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

Rethinking Equality in an Age of Inequalities

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Editorial

Vor 20 Jahren einigten sich die Finanzminister der EU-Mitgliedsländer in Maastricht auf die Einführung der Währungsunion. Am Neujahrstag vor zehn Jahren wurde der Euro als Barzahlungsmittel eingeführt. Jubiläen allenthalben also. Zum Feiern war trotzdem den wenigsten zumute. Die Euro-Krise hielt den Kontinent fest im Griff. Die IWM*post* widmet Zustand und Zukunft der EU einen Schwerpunkt (S. 16–18).

In der Krise diktieren die Ereignisse die Handlungen. Doch Politik muss mehr sein als Krisenmanagement. Sie muss die Ereignisse in einen größeren Kontext einordnen und Diskurse stiften. Die Zukunft Europas darf nicht losgelöst von Problemen wie sozialer Ungleichheit und losgelöst von der Frage nach Zustand und Zukunft der Demokratie – nicht verstanden als Legitimationsinstanz für die Regierenden, sondern als partizipative Lebensform aller – betrachtet werden. Diese Themen stehen im Mittelpunkt der Beiträge von Cornelia Klinger, Permanent Fellow des IWM, und Pierre Rosanvallon, Professor am Collège de France und Redner bei der Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture 2011 (S. 3 und 5).

Tausende demonstrierten im Herbst in den Straßen von New York, Athen, Madrid oder Santiago de Chile. Der Erfolg der Occupy-Bewegung, obwohl aus heutiger Sicht wenig nachhaltig, war auch ein Ergebnis der erfolgreichen Verknüpfung einer politischen Agenda mit dem Thema „Menschenrechte". Über die Menschenrechtsbewegung als politische Kraft sprach Aryeh Neier, Chef des von George Soros gegründeten „Open Society Institute", im November 2011 am IWM (S. 24).

Die Revolutionen des Arabischen Frühlings wiederum stehen beispielhaft für die von Rudolf Vierhaus geprägte Formel von der „Gegenwärtigkeit der Geschichte und Geschichtlichkeit der Gegenwart". Am IWM werden seit bald 30 Jahren Geschichtsdenken und Geschichtsschreibung zum besseren Verständnis der Gegenwart praktiziert – häufig mit transnationalen Bezügen. Ein Beispiel par excellence ist der am Institut entstandene Bestseller „Bloodlands: Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin" von Timothy Snyder, Historiker in Yale und Permanent Fellow des IWM. Die Geschichte der Mordexzesse der stalinistischen und nationalsozialistischen Diktaturen in den Bloodlands, die sich von Polen bis Westrussland über die Ukraine, Weißrussland und das Baltikum erstreckten, eröffnet einen neuen Blick auf die gemeinsame europäische Vergangenheit. Die IWM*post* dokumentiert ein Gespräch zwischen Snyder und der Historikerin Sybille Steinbacher (S. 14).

Twenty years ago, the finance ministers of the EU member-states agreed in Maastricht on founding a monetary union. On new year's day ten years ago, the euro was introduced. Anniversaries all round, then. Still, few have felt like celebrating. The euro crisis has the continent firmly in its grasp. This issue of IWM*post* looks at the state of the EU present and future (p. 16–18).

In the crisis, events are dictating actions. Yet politics needs to be more than crisis management. It needs to place events in a larger context and generate discussion. Without agreement over "which Europe", over the *quo vadis,* over the European common good (however one defines it), calls to politicize the Union, ubiquitous these days, will be futile—regardless of institutional reforms. Good reason, then, to see Europe's future not as being severed from problems like social inequality and from the question of the state of democracy, understood not as a source of legitimacy for governments but as a participatory way of life for everyone. These issues are central to the contributions of Cornelia Klinger, IWM Permanent Fellow, and Pierre Rosanvallon, Professor at the Collège de France and speaker at the 2011 Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture (pp. 3 and 5).

Last autumn saw thousands demonstrating on the streets of New York, Athens, Madrid or Santiago de Chile. The success of the Occupy Movement, though short-lasting from today's perspective, was partly the result of the successful linking of a political agenda with the topic of "human rights". Aryeh Neier, President of the "Open Society Institute" founded by George Soros, talked at the IWM in November 2011 about the human rights movement as a political force (p. 24)

The revolutions of the Arab Spring are, in turn, exemplary of what Rudolf Vierhaus called the "contemporaneity of history and the historicity of the contemporary." Writing and thinking about history as a means of better understanding the present is something that has been done at the IWM for the past thirty years—often with transnational points of reference. An example par excellence is the book *Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* by Timothy Snyder, Yale historian and IWM Permanent Fellow, written here at the Institute. The history of the murderous excesses of the Stalin and Nazi dictatorships in the bloodlands, the area of Europe stretching from Poland to Belarus and Ukraine, open up a new perspective on Europe's common past. This issue of IWM*post* documents a discussion between Snyder and historian Sybille Steinbacher (p. 14).

Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben

VON CORNELIA KLINGER

Die Absicherung des Lebens, die Übernahme von Vor- und Fürsorge durch die öffentliche Hand im Zuge des 20. Jahrhunderts hat die Lebensverhältnisse sehr vieler Menschen deutlich verbessert. Die großen Probleme der Ungleichheit in den sich überschneidenden Dimensionen von Klasse und Geschlecht wurden so jedoch nur verschoben, aber nicht gelöst. Heute, angesichts der Kommodifizierung aller Belange des Lebens, wächst die Kluft zwischen denen, die sich die guten und teuren Angebote der service industries leisten können, und jenen, die das nicht können.

Photo: Marcel Pelletier, Getty Images / Vetta

In Zusammenhang mit der politischen und industriellen Revolution der „Sattelzeit" der Moderne entstand eine Trennung zwischen Arbeitswelt und Lebenswelt. Während die Öffentlichkeit einen signifikanten „Strukturwandel" erfuhr, entwickelte sich die Privatsphäre zu einer Enklave innerhalb der modernen Gesellschaft, zu einem konträren und komplementären Gesetzen gehorchenden Binnenraum.

Von Anfang an war diese Teilung des gesellschaftlichen Raumes durch eine Ambivalenz zwischen idealisierter Humanität und verachteter Natur, zwischen Verschonung und Ausgrenzung geprägt: Einerseits bildete die Privatsphäre ein Refugium des Lebens, einen Freiraum der Subjektivität („Innerlichkeit"), in dem die Aktivitäten der Lebensführung als „Freizeit" aufgefasst werden konnten. Auf der anderen Seite wurden die vielfältigen Aufgaben der Lebenssorge, angefangen von der Sozialisation und Erziehung von Kindern und Jugendlichen, über die Pflege der Kranken und Behinderten bis zur Betreuung von alten Menschen nicht als Arbeit ge- und bewertet, sondern als „unproduktiv" aus dem Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftssystem ausgegliedert. Im Dunkel des Privaten gehalten, wurde der überwiegende Teil dieser Tätigkeiten zur unbezahlten Arbeit der bürgerlichen Haus-Frauen und ihrer meist weiblichen Helfer (unbezahlte Verwandte ohne eigenen Haushalt, gering bezahlte Nicht-Verwandte, „Dienstmädchen" aus der „Unterschicht" oder „vom Lande"). Auf diese Weise wurden die Kosten für das Leben der Menschen, für das Entstehen und Vergehen, für die alltägliche Führung und die spezifischen Fährnisse des Lebens externalisiert. Indem der Preis der menschlichen Kontingenz (Natalität, Morbidität, Mortalität) in den öffentlichen Haushal-ten, in den Kosten-Nutzen-Kalkülen der Betriebe nicht in Rechnung gestellt werden musste, wurden Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Markt und Staat entlastet.

Dieses Lebenssorge-Regime war geprägt durch große, sich überschneidende Probleme von Ungleichheit zwischen Geschlechtern und Klassen: Die strikte Separierung zwischen den verschiedenen Feldern des öffentlichen Raumes und der familialen Privatsphäre war mit einer rigiden Segregierung der Geschlechter verbunden, namentlich mit dem Ausschluss von Frauen sowohl von politischer Partizipation als auch von selbstständigem Erwerb. Zugleich war das asymmetrische Geschlechterarrangement von *male breadwinner* und *female homemaker* an Besitz und/oder Einkommen gebunden. Damit war dieses Lebenssorge-Regime untauglich für breite Schichten der Bevölkerung, für die das Einkommen des Mannes allein für den Lebensunterhalt der Familie nicht ausreichte, die folglich auf die Erwerbstätigkeit von Frauen (nicht zuletzt im Dienst in bürgerlichen Haushalten) nicht verzichten konnten. Der Ausschluss von Frauen vom gesellschaftlichen Prozess und die Pauperisierung des Proletariats im 19. Jahrhundert bildeten die Schattenseiten des bürgerlichen Lebenssorge-Modells.

Seit den frühen 1980er Jahren stellte neoliberale Politik mit ihren Attacken auf den Sozialstaat den Kompromiss zwischen privatem und öffentlichem Sorge-Regime in Frage.

Etwa seit Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts richteten sich Erwartungen zur Lösung dieser Probleme an den „Vater Staat". Hatte die Übernahme von Erziehungs-, Bildungs- und Ausbildungsaufgaben in ein öffentliches Schulsystem bereits früher eingesetzt, so begann nun der Ausbau der öffentlichen Kranken- und Altersversicherungssysteme. Darüber hinaus entstanden in der Trägerschaft von Staat, Kommunen oder Wohlfahrtsverbänden verschiedene Arten von Pflege-Einrichtungen (in deren Bezeichnungen als Kranken-*Häusern,* Pflege-*Heimen,* Kinder-*Gärten* die Reminiszenz an Domestiztität und Privatheit noch erhalten blieb). Im Sinne einer auf nationalstaatliches Maß vergrößerten Solidargemeinschaft wurden private Für- und Vorsorgefunktionen – wenn auch nach Art und Umfang unterschiedlich – in die öffentliche Verwaltung übernommen.

Das erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zu voller Entfaltung gelangende demokratisch-wohlfahrtstaatliche Modell zielte nicht auf die Abschaffung der Privatsphäre, sondern auf Entlastung der Familie *von* und mehr noch auf Unterstützung der Familie *in* ihren Lebenssorge-Funktionen. Dieses Konzept löste das bürgerliche Familienideal nicht ab, sondern ermöglichte nun erstmals eine gewisse Ausweitung auf nicht-bürgerliche Schichten der Bevölkerung („Familienlohn"), bei gleichzeitiger partieller Abfederung der Geschlechterasymmetrie infolge der Zulassung von Frauen zu allen gesellschaftli-

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chen Feldern, namentlich zur nun öffentlich organisierten und professionalisierten Fürsorge-Arbeit. Ohne Zweifel hat die Absicherung des Lebens, die Übernahme von Vor- und Fürsorge durch die öffentliche Hand die Lebensverhältnisse sehr vieler Menschen deutlich verbessert. Die großen Probleme sozialer Gerechtigkeit bzw. der Ungleichheit in den sich überschneidenden Dimensionen von Klasse und Geschlecht sind auf diese Weise verändert, verschoben, gewiss auch gemildert, aber nicht gelöst worden.

Bevor die vielen offenen und umstrittenen Fragen, die mit dieser Entwicklung einher gingen, beantwortet worden wären, konterkarierten bereits ab Mitte der 1970er Jahre neue Entwicklungen sowohl den „Ausbau" des Wohlfahrtsstaates als auch das seit jeher problematische und im Verlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts zunehmend fragiler und volatiler werdende bürgerlich-familiale Lebenssorge-Regime: Seit den frühen 1980er Jahren stellte neoliberale Politik mit ihren Attacken auf den Sozialstaat den Kompromiss zwischen privatem und öffentlichem Sorge-Regime in Frage, häufig mit Verweis auf (tatsächlich oder auch nur vermeintlich) aus dem Globalisierungsprozess resultierende „Sachzwänge". Dagegen entzogen die zeitgleich stattfindenden technologischen Innovationen in den Bereichen der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie und *life sciences* sowie der Mikroelektronik und Mikrobiologie vor allem dem bürgerlichem Konzept der Exterritorialisierung des Lebens in der Separierung von Öffentlichkeit und Privatheit die Grundlagen.

Während so das familiale ebenso wie das wohlfahrtsstaatliche Lebenssorge-Regime in etwa gleichzeitig in eine tiefe Krise stürzten (wobei die Rede von der „Krise" verdeckt, dass beide Regime zu keiner Zeit, weder jeweils für sich noch in ihrem Zusammenspiel, voll funktionstüchtig, geschweige denn sozial gerecht gewesen sind), entwickeln sich seither Ansätze zur marktwirtschaftlichen Organisation für so gut wie alle Belange von Lebensführung und Lebenssorge. Die Bewegung in Richtung „Privatisierung" im Sinne von Vermarktlichung ist eine allgemeine Tendenz, von welcher der Bereich der Lebensführung und Lebenssorge besonders stark betroffen ist.

Auf der einen Seite bekommen längst fest in „Staatshoheit" übergegangene Aufgaben wie Erziehung und Bildung sowie alle die Lebenssorge betreffenden Versicherungssysteme durch den Markt Konkurrenz; auf der anderen Seite dehnen sich die Angebote des Marktes auch auf die Bewirtschaftung gesellschaftlicher Bereiche aus, die (wie beispielsweise die Altenpflege) gesellschaftlich als wenig nützlich erscheinend, vom staatlichen Regime „stiefväterlich" behandelt und den privaten Haushalten besonders nachhaltig überlassen waren. Parallel zur Entstehung von *welfare markets* und *welfare industries* setzt eine neue Kommodifizierungswelle in der Informations- und Unterhaltungsproduktion ein. Die unmittelbare, lebensweltlich-alltägliche Kommunikation zwischen Menschen und die Privatheit der Einzelnen wird durch *creative industries, cultural industries* mediatisiert, virtualisiert und artifizialisiert. Die Kommodifizierung aller Belange des Lebens gewinnt zunehmend Einfluss auf die Gestaltung von personaler Identität und sozialen Beziehungen. Unser aller *lifestyle* wird zum Produkt einer Industrie, die die Bezeichnung *Kulturindustrie* im umfassenden Sinn des Wortes verdient.

Damit geht ein Wechsel der Perspektive einher: Das (Privat-)Leben wird nicht mehr in Hinblick auf die möglichst zu minimierenden Kosten betrachtet, sondern in Hinblick auf den ökonomischen Nutzen, den

Cornelia Klinger

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

Gewinn, den die Erfüllung der enormen Nachfrage abwerfen könnte. Das ist ein Novum: Die patriarchale Klassengesellschaft hatte Lebensführung und -sorge in die separierte private Lebenswelt exterritorialisert, um die Lebenskosten zu externalisieren und das Leben, die Lebensenergie als ebenso wertvolle wie kostenlose Naturressource ausbeuten zu können. Der demokratische Wohlfahrtsstaat war angetreten, die Belange des Lebens bürokratisch zu organisieren, was darauf hinauslief, das nun als Kostenfaktor im Staats-„Haushalt" in Erscheinung tretende Leben möglichst sparsam, knapp am Existenzminimum zu verwalten, um am Ende doch von den immensen Kosten überwältigt und überfordert zu werden. Dagegen schickt sich das marktwirtschaftliche System an, alle Bereiche des Lebens zu bedienen – reichlich, ja im Überfluss – gegen Entgelt. Die Lebenssorge wird umgestellt von dem – nicht zu vergessen, seit jeher schon durch Geschlechter- und Klassengegensätze kompromittierten – Prinzip *Solidarität* in der kleineren oder größeren „Solidargemeinschaft" von Familie und Nation auf *Wertschöpfung*.

Das bringt einige offensichtliche Vorteile mit sich: Wissenszuwachs und Professionalisierung, Technisierung und Vermarktlichung können die verschiedenen Aufgaben der Führung und Versicherung, der Bildung und Pflege des Lebens erheblich diversifizieren und optimieren. Aufgrund der Vermittlung durch Geld wird die Bedienung des Lebens in seinen schier unendlichen Bedarfen und Bedürfnissen volkswirtschaftlich „produktiv". Auf der Seite der Nachfrage bedeutet das einen Freiheitsgewinn: Die Empfänger von Sorgeleistungen avancieren von Bedürftigen und Bittstellern zu umworbenen Kunden. Für sie ergibt sich die relativ freie Wahlmöglichkeit zwischen verschiedenen konkurrierenden Anbietern, mithin ein Individualisierungsfortschritt. Auf der Angebotsseite verbessern sich infolge besserer Ausbildung und höherer Professionalisierung die Aussichten auf leistungsgerechte Entlohnung, auf die damit verbundene finanzielle Unabhängigkeit sowie darüber hinaus auf gesellschaftliches Ansehen und Anerkennung. Es entsteht ein erweitertes, breit gefächertes Feld (sozial)-technischer, erzieherischer, beratender und therapeutischer Berufe, in denen sich theoretisches und empirisches Wissen bildet, das dem (vielleicht oder vielleicht auch nicht) liebevollen, aber jedenfalls laienhaften Management der Lebenssorge in der Familie und dem ansatzweise entwickelten, recht lieblosen Expertenwissen notorisch knauseriger bürokratischer Wohlfahrtspflege überlegen ist oder es wenigstens potenziell sein kann.

Der Vielzahl keineswegs gering zu schätzender Vorteile steht ein Nachteil gegenüber. Die Lebenssorge-Industrie bedient das Leben, aber sie dient ihm nicht. Sie folgt dem Marktmechanismus: Sie bietet auf einer nach oben offenen Preisskala „Produkte" an, die nach keinem anderen Kriterium verteilt werden, als dem der Zahlungsfähigkeit und -bereitschaft der Kundschaft – wie bei jeder anderen Ware auch. Zur Lösung der seit jeher offenen Finanzierungsfragen tragen Markt und Technologie jedoch nichts bei, vielmehr verschärfen sie diese durch die Perspektive auf Gewinn(maximierung) erheblich. Obwohl Industrie und Markt die Aufgaben von Lebensführung und Lebenssorge potenziell besser erfüllen und also Familie und Wohlfahrtsstaat eventuell verdrängen und ersetzen könnten, so werden diese nicht überflüssig, da das marktwirtschaftliche Regime auf deren finanzielle (Vor-)Leistungen nicht verzichten kann. Und an den alten Vorgaben hängen die alten Problemstellungen: Sah es für einige Jahrzehnte so aus, als ob das sozialstaatliche Regime die Ungleichheitsproblematik des bürgerlich-privaten Lebenssorge-Arrangements zumindest mildern konnte, sieht es nun so aus, als würde das marktwirtschaftliche Konzept die alten Übel abermals verschärfen.

Die Lebenssorge-Industrie bedient das Leben, aber sie dient ihm nicht.

Die Konstellationen gesellschaftlicher Ungleichheit und Ungerechtigkeit entlang der Linien von Klasse und Geschlecht verfestigen sich erneut, wenn sich die Kluft vergrößert zwischen denen, die sich die guten und teuren Angebote der *service industries* leisten können, und jenen, die das nicht können. Solange die sozialstaatlichen Handlungsspielräume erhalten bleiben, um Familien und/oder Individuen mit den für den Erwerb privatwirtschaftlicher Sorgeleistungen erforderlichen finanziellen Mitteln auszustatten (in Form von *allowances, vouchers* oder Darlehen zum Erwerb von Pflege oder (Aus-)Bildung), und so lange die Aktienkurse der privaten Versicherungen hoch bleiben, fällt die Schwächung der öffentlichen Fürsorge-Einrichtungen und Versicherungssysteme noch nicht voll ins Gewicht. Je weiter diese Optionen schwinden, je tiefer die Aktien fallen, desto mehr gewinnt der Rückgriff auf das familiale und/oder individuelle Privatvermögen an Bedeutung und damit auch die nach wie vor bestehende soziale Ungleichheit in den Vermögensverhältnissen. Je problematischer diese Konstellation wird, desto grösser wird der nie gänzlich verschwundene Druck zur Senkung und Einsparung der Lebenssorge-Kosten. Dieser Druck zur Informalisierung, Prekarisierung und Externalisierung der Sorge-Arbeit betrifft in erster Linie diejenigen, die nach wie vor den Löwenanteil von Arbeiten dieser Art leisten, das heißt Frauen.

Während also auf der Nachfrage- bzw. Empfänger-Seite des marktwirtschaftlichen Sorge-Regimes das alte Gespenst Klasse wieder auftaucht, bleibt auf der Anbieter- bzw. Service-Seite die ebenso alte Problematik der Geschlechterordnung so virulent wie eh und je. Die mit dem bürgerlichen Sorge-Regime von Anfang an verbundene Tendenz zur Exterritorialisierung und Externalisierung von Arbeit und Kosten auf Dienstmädchen „vom Lande" kommt ebenfalls wieder verstärkt zum Vorschein. Das (Aus-)Land, dessen es bedarf, damit dieser Externalisierungseffekt funktionieren kann, hat sich mittlerweile auf den gesamten Globus ausgedehnt. Im Hinblick auf die Entstehung weltweiter *care-work-chains* tritt neben Klasse und Geschlecht *Ethnizität* als dritte Größe im Machtpoker mit sozialen Asymmetrien in Erscheinung.

Die gegenwärtige Situation ist gekennzeichnet erstens durch ein hohes Maß an Unruhe und Beunruhigung, das zuweilen an Hysterie grenzt, genauer gesagt, das unter Stichworten wie „Krieg der Generationen", „demografische Katastrophe", „Bildungspanik", „extreme Armut" usw. zur Hysterisierung eingesetzt wird. Zweitens durch ein ebenso widersprüchliches wie zähes Festhalten an den drei koexistierenden und konkurrierenden Modellen der Lebenssorge, die mehr oder weniger genau den drei vorherrschenden politischen Strömungen korrespondieren: (Wert-)Konservatismus, Sozialdemokratie, (Neo-)Liberalismus bzw. ihren jeweiligen Klientelen.

Während es evident ist, dass alle drei Modelle Ungleichheits- und Ungerechtigkeitsprobleme in den Dimensionen Geschlecht, Klasse und Ethnizität erzeugen, aber nicht lösen können, zeigt sich gegenwärtig drittens ein auffallender Mangel an alternativen Konzepten, Visionen und Utopien, den es zu erforschen und vor allem zu beheben gilt. ◁

Dieser Beitrag basiert auf einem Vortrag von Cornelia Klinger, der am 27. September 2011 den Auftakt zur neuen Vortragsreihe ***Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben*** *(in Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt) bildete. Informationen zur Reihe und zu weiteren Vorträgen siehe Seite 12/13.*

Cornelia Klinger ist seit 1983 Permanent Fellow am IWM und seit 2003 außerplanmäßige Professorin an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Tübingen.

Rethinking Equality in an Age of Inequalities

BY PIERRE ROSANVALLON

We need a new social contract based on the ideals of the American and French Revolutions, says Pierre Rosanvallon, whose recent book ***La société des égaux*** *has attracted much attention in France and beyond. Rosanvallon, professor at the Collège de France, delivered the Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture at the IWM in November 2011. IWMpost documents the lecture in abridged form.*

Pierre Rosanvallon

Photo: IWM

Everybody knows that inequalities have exploded since the 1980s and that this is mainly due to the huge increase in top incomes. Statistics are everywhere. The point is that rising inequality stands in stark contrast to the earlier decline in inequality in Europe and America. It is indeed remarkable that the recent increase in inequality follows a lengthy period of reduced income and wealth inequality on both continents. The current system marks a spectacular break with the past, reversing the trend of the past century. A return to the 19th century seems to be on its way—with significant repercussions for our democracies.

The "people," understood in a political sense as a collective entity that ever more powerfully imposes its will, is less and less a "social body." Political citizenship has progressed, while social citizenship has regressed. This rending of democracy is an ominous threat to our well-being. If it continues, the democratic regime itself might ultimately be in danger. The rise of populist movements is at once an indicator of this distress and its driving force. To understand the present "great reversal," we must start by understanding the preceding "great transformation."

The Reformism of Fear

The development of the worker's movement and its translation into socialist votes (with the universalization of suffrage) at the end of the 19th century put pressure on conservative governments. "We must choose between a fiscal revolution and a social revolution," concluded Emile de Girardin in France. The German example is the most salient in this regard. For Bismarck, the reformist option was clearly a political calculation: its immediate purpose was to counter the spread of socialist ideas by showing government concern for the working class. In Germany, in other words, the plan to reduce social inequalities and compensate for the vicissitudes of working-class employment stemmed from what we might call "the reformism of fear." Most other European countries followed the German lead. After 1918, all these social and political factors converged to encourage governments to extend and accelerate reforms initiated before the war.

World Wars and the Nationalization of Life

The development of inequalities is closely related to the detachment of certain individuals from the common run of mankind and to the legitimation of their right to distinguish themselves and separate themselves from others. It is therefore linked to the prioritization of private over public norms. The experience of World War One reversed this tendency; in a sense, the war nationalized people's lives. Private activities were largely shaped by collective constraints. Social relations therefore tended to become polarized between two extremes: either withdrawal into the family circle or absorption in the superior problems of the nation. Virtually no middle ground remained between family and country. The fact that the war threatened everyone's existence revived the fundamental principles of the social state of nature. The experience of the First World War thus marked a decisive turning point in democratic modernity. It restored the idea of a society of like human beings in a direct, palpable way. Fraternity in combat and the commemoration of sacrifice are complex phenomena, but they helped pave the way to greater social solidarity. The welfare payments awarded to veterans led to a general reconsideration of social benefits and other redistributive transfers.

The De-Individualization of the World

The redistributive revolution was made possible by these historical and political conditions. But it was also the fruit of an intellectual and moral revolution, which made redistribution thinkable. In short, redistribution became possible because the economy and society were "de-individualized" by thinkers who rejected older views of individual responsibility and talent. What ultimately emerged was a new vision of enterprise itself. A new understanding of the nature of society changed the way people thought about equality and solidarity in the late 19th century. The founding fathers of European sociology—Albert Schäffle in Germany, J.A. Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse in England, Alfred Fouillée in France—all agreed that society was an organic whole.

Socialists of the chair in Germany, Fabians and New Liberals in Britain, Solidarist Republicans in France: these various political and intellectual movements converged in the late 19th century. All reformulated the question of how society is constituted in very similar terms. The idea of a society composed of sovereign, self-sufficient individuals gave way to an approach based on interdependence. In this new context, the notions of right and duty,

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merit and responsibility, autonomy and solidarity were completely redefined. Equality as redistribution not only became thinkable, it also became possible. The introduction of progressive income tax and changes in the estate tax were hence closely related to the growing popularity of the idea that everyone is born owing a debt to society.

A New View of Poverty and Inequality

The development of the welfare state and redistributive institutions was abetted by the fact that the social nature of inequality was increasingly recognized. People were more and more willing to see the organization of society, rather than objective and justifiable individual differences or personal behavior, as the structural cause of inequality. Socialist critiques of the social order gained currency in the first half of the 20th century thanks to this new social representation. Views of poverty also changed.

It is clear that the political and historical factors for the "great transformation" no longer exist. After the fall of communism, there is no longer room for a reformism of fear. Social fears still exist, but they concern such things as violence, security or terrorism. They appeal to an authoritarian state and not to a solidary one. Similarly, ecological threats raise fears about the fate of future generations, but these are expressed in a general and abstract way and not in terms of social redistribution.

More important still, there is the impact of the transformation of capitalism and society. The capitalism that began to emerge in the 1980s differed from earlier forms of organized capitalism in two ways. First, its relation to the market changed, as did the role assigned to stockholders. Second, labor was organized in a new way. Fordist organization, based on the mobilization of large masses of workers, gave way to an emphasis on the creative abilities of individuals. Creativity thus became the principal factor of production. Phrases such as "cognitive capitalism" and "productive subjectivity" were coined to describe this change. *Quality* has thus become a central feature of the new economy, marking a sharp break with the previous economy of quantity. Work routines have consequently become more diverse and products more varied.

These changes precipitated a crisis in societies previously ruled by the spirit of equality as redistribution. At the same time, the new age of inequality and diminished solidarity has been a time of heightened awareness of social discrimination and tolerance of many kinds of difference—a fact often overlooked by critics. The picture is contradictory, to say the least, and while some ground has been lost, there have been undeniable advances with regard to the status of women, the acceptance of differences of sexual orientation, and individual rights generally.

Pierre Rosanvallon

Photo: IWM

If we want to understand recent changes in our societies, we must take note of all of these divergent tendencies. One way to do this is to look at the *internal* transformation in the "society of individuals." This did not suddenly appear at the end of the 20th century: it has formed the framework within which modern institutions have developed for more than two centuries. Succinctly put, what we need to understand is the transition from an individualism of universality to an individualism of singularity, which also reflects new democratic expectations. In democratic regimes associated with the individualism of universality, universal suffrage meant that each individual had a claim to the same share of sovereignty as every other individual. In democracies in which the individualism of singularity is the social form, the individual aspires to be important and unique in the eyes of others. Everyone implicitly claims the right to be considered a star, an expert, or an artist—that is, to expect his or her ideas and judgments to be taken into account and recognized as valuable.

Equality has lost none of its importance in this new context. The most intolerable form of inequality is still not to be treated as a human being, to be rejected as worthless. Hence the idea of equality implies a desire to be regarded as *somebody,* as a person similar to others rather than excluded by virtue of some specific difference. To be recognized as being "like" others therefore means to be recognized for the *human generality* one contains (harking back to the original sense of "humanity" as a quality of unity without distinction). But this human generality has taken on a broader, more complex meaning. It has come to include the desire to have one's distinctiveness—one's history and personal characteristics—recognized by others. No one wants to be "reduced to a number." Everyone wants to "be *someone.*" Hence the centrality of the notion of discrimination, considered the mark of an insult to similarity as well as to singularity.

As a consequence of these different factors, the idea of equality has today entered a deep crisis. What are the options?

The first is a return to the evils of the late 19th century, the time of the first wave of globalization, namely: aggressive nationalism, xenophobia, and protectionism. National protectionism was sustained by a purely negative vision of equality. Barrès put it bluntly: "The idea of 'fatherland' implies a kind of inequality, but to the detriment of foreigners." In other words, the goal was to bring (some) people closer together by exploiting a relationship of inequality. What was distinctive about national protectionism at the end of the 19th century was that it represented an extreme case, the result of a radical polarization of both identity and equality. It reduced the idea of equality to the single dimension of community membership as homogeneity, which was itself reduced to a negative definition ("not foreign"). The constitution of an identity always needs a demarcation, a separation, a mirroring effect of some sort. But identity must also be linked to a properly positive idea of shared existence in order to produce a democratic sentiment of membership. This is what distinguished the revolutionary nation of 1789 from the nationalist nation of the late 19th century. The former was associated with the formation of a society of equals, while the latter conceived of integration in a non-political mode, solely as the fusion of individuals into a homogeneous bloc. Such a national-protectionist vision is today at the heart of populist movements in Europe and in the United States.

The second option is a politics of nostalgia that calls for a revival of civic republicanism and/or the past values and institutions of former social democracies. The late Tony Judt recently pleaded for such a revival in his book-cum-testimony *Ill Fares the Land.* Although there is great nobility in such a vision, unfortunately it does not take seriously enough the irreversible character of the individualism of singularity, which is not to be confused with individualism as selfishness and atomism. The crucial point is that the great reversal is not the consequence of a "broken contract" (see George Packer, "The Broken Contract," *Foreign Affairs,* Nov–Dec 2011) or moral depravity. It derives from historical and political factors as well as structured transformations affecting the mode of production and the nature of the social bond. Neoliberalism has, so far, been the main active *interpretation* of such changes. Neoliberalism considers market society and the perspective of generalized competition as accomplishment of modernity as the desirable form of humanity and personal achievement. But neoliberalism should not be misinterpreted. It is not only a victorious and negative ideology, it is also a perverse *instrumentalization* of singularity. For example, modern firms use singularity as a means of production without any consideration for the self-realization of workers. Hence new types of social conflicts about respect and moral harassment. The problem is that critiques of neoliberalism very often neglect the positive aspiration to singularity and do not take into account the fact that neoliberalism profoundly modifies judgments regarding viable forms of equality as well as tolerable forms of inequality.

Today, there is in fact only one *positive* answer to the challenges of the time. Theories of justice reconsider the question of inequalities by transforming it from a social problem to an inter-individual one. They are based on a new consideration of "just inequalities" as structured by the notions of responsibility and merit. Everywhere, equality of opportunity has been the name for such a perspective—albeit with a great variety of definitions, from minimalist to radical ones. But justice is not another word for equality. It says nothing about the *nature* of democratic society.

What we need is a new model of solidarity and integration in an age of singularity. But if more redistribution is needed today, it has to be re-legitimated. How? Through a redefinition of equality with a universalist dimension. That is to say, a return to the vision of the French and American Revolutions—to a vision of equality as a *social relation* and not as an arithmetic measure. At those moments in history, equality was understood primarily as a relation, as a way of making a society, of producing and living in common. It was seen as a democratic quality and not only as a measure of the distribution of wealth. This relational idea of equality was articulated in connection with three other notions: similarity, independence, and citizenship. Similarity comes under the heading of *equality as equivalence:* to be "alike" is to have the same essential properties, such that remaining differences do not affect the character of the relationship. Independence is *equality as autonomy:* it is defined negatively as the absence of subordination and positively as equilibrium in exchange. Citizenship involves *equality as participation:* it is constituted by community membership and civic activity. Consequently, the project of equality as relationship was interpreted in terms of a *world* of like human beings (or *semblables,* as Tocqueville would say), a *society* of autonomous individuals, and a *community* of citizens.

These ideas were undermined by the Industrial Revolution, which initiated the first great crisis of equality. In order to overcome the second great crisis, we must recapture the original spirit of equality in a form suitable to the present age.

Today the principles of singularity, reciprocity, and commonality can restore the idea of a society of equals and revive the project of creating one. It is these principles that must provide the basic legitimacy for new policies of redistribution. Realizing a society of equals should be the new name for social progress with a universalistic dimension. For the so-called "social question" is not only about poverty and exclusion: it is also about the reconstruction of a common world for the whole of society. ◁

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Pierre Rosanvallon is Professor of Early Modern and Modern Political History at the Collège de France (Paris) and Director of Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris). He also serves as Vice Chair of the IWM's Academic Advisory Board. His new book *La societé des égaux* is the third part of his reflections on the transformations of contemporary democracy, after *La contre-démocratie* and *La légitimité démocratique.*

Bordering Communist and Post-Communist Europe

BY JESSIE LABOV

From September 28–30, 2011, the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres (LBI-EHP), the IWM, and the Historical Commission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences held a conference in Vienna on the history and legacy of East European borders throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Topics ranged from the construction of the Iron Curtain and parallels in everyday life on opposite sides of the border to present-day issues with new zones, frontiers and migration across former borders.

Photo: Bundesarchiv

Three keynote addresses by Alfred Rieber (Budapest), Sabine Dullin (Lille), and Alf Lüdtke (Erfurt) framed the conference. Rieber made a useful distinction between borderlands and *frontiers,* i.e. zones of conflict on the edges of multinational states or empires, and gave examples of several trans-historical zones that have played key roles in a long series of regime changes. Dullin presented a convincing argument that the Iron Curtain had a pre-history in earlier Soviet attempts to control its western border during the interwar period. And in his examination of the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint in Berlin throughout its existence, Lüdtke drew on documentation of the everyday life of border guards and border crossers, highlighting the exceptional nature of the human interaction in this environment.

One of the first themes to emerge from the individual presentations was the internalization of the concept of the border throughout communist societies, whether through propaganda, the image of the border guard, or actual mobilization of everyday citizens.

A frontier passes
through our hearts
and we are all frontier guards,
frontier guards
of the strict homeland –
Communism.

This is an excerpt from a longer poem published in 1976 by the Bulgarian poet L. Levchev, as quoted by Nikola Vukov (Sofia) in his paper on the Turkish-Bulgarian border. Vukov stressed the border's prominence in the Bulgarian cultural imagination, as witnessed in poems or practices such as the "cultural marches to the border" of the 1970s. The image of the border guard played an important role from the earliest Soviet propaganda onwards, but took on interesting new dimensions in later varieties of socialism. An unexpected extension of this heroization could be seen in in Emiliya Karaboeva's (Plovdiv) presentation on Bulgarian truck drivers—figures who embodied the heroic trope of the border, containing both the power of the border and the capacity to legally transgress it.

Several presentations brought up the resettlements of people in different contexts as mechanisms of border control and internalization. In his paper on the discourse of "reliability" in the Czechoslovak borderlands, Matěj Spurný (Prague) detailed "the removal of the unreliable citizens of Czech nationality" in the period directly after the war, that is, *before* the implementation of the Beneš decrees, and their replacement by more "reliable" Czechs resettled from Ukraine and Bohemia. Eagle Glassheim (Vancouver) looked at a later period in Czechoslovak society during which the politically and demographically constructed borderland was still internalized, but experienced as a loss.

Another popular motif could be found in presentations on "twin" border communities separated by the Iron Curtain at the birth of the Soviet bloc. Some of the best examples of this type of study were from Muriel Blaive (Vienna) on České Velenice and Gmünd; Edith Sheffer (Stanford) on Sonneberg and Neustadt bei Coburg; and Elżbieta Opiłowska (Wrocław) on Zgorzolec and Görlitz. Sheffer and Opiłowska focused on the 1970s and the period of détente, when more movement was possible across borders, while Blaive used a longer historical view to understand the postwar construction of the Austrian-Czech border with respect to 1918. All three studies took dialogic approaches, in which each town's cultural identity was largely defined in relation to the entity across the border.

Dialogic does not necessarily mean positive: in the 1970s, on both the Polish-German and FRG-GDR borders, a clash could be seen between perceived stereotypes, material inequalities, and emotionally charged encounters. Another intriguing ethnographic study of intra-border cultural perception was Alexandra Schwell's (Vienna) analysis of Polish and German border guard communities before and after EU accession. Thomas Lindenberger (Vienna) talked about "fabular" border communities in two films: *Die Dubrow-Krise* (1969) and *Meier* (1986). On the basis of these narratives, Lindenberger showed the Western fascination with transgressing the border, and a surprising richness of detail and historical accuracy in the West German imagination of its "twin" communities.

The question of gender also came up in several of the presentations. In her discussion of Bulgarian truck drivers, Emiliya Karaboeva found that, because the truck drivers' fundamental social identity was linked to mastery over borders (as well as the economic gains that came from that privilege), the experience of losing that position after 1989 was also deeply emasculating. Kristen Ghodsee (Maine) told a related story about the Bulgarian town of Maydan: its rapid development during the early socialist period and the glorification of the miner as a modern, socialist, man, along with the subsequent loss of this masculine power during the town's deindustrialization. Following closely on that theme was Alissa Tolstokorova's (Kyiv) presentation on women living in emigration who have taken over as the primary breadwinners, and the effect of this transnational parenting on the fabric of civic life in Ukraine. It was a stark reminder of the power of borders to determine lives even when they are reconfigured as political and economic "zones."

The final roundtable of the conference remained firmly within this territory, with Dariusz Stola (Warsaw), Endre Sik (Budapest), and Alev Korun (Vienna) debating "Migration Policies and Theories of Migration for the 21st Century." Sik suggested that the biggest challenge today is in finding support for quality, social scientific research in this area. Stola's main point was more rhetorical: given that migration is inherently good for Europe, indeed necessary, how can a dialogue or even a policy be built that will sell this to the voters? While the ensuing discussion exposed disciplinary differences and a deep frustration with the current state of migration policy in Europe, it was a fascinating capstone to two days of scholarship that juxtaposed two contingent points of view: the porousness of borders under regimes of control, and the difficulty of overcoming borders that are embodied by migrants even in the supposedly borderless European zone. ◁

Jessie Labov is Assistant Professor in the Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Literatures at The Ohio State University.

Communism as Golden Age?

BY KRISTEN R. GHODSEE

Nostalgia for communism is often dismissed as a geriatric condition that will disappear as time passes. The history of the Bulgarian town of Madan over two decades of political and economic change shows it is very much alive, reflecting broad disappointment with the realities of people's postsocialist lives.

In communist-era Bulgaria, perhaps no other population suffered more than the Pomaks, the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims who lived along the Greek frontier. Up until 1989, the communist government imposed a variety of restrictions on Muslims, eventually passing laws that banned the most intimate religious rituals: circumcision for boys, prayer sessions for newborn infants, and Islamic burials. Headscarves and all other forms of traditional Islamic dress were prohibited.

The government also forced Pomaks to change their Turko-Arabic names to Bulgarian ones. In 2005, I met a woman called Aysel who had become "Silvi." Her husband Fikret had been obliged to change his name to "Iordan." Had they resisted, they might have gone to prison. In order to be issued birth certificates, their two sons had to have Slavic-sounding names. Yet many Pomaks like Fikret and Aysel are now convinced that, despite religious persecution (which they do not deny), their lives between 1946 and 1989 were happier and more fulfilling than at any time since the advent of democracy. They miss communism.

Most scholars dismiss nostalgia for communism as inconsequential, a geriatric condition, something that will disappear when the older generation dies off. But, curiously, Aysel and Fikret's two sons are becoming nostalgic for the communist era too, and they were only boys when it collapsed. As an ethnographer of post-socialist transformations, my research involves listening to the personal stories of those who have lived through the last two decades of political and economic change. Since 1997, I have been conducting ethnographic research in Bulgaria and have written three books examining how ordinary people experienced the massive social upheavals that followed 1989.

One key to making sense of the post-socialist world today is to understand that, despite economic shortages, travel restrictions, religious persecution and ubiquitous state surveillance, the communist era was in fact the most materially comfortable period in the lives of many people in rural areas.

In the case of Bulgaria, the country was transformed from a relatively primitive agrarian state into a modern, industrial economy in the span of four decades. In 1956, the agricultural sector employed around 71 per cent of Bulgarian workers; by 1988, a mere 20 per cent worked in agriculture. Young people from the countryside were educated *en masse* and moved into manufacturing and service jobs, which made use of their new skills.

Photo: Kristen R. Ghodsee

The story of the village of Madan, where I did fieldwork between 2005 and 2007, is a stunning example of the transformations that took place among rural populations. In 1953, Madan was officially declared a city and was targeted for a program of rural industrialization. Before 1946, Madan had been little more than a mosque, a bridge and a collection of homes populated by shepherds and tobacco farmers.

GORUBSO, a state mining enterprise, was formed in 1950 and Madan was its epicenter. Dozens of support industries drew local peasants into industrial labor for the first time. By 1963, GORUBSO employed approximately 20,500 workers in Madan at some of the highest rates of pay available in the communist economy. In less than a decade, GORUBSO brought economic prosperity and modernization to the Central Rhodope region, not only raising living standards for local Pomaks, but also attracting workers from all parts of Bulgaria and as far away as China and Vietnam.

The wealth generated by GORUBSO was largely funneled back into developing Madan. Between 1950 and 1978, GORUBSO built over 6,000 apartments and provided housing for more than 5,400 local families. In 1952, medical facilities in the village consisted of a wooden barracks with 20 beds. By 1978, there was a modern hospital that could accommodate 320 patients. In 1963, there were already 25 primary schools throughout the municipality; by 1978, the secondary school alone had more than 2,700 students. The local communists also built a hotel, a library, a football stadium, a theater, a cinema, and an Olympic-size swimming pool.

This rapid economic development transformed the life chances of many Pomaks, especially Muslim women like Aysel/Silvi, who had never belonged to the formal labor force. Aysel's parents had learned to read and encouraged her to go to school. As "Silvi," she was the first woman in her family to work in a bank. Fikret became a well-paid miner. Together, they could afford to move out of his parent's house in the village and buy their own flat in the city. Although Muslims were still persecuted by the government and had no political rights, the quality of everyday life was better than it had ever been in Madan's history. No one expected that their children might soon have to go back to being shepherds.

One key to making sense of the postsocialist world today is to understand that for many people in the rural areas, the communist era was in fact the most materially comfortable period of their lives.

1989 should have marked the start of a joyous era for the Pomaks. After decades of religious oppression, they were finally free to practice their religion and give their children whatever names they wanted. All the laws prohibiting religious rituals were reversed and the new democracy meant that Muslims minority populations would have a voice in both local and national governance. Unfortunately, the "Wild, Wild East" atmosphere that characterized the transition to free markets led to a corrupt privatization of GORUBSO in the late 1990s. Although the mines were still full of ore, the shady new owners intentionally drove the company into bankruptcy, selling off almost-new equipment as scrap metal and refusing to pay the miners the back wages that were due to them. A gang of predatory elites in local government, allying themselves with newly formed organized criminal networks, embezzled the special funds sent to the municipality of Madan to help retrain the miners. The local economy was decimated.

One Pomak taxi driver told me: "When you build a new house, you live in the old house until the new one is ready. In Bulgaria, we tore down the old house before even breaking ground on the new one. Now, we live on the street."

In 1990, there were almost 47,000 workers employed in the non-ferrous metals sector in Bulgaria, most of whom worked for GORUBSO. By the time GORUBSO went bankrupt in 1999, there were only 3,000 employees remaining. Between 1999 and 2000, 2,800 of these lost their jobs, including Fikret. This left only 200 miners working in an enterprise that once employed tens of thousands.

Factories and workshops that were once teeming with workers now stood empty, their windows cracked and roofs collapsing. As people fled the city, stores were shuttered and schools closed. Aysel lost her job, too. Their neighbors moved back to their villages to farm and tend livestock. Madan became a ghost town. Without jobs, the remaining Pomaks sunk into a level of poverty not experienced since the pre-communist era. Whole families removed themselves from the market, returning to a way of life based on subsistence farming. Many Pomaks now live in conditions similar to those of the 19th century.

For about forty years, Madan was a modern city. Ordinary people had heat, electricity and indoor plumbing. They also shared a dream that their children's lives would be better than their own. To miss communism is not merely to be nostalgic for lost youth. It is also disappointment in the loss of a possible future. ◁

Kristen R. Ghodsee, who participated in the conference "From the Iron Curtain to the Schengen Area: Bordering Communist and Postcommunist Europe", is John S. Osterweis Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies as well as Director of the Gender and Women's Studies Program at Bowdoin College (Brunswick, Maine). Her most recent book is *Lost in Transition: Ethnographies of Everyday Life After Communism* (Duke University Press, 2011).

On Transformation and Normality

BY PHIL HANSON

It is not only the end of the Cold War that has changed the landscape of Comparative Economic Studies. The developments in the countries which the comparativists used to study left plenty of scope for historical studies of dead economic systems and how they had once operated. As comparative economic systems in its Cold War form has declined, two related bodies of literature have grown and become more prominent: Varieties of Capitalism and the new institutional economics. Expertise on particular nations can still be deployed, together with other skills, to tell us something new and persuasive about the world.

Like other comparativists of my generation, I began teaching courses in comparative economic systems at a time when the developed world was divided between two competing social and ideological systems, communism and capitalism. Comparative Economic Systems was quite a popular undergraduate course—if any economics course can be popular—in the US. I started teaching it in Britain, at Birmingham University, in the 1970s. The usual undergraduate course was about countries. We could have studied companies as systems, but that was left to management specialists and others. We could have studied cities as economic systems but that was left to urban planners and social critics. We did nations.

More precisely, we studied the consequences for the functioning of national economies of major differences in the institutional arrangements with which they operated. This is a behaviourist's definition: in other words, it is simply a summary of what we actually did, in research and teaching, under the heading of comparative economic systems, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. We did not usually address the causes of these institutional differences. Nor did we, by and large, address the question of how economic institutions changed over time.

Why do I describe all this in the past tense? I do so primarily because the end of the communist-capitalist confrontation made many of our concerns suddenly historical rather than contemporary. And most people in the field were addicted to current affairs, not history.



Photo: Bundesarchiv

The core components of the usual undergraduate course in the 1970s and 1980s were, first, a review of different desirable properties of an economy: allocative efficiency, growth and/or dynamic efficiency, stability and equity were on the standard list; then came ways of measuring national performance according to these criteria; theoretical models of different kinds of economic system: free-market capitalism, capitalism with indicative planning, Soviet-style central planning, workers' self-management, market socialism (without worker management); then case-studies of the working of each of these types of economy in practice; then assessments of their performance against the criteria discussed earlier, and conclusions.

Notice that this standard Cook's Tour of the world was a great deal more than a comparative economic study of the US and the USSR. Therefore it is not only the end of the Cold War that has changed the landscape of Comparative Economic Studies. For anyone teaching a course on these lines in the 1970s and 1980s, one development out there in the wider world was particularly striking: the number of alternative economic systems in existence kept declining. Teachers of almost any subject you care to name usually find that their subject is constantly expanding. Ours was shrinking. That was partly, but not wholly, to do with the collapse of communism.

My Cook's Tour of case-studies originally included French indicative planning, the Japanese employment system, Yugoslav self-management, the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism (as an approximation to market socialism) and Soviet-style central planning. (Like many others, I learnt to steer clear of China. I did include it for a couple of years, but found it impossible to tell a coherent story about post-1978, reformed China.)

These variants in national economic institutions came to resemble a red list of endangered species. French indicative planning withered to the point where, by the mid-1970s, the subject was largely historical. The Japanese employment system seemed more robust, but it was by all accounts considerably weakened in the 1990s.

Yugoslav self-management came to an end along with Yugoslavia itself. That suggested it did not have a great deal going for it as a working economic system, once the League of Communists of Yugoslavia lost control. Ljubo Sirc and John Moore had both argued much earlier that the Yugoslav model was more smoke and mirrors than a real instance of devolved worker-management. They seem in retrospect to have been justified.

Analysis preceded history in the case of Hungary, too. Janos Kornai's 1986 *Journal of Economic Literature* article showed rather convincingly that improvements in Hungarian economic performance under the New Economic Mechanism, such as they were, had come from the new de facto private sector, not from the attempted decentralization of the state sector. Three-to-four years later, really existing Hungarian socialism, whether decentralised or pseudodecentralised, was abandoned.

Soviet central planning, of course, shuffled off its mortal coil in 1989–91. George Soros described its demise succinctly when he wrote in 1989 that the Soviet Union had "a centrally planned economy with the center knocked out".

These developments left plenty of scope, of course, for historical studies of dead economic systems and how they had once operated. Work by Paul Gregory, Mark Harrison and others shows that this can still be a subject of great interest, with implications that are not necessarily relevant only to our understanding of the past. Nonetheless, comparative economic studies, as conceived during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, had almost disappeared.

Expertise on particular nations can still be deployed to tell us something new and persuasive about the world.

Many economists who worked on socialist countries before 1990 operated in the "country specialist" tradition. By that I mean that they considered it necessary to have a good knowledge of the history, society and politics of the country or countries they especially worked on, and would tend in their work to take into account these non-economic influences on economic performance and economic policy. They might do comparative economic analysis involving "their" countries and other nations, but anyone reading their work could reasonably say, "This author is a Russia-watcher (or Poland-watcher, etc.) as well as an economist".

By 1990 university economics departments had for some time been decreasingly hospitable environments for this sort of specialist. If the Russia-watching or Poland-watching economist could demonstrate advanced analytical and quantitative skills, they might get by: that is, get appointed, get tenure, and even move up the hierarchy of economics departments. But country-specific knowledge counted for little. European and Japanese universities were somewhat more hospitable than American universities to the humble country-watcher, and so were government departments, think-tanks and some banks. But the university trend was strong. This intensification of economics as an academic subject has affected the ways in which comparative economic studies could be undertaken.

As comparative economic systems in its Cold War form has declined, two related bodies of literature have grown and become more prominent: Varieties of Capitalism and the new(er) institutional economics. The former has emerged chiefly from departments of political science; the latter is more 'economic' so far as the cadres involved are concerned.

Both of these sub-fields are mildly hospitable to country-watchers. They do not however create much if any space in economics departments for specialists whose main strength is their knowledge of a particular country. What one can see, however, is the development of a literature in which one or other of these approaches is combined to good effect with detailed country knowledge. ◁

This contribution is partly based on an article for the ***Japanese Journal of Comparative Economics.*** *Phil Hanson relied on this text in his keynote speech delivered at the final conference of the CAPITO project on October 21, 2011.* *See page 10.*

Phil Hanson is Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, and Emeritus Professor of Political Economy at the University of Birmingham. He has published extensively on economic systems and transformation with a particular focus on Russia and the Soviet Union, including *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy.*

Anything New?

BY JÁNOS MÁTYÁS KOVÁCS

Economic pundits often look at Eastern Europe as steering a course between the American and European models. However, this approach may underestimate the historical legacies as well as the potential for innovation in the region. How can we take account of the distinctive character of the emerging capitalist régimes, especially in light of the recent changes introduced in Hungary? Quick thoughts after a pilot project.

Our study on post-communist capitalism in Eastern Europe has begun in the gloomy days of the economic crisis—evidently, bad times for passing balanced judgements. Fortunately, it was not meant to either curse or bless the emerging regimes of capitalism but, as the title of the research program *"CAPITO. Understanding Nascent Capitalism in Eastern Europe"* suggests, to comprehend them. The pilot phase of the program is over[1]; I have six voluminous country studies on my desk, and am meditating on the future of our research endeavor.


János Mátyás Kovács

Photo: IWM

The many hundred pages of the country studies would not have been written if the CAPITO research group[2] had been satisfied with what we found in the growing literature on comparative capitalism while finishing a previous project on economic cultures.[3] Then, we badly needed some firm knowledge of the emerging capitalist regimes, in which these cultures were embedded, and asked questions like these: is there such a thing as Polish, Romanian, Russian, etc capitalism two decades after the 1989 revolutions? If there is, do these kinds of capitalism differ essentially? Do they also differ significantly from other types of capitalism in the "West" and the "South"? If there is no such thing as Polish, Romanian or Russian capitalism, is that due to the fact that their regimes are still "transitory" or is capitalism likely to remain/become relatively uniform in the region anyway? Or should we rather forget about country types and look for dissimilarities on the level of individual regimes?

Beyond metaphors

We knew that it is really hard for Eastern Europeans not to craft their own national types of capitalism when they cannot open a newspaper that would not tell who the current winner is in contests such as "building the market", "good governance" or "fighting corruption". Of course, the most influential "rating agency" is the European Union, which employs an accession design, based on a peculiar average of Western European capitalisms, to measure the "matureness" of the would-be member states. Small wonder that the ensuing rivalry mobilizes in Eastern Europe the spirit of incessant typology-making. But what do we learn from the fact that the day before yesterday Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary had been, while yesterday Slovenia and Slovakia were, the favorite "transforming states" in the region? If one considers just two of the recent frontrunners, it is perplexing to see Slovakia and Slovenia praised for diametrically opposing features: the former for courageous moves of liberalization, the latter for *not* making those moves. To put it bluntly, the former is portrayed as a "big Chicago" while the latter as a "small Austria".

Our reserach group hoped to choose from ready-made typologies of Eastern European capitalism in the scholarly literature. Instead, we were inundated by thought experiments, most of which aimed to construe national types with the help of catchy metaphors such as nomenklatura capitalism, simulated capitalism, patrimonial capitalism, clan capitalism, mafia capitalism, dependent capitalism, Wild-East capitalism, casino capitalism, cocktail capitalism, etc. No matter if these concepts originate in older paradigms like Comparative Economic Systems, or newer ones like Varieties of Capitalism, to name only the most influential sources, they reflect just the current history of a few countries and/or fields of the post-communist transformation. Moreover, many of these metaphors serve to unveil alleged communist, nationalist, neoliberal or post-colonial conspiracies.

The firework of adjectives illuminates much, but probably leaves even more in the dark. CAPITO set out to go beyond high-sounding metaphors and map emerging capitalism in four core fields (property regimes, market regulation, welfare regimes, political economy) in six countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Serbia) by means of literature analysis, field studies and expert evaluation using a great number of comparative variables based on relatively impartial hypotheses.

Why not claim, we asked, that the new capitalist regimes are likely to differ both from the established ones and between one another at least in three important respects: (1) this is not the first time that capitalism emerges in these countries, and on this occasion capitalism was preceded by communism; (2) capitalism takes root under the heavy influence of two rivaling capitalist models, to put it simply, America and Europe, not to speak of their multiple submodels (and, increasingly, China); (3) the new capitalist regimes are not only engineered/invented by the elites but also (often invisibly) by the societies at large, and capitalism-making probably does not stop at mere recombination, *bricolage* and improvisation. This somewhat common-sensical reasoning brought us to a down-to-earth scheme of "tradition, emulation and invention" (*tremin,* for brevity). To put it simply, you either inherit an institution, copy it or build a new one—or, much more likely, tend to combine these procedures.

Our research group did not feel any *furor comparationis* that should lead to distinct country types. We did not mind finding, in the end, a high degree of similarity between the national paths of capitalist evolution. (At any rate, that is exactly what our previous project on economic cultures brought forth.) We did not predict to face a bunch of equally "normal capitalisms" (Shleifer-Treisman) but any kind of methodological nationalism was also alien to our mindset.

Convergence or divergence?

However cautious our working hypotheses may have been, I am surprised to see now how little divergence is exhibited by our studies of capitalism across the country lines. The *tremin* scheme has not discovered conspicuously traditionprone, or, on the contrary, extremely innovative countries. Instead, we identified a large number of essentially uniform moves of emulation throughout the region. Although in a varying rhythm, the countries under scrutiny "forgot about" (did not really reactivate) their own precommunist capitalisms and neutralized much of their communist legacy during the past twenty years. Apparently, the illustrious concept of path dependency does not quite apply after passing an early stage of the post-communist transformation. As regards the external impacts, most of the countries under scrutiny swung from "Americanization" to "Europeanization" at the turn of the millennium. To put it bluntly, they left the supposedly dangerous waters of the Washington Consensus for the safe haven of the EU. (This sounds a bit ironical today, doesn't it?)

However, if one descends from the national level, institutional convergence between the countries may coincide with considerable divergence between the evolution of the individual capitalist regimes in the four fields we examined. Probably, this is an important reason for the fact that ongoing emulation resulting in sustained convergence on the national level within the "East" does not necessarily lead to an ever-growing similarity with the "West". That is even more so if one studies not only the legal constitution but also the actual performance of the nascent regimes. Unilateral rapprochement, to use an oxymoron, between Eastern Europe and the EU, however stormy and successful it was in the beginning, seems to get stuck, or even suffer a setback in certain fields in many countries. Hence, for a long time to come, the capitalist regimes in the region as a whole may remain more statist/redistributive, oligarchic, informal, corrupt, rent-seeking, *anti-solidaire,* exposed to populist cycles, etc, than most of the Western European ones (provided that these do not change in an "Eastern" direction).

This is, of course, nothing else than a bird's-eye view of present-day Eastern European capitalism. Probably, a more colorful picture featuring divergent national types would emerge if (a) additional countries entered the comparison, and (b) the local "spirits" and discourses of capitalism as well as the flesh and blood actors were observed more closely. The next phase of the CAPITO program should open up to include these research goals. However, no matter how thoroughly we refine the research design, the typologies will continue to be fragile if the countries undergo "revolutionary" changes like those in Hungary today. Let me conclude with this.

Two years ago, the Hungarian government had not yet started renationalizing large enterprises and confiscating the private pension funds, my country still had an independent constitutional court and budget council as well as a free media, there was no one-party state yet, and the ideologues of the governing party did not flirt with the idea of the "Chinese Road" and expect the *Untergang des Abendlands* to happen soon. If in a way or another, Hungary managed to release itself from the world of the Copenhagen criteria while remaining within the EU, one of our preliminary conclusions that links convergence between Eastern European capitalisms to the gravitation force of the Union would be severely challenged. Perhaps the "revolution" will pass away under the pressure of the EU, causing double joy: one for the astonishing experience that "European values" do matter, and another—maybe smaller—one for the fact that we do not have to restart comparison because of a sad episode in the history of Hungarian capitalism. ◁

[1] *The project was generously supported by the Jubiläumsfonds of the Austrian National Bank.*

[2] *Originally, the group included Dragos Aligica, Roumen Avramov, Jacek Kochanowicz, Mladen Lazic, Violetta Zentai and myself. Later, we invited Georgy Ganev, Mihaly Fazekas, Leonid Kosals, Aura Matei, Jelena Pesic and Karol Pogorzelski to join us.*

[3] *See János Mátyás Kovács and Violetta Zentai (eds),* ***Capitalism from Outside? Economic Cultures in Eastern Europe after 1989,*** *CEU Press, Budapest 2012.*

János Mátyás Kovács is Permanent Fellow at the IWM and non-resident Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest. He heads the CAPITO and NEUJOBS research teams at the IWM.

Russia's Choice: Change or Degenerate

Political Salon with **Lilia Shevtsova,** October 10, 2011

Photo: IWM

He'll be back". Political analyst Lilia Shevtsova explains what Vladimir Putin's self-nomination as candidate in Russia's 2012 presidential elections means for the country.

Vladimir Putin's decision to reclaim the Russian presidency raises the possibility that he could rule the country until 2024. This foreshadows a continuation of the system of "managed democracy" that many in the West, as well as in Russia, criticize as being anti-democratic. "This filthy deal by the country's supreme authorities is a blow to the institution of the presidency," said Russian political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky in a radio interview after Putin's self-nomination.

What would Putin's return mean for Russia's political and economic future? Will the country face an era of stagnation? Or will Putin manage to re-invent himself? At the Political Salon on "Russia's Choice" on October 10 2011, Lilia Shevtsova, political scientist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained that Russia has only two alternatives: to change or to degenerate.

With Putin as president, degeneration is more likely, she said. In order to reform, the country would need political and economic competition, an independent judiciary, and a de-monopolization of state-owned companies such as Gazprom. None of this is likely to happen, however, since every change would entail a loss of power for Putin. Instead of getting involved with politics, more and more young and well-educated Russians are simply leaving the country to work and live abroad. More than 150,000 people have emigrated in the last three years, according to Shevtsova.

One reason is that current president Dimitri Medvedev's efforts to modernize the country have failed. Putin, on the other hand, still has the backing of the Russian elites. Despite their wish for more economic competition, political pluralism and the rule of law, there is a prevailing fear of liberalization: "They are afraid that if the government opens a window, such as Gorbachev once did, the people will revolt and the country will collapse." Another factor is corruption. The elites know that as long as they are loyal to Putin, politics will not address the problem of corruption seriously. However, as the economy slumps, Putin's electoral basis is beginning to crumble. Putin's answer to this will be to tighten the Kremlin's mechanisms for controlling society. Will Putin stay forever? It seems that transformation in Russia can only come as a result of a "Moscow Spring." As history has shown, Russian revolutions can have dramatic consequences. Putin's rule, Shevtsova concluded, offers Russia no other alternative. ◁

Sven Hartwig

Lilia Shevtsova is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and Moscow.

Discussants:

Christian Ultsch, Editor for Foreign Affairs, *Die Presse*

Ivan Krastev, Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; Permanent Fellow, IWM

In cooperation with ***Die Presse*** *and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance.*

Political Responses to Religious Diversity in India

Monthly Lecture: Rajeev Bharagva, October 11, 2011

Photo: IWM

How to deal with the growing religious diversity in secular societies? Are there any models politicians can learn from? Rajeev Bharagava undertook an assessment of present-day relations between state and religion and offered an alternative way to manage the pluralism of faiths. As a starting point, he clarified the concepts of "secularism" and "religious diversity" and proposed a distinction between "internal" (vertical/horizontal) and "external" (surface/deep) diversity; this enables the identification of discrete dimensions of religious plurality as well as the tracking of differences between models of state-religion relations. The distinction provides evidence that some models of secularism deal with particular aspects of religious diversity while neglecting others, which often translates into a sensitivity towards *intra*-religious but not *inter*-religious dynamics. Building on these remarks, Bhargava considered three normative responses: the American "mutual exclusion model," the French "one-sided exclusion model", and the Western European "separation and support model." This comparison led into Bhargava's presentation of his "principled distance model," the premises of which are: separation, understood as principled distance; contextual moral reasoning; critical respect; and modern—though not necessarily "Western"—character. The novelty of this proposal lies in its multi-value perspective, which takes into account both individual and communitarian rights and values. Moreover, due to the model's sensitivity to inter- and intra-religious dynamics, it is particularly suitable for profoundly diverse societies. Referring to Hindu-Muslim minorities in postcolonial India and to religious policies in the 3rd century B.C. Indian Empire of Ashoka, Bhargava demonstrated that some of the premises of "principled distance" have long been established on the subcontinent. ◁

Agnieszka Pasieka

Rajeev Bhargava is Director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi and Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

City Talks: Wrocław

City Talks: Rafał Dutkiewicz, October 18, 2011

Photo: IWM

For the first time in history, more people worldwide live in cities than in rural areas. Cities form the intersection of global flows of people, goods and information. This means that the central questions regarding the future of our societies will be decided in cities. It is time to bring cities into conversation with each other, to discuss what challenges they face, where they can learn from each other, and which mistakes can be avoided. The new discussion series "City Talks" invites mayors of European and American cities to Vienna to discuss their visions of urbanity in the 21st century. The first in the series was Rafał Dutkiewicz, the mayor of Wrocław, one of Poland's biggest cities. Wrocław has been modernized steadily since 2002, when Dutkiewicz was elected head of the city. Nowadays, it is often called "the Polish Silicon Valley", after Dutkiewicz managed to attract new technology companies such as Hewlett-Packard and Google. More than 130,000 students go to Wrocław's Technical University. The city's success story was made possible by the "three T's", said Dutkiewicz: talents, technologies and tolerance. The tolerant climate of the city may be one reason why Wrocław is to be the European Capital of Culture in 2016. Despite Poland's boom after joining the EU in 2004, it remains a challenge to assure the city's future: Poland has too much bureaucracy and too little money, according to the mayor. Asked what he would do for his city if he were rich, Dutkiewicz responded without hesitation: "Buy a museum of modern art and an American university." ◁

Sven Hartwig

Rafał Dutkiewicz is mayor of Wrocław (Poland). In 2008 he was longlisted for the World Mayor Award.

Discussants:

Alexander Van der Bellen, Member of the Austrian Parliament and Spokesperson for International Developments and Foreign Affairs, Austrian Green Party; Special Commissioner for Higher Education and Research, City of Vienna

Konrad Kramar, Foreign Editor of the Austrian newspaper *Kurier*

In cooperation with ***Kurier.***

What's the Matter with Hungary?

Political Salon with **Charles Gati** and **György Schöpflin,** October 19, 2011


Charles Gati


György Schöpflin

Photos: IWM

Twice in recent history have Hungarians been Europe's heroes. In 1956 they fearlessly faced up to Soviet tanks and fought for their ideals. In 1989 they courageously opened the borders that separated them from Western Europe. Yet since Viktor Orbán's landslide election victory in 2010, the days of heroism seem to be over. Last April, the Hungarian parliament—in which the Fidesz-led government coalition holds a two-thirds majority—passed a new constitution that many critics see as a clear departure from shared European standards for liberal democracy. Prior to that, a new media law was passed that considerably curbs the freedom of the press. Many formerly independent institutions have been staffed with Fidesz members. Is Hungary becoming an authoritarian state, or are fears of the "Orbánization" of Hungary unfounded? György Schöpflin and Charles Gati discussed the question and found there was not much they could agree on. According to Schöpflin, the idea of an endangered Hungarian democracy is mainly a fabrication of the Left and the Western media. Fidesz's two-thirds majority did not come about by chance, he pointed out: many voters wanted political change and modernizing reforms. That may very well be true, Gati responded, but Fidesz was not honest to its voters. Most of the new laws were not a topic in the Fidesz election campaign: virtually no one would have voted for media restrictions or the nationalization of private pension funds. Orbán is losing support, Gati observed, which is why he is attempting to turn Hungary into a "managed democracy." ◁

Sven Hartwig

Read also Charles Gati's contribution on the crisis of the EU ***in Tr@nsit Online.***

Charles Gati is Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.

György Schöpflin is a Hungarian Member of the European Parliament for the European People's Party.

Chairs:

Ivan Krastev, Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; Permanent Fellow, IWM

Christian Ultsch, Foreign Editor, *Die Presse*

In cooperation with ***Die Presse*** *and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance.*

Die Elenden von Łódź

Buchpräsentation mit **Steve Sem-Sandberg** und **Martin Pollack,** 24. Oktober 2011

Photo: ww2today.com

Am 24. Oktober 2011 diskutierte der österreichische Schriftsteller und Publizist Martin Pollack mit seinem schwedischen Kollegen Steve Sem-Sandberg in der Wiener Hauptbibliothek über dessen neues Buch *Die Elenden von Łódź.* Der Berliner Schauspieler Ulrich Matthes las Passagen aus dem Werk.

Sem-Sandbergs Roman, der 2011 in deutscher Übersetzung bei Klett-Cotta erschien, reiht sich in die Tradition von Primo Levis Buch *Die Untergegangenen und die Geretteten,* Imre Kertész' *Roman eines Schicksallosen,* Schalamows Kolyma-Epos oder Herta Müllers *Atemschaukel.* Der Autor liest diese Werke als „Zeugnisse des totalen Zusammenbruchs menschlichen Handelns und Verantwortungsgefühls (…): ein Kollaps, so gewaltig in Art und Umfang, dass er über jeden Versuch hinausgeht, ihn mit ausschließlich historischen, politischen oder psychologischen Begriffen zu erklären" (in seinem Essay „Auch die unaussprechlichen Schrecken zur Sprache bringen", in: *Eurozine,* www.eurozine.com).

Im Rückgriff auf die Chronik, die die Bewohner des Gettos von Łódź von 1941 bis kurz vor ihrer Deportation nach Auschwitz 1944 verfassten, hat Sem-Sandberg einen vielstimmigen Roman geschrieben, der neben der zentralen Figur des Judenältesten Rumkowski das Leben der Gettobewohner porträtiert und ihnen so ein Gesicht gibt. „Ich wollte rekonstruieren. Es ist eine Art Theater im Kopf (…). Der Leser wird sehen, dass mein Roman ein Buch über Macht und Machtlosigkeit ist. Dafür zeigt es Beispiele. Es zeigt auch, dass Grausamkeit eine Überlebensstrategie sein kann. Am Ende verhält sich Rumkowski genauso wie seine Peiniger. Ein Romanschriftsteller ist bemüht, die Bedingungen des menschlichen Lebens zu zeigen, er sieht sie in den großen Themen und im Kleinen. Er zeigt die Mechanismen." ◁

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Steve Sem-Sandberg ist Schriftsteller und Journalist. Im Jahr 2008 war er Milena Jesenská Fellow am IWM, wo er den Roman *Die Elenden von Łódź* fertigstellte. Für das Buch wurde Sem-Sandberg mit dem schwedischen »August-Priset« ausgezeichnet, der dem Deutschen Buchpreis entspricht. Der Roman wurde in zahlreiche Sprachen übersetzt. Der Autor lebt in Stockholm und Wien.

Martin Pollack ist Schriftsteller, Journalist und literarischer Übersetzer. Sein aktueller Roman heißt *Kaiser von Amerika. Flucht aus Galizien.* Im Jahr 2011 wurde er für sein Werk mit dem Leipziger Buchpreis zur Europäischen Verständigung ausgezeichnet.

Eine Kooperation des IWM mit dem Verlag Klett-Cotta, der Hauptbücherei Wien, ***Eurozine*** *und der Schwedischen Botschaft in Wien.*

Betreuung und Pflege in fragmentierten Gesellschaften

Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben; Vortrag von **Erna Appelt,** 3. November 2011


Photo: IWM

Die Organisation von Pflege- und Betreuungsarbeit – der Sorge für Kranke, Kinder und ältere Menschen – hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten dramatisch verändert. Der Wohlfahrtsstaat zieht sich zurück, privatwirtschaftliche Angebote und häusliche Pflege nehmen zu. Betroffen von diesen Entwicklungen, so Erna Appelt in ihrem Vortrag, sind vor allem Frauen. Sie leisten heute den Großteil unbezahlter wie schlecht bezahlter Pflege- und Betreuungsarbeit. Die Folge dieser geschlechtsspezifischen Strukturierung von „Carework" ist eine zunehmende Ungleichheit der Lebenssituationen von Frauen: ihre persönliche Lebensgestaltung wird eingeschränkt, verstärkt durch eine oft nicht einmal existenzsichernde finanzielle Kompensation. Doch Geschlecht ist nicht die einzige Ungleichheitskategorie in diesem Zusammenhang. Nicht nur Frauen, sondern auch Arbeitskräfte mit Migrationshintergrund sind im Bereich der Sorgetätigkeit überrepräsentiert. Längst ist Sorgearbeit „global care", denn erst die Arbeitsmigration von Sorgetätigen ermöglicht das Funktionieren des Care-Bereichs in den wohlhabenden Bevölkerungssegmenten mit der problematischen Folge, dass gleichzeitig Versorgungslücken in den Entsendeländern der Arbeitskräfte entstehen. Für eine Verbesserung der Situation der betroffenen Pflegearbeiterinnen tut die Politik zu wenig. Die österreichische Betreuungspolitik beispielsweise privilegiert noch immer die traditionelle Ehe und Familie, wodurch die geschlechtsspezifische Verteilung von Sorgetätigkeiten fortgeschrieben wird. Um die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter zu verwirklichen, empfiehlt Appelt daher einen umfassenden familienpolitischen Mix aus Karenzmöglichkeiten, monetären Leistungen und Sachleistungen. Der Kampf um Gleichstellung, so warnte sie allerdings zum Abschluss, dürfe nicht auf Kosten von Sorgetätigen mit Migrationshintergrund geführt werden. ◁

Louise Kubelka

Erna Appelt ist Professorin für Politikwissenschaft und Leiterin der Forschungsplattform Geschlechterforschung an der Universität Innsbruck.

Kommentar:

Judith Schwentner, Grüne Sprecherin für Frauen- und Entwicklungspolitik im Nationalrat

In Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt.

Russlands Krise und der Kreml

Seminar mit **Gleb Pavlovsky,** 22. November 2011

Der ehemalige Kreml-Berater Gleb Pavlovsky stellte am IWM Thesen zur gegenwärtigen politischen Verfasstheit Russlands zur Diskussion.

Russland sei von dem Paradox gekennzeichnet, dass es nach außen hin offen gegenüber dem Weltmarkt ist (und gleichzeitig abhängig von ihm), innen aber allenfalls über eine Markt-Travestie verfügt: ein instabiles, risikobehaftetes System von intransparenten Arrangements, die von der Administration kontrolliert werden. Es sei sinnlos, hier von Korruption zu sprechen, da dies die Unterscheidung zwischen legal und kriminell voraussetzt; in Wahrheit habe die herrschende Macht die Wirtschaft außerhalb des Gesetzes gestellt. Im Übrigen regiere der Staat in Russland nicht über Institutionen, vielmehr mittels fortgesetzter Intervention; Ordnung werde ersetzt durch die Demonstration von Ordnung. Dieses Modell von Gouvernementalität (Foucault), verkörpert vom Tandem Putin/Medwedjew, sei heute in einer tiefen Krise. ◁

red

Gleb Pavlovsky ist Direktor der Foundation for Effective Politics und Herausgeber des Onlinemagazins *Russian Journal.* Zwischen 1996 und 2011 war er politischer Berater des Kreml.

Lösungen der Probleme von „Care“

Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben; Vortrag von **Birgit Pfau-Effinger,** 6. Dezember 2011

Photo: IWM

Wie sorgt eine Gesellschaft für ihre Alten, Kranken und Schwachen? Was, wenn ökonomische Prinzipien in die Gestaltung der Sorgetätigkeiten Einzug halten? Allgegenwärtige Spannungen im Care-Bereich analysierte Birgit Pfau-Effinger mit Blick auf die aktuelle Situation in Deutschland. Als Vorreiter der europäischen Pflegepolitik führte Deutschland in den 1990er Jahren ein neues Pflegeversicherungsgesetz (SGB XI) ein. Der seitdem gesetzlich verankerte Anspruch auf staatliche bzw. staatlich finanzierte Pflege bestärkte in zweierlei Hinsicht eine Vermarktlichung von Sorge: Pflegeleistungen innerhalb der Familie werden durch finanzielle Transferleistungen als ökonomische Arbeit sichtbar – wenn auch angesichts der Höhe der Beträge nicht von einer tatsächlichen Entlohnung gesprochen werden kann. Darüber hinaus werden Pflegebedürftige nicht als Klienten, sondern als Konsumenten definiert, die frei zwischen verschiedenen – auf den „Pflegemärkten“ konkurrierenden – ambulanten Diensten wählen können. Zielsetzung der Pflegereform war eine Reduktion der Abhängigkeit von familialer Pflege sowie ein Gewinn an Autonomie im Alter. Der Anteil derjenigen, die im Haushalt von Familienangehörigen gepflegt werden, hat sich jedoch bis heute kaum verändert. „Warum“, fragte Pfau-Effinger, „wird der beabsichtigte Autonomiegewinn nicht angenommen?“ Kulturelle Werte bilden den Orientierungspunkt der Entscheidungen Pflegender wie Pflegebedürftiger, zeigen Pfau-Effingers Studien. Zentral ist das Bedürfnis nach „sozialer Einbettung“: Für eine qualitativ hochwertige Pflegebeziehung stünden Vertrauen, Kommunikation, Zuwendung sowie die flexible Anpassung an Pflegebedürfnisse – Werte, denen ambulante Dienste anscheinend nicht gerecht werden. Angesichts der am Pflegemarkt vorherrschenden Marktlogik bestehe die Befürchtung, als Bedürftige/r zu kurz zu kommen, bloß „nach der Uhr gewaschen zu werden“. Durch marktlogisches Denken im Care-Bereich, kritisierte Pfau-Effinger daher, ignoriere die Politik das Bedürfnis nach stabilen sozialen Pflegebeziehungen. ◁

Julia Rudolph

Birgit Pfau-Effinger ist Professorin für Soziologie und Direktorin des Centrum für Globalisierung und Governance, Universität Hamburg.

Kommentar:

Anita Bernroitner, parlamentarische Fachreferentin der Grünen für Frauenpolitik, Gleichbehandlung und Pflege

In Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt.

Poland Between Two Totalitarian Powers (1933–1939)

Monthly Lecture: Marek Kornat, December 13, 2011

Photo: Private

Poland's political and diplomatic situation before the outbreak of the Second World War was difficult if not impossible. In his lecture, Marek Kornat sketched a picture of the Polish state's attempts to better its situation between 1933 and 1939. The greatest problem for the country, alongside its domestic difficulties, was its "highly unstable external position" vis-à-vis both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. Józef Piłsudski, the dominant figure of interwar Polish politics, chose a middle way between Germany and Russia in 1934, attempting to maintain relations with both powers without succumbing to either, prioritizing this balance over developing relationships with smaller neighbor states. After Piłsudski's death in 1935, Polish foreign minister Józef Beck continued this policy of equilibrium. The result was a flurry of diplomatic activity during the 1930s, beginning with the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932 and a similar pact between Poland and Germany in 1934. Numerous agreements followed in an attempt to stabilize Poland within its borders, including negotiations with France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Lithuania. Following the collapse of the Locarno order, efforts intensified; the British guarantees to Poland in April 1939 provided some security against an increasingly hostile Germany. The last diplomatic agreement of the interwar period, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, struck Polish leaders as "unbelievable" and served as a deathblow to the Piłsudski-Beck political order. Yet despite this failure and the outbreak of war, Kornat, in agreement with the majority of Polish historiography, argues that Poland's attempt to maintain equilibrium between its neighbors was the only acceptable course of action in a world where all other alternatives were morally unacceptable or impossible. ◁

Jadwiga Biskupska

Marek Kornat is Professor of History of International Relations at Cardinal Wyszyński University, Warsaw, and Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

„Modern, aber nicht säkular“: Grundrisse islamischer Reform im 21. Jahrhundert

Reihe: Beyond Myth and Enlightenment / Rethinking Religion in the Modern World mit **Gudrun Krämer,** 15. Dezember 2011

Photo: IWM

Der Streit um die Mohammed-Karikaturen, die Verfolgung kritischer Intellektueller, Zwangsheiraten und Ehrenmorde – Islam und Moderne scheinen aus der Sicht vieler westlicher Beobachter nicht zusammenzupassen. Doch der demokratische Aufbruch im Arabischen Frühling hat gezeigt, dass Muslime nicht in einem vergangenen Jahrhundert leben, sondern längst in der modernen Gesellschaft angekommen sind. Gleichzeitig gibt es mit den jüngsten Wahlerfolgen von am politischen Islam orientierten Parteien, wie Ennahda in Tunesien oder den Muslimbrüdern in Ägypten, bereits Befürchtungen, dass es in den Ländern des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens zu Rückschritten kommt und ein ‚Arabischer Herbst' bevorsteht. In ihrem eine neue Reihe eröffnenden Vortrag bewertete Gudrun Krämer die Umbrüche in der Region und analysierte mit einem Blick in die Vergangenheit, ob und inwiefern der Islam überhaupt reformfähig ist. Tatsächlich gibt es im Islam eine jahrhundertealte Tradition der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der religiösen Praxis. Im Unterschied zum westlichen Verständnis von Reform geht es im Islam jedoch weniger um eine auf die Zukunft gerichtete Entwicklung, sondern eher um eine Wiederherstellung vergangener Verhältnisse. Doch so wenig, wie es *den* Islam gibt, gibt es *die* Reform. Die unterschiedlichen religiösen Strömungen unterscheiden sich vielmehr in ihren Reformansätzen. Neben den radikalen Salafisten, die die – imaginierte – gesellschaftliche Ordnung zur Zeit des Propheten Mohammed wiedererrichten wollen, stehen innovative Bestrebungen von Gruppen, die bereit sind, Neues anzunehmen und den Koran im Lichte der Gegenwart zu interpretieren. Gemeinsam ist allen Reformversuchen, dass sie einen zivilen Staat mit einem religiösen Referenzrahmen anstreben. Dies bedeute aber keine „Re-Islamisierung“. Vielmehr sei es erstmals seit Jahrzehnten wieder möglich, in muslimisch geprägten Gesellschaften offen zu diskutieren, welche Rolle Religion in der Politik spielen soll. Das, so Krämer abschließend, sei nicht nur die Wiederaufnahme einer Tradition, sondern auch ein Bekenntnis zur Modernität. ◁

Sven Hartwig

Gudrun Krämer ist Professorin für Islamwissenschaft an der Freien Universität Berlin. Kürzlich erschien von ihr das Buch *Demokratie im Islam.*

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Inside the Bloodlands

A DISCUSSION BETWEEN TIMOTHY SNYDER AND SYBILLE STEINBACHER

In his critically acclaimed book ***Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin,*** *Timothy Snyder, Permanent Fellow at the IWM, presents the mass murders committed by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes as two aspects of a single historic frame and in the time and place where they occurred: between Germany and Russia, when Hitler and Stalin both held power. The IWMpost documents a discussion between Snyder and Vienna-based historian Sybille Steinbacher, which took place on the occasion of the presentation of* ***Bloodlands*** *at the IWM in October 2011.*

Sybille Steinbacher: The particular strength of your book lies in the double perspective that you choose. You look at the Nazi and Stalinist policies of mass murder as a whole, the entire panorama of the crimes, the excesses of both the one and the other in the "bloodlands", the landscape of death. This is the first study ever to have undertaken this combined analysis.

Another of the book's strengths lies in the way you respect people's suffering. You look at individual fates, allow the sources to speak, as representatives of all victims of persecution, Jewish as well as non-Jewish.

The book is also impressive in its broad reception of international research and its use of sources in many different languages. Just a couple of examples: the Holodomor, which you describe, and its consequence for individuals; or the fate of the Poles immediately after the beginning of the Second World War, whom both sides persecuted with the aim of wiping out Polish society.

Another aspect you emphasize strongly is that the summer of 1941 marked not only the beginning of the systematic murder of the Jews, but also the moment at which a whole series of other groups began falling victim to German policy: Red Army soldiers, Red Army commissars, large numbers of civilians, Soviet prisoners of war. There is still very little known about these people, particularly those killed on Soviet territory.

Also important is how you include the Holocaust in the overall context of the development of violence. You portray it as one of several Nazi extermination projects and relate it to the annihilation strategy of the so-called *Generalplan Ost*. The plan included murdering up to 45 million people in the conquered regions of the Soviet Union in order to implement the policy of "ethnic reallocation of land", the concept of *Lebensraum*. The Holocaust was the part of this extermination plan that was realized.

My first question concerns the beginning of the murder of the Jews in the summer and autumn of 1941. You link this event to Hitler's disappointment with the way the war was going, with the increasing prospect of military defeat. You say that the murder of the Jews was, to a certain extent, compensation for the negative military development, an attempt to realize this utopia at least, even if it looked unlikely that the war could be won quickly. However, there is also a contradictory thesis, the so-called "euphoria thesis", which is supported by Christopher Browning, for example. He says that it was a result precisely of Hitler's certainty about winning this war in these crucial months in 1941. Hitler no longer needed to bother about world opinion and was confident that the Soviet Union would soon be conquered.


Timothy Snyder

Photo: IWM

Why do you opt so strongly for the "depression thesis?" Especially since the murder of the Jews was unique insofar as the Jews were still persecuted even in the face of defeat. 1944 was when the persecution reached its height, when the Jews were deported from all the territories occupied by the Germans. It was only in the summer of 1944 that Auschwitz reached the climax of industrial annihilation with the mass murder of 400,000 Hungarian Jews. It seems to me that here one does in fact need to look at the issue of ideology, and that is a point that is somewhat neglected.

The national paradigm has its limits, even when you're trying to explain national conflicts.

Timothy Snyder: There's a good deal of disagreement about how Hitler understood the events of summer 1941: one argument—which I'm closer to—holds that there was a certain sense of defeat. Another argument is that there was a kind of euphoria of victory. So let's take a couple of steps back, because I want to make it clear that the question about what the Holocaust was is really two questions. First there's the question of how you characterize the Holocaust: what was it, now that it is all over? The answer is that it was an attempt to exterminate Jews wherever German power reached. It was a distinct policy in that sense; you can distinguish its character from other German policies. I think that's correct and that pretty much everyone agrees that's correct.

Then there's a second question, which is the historical question. Very often we think that because something is distinct, we don't have to explain it historically. But that's a fallacy. The Holocaust *was* different—but every policy is different and every policy has to be explained historically. If we think that just because the Holocaust was distinct, or worse, we don't have to explain it, that we're free to take it out of history, then we're in an extremely bad position. Because the people who want to take the Holocaust out of history are generally not friendly people, if we consider it for a moment.

To say that commemoration is enough, that memory is enough, is one sided. The fad for commemoration and memory came, the fad for commemoration and memory will go. It will go in our lifetimes. What will not go is history, which has been around for about a couple of thousand years and is the fundamental human way of understanding the world. It is very important to have a historical account of the Holocaust. One can know why it was specific and why it was different—and it *was* specific and different. That's very important to know. But it's at least as important to be able to explain how it could have happened, and you cannot explain that without appealing to history.

In my account, there's a deep background of imperial rivalry between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany which happens to concern above all the territory where most European Jews lived. That itself would be enough to foresee bad things for the European Jews. But, as you rightly say, there was something special about the way the Nazis understood the Jews. Jews were the explanation for everything that went wrong, well before things really started to go wrong. The Jews were the explanation; they were the default scapegoat.

This is what German historians have done incredibly well and are continuing to do better and better—if you think of Peter Longerich's recent books, which are wonderful: the central idea there is the spread of the politics of anti-Semitism among Germans, German institutions, German society and so on. I think that this is an indispensible part of the explanation of the Holocaust. But to have a Holocaust means you need to have Jews under German power. Not only was there no Holocaust in Germany before 1939, when Hitler had been in power for about six years, there was no Holocaust in Germany *per se*. Nor could there have been one as we understand it, since there were only a couple of hundred thousand Jews in Germany.

The joint invasion of Poland with the Soviet Union and then the invasion of the Soviet Union meant that Nazi Germany now controlled millions of Jews. You need to explain why Nazi Germany carried out these two eastern invasions, and you can't do so by saying that they wanted to control Jews—that's not the case. Their idea was to eliminate Jews, not to have lots of them under their control. They invaded Poland and they invaded the Soviet Union because there was a larger idea of imperialism, but this larger idea of imperialism also has to do with anti-Semitism.

So why did the Germans think that they could destroy the Soviet Union? Because their understanding of the Soviet Union was essentially anti-Semitic. They thought that the Soviet Union was a Jewish state with a Jewish layer at the top that was bewildering and controlling the Slavic *Untermenschen* at the bottom. So the imperial idea of going east and conquering land and turning it into a great empire was integrally connected with the anti-Semitic idea that Jews were communists and communists were Jews, and therefore that the Soviet Union not only should but could be conquered. All that was in Hitler's mind, as is very clear from his writings, before the actual invasion of the Soviet Union. And then we get into things which historians can disagree about.

My own view is that it was actually a case of something like the euphoria of defeat. I think that Hitler did feel euphoric in the autumn of 1941; I think that he felt euphoric because he was trying to convince himself—despite the evidence—that things were going well. But I would emphasize that whatever one thinks about Hitler's psychology, everyone now understands that when the Holocaust began it had something to do with the eastern front. The question is just about the precise "when" and the precise "how".

If you look at it this way, you then actually see the priority of anti-Semitism, because when things started going wrong, when certain things got out of control, what the Germans bore down on was the final solution. This partly has to do with other things going wrong, but also probably with what was going right, because some things on the eastern

front actually turned out better than the Germans had expected.

They learned on the eastern front, for example, that you could shoot thousands of Jews at a time—that you could shoot tens of thousands of Jews at a time. Before that they didn't know that they could do this. And they also didn't know that they could recruit local helpers to do this, who were indispensible. The Germans were learning what they could do in 1941. One of the things that they could do was shoot Jews in large numbers close to where they, the Jews, lived. That knowledge was one of the preconditions of the final solution of the Holocaust as we understand it.

Steinbacher: I'd like to follow this up with a question about your concept of the "bloodlands" as a space. It is, ultimately, a space that you yourself define and that from the moment of Stalin's policy of famine in Ukraine in 1932/33—this is where you start your study—you call a landscape of death. Yet the "bloodlands" make up a region with a much longer tradition of violence, where violence had been on the daily agenda at least since the First World War, and also where the Russian Civil War had played out. A region with massive ethnic conflict.

Wouldn't it be worthwhile to move from space to society and to ask how these ethnic conflicts influenced and structured the social force-field in the "bloodlands"? Ethnic conflicts that both the Nazis and Stalin used for their own ends, since both understood how to exploit these conflicts and play neighbors off against one another. You don't discuss the impact of this prior experience on the development of violence from 1932 onwards.

Snyder: What I have been writing about for most of my career is precisely the *longue durée* of ethnic politics, the emergence of nations, the difference between early modern and modern nationalities. One of the conclusions I came to was that the national paradigm has its limits, even when you're trying to explain national conflicts; that the Germans and the Soviets had to be brought into the picture, and it was this thought which actually led me to *Bloodlands*.

I've written another book, called *The Reconstruction of Nations,* which is about basically the same territory, and in that book, the Soviets and Nazis appear as causes of the nationalization of populations—that was my argument. But they only appear in order to serve my argument, and I realized at the time that there was something unsatisfactory about this—that any truly satisfactory history could not just focus on the nations and then bring in the outside forces, but it had to treat the outside forces as being in some way integral. And that's what *Bloodlands* does.

There's an episode of Ukrainian-Polish ethnic cleansing between 1943 and 1947 which I wrote a great deal about. I came to it as an issue of nationality and the ways I tried to write about it had to do with Ukrainian-Polish nationalisms—which do matter. But the ethnic cleansing would never have happened without all three occupations: the point is that it happened in a place which was first occupied by the Soviets, then by the Germans, and then by the Soviets again. Without all three occupations, the ethnic cleansing would not have happened. And that was why I came to the idea of double and triple occupation, which also led me towards *Bloodlands*. This isn't to say that ethnic cleansing should not be a subject in Polish-Ukrainian history; but if you want to understand how it happened, then you have to bring in the greater causes.

Steinbacher: My next point has to do with the interaction of the two regimes. You make explicit the relationship between the two dictatorships: the temporal, the structural, and the political aspects. Reading your book, one immediately understands that violence is contagious. Yet I still wondered what exactly this interaction looked like: how can it be made tangible, how can it be grasped, how can the interdependencies, the dynamic of violence that arises from the interaction be characterized?


Sybille Steinbacher

Photo: IWM

Snyder: The striking thing to me is how little importance learning had, how little the Nazis actually learned from the Soviets. The easiest argument to make is that Germans were watching with the intention to learn. They saw the Soviet Union in terms that were not only anti-Semitic but very, very vague and impossible.

The Nazis thought that the Soviet Union couldn't possibly have been efficient, because, you know, it's the personality of *Untermenschen.* But it was. It was much more efficient in locating people, and even in killing particular people, than the Nazi regime ever was. The Germans got better at killing large numbers of people indiscriminately, but they were never as good in deporting people, they were never as good in finding people, they were never as good in breaking resistance, they were never as good in killing people defined as individuals. By 1941 or 1942 the Germans were killing people on a larger scale, but the Soviets never had the ambition to destroy an entire group like that.

What I want to say is that we have this incredible institutionalization of bias which says that the Germans were very efficient and the Russians were not. And it's wrong. The NKVD was incredibly precise and well organized. The Germans learned by doing. We want the Germans to have had a plan, because that's our ethnic stereotype, and we want them to have performed precisely, because that is our ethnic stereotype—but they didn't. They had vague ideas, they threw people at problems; those people came up with practical solutions, which then filtered back up to the top. The Soviets were much more organized, things came from the top down and were fulfilled. Unless we get clear of these ethnic stereotypes we have no chance of understanding what went on.

The way that I think about interaction is a little bit different. I think the interactions have different types. One type is a kind of transnational interaction, where things happen inside one society because things happen in another society. In his election campaign in early 1933, Hitler was arguing to German middle-class voters—with significant success—that they shouldn't vote for the SPD, because voting for the SPD meant voting for the Marxists. And what do Marxists do? They create horrible famines like the one going on in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Communists and the Socialists in Germany couldn't cooperate. Why not? Because the party line coming from Moscow said: class conflict. Why was that the party line? It was the party line because of the famine in Ukraine. According to Stalin, there was a class conflict going on in Ukraine and therefore, as long as that was the line for inside the Soviet Union, it was the line for outside the Soviet Union, no matter how inappropriate and catastrophic it would be for Germany and for everyone else. That was the transnational connection, which is often unintentional, but very important.

If we think that just because the Holocaust was distinct, or worse, we don't have to explain it, that we're free to take it out of history, then we're in an extremely bad position.

Then there's the ideational connection. The Germans had a view of what was happening in the Soviet Union and they wanted to undo it, they wanted to reverse it. You can't understand Göring's four-year plan without knowing what Stalin's five-year-plan was, because much of the four-year plan was to undo the five-year-plan. You created cities—we'll destroy them. You've put up factories—we'll destroy them. You have increased the population in your western zones—we will wipe out that increase by starving it.

Then, there's military alliance, which is a much more tangible form of interaction. The Germans and the Soviets were *de facto* military allies. They attacked the same country—we could say in coordination with each other. The Soviets then supplied the Germans as they bombed London, invaded the Low Countries and France and so on.

And then there's another category of interaction, which is provocation. The Germans killed three million Soviet prisoners, or four. Why so many? Because Stalin didn't allow the Red Army to retreat when he should have. Does that make it his fault? No, it was a German crime, but it's relevant that Stalin didn't care about the individual lives of Red Army soldiers. The Germans shot about 300,000 Belarusian civilians between 1942 and 1944. It was a German policy to shoot civilians in so-called retributions. But sometimes the Soviets intentionally provoked those retributions because they knew that retributions were good for recruiting. This is what you do if you are a terrorist or a partisan: you provoke the other side into doing things that are so horrible that you can then benefit from them. Does that make these retributions a Soviet crime? No. But it does mean that, if you want to understand them, you have to look at Soviet policy.

So, interaction is a category which contains different sorts of things within it. In general, and interestingly enough, it very often doesn't contain the simplest things, which would be imitation or learning.

Steinbacher: The last point I'd like to touch on has to do with the context of the politics of history in which your book stands and in which it came about. You're interested in connecting the historiographies of Western and Eastern Europe. You wish to create a pan-European historical awareness based on the history of totalitarian systems, among other things in the interests of a successful EU policy.

In doing so you are referring to a highly complicated "competition of memories". On the one hand, there is Western memory culture, in which the Holocaust became the emblem of evil in the 1990s. On the other hand, there is Eastern European memory culture, where the suffering of entire groups of victims of persecution occupies the central position. Why don't you reflect on this in your introduction? After all, it provides the structure of your book, perhaps even the contours of the "bloodlands" themselves?

Snyder: I think that a historian has two duties. The first duty is to be faithful to the people he or she is writing about in the past and the second duty is to be intelligible to the people he or she is writing for in the present. I wanted this book to be intelligible to Poles and Israelis and Latvians and Californians and Irish and Portuguese; and in order to be intelligible, I have to take into account what people *think* they already know and what people *do* already know. And that's why the introduction is so categorical and is about space and numbers; it's trying to reset the mind for the book that is going to follow.

I think that myths and politics, habits of thinking clannishly, habits of thinking in ethnic terms make it hard for us to understand this past. I was trying very hard not to care about all that. This is not an intervention in a political-historical debate. I take into account where people are, because I want to communicate with them, but if I were trying to push the discussion in a certain way, then I would overemphasize some things or overemphasize other things. More importantly, the book would no longer be *aktuell* after about six months. I've been thinking about this book for about twenty years, and twenty years ago, the historical preoccupations of people were very different from what they are today. Twenty years from now, when I hope modestly that the book will still be read, historical preoccupations will be different again. ◁

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Timothy Snyder is Bird White Housum Professor of History at Yale University and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. His book *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* has been translated into more than 20 languages. He is currently working on a family history of the East European nations tentatively entitled *Brotherlands.*

Sybille Steinbacher is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Vienna. She is author of *"Musterstadt" Auschwitz – Germanisierungspolitik und Judenmord in Ostoberschlesien; Auschwitz: Geschichte und Nachgeschichte* and editor of *"Volksgenossinnen": Frauen in der NS-Volksgemeinschaft.*

Europe and the Threat to Open Society

BY IVAN KRASTEV

What we are witnessing in Europe today is the emergence of a new illiberal political consensus that blames the failure of social integration on immigrants, favors national interests over European interests, and mistrusts state institutions. In the coming decade, the rise of xenophobia and anti-immigrant politics and the clash between the principles of democratic majoritarianism and those of liberal constitutionalism will be at the center of the struggle for open society in Europe. The existence of liberal institutions makes the defense of open society easier in Europe than in any other place in the world, but their mere existence is not enough to guarantee a liberal order.

Photo: Ferenc Isza, AFP / Getty Images

The European Union," George Soros noted in 2006, "embodies the principles of open society and ought to serve as a model and motive force for a global open society." Just five years later, Europe is in a state of quiet desperation. The fundamental question is whether the EU will be able in the future to remain not only a force for promoting open societies in the world, but also an open society itself. Demographic issues, the rise of populist ideology, the loss of geopolitical importance and a lack of leadership are key factors that explain Europe's current paralysis.

It is often said that demography is destiny and indeed it is a kind of "demographic imagination" that shapes European politics today. The general public fears that society is ageing and shrinking. People fear that immigrants and ethnic minorities are overtaking their countries and threatening their way of life. They fear that European prosperity can no longer be taken for granted and that Europe's influence in global politics is in decline. The latest global survey of "hope and despair in the world", conducted by Gallup, showed that prosperous Europeans are among the most pessimistic citizens on the planet. At the close of the last century, Europeans saw themselves as the big winners from globalization. Today a majority of Europeans view themselves as losers from those same currents. Forced to decide between opening their borders in order to preserve their prosperity and closing them in order to preserve the cultural identity of their societies, Europeans have turned against those imposing such a Hobson's choice. They want both: prosperity and fortress Europe. In the changing world of today, Europe is the place where "change" turns out to be a negative concept.

Europeans' reaction to the Arab revolutions is just the latest and most graphic demonstration of this trend. The Arab revolutions are not European revolutions: neither a repeat of 1989 by Arabs born in 1989, nor a re-enactment of 1848 in the age of social media. Arab protesters do not regard European societies as a model to be imitated, nor membership of the EU as the final object of their striving. But these non-European revolutions can still affect Europe as profoundly as did the continent's own revolutions of 1989 or 1848. They test the EU's transformative power and its relevance in international politics, and they test the ability of European societies to adjust to the globalized world, in which Europe is no longer the nerve center of modernity but merely one of its richest provinces.

Contrary to the expectations of many political observers, the economic crisis has not weakened the appeal of identity politics—on the contrary. It was the xenophobic Right and not the egalitarian Left that gained the greatest political benefit from the crisis. Even more salient is that the Left-Right divide that has structured European politics since the French Revolution is gradually losing its grip on reality. Threatened majorities—those who have everything and who fear everything—have emerged as *the* major force in European politics. According to a British Government report of 2008, white people in Britain were less likely to feel that they can influence decisions that affect their country than non-white minorities.

What we are witnessing in Europe today is the emergence of a new illiberal political consensus that blames the failure of social integration on immigrants, favors national interests over European interests, and mistrusts state institutions. It is not the rise of rightwing radicalism that challenges the survival of open societies but the transformation of the European mainstream. In the coming decade, the rise of xenophobia and anti-immigrant politics and the clash between the principles of democratic majoritarianism and those of liberal constitutionalism will be at the center of the struggle for open society in Europe. European liberalism needs to be reinvented in the context of economic stagnation, cultural insecurity and concomitant loss of trust in democratic institutions.

Identity Politics and Populism

A poll on identity and extremism conducted in February 2011 found that a huge number of British citizens would support an anti-immigration nationalist party as long as it was not associated with violence and fascist imagery. In the words of a member of the current British cabinet, Islamophobia has passed the "dinner table test" and is now accepted as normal and uncontroversial. In France, opinion polls showed that if presidential elections had been held in March 2011, the far-right leader, Marine le Pen, would have been one of the two winners in the first round of voting. A survey conducted in in May 2011 by Germany's Forsa Institute indicated that "rightwing ideas appeal to an unexpectedly broad portion of the population." Seventy per cent of those surveyed said that Germany gives too much money to the EU; almost half wanted Germany to drastically reduce immigration; and thirty per cent said that they would like an "independent Germany, without the euro, where the EU holds no legal sway." Rightwing ideas clearly find support both on the Center Right and the Far Left. As is well known, in Denmark, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, and recently Finland, anti-immigrant parties are reshaping national politics.

Unlike in Western Europe, in Central and Eastern Europe fear of immigrants is not the defining political issue—principally because of the absence of large numbers of immigrants. But levels of xenophobia and racism are striking and much higher than in Western Europe. A study on focused enmity, conducted in eight European countries by Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 2010, showed that 77 per cent of Hungarians view immigrants as a burden to

the welfare state, and that the majority of Hungarians and Poles oppose the integration of foreigners in their own culture. It is reasonable to expect that, broadly speaking, "nonnatives" will be at the center of European politics over the next decade. The expected influx of immigrants into Central Europe could lead to new waves of anti-immigrant populism. Not for the first time in European history, cosmopolitan elites and so-called undesirable minorities will be the enemies of choice for the person on the street.

It should be said that the populist actors on the ascendant in Europe today are not anti-democratic, but they are agitated by constitutional limitations on majority rule. At the heart of the populist agenda is an attempt to convince democratic majorities that the rights of minorities are being protected at the expense of their own. Populist governments—Hungary being the classic recent example—have declared war on the independent institutions that are crucial for the functioning of an open society: namely the courts, the media, central banks and independent watchdogs. Nationalism, too, is back in fashion.

The example of Hungary also suggests that in the current state of affairs the EU is an unreliable guardian of citizens' liberties. While the EU provides an impressive framework for defending human rights, it is not a sufficient safeguard against illiberal politics. The EU is effective in containing the populist backlash only in those cases where there is a strong liberal opposition within the country with whom it can partner. This was the case in Poland; it is not, however, the case in Hungary.

In short, the existence of liberal institutions makes the defense of open society easier in Europe than in any other place in the world, but their mere existence is not enough to guarantee a liberal order. The change in the public mood and the fact that rightwing and populist organizations are taking the initiative in many parts of Europe will make it impossible to neutralize populist pressures solely by relying on liberal institutions such as courts of law. This is particularly evident in Central Europe, where courts are corrupt and mistrusted by the citizens. The success of the liberal response to populism will instead depend on the ability of open society actors to build constituencies, present an alternative and be active in civil society.

We are in a situation where new populist parties are openly anti-liberal while liberal elites are secretly anti-democratic, hoping to keep the upper hand by manipulating the public. The outcome is that open society is threatened both by the populism of the masses and the manipulations of the elites. It is symptomatic that a respected Polish professor recently suggested that, in order to prevent the populist temptation imbedded in democracy, citizens should be required to complete a test on political competence before being allowed to vote. In similar spirit, a former Bulgarian foreign minister, Solomon Passy, proposed that a specially designed computer program be used to check the election manifestos of political parties for consistency and realism, and that only parties with realistic programs be allowed to run for office. At a time when lack of leadership is one of the greatest problems facing Europe, it is crucial that we do not mistake elites' arrogance for anti-populism.

Europe's Disintegration Moment

The process of European integration that started after World War II is not irreversible. The Great Recession and its aftermath has revealed one of Europe's best kept secrets: that pan-European solidarity has an institutional but not a popular base. Public resistance in several northern member states to the rescue plans for Greece, Portugal and Ireland demonstrated that solidarity does not cross national borders. In fact, the gap between economic integration and political integration threatens the very survival of the European project. We are witnessing a re-nationalization of politics, a process that is very likely to escalate in view of the current economic malaise.

Whether the EU can survive a decade of economic stagnation is not a question that is easily answered. Some of the factors that explain the success of the European project in the past are no longer present. The economic prosperity that secured public support for the EU will begin to decline in many member states. The EU faces a decade of austerity that will require not only IMF-like macroeconomic belt-tightening, but also a major reform of the European welfare state. According to the IMF's own projections, even if the reforms in Greece succeed, Greek society will only reach its pre-crisis GDP a decade from now.

Shared historical memories of World War II have also faded. There is currently no narrative able to mobilize public support for the EU. The paradox is that, while no major political or social actor openly advocates the disintegration of the EU, the rise of anti-elite sentiments means that the Union can easily become hostage to the domestic political games of its member states. The True Finns party almost succeeded in blocking the bailout of Portugal; the Danish People's Party was able to force the government to reintroduce national border controls, thus undermining one of Europe's main achievements: the free movement of people. For the moment these are just accidents, but they could prove fateful. We should beware of a vicious cycle: some governments will respond to populist pressure by introducing policies that openly contradict the objectives of European integration. The advance of such policies will make the EU less effective and less credible—and the more the EU loses credibility, the more that opposition to it will grow. Europe has been witness to this dynamic more than once in the twentieth century. ◁

Ivan Krastev is Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. He is also a Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

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Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–March 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in History, Tomsk State University

The Influence of Historical Revisionism on the Development of Contemporary Russo-Polish Relations

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Jadwiga Biskupska
Józef Tischner Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in History, Yale University

A Nation Undone: Nazi Policy and the Subjugation of Warsaw

Helene Dearing
Junior Visiting Fellow (September–October 2011)

Doktorandin der Volkswirtschaft, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

Elternkarenzmodelle in der Europäischen Union

Ludger Hagedorn
Patočka Research Associate (December 2010–November 2012)

Lecturer in Philosophy, New York University Berlin; Research Fellow, IWM, Vienna

Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka's Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

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Mihaela Herbel
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2011–April 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in International Relations and European Studies, Babes Bolyai University, Cluj

The Politics of Deliberative Spaces in Romania. Social Movements in the Context of Governance Changes

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Philip Howe
EURIAS Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Associate Professor of Political Science, Adrian College, Michigan

Well-Tempered Discontent: Democratic Institutions and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in a Multinational Empire

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Tom Junes
Bronislaw Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (December 2011–September 2012)

Visiting Lecturer in History, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; Visiting Researcher, University of Warsaw

Rebellion, Hope and Frustration: Coming of Age when the Cold War Ended

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Marek Kornat
Visiting Fellow (July–December 2011)

Lecturer in History, Polish Academy of Science; Professor of History of International Relations, Cardinal Wyszyński University, Warsaw

National States and Diplomacy in East-Central Europe in the Interwar Era (1918–1939)

Louise Kubelka
Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2011–February 2012)

Doktorandin der Rechtswissenschaften, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

Elternkarenzmodelle in der Europäischen Union

Andrey Levitskiy
Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–March 2012)

Senior Lecturer in Theology and Education, Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University, Yekaterinburg

Religious Education, Multiculturalism and Secularism: International Comparative Perspectives

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Olha Martynyuk
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in Ukrainian History, National Technical University of Ukraine, "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute", Kiev

Ethnic Conflict, Urban Development, and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie in Late Imperial Kiev

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Agnieszka Pasieka
Bronislaw Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–March 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in Social Anthropology, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale

Seven Ways to God. The Dynamics of Religious Pluralism in Rural Southern Poland

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Gleb Pavlovsky
Global Europe Dialogue Fellow (November–January 2012)

Director of the Foundation for Effective Politics and the Editor of the *Russian Journal,* Moscow

The Future of Russian Politics

David Petruccelli
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in History, Yale University

International Criminal Policing in Europe, 1890–1950

Stefan Popov
Visiting Fellow (September 2011–January 2012)

Executive Director, RiskMonitor Foundation, Sofia

Policy Metaphors, Policy Failures: Organized Crime, Anti-Corruption, and Good Governance

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Oleksiy Radynski
Milena Jesenská Fellow (July–September 2011)

Editor-in-Chief of *Krytyka Polityczna,* Kiev; Columnist for *krytykapolityczna.pl* and *openspace.ru*

The End of Sport

Elizabeth Robinson
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Speaking in Circles: Metaphysics and Mathematics in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

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Ben Roth
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

The Narrativizing Self

Julia Rudolph
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–January 2012)

Doktorandin der Philosophie, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

Elternkarenzmodelle in der Europäischen Union

Sándor Sajó
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (July–December 2011)

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest

Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Phénoménologie de la perception (French > Hungarian)

Elitza Stanoeva
Tsvetan Stoyanov Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2011–April 2012)

Ph.D. candidate in History, Technical University Berlin

The Socialist City Center of Sofia: Disciplining Architecture and the Monumental Body (1944–1989)

Ksenia Timofeeva
Paul Celan Fellow (July–September 2011)

Freiberufliche Übersetzerin, St. Petersburg

Hans Joas: Die Entstehung der Werte (Deutsch > Russisch)

Victoria Vasilenko
Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–March 2012)

Assistant Professor of Contemporary History and International Relations, Belgorod National Research University

The Polish Question and 1945 as a Transitory Period

Dean Vuletic
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (October–December 2011)

Post-Doctoral Fellow, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence

Zvonimir Dobrovic, Gordan Bosanac: An Oral History of Homosexuality in Croatia (Croatian > English)

For Varia, Publications and Articles and Talks please see page 22.

Ein anderes Europa

INTERVIEW MIT KLAUS GRETSCHMANN

In der Eurokrise wurde nicht nur die Hilflosigkeit der Politik im Umgang mit den Ursachen und Lösungen eines finanziellen Kollaps deutlich, sondern auch eine Krise des europäischen Projekts selbst. Droht das Ende der Europäischen Union, wie wir sie kennen? Oder kann gerade der drohende Niedergang zu einer Wiedergeburt der EU führen? Der deutsche Ökonom Klaus Gretschmann, ehemaliger Berater Gerhard Schröders und bis 2011 Generaldirektor im Rat der EU in Brüssel, diskutierte am 12. Dezember bei einem Politischen Salon mit Michael Fleischhacker von der ***Presse*** *und Leonard Novy vom IWM die Handlungsspielräume europäischer Politik im Angesicht der Krise. Mit ihm sprach Oliver Grimm von der* ***Presse.***


Michael Fleischhacker


Klaus Gretschmann

Photos: IWM

Die Presse: Hätten Sie sich als Wirtschaftsberater des damaligen deutschen Bundeskanzlers Schröder gedacht, dass man 13 Jahre nach Schaffung des Euro bereits über seine Auflösung redet?

Klaus Gretschmann: Ich wette, dass es den Euro auch in 20 Jahren noch gibt. Die einzige Frage ist: Wer sind die Länder, die ihn tragen? Der Euro ist nach wie vor eine extrem stabile Währung nach innen und außen. Sehen Sie sich nur den Wechselkurs gegenüber dem Dollar an. Auch die Finanzkrise hat der Euro gut überstanden. Inflation? Kurz-bis mittelfristig kein Problem, bei 2–3 Prozent. Was heute deutlich wird ist, dass die Vielzahl von warnenden Stimmen in Wissenschaft und Politik, die uns frühzeitig darauf hingewiesen hatten, dass viele Sachfragen der Währungsunion ungeklärt seien, nicht ausreichend Gehör fanden. Da wäre z. B. das „One-size-fits-all"-Problem, also der Umstand, dass es in einer Währungsunion nur einen einheitlichen Zinssatz für alle Länder gibt. Eine differenzierte Steuerung unterschiedlicher konjunktureller Situationen über die Geldpolitik ist daher äußerst beschränkt. Oder die Frage, welches Modell besser geeignet ist, den Geldwert zu sichern: die (deutsche) Geldmengensteuerung oder das (englische) Inflation Targeting? Es war damals auch die Rede davon, ob wir auf längere Frist die Währungsunion um eine Fiskalunion ergänzen müssten. Und: Sind die Volkswirtschaften der Eurozone homogen oder zumindest konvergent genug für eine gemeinsame Geld- und Wirtschaftspolitik? Natürlich wussten wir damals, dass es in Europa ganz unterschiedliche Wirtschaftsmodelle gibt. Die Hoffnung war, dass mit der Einführung des Euro eine Bewegung hin zu einer gemeinsamen Wirtschaftspolitik entsteht. Das ist leider nicht in ausreichendem Maße eingetreten.

Die Presse: Hätte man damals auf die kritischen Stimmen hören sollen, die sagten: Wir sind in Europa zu unterschiedlich, um eine gemeinsame Währung zu haben?

Klaus Gretschmann: Natürlich gab es die Diskussion: Brauchen wir zuerst die politische Einigung und einen stärkeren Konvergenzprozess und bauen dann darauf eine Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion auf? Oder fangen wir mit dem letzteren an und die politische Union ergibt sich daraus dann quasi automatisch, wie das in der Geschichte der EU in vielen Bereichen tatsächlich häufig der Fall war? Wie sagte doch Massimo D'Azeglio, Mitbegründer des modernen Italiens: Erst schaffen wir Italien und dann die Italiener! Man hat sich aus politischen Gründen für die zweite Vorgehensweise entschieden, obwohl kritische Ökonomen davor gewarnt haben. Was damals herrschte, nenne ich *politischen Bewältigungsoptimismus.* Der blendet leider aus, dass Reformen das nach sich ziehen, was wir in der Ökonomie Inzidenzkosten nennen: also unbeabsichtigte Wirkungen und Nebeneffekte, die teuer werden können. Diese Art von Bewältigungsoptimismus ist uns leider bis heute erhalten geblieben.

Die Presse: Die Märkte misstrauen Europa, die Bürger ebenfalls. Was muss sich ändern?

Klaus Gretschmann: Mehr Transparenz und Klarheit für die Betroffenen und Beteiligten statt mehr oder weniger absichtsvolle Begriffsverwirrungen, etwa um Themen wie wirtschaftspolitische Koordination und Kooperation. Wirtschaftspolitische Koordination heißt eben nicht, wie oft suggeriert: Alle machen das Gleiche. Alle die gleichen Steuersätze. Alle die gleichen Ausgabenstrukturen. Alle die gleichen Schuldenstände. Das ist hanebüchener Unsinn. Dazu sind die Staaten, ihre Steuersysteme, ihre wirtschaftspolitischen Traditionen, die Präferenzen ihrer Bürger und deren Wünsche in Bezug auf staatliche Ausgaben viel zu unterschiedlich. Echte Koordination ist keine Harmonisierung, sondern muss heißen: Jedes Land gestaltet seine nationale Wirtschaftspolitik entlang seiner Stärken und Schwächen, und wir stimmen die Maßnahmen und Politiken in Europa so aufeinander ab, dass jeder möglicherweise etwas anderes tut, aber mit dem Ziel des Erreichens eines gemeinschaftlichen europäischen Gemeinwohls. Dasselbe Problem der Irrungen und Wirrungen haben wir beim Begriff Wirtschaftsregierung. Das ist zunächst eine hohle Floskel, unter der jeder verstehen kann, was er mag. Diese müsste man mit institutionellen Vorstellungen (ein europäisches Finanzministerium oder gemeinsame Festlegung von Stimulus- oder Kürzungsprogrammen durch die Regierungschefs oder, oder, oder…) auffüllen. Das traut man sich aber nicht, weil man Angst hat, der Bevölkerung in den Mitgliedsstaaten etwas politisch verkaufen zu müssen, was diese wahrscheinlich ablehnen würde.

Die Presse: Was ist ihre Alternative?

Klaus Gretschmann: Wir werden aus der gegenwärtigen Existenzkrise der EU nur dann herauskommen, wenn wir sagen: Wir brauchen ein anderes Europa. Immer mehr vom Gleichen kann nicht mehr die Devise sein. Wir werden nicht mehr allein mit der – manchmal polemisch „bürokratische Beglückungsmaschinerie" genannten – Brüsseler Apparatur weiterkommen, die eingespielt ist für die normalen Gesetzesvorhaben. Wir benötigen Modelle und Visionen, die über das von Habermas als *„postdemokratischen Exekutiv-Föderalismus"* bezeichnete Modell der Realität hinausgehen, wir brauchen Politiker, die visionär und charismatisch eine Idee von Europa haben, wir müssen eine europäische Identität schaffen, und Identität braucht bekanntlich *Identi-Täter.* Wissen wir eigentlich im Moment, wohin wir wollen? Das sehe ich nicht. Und wir müssen die Bürger Europas weit stärker einbeziehen als bisher geschehen. Eine meiner Lieblingsideen dafür ist: Wir brauchen in Europa nicht mehr Referenden, sondern mehr *„Präferenden"*.

Die Presse: Was sind *Präferenden?*

Klaus Gretschmann: Grundsatzentscheidungen werden heute in Europa häufig ohne öffentliche und gesellschaftlich tiefgreifende Debatten getroffen. Die Interessen und Wünsche der Bürger sind marginalisiert. Ihnen erschließt sich die Sinnhaftigkeit, der Nutzen Europas nicht mehr. Die EU hat eine Distanz zwischen sich selbst, ihren Apparaten und ihren Bürgern geschaffen. Um diese Distanz abzubauen, müssen wir herausfinden, was die Bürger Europas wirklich wollen. Was sind ihre Präferenzen und Anliegen? Dafür brauche ich nicht jedes Mal eine Volksabstimmung. Aber ich muss sehr viel stärker darauf achten, dass ich die Bürger mitnehme und dass Europa aus einer Eliteveranstaltung zu einer Veranstaltung wird, die die Bürger mittragen. Dazu taugen die Konsultationen von Interessengruppen nur wenig. Dazu brauchen wir die *Präferenden:* Das Instrument der Internetbefragung bietet dazu ungeahnte Möglichkeiten der Mobilisierung und Meinungsbildung von Millionen von Europa-Bürgern. So könnten und sollten Präferenden eingesetzt werden, *bevor* die Brüsseler Gesetzgebungsmaschinerie neue Initiativen auswirft. Dann könnten die Bürger Europas frühzeitig und direkt einbezogen werden. Auch könnte damit die Affirmationslogik europäischer Institutionen, die Kritiklosigkeit gegenüber sich selbst, korrigiert werden. Warum sind wir so selten in der Lage zu sagen: „Da haben wir etwas falsch gemacht, das müssen wir korrigieren"? Nein: Wir müssen immer alles rechtfertigen, was wir gemacht haben. Das verärgert die Bürger. Wir brauchen also eine kritische Theorie Europas über sich selbst. Dazu könnten Präferenden beitragen.

Die Presse: Interessanterweise hört man nun Befürworter einer stärkeren Föderalisierung aus ganz verschiedenen ideologischen Ecken: Der Philosoph Jürgen Habermas plädiert ebenso für eine föderale Vertiefung wie der polnische Außenminister Radoslaw Sikorski. Brauchen wir Vereinigte Staaten von Europa?

Klaus Gretschmann: Das hängt davon ab, was man sich darunter vorstellt. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa können eine Konföderation sein, ein Europa der Vaterländer sein, wie De Gaulle das wollte, oder auch ein Gebilde, das enger zusammenrückt. Das entscheidende Kriterium ist: Wie homogen ist das Gebilde? Werden die zentripetalen oder die zentrifugalen Kräfte, die Fliehkräfte, obsiegen? Ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, dass es eines Tages die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa gibt. Das wird jedoch ganz sicher nicht morgen oder übermorgen sein. ◁

Das Interview erschien in gekürzter Fassung am 10. Dezember 2011 in der ***Presse.***

Klaus Gretschmann war bis 2011 Generaldirektor der Generaldirektion C (Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Innovation und Forschung, Industrie und Informationsgesellschaft, Binnenmarkt, Wettbewerb und Zoll, Verkehr, Energie) im Generalsekretariat des Rates der EU; zuvor war er Abteilungsleiter im Bundeskanzleramt unter Gerhard Schröder; Berater von IWF, OECD und Weltbank.

Sad Truths About Serbian Media

BY IVAN ANGELOVSKI

A ministry that pays hundreds of thousands of euros to a newspaper for positive coverage; a telecommunications company that spends one third of its marketing budget for press services—the Serbian media is almost completely dependent on the country's political and business elite, a new critical report has shown. Not surprisingly, none of the newspaper, TV, radio or Internet media outlets in Serbia covered the story.

Photo: Joe Edwards / Flickr

There were no analytical reports in newspapers. No public debates on TV. Radio did not broadcast it, and it was removed from the Internet. You could not read about it anywhere. Well, almost—only if you knew exactly what you were looking for: the Anti-Corruption Council of the Serbian government issued a "Report on Pressure on and Control of Media in Serbia". The results were shocking. It showed evidence that some of the most influential Serbian media is almost completely dependent on the political and business elite.

The Council organized a round table and gathered the most important media experts in Serbia to present the report. Fifteen members of the press attended the conference, so the public could be well informed. Unfortunately, almost none of the newspaper, TV, radio or Internet media outlets covered the story. And if they did, it was completely stripped of all the juicy details. As Vukasin Obradovic, head of the Independent Journalists Association of Serbia, predicted at the round table: "We will get the answers to all the questions raised at the meeting (…) when we see which media will publish the reports from this meeting and to what extent."

Only two dailies and two TV stations featured a story about it. A short one. "Journalists from one Internet based media said they had published the story about the round table, but they had to remove it, after people from above had told them to get rid of it", the Council claims. This is the sad truth about Serbian media. The report showed that the "freedom of speech principle" in Serbia is confronted with a full scale of problems. The Media is open to unknown private and political interests, thanks to a lack of transparency in their ownership and the fact that major parts of their income are generated through various types of budget payments by state-owned companies and institutions. They are on the government payroll.

In the very first paragraph of the report, the Council claims: "(…) the media in Serbia is exposed to strong political pressure and, therefore, full control has been established. (…) There is no longer a media from which the public can receive complete and objective information (…)". Allegations are serious and the evidence, gathered after few months of research, is hard.

The Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, headed by Oliver Dulic, a ruling Democratic Party member, paid half a million euros to newspaper *Blic,* owned by German-Swiss publishing network Ringier Axel Springer, to publish topical appendices about the environment. As a result, during 2010, *Blic* published a number of texts, with Mr. Dulic in a positive context: "Dulic Is Taking 200 Builders to Kraljevo", "Environment Better Than in Previous Year", "1,633 Apartments Will Be Built Next Year", etc. At the same time, they turned a blind eye on conflict of interest accusations that his private computer hardware company, DG Comp from Subotica, was doing business with 70 federal institutions. This was a big scandal in 2010. The same scheme goes for other media as well.

Serbian Media is open to unknown private and political interests.

The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Health, both headed by ruling coalition member party G17plus, spent one million euros in total on different media services, such as TVB92, TV Pink, daily *Politika,* daily *Blic,* TV Avala, daily *Danas,* daily *Vecernje Novosti,* RTS (Serbian Public Broadcasting Service) and magazine *Status.* Thanks to this, Mladjan Dinkic, former minister of economy, and his party colleague Tomica Milosavljevic, former minister of health, had the largest number of positive articles about them in the aforementioned media, although both are very controversial.

Telekom Srbija, a state-owned telecommunications company, spends 30 m euros a year on marketing, out of which one third goes to media services. During 2008 and 2009, they spent most of this money for advertising on RTS (2.6 m euros), RTV Pink (2.2 m euros), RTV B92 (1.4 m euros), *Blic* (1.02 m euros) and *Vecernje Novosti* (934,000 euros). The head of Telekom Srbija is the former secretary general of Serbian President Boris Tadic. "This is probably one of the reasons why it was almost impossible to find a text that would critically examine the problem of the sale [of Telekom Srbija] or an analysis of its business operation", the Council says.

Besides paying for different sorts of advertising, the government and media established seven different models of procurement: from "specialised information services", to different "research services". For example, the Serbian Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises ordered research services from the company Ringier (publisher of daily *Blic*) for 44,800 euros—the job the Agency itself is registered for. The Council concluded: "Such jobs for which federal institutions hire media, which are not professionally qualified for research, such as this one, were used to hide the actual nature of the cooperation between the media and party officials, who are in charge of state institutions, because the subject of such transactions is actually a free political promotion of party officials."

Opposition politicians are using a somewhat different principle. They do not pay the existing media, but rather establish their own, so positive stories can also be published about themselves. That is the case with daily *Pravda,* owned by members of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). This also applies to the publishing company Vojvodina Info Group, which publishes various regional print media and whose owners are, among others, members of the Democratic Party of Serbia (of former prime minister Vojislav Kostunica). Besides publishing positive stories about their owners, those media are the harshest critics of the ruling elite—this is considered major ownership abuse.

The same kind of abuse is indicative of the media owned by controversial businessmen, in the shadows behind foreign and offshore companies. Two Austrian companies and one from Cyprus own *Vecernje Novosti,* a major national newspaper. Until recently, the real owner had been concealed; but then Milan Beko, a controversial Serbian businessman, admitted that he owns the paper. Considering the editorial policy of the daily, this fact had been obvious even before it was announced. *Novosti* are well known as defenders of big businessmen like Beko, or his partner Miskovic, portraying them as "patriotic businessmen", "intelligent business persons" and the like.

Austrian company Greenberg Invest GmbH, established by Viennese lawyer Johannes Krauss, is the co-owner of Serbian TV Avala, and, until recently, owned the weekly magazine *Standard.* It is widely suspected that the actual owner is Zeljko Mitrovic, who also owns the biggest Serbian TV station Pink. This is contrary to Serbian broadcasting law, forbidding that someone can own more than one TV station with national coverage. The same conflict is behind TV Prva and TV B92. The complex ownership structure of those two TV stations actually hides the fact that Minos Kiryaku, a Greek businessman, owns both.

"The Council's reports are always ignored by the government and the media. That's exactly why we have started this research—because without [objective] media there's no fight against corruption. Because corruption in media itself makes objective informing pointless, and public surveillance of budget spending impossible", says Verica Barac, head of the Anti-Corruption Council of the Serbian Government. The results that have emerged only confirmed her assumption. "Lack of media reaction means that the ruling elite is immune to any kind of control. They are so safeguarded within their media domination that no report can ever hurt them", Barac states.

The Anti-Corruption Council is a body of the Serbian government. Unfortunately, it is one of those bodies which government has established only to comply with EU standards. Although they have discovered many corruption scandals, none of their reports have ever reached the ruling elite. The same befell this report. "Corrupted government is keeping Serbian media at its service, so it can hide its own crime and corruption", Barac continues. "The government is responsible. They need to regulate this field and make media independency possible." As with all other reports, Barac has sent this one to Serbian PM Mirko Cvetkovic, along with a cover letter proposing a meeting to discuss its findings. She is still waiting for his response. ◁

Ivan Angelovski is an investigative journalist at the Belgrade TV station B92. He was a Milena Jesenská Fellow at the IWM between October and December 2011 (supported by ERSTE Foundation).

The Sense of an Ending: Putin and the End of "No-Choice" Politics

BY IVAN KRASTEV AND STEPHEN HOLMES

Vladimir Putin will retain his grip on power for some time; but the regime he has built over the past decade has fallen apart and cannot be easily pieced back together.



Photo: Anna Jermolaewa

The protests of December 10th and 24th, 2011 were not a Russian version of the Arab spring. Nor did they represent the belated arrival of a Ukrainian-style colored revolution.

Russia is not Egypt, for one thing. Putin is much younger than Mubarak, he has been in power for eleven years compared to Mubarak's thirty, and the Russian population is much older than the Egyptian one and less charmed by the promise of democracy. The chances that the Russian army will side with the people are slight to non-existent and the Russian opposition lacks the organizational strength of the Islamists. While the protesters in Egypt succeeded in occupying the public square, protesters in Moscow merely visit it. Finally, the Russian authorities are better equipped financially and politically to stay in power.

Nor does Russia in 2012 resemble Ukraine in 2003. The crowds on the streets of Kiev rose up against a government that had cheated their chosen candidate of an electoral victory. The Russian protesters also feel cheated, but not because their votes for a favored party were stolen. In fact, they protested because there was no one to vote for, venting their fury against fraudulent elections as such: "These Elections Were a Farce," read the banners. Where the demonstrators' entirely negative anti-Putin outrage will take the country is therefore anybody's guess. What is certain is that "managed democracy" has collapsed before our eyes.

What is certain is that "managed democracy" has collapsed before our eyes.

But how exactly should we understand this "managed democracy"—an obscure system that until recently seemed set to be the way post-communist Russia would be ruled for the foreseeable future. Now—especially after the removal of its architect, Vladislav Surkov, from his central role overseeing Russia's electoral shenanigans—it has begun to look like an historical curiosity.

In order to unravel the enigma of "managed democracy," we need to answer some simple questions: what is the political function of rigged elections for a government that never really pretended to be a democracy? Why did rigged elections under Putin seem both meaningless and indispensable? And how come that *predictably* rigged elections all of a sudden unleashed such an outpouring of bitter recrimination and resentment?

Making sense of Putin's elections during the past decade is as important for getting his regime right as is making sense of the show trials in the 1930s for getting Stalin's regime right. An important task of Stalin's spin doctors seventy-five years ago was to use the trials' pre-decided verdicts to showcase Stalin's power—a demonstration that was all the more effective the more painfully innocent those were who, in a choreographed *mise-en-scène,* falsely confessed their betrayal of the Great Leader and were speedily executed for their compliance. Similarly, though much less cruelly, the show elections between 2000 and 2008 demonstrated the Putin government's puppeteer power. The Kremlin not only manipulated those elections, it also insisted (contrary to what one might expect) that everyone be made vividly aware that it was directing the movements of every single player in the electoral charade and orchestrating every apparent crisis in the run-up to an election. The Kremlin did not play the czar, it played God.

Until recently, the paradox of Putin's Russia has been that elections, although blatantly unfree and unfair, have been at the very heart

of both the regime's popular appeal and its authoritarian credentials. Just as Stalin's claim to power was based on his constant purging of the Party of never-ending internal enemies, Putin's claim to power has been based on his ability to organize elections that, although obviously rigged, have excited almost no open protest. It is also important to understand why parliamentary elections, despite the political impotence of the State Duma, have now proven to be the regime's most vulnerable point. While presidential elections (even the one that Medvedev "won" in 2008) have been referenda on Putin himself, the parliamentary elections have gradually evolved into a referendum on Putin's *system*. That is why they have become a lightning rod for civic restlessness and dissatisfaction. It proved much easier, psychologically, for a majority to vote against United Russia than against Putin, particularly bearing in mind that Putin himself has been publicly distancing himself from the party he created for much of the past year.

For a decade, the majority of Russians have been convinced that the elections were, yes, rigged. But they also believed that, had elections been free and fair, Putin would have won them easily. Even when labeling Putin "the most sinister figure in contemporary Russian history," a leading spokesman for the Russian human rights movement reluctantly admitted some years ago that, "Putin would have won the campaigns of 2000 and 2004—though perhaps without such large, unseemly margins—even if they had been free of vote tampering and the illegal use of the government's so-called 'administrative resources' and the candidates had actually had equal access to the voters through television and the press" (Sergei Kovalev). Opinion polls conducted by independent pollsters corroborated this view. Elections were meant not to choose Russia's rulers, then, but they did serve to dramatize the unquestioningly accepted reality of the Putin majority in Russian society.

Elections were of critical importance for Putin not only for the sake of legitimacy, but also for the sake of governability. Putin could not have governed for the past decade without the ritualized authorization provided by rigged elections.

Thus, by far the most important political role of sham elections during the past dozen years has been the way they have allowed Putin to display his capacity for manipulating them in an orderly and predictable way and thereby, paradoxically, to demonstrate his authoritarian credentials. Rigged elections, known to be rigged, are the cheapest and easiest way for the regime to mimic the authoritarian power it does not actually possess and thereby to bolster its faltering grip on the country, or at least give itself more breathing room. It takes only modest administrative capacity to rig an election; but a rigged election produces a disproportionate increase in the government's reputation for power and control. Organizing a pseudo-election is like wearing sheep's clothing to prove that you are a wolf. Noncompetitive Soviet-style elections simulate a centralized power that Putin's Kremlin spectacularly lacks. In a sense, fixed elections serve the same function as Red Square parades after the collapse of Russia's military strength: they allow the regime to thump its chest, even if many of the missiles turn out, on closer inspection, to be duds.

By engineering rigged elections that nobody bothered or dared to protest, Putin managed to conceal his regime's deepest secret, namely that Russia, rather than being misgoverned, is governed very laxly if at all. Contrary to the predominant view, Putin's real power has never extended much beyond Moscow. Russia's strongman has been strong enough to prevent anyone from aspiring to replace him; but he has spectacularly failed in his attempts to rule his country. Putin is not the boss of Russia. It is more realistic to see him as a hostage to regional elites. He did not succeed in overcoming the weakness of the state. He succeeded only in hiding it to some extent. His vaunted vertical of power is a sham, boiling down to a guarantee of impunity to regime loyalists and a chance for his inner circle to ascend into a charmed circle of unimaginable wealth. The latter arrangement is a different kind of vertical entirely, resembling the mountain climber's rope by which a few friends manage to pull themselves up and away from their less fortunate fellow citizens, as in Vladimir Vysotsky's 1967 film *Vertikal*. What puzzles any serious observer of Russian politics is not the ability of the elites to get things done or to impose their will, but rather their ability to steal the natural wealth of the nation with only minimal resort to violence. Putin has never been especially strong, in other words. But he has succeeded in creating a system that is relatively stable because it makes him look much stronger than he actually is.

Until now, that is. The electoral debacle of December 4th destroyed Putin's carefully constructed reputation of being in control of events—the principal source of his seemingly immense popularity in a society where public support is bestowed on those who manage to give the impression of an unflinching grip on power. Voters were cheated in 2000, 2003, 2004, 2007, and 2008. But only in 2011 did ballot stuffing and dishonest vote tabulations (recorded on smartphones), rather than fostering cynical resignation, drive an exasperated electorate onto the streets. Putin's party was publicly jeered on Moscow's Bolotnaya Ploshad and Prospekt Akademika Sakharova, just as he had been personally booed a few weeks earlier at Moscow's Olimpiisky stadium. By displaying so embarrassingly the Kremlin's lack of political strategy for dealing with public frustration, the crowds, like the clumsily mismanaged electoral fraud, made clear why managed democracy has ceased to be a viable option for stabilizing the privileges of a politically unaccountable elite.

Russia's strongman has been strong enough to prevent anyone from aspiring to replace him; but he has spectacularly failed in his attempts to rule his country.

What we can now see, in retrospect, is that rigged elections supported the Putin system only because and so far as they were not challenged publicly. When more than 50,000 people took to the streets of Moscow, the *pokazukha* or well-maintained illusion of government control abruptly collapsed.

Large Moscow protests have destabilized the regime not because they drew attention to its unfairness (which was long ago universally understood), but because they demonstrated its weakness, hitherto largely hidden from public view by Surkov's showmanship. Bombing is probably the best way to destroy a village; but to destroy a Potemkin village all that is required is to change the camera angle to reveal the improvised props holding up the flimsy façade. The post-election demonstrations were an expression of this revolutionary shift in perspective.

In addition, the regime has succumbed to an aesthetic failure. Managed democracy was at heart a theatrical performance and it has failed in the way that mediocre performances can fail. First, the swap of positions between Putin and Medvedev spoiled the storyline of an open future. Then came the botched manipulation of the elections. That the December 4 parliamentary vote would offer no choice was a foregone conclusion. What finally ruined the show was that it provided no entertainment either.

On September 24th 2011, when Medvedev announced that his boss and friend Vladimir Putin was going to return to the Kremlin, a delicate balance was shattered—the perceived popular legitimacy of the regime clashed with its perceived authoritarian legitimacy. The message of September 24th was that the possibility of genuine rotation in office, alluringly suggested by the tandem, was and always had been a sham, that the switch had been decided long ago and that the whole thing was closely controlled. Those who had placed their hopes in Medvedev were exposed as naïve dupes and disposable stage-props in Putin's personal theater of survival. It turned out that Russia's "managed democracy" was not simply a regime without a choice. Much worse, it was a play without a publicly convincing plot.

In the run-up to the 2000 elections, the totally unknown Vladimir Putin engineered the Chechen crisis in order to convince Russians that he could save them from the chaos and war. In 2004, he managed to make Russians believe that the choice they faced was between him and the oligarchs. Khodorkovsky was thrown in jail and the majority of Russians preferred to believe that their president had finally broken the chain connecting him to Yeltsin's self-enriching circle. In 2008, contrary to expectations, he decided not to run for a third term, thus promising substantial changes in the framework of existing power. In all three cases, in other words, presidential elections were framed by a dramatic and easily comprehensible public narrative.

In 2012, by contrast, Putin has no story to tell. It is completely unclear in what way public interest could possibly be served by his returning to the Kremlin. He is not coming back to handle the Chechens, because they are now allegedly his most loyal supporters: United Russia won an eye-popping 98 per cent of the vote in Kadyrov's fiefdom. Nor is Putin coming back to save the Russians from the oligarchs, because the new oligarchs are his old St. Petersburg buddies. And all those who had hoped that the regime could be modernized under a younger president feel humiliated by their own embarrassing naiveté. In 2012, Putin has not only lost his image as someone who can solve crises. He is no longer able to create new crises which he can triumphantly resolve because, at this point, any crisis that emerges will be blamed on him. The only thing Putin can tell those who ask why he wants to return to the Kremlin is that he has nowhere else to go. (That he needs to stay in power to protect his "business interests," while widely assumed, is obviously not a tale for public consumption.)

Putin is now facing a dilemma similar to the one that Gorbachev faced in the last two years of the Soviet Union. Genuinely competitive elections, assuming that he won them, might possibly rescue his collapsing legitimacy. But winning an election that he might have lost would not be the end of Putin's troubles. Afterwards, he would start to be held publicly responsible for his actions. The media would freely report on his business associates and the opposition would be constantly after him, pointing out all the promises he failed to keep. This means that he would perhaps keep power temporarily but that eventually he would lose. Shooting at protesters is an even less attractive option, even if it were feasible. In 1993, true enough, Yeltsin shelled the parliament; but back then Russian society was ideologically divided and the most radical democrats supported Yeltsin's decision to shoot. The West was also behind Yeltsin. Today, Putin can reasonably fear that shooting at relatively affluent urban crowds might land him in the company of Gaddafi. History shows that only politicians with a strong social support base—rooted in ideology, religion, or kinship—dare shoot at protesters. ◁

Ivan Krastev is Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. He is also a Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Stephen Holmes is Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. He directs the NYU Law Center for Russian and East European Law and is Editor-in-Chief of *East European Constitutional Review.*

For Fellows and Guests please see page 17.

Varia

Timothy Snyder has been chosen, along with British historian **Ian Kershaw,** to receive the Leipzig Book Award for European Understanding 2012. The award will be presented on March 14, 2012 as part of the official opening ceremony for the Leipzig Book Fair.

We say farewell and thank you to four colleagues who left us around the turn of the year: **Sven Hartwig** was in charge of public relations and, among other things, did much to raise the standards of this magazine over the past three years. From 2007 onwards, our janitor **Gerald Pickl** performed many of the 'invisible' but vital tasks in the realm of logistics and support that allow the Institute to work smoothly. **Frank Epple** joined the Institute as an intern about a year ago and went on to work as a receptionist and editorial assistant, offering a helping hand wherever it was needed. In a similar capacity, **Renée Gadsden** did a great job in making people feel comfortable and welcome at the Institute, as well as in helping to improve the quality of our English publications. We wish them all the best for the future.

Sadly, **András Vári,** who was professor of history at the University of Miskolc, passed away in October. He was a Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow at the IWM as recently as 2009.

Helene Dearing, who came to the Institute as a junior visiting fellow last year, gave birth to **Olga Marie** in November. Both the parents and the little daughter are well.

We wish to thank **Wiktor Osiatyński** for serving as a member of the Józef Tischner jury over many years. His place on the selection committee will be taken up by Harvard professor **Alison Frank.**

Die Redaktion von *Transit* heißt **Walter Seidl** willkommen, der fortan die photographischen Essays in *Transit* kuratieren wird. Der Autor, Kurator und Künstler lebt und arbeitet in Wien. Seit 2004 betreut er die Kunstsammlung der Erste Group. Bei **Josef Wais,** der von 1997 bis 2010 für die Photographie in *Transit* zuständig war, möchten wir uns ganz herzlich für die langjährige gute Zusammenarbeit bedanken.

Am 22. November 2011 wurde **Karol Berger** in Zürich mit dem Glarean-Preis 2011 ausgezeichnet. Der Preis wird von der Schweizerischen Musikforschenden Gesellschaft verliehen.

As many as ten runners from the IWM participated in last year's Vienna Night Run: Vera Asenova, Jadwiga Biskupska, Klaus Gröll, Olha Martynyuk, Agnieszka Pasieka, Dave Petruccelli, Elizabeth Robinson, Sándor Sajó, Manuel Tröster, and Claudia Zimmer. This annual event is a charity run around the city ring for the benefit of blind people.

Open Calls for Application

Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators 2012/13
Deadline: March 25

Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellowships 2012/13
Deadline: March 31

Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists 2012/13
Deadline: April 10

Bronislaw Geremek Fellowships 2012/13
Deadline: April 15

CEU Junior Visiting Fellowships 2012/13
Deadline: April 30

EURIAS Fellowships 2013/14
Deadline: June 7

For details see www.iwm.at > Fellowships

Publications by Fellows and Guests

Tony Judt with **Timothy Snyder**
Thinking the Twentieth Century. Intellectuals and Politics in the Twentieth Century
Penguin 2012



© Penguin

Thinking the Twentieth Century is the final book of unparalleled historian and indomitable public critic Tony Judt. Where Judt's masterpiece *Postwar* redefined the history of modern Europe by uniting the stories of its eastern and western halves, *Thinking the Twentieth Century* unites the century's conflicted intellectual history into a single soaring narrative. The twentieth century comes to life as the age of ideas—a time when, for good or for ill, the thoughts of the few reigned over the lives of the many. Judt presents the triumphs and the failures of public intellectuals, adeptly extracting the essence of their ideas and explaining the risks of their involvement in politics. Spanning the entire era and all currents of thought in a manner never previously attempted, *Thinking the Twentieth Century* is a triumphant tour de force that restores clarity to the classics of modern thought with the assurance and grace of a master craftsman. The exceptional nature of this work is evident in its very structure—a series of luminous conversations between Judt and his friend and fellow historian Timothy Snyder, grounded in the texts of their trade and focused by the intensity of their vision. Judt's astounding eloquence and range of reference are here on display as never before. Traversing the century's complexities with ease, he and Snyder revive both thoughts and thinkers, guiding us through the debates that made our world. As forgotten treasures are unearthed and overrated thinkers are dismantled, the shape of a century emerges. Judt and Snyder make us partners in their project as we learn the ways to think like a historian or even like a public intellectual. We begin to experience the power of historical perspective for the critique and reform of society, and for the pursuit of the good and the true from day to day.

In restoring and indeed exemplifying the best of the intellectual life of the twentieth century, *Thinking the Twentieth Century* charts a pathway for moral life in the twenty-first. It is about the life of the mind—and about the mindful life.

Tony Judt was a Non-resident Permanent Fellow at the IWM; Timothy Snyder joined the IWM as a Permanent Fellow in 2008. A chapter of this book was published In *Transit* 40 under the title "Mein Osteuropa".

János Mátyás Kovács and **Violetta Zentai** (eds.)
Capitalism from Outside? Economic Cultures in Eastern Europe after 1989
Budapest: CEU Press (Spring 2012)



© CEU Press

Does capitalism emerging in Eastern Europe need as solid ethnic or spiritual foundations as some other "Great Transformations" in the past? Apparently, one *can* become an actor of the new capitalist game without belonging to the German, Jewish, or, to take a timely example, Chinese minority. Nor does one have to go to a Protestant church every Sunday, repeat Confucian truisms when falling asleep, or study Adam Smith's teachings on the virtues of the market in a business course. Instead, one may just follow certain quasi-capitalist routines acquired during communism and import capitalist culture (more exactly, various capitalist cultures) in the form of down-to-earth cultural practices embedded in freshly borrowed economic and political institutions. Does capitalism come from outside? Why then do so many analysts talk about hybridization?

This volume offers empirical insights into the current cultural history of the Eastern European economies in three fields: entrepreneurship, state governance and economic science. The chapters are based on large case studies prepared in the framework of an eight-country research project (funded by the European Commission, and directed jointly by the Center for Public Policy at the Central European University and the Institute for Human Sciences) on East-West cultural encounters in the ex-communist economies.

Krzysztof Michalski
The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche's Thought
Translated by Benjamin Paloff
Princeton University Press 2012



© Princeton University Press

The Flame of Eternity provides a new interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and his concepts of eternity and time to which his reflections on human life are inextricably linked. Nietzsche argues that humanity has long regarded the impermanence of our life as an illness in need of curing. It is this "pathology" that Nietzsche called nihilism. Arguing that this insight lies at the core of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, Michalski maintains that many of Nietzsche's main ideas—including his views on love, morality, the will to power, the Death of God, and the myth of the eternal return—take on new meaning and significance when viewed through the prism of eternity.

"This remarkable book is an attempt to understand that most enigmatic of philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche. It reads for us the central notions of Nietzsche's work, culminating in the Eternal Return of the Same. The special illuminating power of Michalski's interpretation comes not just from his reading Nietzsche in the context of the philosophical tradition, but even more in his placing it in constant comparison to Nietzsche's foil and reference point, the Christ of the Bible. Most strikingly of all, Michalski helps us to grasp Nietzsche by exploring with insight and feeling the dimensions of human experience which this philosopher strove to lay open for us."
Charles Taylor, author of *The Secular Age*

"There are many books on Nietzsche. Some of them are distinguished by their learning and analytical power, some by their beauty. Very rarely can we find a book that combines both: learning and beauty. We see this unusual virtue in Michalski's book."
Leszek Kolakowski, author of *Main Currents of Marxism*

"This is an excellent and original interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, as well as a remarkable piece of scholarship and argumentative skill. Michalski has managed to achieve the happy balance that all of us professional philosophers strive for: he has succeeded in writing a philosophical book that has a lot to say to scholars and Nietzsche experts as well as to the general educated public. This is a rare feat indeed."
Piotr Hoffman, University of Nevada, Reno.

Steve Sem-Sandberg
Die Elenden von Łódź
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 2011

© Klett-Cotta

Im Rückgriff auf die Chronik, die die Bewohner des Ghettos von Łódź von 1941 bis kurz vor ihrer Deportation nach Auschwitz 1944 verfassten, hat der schwedische Schriftsteller Steve Sem-Sandberg einen vielstimmigen Roman geschrieben, der neben der zentralen Figur des Judenältesten Rumkowski das Leben zahlreicher Ghettobewohner porträtiert und ihnen so ein Gesicht gibt.

Der Autor war 2008 Milena Jesenská Fellow am IWM, wo er den Roman fertigstellte.

Timothy Snyder
Bloodlands. Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin
3. Auflage 2011
München: C.H. Beck

© C.H. Beck

Timothy Snyder erzählt in seinem Buch drei miteinander verknüpfte Geschichten – Stalins Terrorkampagnen, Hitlers Holocaust und den Hungerkrieg gegen die Kriegsgefangenen und

die nichtjüdische Bevölkerung – wie sie sich zur gleichen Zeit und im gleichen Gebiet zugetragen haben: in den „Bloodlands", zwischen Russland und Deutschland. Nach 1945 verschwand die Erinnerung an diesen millionenfachen Mord in der Dunkelheit hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang. „Bloodlands", das inzwischen in 23 Sprachen übersetzt wurde, eröffnet einen anderen Blick auf die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Nicht nur unser Bild vom Holocaust erweist sich als unvollständig und westlich verzerrt. Auch die Geschichte Europas gewinnt ein verlorenes Terrain im Osten zurück: die gemeinsame Erinnerung an 14 Millionen Tote und die größte Katastrophe der modernen Geschichte.

Zur Eröffnung der Leipziger Buchmesse 2012 wird am 14. März der **Leipziger Buchpreis zur Europäischen Verständigung** zu gleichen Teilen an die Historiker Ian Kershaw und Timothy Snyder verliehen. Diese Auszeichnung zählt zu den wichtigsten Literaturpreisen in Deutschland. Beide Werke verbindet, dass sie ein tieferes Verständnis für die dunkelsten Kapitel der Geschichte Europas ermöglichen.

Im Urteil der international besetzten Jury heißt es: „In seinem Buch *Bloodlands. Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin* verbindet Timothy Snyder genau recherchierte Daten über das deutsche und sowjetische Morden in der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts mit der Erinnerung an individuelles Leid. Er erweitert unsere Vorstellung vom industrialisierten Massenmord, indem er Hunger und Terror als Todesursache für mehr als die Hälfte der Opfer in den Blick rückt. Dabei entgeht *Bloodlands* der Gefahr des Abstumpfens: Hinter den unvorstellbaren Zahlen hält Timothy Snyder die Menschen und ihre einzelnen Schicksale stets sichtbar."

Zu den weiteren Auszeichnungen und Nominierungen für *Bloodlands* zählen: Phi Beta Kappa R. W. Emerson Book Award in the Humanities; Gustav Ranis International History Prize; Jean-Charles Velge Prize, Université Libre de Bruxelles; Prakhina Foundation Literary Award; Tadeusz Walendowski Book Prize; Cundill History Prize, Recognition of Excellence; Wayne S. Vucinich Prize, shortlist; Duff Cooper Prize, shortlist; Wissenschaftsbuch des Jahres (Österreich), shortlist; NDR Sachbuch des Jahres, shortlist.

Antonio Ferrara and **Niccolò Pianciolà** *L'etá delle migrazioni forzate. Esodi e deportazioni in Europa 1853–1953 (The Age of Forced Migrations. Instances of Relocation and Deportation in Europe, 1853–1953)*
Bologna: Il Mulino (2012)

© Il Mulino

Between the Crimean War and the death of Stalin (1853–1953), around thirty million people in Europe were expelled, deported, or forced to emigrate. The area affected coincided with the 'Europe in between', which was divided between the Tsarist, German, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires until the First World War. Most of the instances were concentrated in the first half of the 20th century, starting with the Balkan Wars and culminating with the two great Totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Covering the full range from the Asian part of Russia to the Istrian exiles in Italy, this volume addresses the dramatic subject of forced migrations, which have often been intertwined with practices of ethnic cleansing and extermination, thus accompanying the complex reconfiguration of Europe and her borders in the course of the 20th century.

Antonio Ferrara was a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2010.

IWM Publications

Photo: Anna Jermolaewa

Transit 42 – Europäische Revue (Winter 2011/12), Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag Neue Kritik
Russland: Rückkehr der Politik?
Mitherausgeber: Ivan Krastev

Steht ein Russischer Frühling bevor? Das neue Heft von *Transit* versucht eine Diagnose der gegenwärtigen politischen und sozialen Situation Russlands.

Ivan Krastev
Totgesagte leben länger
Autokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung

Stephen Holmes
Weder autoritär noch demokratisch
Verborgene Kontinuitäten im postkommunistischen Russland

Die Politik der Alternativlosigkeit
oder: Wie Macht in Russland funktioniert
Ein Gespräch mit **Gleb Pavlovsky**

Vladislav Inozemtsev
Ist Russland modernisierbar?

Ekaterina Kuznetsova
Russland in die Europäische Union? Vielleicht, vielleicht auch nicht

Samuel A. Greene
Gesellschaft ohne Bürger?

Anna Jermolaewa
Ohne Titel. Russland 2011/2012

Rossen Djagalov
Volksverächter
Der Antipopulismus der postsowjetischen Intelligentsia

Ilya Budraitskis
Unmögliche Umwälzungen
Staatsgewalt und „Extremismus" in Russland

Zakhar Prilepin
Rebellen.
Prosa

Paul Celan Translation Program

The division of Europe deeply impaired the East-West reception of literature and debates in the humanities and social sciences for decades. The Program was established in 1987 with the aim to help fill the gaps in the relevant literature on both sides. Generously supported since 2006 by ERSTE Foundation.

Jan Patočka
Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs
Présenté et traduit par **Erika Abrams**
Paris: Vrin 2011

© Vrin

L'une des grandes contributions à l'étude de la philosophie d'Aristote inspirées par la pensée moderne et œuvre majeure sur l'histoire du concept de mouvement en général – des présocratiques jusqu'à Hegel –, *Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs* de Jan Patočka est lui-même l'expression d'un double mouvement. Porté, en tant que recherche sur la philosophie aristotélicienne de la nature et sa signification pour les sciences modernes, par des motifs phénoménologiques, il entreprend en même temps, à partir d'Aristote, une réévaluation des points de départ de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie de l'existence, de façon à orienter la philosophie moderne sur le concept de mouvement comme accomplissement de la vie. Livre charnière donc, qui aura attendu près de cinquante ans avant d'être traduit.

Saskia Sassen
The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo
Translated into Bulgarian by **Elitza Stanoeva**
Sofia: Critique and Humanism Publishing House 2011



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Milena Jesenská Blog

The Milena Jesenská Fellowship Program, generously supported by ERSTE Foundation, was established in 1998 to enable journalists to work on larger projects of European social, political or cultural relevance and thereby to strengthen investigative journalism and the freedom of the press. The Milena Jesenská Blog provides a new platform for the work of these journalists and allows them to exchange their ideas and views with a wider public.

Recent contributions:

Ivan Angelovski
The Sad Truth About Serbian Media

Cynthia L. Haven
Hot New Social Media Maybe Not so New:
plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

Vukša Veličković
Inside Gaddafi's Tent: the Colonel's Yugoslav Connection

Oleksiy Radynski
We Are All Russians Now

Slavenka Drakulic
Who Created Ratko Mladic?
What remains after a war criminal has been sent to The Hague

More at www.iwm.at/jesenskablog

Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences

The Junior Visiting Fellows regularly present their research projects in seminars. The final results are discussed at the Junior Fellows' Conference at the end of each semester, and later published on the IWM website.

Anne Dwyer and **Marta Bucholc** (eds.)
Disappearing Realities.
On the Cultural Consequences of Social Change
IWM, Vienna 2011
Contributions by Marta Bucholc, Anne Dwyer, Julia Hertlein, Jan Kühne, Olena Palko, Anastasia Platonova, Olga Tyapkina and Iryna Vushko

© IWM

Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

Karol Berger

"Carl Dahlhaus' Konzeption von Wagners Dramaturgie nach 1848", in: Hermann Danuser, Peter Gülke und Norbert Miller (Hg.)., *Carl Dahlhaus und die Musikwissenschaft: Werk, Wirkung, Aktualität,* Schliengen: Edition Argus 2011, pp. 52–63

"'Der Dichter spricht': der Karfreitagszauber und die Performanz der Interpretation," in: Camilla Bork, Tobias Robert Klein, Burkhard Meischein, Andreas Meyer und Tobias Plebuch (Hg.), *Ereignis und Exegese. Musikalische Interpretation, Interpretation der Musik. Festschrift für Hermann Danuser zum 65. Geburtstag,* Schliengen: Edition Argus, 2011, pp. 479–91

Ludger Hagedorn

"Beyond Myth and Enlightenment: On Religion in Patočka's Thought", in: *Jan Patočka and the Heritage of Phenomenology,* ed. by Erika Abrams and Ivan Chvatik, (Contributions to Phenomenology, vol. 61), Dordrecht: Springer Publishers 2011, pp. 245–262.

„Noch immer nicht Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Der polnische Philosoph Józef Tischner in deutscher Übersetzung", erschienen unter dem Titel „Die Hölle sind wir" in: *Die Tagespost,* Feuilleton vom 19. 1. 2012

Vortrag: „Drama, Komödie, Inferno. Tischner und Guardini auf den Spuren Dantes" auf der Deutsch-polnischen Konferenz *Drama der Verantwortung. Romano Guardini und Józef Tischner,* Humboldt-Universität Berlin, November 10–12, 2011

"'Somewhat closer to the heart of creation than usual.' Hegel à la Patočka", opening lecture for the conference *Questioning Grounds: Contemporary Readings of German Idealism,* organized by the Nordic Network of German Idealism, Södertörn University, Sweden, June 3–4, 2011

Cornelia Klinger

Festrede zur Preisverleihung des Wettbewerbs *Jugend denkt* der Kulturregion Hannover am 24. November 2011

Unterricht: Wissenschaftstheorie und Empirie in der sozialen Arbeit, Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, 30. November 2011

Vortrag: „Subjekt, Individuum, Ich und Selbst: Erkundungen in einem unübersichtlichen Wortfeld." Internationaler Workshop des DFG-Graduiertenkollegs *Selbst-Bildungen. Praktiken der Subjektivierung* an der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, 3. Dezember 2011

Olha Martynyuk

"Ten things you should know about the history of feminism in Ukraine", in: *Politychna Krytyka,* no. 3 (2012, in Ukrainian)

"Who Should Take Care of the Baby After It Is Born?", interview with Helene Dearing and Julia Rudolph about parental leave", in: *Feminist Ofenzyva blog,* 2011 (in Ukrainian)

Krzysztof Michalski

„Emocje i obowiązki. Oblicza patriotyzmu" (Gefühle und Pflichten. Über Patriotismus), in: *Instytut Obywatelski,* 13 November 2011; reprinted in *Gazeta Wyborcza,* 31 December 2011 / 1 January 2012

Leonard Novy

„Stiftung Journalismus. Zur Konkretion neuer medienpolitischer Strategien", in: *Funkkorrespondenz* 41/42 (2011)

„Zeitungen als Gemeinwohlaufgabe. Nichtkommerzieller Journalismus als Modell der Zukunft?", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* vom 8. Juni 2011

„Wenn Zeitungen stiften gehen", *vorgänge. Zeitschrift für Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik,* 3 (2011), pp. 15–22 (mit Knut Bergmann)

„Ein präsidialer Stil ersetzt noch keinen Präsidenten", *Die Presse* vom 25. Januar 2012

Elitza Stanoeva

Interview with Saskia Sassen, "The Global City is a Structural Hole in the Tissue of Sovereign National Territory," in: *Sociological Problems,* 3–4 (2011, in Bulgarian)

Interview with Luca Giuliani, "Defining Research Priorities in the European Context", in: *Critique & Humanism,* vol. 36 (2011, in Bulgarian)

Interview with Diana Mishkova, "The Agency of the Periphery after the Disintegration of the Old Centrisms", in: *Critique & Humanism,* vol. 36 (2011, in Bulgarian)

The Human Rights Movement as a Political Force

BY ARYEH NEIER

In his guest contribution to the IWMpost, Aryeh Neier, president of the Open Society Foundations and speaker at the IWM's "Politischer Salon" in November 2011, explains the global rise of the human rights movement since the 1970s. In his reading, the main factor that made the human rights movement a significant force was the relationship it established to the Cold War. Since then, he argues, it has not had the capacity to have the same political impact, but sustained its significance in a number of ways.

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There are three movements that acquired the characteristics of "movements" in the 1970s. They all had precursors, but starting in the 1970s they spread globally. Large numbers of people became active in those movements. They don't depend upon particular individuals or particular organizations, and you can find them today everywhere in the world, except a handful of the most repressive countries.

The three movements that I have in mind are the women's movement, the environmental movement and the human rights movement. All have had a profound impact on the ways in which people relate to each other, and in that respect I think it's the women's movement that has had the largest impact. But they have also had major impacts on public policy, and here I think it's the human rights movement that has had the biggest impact.

In my view, the main factor that made the human rights movement a significant force, starting in the 1970s, was the relationship it established to the Cold War. The Cold War had already had an impact on the human rights movement. Amnesty International was established in 1961, and a founding principle of Amnesty International was that it had to be concerned simultaneously and equally with abuses of human rights in countries connected to the Soviet Bloc, countries connected to the West, and non-aligned countries. There was a rule of three: in each Amnesty Section that worked on prisoners of conscience it was necessary to deal with at least one prisoner of conscience in each of these three sectors of the world. However at that point Amnesty was limited in the activities that it undertook.

But in the 1970s a number of events took place that all acquired heightened significance because of the Cold War context. There was the coup in Chile, which brought Pinochet to power, and—more importantly—the role of the United States in that coup. There was the fall of Richard Nixon as President of the United States due to his involvement in human rights abuses in the United States. There was the adoption of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and—much more important than the adoption of the Helsinki Accords—the establishment of the Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor compliance with the human rights previsions of the Helsinki Accords. There were the Soweto riots of 1976 in South Africa and the murder shortly thereafter of Steve Biko, which focused attention on South Africa and Apartheid. There was the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International in 1977, and then, in 1978, the astonishing emergence of the democracy wall movement in China. This was just two years after the death of Mao and two years after the end of the Cultural Revolution. At that point, China was still virtually completely isolated from the rest of the world. The fact that the human rights movement emerged in China at that moment was an exciting development.

These events had heightened significance because all of them had Cold War reverberations. A large number of human rights organizations were started in different parts of the world in the 1970s. Today, there are literally thousands of human rights organizations that operate worldwide.

The human rights movement of that era found an opportunity simultaneously to challenge the Soviet bloc regimes and to challenge the West.

A part of the reason the Cold War had such a significant effect was that it underwent a transformation, or at least a transformation in the way people thought about it. In the 1950s and still in the 1960s it was commonplace to think of the competition between East and West in economic terms. It was "communism" versus "capitalism", or "communism" versus "free enterprise". But by the 1970s—under the influence of writers and thinkers—this way of thinking about the Cold War had shifted. It was being thought of in terms of "political oppression" versus "liberty", "totalitarianism" versus "freedom". The emergence of a human rights movement at that moment built upon this transformation in thinking that was taking place.

The human rights movement of that era helped to undermine the Soviet system by denying it legitimacy due to its oppression—the fact that it was locking up political dissidents. In fact, far larger numbers had been locked up in previous periods, but the imprisonment of people like the Helsinki monitors or those who were active in South Korea, in Poland, or the signatories of Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia excited greater attention from the West.

But at the same time, the human rights movement challenged the West, because a government like the United States was supporting anti-communist tyrannies in different parts of the world. It was supporting military dictatorships that ruled virtually every country in Latin America during that period, along with military dictatorships in Asia, such as South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Indonesia, and was also supporting the Apartheid regime in South Africa.

So the human rights movement of that era found an opportunity simultaneously to challenge the Soviet bloc regimes and to challenge the West. Not everybody did this: some focused only on leftwing tyrannies, some focused only on rightwing tyrannies. But the mainstream of the human rights movement focused on abuses regardless of the political character of the regimes that were engaging in oppression, in effect maintaining or staying on the path that had been pioneered by Amnesty International.

The human rights movement therefore contributed eventually to the fall of the communist regimes, but it also contributed to the fall of the military dictatorships. Between 1983 and 1990, every military dictatorship in Latin America, except Cuba, was transformed; they were supposedly transformed into democracies. Some of these were very flawed democracies, but still by no means as abusive as the military dictatorships that had preceded them. Similarly, there were transformations in countries like South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. So worldwide the human rights movement in that period was able to have a significant impact.

Subsequent to the Cold War period, the human rights movement has not had the capacity to have the same political impact. But it has sustained its significance in a number of ways. First, it has continued to grow,

so that there are human rights organizations everywhere. If you go to a country like Brazil or Nigeria or India, countries that are very different one from each other, everywhere you go in these countries, in every significant city, you will find a human rights organization, and you will find them almost every place else in the world. Many, many millions of people today identify with the human rights movement.

The human rights movement also began to focus on abuses committed in the context of armed conflicts, which is where the most severe abuses take place. As a result, much of the way we think about armed conflicts is now in terms of the number of civilian casualties. That's not the way we thought about them previously. There are still a great number of armed conflicts, and there are still vast numbers of civilian casualties, but those who are responsible for those casualties are today stigmatized in a way that they were not previously, and that has had an impact on what takes place in armed conflicts.

The other focus it developed was on holding officials accountable for abuses committed under their jurisdiction. And so you have had a series of international criminal tribunals, a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for Ruanda, for Sierra Leone, for Cambodia, for Lebanon, and also a permanent international criminal court that is now involved in cases involving nine countries. Many heads of state have been put on trial and prosecuted and convicted for human rights abuses in national trials as well as in international trials. In the past two decades, about sixty heads of state have been put on trial for human rights abuses. That is a significant impact.

These are the principal ways in which the human rights movement has established itself as a political force, and I think you can see some of that in the way in which the Arab revolutions are playing out today.

Q & A

Christian Ultsch *(Die Presse):* You have said that after '89 the human rights movement was still very active and spread all over the world. I want to talk now in the present tense, whether you think that human rights is still an important factor for Western governments, for instance for the US and European countries, in their relationship with China.

Aryeh Neier: As far as the US is concerned—and this may also be true for Western European countries—I would say that the administration would probably prefer to downplay human rights as a factor in its relationship to China, but it can't do so. It would like to put economic interests and security interests and issues such as climate change at the top of its agenda. But I would say that there is a significant segment of public opinion in the United States that makes it impossible for any American president not to make human rights a significant factor. Take one example: China gets very angry every time someone meets with the Dalai-Lama, but no American president can avoid meeting with the Dalai Lama. There is a substantial constituency that insists that the president should meet with the Dalai Lama. So the president of the United States basically has to tell the Chinese: Forget about it! I have to meet with the Dalai Lama. What the United States does on human rights, even if it's reluctant, has an impact.

Leonard Novy *(IWM):* There is tendency to see human rights as something contingent, as a contingent concept, to relativize it in reference to culture and context and so on. This tells us that, despite the historic progress that has been made—and you outlined the historical conditions for this progress in the '80s—there remain structural difficulties, enormous obstacles in communicating human rights. There's still the tendency to frame human rights as a luxury, to see it in terms of trade-offs; and when you have trade-offs, all you need to do is strike a balance. Striking a balance, agreeing on compromises, is seen to be inherently good. How do you overcome this as an organization fighting for human rights?

Aryeh Neier: What I consider to be most successful is helping to ensure that the human rights movement has the capacity to gather and disseminate reliable information on human rights abuses on a worldwide basis, and that it's capable of using remedies, such as legal remedies, as a way of trying to address these. Because, ultimately, with a worldwide movement, one is unable to ignore human rights abuses.

Look at what's happening in Syria: the government has closed the country, it wants to keep the entire world ignorant of what it's doing. And it's being defeated in that because, somehow or other, the small human rights organizations in Syria are managing to get out information, and so the world is continuing to pay attention to what's going on in Syria. If it weren't for that small human rights movement in Syria you would hardly know, you would hardly hear anything about what's taking place. But they're providing detailed information: so many people were killed today in this particular city. It's all coming from that little human rights movement, much of it to the larger international human rights organizations, and they in turn are providing the information to the world's press.

Leonard Novy: There is this debate that's resurfaced over the past few months about the indivisibility of human rights, the interrelationship of socio-economic rights and political rights. Just two observations on this: On the one hand, until Quaddafi's violent suppression of unrest in spring, the UN Human Rights Council was kind in its judgment of Libya, commending the country for its record on social and economic rights. The Occupy movement, on the other hand, has been very successful in framing its cause as a human rights issue. How can, how should the interrelationship between economic and social rights on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other be grasped?

Aryeh Neier: I'm actually notorious in the Human Rights Movement as someone who doesn't believe that economic and social rights should be equated with civil and political rights. In my view, whenever you're talking about economic issues, you are talking about trade-offs. If we want housing, if we want food, if we want employment, if we want education, if we want healthcare, if we want roads, if we want security—all of these things are important, but usually there are limits on resources, and somebody has to engage in compromises to determine what should be done at a particular moment. I think that's the purpose of the political system; I think that a democratic process ought to deal with those issues. I'm in favor of economic justice—I'm not in favor of economic rights. The difference between economic justice and economic rights is that, if I espouse economic justice, I want to provide greater economic opportunities and economic assistance to people who are deprived. I'd like to do as much as I can on behalf of those people, I'd like to see resources distributed on a more equitable basis. But if I elevate the question from a question of justice to a question of rights, it means that somebody can say: my right to healthcare takes precedence over everything else. And so a person says: I need a kidney-transplant, I need open-heart-surgery, I need lifelong anti-retroviral treatment—many things that are expensive.

Rights have to take precedence over everything else—otherwise they're not rights. My right to speak is my right to speak, even if everybody is against my point of view. Everybody is to have a right to speak! My right not to be tortured is my right, even if there's an overwhelming demand for the information I might possess and I might disclose. So, rights trump everything else, but economic rights can't trump everything else. Economic matters have to be dealt with through trade-offs, and I think that the political process, or the democratic process, is the appropriate way to determine how one provides economic justice. And in that democratic process I will be an advocate for economic justice.

Christian Ultsch: Where do you expect the next transition to come?

Aryeh Neier: You know, if you had asked me before the Arab revolutions, did I expect the Arab revolutions, I would have said "No". I had no idea they were going to take place. If you had asked me in 1986 to predict what was going to happen in 1989 I couldn't have done it, I would have been wrong. Predicting these things is very difficult. Things like this happen for many different reasons, and at certain times there are sparks which set certain things off, but I don't have the capacity to predict where the next transition will take place. I'd love to say China. ◁

Photo: IWM

I don't have the capacity to predict where the next transition will take place. I'd love to say China.

Aryeh Neier is president of the Open Society Foundations. Prior to joining the Open Society Foundations in 1993, he served for 12 years as executive director of Human Rights Watch, of which he was a founder in 1978. Before that, he worked 15 years at the American Civil Liberties Union, including eight years as national executive director. Neier, who served as adjunct professor of law at New York University for more than a dozen years, played a leading role in the establishment of the international tribunal on war crimes and crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia and has published extensively on the subject of human rights.

Making Freedom Possible

BY KRZYSZTOF MICHALSKI

He was one of the great liberals of our time. As a thinker as well as a politician, Ralf Dahrendorf courageously defended an open society against its enemies. Krzysztof Michalski, who delivered at this year's Dahrendorf Symposium in Berlin, on an exemplary democrat and close friend.

There can be no doubt for anybody who met Dahrendorf or has read his books that the concept organizing his thoughts and actions was the concept of liberty. Dahrendorf was first of all a liberal: a liberal thinker, a liberal politician. *The* liberal of our time. *I prefer to think of myself as a radical liberal*—he wrote in the ***Reflections on the Revolution in Europe.*** *Liberty above all is what I believe in.*

Liberty as he understood it is not just freedom of choice. Dahrendorf resisted Isaiah Berlin's distinction between "negative" and "positive" freedom; he defined freedom or liberty as a capacity to choose one's way—without being prevented by anybody, but at the same time being enabled to do so. Freedom is thus not a fact, it is nothing natural; one *is* not simply free—one can only *become* free. Freedom requires effort, it is an achievement. It *…does not just happen*—wrote Dahrendorf—*it has to be created.*

A Hegelian thought (Dahrendorf would not have liked this pedigree, Hegel was not his hero): *Die Freiheit*—wrote Hegel—*ist nicht als ein Unmittelbares und Natürliches, sondern muss vielmehr erworben und erst gewonnen werden.*

Interpreted thus, liberty requires a particular set of *norms, the sanctions attached to them, organizational forms in which these appear:* a particular institutional setting, an institutionally organized space enabling those who share it to do what they wish to do. Dahrendorf, following his intellectual mentor Karl Popper, called such a setting an "open society": a set of societal institutions which make individual freedom possible.

The Romans (Dahrendorf the classicist maintains) taught us the importance of institutions (it was, he says, *Rome's gift to the West*). But the particular institution of an "open society" was for Dahrendorf *the fundamental discovery of modernity.*

It is no surprise, then, that institutions—and above all the institutional conditions of an open society—became the main focus of the sociological and political analysis as well as of the practical engagement of Dahrendorf, the liberal. The list of institutions Dahrendorf was involved with one way or another is very long, and I can remind you now only of a few: the universities of Konstanz and of Oxford, the London School of Economics, St. Antony's College, Oxford, the House of Lords, the European Commission, the German government, the Ford Foundation, etc., etc. He had respect for old, entrenched, historical and not entirely rational institutions (though by no means for all: he admired the House of Lords but disliked the even older Church of Rome)—and at the same time he helped to create many new ones (the Institute for Human Sciences, an institute for advanced study in Vienna where I work, is one example of many).

Ralf Dahrendorf 1929–2009

Photo: Renate Apostel

Freedom requires effort, it is an achievement.

Of all Dahrendorf's multifarious interests and activities, I was most familiar with his efforts to support emerging open societies in Eastern Europe during and after the Communist rule. He had and still has many friends there; with his advice and influence he helped numerous institutions of civil society to begin, to find the right way, to prosper. One of his tools for doing so was the "Hannah Arendt Prize" for academic institutions in the former Eastern Europe, established by our Viennese Institute together with the Körber Foundation in Hamburg. Together with the other members of the jury—Dahrendorf was of course its chairman—we travelled around that part of Europe several times looking for innovative ideas, for early success stories to be cultivated, for excellence. Dahrendorf was a wonderful leader in this enterprise; he brought to it sympathy for the people we talked to and for their struggles (the sympathy necessary to understand them) as well as distance (indispensable in order to give them advice), wisdom as well as an astonishing ability to get things done.

During these journeys I was able to witness the notions and principles embodied in Dahrendorf's actions, indeed in his everyday life. In conversations with former revolutionaries, turned university rectors, or ministers still full of revolutionary élan, he repeatedly insisted that a free, democratic society needs order, i.e. institutions—and institutions must function, which means they need governance. *Democracy is a form of government*—he wrote at the time to an imaginary Polish friend in his *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe—not a steam bath of popular feelings* (he liked order, by the way; his words were always very well organized, as were his thoughts—and he could become very impatient when a taxi would not arrive the minute it was supposed to). But the order, the necessity of which he preached, was not intended to replace an unruly reality with logic—on the contrary, he argued that the order which an open society needs must only be temporary, always fragile, correctible at any time. Dahrendorf's plea for order was inseparably connected with the demand to *bear the untidiness of the real world.*

Dahrendorf's engagement with the anti-totalitarian opposition and revolutions in Eastern Europe arose from his understanding of the duty of a public intellectual, which he considered himself to be and undoubtedly was: *to do what one is able to do on behalf of others.* A precarious duty, no doubt, and Dahrendorf was very much aware of it. It can so easily turn into the claim to know better than others, to tell others what is to be done for their own sake. But Dahrendorf was at pains to *care without meddling;* his assistance to the new institutions of civil society in Eastern Europe was meant to allow its people to speak with their own voice, to express their own wishes and desires.

Concerned with order and institutions, with clarity and efficacy, yet suspicious as he was of outbursts of feeling and *steam baths of emotion,* Dahrendorf nevertheless understood very well the vital importance of enthusiasm, hope and anger (messy and unpredictable as they may be) for social change, and in particular for revolution. This rational, always upright and distanced intellectual could indeed sometimes show surprising empathy and warmth. I was lucky to experience it many a time in the more than 30 years between my first visit to his office at the LSE to my last, shortly before his death, in his flat *An den Dominikanern* in Cologne.

As Dahrendorf used to say, *one should always finish when one is inclined to become lyrical.* So I will. ◁

Krzysztof Michalski is Rector of the IWM and Professor of Philosophy at Warsaw and Boston Universities. His latest book is *The Flame of Eternity,* Princeton UP, 2012.