europe, where ethnic groups thrive in abundance and share a complicated and long past, offers a fertile soil for historical memory manoeuvres and exercises. Looking at Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary, leaders in each exhibited great skills in flaring ethnic tensions to get people to rally around the flag, and ultimately cast their votes for their political party. Whether it was the separation of Czech and Slovak Republics, territorial arrangements in Slovakia, or Hungarian Status Law (law on the benefits to the ethnic Hungarians residing in neighboring countries), political parties got extra mileage out of fanning the flames of sentiments related to recent and distant past clashes and painting them in ethnic colors (dissertation thesis analyzes these and other case studies in depth). The Velvet Divorce of Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993 is among the most vivid examples of the politics of memory at play.

After the fall of communism, both Czech and Slovak national elites struggled to assert the position of their nations within Europe. National identity had to be reconstructed, and to a large extent even re-invented. Both turned to their past to seek linkages and justifications for steps towards self-determination. Czech and Slovaks, however, sought friendship with very different animals from their past. Czechs built on the message of Masaryk’s democratic ideals from the first interwar republic, while Slovaks viewed this era suspiciously, with the memory of the Czech ‘Pragocentrism’ and the refusal of the Czechoslovak government to grant Slovakia a right to self-determination in a federation or an autonomy. Instead, Slovaks sought legacy in the

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4 Pragocentrism was a term used by the Slovak leaders to denote the tendency of the Czech representation to rule the country from a strong unitary center, Prague. Slovak elite had qualms with Pragocentrism ever since the creation of the first republic in 1918.

5 This claimed heritage is a controversial and complex one. Though perhaps only the Slovak National Party would claim the heritage of the war period Slovak Republic fully, along with the persona of its
puppet fascist Slovak state, existing in an area when the Czech lands were occupied. For the Czechs, this was the darkest era in the Czech 20th century history. Czechs turned to the positive experience of the rise against the Stalinist rule in the late 1960s in Czech and Slovak public and cultural life, while Slovaks were contended by the gift of a status of federation and enjoyed an era of “growth and security” that followed the invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies in 1968, establishing the rigid totalitarian regime of ‘normalization’. This “failure to find a decent past” together, as Igor Lukes coins the situation (Lukes, 1995), led to the choice of separate paths for the future, which was not reciprocated by the sentiment of majorities on either side of the new border.

In the confused atmosphere of rampant that had anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and even anti-Western traits nationalism in the years prior to the Velvet Divorce, the Slovak representation raised many issues that seemed frivolous, escalating into what popularly became known as the ‘hyphen war’ about the spelling of ‘Czechoslovakia’. Slovak delegates claimed that the term Czechoslovakia was discriminatory to the Slovaks, who are commonly mistaken for Czechs abroad. Claims were naturally backed by recalling the myths of one thousand year long suffering of the Slovaks under the Hungarian yoke, only to be replaced by the Czech yoke in 1918. Federative Assembly finally settled on the “Czech and Slovak Federative Republic”. Slovak Prime Minister Mečiar constantly led a policy of blackmail, threatening Czechs with a possibility of secession, until the Czech Prime Minister Klaus called his bluff and startled him by accepting the proposal of separation. The divorce was decided on the top political level without participation, but also without physical protests of the Czech and Slovak public. Over half of respondents in public opinion surveys voiced their desire to remain in common state and/or to have an opportunity to decide its fate in a referendum (Nemcová, 1992). It was instead decided on the top of the political pyramid. On January 1993 the two nations started a new period in their history and had to figure out their identity anew.

Historical memory has been nurtured especially by the fringe nationalist leaders of all present ethnic groups. It comes into play most significantly before the general election, or during debates on important legislative changes that have some impact on inter-ethnic relations. In Slovakia, such was the case with the Act on the Official State Language, Act on the Use of Languages of National Minorities, President Jozef Tiso responsible for wide-scale anti-Semitic measures, all parties and most leaders do recognize at least its partial validity as the first form of official Slovak statehood.
Territorial Arrangement that redrew districts to lessen the percentage of ethnic Hungarians, and numerous others.

Sometimes the calculated attempts to stir masses’ feelings or support on the basis allegiance towards shared historical memory also fails. Such cases are instructive to uncover the true political agendas behind these emotion-targeting exercises. Hungarian political scene recently produced an obscure example of that. A group claiming to be the descendants of the Huns, has collected a petition with signatures of some 2,500 people and approached the Hungarian Parliament to be recognized as a distinct ethnic group, a national minority in September 2004 (Thorpe, 2005). Huns have dispersed across half of Europe after their leader, Attila the Hun, died in 495. There are no chronicles and no way to trace the origins of the people all the way back to this group. Yet here they were, demanding their right to be recognized, counting, no doubt, on public backing. After all, Huns are popularly claimed as Hungarian predecessors in the national imagination. Motivation of the group seems to have been purely pragmatic, however. Hungary has passed a law on ethnic self-governments, whereas each official national minority, achieving certain numbers in the locality of their residence, qualifies for government funding for the support of culture and education. The Huns were laughed out by the parliamentarians, 17 out of 21 members of the Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities voted against their bid, 4 have abstained. They did not fare much better with the public, becoming the major source of amusement for many weeks.

Historical Memory in the Public Life in Southern Slovakia.

Struggle for self-determination does not only take place on a national level. Ethnic groups exert their territoriality—control over material, as well as symbolical resources—in the places of everyday life. From names of the streets, through monuments, statues, plaques, we label places and claim historical heritage as ours. In areas where two or three ethnic groups live side by side, such struggles can take on a particularly exhibitionist nature.

I conducted the field research for my dissertation thesis in May – August 2003. It focused on the issues of politics of memory on a local level—in two

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6 David Sack coined the term of territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area (1986:19)
medium-sized towns of the ethnically mixed Slovak south. Both towns consist of a majority of ethnically Hungarian inhabitants (over 60% for Komárno and over 70% for Štúrovo) and, being close to the state boundaries, have a turbulent history of being tossed between Hungary and Slovakia a number of times in the 20th century. Research consisted of interviews with the mayors of Komárno and Štúrovo, representatives in the municipal governments, teachers, local leaders, members of non-governmental and cultural organizations, media, as well as with random people. Interviews were complemented by a survey on political and institutional matters that flared up ethnic tensions that used historical memory within the Slovak and Hungarian (in Slovakia as well as/or in Hungary) populations and were floating in the public debate at the time of the field research.

117 questionnaires were collected for the survey. Respondents were divided into elite (representatives of the municipality government, teachers, priests, local opinion leaders, etc.) and random sample. The vast majority of the respondents were either of Hungarian or of Slovak ethnicity. Other demographic indicators – gender, age, income, how long have they lived in the town, and education, were taken. Elite and ethnicity were factors I was most interested in observing, assuming both would have significant impact on the level of agreement with statements put forth by the survey. Survey is divided according to the chapters of the dissertation. One part inquires about reactions to institutional changes, another about actions of elites and attitudes towards them. Third part touches on historical memory directly, testing reactions of approval or disapproval to the statements about the past of the two communities. Since it is impossible to reproduce the results of the entire survey here, let us focus on the approval rate of the respondents with the statements on historical events or eras deemed important in both Slovak and Hungarian historical memory.

Statements presented to the respondents touched on the common history of Slovaks and Hungarians in the region, as well as generally. While there were statements that received similar reactions from all groups of population, some received very diverse answers.

The single largest polarizing factor was that of ethnicity (see Table 1 below). Most of the participants concurred that the Hungarian political elite in Slovakia is more aware of Hungarian history and falls back on it more frequently and comfortably than the Slovaks who lack legacy of long-term statehood prior to 1993. They likewise agree that Hungarians have not fully accepted the dissolution of the Hungarian
kingdom after the First World War. Second World War was followed by the policy of Beneš Decrees – laws stripping Germans and Hungarians of Czechoslovak citizenship for three years that prepared the ground for later transfers of these populations out of the country. While the majority of the both ethnic groups thought that these decrees should be officially nullified, or at least not be upheld by the government, most Slovaks thought this issue is a by-gone and should be let by-gone. Hungarians thought so significantly less.

Other questions that split the sample of the respondents on the basis of ethnicity were also related to crucial events of eras in historical memories of the two ethnic groups. The first concerned the era of Magyarization – forceful elimination of Slovak and other non-Hungarian languages from official use and abolition of cultural and educational institutions of these ethnic groups after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. 85% of the Slovaks in Komárno and Štúrovo thought this to be the worst era in the Slovak history, while only 38% of Hungarians considered it that bad. The two groups also didn’t agree on the statement on the ‘thousand year long oppression’ of the Slovak nation by Hungarians. Over half of the Slovak respondents opined that due to the ‘Hungarian yoke’ Slovaks are entitled to claim the dominant position in their own country. Only one quarter of Hungarians agreed. They have also not found a consensus on the openness of the Slovaks in their dialogue with the Hungarian minority. Three quarters of Hungarians believed that Slovaks were never open to such a dialogue, compared to a little over forty percent of the Slovaks.

Another important factor, which strengthened the differences in answers to some of these statements, was the factor of membership to local elite. While on its own, elite vs. random population did not disagree on the above statements statistically significantly, elite group did have more extreme opinions on the statements (leaning more towards full agreement or disagreement). Statement on Magyarization was an exception. In this statement, there was a stronger negative correlation between ethnicity and agreement on the statement, whereas such a correlation was not statistically significant at all among the elite group. Elite members were, however, more inclined than random sample to think that Slovaks were never opened to compromise, where the correlation between ethnicity and level of agreement did not prove statistically significant in the latter group. Same was true for the statement that Beneš Decrees were just a payback for the harms caused by Hungarians and Germans
to Czechs and Slovaks in the past. While random sample did not think much of the statement, elite members believed it true at a significance level of 0.009.

Table 1: Percentage of those that fully or partially agree with the statements below. (‘No opinion’ was treated as a missing value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Hungarian respondents</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% of Slovak respondents</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Chi square</th>
<th>Pearson’s R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians are more conscious of their history than Slovaks</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magyarization was the worst era in Slovak history</strong></td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>After thousand years of oppressions Slovaks deserve to be in a dominant position in their own state</em></td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians have fully accepted the dissolution of Hungary after the World War I</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Hungarians were always in a position equal to that of other minorities in Slovakia</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Slovaks were never willing to lead and open dialogue and to compromise with Hungarians</em></td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitation of Slovaks and Hungarians here in southern Slovakia was always without problems</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should draw a line behind the past and not come back to it</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity of Beneš Decrees should be officially confirmed</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneš Decrees should be fully nullified</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* These events (BD) have to be understood within the context of the World War II</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>-.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneš Decrees were a fair payback for the wrongs committed by Hungarians and Germans in the past</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The significance level for the chi-square statistic is less than 0.05  
** The significance level for the chi-square statistic is less than 0.001

We cannot draw conclusions from the indications based on the elite variable, however. While it still is informative and makes the initial thesis stronger, the sample was not representative, and the size of the Slovak elite group was disproportionately
small. Most of the administrators, teachers, representatives... in the two towns is are ethnic Hungarians, which meant inclusion of but a handful of Slovak opinion leaders into the pool of respondents.

Among other contributing factors towards the difference in opinions were age, gender, and how long the respondent lived in his/ her town. Women, older people, and those living in their town longer, proved to be more optimistic in respect to the Slovak-Hungarian relationships and more accommodating of the other ethnic group.

**Struggle for the Public Mind Through the Public Space. Unveiling of the Statue of Cyril and Metodius in a Southern Slovak Town of Komárno.**

![Picture 2: Unveiling of the Cyril and Metodius statue at Matica Slovenská in Komárno on 12th July, 2003 © M. Drozd, TASR](image)

Hungarians and Slovaks normally share public spaces in the Slovak south, where they live in proximity for centuries. Many are fully bilingual and claim a double Slovak and Hungarian identity. Komárno seats Hungarian cultural and educational associations, such as Csemadok, a branch of the Hungarian Economic University, Collegium of János Sellye, as well as Slovak ones - Slovak high school, or Matica slovenská (Matica) – The Slovak Heritage Foundation. Peaceful cohabitation in Komárno was abruptly interrupted last summer, when a petty squabble about a statue brought the attention of entire Slovakia and Hungary onto it. Slovak leaders – local and national alike, fenced against the enemy – the local Hungarian representatives holding a vast majority in the municipal government - with laments about centuries of historical injustices perpetrated against the dove-like Slovaks and demonstrated their anger with the refusal of Hungarians to accommodate the humble
request to place a statue of two Byzantine emissaries, symbols of the imagined Slovak ancient homeland\(^7\). Average Komárňians were hardly affected by the quarrel in any practical sense. Most just avoided the spectacle altogether. But the leaders of Matica and of the municipal government played the battle out in the media as if everybody’s life depended on it.

The quarrel about the Cyril and Metodius statue began some 11 years ago. When general Klapka, the Hungarian national hero of the 1848 revolution, made his return onto a pedestal on the main square, Matica wanted to place a statue of the Byzantine emissaries Cyril and Metodius in front of the public’s eye. Matica had good reasons for it. It was created on August 4, 1863, marking a millennium since the introduction of Christianity brought by the Byzantine brothers. Historic research documents that it is possible that the missionaries passed into Slovak territories through Komárno. Dušan Čaplovič, an MP for SMER and a historian by trade supported Matica’s claim in a personal interview:

“Cyril and Metodius passed through Blatňohrad and Kocel’s areas, and along the Danube. We know everything only from narrative sources. But there were two ways to cross Danube at that time. One was in Komárno, that was the shortest pass... the other went around the whole of Danube and crossed from Tisa side. So there are good premises, but it is not proven.”

Vladimír Turčan (In: Krekovič, 2005: 36–42) is of a different opinion. Since Cyril and Method traveled from Thessalonica via route that is not known today, it is open to mythological creativity. Crossing Danube in Komárno is just a demonstration of that. „There is no registered archeological locality which could support this projection. Furthermore there is not even evidence of Komárno being integrated within Great Moravia“ (Ibid., 37). There is, however, written evidence that the emissaries were planning to return to Thessalonica via Venice, which would indicate they would be more likely to use the Devín ford way instead of the more distant Komárno. In any case Matica insisted on the statue and approached the municipal government about it.

Municipal government did not have much enthusiasm for the project. The two sides could not arrive at a decision where to place the statue. The sites proposed by Matica were either already taken, or unsuitable for technical reasons, the sites proposed by the town representatives did not seem dignified to Matica. They included

\(^7\) Konstantin (later admitted to holy orders as Cyril) and Metodius were invited by Prince Rastislav of the Great Moravian Empire to bring Christianity to the people. Great Moravia, despite the fact that it included only small portions of today’s Slovakia, is portrayed in Slovak national imagination as the ancient homeland of the Slovaks.
a distant public park near public toilets, or an abandoned military church in a
dilapidated condition. Statue was ready, but neither side was willing to step back to
accommodate the other. After years of the back and forth, when the 140th anniversary
of Matica’s birth was approaching, its leaders decided for a unique solution. Matica
opted to mount the statue onto their own building, which allowed them to forego the
necessity to obtain town’s official permission. Date was set for the 5th of July 2003
and Matica proceeded with great resolve.

Municipality government summoned the city police to halt the installation.
After a minor skirmish, Matica proceeded with the mounting. Later Matica sued the
local government for limiting its freedoms. Town representatives, on the other hand,
slapped a million and a half SK fine on Matica for not having obtained a building
permit in advance.

The unveiling of the statue, taking place on the 12th July, was more grandiose
and more controversial than anyone had imagined. The complot of coincidences that
carry various symbolic and historical meanings shows almost all key scars on the face
of the history of this region and country. Celebration itself was well attended. 16
buses brought six to seven hundred people from all over Slovakia. Among the present
were clergy, leaders and members of Matica, top representatives of political parties
with nationalist leaning – Slovak National Party (SNS) and Movement for Democratic
Slovakia (HzDS), but also of centrist-populist SMER and ANO, and the Christian
Democrats, who were supporting Matica in its quest to place the statue of emissaries
in Komárno over the whole 11 years. There were groups of men and women in folk
costumes, members of the Senior Club, as well as youth in jeans. Disturbance came in
the form of a few skinheads roaming around, along with a pack of youngsters in
uniforms resembling the Arrow Crosses, Slovak counterpart to Hitler’s SS guards
during the interwar Slovak state. Members of this group, called Slovenská
Pospolitosť, claim not to have neo-Nazi leanings and refer to themselves as Slovak
nationalists. They marched to the border crossing to deliver the message of the
unveiling as they understood it: “Slovakia begins here!”
The space where the emissaries’ statue was placed is symbolically extremely rich. The myth of the thousand years long existence of the Slovak nation personified in the bearers of Christianization of the Slovak lands crosses paths here with the message of the national revival of the Slovaks against the oppressing Hungarians through the building of Matica slovenská. Some ten or twelve meters in front of the building towers the statue of Milan Rastislav Štefánik, leader of the Czechoslovak legions in the World War I and one of the founders and cabinet members of the first Czechoslovak republic. It was placed there by the same Matica in 1990.

All on the soil of a city that played a crucial role in the Hungarian revolution of 1848, of which we are duly reminded by the statue of general Klapka on a nearby Klapka Square. If that isn’t enough, the same Cyrilo-methodian tradition was claimed by the interwar fascist Slovak state, which found its admirers at this celebration in the uniformed men of the Slovenská Pospolitost'.

The celebration and the conflict between Matica and the city hall was downplayed by most as petty stubbornness of local representatives, but deeper national stereotypes seeped to the surface through interviews. Here is what the mayor of Komárno, and the chair of Matica slovenská in Komárno had to say on the subject:

**Tibor Bastrnák, Mayor of Komárno:**
“Local politics is not about major historical trauma. It is about everyday things. Unless Matica Slovenská comes with a provocation. This was not about history. It was a problem of communication. Matica carried it in the confrontational manner from the beginning, from the position of power; you know those were different times then. And the self government probably did not react the best way either. Then it became such an issue that it was difficult for anyone to step back. Many lies and half-truths were told. I have been in this office for seven months, not once was I visited by anyone from Matica about this issue. We tried to find a solution in the past few months, but even much more influential people than I could not change their mind. Matica in Komárno and in southern Slovakia does not fulfill the mission for which it was created. It just serves the purpose to be here. That is why there were maybe 50 people from Komárno, rest was brought by buses from elsewhere. Slovak history to them is not to give them meaning, but to create sensations that will be written about.”

**Mária Kobulská, Matica slovenská in Komárno:**
“What concerns my opinion, there is a surge in Hungarian plaques denoting houses where Kossúth slept one night, where someone was born, etc. Komárno, with its location on the Danube crossing point, is certainly a town of memorials. The city is of a different opinion about our solution, we will leave it to the court. It is a pity, and it lacks dignity that we argue about such petty details when our

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8 Louis Kossúth, one of the leaders of the Revolution of 1848.
Constitution guarantees a right to develop one’s cultural heritage. Why are we not allowed to enjoy that right?”

The unveiling of the statue was not the end of the saga, which very much continues in Komárno, as well as elsewhere, to this day. In February, the city of Rožňava (Rozsnó) unveiled a statue of Louis Kossuth, the controversial Hungarian revolutionary hero from 1848. The Slovak National Party immediately protested that this statue desecrates the memory of Ľudovít Štúr, the Slovak national revival hero.

Komárno became abuzz on the 5th of July this year as well. Among the usual participants commemorating the entry of Cyril and Methodius to our lands this year—Matica leaders and members, representatives of clergy and political parties, handful of believers and some passer-bys, it (already traditionally) saw the uniformed members of the Slovenská pospolitost’. However, in 2005 they were not the only inflammatory group to be watched by the police there. About 40 Hungarian short-haired youths showed up as well, and started a word fight with the Slovak nationalists. The two groups had to be cordoned off by police forces. Matica and Pospolitost’ denounced the Hungarian group as a fascist provocation. Matica went as far as to suggest that the forty youths are a sign of the: „Fascist hailing, chauvinism, instigation of border revisions, celebration of Great Hungaria from the side of the young Hungarians... and that it serves as a proof of what the basis of part of the Hungarian national and international party politics is about... Matica denounces their misuse of the St. Cyril and Methodius holiday as a dark spot on Slovak-Hungarian civil relations, revival of irredentism in the Slovak south, incitement of unwanted provocations, misuse of ecumenical cyrilo-metodian message for fanning the flames of nationalist passions. “ (Matica slovenská webpage). Gabriela Kobulská, chair of Matica in Komárno opined that the Slovak uniformed men behaved well, merely wanting to pay respect to the two key figures in Slovak national history. „ [Slovenská pospolitost’] is a serious organization…it is one of the few associations that feels with the Slovaks.” (SME, 7.7. 2005) While the Hungarian youth yelled „Ria, Ria, Hungaria,“ and called the Slovak participants the “Beneš bootlickers“ who will be pushed out of the rightful Hungarian territory, the Slovak youth replied „Hungarians behind Danube! Hungarians behind Ural! Slovakia is ours!“ Articles on the Pospolitost’ website refer to Hungarians as ‘ugly Huns’ and dismisses them as neo-Nazis hooligans. After three of the Hungarian visitors were arrested by the police for hailing and stealing a wreath
from in front of the Štefánik statue, Pospolitos held a minute of silence „for all the victims of Hungarian rage“.

Mainstream Slovak and Hungarian media responded as one would expect. The Slovak dailies paid attention mainly to the three arrested Hungarians. Hungarian daily Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet wrote about the Slovak nationalists in uniforms resembling the Hlinka guards, hurling insults at Hungarians, Jews, and the Roma. (SME, 6.7. 2005).

Cyril and Metodius statue started off on the wrong foot. It has been a combustible issue in Komárno over the years and will likely remain so. The Matica – municipal government squabble was mirrored into the relations of political parties on the national level immediately. HzDS9 and SNS10 were accusing SMK11 of intolerance and discrimination. In May 2005, MP for LS-HzDS Katarína Tóthová has issued a statement conveying deplorability of the Slovak Parliament’s dismissal of her motion to put the government report on the agenda whether or not the causa of the non-placement of Cyril and Metodius statue in Komárno by the municipal government is a case of ethnic intolerance. Tóthová was puzzled that „MPs for Slobodné fórum and Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), who profess Christian principles and ethnic tolerance did not vote on this issue“ (Vyhlásenie poslankyne...: 2005). KDH was indeed active in the matter of the statue placement throughout the years. In 2000 it has blocked SMK’s application for membership in the European Democratic Union purely because of the issue of the Komárno statue (Repa: 2000).

Cyril an Metodius, emissaries that are valued for bringing education, Christianity, culture of peace and tolerance into Slavic lands brought very little of that to Komárno. Their statue became a local as well as national battle ground of historical memory and expression of territoriality. It now symbolizes stubbornness of political elites to find a practical solution and peddle their own agendas, attempting to incite ethnic antipathy among their constituencies. Locals, however, luckily seem to have more pedestrian priorities. None of the asked thought that the statue will influence the relationship of local Slovaks and Hungarians, or will overall worsen the relationship of the Slovak and Hungarian nations. The dispute found much sounder resonance on

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9 Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)
10 Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)
11 Strana maďarskej koalície (Party of Hungarian Coalition)
the national political sphere, where numerous political parties used it as the
aforementioned packed snowballs in their own political fights.

Conclusion
It may seem logical to expect that the entry into the European Union would alleviate
some of the inter-ethnic tensions within and among studied countries. But nothing so
far indicated that it would be so. Hungarian right focuses on rhetorically re-claiming
Hungarians living on the territories once belonging to the Greater Hungary, today
neighboring states, Slovak politicians respond by drumming on war drums, calling on
Slovaks to stand up against traditional Hungarian irredentism and tendencies to
oppress the weaker and usurp what’s not theirs, Czechs dig their heels in deep into
their concept of a historical state to justify present standpoints and actions towards its
neighbors and towards the EU. Purposeful ethnic mobilization may be targeting a
wider array of scapegoats, who are at hand due to the process of the EU enlargement.
The ‘other’ is now being sought not only in the immediate geopolitical area, but also
among immigrants, Turks, Muslims, or any other, currently popular intruder. Politics
of memory thus only received a boost in its wings size, giving ever more space to
imagination, interpretation, and borrowing. It will be interesting and instructive to
follow this development and compare it with the period of time leading to the EU
accession. That will, however, have to be the task of some future text.

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