

Where is Europe?

Debates at the Burgtheater



Money, Art, Identity

The New Role of
Art History Museums

Publication

Im Räderwerk
der Moderne

Global Player?

Poland and the
Transformation

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Editorial

VON ANDREA ROEDIG

Dass diese *iwm*post sehr anders aussieht als ihre Vorgängerinnen, liegt, im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes, auf der Hand – doppelt so groß und ganz in Farbe ist sie nun, dank des neuen Konzepts der Grafiker Philipp Steinkellner und Gerri Zotter. Viele Worte zum neuen Layout muss man hier nicht verlieren, denn wie alles anfang mit dem Newsletter, wie er wurde, was er ist, und warum wir ihn jetzt so machen, wie er vorliegt, können Sie auf Seite 3 ausführlicher lesen.

Die „Wende“ hat dieses Jahr ein rundes Jubiläum. 20 Jahre nach 1989 besteht allerdings nicht nur Grund zum Feiern. Das wurde unter anderem bei den politischen Debatten am Burgtheater klar, die das IWM zusammen mit *Der Standard* veranstaltete. Der zufriedene Rückblick auf die wunderbare Revolution von 89, den man eigentlich erwartet hatte, war überschattet von bedrohlichen Szenarien. Denn im Zeichen der globalen Finanzkrise steht die Einheit Europas noch einmal ganz neu auf dem Spiel, und diese Besorgnis war den Diskutanten anzumerken. Einen Eindruck von den Debatten bekommen Sie auf den Seiten 4 und 5, und mit der Rede von Kurt Biedenkopf, abgedruckt auf Seite 14. Ein Gastbeitrag von Jacek Kochanowicz (Seite 15) gibt, passend zum Thema, eine Einschätzung des Transformationsprozesses in Polen und des Dilemmas der gegenwärtigen Politik im Lande.

Unter den Stipendien, die das IWM vergibt, richten sich die „Milena Jesenská Fellowships“ an erfahrene Journalisten. Sie sollen, fernab des Zeitungsbetriebs, die seltene Möglichkeit erhalten, für längere Zeit an einem Thema zu arbeiten. Merlijn Schoonenboom, Redakteur der niederländischen Zeitung *De Volkskrant*, nutzte sein IWM Stipendium für eine ausgedehnte Recherche über den Wandel und den Zweck kunsthistorischer Museen heute. Seine zusammenfassende Analyse lesen Sie auf den Seiten 8 und 9.

Ansonsten finden Sie in dieser Ausgabe wie immer Berichte über Monatsvorträge, Projekte der Fellows, unsere Publikationen. Denn auch im neuen Gewand bleibt die *iwm*post im Grunde die alte – und wir hoffen, sie gefällt. <

That this edition of the *iwm*post literally looks different from all previous ones is obvious: twice as big and in full-colour – thanks to the work of graphic artists Philipp Steinkellner and Gerri Zotter. It is not necessary to spend much time talking about the new layout here, as a complete history of how everything started with the newsletter and how and why it turned into what it is now, can be read in detail on page 3.

This year is the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain. However, it is not only a reason to celebrate. This became apparent in the political debates at the Burgtheater, organised by the IWM and *Der Standard*. The contented look back on the wonderful revolution of ’89, which is what had been expected, was overshadowed by menacing scenarios. The concern about Europe’s unity being at risk in the light of the global financial crisis became evident among the participants. You can gain an impression of the debates on pages 4 and 5 and in Kurt Biedenkopf’s speech on page 14. A guest contribution by Jacek Kochanowicz (page 15) gives you the chance to review the transformational processes in Poland since 1989 and the dilemmas of current politics there.

Among the scholarships the IWM awards, the “Milena Jesenská Fellowships” are aimed at experienced journalists. Far away from the hectic life of the press, they are given the rare opportunity to work on a specific topic for a longer period of time. Merlijn Schoonenboom, editorial journalist of the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant*, used his scholarship for extensive research about the change and purpose of art history museums today. A summary of his analysis is published on pages 8 and 9.

In addition you can, as always, find reports about our Monthly Lectures, our Fellows’ projects and our publications. So even with its new look, the *iwm*post is after all still the same – and we definitely hope you will like it. <

Immer wieder neu

Aus Anlass der NR. 100: Eine kurze Geschichte der Wandlungen des IWM Newsletters



Zu welchem Zweck und Ende existieren Newsletter? Manche sind der Ansicht, dass solche Produkte samt Verpackung sofort in den nächsten Papierkorb wandern, andere wieder sagen, dass sie sehr wohl gelesen werden. Unbestritten ist ein Newsletter neben der Webseite im Internet der wichtigste Informationsträger einer Institution, und er ist – wie wir sehen werden – eine ergiebige Quelle für Geschichtsschreibung.

Der erste Newsletter des 1982 gegründeten IWM datiert von Januar/Februar 1986. Nach den Erzählungen der langjährigen Mitarbeiter war dies auch das Jahr, in dem das Institut seinen ersten Computer erwarb, „Rainbow“ mit Namen. Nummer 1 sieht allerdings noch ein bisschen wie Samisdat aus. Bestehend aus vier weißen, mit Heftklammern zusammengehaltenen Seiten, listet er die Aktivitäten des Instituts auf: eine Konferenz mit dem Titel „Metapher und Kunst“, Vorträge, wie „La Révolution française et la pensée thermidorienne: 1795–1799“ von François Furet, und die Visiting Fellows und Gäste des Vorjahres.

Vier Seiten alle zwei, drei Monate, so erscheinen die gehefteten Blättchen. Hin und wieder auf buntes Papier gedruckt, enthalten sie vor allem Aufzählungen, ab Nummer 4 kommen dann Tagungsberichte hinzu. Ab Ausgabe 9 (Juli/August 1987) wird der Newsletter zum Heft mit ineinander gelegten Seiten, ab Nummer 11 erscheint er zweisprachig mit je 8 Seiten, grün in Deutsch, gelb in Englisch. Mit Ausgabe 17 schließlich erreicht das Computerzeitalter auch den Newsletter, und er erhält dank „Rainbow“ ein richtiges Layout.

All diese frühen Ausgaben des Newsletters finden sich heute säuberlich abgeheftet in einem Aktenordner im Büro von Klaus Nellen, der lange Zeit die Redaktion betreute. In diesem Ordner stecken auch interessante Aufstellungen über den Verteilerkreis: Von Nummer 19 (Februar/März 1989) etwa gingen 724 Exemplare ins europäische Ausland, 192 nach Übersee, 1340 wurden als Massensendung in Österreich zugestellt. Zu einer Zeit, als noch niemand von Globalisierung sprach, hatte das IWM also bereits einen bemerkenswerten internationalen Verteiler von rund 2.000 Adressen. Heute wird der Newsletter an fast 6.000 Adressaten weltweit verschickt.

1989, das Jahr der Wende, spiegelt sich auch im Newsletter wieder. Nummer 19 berichtet vom Vortrag

cy“ vom Juni 1990, die auch von der Presse wahrgenommen wird: „It was extraordinary who turned up“, zeigt sich der *Economist* beeindruckt von der Liste der Teilnehmer: Yuri Afanasiev, Kurt Biedenkopf, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ralf Dahrendorf, Timothy Garton Ash, Joachim Fest, François Furet, Ernest Gellner, Bronisław Geremek, Leszek Kołakowski, Bronius Kuzmickas, Marju Lauristin, Adam Michnik, Andrei Pleșu, Gavril Popov, Jeffrey Sachs, Karl Schwarzenberg, George Soros, Fritz Stern, Jozef Tischner, Sascha Vondra, Lech Walesa, Lord Weidenfeld, und Franz Vranitzky. Für die *FAZ* ist es gar „die bisher gewichtigste Konferenz zu den Irrungen und Wirrungen Zentraleuropas... Ein Gipfeltreffen außerhalb des üblichen politischen Rahmens, eine wissenschaftliche

Drakulić, und viele andere im Newsletter geschrieben.

Auch beim Erscheinungsbild tut sich wieder etwas. Ebenfalls 1993 erhält das Institut erstmals ein Logo und ein *Corporate Design*, entworfen von Gerri Zotter. Der Newsletter, jetzt mit 12 Seiten Umfang, erscheint ab Nummer 39 in elegantem Layout auf hochwertigem Papier mit einer zusätzlichen Schriftfarbe, später kommt auch ein Foto auf die Titelseite. Immer ausführlicher wird nun berichtet, ab Nummer 67 in nur einer, gemischt englisch-deutschsprachigen Ausgabe, und es wird höchste Zeit für einen eigenen Namen. Ab Nummer 87 heißt der Newsletter dann: *IWMpost*. Von Nummer 91 bis 99 erscheint die *Post* in einem nochmals veränderten Layout durch den Grafiker Franz Ruep.

So manches, was in einem Newsletter steht, wird gelesen, und wohl schnell wieder vergessen. Einiges aber bleibt bis heute aktuell. 1991 beispielsweise initiierten Tony Judt und Jan T. Gross am IWM das transdisziplinäre Forschungsprojekt „Re-thinking Post-War Europe“, an dem sich ost- und westeuropäische und amerikanische Forscher beteiligten. Newsletter 41 berichtet über die erste große Konferenz, im September 1993 unter dem Titel „Resistance and Collaboration in Europe, 1939–1945: Experience, Memory, Myth, and Appropriation“. Das Projekt leitete einen Paradigmenwechsel ein. Es brach mit den Gründungsmythen und Tabus der Nachkriegszeit und markiert den Beginn einer radikalen Umschreibung der europäischen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, aus der u. a. Werke wie Judt's *Postwar Europe*, Gross' *Nachbarn. Der Mord an den Juden von Jedwabne*, und *Flam-*

mender Hass von Norman Naimark hervorgegangen sind. Der Newsletter zitiert Jacqueline Hénard, die damals in der *FAZ* schrieb: „... nach dem Epochenschnitt des Jahres 1989 sind die historischen und die moralischen Koordinaten neu zu definieren ... Das Ende der Zweiteilung Europas zwingt zur Wiederbegegnung mit dem Ausgangspunkt, mit dem Verhalten von Völkern und Eliten in dem halben Jahrzehnt deutscher Vorherrschaft und mit den sinnlos gewordenen Gründungslegenden der Nachkriegswelt. Die Historiker haben die Chance, an der Suche nach einem neuen europäischen Selbstbild ... teilzunehmen.“ An dieses Vorhaben, Europa und seine Geschichte neu zu denken, knüpft das 2008 begonnene und von Timothy Snyder geleitete IWM Projekt „United Europe – Divided Memory“ an, über das die *IWMpost* 99 berichtete.

Ist aber in Zeiten des Internets und Zeitungssterbens ein gedrucktes Produkt überhaupt noch zu vertreten? Viele Organisationen verschicken ihre Newsletter mittlerweile nur noch elektronisch – was die eingangs gestellte Sinnfrage noch verschärft und auf den jetzt virtuellen Abfalleimer verschiebt, denn wer liest Newsletter wirklich online? Wir setzen weiter auf die gedruckte *IWMpost*, und wir wollen sie (noch) mehr zu einer Zeitung machen. Daher kommt sie jetzt – eine Revolution mit Nummer 100 – in größerem Format und neuem Design. Denn eines ist bei diesem kurzen, schlaglichtartigen Rückblick klar geworden: Über die Jahre betrachtet, ergeben Newsletter eine lebendige Chronik, ein eigenes Geschichtsbuch jener Institution, deren „Ausdruck“ sie sind. <

*Vier Seiten alle zwei, drei Monate,
so erscheinen die gehefteten Blättchen*

„East-Central Europe: Transition to What?“ des Pariser Politologen Jacques Rupnik in dem er geradezu hellsichtige Szenarios zur Überwindung der Teilung Europas entwirft. Die Winterausgabe von 1989 kündigt das neue Projekt „Übergänge zur Demokratie“ an, das die Transformationsprozesse in Osteuropa erforschen soll. Zwei Ausgaben später ist der Vortrag „Die Dynamik des Zerfalls totalitärer Systeme“ von Adam Michnik abgedruckt, und Nummer 25 berichtet von der Konferenz „Central Europe on the Way to Democra-

Konferenz ohne akademische Rituale in einer Stadt, die heute einen anderen neutralen Boden bietet als vor einem Jahr.“

Ab der Nummer 38 (Januar/Februar 1993) gibt es eine neue Rubrik, die den reflexhaften Wurf in den Papierkorb weiter verzögern soll. Von nun an enthält jede Ausgabe Gastkommentare zu aktuellen Fragen. Seitdem haben Peter Demetz, Richard Rorty, Bernard Lewis, Sheyla Benhabib, Hans Mommsen, Cornelia Klinger, Charles Taylor, Larry Lessig, Tzvetan Todorov, Slavenka

The Best Moment in History

BY CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON

In February and March two discussions in a matinee-series, hosted by the IWM and the daily Der Standard, took place on the stage of Vienna's Burgtheater. In the first debate, "20 Years after 1989", Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of History in Oxford, Kurt Biedenkopf, former Prime Minister of Saxony, Adam Michnik, Editor in Chief of Gazeta Wyborcza and Viktor Orbán, former Prime Minister of Hungary, discussed what has changed in Europe since the peaceful revolutions brought down the Iron Curtain.

Europe, wake up! Wake up to where we are!" declared Timothy Garton Ash, ... "Wake up, but act!" interjected Kurt Biedenkopf, "there's a long way between waking up and acting."

What had started out as a commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall branched out into questions about Europe's need to find itself, given the weight of history, at this defining moment in its political and financial future.

The invitees included figures who had witnessed and guided the peaceful revolution of that fateful last decade of the Cold War ... Adam Michnik, editor of Poland's leading newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*, helped the packed house understand the significance of the revolution that had occurred in Poland in the 80s.

"In democracy, compromise is the only thing that works," he declared. "We realized how to do it in 1989. Many other scenarios [for regime change] were possible: Tiananmen, the Balkans under Milosevic, Belarus under Lukashenko, Russia under the sovereign democracy of Putin." Michnik had been a part of the round-table discussions that agreed to make compromises and have democratic elections on June 4, the same day a man stood in front of a tank on a square in Beijing.

Proving to be the story-teller of the morning, Michnik recounted his experience of attending the June 16, 1989 reburial of 1956 martyr of the Hungarian Revolution Imre Nagy.

From left to right: A. Michnik, K. Biedenkopf, K. Michalski, V. Orbán, T. Garton Ash



Photo: Reinhard Werner

A 35-year old revolutionary Victor Orbán addressed the crowd. "He just told the Russian tanks, 'Go home!'" Michnik said. "And they did!"

Orbán himself recalled the inspiring *Zeitgeist* of his generation. "My father said 'I will die in a Hungary occupied by the Russians.' I said,



Garton Ash

Photo: Reinhard Werner

The Weltgeist is elsewhere

"I will not!" The Hungarian pointed out that he respects Michnik "more than I should. He wrote the civic social strategy: create and build up islands that are ready to become a continent at the right moment."

Orbán brought the discussion to the issue of the "real and serious danger" of the current financial situation, calling for Europe to regard the banking crisis in the former socialist countries as a high priority. "Without the Central European Countries, the EU cannot be competitive." He warned against financial and industrial protectionism against Central Europe, stating that "our economy will dry out because we cannot get the Euro. That financial protectionism is dangerous."

If Michnik and Orbán reflected the revolutionary element of the

cordial discussion, Kurt Biedenkopf and Timothy Garton Ash exuded the gravitas and solemnity of a memorial service, heralding the achievements of those visionaries, all the while calling for a new vision for Europe. Biedenkopf reminded the audience – that included Austria's Minister of Science and Research Johannes Hahn and Vice Chancellor Josef Pröll – of the unique role East Germany held in 1989 vis-à-vis Poland and Hungary.

"The national identity was not the issue, but the resurrection of a divided nation. East Germany participated in the West German cultural life with the help of radio, and later television. In fact, the East Germans were better informed about West German politics than the West Germans themselves!"

Highlighting Orbán's statements about the financial crisis, Biedenkopf added how unprepared Europe was. "It was the failure of the elites, and we have to fix the problem with the same elites. This is a time of reckoning. We should take courage to act, the same way the '89ers did."

Garton Ash stressed the importance of the unique peacefulness of that revolution. "It has become the default model for nations such as Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, South Africa and Burma." He recalled a similar gathering in 1999 ("10 Years after 89") with the same guests, minus Biedenkopf and plus then Czech President Václav Havel. The only difference was that 1989 marked the end of the so-called "short 20th century," one which featured the clash of Fascism, Communism and Democracy.

"In 1999, we were in a strange intermediary period." It was a period

that ended, according to him, with the September 11 attacks, announcing a new chapter in history.

The Oxford professor offered a more critical, "non-continental" perspective of the current state of affairs, in sharp contrast to that of Michnik, who sees the last two de-

history." The agenda is now set outside Europe, he said, in Asia and America. "The *Weltgeist* is elsewhere," he explained, meaning the driving force of world events is in China or India.

In the final statement of the day, Garton Ash summed up the

He just told the Russian tanks, 'Go home!' ... And they did!

cade as "the best 20 years of 300 years of Polish history."

"1989 was the best moment in European history," Garton Ash said, "for it was possibly the last time at which Europe was at the center of

discussion with a call. "We need a new generation of believers and visionaries"... <

from: *Vienna Review*, March 1, 2009

Debating Europe / Europa im Diskurs

Debate 1:
20 Years after 1989
(February 22)

Kurt Biedenkopf, former Prime Minister of Saxony, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin

Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of European Studies, University of Oxford

Adam Michnik, Editor in Chief, *Gazeta Wyborcza*

Viktor Orbán, former Prime Minister of Hungary, Chairman of the Hungarian Civic Union "Fidesz"

Chair: **Krzysztof Michalski**, Rector of the IWM

Debate 2:
Where are Europe's Borders?
(March 15)

Nino Burjanadze, Professor for International Law, founder and Chairperson of the Opposition Party "Democratic Movement – United Georgia"

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy

Aleksander Kwasniewski, former President of Poland

Cem Özdemir, Co-Leader of the German Green Party

Chair: **Alexandra Förderl-Schmid**, Editor in Chief, *Der Standard*

The debate series is a cooperation of Burgtheater, IWM, Der Standard, and is sponsored by ERSTE Foundation.

Demokratie ist die Grenze

VON CHRISTOPH PRANTNER

Aleksander Kwasniewski
und Nino Burjanadze



Cem Özdemir



Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union und die Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei haben die Debatte über Europas Grenzen erneut entfacht. Wo beginnt Europa und wo hört es auf? Über diese Frage diskutierten die georgische Oppositionsführerin Nino Burjanadze, EU-Außenkommissarin Benita Ferrero-Waldner, der ehemalige polnische Staatspräsident Aleksander Kwasniewski und der Co-Vorsitzende der deutschen Grünen, Cem Özdemir, bei der zweiten Debatte im Burgtheater.

Europas Geschichte bestand seit jeher aus dem Umgang mit und der Überwindung von Grenzen. Das Zitat stammt vom großen mitteleuropäischen Schriftsteller Claudio Magris. Am Sonntag brachte es EU-Außenkommissarin Benita Ferrero-Waldner in die Debatte im Wiener Burgtheater ein ...

Burjanadze pochte darauf, „in Europa keine künstlich geschaffenen geografischen Grenzen zu errichten. Europa halten Werte zusammen und nicht die Geografie. Gemeinsame Ideale sind entscheidend. Europa sollte erst dort seine Grenzen haben, wo auch die Demokratie endet.“ Um die Anhänger der geografischen Argumentation – zumindest in Bezug auf ihr Land – dennoch mit deren eigenen Mitteln zu überzeugen, erwähnte sie sicherheitshalber auch, dass Georgien von italienischen Kartografen bereits im 16. Jahrhundert zu Europa gerechnet wurde. Und christlich, ja, christlich sei es schon tausend Jahre länger.

„Natürlich ist die Geografie ein Kriterium“, konterte Ferrero-Wald-

ner. „Aber eben nicht das einzige.“ Die griechisch-römischen, jüdischen und islamischen Einflüsse auf die europäische Kultur seien evident („Für mich ist die EU kein Christenklub“). Die Werte der Europäischen Union seien überdies in den Kopenhagener Kriterien klar festgelegt, wo neben politischen, ökonomischen und technischen Voraussetzungen auch die Aufnahmefähigkeit der Union für weitere Beitritte explizit festgeschrieben ist.

Der „Schwabe aus Anatolien“ Cem Özdemir – er versicherte dem Publikum augenzwinkernd, dass seine Vorfahren im Jahr 1683 nicht vor Wien gestanden hätten und dass er zudem gezwungen worden sei, Waffen und Schleier an der Garderobe abzugeben – fragte dagegen, warum sich Europa denn eigentlich im Ausschlussverfahren definieren müsse. „Wir sollten Europa doch durch uns selbst, also europäisch definieren.“

Dass er für eine Reise von Warschau nach Lissabon keinen Reisepass mehr brauche („Kreditkarte ja, Pass nein“), sei mehr als bemerkens-

wert, sagte unterdessen Kwasniewski, der zwischen 1995 und 2005 polnischer Staatschef gewesen war. „Das Dilemma der EU ist, wie wir heute in Rahmenbedingungen, die in den vergangenen 60 Jahren erfolgreich waren, erweitern sollen. Wir müssen uns entscheiden, ob wir eine europäischere EU wollen oder eine weniger europäische EU.“

Eine Fortsetzung der Erweiterung ist Kwasniewski zufolge jedenfalls überlebenswichtig für die Union – genauso wie für jene, die dem Klub beitreten wollen. Burjanadze: „Wir wissen, dass wir derzeit nicht

kommen, muss eine Liste von Bedingungen erfüllt werden – diese Soft Power der Union ist eines der effektivsten Werkzeuge, das wir Europäer haben. Heute haben wir kurdisches Fernsehen in der Türkei, Freunde von mir treten dort als Moderatoren auf, die noch vor 15 Jahren eingesperrt worden sind.“

Ferrero-Waldner verwies im Zusammenhang mit der Erweiterungspolitik auf die Verpflichtungen der Union, aber auch auf jene der Kandidatenländer. „Ein EU-Beitritt ist keine Einbahnstraße, es wird keine Beitrittsrabatte geben.“ Die Union

einzuhalten. Das sogenannte Ankara-Protokoll über direkten Verkehr zwischen der Türkei und Zypern müsse anerkannt, in Sachen Energiesicherheit – die Trasse der federführend von der omv geplanten Nabucco-Gaspipeline führt durch die Türkei – müsse Ankara mehr kooperieren. Und während die Diskutanten es geschlossen als ziemlich unwahrscheinlich ansahen, dass Russland je der EU beitreten werde, erklärte Ferrero-Waldner zur Ukraine: „Kiew kann in beide Richtungen aufbrechen, nach Moskau oder nach Brüssel. In einem Fall wäre es eine Anpassung an ein semidemokratisches System, im anderen ein Assoziationsabkommen mit dem Westen. Es ist nicht klar, worauf sich Präsident Juschtschenko und Ministerpräsidentin Timoschenko einigen werden, aber manchmal müssen wir uns fragen, ob einzelne Politiker zum Besten ihres Volkes handeln.“

Allen Fantasien einer „eingeschränkten Demokratie“ an den Rändern Europas erteilten die Politiker aus den Transformationsstaaten eine Abfuhr. Selbst in den neuen EU-Staaten sei Demokratie heute noch kein Wert an sich, sagte Aleksander Kwasniewski. Der grundlegende Wert sei Macht. Burjanadze ergänzte: „Entweder es herrscht Demokratie oder eben nicht. Unser größter Fehler in Georgien war es, zuerst alles andere in Angriff zu nehmen und uns erst dann um die Demokratie zu kümmern. Damit haben wir ein Haus gebaut, dem das Fundament fehlt.“ Diese Grenze müsse für alle, die Europäer sein wollen, tabu bleiben. <

aus: Der Standard, 16. 03. 2009

Benita Ferrero-Waldner



*Für mich ist die EU
kein Christenklub*

bereit für einen Beitritt sind und dass auch die EU nicht in der Lage ist, uns aufzunehmen. Aber: Wir wollen nicht immer nur Nachbarn bleiben.“ Würde Brüssel aber seine Erweiterungspolitik ganz aufgeben, würde die Union auf eines ihrer besten Instrumente verzichten, erklärte auch Özdemir: „Die Türkei ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür. Dort liegt noch vieles im Argen, aber die Reformanstrengungen gehen in die richtige Richtung. Um durch die Tür zu

selbst müsse für weitere Erweiterungsschritte bereit sein, sonst würden die Bürger nicht mitmachen. Dazu gehöre auch, dass die EU über ihre Zielvorstellung Auskunft gebe. Denn „aus einem Mangel an klaren Zielen entsteht auch ein Mangel an Glaubwürdigkeit. Die drei verlorenen Referenden zum Verfassungsvertrag und Lissabon-Vertrag sind genau darauf zurückzuführen.“

Die Außenkommissarin mahnte die Türkei, ihre Verpflichtungen

Russia in Search of Its History: The Grand Battles About the Past and Future

Monthly Lecture: **Irina Prokhorova**, January 27

Endless battles about national history, particularly of its most crucial and dramatic moments (Bolshevik revolution, World War II, Stalinist terror, the end of the Soviet regime, etc.) are characteristic of Russian political and intellectual debate over the last 20 years. In her lecture, Irina Prokhorova pointed out how educational historiography in Russia currently tends to establish a sort of “museum history”: it mostly clings to ancient times as a “beautiful Russian past” and tries to avoid more recent and disagreeable topics like the Afghanistan war

or the Gulag. As an example for another approach to history, Prokhorova presented one of the projects of her publishing house, the “Chronicles of 1990”, an electronic and print edition which assembles all different kinds of memories and facts of the year 1990. To Prokhorova this project is also a “reconciliation with the past” and a “rehabilitation of the 1990s” – years in which almost all the new institutions appeared and “people just did something to change their future.” (see also www.nlobooks.ru/eng) ◀



Irina Prokhorova is the founder, editor and publisher of the journal *New Literary Review* and the publishing house NLO.

Global Changes and European Policy Towards Russia

Monthly Lecture: **Aleksander Smolar**, March 17

After 1989 Russia was – and still is today – looking for its place in the new world order. In his lecture, Aleksander Smolar examined the role Russia plays in contemporary international politics, the problems the West has with Russia, and the problems Russia has with itself. With the downfall of the Soviet Bloc, a unipolar world seems to have arisen, dominated by the United States, while Russia lost its role as the former “other” in the geopolitical game. Smolar showed that the Russian reaction to its loss of political power modified over time. In a first period under President Yelzin, Russia tried to follow the West and to build up privileged relations with Western countries. But after the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, which Russia didn’t accept but couldn’t prevent, Russian politics became more and more nationally oriented. In this second period, the relations between Russia and the West cooled down. Only after the attacks of 9/11 the situation changed, when President Putin was the first leader who declared his solidarity with the US in the so-called “war on terror”. A close cooperation began not least because Putin expected Western restraint in the Chechnya conflict. This third period has now come to an end with the Ukraine gas dispute, the war in Georgia and the world financial market crisis. Particularly the financial crisis, Smolar assumed, will change Russia and its role in the world again. Before the crisis, Russian elites claimed that “Russia is back”. They observed a weakening of the US under the presidency of George W. Bush, a fragmentation of the EU after the referendums on the European constitution had been lost, the emergence of a multipolar world “without a center”, and Russia’s growing prosperity due to its gas and oil reserves. But now, Russia seems to be one of the worst vic-



Aleksander Smolar is researcher at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, and President of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw.


tims of the crisis, with the price of gas and oil decreasing rapidly, the rubel losing its value, inflation increasing, and the GDP plummeting. However, Smolar ended his speech with some optimism, suggesting that the crisis could also be seen as a window of opportunity for Western policy towards Russia: “Russia didn’t turn away from the West, it still wants to join the West, not as a secondary power but as an equal partner. Therefore, we should give Russian politics a perspective.” ◀

Gender Equality at the Crossroads: New and Old Politics of Privilege and Exclusion

Monthly Lecture: **Mieke Verloo**, February 24

Working for gender equality in Europe has come to mean very different things over the last two decades: from equal rights for men and women to positive action for women and gender mainstreaming. In the last 10 years, the European Union increasingly has also given attention and new legal protections to other inequalities, such as racial and ethnic origin, sexual orientation, age, and religion or belief.

Should this be seen as a great chance to address what is called “intersectionality” in feminist theory? Is there finally attention for ethnocentrism, heteronormativity and middle class dominance? Or is this development the end of gender equality policies; just another danger that gender will lose out; that there simply will be less money and less resources for gender and less precise mechanisms to address the specific dynamics of gender relations? The developments at the EU level, Verloo stated, have triggered more attention for multiple inequalities at national levels. All over Europe, there seems to be a tendency for institutional changes in which departments, councils, committees and ministers are given a mandate to address a growing number of inequalities. The overall trend is one from a “gender solo” approach to a widening of the categories and to single equality bodies; that is to institutions that address several types



Mieke Verloo is Professor in Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues at the University of Nijmegen and QUING Research Director at the IWM.

of inequalities. However, there is still too little attention paid to the interaction and interdependence of different inequalities by policymakers in Europe, and one can still observe an inequality of protection between the various dimensions of inequality. Therefore, a step towards equality mainstreaming is needed, Verloo concluded, that places equality considerations at the heart of political decision-making. (see also www.quing.eu) ◀

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Wider den Vertrauensverlust

Politischer Salon mit **Gesine Schwan**, 16. Januar

Die Politikwissenschaftlerin Gesine Schwan, von 1999 bis 2008 Präsidentin der Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt an der Oder, wurde von der SPD für die deutsche Bundespräsidentenwahl am 23. Mai 2009 nominiert. Über ihre Ideen, die Werte, für die sie eintritt, und ihre Vorstellungen vom Amt diskutierte sie beim Politischen Salon mit Michael Fleischhacker, Chefredakteur der *Presse*, und Krzysztof Michalski, Rektor des IWM. Das Hauptmotiv für ihre Kandidatur – die zweite nach 2004, bei der sie Horst Köhler knapp unterlag – sei der „zunehmende Vertrauensverlust in die Politik“, sagte Schwan. Der politische Leitsatz ihrer Präsidentschaft könne daher lauten: „Demokratie stärken, Vertrauen zurückgewinnen.“

Doch was kann Politik heute noch leisten? Die Globalisierung schränke die Spielräume nationalen politischen Handelns ein, der Neoliberalismus propagiere einen schlanken Staat, viele Bürger fühlten sich mit ihren Problemen von der Politik allein gelassen. Deswegen, so Schwan, brauche es eine starke Bürgergesellschaft und die politische Teilhabe aller Menschen, um die Demokratie zu beleben und das Vertrauen in die Politik zu stärken. Die Politik wiederum müsse dafür die Voraussetzungen schaffen, zum Beispiel durch die Förderung der Bildungspolitik. Bildung stehe zwar seit langem auf der politischen Agenda, aber, so kritisierte Schwan, sie sei zunehmend für Zwecke der Ökonomie instrumentalisiert worden:



Gesine Schwan war Präsidentin der Europa-Universität Viadrina, sie kandidiert für das Amt des deutschen Bundespräsidenten.

Die Verabsolutierung von Wettbewerb, die Reduzierung von Bildung auf arbeitsmarktorientierte Ausbildung, die Konzentration auf die Förderung von Eliten – all das sei vielmehr eine „Anti-Bildungshaltung“. Bildung sei mehr als ein Instrument zur Steigerung der Wirtschaftskraft, sie sei unverzichtbare Vorbedingung für die Partizipation an einem demokratischen Gemeinwesen, denn: „Wer nicht gelernt hat, sich ein eigenständiges Urteil zu erarbeiten, kann seine Rolle als selbständiger Bürger in einer Demokratie nicht wahrnehmen.“ Genau dies, die Ausbildung der Persönlichkeit und der Urteils-

kraft, sei die Aufgabe heutiger Bildungspolitik. Das bedeute auch, die Möglichkeit sich zu bilden für alle offen zu halten. Bildung sei ein öffentliches Gut, das man nicht privatisieren dürfe, vielmehr gelte es das Prinzip „gleiche Bildungschancen für alle“ und damit auch mehr soziale Gerechtigkeit in der Bildung durchzusetzen. Der Bundespräsident hat in Deutschland hauptsächlich repräsentative Funktionen, sein politischer Gestaltungsspielraum ist eng. Daher, so Schwan zum Abschluss der Diskussion, wolle sie vor allem eines sein: „Mahnerin gegen Fehlentwicklungen und Ermutigerin, diesen etwas entgegen zu setzen.“ <

In Kooperation mit *Die Presse*

Christdemokratie als Modell „muslimischer Demokratie“?

Reihe: Den Staat neu denken? **Jan-Werner Müller**, 20. Januar

In der Türkei ist im letzten Sommer die regierende Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (AKP) nur knapp einem Verbot durch das Verfassungsgericht des Landes entgangen. Die Staatsanwaltschaft hatte ihr vorgeworfen, sie versuche das Land zu „islamisieren“ und letztlich eine Theokratie einzuführen. Nach der Entscheidung feierten nicht nur die AKP-Anhänger; auch jene im Westen, die die AKP als prototypische „muslimisch-demokratische“ Partei ansehen, waren erleichtert.

In seinem Vortrag argumentierte Jan-Werner Müller, dass die christdemokratischen Parteien Westeuropas ein Modell sein könnten für gemäßigt religiöse muslimische Parteien, die sich zu demokratischen Spielregeln bekennen. Müller zeichnete die Geschichte der Entwicklung christdemokratischer Parteien in Europa nach, wobei er zeigte, dass politische Neuerer und liberale katholische Intellektuelle bei der Schaffung der



Jan-Werner Müller ist Professor für Politikwissenschaften an der Princeton University und Open Society Fellow an der Central European University, Budapest.

Christdemokratie eine entscheidende Rolle spielten. Christdemokratische Parteien waren keine Schöpfung des Vatikan, im Gegenteil, sie entstanden unter dem Einfluss einzelner Vordenker und aus dem Bedürfnis heraus, dem antiklerikalen Staat etwas entgegen zu setzen. Nur ein starker, souveräner Staat, nicht ein schwacher, autoritärer, sei in der Lage, politischen Raum für religiöse Parteien zuzulassen, sagte Müller. Im Europa der Nachkriegszeit gab es gute Bedingungen für die Entwicklung der Christdemokratie, die Wertekonservatismus mit marktfreundlicher Einstellung kombinierte. Es liege nahe zu vermuten, dass muslimische Reformer unter den richtigen Umständen in ähnlicher Weise in der Lage sein könnten, eine muslimische Demokratie herbeizuführen. <

In Kooperation mit der Politischen Akademie der ÖVP



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Please visit the IWM website for further details: www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm

FORTHCOMING

Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture



Ian Buruma The Virtues and Limits of Cosmopolitanism

Ian Buruma, einer der bekanntesten Publizisten und Kulturanalytiker im englischsprachigen Raum, ist der Inbegriff eines Kosmopoliten. 1951 in Den Haag als Sohn eines Holländers und einer britischen Mutter deutsch-jüdischer Herkunft geboren, wuchs er in England und Japan auf, er lebte und arbeitete lange Jahre in Ostasien. Burumas Texte befassen sich mit Ost-West-Beziehungen und mit dem Begriff der nationalen Identität. Bekannt wurde er in Deutschland u. a. durch sein Buch „Erbschaft der Schuld. Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland und Japan“ (1996) und durch „Okzidentalismus. Der Westen in den Augen seiner Feinde“ (2004). Nach der Ermordung des Regisseurs Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam durch einen radikalen Islamisten im November 2004 kehrte Buruma für ein Jahr in sein Geburtsland zu-

rück und schrieb mit „Die Grenzen der Toleranz“ (2006) ein Porträt aller direkt oder indirekt an dem Mord Beteiligten.

„Kosmopolitismus wird heutzutage im Allgemeinen als etwas Gutes angesehen, als ein positiver Begriff, der einen hohen Grad an Kultiviertheit, sogar Glamour bezeichnet ... Gleichzeitig kann dasselbe Wort, mit höhnischer Verachtung ausgesprochen, auch etwas vollkommen Negatives meinen“, sagte Ian Buruma in seiner Rede zur Verleihung des Erasmus-Preises 2008. Welches die Vorzüge und welches die Grenzen des Konzepts eines liberalen Kosmopolitismus sind, wird er bei der, vom IWM veranstalteten, Patočka Memorial Lecture in Wien erläutern. <

10. Juni 2009, 18.00 Uhr
Börsensäle, Wipplinger Straße 34,
1010 Wien

Money, Art, Identity

BY MERLIJN SCHOONENBOOM

How the role of old art and art history museums changes

The political excitement will rise high this summer in Athens, Greece. After almost thirty years of preparation, on the 20th of June the New Acropolis Museum will open. Insiders announce that not only “everybody that matters in the political and cultural elite” will be present on the opening ceremony, but also the festivities of this evening will be organised with a contribution of no less than 6 million euro’s by the man who also directed the opening of the Olympic Games in 2004.

This summer, political big shots will not only be found in a museum in Athens. In Amsterdam the Russian president, Dimitri Medvedev, is expected to drop by in June. The reason is not an important economical contract, but a so-called “satellite museum” of the Hermitage in St. Petersburg. It will open in Amsterdam, after at least 15 years of planning. Medvedev, as reported by sources inside the Ministries of Cultures in Russia and the Netherlands, will be there to open this museum personally.

In itself it is not uncommon that museums are used as the background of national festivities. Nevertheless, this present enthusiasm on the highest political level is remarkable. Both in Athens and Amsterdam, traditional, classical art and culture is being presented; Old Master paintings of the Hermitage, classical statues of the Acropolis. In general, this does not attract a large audience for television shows, and is not considered a “sexy” topic for a politician to show off with in public.

Still, these museums of old culture are ambitious projects, with budgets which are even more ambitious. The New Acropolis Museum for example, is built by the international star architect Bernhard Tschumi, funded by the Greek government and the European Union. And it is not the only major national museum project at the moment in Europe. Everywhere museums for old art and culture are being renovated or even newly built. In Amsterdam the Rijksmuseum is renovated for more than 200 million euros, in Berlin the Museumsinsel is being rebuilt till at least 2015 for 100 million euros yearly, and in St. Petersburg in 2014 the Hermitage gets a huge new wing.




Photo: Schoonenboom

At the same time the Louvre and the Berlin museums have established for the first time ever, new connections in the Arab world, the Gulf States Abu Dhabi and Dubai. And on top of all this building activity, inside the museums, the staff is announcing plans for modernisation of the art-historical presentations, the way the Rembrandts, the Titians and the Michelangelos are brought to the new generations.

Although it seems an unlikely combination at first sight, the conclusion must be that museums for old culture raised new political interest. But why? Where do these ambitions come from? How do the major players, the European museum elite, explain these new ambitions? And what is, according to them, the meaning of the traditional, classical culture in 21st century Europe?

The first answer points out a dynamic far beyond the limits of art history. The directors stress the enormous impact of the rise of cultural tourism, this unforeseen byproduct of cheap flights, free time, boredom, organised city-trips, and a bigger

number of highly-educated people than ever before in history.

It is only since the beginning of the 1990s, that most museums began to think about the consequences of this cultural masstourism. Plans to canalise these masses (in 2008, 8,5

has been called the “Bilbao-effect” – named after the Spanish city, which became a magnet for tourists after the building of a huge extravagant museum of modern art.

The first incentive of the contemporary movement in the muse-

ence economy”. Rudin: “They want to be young and daring, they want to compete. Therefore they need money and sponsors, and for that they have to look good.”

The ambitious rebuilding of the last years can therefore be seen as a

Art does not have a function anymore in the creation of national identity, but it can be used for city-branding

million visitors came to the Louvre, a record) began in the late 1980s in Paris with the Louvre-extension of the architect I.M. Pei, and then spread slowly to Berlin, Madrid, Amsterdam. In addition, there arose at the beginning of the 21st century a new “ideology” in city-planning: the importance of the so-called creative industry. State-officials and economists began to believe in the stimulating effect of a cultural environment on the city-economy. For museums, this

ums for old culture is, therefore, very pragmatic: there is hope that with old culture money can be made. According to Rebekka Rudin, manager of the travelling exhibition “Museums in the 21st Century” at the Art Centre Basel, there is not much difference between the completely new modern art museums and the traditional institutions. Also museums for old culture are “relatively new institutes”, which are searching for a new place in the contemporary “experi-

kind of “second phase” in the history of museums. Most of the existing national museums have their roots in the 19th century. At that time, the museum architecture was based on religious buildings, temples and churches. Now, as Rebekka Rudin describes it, the buildings “need to attract attention”. According to Rudin, and also according to someone like Wolfgang Waldner, Director of the highly successful MuseumsQuartier in Vienna, art – be

it modern or traditional – does not have a function anymore in the creation of national identity, but it can be used for city-branding.

Plausible as this may be seen, this “pragmatic” use of art, is only a part of the explanation of the new political enthusiasm for the national museums. When you take a look at the building plans of the New Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam (ready in 2013) for example, the most remarkable thing is not the “new modern comfort”, but the major role of a “history-experience”: for the first time in more than sixty years, the decorations of the original architecture, which has been painted white during the modernist 1950s, are being restored, and also other aspects celebrate the historical atmosphere of this building, which has been mocked so long for its “historical kitsch”.

In Berlin there is a comparable development. The original 19th century concept of the Museumsinsel was to be a “Tempelstadt” (a town of temples), dedicated to art. Not only are the original temple-facades now being restored and modern architecture only modestly presented, but also there is on the opposite of the Museumsinsel a complete baroque city-palace being rebuild – in the fifties destroyed by the GDR government –, that will get a new function as part of the Museumsinsel.

Not surprisingly, this “experience of history” is exactly the answer the museum directors give on the question of why masses of tourists visit the national museums from Athens to Petersburg. In the age of information technology, the directors say, people are curious for “historical authenticity”. They search for it in the buildings, and in the objects. As Mikhail Piotrovsky, the longtime Director of the Hermitage in Petersburg puts it: “We live in a time where people start looking for their cultural roots.”

And art brings this experience, according to Mr. Piotrovsky. Not to mention Peter-Klaus Schuster, the former Director of the Berlin Museums, who conceives the Museumsinsel as a possible new spiritual centre of the new Germany. The task which the Dutch Rijksmuseum sets for itself is of the same caliber: although Rembrandt is not anymore the 19th-century “son of the nation”, he again has the function to illuminate the essence of a typical “Dutch spirit”; for tourists as well as for the new generations in the Dutch schools.

The public doesn’t look for modernity in these museums. They look for historicity – in a space that is equipped with all modern comfort. That the old masterpieces play indeed a new role in the experience economy, means the displaying of the “mystery of the historical sensation” in a society that is losing contact with its own roots in rapid speed.

In this sense, it is very plausible to describe the actual activity in the European national museums as “a second phase” after the first one in the 19th century. Museums emerged in a society which changed very fast as a result of industrialisation. The desire grew to create “temples” of contemplation on the past

and on traditions. This type of reaction can also be seen in present times: society changes quickly, and in Europe there is a collective desire to look back.

In the stories of the directors, reflection on the cultural past is linked to the confusion caused by information technology, globalisation and multiculturalisation. Sabi-



Photo: Schoonenboom

Merlijn Schoonenboom is an art journalist at *De Volkskrant* in Amsterdam. From October to December 2008 he was Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM with the project “Money, Art, Identity: European Art History Museums in a Changing Society”. The research was restricted to museums for classical art and art before the modern times, until around 1880. For his project, Schoonenboom spoke with directors of the most important national museums in Amsterdam, Athens, Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna. The results were published in reports on four specific cities – Athens, Berlin, Petersburg, Vienna – in *De Volkskrant*.

ne Haag, since 2009 Director of the Kunsthistorische Museum in Vienna, thinks this is one of the reasons why the Old Masters have regained popularity. Their meaning, says Haag, has survived the turbulence of changing fashions. They have the power to speak directly to the people of the 21st century, who, after modernism, have more feelings for figurative painting. Also Norbert Zimmermann, Vice President of the highest cultural institution of Germany, the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz, thinks that museums can reach answers in the “confusion” created by globalisation and multiculturalism: museums of classical art and culture “show us where we come from”, according to Zimmermann.

With these arguments, it is not a surprise that national politicians can be convinced of the purpose of good functioning art-historical institutes. Relatively new is the fact that the diplomatic possibilities of the artworks are being stressed.

Twice a year, an exclusive group of men gather somewhere in a museum in the world. They are the directors of the so-called Universal Museums, such as the Louvre and the Metropolitan Museum in New York: museums who collect and present all of art-history, from the Egyptians to the modern times. In the last years, these men have come up with a slogan: “for the world, about the world”. More and more, they set up exhibitions on the cultures of the world, and they present these exhibitions on different locations worldwide: in China, in Brasil, the Gulf States, etc. According to Mr. Schuster, this has not only a pragmatic reason – “If the tourists travel to the Gulf, we go too” –, but also because the mu-

seums want to contribute to the “dialogue of cultures”.

Sabine Haag, who is this year the first woman in the club, describes the Universal Museums as “ice-breakers” between countries and cultures. By exposing art, they create more and deeper mutual understanding between cultures, she argues. At the Ministry of Culture in Moscow, they see the “satellite museums” of the Hermitage as a possibility to show “Russian culture” to the rest of the world. And in Athens, there is the ongoing discussion on the question of what will be better for the position of Greece in an international context: to leave the hotly contested Pantheon (“Elgin”) Marbles in London, or to put on more political pressure to get them to Athens to the New Acropolis Museum.

Since their inception, the museums have played a political role. But cultural diplomacy, as the Dutch Secretary of State Frans Timmermans stresses, will become more and more crucial in foreign policy-affairs in the next years. The museums seem to become a useful factor in the foreign policy of a country. This is also the background of the visit of Dimitri Medvedev to Amsterdam. Smilingly, he will open the Hermitage in Amsterdam, but without doubt other (political and economic) business will be done behind the scenes.

These are the socio-cultural backgrounds that can explain the renewed ambitions of the national art historical museums. Of course, the next question should then be: what can be seen? What change is seen in the art historical presentations, which sometimes could be dated back to the 19th century?

Here the museum world is a lot less daring. In most museums the Old Masters are presented by age, by country and by school. The “dialogue of cultures” is almost never made explicit, thematic depth or creative insights learned from new disciplines such as “visual culture studies” is absent.

The only daring modernisation seems to be the combination of contemporary art with the Old Masters. Last year this “trick” was to be seen in almost every capital in Europe, in more or less successful expositions: Damien Hirsts’ diamond skull in the Amsterdam Rijksmuseum, Jan Fabre in the Louvre, Kienholz in the London National Gallery, Giacometti in the Altes Museum in Berlin.

For a long-term actualisation of the old art and culture, this is not enough. This is the paradox of the desire to experience the “historical authenticity”. As Peter-Klaus Schuster puts it: to keep a feeling with the art historical masterpieces, art has to be presented for every generation in a new way, because in every age people have different “ways of seeing”. To change these oldfashioned presentations, the national museums in Europe will need a much more daring vision on the future than is needed to close some lucrative deals with the Gulf States or the construction of luxury buildings. Otherwise, the interest in the art history and classical culture will easily slip away, when the prices of the city-trips and flights go up again. <

“1989 – Images of Change”

A European search for traces
(for the age-group 1980 until 1991)

The history network for young Europeans – EUSTORY – initiates the first pan-European search for traces of 1989. This project calls on those born in the years of change between the Polish strike of 1980 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to an online competition (www.1989history.eu). It offers prizes of 20,000 € and concludes with an award ceremony in November 2009 in Brussels.

Closing date is June 30, 2009.

The idea is to recall the historical moment of 1989 with the help of pictures: photos, postcards, letters, dairies, and newspaper articles, everything, which serves as a visual memory of this time. Most interesting are private items of time witnesses – not only in the East. People in the West have memories of 1989 as well, e.g. the many newcomers or own journeys.

EUSTORY is a network of history contests, which is active in 22 states. The Nobel Prize for Peace winner Martti Ahtisaari, the Polish survivor of Auschwitz, Władysław Bartoszewski, and former president of the EU Commission, Jacques Delors, support the organisation serving as patrons.

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Anthony Giddens

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Claus Leggewie und Harald Welzer

Können Demokratien den Klimawandel bewältigen?

Ingolfur Blühdorn

Klimadebatte und Postdemokratie
Zur gesellschaftlichen Bewältigung der Nicht-Nachhaltigkeit

Wolfgang Sachs

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Ressourcenkonflikte und Menschenrechte

Lukas Meyer

Klimawandel und Gerechtigkeit

Dirk Messner

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Nadine Pratt

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Nachhaltiger Konsum – eine Kontextbestimmung

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Chris Niedenthal

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Fellows and Guests

January – March 2009



Clemens Apprich
Junior Visiting Fellow
(August 2008–January 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Cultural Studies, Humboldt-University Berlin; ÖAW DOC-stipendiary

DIY or Die: The Historical Genealogy of the Network Society

Talking about as well as investigating networks has become a determining morphology of our society in recent years. The aim of my research will be to reveal new forms of subjectivation, which produce specific concepts of subjectivity (as in the arts, business or communications) within the digital context. “Do it yourself or die” is therefore a credo committed to a certain type of knowledge production in which the collective intelligence of the users becomes the central resource of individual and community life.



Michal Biletzki
Junior Visiting Fellow
(January–June 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston University

They Shoot Citizens, Don't They? The Case of Palestinian Citizens of Israel

I will investigate the development of the citizenship status of the Palestinian citizens of Israel (pci) in terms of their equality with regard to both state actions and state distribution of justice. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to expose the inherent deficiencies of the term “citizenship.” The misuse of this term in the Israeli case may shed light on other such misuses throughout the world's nation-states. An understanding of the unpredictable meta-morphosis undergone by the status of citizenship of the pci and their treatment by the state may lead to a better understanding of their future prospects in Israel along with a realization of the type of state Israel actually is.



Shelby Carpenter
Junior Visiting Fellow
(January–June 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Sociocultural Anthropology, Boston University

Envisioning Trust: A Study of “Cultural Bereavement” in Sierra Leone and The Gambia

My dissertation asks how trust is established after war, and how Sierra Leoneans cope in their everyday lives both as urban dwellers in Freetown and as international refugees in The Gambia. As Africa undergoes rapid social change as a result of war and political instability, I argue that at times, solutions are found in the most unlikely of places. My findings are the result of 22 months of field research on mental health, social healing, performance, and civil society issues in West Africa.



Vytautas Deksnys
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(October 2008–March 2009)

Freelance translator, Vilnius

Józef Tischner: Filozofia dramatu (Polish > Lithuanian)

“Philosophy of drama” (*Filozofia dramatu*) is the famous work, in which Józef Tischner constructs a philosophical anthropology that permits the most essential questions to be asked: Where is God? Why evil? What are beauty, truth and goodness? Tischner links the phenomenology of Husserl with the dialogical thought of Levinas and a philosophy of history inspired by Hegel and Heidegger. This book will be important for the Lithuanian audience, since it discusses problems of universal relevance. Moreover, there is still a considerable lack of Central-Eastern European philosophical thought published in Lithuanian.



Heike Flemming
Junior Visiting Fellow
(October 2008–March 2009)

Doktorandin (Philosophie, Literatur), Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Stipendiatin

Parallele Geschichten – Unbeschreiblicher Blick. Darstellungen der Geschichte im literarischen Bewusstsein Ungarns nach 1970 am Beispiel von Péter Nádas und László Márton

Das Dissertationsprojekt wird am Beispiel der ungarischen Gegenwartsliteratur und ihrer Darstellung der eigenen jüngeren Vergangenheit – konkret anhand des Werkes zweier zeitgenössischer ungarischer Autoren – Péter Nádas (*1942) und László Márton (*1959) – dem alten Problem des Verhältnisses von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtserzählung, Historie und Fiktion, nachgehen. Wie stellt sich dieses Verhältnis unter den Bedingungen der Moderne und der totalitären Erfahrungen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts dar?



Justyna Górny
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(December 2008–February 2009)

Übersetzerin und Doktorandin an der Fakultät für Moderne Sprachen der Universität Warschau

Karin Hausen: Textauswahl (German > Polish)

Karin Hausen gehört zu den international anerkannten Begründerinnen der historischen Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung; sie lehrte bis 2003 als Professorin an der ru Berlin. Die Übersetzung ihrer Arbeiten ist für den wachsenden Kreis von Historiker/innen interessant, die sich in Polen mit Familien- und Frauengeschichte befassen. Zudem bereichern sie die sich in Polen entwickelnden Gender Studies um neue Impulse: Hausens Texte werden der „Frauengeschichte“, als Zweig der Geschichtswissenschaft, festere methodologische Grundlagen geben, und sie werden den Wissenstransfer zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa fördern.



Yaroslav Hrytsak
Visiting Fellow
(February–July 2009)

Director of the Institute for Historical Research, Ivan Franko Lviv National University, Ukraine; Visiting Professor, Central European University, Budapest

Historical Memory Between Conflict, Ambivalence, and Reconciliation: The Case of Ukraine, 1989–2009

The project deals with the transformation of historical memory in Ukraine since the collapse of communism. In contrast to other similar projects, it shifts the focus from sharp political and public debates on history – which have been sufficiently analyzed – to their social perceptions that are largely underestimated and characterized by polyvalence. Such a shift helps to reveal the ways in which a divided society can cope with its traumatic memories and suggests interesting comparisons and generalizations.



Kristof Jacobs
Guest (February 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Radboud University of Nijmegen

Who is Behind the Steering Wheel? Democratic Reforms in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands

In my dissertation I will study democratic reforms, specifically changes in local and national electoral, participatory and referendum legislation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria. The focus is on the period from 1987 onwards; the aim of the Ph.D. is to examine how changes since then can be explained. Therefore I will examine the role of political parties, ideological concerns and public demands for such changes.



Marusa Krese
Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (November 2008–January 2009)

Freelance journalist, writer, poet, Graz

Do Not Despair, You Asked Us Not to Live. Comparing the Position of Women in the “East” and “West” (Slovenia, Austria, Italy, Croatia and Romania)

“Do women in Slovenia feel relieved, now that you live in a democracy and since Slovenia has become an EU-member?” This cliché question most often doesn't even sound like a question, but rather a statement of fact. My answer: Slovene women have lost much in a democracy, and they lost it before they even noticed. Before 1990, the struggle for equality in Western societies seemed to us an unnecessary affair. But today we're hearing from our friends in Western Europe how hard it is to fight for equality. These women are breaking taboos that we're barely beginning to know. We'll need a very long time to go back to reclaim positions that our mothers and many among us once had.



Ivan Landa
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(January–June 2009)

Übersetzer und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Philosophischen Institut der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Prag

G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (German > Czech)

Die Bedeutung der „Vorlesungen“ liegt vor allem darin, dass in ihnen die Philosophie der Religion als philosophische Theologie verstanden ist, d. h. verschiedene Religionen im Zusammenhang mit der Frage nach der Denkbarkeit Gottes betrachtet werden. Hegels Interpretation des „Todes Gottes“, sein Versuch, die Trinitätslehre mit der Theorie der Subjektivität zusammenzufügen und die Deutung des Verhältnisses zwischen Glaube und Vernunft sind auch für gegenwärtige Diskussionen in der philosophischen Theologie relevant. Die Übersetzung wird das Werk erstmals auf Tschechisch zugänglich machen, und dazu beitragen, die Hegel-Forschung in der Tschechischen Republik zu vertiefen.



Sandra Lehmann
Visiting Fellow (September 2008–July 2009)

Habilitandin (Philosophie), ÖAW APART-Stipendiatin

Grundlagen einer Ontologie aus dem Glauben

Ich befasse mich mit dem Wirklichkeitsbegriff im Kontext der philosophischen Moderne. Dabei liegt mein Augenmerk auf dem, was man den „Prozess moderner kritischer Selbsterschöpfung“ nennen könnte. In seinem Verlauf schlägt der dem modernen Wirklichkeitsbegriff eigene emanzipatorische Impuls, der auf „Verwirklichung“ im Sinne einer humanen Gestaltung von Welt zielt, in diverse Diskurse des Wirklichkeitsverlusts um. Gegen diese Diskurse versuche ich zu einer neuen Fundierung der Rede von Wirklichkeit zu kommen. Ich setze hierzu bei der vorprädikativen Relation des Menschen zur Welt, beim so genannten „Wirklichkeitsglauben“ an, den ich systematisch auslege, wobei ich einen utopischen Fluchtpunkt für ihn annehme.




Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow (March 2008–February 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Paderborn; FWF-stipendiary

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in “Naturphilosophie” around 1800

Biology, established around 1800 as the “science of life,” not only developed in modernity as a specific scientific discipline, but also continually served as a kind of social knowledge. The proposed research project will start from and explore the thesis that the re-configuration of philosophy at the beginning of modernity is crucial for the status that biological knowledge gained in the modern order of knowledge. The research project focuses on the writings in Naturphilosophie by Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer.



Boyan Manchev
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow (August 2008–January 2009)

Associate Professor of Philosophy, New Bulgarian University, Sofia; Director of Program and Vice President of the International College of Philosophy, Paris

Alexandre Kojève, the Paradox of the End of Politics and the Philosophy of Political Action. European Project and European Praxis

Is the European project becoming a paradigmatic post-political project? The aim of the proposed research is to contribute to the analysis of the philosophical and political premises of the European project and at the same time to foster critical reflection on its future. A departure point will be the analysis of the political visions of the philosopher Alexandre Kojève who was also practically engaged in the construction of Europe. My working hypothesis: According to the logic of Kojève's philosophy of history, the EU is the embodiment of the Hegelian “end of history.”



Csaba Olay
Andrew W. Mellon Fellow
(January–March 2009)

Senior Lecturer of Philosophy, Eötvös University Budapest

The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt

My research tries to elaborate an enlarged German version of my Hungarian book, “The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt,” published in 2008. I treat her political philosophy as basically grounded on a conception of human life and existence, insofar as the meaning of politics is to give room for human existence to grasp itself. Consequently, her theory is not a proposal to define political tasks as distinct from others, but rather to search for the meaning of public activities and the meaning of action within the context of human life, what I labelled “political existentialism.”

Fellows and Guests



Damiana Gabriela Otoi
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2009)

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Bucharest University

“We Shouldn’t Sell Our Country!” Property and Identity Politics in Post-socialist Romania

The aim of this research project is to explore the reconstitution of private property in post-socialist Romania through the investigation of policies concerning Jewish properties. I intend it to be an illustrative case, which may foster wider reflection on how the process of reprivatization has been intersected with an “identity politics” and with “ethno-national” political discourses and projects.



Leonhard Plank
Junior Visiting Fellow (July 2008–January 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Business Administration, University of Graz; ÖAW DOC-Team-stipendiary

The Responsibilities of States and Transnational Corporations for Human Rights in Global Value Chains – An Analysis of the Electronics, Oil & Gas and Apparel Sectors in Central and Eastern Europe

The research project analyzes production networks and labour rights in Central and Eastern Europe, concentrating on the apparel, electronics and oil & gas sectors, particularly in Romania. The main focus is on mapping the production networks and their key actors as well as respective labour rights issues, analyzing the socio-economic effects of the incorporation in these predominantly Western European production networks and analyzing who is and who can be made responsible and accountable for labour rights violations.



Irina Prokhorova
Guest (January–February 2009)

Founder, editor and publisher of the journal *New Literary Review* and the publishing house NLO, Moscow

Russia in Search of Its History: Grand Battles About the Past and Future

Endless battles about national history have been characteristic of the Russian political and intellectual debate over the last 20 years. To some extent this may be compared to public debates in post-Nazi Germany, but the Russian situation is complicated by the total loss of direction concerning the country’s economic perspectives and ethical priorities. On the one hand, the present regime plays a quasi-Soviet restoration card; on the other, an intensive search has begun for new historical paradigms, social imagery and intellectual approaches to reevaluate the Russian past for the sake of its democratic future.



Artan Puto
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (October 2008–March 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in History, European University Institute, Florence; Editor in Chief of *Perpjekja* magazine, Tirana

Nathalie Clayer: Aux origines du nationalisme albanais (French > Albanian)

Nathalie Clayer’s book is a deep analysis of the development of Albanian nationalism during the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. The “national” identity building process in Albania was very complex, and overlapped and intertwined with other patterns – religious, regional, social and generational – of collective identity development. The book will be a point of reference not only for foreign and local scholars of the Albanian National Movement (1878–1912), but also a guiding methodological work for students of history.



Dirk Rupnow
Visiting Fellow (April 2007–February 2009)

Lecturer at the Institute for Contemporary History, University of Vienna

Transforming the Holocaust. Trans-/National European and Global Politics of Memory (1989–Today)

More than five decades after the end of World War II, the Holocaust has apparently arrived at the center of European identity. Moreover, it seems to have become a negative norm even beyond the borders of Europe – the object of transnational and global remembrance, but nonetheless contested. In these processes the interpretation and representation of the events have seen manifold transformations. The project focuses on new dynamics and developments in Holocaust remembrance since 1989 and especially on transnational actors (the EU, the UN, etc.) and their politics of memory.



Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow (November 2007–October 2010)

Head of Research, FWF; Lecturer, University of Vienna

The Many Faces of Violence: Toward an Integrative Phenomenological Conception

Events of extreme violence (suicide attacks, the return of a new archaic violence, etc.) have renewed attention about physical violence, and there has also been a reappearance of interest in social, cultural and structural violence. However, while all these forms of violence have been widely investigated, interdisciplinary research still lacks a unifying approach. We miss a paradigm to address these forms as aspects of one phenomenon. My project uses the phenomenological method to resolve this deficit and elaborate an integrative conception of violence.



Ferenc Szijj
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–June 2009)

Freelance translator and writer, Budapest

Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger: Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse (German > Hungarian)

Der Briefwechsel von Hannah Arendt und Martin Heidegger ist ein wichtiges zeitgeschichtliches Dokument aus den 1920–30er, sowie den 1950–70er Jahren und trägt zum besseren Verständnis der Persönlichkeit der beiden Philosophen bei. Diese Briefe einer Liebesbeziehung und Freundschaft helfen den psychologischen und geschichtlichen Hintergrund zweier unterschiedlicher und in einigen Aspekten trotzdem verwandter Denkweisen nachzuzeichnen. Die Übersetzung des Briefwechsels wird die in den letzten Jahren belebte Arendt- und die schon längere Zeit andauernde Heidegger-Rezeption in Ungarn ergänzen.



Andras Vari
Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow (January–June 2009)

Associate Professor of History, University of Miskolc

Cross-currents: Ideological Reactions to the First Phase of Globalization in England, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Its Successors, 1873–1929

This project studies anti-modern reactions of societies. It compares different reactions to the first wave of globalization – the trade cycles and the crises of agriculture from the 1870s. These anti-modern reactions were wider based than conservative movements and gained particular strength by combining representations of economic interest with highly ideological issues and by letting social groups redefine their roles.



Olga Wysocka
Józef Tischner Fellow (September 2008–February 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence

Populism

The aim of my research is to analyse populism using Poland as an empirical example. The study attempts to clarify this phenomenon by answering specific questions: What does populism in Poland actually mean? What are the reasons for its emergence and growth? Should we describe Polish populism in general terms, or rather as a country-specific phenomenon? The second part of my project is to compile texts for an anthology on populism. My intent is to fill gaps that exist in the relevant literature that has been published in Poland.



Olga Zaslavskaya
Visiting Fellow (January–March 2009)

Senior Research Archivist at CEU Open Society Archives; Director of the International Alternative Culture Centre, Budapest

Archives as “Artefacts of History”; or: How the History of the Recent Past Has Been Preserved

The twentieth century brought into question the very idea of a historical fact, and also a reconsideration of the function and role of archives. An archive is not just the bearer of documentation, but also a reflection of the needs of its creators. The purposes for its creation need to be considered within a broad socio-political and cultural context. This project will contextualize the “turn to memory” within the larger theoretical debate over the notion of historical representation and also examine the institutional location of the archive as “memorial site” and “historical artefact.”

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

Vortrag: „Grüner Grundwert Solidarität“, in der Reihe *Grüne Grundwerte* an der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt, Wien (16. Januar)

Vortrag: „Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen produktiver, reproduktiver und informeller Arbeit“, im Rahmen der Ringvorlesung *Geschlecht und Arbeit* an der Universität Hildesheim (20. Januar)

Lecture: “When the Celebrations Are Over ... Intersectionality and the Long Road to Theory”, bei der Konferenz *Celebrating Intersectionality? Debates on a Multi-faceted Concept in Gender Studies* at the Cornelia Goethe Zentrum für Frauenstudien und die Erforschung der Geschlechterverhältnisse, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a. M. (January 23)

Teilnahme: Fernsehdiskussion in der Sendung *Kreuz & Quer* zum Thema „Was kümmern uns die Armen?“, ORF (27. Januar)

Seminar: „Figuren des Anderen im Denken der Moderne: Der Fremde – die Frau – das Tier“, am philosophischen Seminar der Universität Tübingen (16.–18. Februar)

Boyan Manchev
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow

Seminar: “Aristotle – Bataille. Sensible Experience and Alteration: Towards a Radical Aesthetics” in the seminar series *The Crisis of the Political and the Alteration of the World*, at the Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche, Weimar (March 19)

Seminar: “What Matter for the World? From Ontology to Ontoasthetics” in the seminar series *The Crisis of the Political and the Alteration of the World*, at the Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche, Weimar (March 26)

Damiana Gabriela Otoi
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow

Lecture: “Political Anthropology”, lecture series at Bucharest University, Political Science Department (February 2–March 30)

Lecture: “Interest Groups/Pressure Groups”, lecture series at Bucharest University, Political Science Department (February 2–March 30)

Seminar: “The Romanian Political System”, seminar series at Bucharest University, Political Science Department (February 2–March 30)

Karin Tertinegg
QUING Project

Moderation: „Yes, we can! Rechte, Gleichstellung und eine faire Politik für Frauen“, Pressekonferenz, Hauptbücherei Wien (2. März)

Andras Vari
Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow

Participation in a preparatory workshop to develop a “Proposal for a Session in the ESSHC in Gent 2010 on Enquiries, Agrarian Interests and Response to Economic Change, c. 1860–1900”, EHES, Paris (March 6–7)

Mieke Verloof
QUING Project

Participation, Presentations, and Chair at the First European Conference on Politics and Gender (ECPG), Queen’s University Belfast (January 21–23).

– **Presentation:** “Challenges of the Discursive Politics of Gender Equality. What About Feminist Taboos?” with Emanuela Lombardo, Universidad Complutense Madrid, and Petra Meier, University of Antwerp

– **Presentation:** “Gender’ and ‘Equality’ in the European Union. Policy Developments and Contestations” with Emanuela Lombardo

– **Presentation** of the QUING Project at the roundtable on “EU Gender Projects – Practising Self-reflexivity?”

– **Participation** at the Paneldiscussion on “Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies. Debates About Muslim Headscarves”

– **Participation** at the Paneldiscussion on “Intimate Citizenship in Europe: Claims, Demands and Practices of Women’s and Other Movements for Gender and Sexual Equality and Change”

– **Chair** of the Panel “Equality in Gender” Equality Policies in Europe”

Presentation of the QUING Project at the Panel on “Gender Equality Politics and Policies in the European Union” of the *Gender, Politics and Society Study Group*, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University (March 19)

Lecture: “Links Between Different Equality Struggles, General Anti-discrimination Frameworks vs Specific Strategies: Concepts, Issues and Challenges for the Women’s Movement”, at the Seminar *Filling the Gender Equality Gap in European Legislation and Tackling Multiple Discrimination*, European Women’s Lobby, Brussels (January 26)

Participation: Workshop “What in the World Does Gender Expertise Mean?”, *Transnational Applied Research in Gender Equity Training (TARGET)*, Northeastern University, Boston (March 20–21)

Publications of Fellows and Guests

Robert Clewis
*Junior Visiting Fellow
in 2003*

**The Kantian Sublime and
the Revelation of Freedom,**
Cambridge University
Press, 2009

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

**Ungleichheit in den
Verhältnissen von Klasse,
Rasse und Geschlecht,**
in: Heike Solga, Peter A.
Berger, Justin Powell (Hg.),
*Soziale Ungleichheit.
Klassische Texte zur
Sozialstrukturanalyse,*
Frankfurt a. M.: Campus,
2009

Sandra Lehmann
Visiting Fellow

Zeit der Hölle, Rezension
von Sigrid Weigel: „Walter
Benjamin – Die Kreatur,
das Heilige, die Bilder“,
Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer,
2008, in: *Recherche.*
Zeitung für Wissenschaft,
1 (2009)

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow

**Biophilosophien – Philo-
sophische Strategien und
die politisch-ethische
Formierung von Biowissen-
schaften,** in: Astrid
Deuber-Mankowsky,
Christoph F. E. Holzhey,
Anja Michaelson (Hg.),
*Der Einsatz des Lebens.
Lebenswissen – Medialisie-
rung – Geschlecht,* Berlin:
b-books, 2009

Krzysztof Michalski
Rector of the IWM

**Nietzsche nasz
współczesny**
(Nietzsche unser Zeit-
genosse), in: *Europa*
(Dziennik), 248 (2009)

Damiana Gabriela Otoiu
*Robert Bosch Junior
Visiting Fellow*

Property Restitution, in:
Lavinia Stan and Nadya
Nedelsky (eds.), *Encyclope-
dia of Transitional Justice,*
Cambridge University
Press, 2009 (forthcoming)

**Reconfiguring the Urban
Space in (Post)communist
Romania. The Case of the
Jewish Community,**
in: Tovi Fenster (ed.),
*Remembering, Forgetting
and City Builders,*
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009
(forthcoming)

**Négociier la (re)constitution
de la propriété privée en
Roumanie postsocialiste.
(Nouveaux) acteurs,
(anciennes) stratégies,** in:
Options Méditerranéennes,
special issue “Enchâsse-
ment social de la question
foncière dans les Balkans”,
2009 (forthcoming).

Andras Vari
Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow

**Herren und Landwirte.
Ungarische Aristokraten
und Agrarier auf dem Weg
in die Moderne (1821–
1910),** Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009

**Güter und Grafen.
Die Großgrundbesitzer
Ungarns im Spannungsfeld
zwischen der höfischen
Gesellschaft und den
eigenen Herrschaftsberei-
chen 1740–1848,** in:
Ivo Cerman, Luboš Velek
(Hg.), *Lebensunterhalt der
Adeligen in der Moderne,*
München: Martin
Meidenbauer Verlag, 2009

**Vízszabályozások,
tulajdonjogok és gazdálko-
dás Magyarországon az
1820-as és az 1870-es
évek vége között** (River
Regulations, Property
Rights and Rural Economy
in Hungary Between the
1820's and the 1870's), in:
Károly Halmos, Judit
Klement, Béla Tomka,
Ágnes Pogány (eds.), *A
felhalmozás míve. Történeti
tanulmányok Kövér György
tiszteletére,* Budapest:
Századvég, 2009



Transit 36 (Winter
2008/2009), *Klimapolitik
und Solidarität.*

Der Klimawandel stellt
die bestehenden demokra-
tischen Institutionen und
das Instrumentarium
herkömmlicher Politik vor
nie gekannte Herausforde-
rungen. Zum einen in
räumlicher und zeitlicher
Hinsicht: der Klimawandel
ist ein globales, ebenso
akutes wie langfristiges
Phänomen, dem nur mit
Maßnahmen beizukommen
ist, die die nationalen
Grenzen und den nur bis
zu den nächsten Wahlen
reichenden Horizont von
Parteipolitik überschreiten;
zugleich wirft er die Frage
nach globaler Gerechtigkeit
und Generationengerech-
tigkeit auf. Zum andern
in struktureller Hinsicht:
der Klimawandel macht
Denken in politischen
Ressorts obsolet, denn er
hat nicht nur ökologische,
sondern untrennbar davon
auch ökonomische, soziale
und sicherheitspolitische
Konsequenzen.

Mit Beiträgen von
Anthony Giddens, Claus
Leggewie und Harald
Welzer, Ingolfur Blühdorn,
Wolfgang Sachs, Lukas
Meyer, Dirk Messner,
Nadine Pratt, Oliver Geden.
Außerdem: Bronislaw
Geremek schreibt zur
Sozialgeschichte von
Ausgrenzung und
Solidarität, Stefan Troebst
über den langen Weg zum
Vertreibungsverbot. Die
Photografien dieses Heftes
stammen von Chris
Niedenthal.

Cornelia Klinger (Hg.),
*Perspektiven des Todes in
der modernen Gesellschaft,*
Wien: Böhlau Verlag und
Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
2009.

Mit Beiträgen von
Hubertus von Amelnxten/
Dieter Appelt, Anna
Bergmann, Ulrike
Brunotte, Iris Därmann,
Terry Eagleton, Kathleen
M. Foley, Alois Hahn/
Matthias Hoffmann,
Hanfried Helmchen/Hans
Lauter, Eberhard Jüngel,
Gabriela Kiliánová,
Cornelia Klinger, Oliver
Krüger, Christoph
Markschies, Hans-Ludwig
Schreiber.

Christine von Kohl,
journalist, human rights
activist and Balkan expert,
died on January 23. She was
affiliated with the IWM by a
long-standing cooperation
and she was a personal
friend. On the occasion of
her 85th birthday the IWM
together with the Bruno
Kreisky Forum hosted a
presentation of her latest
book *Wir und der Balkan.*
Christine von Kohl was the
founder of the “Kulturni
Centar”, an organisation
that supports the integra-
tion of Bosnian refugees in
Vienna, and of the journal
*Balkan – Südosteuropä-
ischer Dialog.* Since the
breakdown of Yugoslavia,
she was in great demand for
her critical comments on
the Balkan situation.

On February 10, after a
protracted illness, **Jan
Blonski** died in Cracow.
He was a marvellous
interpreter of poetry (e.g.
Beckett, Proust, Witkacy,
Sep-Szarzynski) and of the
life of his country, a master
of the Polish language, and
Professor of Literature at
Jagiellonian University
Cracow. Blonski was
attached to the IWM since
its inception: as a Visiting
Fellow, as a member of
the Editorial Committee
of *Transit.* But first and
foremost he was a true and
reliable friend.

Princeton Professor
Anne-Marie Slaughter was
a speaker at several IWM
Summer Schools, and on
stage at the Burgtheater
Debates “Talking about
Europe” in 2008. Now she
is assigned by US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton to
be the new Director of
Policy Planning for the
State Department.
Congratulations.

After two years working
for the QUING Project **Doris
Urbanek** left the Institute in
March to concentrate on
her dissertation that is
funded by a DOC-scholar-
ship of the Austrian Aca-
demy of Sciences. However,
it's not a complete farewell,
since her Ph.D. project is
related to the findings of
QUING.

Thanks to a donation by
the **Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft (DFG),** the
IWM could fill some gaps in
its library stock. The money
was handed over by the
German Embassy, Vienna.
The IWM bought only
what's “good and expensive
with this money”, Cornelia
Klinger pointed out at the
presentation of the new
books on January 15th.
Thanks a lot again to the
DFG and the Embassy.

krakky

Michael Fleischhacker, Chefredakteur

RETTET
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Im Räderwerk der Moderne

VON CORNELIA KLINGER

In den Jahren 2004 bis 2006 führte das IWM in Zusammenarbeit mit der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Berliner Akademie der Künste ein Projekt zum Thema „Die Bedeutung des Todes in der Gesellschaft heute“ durch. Jetzt ist das Buch „Perspektiven des Todes in der modernen Gesellschaft“ erschienen, das die Ergebnisse des Projekts bündelt. Der folgende Text gibt eine Einführung.

Unter den Bedingungen des Planeten Erde wird zu allen Zeiten und an allen Orten gestorben – und getötet. Dennoch hängt die Frage, was es heißt, sterben zu müssen und töten zu können, davon ab, an welchem Ort, zu welcher Zeit und unter welchen Umständen dies geschieht. Das universale und invariante physiologische Faktum des Todes, das den Menschen keineswegs allein betrifft, ist offen für unendlich viele spezifisch menschliche Deutungen und Anschauungen, Regeln und Gesetze, Verhaltens- und Handlungsweisen. Daher ist die Frage nach dem Tod ganz unmittelbar und wesentlich die Frage nach dem Leben, nach Gesellschaft und Kultur. In den vielfältigen Antworten auf diese Fragen spiegelt sich das weite Spektrum der unterschiedlichen Auffassungen der *conditio humana* wider. Das Rätsel des Todes werden wir nicht lösen und ihm seinen Stachel nicht nehmen können, aber wir erfahren sehr viel über die Menschen und ihre Welt, wenn wir die Frage nach dem Tod stellen. Wie die Frage nach dem Tod zu stellen ist, hängt davon ab, welches Konzept, welchen Begriff und welches Bild eine Gesellschaft von sich selbst hat – so wie umgekehrt die Konzeption einer Gesellschaft nicht zuletzt davon abhängt, wie sie ihr Verhältnis zu Sterblichkeit und Tod bestimmt.

Eine Gesellschaft, die sich in einer höheren, außerhalb ihrer selbst liegenden, transzendenten Ordnung verankert sieht, eröffnet zu diesen Fragen einen prinzipiell anderen Zugang, als eine Gesellschaft, die nicht auf einer solchen Annahme basiert. Eine Gesellschaft, die als Organismus vorgestellt wird, sieht sich damit als ganze den Gesetzen des Lebens und Sterbens unterworfen, während eine Gesellschaft, die als ein Mechanismus gedacht wird, der als Perpetuum Mobile auf einen infiniten Progress hin angelegt ist, zwar mit der Sterblichkeit ihrer Mitglieder, nicht jedoch mit der Endlichkeit der Gesellschaftsmaschine als solcher rechnet. Entsprechend verschieden gelagert sind die blinden Flecken und Grenzen, entsprechend unterschiedlich geartet sind die Aporien und Pathologien, an und in die jede Gesellschaft gerät bei dem letztlich notwendigerweise scheiternden Versuch der Bewältigung des schlechthin nicht zu Bewältigenden. Entsprechend variieren die allesamt beschränkten Mittel und Wege zur Kontingenzbewältigung, welche die Gesellschaften entwickeln. Entsprechend differieren schließlich auch die Einstellun-

gen gegenüber der Macht zu töten, die – keineswegs ein menschliches Privileg – noch jeder Gesellschaft als Hypothek ihrer Animalität auferlegt ist. Durch sie erhält die unentrinnbare Ohnmacht vor dem Tod den Aspekt der tragischen Verstrickung in die Macht des Todes und der Schuld vor dem Leben.

Die moderne westliche Gesellschaft, die ohne transzendente Verankerung, sich auf sich selbst stellend als mechanisches „Räderwerk“ konzipiert wird, rechnet nicht mit dem Ende. Die erste Gesellschaft in der menschlichen Geschichte, die über Instrumente zu kompletter Selbstzerstörung verfügt, ist zugleich mit der vollständigen Absurdität dieser Möglichkeit konfrontiert. Diese, ebenso wie in diesem Licht nun auch jede andere Art des Endens,

sentiert. Zusammen mit der Vorstellung des Organischen weist die moderne Gesellschaft den Tod, aber damit auch das Leben, die Kontingenz überhaupt, von sich als ganzer ab und den einzelnen Menschen zu. So auf sich gestellt, zum Subjekt ihres Lebens und Sterbens geworden, werden die Einzelnen erst zu Individuen, nimmt das Prinzip spezifisch moderner Subjektivität und Individualität Gestalt an. Daraus folgt zweierlei.

Erstens verliert eine Gesellschaft, die dem Tod keinen Sinn zu verleihen vermag, zwar nicht die Macht, wohl aber prinzipiell das Recht zu töten. Ohne die Aussicht auf einen jenseitigen, höheren Sinnhorizont, darf die moderne Gesellschaft den Individuen kein Blutopfer abverlangen. Dass ein moderner Staat einen gestrauchelten oder misslie-

zur Schonung des ihr grundsätzlich fremden und eben aufgrund dieser Fremdheit unantastbaren Lebens der Einzelnen verpflichtet. Mögen die Menschenrechte und das Ideal des Ewigen Friedens nur schwer zu realisieren sein, so sind es doch für die moderne Gesellschaft infolge ihrer spezifischen Verfasstheit notwendige Ideen.

Es versteht sich zweitens von selbst, dass die Gesellschaftsmaschine den Individuen die Suche nach dem Sinn ihres Lebens und Sterbens anheim stellen muss. Die Problematik des Todes wird in der modernen Gesellschaft nicht „verdrängt“ – der mit einer sehr spezifischen Bedeutung versehene Begriff der Verdrängung ist in diesem Zusammenhang nicht passend oder höchstens als Metapher, als anderer Ausdruck für die Verschiebung, Verlagerung, Überweisung der Sinn- und Zielfragen von der Gesellschaft an die Individuen, kurzum für die Privatisierung des Lebens, der Lebens(ab)läufe und des Sterbens sowie der diese Vorgänge begleitenden Sinngebungen und Symbolisierungen. Unter dem Gebot der Privatisierung steht am Beginn der Moderne an erster Stelle die Religion. Was die Menschen denken und glauben, nach welchen Prinzipien sie ihr Leben gestalten, wen und wie sie lieben, vor allem aber: wie, mit welchen Ängsten oder Erwartungen sie sterben, wird zu ihrer Privatsache. Mit der Privatisierung verschwindet die Religion nicht, sondern sie vervielfältigt und verbeliebt sich, indem sie der freien Wahl der Indi-

viduen überlassen wird. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass kein Glaubenssystem archaisch oder atavistisch genug, kein Aberglaube zu irrational ist, um nicht den Individuen in der entzauberten, durchrationalisierten, der nüchternen modernen Wirklichkeit als Strohalm ihrer idiosynkratischen Sinngebungsversuche zu dienen. Tatsächlich ist das Individuum mit dem ihm überlassenen Leben und Sterben nicht allein. Neben den Religionen und Religionsurro-

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Wie die Frage nach dem Tod zu stellen ist, hängt davon ab, welches Bild eine Gesellschaft von sich selbst hat

erscheint ausschließlich in der Perspektive einer Katastrophe, der Zerstörung ohne jeden Sinn. Viel mehr als mit dem Tod rechnet die moderne Gesellschaft mit dem Leben, ja sie berechnet das Leben. Alle ihre Wissens- und Handlungsstrategien zielen auf die Versicherung und Verlängerung, die Verbesserung und Verschönerung des Lebens.

Insofern als (oder vielleicht auch nur, solange) diese Strategien nicht ausreichen, den Tod abzuschaffen, tritt hier eine Scheidung ein. Der Versuch, Kontingenzbewältigung durch Trennung zu bewerkstelligen, ist an sich kein Novum – die mittelalterliche Gesellschaft, zum Beispiel, hatte ihrem König zwei Körper zugeordnet, um sich mit dem Faktum seines Todes abfinden („Der König ist tot!“) und ihn zugleich hochleben lassen zu können („Es lebe der König!“), um so selbst weiter zu bestehen. Auch die moderne Gesellschaft nimmt eine Trennung vor, allerdings ist diese von anderer Art. Die Gesellschaft ist kein Körper, sie hat keinen Körper, sie wird nicht mehr durch den (einen, beziehungsweise die beiden) Körper des Monarchen reprä-

bigen Bürger zum Tod verurteilt, scheint kaum noch erträglich; noch viel verächtlicher, dass Staaten ihre Bürger in den Krieg gegen einander schicken. Wenn beides trotzdem geschieht, dann erfolgt es – dem Charakter der modernen Gesellschaft als Mechanismus entsprechend – anonym, mechanisch, maschinell: in den Materialschlachten moderner Kriege oder mittels Giftspritze in der Todeszelle. Krieg und Todesstrafe gibt es; gleichwohl steht die Verletzung oder Vernichtung des Lebens durch den staatlichen Apparat unter dem Verdikt der Delegitimierung und Ächtung, weil es der Aussicht auf Sinn entbehrt. Wenn ein Staat sich veranlasst oder genötigt sieht, die ihm verliehene Macht zum Töten einzusetzen, dann demonstriert er nicht diese Macht, sondern nackte Gewalt. Durch den Einsatz von Gewalt gewinnt der moderne Staat nicht an Macht, sondern riskiert ihren Verlust, indem mit diesem Einsatz seine Legitimität auf dem Spiel steht. Als Mechanismus selbst weder lebendig noch sterblich, ist die moderne Gesellschaft in ihrer staatlichen Ganzheit, zum Schutz und

gaten aller Art sind ganze Industrien und Märkte entstanden, um den Bedarf an Zerstreuung und Ablenkung von der Bürde der Existenz zu decken und/oder um den schier unersättlichen Hunger nach Sinn zu stillen. Das Angebot ist weit gefächert und reichhaltig, aber nichts und niemand kann und darf dem Individuum die (Kauf-)entscheidung abnehmen.

Unteressen laufen die Räder der Gesellschaftsmaschinerie zur materiellen Kontingenzbeherrschung unermüdlich weiter. Die Apparaturen von Wissenschaften und Technologie haben beachtliche Erfolge erzielt in der Sicherung und Ausdehnung, in der Verbesserung und Verschönerung – „enhancement“ des Lebens *in the brave new world* – und sie versprechen das Blaue vom Himmel der Zukunft. Es ist offenkundig, dass die klassisch-moderne Trennung zwischen Gesellschaftsmaschine und Privatleben die Geltung, die sie nie vollständig hatte, verloren hat oder doch in absehbarer Zeit verlieren wird. Damit werden die Karten im Spiel auf Leben und Tod noch einmal, wieder einmal, neu gemischt. <

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Cornelia Klinger (Hg.)
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Am 12. Mai findet eine Präsentation des Buches mit den Herausgebern/innen der Wiener Reihe statt. 18 Uhr, IWM Bibliothek

Will Europe Stay Together?

BY KURT BIEDENKOPF



On February 22, Kurt Biedenkopf participated in the Debate “20 Years after 1989” at Vienna’s Burgtheater (see page 4). The following text is an extract of his speech, concentrating on Europe’s reaction to the financial crisis.

“There’s no question that what is generally referred to as a financial crisis is much more than a financial crisis. The eruption that took place because of a total delimitation, an almost total setting-free of the financial markets, is the combination of a development that started in the 70s in Western Europe. We lived beyond what we earned, and we started going into debt. We had increasing budget deficits, and at the same time our GDP was growing, which was a paradox, and we thought that we could make the government’s life easier by spending more than we had, very simply said. Because of that, we refused to adapt the West European countries to the revolutionary change of our economies, to the increasing importance of science-based production, and we also missed the chance of putting our social systems in order, so they did not develop the kind of pressure on increasing government deficits that they could have. The crisis, therefore, hits us rather unprepared. Our countries are not elastic enough to even solve part of it, and that has a tremendous centrifugal force. The real test on Europe is whether it can manage to stay together. Whoever doesn’t understand this, doesn’t understand the crisis. Europe was creating an illusion by living on future resources to stabilize the present. And it is not that politics alone are responsible for that; there was a general feeling, and to

a certain extent there still is, in our elites, both in social sciences, especially economics, in industry, in finance, and in politics. They all participated, and the real problem we have today is that this is to a very certain extent, a failure of elites, and we have to fix the problem with the

difficult issues is the re-nationalization of financial politics. Well, to a certain extent, they’re no longer really national because of the Stability Act, so the test is whether the Stability Act will hold. Clearly it has to hold, but it must also be developed for the situation we’re in. The rules

... this is a failure of elites, and we have to fix the problem with the same elites that failed

same elites that failed. We obviously cannot replace them, put them aside and build up new elites in a short period of time. What does that mean?

Europe really has before it a time of reckoning. And this is not to imply the importance of being a world power, or being in competition with China. I don’t think that’s the real issue. Important is: Europe must stay together, and that includes Poland, Hungary, the Baltic States. Moreover, Europe has to take responsibility for its banking system. The fact that Europe supported the privatization of banking systems in Hungary now means that it has created a responsibility, and should deal with the consequences. One of the most

about bailout, for example, have been made for a totally different condition. We don’t bailout within the European Union because of a danger of failure. That was a policy directed at individual politics of an individual country, but it was not directed at a situation like we have now, where the bailout problem arises not for one country but for several, both in eastern and western parts of Europe. It arises for countries like Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, and others which are being rated down, which, in turn, means they have to pay more interest. Consequently, there is a tremendous pressure on Europe to stay together, and a strong centrifugal force, trying to tear it apart. This, to me, is the sit-

uation, and unless we wake up to the dimension of the situation, we won’t be able to cope with it. If you ask the wrong questions, you’ll get the wrong answers. So we have to ask the right questions.

We should take great courage from what Europeans were capable of doing twenty years ago. In retrospect for the younger generation that seems pre-planned almost. In hindsight, it looks as though it was all very well done. Of course that’s not the case. There was a huge amount

ness was coinciding with the will of the people to be free. What we have today is a situation where Europe is again at the crossroads. Europeans must understand the importance of this for Europe. I don’t reflect on the United States, which carries a gigantic public deficit, both in trade terms and in domestic terms, which is not financed by the United States. It’s being financed by Europe, Japan, and for the last three or four years it’s been financed by China. America is economically weak, and if they now blow up the deficit even more, and they will – to trillions rather than hundreds of billions – they cannot finance it. Either they print money, and introduce an inflation, by means of which reducing the deficit, making the rest of the world pay, or they restrain themselves and go through very hard times.

We will have to go through really hard times as well. But the wonderful vision here is that this Europe doesn’t want to be a military force anymore. Its revolutions have invented, for all practical purposes, a new way of solving basic problems: an irreversible knowledge, which cannot be erased, and if Europe continues on that path, it can make a very important contribution to the world not in the sense of power but in the sense of wisdom and culture. And when I see that eight out of ten of the top singers in the opera contest in Dresden come from Asia, and accept our culture, I feel pretty good. < >>

Kurt Biedenkopf was Prime Minister of the German state of Saxony from 1990 until 2002. At present he is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin.

Poland Goes Global

BY JACEK KOCHANOWICZ

After transformation, NATO-membership and accession: What is the next goal of Polish politics?

A few weeks before the financial crisis broke out, the main preoccupation of the Polish media was a curious, awkward, grotesque and perhaps disgracing incident: the Prime Minister's Office refused the President of the Republic a government plane he wanted to use in order to go to Brussels for a EU summit. (Lech Kaczynski, the President, chartered another plane and eventually got there.) Government officials were giving technical reasons for this incident, which were not very convincing, as it was a culmination of a controversy over who should lead the Polish delegation to Brussels – the Prime Minister or the President. In part, it was a consequence of somewhat contradictory regulations of the Polish constitution, which has a parliamentary, not a presidential system, but also has the president elected by popular vote and gives him some unspecified role in foreign policy affairs.

The crux of the matter, however, is a bitter rivalry between Kaczynski, the President, and Donald Tusk, the Prime Minister. It is a personal rivalry as much as it is political. Both will start in the presidential elections three years from now while representing rival parties. Tusk is the leader of the governing Civic Platform (PO). Kaczynski is close to the Law and Justice Party (PiS), headed by his twin brother, Jarosław Kaczynski, Prime Minister in 2005–2006. While Lech Kaczynski left the party after his election, he never denied his close links to it. In fact, the day his election to presidency was announced, he stood up during a meeting and, addressing his brother, reported in a military fashion: "Mr. Chairman, mission accomplished." Jarosław Kaczynski, the outspoken head of Law and Justice – which gained power in 2005, but later lost an early election in 2007 to Civic Platform – is less visible today than Lech Kaczynski, who apparently tries to use the rather limited competencies of his office to gain as much power and visibility as possible. But it is a widely shared opinion that the brothers work in tandem, and that their aim is to secure the presidency for Mr. Lech Kaczynski and to maintain the Law and Justice electoral base.

As far as Tusk is concerned, he is much more popular than his adversary. However, in office as Prime Minister for more than a year now, he has not accomplished anything in terms of major projects and desperately needed reforms. He seems to

be keen on not doing anything that may reduce his popularity. A good party tactician, he rules through a tightly knit circle of loyal party apparatchiks; reserving final decisions to himself. He has little, if any, experience running state machinery, having never held any public office before becoming Prime Minister.

Unfortunately, the problematic interaction between these two personalities, and indeed two parties rarely elevates beyond such petty incidents as the one described above, and a number of similar, although perhaps not as grotesque, stories may easily be quoted. Each of them, not surprisingly, is enhanced by the media, which is always searching for sensation. The politicians themselves, eager to gain media visibility, easily succumb to the style of quick, one-sentence formulations of ideas, mostly consisting of critiques of their opponents. Often they have a brutal and accusatory nature, and as a consequence, libel suits in court became a national sport for the Polish political class. As a result of all this, the public debate degenerates; the issues of deeper importance are swept aside. For those who are members of the political class, the primary issue is to remain in power and – if possible – keep all the perks it provides. What matters is politics in the narrowest sense of the word (who can outwit whom); the wider reform agenda having less and less importance. As for the wider public, the political life becomes a theatrical performance, with little reference to the real world. In fact, one might have an impression of a certain aimlessness of the current policies, and a lack of clear recognition of the country's objectives.

It was not so in the past. When we look back into the period that opened with the collapse of state socialism in Poland in 1989, the agenda was more clear, although it had been changing. It is possible to distinguish three grand projects in the past, which guided the policies and allowed the mobilization of support. The first was TRANSFORMATION. The second was NATO. The third was EU-ACCESSION.

The transformation agenda had been set by the fall of state socialism in 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of that year shall remain the symbol, but for Poland the date was earlier: June 4 (ominously, the day of the Tiananmen Square massacre) was the day



Photo: Chris Niedenthal

of the semi-free elections, which allowed the democratic opposition to form a coalition government with the communists and their satellite parties. The economic challenges were enormous: In the short term 40 billion US dollars of foreign debt, hy-

reforms: Leszek Balcerowicz, who served as a finance minister and deputy prime minister in the first post-communist government. In the background, were the IMF and the World Bank, and the program introduced was, in its basic lines, similar

working class. But they were painful enough to remove the Solidarity-led government from office and to replace them with Social Democrats – the reinvented communists – who, in order to keep popularity, slowed down the reforms, as well as the privatization process – with one exception: they gave their blessing for the work intended to prepare a general pension reform. They were guided by the Chilean example and the World Bank recommendations, i.e., shifting from the redistributive pay-as-you-go system towards a much more market based funded system.

The Solidarity-dominated political party AWS returned to power in 1997 and, despite its internal rivalries and rising involvement in petty politics and even corruption, it managed to go on with the pension reform and three further big reforms: health care, education, and territorial administration. The latter had been very much related to an issue increasingly on the agenda – the likely accession to the EU. AWS lost the elections in 2001, and the post-communists returned to power.

In the meantime, Poland joined NATO in 1999. This was much less controversial than economic reforms. Nobody across the spectrum of the political horizon seemed to oppose it in any serious way. Looked at from a certain perspective, it seems

There is a feeling that the country is still not on a fast track with most of the developed world

perinflation, shortages, and waning output; in the longer term dismantling the remnants of the collapsing command economy and introduction of some – nobody knew what – sort of market economy. In other words, macroeconomic stabilization and institutional rebuilding.

A coincidence of factors led to the choice of what became known as "shock therapy": the end of price controls, pegging local currency to the dollar, end of subsidization, removal of job security. They were to be followed by privatization and partial abolishment of the socialist welfare state. These reforms were designed by a hitherto almost unknown economist, whose name later became symbolic for these early

to what is known as the Washington Consensus. These early reforms were followed by a further decrease of output and a wave of correctional inflation, as well as heavy social costs, particularly in terms of unemployment. But almost immediately, they eliminated shortages, and later led to price stability and the revival of growth (which started in 1992). With the prospects of economic stability, foreign capital started to come.

These reforms were politically possible in the specific climate of communism's collapse with the Solidarity trade union initially giving legitimization to the reforms, which, to a large degree, were contrary to the immediate interests of the industrial

that the 90s opened a window of opportunity in this respect. The Soviet Union imploded, and, for a while at least, the Russian Federation – its most important successor state – lost its capacity for influences and veto power in international affairs.

The real importance of NATO is, perhaps luckily, difficult to ascertain, particularly because it is in the process of redefining its role after the end of the Cold War. Symbolically, the accession was enormously important, as it signified inclusion into the Western World. After 9/11, the Polish government (then in the hands of the post-communists) was keen to assert its commitment to military links with the West, and particularly with the US, by sending troops to Afghanistan and to Iraq. More recently, both the PiS and the PO stand committed to allow Americans to build a medium-range rocket installation within the Polish territory. There are also allegations – never proven or confirmed – that the Poles allowed CIA to keep, and perhaps torture, the Al Kaida prisoners in one of its intelligence facilities.

All of this was happening while Poland was on its way to join the European Union. And given the widening rift between Europe and the United States in the first half of the decade, it led to the accusation that Poland is a “Trojan horse” of the US in Europe, the answer to which was that Europe can not be counted upon in terms of security.

An accession had not been very likely in the beginning. Slowly, however, it started to take shape, embracing not only Poland but also other Visegrad countries as well as the Baltics. Why Europe, and Germany in particular, decided to enlarge the EU, is another matter. What is important for Polish development is that it set the agenda for almost ten years, requiring the country to adjust itself to the *acquis communautaire*, but offering also incentives in the form of pre-accession funds and the promise of more once it is completed. This process was much less dramatic and much more mundane than the transformation in the sense described above, as it consisted of a myriad of negotiations on various levels, redrawing of laws, introducing procedures.

There was some opposition, but not much. For the political class, Brussels had been apparently ap-

praised as offering opportunities rather than threats. Some opponents argued from ideological positions. Europe was perceived by them as endangering the national and religious (i.e. catholic) identity of the Poles. Peasant farmers were afraid that they would be put out of competition by cheap, subsidized farm products coming from the West. The ultimate decision had to be made by the referendum with at least 50% participation. Thus, the supporters of unification, including the ruling Social Democrats (irony of history) put, for months, a considerable effort in mobilizing the public opinion in favor of unification.

Once it was completed, the positive assessment seemed to increase with various benefits it brought, such as access to the common market, flow of money, possibilities of legal work outside, and a general feeling of enlarged space for life, particularly after Poland had been included into the Schengen zone. But at the same time, once the goal of accession was achieved, a clear direction for the march ahead disappeared, and the country lost a compass for further development.

Moreover, the political system, or rather the party system of Poland, proved, in a certain sense, unstable. The 2001 elections wiped out the AWS, the Solidarity successor party, and put its leaders into oblivion, out of the political scene. In a similar way, the 2005 elections reduced the Social Democrats to their own shadows, compromised – despite their successful campaigning for the EU – by corruption scandals. The PiS and PO campaigned under the banners of the “Fourth Republic” and moral revolution, attacking not only their predecessors, but also the liberal and liberal-left circles for their complicity with the ex-communists and, in consequence, not allowing a real change to take place. The story of these ideological battles, however interesting in themselves, replaced any serious political debate on what sort of policies were needed and possible in the face of all kinds of challenges outside, as much as inside, the country.

It is true that among the experts and the public intellectuals the catchword is “modernization.” There is a feeling that, whatever tremendous change has occurred in the last 20 years, the country is still not on a fast track with most of the developed world. Transformation led in-

deed to institutional rebuilding and to the introduction of a much more efficient (capitalist) market system; in other words, to the introduction of an incentive system much more efficient than the previous one. That might be used to explain the early decrease of output (until 1992), as the later economic growth. Decrease (some claim it was overstated) had been an effect of “cleaning” the economy of inefficient production. Later came growth by a more efficient use of resources as well as the subsequent investment.

The political class seems to have a sort of a tunnel vision, focused on their internal battles

But basically, growth depends upon innovation, so it is important to see how that worked in the Polish case. Not surprisingly, most of this innovation – be it physical technologies as much as management, organization, financial and marketing arrangements – has been brought in from outside. Some of the main agents were Western companies, which either bought the SOE and modernized them, or engaged de novo in green field investment (apparently, the most profitable); also there was the import of machinery and technologies by Polish companies; and finally, on another level, were the programs and projects of the EU, where obtaining funds had been contingent upon and/or led to introducing Western technologies.

Thus, most of this process was copying, adapting and imitating. There is, obviously, nothing wrong in it. On the contrary, after the fall of state socialism, it was crucial that the country catch-up, as much as it could, with the Western economies. The question remains, however, how successful it was, and whether it is doomed to imitation only.

Unfortunately, this success in imitation, while considerable, was limited. Take the example of infra-

structure, the issue crucial for further development. For 20 years, Poland proved unable to really move ahead with the reconstruction of its outdated road networks, and, in particular, it did very little highway construction, even when in 2004, EU funds became available. The same is true with the railway and, to a degree, the airport facilities. This is not easy to explain. It looks as though the main obstacles were of an institutional, political, and perhaps of a cultural character. The government and public administration is notoriously incapable of moving ahead with large-scale modernization projects.

In the private sector, as recent studies show, local firms succeed in introducing modern technologies mostly in low-tech industries, or – at best – in those on the middle level of technological development. This is a good solution as long as low wages allow for being competitive: in this respect Poland can compete with Western Europe, but not with China. As of now, it bases its position in the wider, European (or world) economy on exporting low value added products of medium level technology. The automotive industry is a good example for this strategy. Poland is a great automobile producer, but neither designs, nor technologies are developed there.

So the success of imitative modernization is a limited one. Moreover, there is little to suggest that there are any considerable successes of original, innovative thinking on the way from within the society. The comparative statistics of original thinking is dismal. Poland is second to last in Europe in terms of the number of industrial patents. It is also very low in the rankings of its scientific publications. These low levels of outcomes reflect as little interest in innovative thinking by the political elite as by the firms, because in both cases the level of expenditure on research and development is low. Apart from research, there are also problems with education. Primary and high school education still remain very traditional, with not enough stress on languages and communication skills, or on maths and sciences. Poland boasts large numbers of college students, indeed high by the European standards, but the quality of this college training is often also dismally low.

These problems are, of course, recognized by experts and, to a degree, even pop up in the more general debate. They seem, however, to have little appeal to the political class, which is fixated on their immediate goals of outmaneuvering their competitors. It would be naive, of course, to expect them not to do so. What is depressing, is that they don't do anything else. In part, it is the result of a certain amateurism of Polish politicians, and particularly those from PiS and PO. They had little previous experience of governance. There are no real thinkers among them. There is a lack of institutionalized reflection, in particular, think-tanks, and apparent inability for systematic use of intellectual analysis, except, perhaps that which is strictly related to political marketing – poll-watching, PR, the media image. (To give just one example – the President, as much as he tries to be visible and to react to the incoming challenges, the financial crisis included, does not even have an economic advisor.)

The political class, thus, seems to have a sort of a tunnel vision, focused on their immediate internal battles, but hardly able to see and analyze the wider issues, and, in particular, those which are related to what is covered by the term “globalization.” As I am trying to argue, in 1989/90 Poland entered the globalizing world without, perhaps, fully understanding it. For the last 15 to 20 years it was rather lucky to benefit from the blessings of globalization, then to suffer from its adverse effects. With relatively high economic growth, there was perhaps little realization than that, in the longer run, the imitative modernization would have to be supplemented by the internal innovative efforts, for which it may not be enough to count on business, and by some serious public policies, which would have to be included as well.

It might be that the financial crisis is a serious test. *The Economist*, analyzing recently the situation of Eastern Central Europe in the previous decade, commented that it “could sit back and enjoy the weather.” We shall see what comes when the weather turns worse. <

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June 9

Jan Patočka
Memorial Lecture:
Ian Buruma: The Virtues and Limits of Cosmopolitanism
June 10 (Börsensäle, Vienna)

Bernhard Waldenfels: Feindliche Gewalt
June 18

Lecture Series:

Ecopolitics and Solidarity:
Claus Leggewie: Klima und Demokratie
May 14

Art – Society – Politics:
Uwe Hebekus: „Eine dauernd arbeitende Selbstreinigungsinstrumente“. Nationalsozialistische „Bewegung“ und ästhetische Modernität
June 2

Further Events:

Book Presentation:
„Perspektiven des Todes in der modernen Gesellschaft“ und „Viele Religionen – eine Vernunft? Ein Disput zu Hegel“
with: **Cornelia Klinger, Herta Nagl-Docekal, Ludwig Nagl**
May 12

Panel Discussion:
Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses
with: **Shlomo Avineri, Rajeev Bhargava, Saskia Sassen, Charles Taylor**
June 4 (Palais Glam Callas, Vienna)

Panel Discussion:
Die „Schöne neue Welt“ nach dem Kommunismus: Was bleibt von 1989?
June 15 (Renner Institut, Vienna)

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