Serbia’s Protesters Are Standing Alone—And Winning

On 1 November last year, the canopy of the newly reconstructed railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, collapsed, killing 15 people. Beyond being a tragic infrastructure failure, the incident has come to symbolize the unravelling of the mafia-like patronage system that has long defined Aleksandar Vučić’s regime. The disaster has sparked the largest anti-government protests in Serbia since the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, posing the most serious challenge to Vučić’s 13-year grip on power. The students and citizens who have taken to the streets see the collapse as a direct result of high-level corruption and are demanding transparency, accountability, and justice from those responsible.

Last month, in response to these protests, the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly instructed its diplomatic network to “explain” the situation to foreign officials worldwide. According to insiders, diplomats were even advised to tailor their message for Western audiences, absurdly claiming that Russia was behind the student protests. While such an accusation may seem outlandish, it is not Vučić’s regime’s first use of this narrative.

In 2021–2022 and again in 2023, the Serbian government falsely portrayed environmental protests as Russian-backed uprisings, despite overwhelming evidence that these movements were homegrown. Interestingly, this Russian framing is used only in private diplomatic conversations with the West. Domestically, however, Vučić labels the same protests as a Western-backed “color revolution”, echoing Kremlin propaganda—and often receives direct support from Moscow for this narrative.

This Orwellian doublethink—in which people are expected to simultaneously accept two conflicting beliefs as truth—is a defining feature of Vučić’s spin-dictatorship. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy aptly described Vučić’s erratic and personalized diplomatic strategy in a 2020 publication as a “policy of musical chairs”—using a metaphor of a children’s game in which Serbia’s leadership jumps between geopolitical alliances, ensuring it always has a seat when the music stops.

The West, the East, and Vučić’s Balancing Act

Since assuming power, Vučić has juggled the conflicting interests of the West and the East. This balancing act became even more evident after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

On the one hand, Serbia refused to align with EU sanctions against Moscow, maintaining its long-standing ties with the Kremlin. On the other, Vučić quietly allowed Serbia to export ammunition to Ukraine, presenting this to Western media as a sign of Serbia’s “gradual pivot” toward the EU and NATO.

This calculated ambiguity served two purposes: It reassured Russia that Serbia remained a loyal ally in the Balkans. It placated the West, offering a token gesture that allowed EU and U.S. policymakers to maintain their illusion that Vučić was slowly but surely “drifting toward the West.”

The ammunition exports were a win-win for Vučić. They secured support from Washington and Brussels, while simultaneously enriching his inner circle and fueling the corrupt oligarchy that sustains his rule.

Yet despite these gestures, Vučić continues to spread anti-Western propaganda through state-controlled media, retains Aleksandar Vulin (a Kremlin-linked official sanctioned by the U.S. and UK) as Deputy Prime Minister, and is steadily turning Serbia into a Russian-style autocracy as much as the geopolitical realities allow him.

Vučić’s Regime Has International Backing—But It’s Still Destined to Fall

Cornered by mass protests that have already forced the resignation of his fig-leaf Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić finds himself at a crossroads. But, Serbia’s protesters stand alone. No major international actor supports them. Most global powers either actively back Vučić or remain indifferent, preferring the stability of his rule over the uncertainty of democratic change.

Vučić’s bet is on the protests dying down but by now it is clear that this is wishful thinking. This leaves the regime with two options.

The first one is the only viable path forward for Serbia: democratic transition. The government could fulfill students’ demands, agree to a transitional government, and lead Serbia toward democratic elections and media freedom. But Vučić has categorically rejected this, absurdly calling it a coup d’état.

That leaves the second scenario, an attempt at a violent crackdown. But repression would be a fatal miscalculation. Serbia’s police are unlikely to turn against peaceful demonstrators. Any crackdown would only accelerate Vučić’s downfall while pushing the country into chaos and instability. Yet, despite the risks, he will seek external support if he chooses to go down this path—but who would back him?

For now, the EU remains largely silent. Even when it did respond, such as Commissioner Marta Kos’s open letter responding to pleas from Serbian academia and civil society, it failed to seize the opportunity to engage meaningfully. Unlike in Georgia, where the EU firmly took a stance in support of protesters and against the government, in Serbia, it still watches from the sidelines.

Would a Trump administration intervene to prop up Vučić? Unlikely. Serbia holds little geopolitical significance for Washington. However, a single tweet from Richard Grenell (Trump’s former Special Envoy for Kosovo, now with a broader portfolio) or the presence of real estate dealings involving Jared Kushner could give Vučić false hope that the U.S. would back him.

Would China or Russia support Vučić if he moved toward full-blown authoritarianism? China’s interest in Serbia is purely economic—it will back Vučić, but ultimately will work with any leadership trying to protect its business deals. Russia, however, would be the only actor fully backing the Serbian spin-dictator—but its influence in the Balkans is weaker than ever.

In 2000, when Slobodan Milošević was overthrown, Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov rushed to Belgrade to negotiate a peaceful transition and try to protect Moscow’s stake in Serbia. In 2022, when Vučić invited Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Belgrade, he could not even get there—all neighboring countries denied his flight passage.

This leaves major global players either unwilling to act or backing Vučić in a scenario that is doomed to fail. No one is supporting the only viable alternative—a democratic transition led by students and backed by the citizens.
Serbia’s protesters may stand alone on the international stage, but they do not need foreign backing. The regime is rotting from within, and no amount of geopolitical support will prevent its collapse.

If the EU shifts its position and pressures Vučić into democratic reforms, it may still have a chance to salvage its credibility in Serbia. But time is running out.

This publication represents the views of the author(s) and not the collective position of the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM Vienna) or the “Europe’s Futures” project.