Europe Under Trump
Europe has historically been torn between Transatlanticism and strategic autonomy. This is the main reason for which it is unprepared for the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House on 20 January 2025. The risk is that the choice will no longer be available.
A stronger Europe within the Transatlantic relationship would have been in the long-term interest of both sides of the Atlantic. Yet Europeans appealed to their Atlanticist vocation to push back proposals to build greater "strategic autonomy". Americans also were suspicious of greater European independence. The end result is that all the rhetoric of the past eight years—since Trump was first elected in 2016—amounts to European unpreparedness.
There are many measures for this lack of preparation. In the face of Russia’s aggression, Europe has become more dependent on US security guarantees and military procurement, even if it has started to spend more on defense. Its economy depends heavily on trade with the United States. Weaning Europe off Russian energy has meant importing more gas from the US. If anything, Russia’s war has increased Europe’s dependence on the US.
Europe is disproportionately vulnerable to Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Politically, European governments are likely to splinter, scrambling to get access to and curry favor with the President-elect. Ukraine and the Eastern flank of NATO and the EU will do whatever they can to ensure the US remains committed to security in Europe. That existential priority will override any concern about EU unity.
Like-minded radical right leaders will feel emboldened. Some will align with Trump upending agreed EU policies. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban made a long-term investment in becoming influential within the Trump entourage. One country to watch is Italy, led by radical right leader Giorgia Meloni, who will likely have access to Trump’s magic circle thanks to her relationship with Elon Musk.
Germany and France are both the weakest they have been for decades, and the European Commission and collective institutions are unlikely to have the strength or legitimacy to lead without the backing of key member states. The UK and the EU have promised a reset, but it is unclear how ambitious that may be.
Europe’s admirers of Trump are not just in the EU. He also has many allies and admirers in wider Europe, supported by the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has been pursuing the "Orbanization" of politics in East-Central Europe.
Europe’s best bet is unity and scale, but it could take months before European governments recognize this.
In terms of policies, the impact of the next US presidency is set to be immense: From climate to technology, Trump promises to upend all areas of international cooperation. "Drill, baby, drill" is the antithesis of the international consensus achieved in Paris in 2015 that the European Union has been pioneering. Battered multilateral institutions—the United Nations and the World Trade Organization—will take more major hits. His expected assault on US democratic institutions will embolden others around the world.
Focusing on Europe’s priorities, problems start in Ukraine with the question of Europe’s security, move onto trade and the damage Trump’s tariffs can do to Europe’s economy, and come together in China, where an intensification of the US-China rivalry could force Europe to make uncomfortable and costly decisions.
The President-elect has promised to seek some kind of agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin over its invasion of Ukraine. Unlikely to be in Ukraine’s favor, security in Eastern Europe will be in permanent peril, forcing Europeans to double down on defense and on securing the Eastern border.
If the US were to lighten its security responsibilities in Europe, it does not mean European governments would have more space to pursue their policies, such as EU enlargement—the most impactful pledge Brussels can make to bring security, democracy, and economic growth to wider Europe.
The empowerment of Trumpian mini-autocrats in East-Central Europe is likely to undermine EU policy and the credibility of the accession prospect. In the first Trump Administration, US envoy Richard Grenell sought to address the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo uncoordinated with the talks steered by the EU. Grenell is among those considered to obtain foreign policy positions in the next Trump Administration.
European Union officials claim they have plans to offer a "deal" to Trump to stave off the promise of tariffs and of pulling out of NATO. The EU also has a better toolbox to retaliate should a deal not be reached. However, the impact of a Trump presidency is far more encompassing than buying a US military kit and soybeans, which, in any case, will increase Europe’s dependency on the US.
Looking wider afield to the expectation of increased tensions between the US and China, Washington may demand greater subservience from its allies. The EU managed to find some understanding among its members and with the US on the notion of derisking the economy from undue foreign interference disrupting the rules of the single market. Economic security measures and foreign investment screening have been strengthened by all countries over the past years. However, the US-China rivalry can impact all areas of policy, from managing supply chains and accessing critical raw materials to the multilateral governance of climate and the regulation of digital technology.
The EU and European countries may want to seek a modicum of autonomy from some US policies, especially if they are heavily geared towards deregulation of digital technology or driven by US-China rivalry. But a transactional approach in responding to the incoming Trump administration could impose very costly quid pro quos around which Europeans may not find common ground. The moment for Europeans to find their strategic autonomy may have been lost.
This publication represents the views of the author(s) and not the collective position of the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM Vienna) or the “Europe’s Futures” project.