

*Memory*Rewriting
European History*Climate*Managing
the Unavoidable*Racism*Violence
Against Roma


The Crisis of the Left

In his latest book “First as Tragedy, Then as Farce,” the philosopher Slavoj Žižek points out that “although we always recognized the urgency of the problems, when we were fighting AIDS, hunger, water shortages, global warming, and so on, there always seemed to be time to reflect, to postpone decisions ... But with the financial meltdown, the urgency to act was unconditional; sums of an unimaginable magnitude had to be found immediately.” However, the call to “save the banks!” is more and more met with the slogan “We won’t pay for your crisis!” The financial crisis has turned into a crisis of solidarity and social cohesion seems at risk. At the IWM conference “Social Solidarity and the Crisis of Economic Capitalism” on October 16 and 17 international experts discussed the social impact of the global crash of the markets and the ensuing reactions of governments. The following article by Robert Kuttner explains why it is that even the center left parties but also Barack Obama, who everyone expected so much from, do not find answers to the big crisis of capitalism.

BY ROBERT KUTTNER

Why does the center-right now dominate so many countries? Why has the democratic left been unable to make gains, even in a moment of the greatest disgrace for free market capitalism since 1929? The financial collapse was the ultimate test of the proposition that markets are self regulating; and it should have discredited its sponsors, as in 1929. But so far, the democratic left is weaker than it was in 2007, at the beginning of the crash.

Of course, the troubles of the social democratic model and of social solidarity go back well before the recent financial collapse. The standard story of the weakness of the left is that the welfare state, or mixed economy, or managed form of capitalism has reached its natural limits, fiscally, economically, and demographically. You reach a point where you can’t provide any more services without taxing the middle class so heavily that voters revolt, and the political coalition collapses; or you tax industry and entrepreneurs so heavily that the productive engine sputters; or you defensively create a two tier welfare state of insiders and out-

siders, as the French and Germans and Italians have done, and that further splinters your coalition.

This tension is compounded by an aging population that needs more services, and working age people who are having fewer children, so that there are fewer workers to pay the costs. The model is further strained by immigrants who are not easily assimilated and who are re-

parents’ ideal of social solidarity; they are not getting much from it, and they don’t understand why successful people need to pay for society’s failures.

A neo-Marxian variant of the same story, going back to the first stagflation crisis of the 1970s, proposed a fiscal crisis of the state, in which the state was being made to socialize the ever increasing social

*Globalization has liberated
capital to undermine
the regulatory constraints
of the state*

sent by the locals, both culturally and because of the costs to the welfare states. On all counts, voters turn to the right because they conclude that the social democratic model is no longer a good bargain. There is also, supposedly, a cultural dimension, in that some younger citizens have bought the appeal of individualism; they don’t accept their grand-

costs of capitalism, and these just got too onerous to bear.

There are elements of truth to all of this, but I don’t think any of it is the primary explanation. The history and institutions of particular countries vary widely, as does the stage of their development of the welfare

continued on page 4

Contents

NO. 102 • SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 2009

Reason, God, Love, Death – In Memoriam of Leszek Kołakowski	3/5
The Crisis of the Left – by Robert Kuttner	1/4/5
CONFERENCE ON MEMORY	
Tomorrow's Yesterday – by Csilla Kiss	6
Tito Between Legend & Thriller – by Slavenka Drakulic	7
DEBATES AND LECTURES	
Militant Rhetorics, Soviet Assassinations, Globalized Women, Phenomenology in Europe – Monthly Lectures	8
Climate and Solidarity, Art and Politics – Lecture Series	9
Balkan Perspectives, the Habsburg Empire, Equality Policies, Memory and Identity – Further Events	11
TISCHNER DEBATES IN WARSAW	
Market Mysticism – by Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg	13
FROM THE FELLOWS	
Unwanted by All – by Lisa Bjurwald	14
FELLOWS AND GUESTS, VARIA	
PUBLICATIONS	
GUEST CONTRIBUTIONS ON CLIMATE POLITICS	
Was zu tun ist – von Franz Fischler	17
Revolution in the Making – by Paweł Świeboda	18



Jennifer Hochschild, Professor of Government at Harvard University, discussing with the panelists of the Jacek Kuron Debate on Solidarity at the IWM library. The debate dealt with the impacts of the economic crisis for society and politics. Read more about this in the contribution by Robert Kuttner on pages 1, 4 and 5.



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Editorial

Wofür 9/11 steht, das wissen wir. Doch was bedeutet 9/15? Am 15. September 2008 schlitterte die amerikanische Großbank Lehman Brothers in die Pleite und mit ihr die Wirtschaft in die Krise. Ein Jahr nach Lehman lud das IWM Wissenschaftler und Politiker ein, die gesellschaftlichen Folgen des „Crashes“ zu bewerten. Klar wurde bei einer Tischner Debatte in Warschau, dass die Krise der Finanzmärkte wohl nicht das Ende des Kapitalismus einläutet, aber vielleicht das Ende des ökonomischen Modells der selbstregulierenden Märkte. Das nämlich sei gescheitert, argumentieren Roman Frydman und Michael Goldberg auf Seite 13. In die Krise geraten ist aber nicht nur die „unsichtbare Hand“ des Marktes, sondern auch die Politik linksliberaler Parteien. Warum das so ist, danach fragte die Konferenz „Social Solidarity and the Crisis of Economic Capitalism“. Im Artikel von Robert Kuttner auf den Seiten 1, 4 und 5 können Sie Antworten finden.

Zur Rettung des Planeten vor dem Klimawandel hat es beim Klimagipfel in Kopenhagen nicht ganz gereicht, die dänische Hauptstadt ist kein „Hopenhagen“ geworden. In den Gastbeiträgen von Franz Fischler und Paweł Świeboda können Sie lesen, was nun in der Klimapolitik getan werden muss. Sie plädieren für nicht weniger als eine zweite industrielle Revolution, hin zu einer emissionsarmen Wirtschaft.

2009 war nicht nur ein Jahr der Krisen, sondern auch eines der Erinnerungen. 1989 fiel die Mauer und beendete die Teilung Europas. Eine gemeinsame, von Ost- wie Westeuropäern akzeptierte Nachkriegsgeschichte ist aber immer noch nicht in Sicht. Die Konferenz „Tomorrow's Yesterday“ machte deutlich, dass eine solche nur dann möglich ist, wenn an die Stelle selektiver, nationaler Erinnerungskulturen endlich eine faktenorientierte Geschichtsschreibung tritt. Slavenka Drakulic zeigt auf Seite 7 am Beispiel Ex-Jugoslawiens was sonst passiert: Legendenbildung.

Eine Menschengruppe, die in der europäischen Geschichte stets vergessen wird, sind die Roma. Kaum jemand scheint daher zu bemerken, dass sie zunehmend mit rassistischer Gewalt konfrontiert sind. Milena Jesenská Fellow Lisa Bjurwald hat eine aufrüttelnde Reportage über haßerfüllte Politiker, eine ignorante Öffentlichkeit und die Angst der Roma geschrieben, zu lesen auf Seite 14. ◀

*Eine anregende Lektüre
wünscht Ihnen*

Sven Hartwig

We all know what 9/11 stands for. But what is the meaning of 9/15? On September 15, 2008, the major American bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt; its collapse marked the beginning of the economic crisis. One year after Lehman, the IWM invited researchers and politicians to discuss the societal consequences of the crash. During a Tischner Debate in Warsaw it became clear that while the financial crisis is unlikely to end capitalism, it may undermine the economic model of self-regulating markets. Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg argue that this model has failed, on page 13 of this *IWMpost*. Not just the market's "invisible hand" has lost credibility, but also the policies of moderate leftists in Europe. The conference "Social Solidarity and the Crisis of Economic Capitalism" asked for the reasons behind this development. Robert Kuttner's article on pages 1, 4 and 5 provides some answers.

As we all know the Copenhagen Summit did not save the planet from climate change; Copenhagen did not become "Hopenhagen." In their guest contributions, Franz Fischler and Paweł Świeboda outline the future of climate policy. They call for a second industrial revolution to bring about a low-emission global economy.

However, 2009 was not just a year of crisis, it was also a year of retrospection. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and Europe was reunited. Still, a common history of the post-war era, accepted by both Western and Eastern Europeans, has yet to be written. Twenty years after the Fall of the Wall, the conference "Tomorrow's Yesterday" showed that such a common history is possible only if objective historiography takes the place of particular national narratives. On page 7, Slavenka Drakulic, discussing the example of former Yugoslavia, describes the frightening alternative to objectivity: the creation and proliferation of myths.

The Roma are commonly ignored in Europe's history. Few seem to notice that they are facing increasing racist violence. Milena Jesenská Fellow Lisa Bjurwald wrote a jolting feature on hateful politicians, an ignorant public, and the fear of the Roma; you can find it on page 14. ◀

I hope you enjoy reading,

Sven Hartwig

Reason, God, Love, Death

He saw himself as the jester, as the one “who doubts all that appears self-evident”. On June 17, 2009, Leszek Kołakowski, the great Polish philosopher and historian of ideas, died at the age of 81. He had been a true and inspiring friend of the Institute and a member of its Academic Advisory Board from the beginning. But first and foremost, he was “simply a very brilliant thinker” as Krzysztof Michalski referred to him in a recent interview on Kołakowski in the Polish weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* (see below). In one of his last essays that we exclusively present here in English, Kołakowski reflects upon one of the most self-evident realities of human existence, the terrifying passing of time and upon the four ways we can escape that: reason, god, love – and death.

A Complete and Short Metaphysics. There will be no other. There will be no other.

Four cornerstones support the house in which, to put it pompously, the human spirit lives. And those four are:

Reason
God
Love
Death

The vault of this house is Time – the most commonplace reality and the most mysterious. From the moment of our birth, we think of Time as the most ordinary, the most familiar of realities. (Something was, and then ceased to be. Something was such-and-such and is now different. Something happened yester-

day or a minute ago and can never, ever, come back.) But while Time is our most commonplace reality, it is also the most terrifying. The four entities mentioned are our ways of coping with that terror.

Reason is there to discover eternal truths, which are impervious to time. God, or the absolute, is an entity that knows neither past nor future, but contains everything in its “eternal present.” Love, when lived intensely, also blots out past and present; it is a concentrated form of present, cut off from Time. Death is the end of the temporality which engulfs us in life and perhaps a transi-

tion to a different kind of temporality, of which we know nothing (or almost nothing). Thus all the cornerstones of our thought are instruments which allow us to escape the terrifying reality of Time; all seem designed to make Time into something we can live with – something familiar and tame. ◀

From the book “Czy Pan Bóg jest szczęśliwy i inne pytania” (ZNAK 2009); translated by Agnieszka Kołakowska



Leszek Kołakowski 1928–2009

Photo: Remate Apostel

An Intellectual Volcano

Tygodnik Powszechny: Leszek Kołakowski was one of those philosophers who performed a fundamental volte-face in their thinking. Having taken up various subjects and issues, he then went on to subject them to criticism. Is there a central thread in his philosophy that connects Kołakowski the Marxist and Kołakowski the religious thinker?

Krzysztof Michalski: Yes, I think there is. Of course, his early texts from the late 1940s or 1950s, such as those collected in *Sketches on Catholic Philosophy*, are very different from the book he wrote a few decades later about Pascal and Saint Augustine and other works from the 1990s and 2000s: the young Kołakowski was initially a communist activist who sharply attacked the institutions and doctrine of the Catholic Church, while the (very rapidly) mature Kołakowski was an uncompromising critic of communist reality, and in time also of its Marxist theoretical foundations; he was full of sympathy for religious consciousness and for its institutional expression, the Catholic Church, as well.

Yet it is not so hard to spot a distinct continuity within this difference; I think the reasons that led Kołakowski to his initial acceptance of communism were not so very different from those that later led him to reject it – just as his early criticism of

catholic philosophy is not entirely at odds with his later affirmation of the fundamental role of religion and the church for culture; the element without which man is not man.

Naturally I do not wish to blur the actual differences, both in Kołakowski's views and in his moral attitude. Towards the end of his life he did not believe that a free society cannot be accomplished without nationalising the means of production (as he thought in the 1950s); he very soon recognised that his own youthful criticism of Catholic priests and philosophers – in a situation where in fact not his, but arguments similar to his, sometimes led to the imprisonment or even the death of those to whom they were addressed – was inadmissible from the moral viewpoint too. He regarded communism as the embodiment of reason, and as a remedy for social inequality and exploitation. In this he was wrong.

But even then, in his criticism of the Church, he was also right about many things. As the young Kołakowski used to remind us, the Catholic Church often really did fulfil a reactionary social role – here and there it still does this nowadays. It helped – as it sometimes still does – to provide grounds for inequality, oppression and exclusion. Eminent church leaders, such as John Paul II, also saw this and fought against it.

Religion – Christianity – does not have to be a tool for immunising a moral code, a defensive wall built around a collection of moral rules which, as a result, becomes something like a set of military regulations demanding total obedience (without any elaborate intellectual gymnastics, including standing on one's head, I do not think this sort of understanding of religion can be connected with the stories in the New Testament in any case). Kołakowski deliberately, sometimes very amus-

other texts in Kołakowski's mature philosophy, help to understand religion rather than to reject it.

The twenty-something-year-old Kołakowski criticised religion in the name of reason and by doing so also exposed actual weaknesses in Christian institutions and doctrines. In time he came to understand – and convinced many of us, his listeners and readers – that opting in favour of reason means above all opting in favour of freedom; for the total, unlimited freedom of the human be-

Paul II once said in a conversation with Tischner and myself. “Does not appealing to mercy by necessity go hand in hand with total respect for inalienable human rights, with absolute recognition for the dignity of each individual person? Is it not the case that only a free man can truly love his neighbour?”

The young Kołakowski accepted communism because he believed it was the party of reason, but he soon...

Tygodnik Powszechny: ... noticed how aberrational it was?

Krzysztof Michalski: ... realised that the real world does not correspond to an ideal (and became a revisionist) and also that the ideal is not unrelated to its applications (and rejected the ideal too, and thus Marxism). The intellectual conclusion of his debate with Marxism is *Main Currents of Marxism*, a book which has entered the canon of the twentieth-century history of ideas. He became a Marxist in the name of reason – and in the name of reason he dropped it, once he had realised (as Kant had once done) that reason and freedom are one and the same thing. This opened his eyes not just to the weaknesses, but also to the strength of Christianity.

continued on page 5

*Kołakowski's mature philosophy
helps to understand religion
rather than to reject it*

ingly criticised this understanding of religion in his early articles, and later on the fruit of this criticism was *Ethics Without a Code*. Finally, Kołakowski's opposition to the view that texts we regard as sacred (such as the Old and New Testaments) explain the world to us in the same sense as science does, and thus that they can be a yardstick separating good science from bad – this opposition, taken to its ultimate consequences in *The Presence of Myth* and

ing, in its social, moral and metaphysical dimensions. This put him in opposition to the totalitarian regime of contemporary Poland and Marxism as its legitimisation, and brought him closer to Christianity; in that (as he thought at the time) the basis of Christianity actually is faith in the absolute freedom of each individual person. Józef Tischner understood Christianity in a similar way, and so did John Paul II; “...does love make sense without freedom?” John

continued from page 1

state. But the current pattern seems pervasive among the democracies. In the US, for example, our welfare state is smaller today relative to GDP than Europe's was already in 1955, but we are experiencing the same turning away from social remedy. So this must be something other than just the welfare state reaching its natural fiscal or demographic or coalitional limits.

So let me complicate the story. I think two fundamental factors are at work. One is the corrosive effect of free-market globalization on the ability of the state and the democratic citizenry to counter-balance the market. The other factor has been the tendency of center-left parties to behave like center-right parties. Of course, these two trends reinforce each other.

Globalization, as defined and implemented by believers in *laissez-faire*, has liberated capital to undermine the regulatory constraints of the state. It has destroyed settled social bargains, destroyed the capacity of states to regulate finance; intensified global competition to cut taxes on capital; and significantly strengthened the ability of corporations to exploit workers. So the social democratic model delivers less. Globalization has also created a path of economic development for emergent nations like China based on paying labor wages far below what would be justified by rising worker productivity.

The overall effect has been to allow market forces to overwhelm what Galbraith called countervailing forces. The model of managed capitalism relies on a strong democratic state and effective citizenship; but there is no global state, and no global democratic citizenship. And the institutions for management of globalization are almost totally those either of private capital, or nominally public institutions captured by capital.

When I was a student in the 1960s, Europe and the US looked to me much more like a Galbraith world than a Marxian world. You had strong democratic states; strong trade union movements; activated citizens, and so countervailing institutions were able to fight owners of capital roughly to a draw. Ordinary people enjoyed security, opportunity, and rising living standards; the income distribution became more equal. And managed capitalism was an economic success; the social stabilizers did not kill the golden goose; they enriched it.

Part of this was a social democratic story, but part of it was also a story of stable corporations and banks that did not go in for today's casino model of capitalism; they had more of a corporatist conception of mutual obligation. This was reinforced by the tight regulation of finance. Much of the European welfare state was created by Christian Democrats and paternalistic conservatives. But it was well regulated and it promoted social solidarity.

The world today looks less like a Galbraith world, and rather more like a Marxian world. It doesn't sound

so quaint any more to speak of capital as a class. Phrases that sounded out of date and corny to me as a student in 1966 like the reserve army of the unemployed, or the state as the executive committee of the ruling class – think of Goldman Sachs and the US treasury – no longer sound so archaic or stilted; they sound like pretty accurate descriptions. I don't think my views have changed; I think the world has become more Marxian.

If globalization under *laissez-faire* auspices is one part of the story,



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the other is the failure of the center-left to offer a fundamentally different path.

If the center-left embraces the basic neo-liberal program of the center-right – the deregulation and liberation of capital with a little bit more redistribution around the edges, then, as Margaret Thatcher famously put it, “there is no alternative.” This is the historic contribution of the so-called Third Way – to preclude any serious progressive alternative to neo-liberalism. I will return in a moment to why nearly all of the center-left parties chose this path.

Now, there are some exceptions to this, most notably the Nordics, who have a somewhat different model of the welfare state, and who have resisted a society of insiders and outsiders. My friend Andrew Martin, a distinguished American student of Sweden, wrote a paper more than 20 years ago in which he said we really should not speak of American exceptionalism, we should speak of Swedish exceptionalism; because if you want the model of managed capitalism to hold, you need a very high degree of unionization, and high mobilization of citizens, and universal services that are too popular to destroy, and Social Democrats as the party of government most of the time.

And Martin was writing before globalization had its destructive effects on the model. Even the Nordics today are facing some of the same pressures.

But this basic story, of the center-left embracing the center-right ideology and program, characterizes Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the UK, Gerhard Schröder in Germany, and the Democrats in the United States under Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and I am sorry to report, Barack Obama in the US, at least in his first year.

The EU is also an important part of the neo-liberal trend. For a time, during the Delors era, it appeared as if the EU could be something of a counterweight – fortress

company to re-flag a ferry based in Sweden and lower the wages and benefits to Estonian levels; and that the Swedish unions could not legally take action against a Latvian construction company operating in Sweden, whose workers were paid less than Swedish collectively bargained agreements provided.

The second weakness of the EU as a counterweight to neo-liberalism is the EU as a weak state. For decades, we American Social Democrats looked enviously to Europe because Europe had strong states. When the left took office, it could govern and

dominates many of the new member states; part of it is the corrosive influence of British New Labour, where a nominally left government in league with the City of London works with center-right governments to block most forms of regulation of finance and labor.

In the spring of 2008, I spent several months in Europe, doing interviews with people from governments, political parties, trade unions, scholars, business leaders, NGOs, trying to better understand the weakness of social solidarity and the democratic left. I wrote up my findings in an article for *The American Prospect*, and I began by writing, “I am on the road in Europe looking for the global opposition party.” And after reviewing the weakness of countervailing institutions across Europe, I concluded by looking back at my own country – this was before the election.

I wrote, “If you think American liberals are obsessed with the promise of Barack Obama, you should listen to European Social Democrats.

Despite its weakened condition, the US is still the world's most influential economy. Our friends in Europe are well aware that market fundamentalism originated in America – and will best be extinguished in America. Because of Europe's institutional fragmentation, the power of global finance, the domination of center-right governments in major European capitals, and the often surprisingly perverse role of the EU, the best hope for a different path is for the US to reverse roles and become once again the engine of a balanced form of capitalism, updated for the 21st century. So I conclude my tour with one more paradox. America, whose biggest export these days is toxic financial products and market-fundamentalist ideology, has brought the world's economy to this precarious pass. But if the pendulum swings back, that momentum will most likely begin in the United States.”

I wrote that in June 2008, before Obama's election, when hopes were high that he could be one of the great, transformative presidents.

So how is President Obama doing? I have to say that his performance so far is lacking in the audacity that he demonstrated in the campaign, and that he has shown few signs of being the instrument of a new New Deal or a new, modernized model of managed capitalism.

Most disappointingly, he hired as his top economic advisers protégés of Robert Rubin, the man who did more to deregulate finance and create the conditions for the financial crisis than even George W. Bush. He hired exactly the same team that we would have gotten had Hillary Clinton been elected. The major difference is that the left has had such high hopes for Obama that many of us are still very protective of him. If these policies had been carried out by President Hillary Clinton, or for that matter by John McCain, we would be screaming.

To remake the economy – to get a serious recovery, and then to reform the casino domination of the real economy going forward – Obama had several challenges. First,

Europe in the best sense of the word – a bastion of social democracy or managed capitalism on one continent. But this has not occurred. The origins of the EU, of course, were more a force for economic liberalism. And since the end of the Delors era, the EU has added to the problem. On balance, it has served to strengthen the forces of the market and weaken the reach of the state as a counterweight.

This has three aspects, I think. One is that the fundamental law of the EU privileges free movement of

its program could make a difference. But the EU replicates something in America's own history – the Articles of Confederation of the 1770s, prior to our Constitutional Convention of 1787–89. Our central government was too weak to guarantee liberties or to give meaning to democratic citizenship, or to help the new nation to develop. We needed a stronger federal state, which we got with the Constitution of 1789.

In the same way, the EU is a weak state, but it has usurped regulatory powers from member states with

It would be hard to think of two succeeding administrations more different than Bush and Obama – except when it comes to dealing with the financial crisis

capital, goods, services and persons over mechanisms of social solidarity. This is not changed in the Lisbon Treaty. This was a kind of time bomb, and we have seen some explosions in recent decisions of the European Court of Justice, holding that wage regulation in public contracts by German states are unfair to Polish subcontractors who want to pay low wages; and holding that it was legal for an Estonian ferry com-

strong governments, and the winner is global capital. You see this in the fragmentation of regulatory authority over finance in the current crisis.

The third problem with the EU is political. A decade ago, the center-left was in power in 13 of the 15 countries then in the EU. Today, there seems to be a permanent domination by the center-right. Part of this is the fact that the center-right

comprehensive re-regulation of finance, not just of the excesses but of the entire business model – a model where the profits of large banks and investment banks are built on speculation rather than provision of credit and capital to the real part of the economy.

Second, to deal with the crisis in home mortgage foreclosures, to brake the collapse in housing prices which so far has destroyed about 5 trillion dollars of household wealth, the main form of wealth held by the middle class.

Third, to legislate a stimulus program large enough to prevent a self-deepening cycle of weak demand and weak financial institutions dragging each other down.

So far, he hasn't delivered enough of any of this; and while we have been spared a second Great Depression, we are at risk of a prolonged Great Stagnation. That will bring the right back to power and squander the best opportunity for a resurgence of a democratic-left policy and majority coalition since Roosevelt.

He failed to deliver a more radical rupture with the past, I think, for two basic reasons. One is his own character of a seeker of consensus. That can be an admirable trait at times, but other times it is necessary to break some china.

Obama's desire to be a conciliator, bridge-builder, and post-ideological leader might have fit the moment, if only the prime challenges of this era had been those of expanding tolerance, restoring and broadening constitutional government, and redefining a constructive role for America in the world. These were more or less the issues that faced the young John F. Kennedy, at a time when America's economy was basically solid. Had Obama been judged on those questions, his mix of temperament, conviction, and governing style could have made him a great progressive president. But that cluster of issues, though important, was not the grenade that history tossed Barack Obama.

The other obstacle is the hegemonic power of Wall Street in both major political parties. It would be hard to think of two succeeding ad-

ministrations more different than Bush and Obama – except when it comes to dealing with the financial crisis. There, the policies of propping up and bailing out banks, rather than transforming the financial system, were basically similar in the last year of Bush and the first year of Obama. Even the leading players were the same – Paulson, Geithner and Bernanke in the case of Bush, and Summers, Geithner and Bernanke in the case of Obama. Wall Street is on the road to recovery, while Main Street is lagging far behind. A Democratic administration is seen, all too accurately, as the instrument of the big banks, and there is a terrible risk, in the US as in Europe that the populist initiative passes to the right.

In American history, the great progressive presidents who turned crisis into opportunity all became more progressive in office. They did so because they had social movements pushing on them. That describes Lincoln, who at first wanted to preserve the nation but not free the slaves; and Roosevelt who at first wanted to balance the budget. And it describes the Lyndon Johnson of the civil rights era before the Vietnam debacle, who became a real radical on the subject of racial equality. None of this would have happened without the abolitionist movement pushing on Lincoln and the industrial labor movement pushing on Roosevelt, and Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement pushing on Johnson.

So if we want Obama to maximize the moment, and to redeem the promise of his presidency, the democratic left need to rekindle a social movement. Otherwise, Wall Street will be disgraced but not disempowered. <

Watch the Video of the Jacek Kuroń Debate on Solidarity: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Mediathek

continued from page 3

Tygodnik Powszechny: An interesting though rarely discussed issue is the role Kołakowski played in Western philosophy.

Krzysztof Michalski: In the 1960s Kołakowski was perceived in the West as a "revisionist", critical of the totalitarian traits of the political regime in power in Eastern Europe; this, above all, was the basis for his popularity, which by then was already greater than that of any other Polish intellectual following World War II (on top of which he was outstanding, brilliant, superbly well-read, and incredibly engaging). The intellectual left in Western Europe, which was very lively in those days, accepted him – initially his books, and later his actual self – with open arms. The oppressive, reactionary nature of the communist governments in Eastern Europe was becoming increasingly evident, and moreover increasingly embarrassing for left-wing intellectuals in the West, for whom Marxism was still a tool for social criticism; in this situation a critic of East European totalitarianism with awe-inspiring intelligence and courage, who nevertheless admitted to a Marxist inspiration for his own attitude, became the hero of the day. In time however it turned out that Kołakowski went further than his initial admirers would have been prepared to go; the third volume of *Main Currents of Marxism* (especially the criticism it contains of Adorno and Marcuse) met with very sharp criticism from left-wing circles in Western Europe. I have a very clear memory of Habermas in the early 1980s trying to convince me – as well as the students surrounding us at the Inter-University Center in Dubrovnik – that Kołakowski was a tragedy for the left.

But the left, the right, Marxism, criticism of Marxism: Kołakowski's political and ideological reception – that was not ultimately the most important thing. In the West too it was soon noticed that Kołakowski was quite simply a very brilliant thinker, one of the rare, truly great minds, and a top-flight scholar as well. Hence the recognition enjoyed

by no other Polish humanist of the twentieth century: Kołakowski became a fellow of the legendary All Souls College at Oxford, and in time of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago in an era when the most eminent Western scholars taught there (such as Paul Ricoeur, Mircea Eliade, François Furet, Reinhart Koselleck and others). The Germans awarded him their biggest prize, the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, the French elected him to their elite Académie, the United States Library of Congress made him the first winner of

I run in Vienna organised meetings for the eminent scholars who form its Academic Board in the Pope's summer residence Castel Gandolfo. Once, in the 1980s, as we were on our way back to the hotel after one of the debates held during one such meeting – which had been dominated by Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas – Leszek, who was a member of our Board from the very start, suggested changing the name of our Institute to "The Institute for Levinasism-Derridaism" and launched into a discussion with Krzysztof Pomian on its future programme (which in-

He became a Marxist in the name of reason – and in the name of reason he dropped it

the Kluge Prize, from Israel he received the Jerusalem Prize, and from Italy the Nonino Prize – this list is much longer, I am sure I only know a small part of it.

Tygodnik Powszechny: In the later period did Kołakowski feel changes in the philosophical climate? How did he react to the presence of new thinkers?

Krzysztof Michalski: Some of them he did not like, and I think he did not appreciate them either. He had no patience with the texts of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, which sometimes are indeed complicated (but isn't Hegel complicated too?); it is a pity, because some of those texts are truly original and innovative. He had established his opinion on Nietzsche and Heidegger earlier; despite multiple attempts I never succeeded in convincing him that there are also other, in my view more interesting options for understanding these authors (if I had succeeded, then perhaps Derrida and Levinas would also have gained ground in his eyes).

For many years, the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Institute for Human Sciences) that

involved creating departments for the dialectics of Levinasism-Derridaism, the history of Levinasism-Derridaism, and so on). To the amazement of the serious German professors who were with us at the time, their discussion was concluded in Russian. On getting back to the hotel Kołakowski wrote, in medieval Latin, the draft of a Papal bull, which declared inter alia that "the statement that not all French philosophers should be burned" was heretical, badly formulated and should be condemned. Later on we gave this bull to the Pope for his signature, but I won't say if he signed it or not. <

This is an abridged version of an interview that appeared in the Polish newspaper *Tygodnik Powszechny* on September 8, 2009. Translated from Polish by Antonia Lloyd Jones

You can find the original interview in Polish on our website: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Publications/IWMpost

On Solidarity V Social Solidarity and the Crisis of Economic Capitalism

Jacek Kuroń Debate on Solidarity

Henryka Bochniarz, Warsaw
Alfred Gusenbauer, Vienna
Katherine Newman, Princeton
Ewald Nowotny, Vienna (Chair)

Conference Speech

Robert Kuttner, Washington D.C.

Introductory Session

Kurt Biedenkopf, Dresden
Michał Boni, Warsaw
Ira Katznelson, New York

Session I:

Relationship of Capital and Labour

Ron Blackwell, Washington D.C.
Julia Kiraly, Budapest (Chair)
Iveta Radicova, Bratislava
Tiziano Treu, Rome

Session II:

Tolerance and Group Difference

Meindert Fennema, Amsterdam
Jennifer Hochschild, Cambridge, MA
Claus Offe, Berlin
Kenneth Prewitt, New York (Chair)

Session III:

Political Implications

Stanley Greenberg, Washington D.C.
Ira Katznelson, New York (Chair)
Ulrich Preuß, Berlin
Jelle Visser, Amsterdam

The conference was generously supported by Duitsland Instituut, Erste Foundation, Renner Institut and Der Standard.

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HIMMER, BUCHHEIM & PARTNER

Tomorrow's Yesterday

BY CSILLA KISS

Europe is united but its history is still divided between East and West. While 1945 stands for freedom and prosperity in the West, the same year means something entirely different in most of the Eastern European countries: the transition from one occupation to another, from Nazi rule to communist rule. The Institute's research focus "United Europe – Divided Memory," led by Yale historian and IWM Permanent Fellow Timothy Snyder, seeks to overcome divisions among Eastern and Western historiographies. Since 2008 four international conferences have taken place in this project, dealing with Hitler's and Stalin's policies in occupied Eastern Europe. The concluding conference "Tomorrow's Yesterday: Memory Politics in Europe" (September 25 to 26) critically reflected on today's obsession with memory. Since commemoration, as Slavenka Drakulic shows in her contribution on Tito, is always highly selective, we need more fact-oriented history to come to a better – and common – understanding of Europe's past.

The tension between memory and history was one of the key problems addressed by the conference. So far, just as all the immediate witnesses are leaving, memory has been getting the upper hand. Those discussing memory, then, are exactly those who have none. Instead of trying to reveal lesser known aspects of history, "memory as a theatre" addresses events whose history has already been framed. "Auschwitz" and "the Gulag," for example, have become misleading metaphors for much more diverse and complicated events. This dominance of memory also carries the danger of its manipulation for political purposes: every generation will try to use memory for its own collective goals. Depending on the type of memory, societies are also often torn in the dilemma either to remember or to forget.

Commemorations of significant historical events that had an impact on the whole of Europe provide ample opportunities to see how differently memories are structured. The main obstacle is that historical narratives are still constructed on the national level, thus creating a barrier to integration. The precondition of a European memory is a common history. This is not surprising, since common narratives have always been a primary device in nation-building. For this purpose teaching should start early in school and deal with controversial issues, especially mass violence during WWII as well as the communist past in Eastern Europe, which is as important as it is difficult.

The established hierarchy of memory was disturbed when some of the EU's new members described communism and Nazism as "equally criminal," although this argument was already present in the German *Historikerstreit*. Since "Auschwitz" acquired the role of a "negative founding myth" in Europe, the way they deal with their wartime past has become a significant issue for states wanting to enter the Union.

This is where history enters the picture. History is needed for a clearer understanding, which can balance the anaesthetic impact of memory, which simply makes the past more comfortable to live with. However, historians have only recently started studying the suffering of the population and extending their scope beyond the initial focus on German



Timothy Snyder at the conference

Photo: IWM

Jews to East European Jews, as well as to other groups of victims.

Museums and Archives

Memory palaces and memory dungeons, that is, museums and archives, have traditionally played a significant role in nation-building, and they continue to do so. They reflect and actively transform the perception of the past, while, at the same time, serve as devices in the hands of politicians in order to advance their politics of memory. This is apparent already in the establishment of museums: why are certain facts or events, rather than others, chosen? At the same time, they also reveal the differences between national approaches to history, whereas the *Musée de l'Europe* in Brussels is supposed to transcend the traditional national frameworks.

New East European museums usually commemorate such key events or periods in the nation's twentieth-century history that could not be officially remembered during the communist era, but remained fundamental for national identity. One such event is the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The national, let alone the international, reception of such museums is not unequivocal. The Museum of the Warsaw Uprising shows an apparent contradiction between its image – strongly related to the politics of the Kaczynskis – and its popularity among the liberal-minded young. Rather than glorifying nationalism and militarism, the presentation focuses on freedom and the readiness to fight for it.

Archives, especially in post-communist countries, also play a significant role in shaping the way people think about their recent past. With the availability of documents from communist secret police, a wealth of new sources opened, and it is important how societies use them. In this respect the German Gauck-Birthler-Authority is regarded as exemplary. Germany benefited from its earlier experience, and intended to compensate for its failure to deal with the Nazi past in the post-war era. German emphasis on the Stasi as part of its national history, rather than as the work of external forces, contrasts with the approach often taken by post-communist states, which prefer to represent communism as imposed on their countries from outside.

Perpetrators, Victims, Heroes

The Friday evening panel *On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Memory for Life* took up another key question of the conference: who is the victim; who is the perpetrator? Collaboration might blur the distinction. Different pasts and their victims compete for public and political recognition. Today's legal culture favours victimhood, rather than heroism. Compensation is given to victims of genocide or expulsion. This has not always been the case. In post-war France every deportee was a "hero" who died for France, even as a victim of the Holocaust; in Poland, on the other hand, Poles in general were regarded as victims.

Competition for victimhood and the question "who suffered more" enter into projects of nation-building and have developed into a race between Jewish and Slav victims of WWII. While it is not surprising that nations, which have to re-construct their identity, try to legitimate themselves through national martyrdom, one must warn against the culture of victimhood. At least a part of a national mythology needs to be positive. Ukrainians, for example, need a better focus than the Stalin-induced famine. Putting the Holocaust and the *Holodomor* on equal footing and trying to frame the latter as an example of genocide is seen as a possible entry ticket to the EU, while, at the same time, it could also acquit Ukrainians of charges of collaboration and complicity in the murder of Jews. Complicity is difficult to come to terms with. For the French it took a long time to confront their wartime behaviour, and communism did nothing to bring about a similar self-criticism in Eastern Europe. Neither is it easy to face complicity with respect to communism itself, as became obvious in the case of Milan Kundera.

History and Historians

Even though we need more history, can the entire project be left in the hands of historians? Historians are already part of an established

culture and their existence depends on funding and institutional frameworks, such as the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). Some call it a "Ministry of Memory," "étatist, centralized, bureaucratic and costly." Due to generous state subsidies it dominates the field of Polish historical research and frames the way Polish historians look at the past. There is also a fascination with documents that leads into the trap of an emerging "new positivism," where documents are treated as a substitute for historical analysis and interpretation. Simple documents do not tell us everything about the complexity of historical situations, the motives of people and the choices they faced. Furthermore, young historians involved in such institutions lack first-hand knowledge about the period they investigate and have a tendency to moral rigour which does not accept ambiguity. For the sake of history it is important to resist the "politics of history," i.e. the imposition of the state's official view about historical events on society. <

You can find the results of the four conferences on "United Europe – Divided Memory" in the new issue of IWM's journal *Transit* (see page 16) and in *East European Politics and Societies* (Vol. 25/2010, No. 1). A publication edited by Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon entitled "Stalinism and Europe: Terror, War, Domination, 1937-1947" is forthcoming.

United Europe – Divided Memory IV Tomorrow's Yesterday: Memory Politics in Europe

Panel Discussion: On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Memory for Life

Anne Applebaum, Warsaw
Michael Fleischhacker, Vienna (Chair)
Ivan Krastev, Sofia
Timothy Snyder, Yale/Vienna

Session I: Memory Palaces: The Museums

Klaus Bachmann, Warsaw
Christine Cadot, Paris
Dariusz Gawin, Warsaw
Thomas Lindenberger, Vienna (Chair)

Session II: Memory Dungeons: The Institutes and Archives

Benjamin Frommer, Evanston, IL (Chair)
Jens Gieseke, Potsdam
Janos Rainer, Budapest
Dariusz Stola, Warsaw

Session III: Memory Wars: Historians, Holocausts, and Publics

Gerhard Botz, Vienna (Chair)
Slavenka Drakulic, Zagreb/Stockholm
Jan Gross, Princeton
Yaroslav Hrytsak, Lviv/Budapest
Hiroaki Kuromiya, Bloomington (Chair)
Dieter Pohl, Munich
Dirk Rupnow, Innsbruck

Session IV: Memory Purges: Decommunization and Lustration

Benjamin Frommer, Evanston, IL
Gerhard Gnauck, Warsaw (Chair)
Aleksander Smolar, Warsaw/Paris

Session V: Stalinism Today

Alexei Miller, Moscow/Budapest
Wolfgang Müller, Vienna (Chair)
Veljko Vujacic, Oberlin, OH

Tito Between Legend & Thriller

BY SLAVENKA DRAKULIC

A museum to Tito at his one-time summer residence glorifying the Yugoslav dictator is in stark contrast to a damning new biography. Yet between the two extremes is an absence of objective history-writing in the former Yugoslavia.

When I imagine paradise on earth, it is as a small, deserted island surrounded by turquoise blue sea, with pine trees and pebble beaches. Exactly like the one I saw the other day, while travelling on a boat towards the Brijuni archipelago in the northern Adriatic near Pula.

Josip Broz Tito must have had the very same idea when he visited the islands for the first time in 1947. However, the difference was that for him, this paradise on earth became reality. Soon afterwards, the late president of the former Yugoslavia moved to a newly built residence in Vanga, one of fourteen islands. After him, no one else had a chance to nurture the same dream. Ordinary mortals could no longer even visit the islands. It is said that the surveillance was so strict that even the fishing village of Fazana, on the mainland directly across from the archipelago, was populated solely by secret policemen and their families.

After Tito's death in 1980, the Brijuni archipelago was proclaimed a national park. On my visit that day I learned that over the thirty or so years that Tito enjoyed the privilege of living there, he often managed to spend up to four months a year in Vanga and Veli Brijun, which he loved the most. I could find out all about his life in Brijuni in a photographic exhibition from 1984 on the first floor of the local museum. There, in hundreds of sepia coloured photos, I saw him in his role as head of state with his important visitors, as well as in his private moments. I could also see that, during his stay in paradise, Tito not only relaxed. He spent his holidays working – as the head of state, chairman of the communist party and commander of the military. At the same time he played host to political leaders from Fidel Castro to Queen Elisabeth, Indira Gandhi to Willy Brandt, Leonid Brezhnev to the Persian tsar Reza Pahlavi – and many, many others. Stars fascinated Tito, and many popular personalities, from opera singers like Mario del Monaco, to Valentina Tereskova, the first woman in space, were invited to Brijuni too. But he enjoyed visits by film stars the most – Elizabeth Taylor and Sofia Loren, to mention just two.

While a foreign visitor would probably find this exhibition bizarre, for me it was a trip back to my childhood. Seeing a photo of Tito harvesting tangerines in his orchard, for example, I remembered our teacher telling us that he always sent these tangerines to orphanages – he was such a goodhearted person,

she would add. We kids could only try to imagine how heavenly these fruits tasted, as there were none to buy in Yugoslavia at the time.

But it would not escape the notice of any visitor that this exhibition is a glorification of the “biggest son of our nations and nationalities” – as Tito was once called.

On the ground floor of the museum there is another exhibition, a very strange one. It is dedicated to – Tito's animals. It was the fashion at the time for visiting statesmen to bring presents, often wild, exotic animals that could not adapt to the local climate and soon died. They would then get stuffed and exhibited. So, while upstairs you can see Tito playing with a baby orang-utan, downstairs you can see the stuffed corpse of the wretched beast. While upstairs he is photographed caressing a young leopard, on the floor below the visitor can see the same leopard staring at him with his glass eyes. Although it probably wasn't intended, the stuffed animals exhibited in the same museum create an awkward, morbid contrast to the glorification going on upstairs, almost turning the museum into a metaphor for Tito's rule.

The 25-year-old photographic exhibition of Tito's life and work in Brijuni is only a small contribution to the personality cult that Yugoslavians built and nourished so successfully for so long, with notoriously tragic consequences.

But there is another approach besides glorification that sporadically comes to the surface. Recently, in both Belgrade and Zagreb, a new book about Tito appeared that tries

In the former Yugoslavia, we still have too many myths and too much ideology instead of facts, of history

to prove that this historical person, however important, was – to put it mildly – not unblemished. *Tito: A Phenomenon of the Century* is written by the Belgrade journalist Pero Simic, who has studied Tito's personality for decades. Simic has also written a book about the compromising documents about Tito he found in the Stalin archive in Moscow. This recent book about Tito, however, is a kind of “all-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-Tito-but-never-dared-ask” publication. In other words, Simic, reveals to the reader secrets and half-secrets about Tito's



Slavenka Drakulic is a Croatian writer and journalist. She has written for various newspapers and magazines. One of her most famous books is *As If I am Not There: A Novel About the Balkans*. In 2008 she was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

life. The text consists almost entirely of quotations. He quotes private as well as official sources (there is a long list at the end of the book) and does not comment or interpret much. Tito's life is a mystery, it seems. Not even his birth date is certain: Simic found 15 different ones. The same goes for Tito's name and the name of his father. Facts about his education are equally problematic: it is not quite clear what kind of school he went to, or whether he completed his schooling. It is not known where exactly he worked, or

for how long... and so on.

In Simic's book, documents from Tito's time spent in Moscow as a Kominintern cadre are published for the first time. Apparently, he gained promotion by informing on his comrades, many of whom ended up being executed. His rise to the top of the communist party in Yugoslavia seems to be highly suspicious too, according to Simic. From the very beginning till the end of his political career, Tito was not only a manipulator and liar but a traitor, guilty of ordering the murders of his close collaborators and even friends – as

well as mass executions of war prisoners in Bleiburg after WWII. Tito appears as an ambitious, ruthless man not shy to commit criminal acts – the closest parallel probably being a Mafia don.

Obviously, the aim of Simic's book is to discredit Tito as a person, and thus his political decisions and projects. However, since the book is based on quotations, it is very difficult for an ordinary reader to judge how truthful Simic's arguments are. Their reliability depends on the reliability of his sources, which can be verified and judged only by specialists, i.e. historians. Most other readers will only be able to read the book as a thriller.

I visited Brijuni with a journalist, a foreign correspondent from the former Yugoslavia. While touring the Veli Brijun island and its museum, we debated the exhibition and the book, as the two extreme approaches to Tito. My journalist friend asked me why I thought that, after more than a thousands books written about Tito, there is not one meticulously researched, reliable biography of him. It is an excellent question to which there are many answers, though none are very convincing. For one, there has been no time to write it, because the country fell apart in several wars. Another is that the attitude towards the past in the Balkans is rather problematic in general. But – my friend insisted – perhaps now, thirty years after his death, the time has come for a serious biography that could be used by historians? I could not agree more. We often hear that “there is too much history in the Balkans.” This is indeed true, but only in the sense of historical events, not history as a discipline. Tito is just one ex-

ample of how, in the former Yugoslavia, we still have too many myths and too much ideology instead of facts, of history. Tito deserves to be approached seriously. We owe this to him as an historical personality – and even more to ourselves.

While we were waiting on the mainland for a boat to take us over to Brijuni that afternoon, Stipe Mesić, the Croatian president, together with a few bodyguards disembarked at the tiny port in Fazana. The handful of tourists and locals standing at the pier waiting for a boat did not even react to his presence as the president walked along the waterfront to his car. My companion was impressed with his easy-going manner. Obviously, times have changed – unlike our attitude to history, which we still perceive as a mixture of legends and crime stories.

The day of our visit was a perfect summer's day. Before we left, I wanted to take a swim in a stunning bay with ruins of a roman villa from the first century AD and a temple to Aphrodite. Legend has it that if you swim right under the temple, you will find perfect love. But I did not take a swim. I was afraid. One should not ask too much of life, I thought. What a strange idea on the island where, once upon a time, one man just snapped his fingers and got it all. It is a sad fact that exactly thirty years since he departed from Brijuni for the last time, on 29 August 1979, it remains to be seen who Tito really was. ◀

First published in *Eurozine*: www.eurozine.com

Watch the video of the panel discussion “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Memory for Life”: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Mediathek

The Guilt of Being Alive: Sacrifice and Humanity in Militant Rhetoric

Monthly Lecture: **Faisal Devji**, September 16

Faisal Devji started his lecture by explaining that al-Qaeda surprisingly does not create a distinct and negative picture of its supposed enemies in its rhetoric. Those seen as the foes to Islam are characterized just as Muslims themselves. No hierarchy of the “good” i.e. Islamists, and the “bad” or “less worthy/lower in life” (i.e. any kind of non-Muslim state or group of people) is established; instead of degrading or dehumanizing their enemies, militants routinely aspire to compete with their foes in virtue as well as in vice. Justification of militant activity is thus not easy to find as it is only perceived as the retaliation of the supposed persecution of Muslims or responses to infidel provocations. Responsibility is no longer necessary in a global arena where



Photo: Philipp Steinkeller

all are complicit in provocations and retaliations.

Devji stressed that there is only one militant phenomenon al-Qaeda would claim full responsibility for, that of martyrdom. Sacrifice is the trait in al-Qaeda's self-perception that distinguishes it from others, both on the outside and the inside of the organisation. It is what demonstrates Islam's universality in mil-

itant circles, though even such practices of sacrifice can be stolen from Muslims and so must be repeated in the most egregious of ways.

This, however, is a fragile concept since sacrificial practices can be found any place where people dedicate themselves to a cause, be it humanitarian, environmental or other. Indeed, sacrificing oneself for humanity has its well-known and longstanding history in Christianity, with the story of Jesus dying for the sake of mankind. <

Watch the video: www.iwm.at ->
Menu item: Mediathek

Faisal Devji is Reader in Modern South Asian History at Oxford University and was Visiting Fellow at the IWM (May – September 2009). His new book *Muslim Zion: Jinnah and the Making of Pakistan* is forthcoming.

The Politics of Assassinations: The Soviet Case

Monthly Lecture: **Hiroaki Kuromiya**, October 20



Photo: IWM

The attack came at dawn, about 4 a.m. I was fast asleep, having taken a sleeping drug after a hard day's work. Awakened by the rattle of gun fire but feeling very hazy, I first imagined that a national holiday was being celebrated with fireworks outside our walls. But the explosions were too close, right here within the room, next to me and overhead. The odour of gunpowder became more acrid, more penetrating. Clearly, what we had always expected was now happening: we were under attack." This is how Leon Trotsky described the attempt of his assassination by the Stalinist secret service

Hiroaki Kuromiya is Professor of History at Indiana University Bloomington and IWM Visiting Fellow. In 2007 he published *The Voices of the Dead: Stalin's Terror in the 1930s*.

GPU on May 24, 1940. Three months later on August 20, the murderers finally succeeded in killing one of Stalin's big opponents.

As Hiroaki Kuromiya showed in his lecture, Trotsky's assassination is just one example for thousands of victims of Stalinist state terrorism: from 1929 until Stalin's death in 1953 up to twelve million people were killed or deported to the GULAGS. Among the victims were dissidents, regime critics, “saboteurs” and “counter-revolutionists,” or anyone who was suspected to be in opposition to the Stalinist rule. As Kuromiya pointed out, these assassinations were an integral part of Soviet policy. Stalin used killings and terrorism strategically to achieve his political goals, i.e. the protection of his own power and the expansion of the Soviet empire. Even though many of the assassinations were executed secretly, they were, in Stalin's view, a legitimate means of policy because, so he thought, everyone in politics would sooner or later get his hands dirty. Kuromiya emphasized that the

Soviet politics of assassination did not end with Stalin's death but continued during the Cold War, even though the number of the murders decreased and mass terror was not a part of government policy anymore. Even today, as the cases of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko have shown, political killings occur in Russia. Yet unlike in Soviet times assassinations are nowadays “outsourced” and “privatized” so that any connection to Russian government officials cannot be found. A significant difference, said Kuromiya, because “Stalin didn't really care if someone found out.” <

Monthly Lecture: **Marci Shore**, December 1

In a February 1990 speech to the United States Congress a few months later, Czechoslovakia's new president Václav Havel asserted, “Consciousness precedes Being, and not the other way around, as the Marxists claim.” Few of Havel's American listeners had any idea what he meant. Yet Havel's language of “consciousness” and “Being” did not come from nowhere, but rather reflected at least a century of intellectual history in his part of the world. Marci Shore began her discussion of phenomenology's role in Eastern Europe with the nineteenth-century philosopher Franz Brentano, who rejected Hegel's Geist in favor of a more concrete, empirical “consciousness.” Students attending Brentano's lectures in Vienna of the 1870s and 1880s included Sigmund Freud and Tomáš Masaryk, Kazimi-

Paradoxe Integration: Frauen im Globalisierungsboom und in der Globalisierungskrise

Monatsvortrag: **Christa Wichterich**, 5. November

Die globale Wirtschaftskrise beendet nicht nur die Höhenflüge an den Aktienmärkten, sondern auch eine Boomphase der Emanzipation von Frauen. Seit den 1980er Jahren, so Christa Wichterich in ihrem Vortrag, konnten Frauen erfolgreich in Beschäftigung, in Politik und in andere öffentliche Bereiche vorstoßen. Diese Integration in die Erwerbs- und Finanzmärkte war ein entscheidender Schritt in der Modernisierung von Geschlechterarrangements und ließ das fordistische Modell vom vollbeschäftigten Ernährer und der Hausfrau erodieren. Trotzdem spricht der „2009 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development“ der UN nach wie vor von einer strukturellen Benachteiligung von Frauen in der Gesellschaft.

Wichterich zeigte, dass sich die Integration von Frauen als äußerst paradox erweist: Integriert ja, aber ungleich. Denn weder gibt es ein Ende von Diskriminierung und Gewalt, noch eine systematische Umverteilung von Macht, Ressourcen und Rechten. Die hierarchische Arbeitsteilung zwischen Frauen und Männern und die systemische Geringschätzung von Sorge- und Reproduktionsarbeiten sind nicht beendet. Vielmehr werden sie in der Globalisierung und bei der neoliberalen Neuordnung von Wirtschaft und Politik strategisch eingesetzt und bestätigt. Frauen, die überproportional informell und prekär, unterbezahlt und sozial ungesichert arbeiten, sind in der globalen Standortkonkurrenz schlicht ein Wettbewerbsvorteil.



Photo: IWM

Christa Wichterich ist Soziologin, freie Publizistin und Buchautorin in Bonn. Im September 2009 ist ihr neuestes Buch *Gleich, gleicher, ungleich: Paradoxien und Perspektiven von Frauenrechten in der Globalisierung* erschienen.

Die derzeitige Wirtschaftskrise verschärft die Benachteiligung von Frauen zusätzlich. Ihre ungeschützten Arbeitsplätze sind leichter wegzurationalisieren, sie arbeiten selten in sogenannten „systemrelevanten“ Branchen die Staatshilfe bekommen, können aufgrund ihres geringeren Verdienstes privatisierte staatliche Leistungen kaum in Anspruch nehmen und müssen den Sozialabbau durch unbezahlte Mehrarbeit in den Privathaushalten kompensieren.

So werden Frauen als *homo oeconomicus* zwar von tradierten Gendernormen befreit, resümierte Wichterich, doch solange die Ungleichheit der Geschlechter gesellschaftlich und marktwirtschaftlich funktional ist, wird sich an der Schlechterstellung von Frauen kaum etwas ändern. <

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The Self Laid Bare: Phenomenological Encounters in Central Europe

Monthly Lecture: **Marci Shore**, December 1

erz Twardowski and Edmund Husserl. Later Husserl, while adopting a version of Brentano's idea of “intentionality,” would come to reject Brentano's psychologism. Husserl's own phenomenology emerged in turn as a theory of radical subjectivity with a claim to objective truth.

In this lecture, Marci Shore explored the trajectory of phenomenology – and later, beginning in the 1920s, of the Heideggerean existentialism that grew out of phenomenology – in East-Central Europe through the Second World War and the Stalinist years; the attempts in the late 1950s and 1960s to create a revisionist Marxism; and later, after 1968, to dissident intellectuals' efforts to develop a post-Marxist, “anti-political” philosophy. This century-long arc reveals a path from epistemology through ontology to

ethics, from a preoccupation with clarity and certitude to a preoccupation with authenticity as a moral stance. In 1974 the aging Czech philosopher Jan Patočka wrote to the young Polish graduate student Krzysztof Michalski of “the special meaning of Heidegger's philosophy for our East European countries.” Among the questions this lecture posed was this one: just what was this “special meaning?” More generally, what was it about phenomenology and existentialism – and about Husserl and Heidegger in particular – that took such a particular hold in East-Central Europe? <

Marci Shore is Assistant Professor of History at Yale University and IWM Visiting Fellow. Shore is the author of *Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918–1968* (2006).



European Environmental Leadership: Past, Present, Future

Series: **Ecopolitics and Solidarity** with **Miranda Schreurs**, September 29

Miranda Schreurs' lecture emphasized the ever-changing dynamics of environmental politics worldwide. Only in the 1980s, as American initiative flagged under the burden of complex regulatory codes and corporate pressures, did a slowly unifying Europe attain the capabilities and influence to be a world leader in environmental protections. Within Europe, economic competition has often driven regulation, as member-states pressure their neighbours to adopt the same industrial standards and practices. The economic clout of a unified European market has been sufficient to influence manufacturing standards worldwide, even in countries where these standards have not obtained the force of law. Europe has also been able to spearhead efforts to set and meet targets in emissions reduction, research and implementation of renewable energy technol-



Photo: IWM

ogies, and waste control. The growing union, however, faces challenges within and competition once again for environmental leadership from abroad. Industrial and economic disparities between Western and Eastern Europe, as well as a general reluctance to revise agricultural policies, threaten both emissions targets

and conservation efforts. The threat of not keeping pace with international standards, which, especially in East Asia, are being continually raised, is perhaps unflattering but not as worrisome. The worries for the future, argued Schreurs, are not whether Europe will lead but whether it and the international community together will meet their current commitments and adopt ever more comprehensive measures for environmental protection and restoration. <

Brian Marrin

In cooperation with
Grüne Bildungswerkstatt

Miranda Schreurs is Director of the Environmental Policy Research Centre and Professor of Comparative Politics at the Free University Berlin. Recently she published *Conflict and Cooperation in Transatlantic Climate Politics: Different Stories at Different Levels* (2009).

Commentary: **Rüdiger Maresch**, Spokesperson for the Environment of the Austrian Green Party in Vienna.

Mobilizing for Green Politics in Hungary

Series: **Ecopolitics and Solidarity** with **Peter Rauschenberger**, December 15

Peter Rauschenberger, a founding member of the Hungarian Green Party LMP started his lecture by showing a picture of our planet. By means of this picture, he illustrated his individual view of politics. The earth is the only place where we can live and it is still adapted to our needs. This happens to such an extent that human beings degrade the planet's resources in order to sustain their way of life. He then proceeded to sketch the guidelines of green politics as he understands them: there should be a focus on the poor and weak people, thus emphasizing the moral aspect of politics, communitarianism, i.e. working for deliberative democracy, extend the scope of solidarity and fight the democratic deficit. In short the LMP promises: Politics can be different! An increase of unemployment, an unhealthy balance in the labour market, an educa-

tion, which does not provide equal opportunities for everyone, a crisis in the co-existence of Roma and the majority of the population, and a rapidly growing support for the right parties are current unsolved political problems in Hungary. The general public is disillusioned with democracy, and there is an evident decline of trust and participation in democratic procedures. Rauschenberger pointed out several causes for this lack of democratic awareness: too much immovability in the political field, no renewals in the traditional parties, long-term effects of a totalitarian past, and corruption. In 2007 a group of Hungarian activists from environmental NGOs founded LMP as a new green party to adopt a new political line in Hungary and to provide the voters with an alternative to the traditional parties. Although the LMP is still struggling with initial difficulties, they secured a first success in the European elections by winning 2,6 % of the votes. <

Marlene Falmbigl

In cooperation with
Grüne Bildungswerkstatt

Peter Rauschenberger is Co-Founder of the Hungarian Green Party Lehet Más a Politika.

Commentary: **Gerhard Jordan**, Member of the Steering Group of the Green East-West Dialogue; Head of the Green Party in Vienna's 13th district.

Towards a Green Market Economy: The Case of Hungary

Series: **Ecopolitics and Solidarity** with **Andras Lukacs**, October 13

Road freight transport in the EU currently only pays for its 50 billion Euro annual infrastructure costs. The remaining 90 billion Euros, resulting from so-called external costs, i.e. costs due to environmental damages, traffic congestion and road accident costs, is not paid by the transport sector but by the states in question, which ultimately means: by the whole of society. This is just one of the many examples of serious market distortions which are detrimental both to the economy and to the environment. Thus, Andras Lukacs argued in fa-

vor of a green budget reform. Such a reform would include a tax shift from labour to the use of natural resources and the causing of pollution, the elimination of environmentally damaging subsidies and tax exemptions and the support of ecologically beneficial activities.

Yet Lukacs knows only too well that state authorities take economic aspects more seriously than the protection of the environment. His NGO CAAG carried out several campaigns against the pollution of the environment in Hungary, e.g. the campaign „Freight: From Road to Train,” which

started in 2006. Demonstrations, advertisements in the media and the internet, billboards on the roads, letters to ministers, opinion polls, and a conference held in the parliament building were supposed to convince the government to introduce a nation-wide road toll for lorries. As a result, the Hungarian administration decided to introduce a bill in 2009. Because of the fierce lobbying of truck drivers' organisations, however, the bill was constantly delayed and is now scheduled for implementation in 2012. Nevertheless, the government introduced higher

subsidies for combined transport, which is a first step towards a greener economy in Hungary. <

red

In cooperation with
Grüne Bildungswerkstatt

Andras Lukacs is President of the Clean Air Action Group (CAAG), Budapest.

Following the lecture, a discussion with Andras Lukacs took place. Participants included:

Josko Vlasich, Spokesperson for the Green Party in the Federal State of Burgenland, Austria

Gerhard Emrich, Member of the Green Party and Head of Austrian Health Food

Chair: **János Mátyás Kovács**, IWM

Wirtschaftliche Chancen und Risiken des Klimaschutzes

Reihe: **Umweltpolitik und Solidarität** mit **Claudia Kemfert**, 25. November

Wenn jeder der fast 7 Milliarden Menschen auf der Erde soviel Treibhausgase verursachen würde wie wir im Westen, dann bräuhete die Menschheit drei weitere Planeten. Ein einzelner us-Bürger produziert derzeit mehr als zwanzig Tonnen CO₂, ein Europäer immerhin noch knappe zehn. Um den globalen Klimawandel einzudämmen dürfte jeder Mensch aber nur drei Tonnen CO₂ ausstoßen, das entspräche einer Reduktion der Emissionen um bis zu 80 Prozent. Verhandelt wird im Dezember beim Klimagipfel in Kopenhagen aber über lediglich 40 Prozent. Claudia Kemfert blieb in ihrem Vortrag trotzdem optimistisch und plädierte für „Innovation statt Depression.“ Das Bewußtsein, dass die Erderwärmung auf zwei Grad begrenzt werden muss, sei da, die



Photo: IWM

Instrumente für eine erfolgreiche Klimapolitik bekannt: Emissionshandel, CO₂ Steuern, Förderung er-

neuerbarer Energien. Nun läge es an den Konsumenten, Politikern und Unternehmern an einem Strang zu ziehen und das „Klima-Karussell“ zu durchbrechen. Die Verbraucher müssen ihren Lebensstil ändern und bewusst ökologisch einkaufen, die Politik muss fiskalische Anreize für Konsumenten schaffen sowie klimapolitische Rahmenbedingungen für Unternehmen, die Wirtschaft sollte in grüne Technologien investieren. Denn Klimaschutz sei der Wachstumsmarkt der Zukunft, schaffe Arbeitsplätze und innovative Weltmarktführer. So lasse sich dann gemeinsam mit der Klimakrise auch noch eine zweite Krise bewältigen: die Wirtschaftskrise.

Alexander van der Bellen blieb in seinem Kommentar allerdings skeptisch: Kopenhagen drohe zu schei-

tern, Österreich hinke beim Klimaschutz hinterher und eine nachhaltige Wirtschaft erfordere „einen Umbau der Industriegesellschaft, wie es ihn noch nie gegeben hat“. Claudia Kemfert entgegnete, dass daher umso mehr das Motto gelten müsse: „Jetzt die Krise nutzen!“ <

red

In Zusammenarbeit mit der
Grünen Bildungswerkstatt

Claudia Kemfert ist Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung und Professorin für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Humboldt-Universität Berlin. Zuletzt erschienen von ihr *Die andere Klima-Zukunft: Innovation statt Depression* (2008) und *Jetzt die Krise nutzen* (2009).

Kommentator **Alexander Van der Bellen** ist Grüner Sprecher für internationale Entwicklungen und Außenpolitik im Nationalrat.

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Auratisierungen zwischen High and Low: Zur anhaltenden Notwendigkeit feministischer und postkolonialer Kritik an der Figur des Künstlers

Reihe: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Silke Wenk**, 1. Oktober

Längst hat die Globalisierung auch den Kunstbetrieb erfasst. Dass sie einen gleichberechtigten Austausch zwischen den Kulturen vorantreibt, kann aber mit gutem Grund bezweifelt werden. Zwar wird in europäischen Hauptstädten zunehmend in sogenannte Orte der Begegnung der „Weltkulturen“ oder der „Weltkunst“ investiert, doch die Hierarchien zwischen Nord und Süd und die Dominanz des westlichen Blicks auf die Welt, bestehen fort. Silke Wenk zeigte dies am Beispiel zweier Kunstprojekte in Berlin, der Ausstellung „Die Tropen“ im Martin-Gropius-Bau und „Anders zur Welt kommen“ im Museumsprojekt „Humboldt-Forum“. Außereuropäische Objekte wer-



Silke Wenk ist Professorin für Kommunikation/Ästhetik an der Universität Oldenburg. Zuletzt veröffentlichte sie *Studien zur Visuellen Kultur. Eine Einführung* (2008).

den, so Wenk, hier wie dort dekontextualisiert und ästhetisiert neben europäischen Werken dargestellt. Suggestiert wird damit eine Gleichstellung nichtwestlicher Kunst; tatsächlich bedeute dies aber eine Universalisierung des westlichen Blicks, nach dessen ästhetischen Idealen die Ausstellungen kuratiert und die Objekte ausgewählt worden seien. An die Stelle des militärischen Kolonialismus des 19. Jahrhunderts trete damit im 21. Jahrhundert ein „intellektueller Kolonialismus“ (Wolf

Lepenes), der die, wie Wenk sagte, „Ökonomie des kolonialen Begehrens“ fortschreibt und die ungleichen Machtverhältnisse zwischen dem Westen und „dem Rest“ unangestastet lässt. Das gelte auch für die Rolle der Frau als Künstlerin. Die Zentralfigur des kunsthistorischen Diskurses bleibt der männliche, heterosexuelle Künstler, eine „world art herstory“ ist nach wie vor ungeschrieben und viele Künstlerinnen unbekannt. Notwendig, so Wenk, sei daher eine Hinterfragung der eurozentrischen und androzentrischen Perspektive des heutigen Kunstbetriebs und eine offene Thematisierung der kolonialistischen Vergangenheit von Kunstsammlungen. Nur dann sei ein wirklicher interkultureller Dialog möglich. <

In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

red

Adolf Loos und das koloniale Imaginäre

Reihe: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Christian Kravagna**, 27. Oktober



Der Wiener Architekt Adolf Loos, Mitbegründer der modernen Architektur, hatte in seiner baukünstlerischen Praxis keine direkte Verbindung zum Kolonialismus. Und doch hat Loos in zahlreichen Schriften ein Konzept von Moderne proklamiert, das kolonialen Vorstellungswelten verpflichtet ist. In seinem Vortrag beschäftigte sich Christian Kravagna mit einigen wiederkehrenden Motiven der Loos'schen Texte zu moderner (Alltags-)Kultur und fragte nach der Bedeutung ihrer kolonialrassistischen Bilder für den nicht-kolonialen österreichischen Kontext. Loos kann hier als ein Beispiel für die besondere Gestalt angesehen werden, die koloniale Weltbilder und koloniale Rhetoriken in den Modernediskursen europäischer Staaten annehmen konnten, die nicht direkt am kolonialen Projekt beteiligt waren. So zeigte Kravagna, dass Loos die Programmatik einer kulturellen Missionierung verfolgte, die mit der rassistischen Differenz von Zivilisation und Primitivität operier-

te, aber nicht nach außen sondern nach innen gerichtet war. Loos propagierte eine Selbstmissionierung Österreichs, das er im Vergleich zu Ländern des Westens, wie den USA, als kulturell rückständig betrachtete. Ein Projekt, das er unter anderem durch seine 1903 gegründete Zeitschrift „Das Andere“ umsetzen wollte, die den bezeichnenden Untertitel trug: „Blatt zur Einführung der abendländischen Kultur in Österreich“. Ganz dem kolonialen Diskurs seiner Zeit verhaftet, sah er es als Aufgabe des „weißen Mannes“, den „Unzivilisierten“ Kultur beizubringen. Die Besonderheit der Loos'schen Argumentation lag aber darin, dass er dieses „Unzivilisierte“ nicht nur in den Kolonien, sondern auch in seinem Heimatland sah: „Der Indianer in uns aber muss überwunden werden.“ <

In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

Christian Kravagna ist Professor für Postcolonial Studies an der Akademie der bildenden Künste in Wien.

red

Figures of Memory in East and West German Painting 1945–1989

Series: Art – Society – Politics with **Andreas Huyssen**, November 3



Andreas Huyssen discussed how German painters dealt with the memories of the 3rd Reich and the Holocaust focusing on the different approaches in East and West Germany with regard to the cultural and political context.

Huyssen explained that a “continuous narrative of art” could not be expected in Germany after the experiences of two wars, Nazism, communism and the Cold War. It is nevertheless surprising that artists remained “mute and uninventive” after WW II while after 1918 artists experimented with new forms of expression and new genres. Dealing with trauma and guilt led to a “psycho-social image-denial:” artists did not really address the horrors of their past in the early post-war time.

After 1949, artists in the West soon turned to abstraction while there was an anti-modernist attitude in the East under Soviet influence, where socialist realism was the approved art form. There was no contact between Eastern and West-

ern artists – while from the 60s onwards the 3rd Reich was present in painting – no reflection of the Holocaust was undertaken. This attitude changed only in the 80s when artists like Richter and especially Kiefer addressed those issues and simultaneously criticised the present. In East Germany on the other hand, artists, due to the censorship, ignored contemporary political issues.

Huyssen concluded by criticising exhibitions about German art, which either condemned East German art or simply missed out on a discussion on politics. He suggested that perhaps “only a non-German museum could do a genuine comparison.” <

Karina Karadensky

In cooperation with Renner Institut

Andreas Huyssen is Villard Professor of German and Comparative Literature at Columbia University. He recently published *Other Cities, Other Worlds* (2009).

FORTHCOMING

Once a month public lectures that relate to the main research interests of the Institute take place at the IWM library. A sequel to the Tuesday Lectures, which were initiated in 1993, the purpose of the Monthly Lectures is to be a “mirror” of the Institute’s work.

Monthly Lectures 2010

- Ivan Krastev**
Democracy and Dissatisfaction. How 1989 Changed Our View on Democracy
January 26
- Lajos Bokros**
Crisis Management Without Reforms – Hungary Before and After the Elections
February 12
- Włodzimierz Borodziej**
Polen und Deutsche: Nach dem Gedenkjahr 2009
March 23
- Patrick Weil**
Does French *Laïcité* Respect Individual Freedom?
April 8
- Peter Demetz**
Ein Kapitel deutscher Filmgeschichte: Veit Harlans „Die Goldene Stadt“, 1942
May 11
- Dipesh Chakrabarty**
Globalization and Global Warming: Some Emerging Questions in Human History
June 6
- Peter A. Berger**
Rückkehr der Klassengesellschaft?
September 21
- János M. Kovács**
Anything New? Understanding Nascent Capitalism in Eastern Europe
Date to be announced
- Chris Hann**
Feudalism, Socialism and Religion in Rural China
Date to be announced
- Karl Schlögel**
„Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit“ – Probleme einer räumlich aufgeschlossenen Historiographie
December 14

„Eine dauernd arbeitende Selbstreinigungsmaschine“ – Nationalsozialistische „Bewegung“ und ästhetische Modernität

Reihe: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Uwe Hebekus**, 3. Dezember



Noch immer, so hob Uwe Hebekus gleich zu Beginn seines Vortrags hervor, regten sich erhebliche Widerstände, wenn Versuche unternommen werden, den Nationalsozialismus als genuin modernes Phänomen zu verstehen. Vor diesem Hintergrund betrachtete Hebekus das ästhetische Fundament der „Bewegung“, der spezifischen Organisationsform des nationalsozialistischen Politischen, und formulierte die These, dass sich diese „Bewegung“ – mit

Nietzsche zu sprechen – allein „als ästhetisches Phänomen gerechtfertigt“ sehen wollte. Ihrem Selbstverständnis nach fundierte sich die „Bewegung“ in einer rückhaltlosen Autonomie des Ästhetischen und erweist sich genau deshalb als Abkömmling der Moderne – ein post-essentialistischer Selbstentwurf, der, nicht zuletzt, einschneidende Konsequenzen für das nationalsozialistische Denken politischer Souveränität habe. Denn mit seinem Modell von „Führer“ und

„Gefolgschaft“ verschreibe sich dieses Denken einer reinen Immanenz des Politischen und sei auch darum eine – wenngleich höllische – Ausgeburt der Moderne. <

In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

Uwe Hebekus, ist Privatdozent für Literaturwissenschaft an der Universität Konstanz. Zuletzt veröffentlichte er *Ästhetische Ermächtigung. Zum politischen Ort der Literatur im Zeitraum der Klassischen Moderne* (2009).

Die Blindheit der Avantgarde

Reihe: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Helmut Lethen**, 10. Dezember



Noch im Jahre 1930 lehnte Gottfried Benn in einer Kontroverse mit Johannes R. Becher jegliches politisches Engagement von Künstlern ab und betrachtete sich selbst als eine Art „Diogenes der Weimarer Republik“, wie Helmut Lethen ihn in seinem Vortrag charakterisierte. Doch bereits drei Jahre später, nach seiner Aufnahme in die Preussische Akademie der Künste, mutierte Benn vom „stillen Poeten“ zum öffentlichen Intellektuellen und setzte sich in Rundfunkreden für den Nationalsozialismus ein. Zwar wurde er bereits kurz darauf vom Regime wieder fallengelassen und wendete sich resigniert von der Politik ab, doch an Benns widersprüchlichem Verhältnis zum Nationalsozialismus lässt sich die „Blindheit der Avantgarde“ in der Zwischenkriegszeit ablesen, die einerseits begeistert war, dass ihre Gedankenexperimente in die Realität umgesetzt wurden und andererseits nicht oder zu spät sah, zu welchen fatalen Konsequenzen dieses Zuedenken führte. Die Übertragung der Autonomie der Künste auf die Lebenspraxis bezeichnete Lethen daher als „lebensgefährlich“. Denn der „Wahn der Avantgardisten“, die Geschichte sei ein Projekt, das sie in

ihre Hände nehmen könnten, führte direkt in die Katastrophe. An den Anfang und das Ende seines Vortrags stellte Lethen daher den warnenden Satz von Georg Büchner: „Geht einmal euren Phrasen nach bis zu dem Punkt, wo sie verkörpert werden.“ <

In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

Helmut Lethen ist Direktor des Internationalen Forschungszentrums für Kulturwissenschaften (IFK) in Wien. Zuletzt veröffentlichte er den Essayband *Unheimliche Nachbarschaften. Essays zum Kälte-Kult und der Schlaflosigkeit der Philosophischen Anthropologie im 20. Jahrhundert* (2009).

European Prospects for the West Balkan

Political Salon with **Miroslav Lajčák** and **Wolfgang Petritsch**, October 15



I. Krastev, W. Petritsch, M. Lajčák

The IWM prepared a Political Salon for October 15 dealing with the European Prospects for the Western Balkans. The current High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), Valentin Inzko was supposed to meet the ex-OHR and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Miroslav Lajčák. However, Valentin Inzko had to cancel due to political developments in the Balkan region. Fortunately, the IWM succeeded in finding a replacement: Wolfgang Petritsch, Austrian diplomat serving in OHR from 1999–2002. The Editor of Foreign Affairs of *Die Presse*, Wieland Schneider, and IWM Visiting Fellow Ivan Krastev chaired the discussion.

In his opening speech, Lajčák emphasized that “there are no better perspectives than the European ones for the Western Balkans” but also stressed out that “the whole process lost its dynamic and credibility.” He voiced his recommendation to the international community: to find a compromise between political and technical criteria for EU entry, set neither too high nor too low, and approach all countries in the region in the same way and, last but not least, to promote regional cooperation.

Wolfgang Petritsch then commented on Lajčák’s views, high-

lighting that the whole region is dependent on the European internal integration process while the regional power of Serbia must not be overlooked. They then discussed the impact of a visa-free zone for all the Balkan countries. Bosnia and Albania had been excluded since they do not fulfil the criterion of biometric passports. Lajčák and Petritsch pointed out that this decision was made on technical grounds rather than on political ones.

The question whether Bosnia and Herzegovina would gain EU candidate status if a new Constitution is implemented remained unresolved in the following discussion with the audience. Yet keeping in mind that the leaders of Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups recently failed to reach an agreement on constitutional reforms for the country, it seems there is still a long way to go towards the European Union. <

Věra Stojárová

In cooperation with *Die Presse*

Miroslav Lajčák is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia and was the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2007 to 2009.

Wolfgang Petritsch is Permanent Representative of Austria to the OECD. He served as the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1999 to 2002.

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Literatur im Herbst: Der König der Ukraine

Matinée mit **Timothy Snyder** und **Alfred Gusenbauer**, 8. November



A. Gusenbauer, T. Snyder, E. Klein

„Das Modell der Monarchie ließ eine Doppel-Identität zu: Man konnte Ukrainer, Pole, Tscheche und zugleich kaisertreu sein. Diese Doppelidentität erscheint heute wieder in der vitalen Frage: Wie kann ich Österreicher, Pole etc. sein und zugleich Europäer?“ Bei Literatur im Herbst diskutierte Timothy Snyder diese Frage mit dem ehemaligen österreichischen Bundeskanzler Alfred Gusenbauer im Kunstverein Alte Schmiede in Wien. Ausgangspunkt der Unterhaltung war Snyders kürzlich auf Deutsch erschienenes Buch *Der König der Ukraine* über das Leben von Wilhelm von Habsburg. „Wilhelms Vorstellung eines loserer Zusammenschlusses der Völker der Monarchie bei stär-

kerer Autonomie“, sagte Gusenbauer bei der Besprechung des Buches, „kann man lesen als Vorgriff auf den demokratischen Zusammenschluss der EU“. Snyder fügte dem noch eine weitere Parallellität zwischen damals und heute hinzu. Wilhelm sei ein Beispiel dafür gewesen, dass eine politische Identität bewußt gewählt werden kann: „Dass heute jemand mit einem so komplexen ethnischen Hintergrund wie Obama Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten werden kann, gibt Anlass zu der Hoffnung, dass der Nationalstaat der Zukunft politisch und nicht ethnisch sein wird.“ Denn nur als politische und nicht als ethnische Einheit, so waren sich die Diskutanten einig, könne der Nationalstaat

im 21. Jahrhundert überleben und eine zunehmend multikulturelle Bevölkerung integrieren. Wilhelm von Habsburg, wenngleich Monarchist statt Demokrat, wußte das. < red

In Kooperation mit dem Kunstverein Alte Schmiede Wien

Ein Ausschnitt aus der Diskussion ist nachzulesen unter: www.iwm.at -> Publications/iwmpost

Timothy Snyder, Historiker an der Yale University und IWM Permanent Fellow

Alfred Gusenbauer, Visiting Professor an der Brown University und ehemaliger Bundeskanzler Österreichs

Moderation: **Erich Klein**, Redakteur der Literaturzeitschrift *Wespennest*

Perspectives on Memory and Identity

Junior Visiting Fellows' Conference, December 17



P. Napierala, M. Shore

At the end of each semester, the Junior Visiting Fellows present the results of their research at the In-

stitute. The conference on December 17 dealt with the various perspectives on memory and identity. < red

Conference Program

Panel 1: Secular and Religious Identities

Asim Jusic

Law, Identity and Religion. A Theoretical Analysis from Economics and Psychology

Paulina Napierala

From the Secularization of the State to the De-privatization of Religion and Faith-Based Initiatives Policy in the USA

Avraham Rot

Political Non-Differentiation and Popular Indifference in the EU

Panel 2: Lessons in Remembering and Forgetting

Katrin Hammerstein

Divided Austria: History Fiction in Linz

Andreea Maierean

The Unbearable Burden of Forgetting. Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania

Ewa Rzanna

Tombstone. Remembering the Great Famine of 1958-1962 in China

You can find the final results of all Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences on the IWM website. Please refer to: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Publications/Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences

Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies

QUING conference at CEU Budapest, October 2-3

QUING is a European-wide research project aiming at constructing the knowledge needed for inclusive policies that integrate gender and other forms of inequalities. It assesses the current content, quality and problems of gender equality policies and formulates recommendations and standards for gender

training so that policy making fits gender equal citizenship in a multicultural Europe. It covers all 27 European Union member states plus Turkey and Croatia as EU accession candidate countries.

On October 2-3 the QUING Conference was held at the Central European University, Budapest. A select-

ed range of preliminary results of the different research activities of QUING were presented to the public as well as to Agnès Hubert from the European Commission. As most of the research activities are coming to an end soon, possibilities for publication as well as future research cooperations were discussed. It was agreed that the

data collected in QUING and the research conducted so far offered rich insights for inclusive gender equality policy making and that this would be particularly fruitful not only for academia, but also for civil society and policy makers.

QUING is coordinated by the IWM and involves 12 partner in-

stitutions throughout Europe. It is funded within the European Commission's 6th Framework Program and will last until 2011. < red

For the detailed conference program please refer to: www.quiring.eu



Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists

2010/2011 — Call for Applications

The Milena Jesenská Fellowships are awarded to enable experienced European journalists in print, broadcasting, and electronic media to work in Vienna for three months on projects of their choice, free of daily duties and obligations. The projects typically have European relevance. Recent calls for applications have been directed towards cultural journalists, with the term "cultural" employed in the broad sense to encompass all kinds of artistic and intellectual disciplines. The program is supported by ERSTE Foundation, Project Syndicate and private sponsors.

Please visit the IWM website for further details:
www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm

Deadline for application
is April 9, 2010.

Market Mysticism

BY ROMAN FRYDMAN AND MICHAEL D. GOLDBERG

The Tischner Debates have been organized by the IWM and the University of Warsaw since 2005. They regularly take place in Warsaw in commemoration of the Polish priest and renowned philosopher Józef Tischner. On November 24, a debate entitled “Russia, Poland and WWII” was held on the different memories these two countries – Russia and Poland – have of the war. Before that, on October 19, the discussion “Crisis of Capitalism?” dealt with the financial breakdown. See below a contribution to the latter, arguing that the current crisis was caused by the neoliberal assumption of self-regulating markets.

A year ago, while testifying before the United States Congress, Alan Greenspan, the former head of the Federal Reserve, admitted that the economic theory he followed all his life, which assumed that self-regulating financial markets would function faultlessly, was “profoundly flawed.” To the world’s astonishment, he also expressed his surprise that market participants’ self-interest was not sufficient to protect the financial system’s stability from the sort of irresponsible behavior that led to the worst crisis since World War II.

This belief – that self-interest is the basis of self-regulation by markets – became a dominant principle of American economic policy in the last 30 years. Democrats like Bill Clinton subscribed to it no less ardently than Republicans like Ronald Reagan and the two George Bushes.

For 30 years, economists from the so-called neo-classical school have been building powerful pseudo-scientific foundations for this ideology. According to their theories, markets define values in an exact way, and therefore should not fluctuate significantly. The recent financial crisis – triggered by a severe correction in US housing prices – should not have happened at all.

But since it did happen, a question should be asked: are recurrent crises provoked by our ideologically motivated refusal to consider capitalism’s propensity for extremes, both in the social sphere (for example, deep inequalities) and in the functioning of financial markets?

In capitalist economies, individuals and businesses innovate by discovering new ways of using capital, and by creating new technologies. These innovations are by their very nature unforeseeable, as is the evolution of their social context. They cannot be captured in any mechanical rule. Unpredictability is hard-wired into market economies.

But, whatever their flaws, financial markets and private property are the only social institutions known to us that are able, adequately though imperfectly, to consider diversity of knowledge and intuition in allocating capital. Incentives to innovate and to manage ever-imperfect knowledge are the main underpinnings of capitalism’s success. Conversely, the inability of the planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to innovate was one of the main causes of their ultimate collapse – and of the complete disappearance of central planning as a



serious economic alternative.

Paradoxically, however, contemporary economic theory has kept alive the core ideas of central planning, because it relies on a similarly false concept of rationality – one whose inadequacy was already proved by Friedrich Hayek. Central planning, Hayek concluded, is by its nature impossible, because no mathematical model can precisely mimic the behavior of markets.

But mainstream contemporary economics understood Hayek’s conclusion about rationality as if it applied only to planned economies, while basing economic theory on a

stream economic theory is based, also underpins mistaken conclusions about the proper extent of market regulation. As a result, contemporary economic models produce two extreme positions: exclusion of any active role for the state or radical state interventionism.

As Michel Foucault convincingly showed, language is power. Aware of this, the neo-classical economists carried out a real coup d’état. They created a para-scientific jargon that helped them to direct social

choices in a very dangerous and unproductive direction. The premises that form the basis of their models became in great part inscrutable to anyone lacking a PhD in economics, and debate was infused with terms that mean one thing to the uninitiated and quite another to economists.

The concept of rationality forms the foundation of this discourse. In everyday language, rationality means common sense or reasonableness. By contrast, for economists, a “rational individual” is not merely reasonable; he or she is someone who

came to believe this claim, known as the “efficient markets hypothesis,” resulting in the massive deregulation of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s that made the crisis more likely, if not inevitable.

In recent years, another school of thought, behavioral economics, has uncovered mountains of evidence that market participants do not act as conventional economists would predict “rational individuals” to behave. But, instead of jettisoning the bogus standard of rationality underlying those predictions, they interpret their empirical findings to mean that many market participants are irrational, prone to emotion, or ignore economic fundamentals for other reasons.

The behavioral view suggests that large swings in asset prices serve no useful social function. If the state could somehow eliminate them through massive intervention, or ban irrational players by imposing strict regulatory measures, the “rational” players could reassert their control and markets would return to their normal state of setting prices at their “true” values.

This is implausible, because an exact model of rational decision-making is beyond the capacity of economists – or anyone else – to formulate. Once economists recognize that they cannot explain exactly how reasonable individuals make decisions and how market outcomes unfold over time, we will no longer be stuck with two polar extremes concerning the relative roles of the market and the state.

An alternative theory of markets is needed, and its basis should be the fact that participants must cope with ever-imperfect knowledge about the fundamentals of economic change. This obvious feature of capitalism is completely ignored by the dominant market models, though it is the main explanation for asset-price fluctuations in market-based economies.

Such an alternative approach also leads to a new way of thinking about the respective roles of the state and financial markets. So long as price fluctuations remain within reasonable bounds, the state should limit its involvement to ensuring transparency, curbing monopolistic behavior, and eliminating market failures. But when price fluctuations become excessive, as they did in the run-up to the recent crisis, the state can implement measures to limit their amplitude (though it always has a greater problem cop-

ing with imperfect knowledge than the market does).

A combination of passive and active roles for the state along these lines would leave markets to allocate capital while holding out the possibility of reducing the social costs that arise when asset-price swings continue for too long and then end, as they inevitably do, in sharp reversals. <

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Roman Frydman is Professor of Economics at New York University; Michael D. Goldberg is Professor of Economics at the University of New Hampshire. They are the authors of *Imperfect Knowledge Economics: Exchange Rates and Risk* (2007).

Tischner Debate XVI Crisis of Capitalism?

Participants:

Michal Boni, Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister

Roman Frydman, Professor of Economics, New York University

Jennifer Hochschild, Professor of Government, Harvard University

Witold Orłowski, former Economic Advisor to the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski

Aleksander Smolar, President of the Stefan Batory Foundation

Chairs:

Marcin Król, Warsaw University
Krzysztof Michalski, IWM

Tischner Debate XVII Russia, Poland and WW II

Participants:

Victor Erofejev, Russian writer

Yaroslav Hrytsak, Director, Institute for Historical Research, Lviv National University

Adam Michnik, Editor-in-Chief, *Gazeta Wyborcza*

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs

Timothy Snyder, Professor of History, Yale University; IWM Permanent Fellow

Chairs:

Marcin Król, Warsaw University
Krzysztof Michalski, IWM

Unpredictability is hard-wired into market economies

belief that economists can predict future market changes exactly. The creation and legitimation of today’s most controversial financial instruments rests on this false premise.

Financial models that assumed that it is possible to count precisely the causes of price fluctuations were widely used by America’s most respected financial institutions to price derivatives and financial insurance. Economic theory that treated these financial instruments as innovations – similar to the computer, for example – legitimized their use in markets worldwide. But these instruments correspond only slightly with prices and risk in financial markets, and their widespread adoption, we now know, fueled market fluctuations and provoked the recent crisis.

What is worse, the false concept of rationality on which main-

behaves in accord with a mathematical model of individual decision-making that economists have agreed to call “rational.” The centerpiece of this standard of rationality, the so-called “Rational Expectations Hypothesis”, presumes that economists can exactly model how rational individuals comprehend the future. The unreasonableness of this standard helps explain why macroeconomists and finance theorists find it so hard to account for large swings in market outcomes.

Indeed, economists’ incoherent premises have led them to embrace absurd conclusions – for example, that unfettered financial markets set asset prices nearly perfectly at their “true” fundamental value. If so, the state should drastically curtail its supervision of the financial system. Unfortunately, many officials worldwide

Unwanted by All

BY LISA BJURWALD

The hatred against Roma, also known as gypsies, is growing at an alarming rate. In Eastern and Central Europe, it has already reached boiling point. Elected politicians use racist rhetoric to build political platforms while civilians take matters into their own hands, executing individuals whose only crime is their ethnicity.



Radical anti-Roma party Jobbik attracted hundreds of sympathisers at a gathering in Budapest in August 2009

Photo: Lisa Bjurwald

Incidents of Anti-Roma Violence

Tatarszentgyörgy in Hungary, February 23, 2009. A house is set on fire with Molotov cocktails. A young father and his 5-year-old son are shot dead as they flee their home.

Vitkov in the Czech Republic, April 18, 2009. Three members of a Roma family are injured in an arson attack. Their 2-year-old daughter suffers burns on 80 percent of her skin.

Tiszalök in Hungary, April 22, 2009. 54-year-old Kóka, leaving to work the night shift, is shot dead in front of his family home.

Kisléta in Hungary, August 3, 2009. Mária, a middle-aged mother, is shot and killed in her bed. Her 13-year-old daughter is severely wounded.

Shootings. Stabbings. Firebombings. Beatings. The European Roma Rights Centre's (ERRC) winding list of the past year and a half's attacks on men, women and children reads like a news report from the 1930's. Europe's largest ethnic minority, the Roma (or gypsies) is treated as almost sub-human. Despite the lessons of history, Europe is failing in protecting the Roma living on its lands. In the EU-MIDIS, published last spring as the first ever EU-wide survey of minority groups' experience of discrimination, Roma respondents reported the highest levels of discrimination across all areas surveyed.

Prior to the European Parliament elections in June 2009, a Czech extreme-right group was allowed to run television adverts calling for a "final solution" to the "gypsy problem," evoking Nazi terminology. But the threat to Europe's ten to twelve million Roma (there are no certain figures) is not just coming from skinhead-gangs or individual perpetrators.

Cases of coercive sterilizations are still being reported in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Authorities in several EU countries are guilty of the forced evictions of Roma families and the destruction of their camps. These actions, carried out without consideration of the fate of the families involved, are a clear breach of the member states' obligations under international human rights law. It should come as no surprise that in the EU-MIDIS survey, 66–92% of Roma did not report their most recent experience of discrimination to the competent authority, and 65–100% reported a lack of confidence in law enforcement and justice structures.

In a report issued in October 2009 the EU Fundamental Rights

Agency (FRA) states that the Roma are easier targets for hate crimes in their segregated settlements. The FRA also notes that these near-ghettos are sometimes the result of deliberate policies by national or local authorities. If it were up to non-Roma citizens, the segregation would be likely to continue: almost a quarter of Europeans would feel uncomfortable having a Roma neighbor, according to EU statistics.

Italy, home to an estimated 150,000 Roma, has been widely condemned for its discrimination of the minority group. In its latest annual country report, human rights NGO Amnesty International states that Roma are still not recognized as a national minority and thus remain unprotected by the authorities. Physical attacks, unlawfully forced evictions, hate-speech by mainstream politicians and arson attacks against Roma camps were frequent throughout 2008 and continued during 2009. In a new report, "Security à la Italiana: Fingerprinting, Extreme Violence and Harassment of Roma in Italy," a coalition of organizations (including the ERRC and the Open Society Institute) claim that the physical and verbal abuse of Roma has increased disproportionately since the election of the new government in April 2008. The report's damning conclusion? "Violence and racist attacks against Roma are no longer isolated in nature, but have rather become a structural component of the Italian reality."

Healthy Roma children in countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia and all over former Yugoslavia are placed in schools for children with special needs, despite having no mental disabilities. Up to 80 percent of children placed in special schools in Slovakia are thought to be Roma.

Roma-only classes and schools are commonplace, hindering the already difficult integration of Roma into society and labeling the youngsters as outsiders from an early age. The ERRC goes so far as to compare the educational situation with the United States' treatment of black children before 1957, when the plan of gradual integration was implemented. The urgency of the matter was stressed at the European Platform for Roma Inclusion's second meeting, held in Brussels on September 28, 2009 under the auspices of the Swedish EU Presidency. "We cannot allow ourselves to lose another generation of

tional Movements is currently comprised of Jobbik, the National Front of Belgium, the National Democrats of Sweden, Fiamma Tricolore of Italy, Front National of France and the British National Party, which joined in November. Parties from Austria, Spain and Portugal are expected to soon join the extreme right federation, aiming to increase their influence in Brussels and gain access to substantial EU grants.

Another anti-Roma party looks set to win this spring's Hungarian election. The Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz), founded in 1988, was once the liberal voice of young anti-communists. Today, the disturbing views of some of Fidesz' representatives differ little from those of the extreme right. Oszkár Molnár, mayor of the town of Edelény and member of the Hungarian parliament, is a case in point. Molnár recently claimed that Roma women hit their stomachs with hammers in order to give birth to handicapped children, thus making them eligible for larger state benefits. Nearly 400 Roma women have filed a defamation suit against him. But Fidesz has yet to expel Molnár. With the established parties more prone to tolerating racism, Jobbik's influence on the political climate in Hungary is thus becoming clear.

Despite having arrived in the Balkans during the Ottoman period, the region's Roma are still subjected to appalling discrimination and

ery of the Romani Holocaust" in its first issue of 2009. Writing for *Eurozine* (*The enemy within*, March 2009), Nicolae quotes another article, published by the newspaper *Flacara Iasului* in September 2007:

Gypsies [...] "Those disgusting beings" with "filthy and lewd women" [...] "a living proof we come from monkeys," "hysterical," "cunning," "treacherous," "societal abortions" [...] "those gypsies multiply like rabbits (my apologies to rabbits) only to get their stinky dirty paws on the welfare of some poor children [...] the gypsies steal, are rapists."

Shockingly, it is signed by two members of the Romanian Writers' Union. One of them is the spokesperson for the Museum of Literature.

Pieced together, the picture is a frightening one. Politicians fire up the masses by pointing out the Roma as scapegoats – a tried and tested strategy in dire economic times – with the media quick to follow. The current situation is not so much a failure of integration as the result of active segregation. Healthy children placed in special-needs schools and the failure to provide proper accommodation after the destruction of Roma camps are just two examples.

After criminal incidents involving inhabitants in a Roma settlement, the authorities in a village in eastern Slovakia recently agreed to build a wall to separate it from the mainly non-Roma villagers, thus condemning them all as thieves. The Roma say it has turned their settlement into a zoo. Does anyone seriously believe that this will lead to a drop in criminality?

We seem to have left the fate of the Roma in the hands of angry mobs and populist politicians – the medieval method, you may call it. Yet the killings and the arson attacks, the unlawful discrimination and the political persecution should be more than enough to shake Europe into action. The true meaning of the worn-out phrase "Never again" is not to prevent another Third Reich from coming to power. Instead, it should inspire intellectuals and media professionals as well as politicians to react quicker and more powerfully when racism rears its ugly head. In Eastern and Central Europe, such a call for collective action is long overdue. ◀

Lisa Bjurwald is a Stockholm-based journalist and author, specialized in current affairs and political extremism. She was one of the 2009 Milena Jesenská Fellows at the IWM.

Despite the lessons of history, Europe is failing in protecting the Roma living on its lands

Roma," said Christer Hallerby, Sweden's Secretary of State for Integration and Equal Opportunity.

Hungary has seen the rise of the radical anti-Roma party, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), which won almost 15 percent of the vote and three European Parliament seats last June. The party is already using its new position to sway Brussels to the far-right. In October, they managed to block a resolution condemning Italy for violating human rights.

Jobbik will not be advancing their agenda on their own, neither in Hungary nor in Europe. On October 25, five European far-right parties forged an alliance in Budapest. The Alliance of European Na-

denied basic healthcare, education and housing. The past autumn saw a string of attacks by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Yet the police seems hesitant to act, leading Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to call for speedy investigations to prevent further attacks. Despite the fact that the persecution they fled is as bad as ever, thousands of Roma are being forcibly returned to Kosovo from several EU countries.

The European media plays a key role in the dehumanization of the Roma. Some of the most vicious attacks can be found in the Romanian press. According to Valeriu Nicolae, Senior Advocacy Officer for the Roma initiatives of Open Society Institute, the respected weekly *Academia Catavencu* featured a "grotesque mock-

Fellows and Guests 09–12 2009

Paul Dragos Aligica

Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow
(October 2009 – March 2010)

Senior Research Fellow, Faculty Fellow, James Buchanan Center for Political Economy, George Mason University, Arlington

From “South-Eastern Europe” to “The Black Sea Region.” A Study of Social and Institutional Construction of Economic Regionalization

Zoltan Ban

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(July – December 2009)

Freier Übersetzer, Budapest

Hannah Arendt: Rahel Varnhagen. Eine Lebensgeschichte / Rahel Varnhagen. The Life of a Jewess (German/English > Hungarian)

Joshua Berson

Junior Visiting Fellow
(October 2009 – March 2010)

Historian and Anthropologist, Philadelphia

The Ethnographic Production of Cultural/Spiritual Value

Lisa Bjurwald

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (July – September 2009)

Editorial and Opinion Writer, *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm

The Women in Europe's Extreme Right

Christine Blättler

Lise Meitner Visiting Fellow
(August 2009 – July 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Potsdam, FWF-project leader

The Phantasmagoria as a Focus of Modernity. On Genealogy and Function of a Philosophical Concept

Mateusz Borowski

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(December 2009 – February 2010)

Adjunct Professor of Drama, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

Judith Butler: Antigone's Claim. Kinship Between Life and Death (English > Polish)

Faisal Devji

Visiting Fellow
(May – September 2009)

Reader in Modern South Asian History, Oxford University

Muslim Zion: Jinnah and the Making of Pakistan

Katrin Hammerstein

Junior Visiting Fellow
(October 2009 – March 2010)

Ph.D. candidate in History, Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg

Shared Past – Divided Memory? National Socialism in Memory Discourses and Constructions of Identity in the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR and Austria

Sandor Horvath

Andrew W. Mellon Fellow
(July – September 2009)

Research Fellow in History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Youth Movements and Divided Memories: Perception of the “West” and Youth Subcultures in the 1960s

Yaroslav Hrytsak

Visiting Fellow (March – September 2009)

Director of the Institute for Historical Research, Lviv University; Professor of History, Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv; Recurrent Visiting Professor, CEU, Budapest

Historical Memory Between Conflict, Ambivalence, and Reconciliation: The Case of Ukraine, 1989–2009

Asim Jusic

Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2009 – March 2010)

Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law, CEU, Budapest

Comparative Legal Regulation of Religious Institutions: A Behavioral Law and Economics Approach

Ivan Krastev

Visiting Fellow
(May 2009 – August 2010)

Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

The BRIC-Hiker's Guide to the New World Order

Grzegorz Krzywiec

Bronislaw Geremek Fellow
(September 2009 – June 2010)

Adjunct/Research Associate of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

Vienna's Impact on Polish Modern Antisemitism, 1883–1938

Hiroaki Kuromiya

Visiting Fellow (September 2009 – June 2010)

Professor of History, Indiana University, Bloomington

Europe, the Soviet Union and Asia

Diljana Lambreva

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (October – December 2009)

Correspondent, *Der Standard / eurotopics / n-ost*, Bulgaria

„In varietate Concordia“ on the Balkans

Susanne Lettow

Visiting Fellow (March 2008 – February 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Paderborn; FWF-project leader

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in “Naturphilosophie” around 1800

Andreea Maieran

Junior Visiting Fellow
(July – December 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston University

Lustration in Central and Eastern Europe

Jacek Maj

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (July – September 2009)

Freelance Journalist, Krakow

Anti-Semitism and the Catholic Church in Poland: The Case of Father Stanislaw Musial SJ

Brian Marrin

Junior Visiting Fellow
(July – December 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Can There Be a Politics of Nature?

Jyoti Mistry

Visiting Fellow
(August – October 2009)

Professor of Film and Television, Wits School of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Documentary “4 CITIES: Johannesburg, Helsinki, Vienna, New York City”

Paulina Napierala

Józef Tischner Fellow
(July – December 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

Polish and American Religious Rights Movements in the Perspective of Secularization and De-privatization of Religion Theories

Avraham Rot

Hebrew University Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2009 – March 2010)

MA student in Sociology of Knowledge, Hebrew University

European Identity and the Function of Boredom

Ewa Rzanna

Junior Visiting Fellow
(September 2009 – February 2010)

MA student in Far East Studies, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

The Other Secularity

Marci Shore

Visiting Fellow (August 2009 – August 2010)

Assistant Professor of History, Yale University

The Self Laid Bare: Phenomenology, Structuralism, and Other Cosmopolitan Encounters

Pawel Sowinski

Andrew W. Mellon Fellow
(July – September 2009)

Assistant Professor of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

Polish Illicit Publications During the Communist Era from an International Viewpoint

Michael Staudigl

Visiting Fellow (November 2007 – October 2010)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Vienna, FWF-project leader

The Many Faces of Violence: Toward an Integrative Phenomenological Conception

Vera Stojarova

Andrew W. Mellon Fellow
(August – October 2009)

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno

The Far Right in Balkan Politics. A Comparative Study

Varia

Ever-growing IWM Academia:

Congratulations to **Mieke Verloo**, Research Director of the QUING Project at the IWM, for having been appointed Professor of Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues at Radboud University Nijmegen on September 18. She held her inauguration lecture on the topic of intersectionality; in Dutch it was entitled: “Intersectionaliteit en interferentie. Hoe politiek en beleid ongelijkheid behouden, bestrijden en veranderen.”

Dirk Rupnow, former Visiting Fellow of the IWM, defended his postdoctoral thesis (Habilitation) successfully at the University of Vienna in June this year. Recently he was awarded the Fraenkel Prize in Contemporary History by the Wiener Library for his work “*Judenforschung im ‘Dritten Reich.’ Wissenschaft zwischen Politik, Propaganda und Ideologie.*” Most of the work he composed during his time at the IWM.

Yet another former Visiting Fellow received an award: **Monika Ankele's** dissertation *Alltag und Aneignung in Psychiatrien um 1900* was honoured with the Käthe Leichter Prize 2009 by the Austrian Ministry for Women and Public Services. Her work was recently published by the Böhlau publishing house.

Last but not least congratulations to **Karin Oberer**, assistant to the Managing Director of the IWM. She studied interpretation for the languages German, French and Spanish and received her Mag. phil. from the University of Vienna in December.

Some leave, others return:

After more than six rich years working at the IWM, **Karin Tertinegg** left the Institute in December. She will be making good use of her knowledge and skills acquired in various gender equality projects – notably **MAGEEQ** and **QUING** – in the Department for Women's Advancement of the City of Vienna.

Barbara Abraham left the Institute in September. She had been project manager here for the past five years. We wish her all the best! Starting in January 2010 **Manuel Tröster** will be responsible for project management and program coordination at the IWM.

After a long and hot summer, Office Manager **Claudia Zimmer** returned from maternity leave and was amazed to find a new artily decorated workplace as well as some new colleagues. Like our new intern **Marlene Falmbigl**. She succeeds **Karina Karadensky** and will support the IWM staff from December 2009 to March 2010. She recently completed her studies in German Literature and Art History at the University of Vienna. (Congratulations, too!)

Studying the IWM:

The research at the IWM is carried out by an open community of scholars – that's what we often say about ourselves in our profiles. But how does this work? In October a group of young students from the **Department of Social Studies of Science** of the University of Vienna visited

us to find out and to observe social science “in the making.” We are curious about their findings and looking forward to learning more about how we do what we do.

Happy Birthday!

And finally, congratulations to two longstanding friends of the Institute: **Bob Silvers**, editor of the *New York Review of Books*, and **Kurt Biedenkopf**, German politician, economist and member of the IWM's Board of Patrons, both celebrated their 80th birthday recently. Silvers on December 31, 2009, Biedenkopf a few weeks later on January 28, 2010. We wish them all the best for their future activities.

You can find the Travels & Talks on the internet: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Fellows

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Publications of Fellows and Guests

Paul Dragos Aligica
Visiting Fellow

Elinor Ostrom on the Market, the State, and the Third Sector. The Remarkable Achievements of the Nobel Prize-winning Economist, in: *Reason* (2009)

Christine Blättler
Visiting Fellow

Der Philosoph der Zukunft ist Gesetzgeber. Zur Ethik Nietzsches, in: Martin Stingelin und Clemens Porschlegel (Hg.), *Nietzsche und Frankreich*, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2009

Slavenka Drakulic
Visiting Fellow (October – December 2008)

Two Underdogs and a Cat: Three Reflections on Communism, London: Seagull Books, 2009

Timofiy Havryliv
Visiting Fellow (April – December 2006)

Wo ist dein Haus, Odysseus? Zürich: Ammann Verlag, 2009

Form und Figur. Die österreichische Literatur der Zweiten Republik, (ukrainisch), Lviv: WNLT-Klasyka, 2009

Yaroslav Hrytsak
Visiting Fellow

Nova Ukraina. Nowe interpretacje, Warsaw: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, 2009

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

Autonomy – Authenticity – Alterity: On the Aesthetic Ideology of Modernity, in: *Modernologies: Contemporary Artists Researching Modernity*, Museo d'art contemporani de Barcelona, 2009

The Sublime – A Discourse of Crisis and of Power, Or: "A Gamble on Transcendence", in: Luke White and Claire Pajackowska (eds.), *The Sublime Now!* Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009

Zwischen Haus und Garten. Weiblichkeitskonzepte und Naturästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert, in: Christiane Holm und Holger Zaunstock (Hg.), *Frauen und Gärten um 1800. Weiblichkeit – Natur – Ästhetik*. Halle/Saale: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2009.

Im Gespräch mit Cornelia Klinger: Utopien, Menschenrechte und Geschlecht, in: *Feministische Studien*, 27/2 (2009)

János Mátyás Kovács
Permanent Fellow

Capitalism from the Outside? Economic Cultures in Central and Eastern Europe After 1989, with Violetta Zentai, Budapest: CEU Center for Policy Study, forthcoming

Accomplices without Perpetrators. What Do Economists Have to Do with Transitional Justice in Hungary?, in: Anatoly Khazanov and Stanley Payne (eds.), *Perpetrators, Accomplices and Victims in Twentieth-Century Politics. Reckoning with the Past*, London: Routledge, 2009

Ex Occidente Flux. A Debate on the Usefulness of Macroeconomics and the Responsibility of Economics, in: *Közgazdasági Szemle*, 10 (2009) (in Hungarian)

Various Varieties. On the Classification of New Capitalisms in Eastern Europe, in: Hans-Georg Soeffner (ed.), *Unsichere Zeiten. Herausforderungen gesellschaftlicher Transformationen*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009

Grzegorz Krzywiec
Visiting Fellow

Chauvinism in a Polish Way. The Case of Roman Dmowski (1886–1905) (in Polish), Warsaw: Neriton & Instytut Historii PAN, 2009

Hiroaki Kuromiya
Visiting Fellow

Stalin's Great Terror and Espionage, Seattle, WA: The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2009

Notatka Włodzimierza Baćkowskiego na temat współpracy polsko-japońskiej wobec ruchu prometejskiego (1938), with Paweł Libera, in: *Zeszyty historyczne*, 169 (2009)

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow

Les bio/technosciences dans la philosophie: Défis et perspectives pour les gender studies en philosophie, in: *Diogenes. Revue internationale des sciences humaines*, 225 (2009)

Krzysztof Michalski
Permanent Fellow

Eternity's Flame, Princeton University Press, forthcoming

On Eternity, (in Polish), in: *Krytyka Polityczna*, 16/17 (2009)

Marci Shore
Visiting Fellow

(The End of) Communism as a Generational History, in: *Contemporary European History*, 18/3 (2009)

God is an Invented Thing: Marek Edelman, Hero of the Most Polish of all Polish Uprisings – That is, the Most Hopeless – Had in Himself Little of a Romantic (in Polish), in: *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 238/26 (October 2009)

Legacies of 'Judeo-Bolshevism': Scenes from Post-communist Poland, in: *Eurozine* (July 2009)

Timothy Synder
Permanent Fellow

Der König der Ukraine: Die geheimen Leben des Wilhelm von Habsburg, Wien: Zsolnay, 2009



Er träumte von einem Thron in Kiew und starb als Spion in einer sowjetischen Zelle. In seinem jetzt auf Deutsch erschienenen Buch *Der König der Ukraine* zeichnet Timothy Snyder das schillernde Leben und tragische Ende von Erzherzog Wilhelm von Habsburg (1895–1948) nach. In dessen Geschichte als „roter Prinz“ der ukrainischen Bauern, als verarmter Aristokrat im Pariser Exil, Faschist, Widerstandskämpfer, Geheimagent und Lebeamant, spiegelt sich die europäische Geschichte des „kurzen 20. Jahrhunderts“ mit all ihren Umbrüchen und Widersprüchen.

Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746–1817): libérateur et penseur, in: *L'héritage de la Res Publica des Deux Nations*, Paris: Bibliothèque Polonaise de Paris, 2009

The Ethical Significance of Eastern Europe, Twenty Years On, in: *East European Politics & Societies*, 23/4 (2009)

Nazis, Soviets, Poles, Jews, Review of Richard Evans: "The Third Reich at War" and Yitzhak Arad "The Holocaust in the Soviet Union," in: *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 56/19 (December 2009)

Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow

Alfred Schütz und die Hermeneutik, Konstanz: UVK, i. E.

Sens détruit, Nous brisé, monde retiré. A propos de la violence dans le cadre d'une phénoménologie a-subjective, in: Nathalie Frogneux (ed.), *Jan Patočka. Existence, histoire et monde commun*, Paris: L'édition du cercle herméneutique, i. E.

Entwurf einer Phänomenologie der Gewalt, (japanisch), in: *Gendai Shisou. La revue de la pensée d'aujourd'hui* (Dezember 2009)

Charles Taylor
Permanent Fellow

Ein säkulares Zeitalter, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2009



Der Ort der Religion in der Gesellschaft hat sich in den letzten Jahrhunderten dramatisch verändert. Religion als überwölbendes Dach ist zu einer gesellschaftlichen Wertsphäre neben anderen, wie Politik, Wirtschaft, Kunst oder Wissenschaft geworden – wir leben heute in einem säkularen Zeitalter. In seinem nun auch auf Deutsch übersetzten opus magnum untersucht Charles Taylor den Wandel von einer Gesellschaft, in der es nahezu unmöglich war, nicht an Gott zu glauben, zu einer, in der Glaube nur eine Option ist. Taylor legt den Fokus seiner ideengeschichtlichen Rekonstruktion auf das westliche Christentum und setzt der üblichen These von der „Entzauberung der Welt“ die Überzeugung entgegen, dass es die Religion selbst war, die das Säkulare hervorgebracht hat.

Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2009

Mieke Verloo
QUING Project

The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality: Stretching, Bending and Policy-Making edited with Emanuela Lombardo and Petra Meier, New York: Routledge, 2009

IWM Publications

Transit 38 (Winter 2009), *Geteilte Geschichte / Zwanzig Jahre 1989*

Europa muss seine Geschichte neu schreiben. Auch zwanzig Jahre nach dem Mauerfall verläuft auf der Landkarte der Erinnerungen eine Grenze zwischen Ost und West. Im Mittelpunkt des neuen *Transit 38* steht die geteilte Geschichte des vereinten Europa. Ausgehend von Timothy Snyders Neukartographierung der von den Regimen Hitlers und Stalins begangenen Massenverbrechen wird deutlich, dass Osteuropa von 1933 bis 1944 das geographische, moralische und politische Zentrum des Terrors bildete. Dies – und die damit verbundenen Traumata – endlich anzuerkennen, ist der erste Schritt zu einer gemeinsamen europäischen Geschichte. Ein zweiter Schwerpunkt fragt nach den politischen und sozialen Herausforderungen der Wende von 1989, illustriert durch emblematische Photographien von Chris Niedenthal. Das Heft schließt mit den Reflexio-

nen des legendären Mitbegründers und Herausgebers des *New York Review of Books*, Bob Silvers, über die Dilemmata eines Zeitschriftenmachers.

Mit Beiträgen von: Ralf Dahrendorf, Alex J. Kay, Mark Kramer, Hiroaki Kuromiya und Andrzej Peplonski, Wolfgang Mueller, Claus Offe, Ulrich Schlie, Steve Sem-Sandberg, Robert B. Silvers, Timothy Snyder, Lynne Viola

Tr@nsit_online
The "Brave New World" after Communism. 1989: Expectations in Comparison

Much of the history of the 1989 revolutions has been lost or remained hidden until now. A good part of it, however, can be retrieved by reconstructing the expectations (both elite and popular) prevailing at the time. On June 15–16, 2009 the IWM organized an international conference on revisiting the pre-1989 visions of the much-awaited world after communism. *Tr@nsit_online* is now presenting a selection of papers contributed to this event: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Publications/Transit

Contributions by: Thomas Ahbe, Roumen Avramov, András Bozóki, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Michal Kopeček, János Mátyás Kovács, Ivan Krastev, Mladen Lazić, Hans J. Misselwitz, Edelbert Richter, Dieter Segert, Paweł Spiewak, Irina Papkov, Alexander von Plato

Paul Celan Translation Program

Ewa Nowak
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (October – December 2006)

Gustav Radbruch: Filozofia prawa (Rechtsphilosophie), Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2009

Artan Puto
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (October 2008 – March 2009)

Nathalie Clayer: Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar (Aux origines du nationalisme albanais), Tirana: Botime Përpjekja, 2009

Transit
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Timothy Snyder	Der Holocaust: die ausgeblendete Realität
Kuromiya / Peplonski	Stalin und die Spionage
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Alex J. Kay	Deutsche Wirtschaftsplanung für die Sowjetunion 1941-1944
Mark Kramer	Konsolidierung des Ostblocks
Wolfgang Mueller	Stalinismus und europäisches Gedächtnis
Zwanzig Jahre 1989	
Claus Offe	Die neuen Wohlfahrtsstaaten
Ralf Dahrendorf	Freiheit und soziale Bindungen
Chris Niedenthal	1989. Photographien
Steve Sem-Sandberg	Die Ausstellung
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Was zu tun ist

VON FRANZ FISCHLER

Kopenhagen didn't bring about the climate change in climate politics everyone was hoping for. However, the world summit has put the issue on the global agenda. At the fourth European Challenges Forum, hosted by the IWM and the Robert Bosch Foundation on November 20 and 21, representatives from Poland, Germany and Austria discussed the "Social and Political Consequences of Climate Change" on a regional level. In the guest contributions by Franz Fischler and Paweł Świeboda you can read what we have to do now, after Kopenhagen, to avoid a climate catastrophe.

Es herrscht breite Übereinstimmung in der Wissenschaft, dass der Klimawandel stattfindet. Die gemessene globale Erderwärmung nähert sich bereits 1°C. Verantwortlich dafür ist zum größten Teil die Zunahme der Treibhausgaskonzentration in der Atmosphäre, die ohne das Zutun der Menschen nicht erklärbar ist. Zusätzlich beschleunigt sich der Klimawandel – die Treibhausgasemissionen haben zwischen 1970 und 2004 um 70% zugenommen.

Was die Folgen anbetrifft, so sind sich die Experten ebenfalls einig, dass diese jenseits der 3°C Grenze unkontrollierbar werden. Denn dann werden so genannte „Tippingpoints“ überschritten, was bedeutet, dass irreversible Entwicklungen eintreten. Beispielsweise müsste man mit einem massiven Artensterben rechnen, 30% aller Arten könnten verschwinden. Dazu kommt, dass sich die globale Erwärmung sehr ungleich über die Erde verteilt, mit der Konsequenz, dass in erster Linie die Häufigkeit und Intensität abnormaler Wetterereignisse zunimmt, Wüsten sich ausbreiten, aber auch Permafrostböden auftauen. Die Entwicklungsländer empfinden es als besonders ungerecht, dass sie vom Klimawandel wesentlich stärker betroffen sein werden, obwohl sie dazu nur einen geringen Teil beitragen.

Die Europäische Union und viele andere Staaten sind daher zurecht zu der Schlussfolgerung gelangt, dass man alles daran setzen sollte, die Erderwärmung auf 2°C zu begrenzen. Auch in einem solchen Szenario sind die Folgen beträchtlich.

In Afrika südlich der Sahara wird die Wasserknappheit enorm zunehmen, ebenso in einigen südeuropäischen Regionen. Die meisten Korallenriffe werden absterben, einige dicht besiedelte Zonen wie z.B. in Bangladesch, werden von regelmäßigen Überschwemmungen bedroht sein, weil Gletscher verschwinden und das Grönland- und Islandeis zurückgeht. Auf jeden Fall ist mit großen Auswirkungen auf die globale Lebensmittelproduktion, mit wachsender Marktvolatilität, und mit Millionen von Klimaflüchtlings zu rechnen. Was ist zu tun?

Nicholas Stern spricht in seinem Bericht vom größten Marktversagen aller Zeiten, macht jedoch darauf aufmerksam, dass die Vermeidungskosten durchaus in einem akzeptablen Bereich bleiben, wenn



Franz Fischler at the European Challenges Forum

Photo: IWM / Johannes Noophradsky

nicht länger zugewartet, sondern sofort mit energischen Maßnahmen begonnen wird. Es gilt, wie mit einer Zange, das Problem von zwei Seiten her anzupacken. Es geht um Mitigation und Adaption. Diese beiden Herangehensweisen haben Wissenschaftler wie folgt auf den Punkt gebracht: „avoid the unmanageable and manage the unavoidable“.

Dabei geht es nicht nur um die Frage, wie die Folgen und deren Kosten unter den Völkern aufzuteilen sind, sondern der Klimawandel kann durchaus auch als Stimulus für eine grundlegende Umgestaltung unseres Wirtschaftssystems dienen. Wer in der Technologieentwicklung die Nase vorne behält, kann aus dem Klimawandel als Gewinner hervorgehen, wer sich an der Gegenwart festklammert, wird der Verlierer sein. Diese Tatsache muss sich zu allererst in den Köpfen der Unternehmer und Manager festsetzen und um dies zu beschleunigen muss die Politik diesen Prozess verstärken. Das ist schwierig, weil es sich in der Regel um längerfristige politische Projekte handelt und daher nicht ein und dieselbe Politikergeneration den Nutzen aus den zunächst notwendigen „politischen Investitionen“ ziehen kann. Dazu kommt, dass der volle Effekt nur eintritt, wenn die Menschheit aus dem „prisoner dilemma“ auszubrechen vermag und nicht jeder nur auf den anderen wartet bis er zu handeln beginnt. Was sicher nicht genügt, sind bloß immer neue Appelle. Es müssen schon einige neue politische Weichen

gestellt werden, die den notwendigen Turnaround provozieren. Welche müssen das sein?

- Es ist dringend notwendig, die Idee der Europäischen Kommission aufzugreifen und statt bloß das quantitative Wachstum zu messen, Parameter zur Messung von Lebensqualität einzuführen.

- Unser Steuersystem braucht eine neue Struktur, mit der die Steuerlast weg von der menschlichen Arbeit und stärker hin auf Kapitalgewinn und Ressourcenverbrauch gelenkt wird. Das würde die Steigerung der Energieeffizienz und die stärkere Hinwendung zur Realwirtschaft wesentlich attraktiver machen.

- Konjunkturprogramme dürfen nicht länger reparaturorientiert bleiben, sondern müssen den Umstieg auf Zukunftsindustrien erleichtern.

- In der Handelspolitik sollten nicht jene Staaten begünstigt werden, die sich einer weltweiten Klimapolitik verweigern.

- Eine zentrale Rolle muss Forschung und Entwicklung spielen, denn nur mit neuen Technologien werden wir die notwendige Effizienzsteigerung und den Wechsel hin zur erneuerbaren Energie schaffen.

- Die Energiezukunft ist noch nicht entschieden. Wahrscheinlich wird es zwei Strategien brauchen: Zum einen eine möglichst dezentrale Energieproduktion, die mit einem völlig neuen Verteilungssystem verbunden sein muss, das über ein eigenes Energieinternet gesteuert wird. Zum anderen Offshore

Windkraftwerke und Photovoltaikanlagen in der Sahara, für die es allerdings dann neuartige Supraleitungen braucht um die Stromverluste in Grenzen zu halten.

- Nicht zu vergessen sind natürlich neue Transportsysteme und effizientere Heiz- und Kühlsysteme, wobei in allen diesen Fällen gilt, dass eine wesentliche Effizienzsteigerung durch die richtige Planung von Gebäuden, Siedlungen und Regionen entsteht.

Die gesamte Klima- und Energiepolitik muss jedoch auch im Lichte der Klimagerechtigkeit gesehen werden. Konzepte, die darauf hinaus laufen, dass man den weniger entwickelten Ländern mit dem Argument der notwendigen Treibhausgasreduktion jegliche Entwicklungschance nimmt, sind von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Ebenso solche, mit denen kein ausgewogener Kontrakt auf die Zukunft geschlossen wird; denn es geht ja schließlich darum unsere Welt zukunftsfähig zu machen. ◀

Read the report of the conference: www.iwm.at -> Menu item: Publications/ iwmpost

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European Challenges Forum IV Social and Political Consequences of Climate Change

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The event was organized by the IWM and the Robert Bosch Foundation with the generous support of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and the European Climate Foundation.

Revolution in the Making

BY PAWEŁ ŚWIEBODA

The building of a low-carbon economy is Europe's fundamental mission in the twenty first century



Gesine Schwan and
Paweł Świeboda

Photo: IWM / Johannes Novehradsky

If science is right and we need to start reducing emissions globally in the context of the next 5–10 years, we will have to go through a political revolution requiring the necessary public support for this type of agenda. The awareness of inevitable costs will be growing. Nicolas Stern anticipates that the price tag for mitigation and adaptation measures would amount to 1 percent of GDP assuming that an appropriate set of political instruments is adopted. If they are not, then the costs will equal 2 percent of GDP and more. There has to be an open and honest debate about the costs. There is no doubt that for the first years, investments are needed before the dividend can be paid.

Public attitudes to climate change are relatively stable although support for a robust policy framework has fallen during the recession, which means that the social consensus cannot be treated as a given. Age plays a role. Climate is an important but not the single most important issue for the Europeans who are over 40 years old. It is a dominant question for the Europeans below 40 years of age. Voters' preferences have an impact on the political scene, most often leading to parties of the mainstream internalizing the climate agenda; less frequently to an increase in importance of "green" parties. Questions of fairness and equity are important in some national debates, for example in Australia, and less significant elsewhere.

Climate change has become an everyday issue. It is a factor in mortgage decisions. The first issue one deals with when buying a house in

many places in Europe, nowadays, is whether it is in an area at risk of flooding. Climate policy has a democratizing impact as well. The initiative and authority lies at different levels. Cities, regions and states want to be a part of it. San Francisco and Chicago want to learn from European cities and examine their experience in advancing sustainability.

We are talking about a systemic change. Climate stability is a point of departure for security and prosperity. It is a challenge which goes beyond the boundary between national and international political systems. US President Barack Obama defined the parameters of the task when he said that whoever leads low-emission tech-

nologies will be the leader of the future. The issue is about vital economic interests.

The global talks on climate policy are some of the most important negotiations currently taking place because they have consequences which reach very deeply into national economies. The stakes involved are enormous. It is a "2 degrees Celsius" project but one in which everyone suspects others of being freeloaders. The US wants to have certainty from China before it moves its climate legislation through the Senate. China is beginning to declare its intention to build a low-carbon econo-

my. It uses a different language than 2–3 three years ago, but it still does not get anywhere near the 2 degrees Celsius scenario.

The building of a low-emission economy is a project in which state interventionism is being revived. The market itself is not in a position to address the challenge. There are, at the outset, large capital costs of the investment. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) or tidal energy projects will not be financed on commercial basis for at least five years to come. The investors will wait for the results of government-funded projects. Building a low-carbon economy is about identifying competitive advantages and creating low carbon economic

zones on that basis.

The state needs to be watched very closely in this process because climate policy can be an excuse for excessive taxation. At least half of the income from the auction of allowances is to be devoted to activities undertaken to reach the objectives of climate policy, for example in the form of a technological fund, but from the technical point of view these are revenues of the government. The balance of power inside the government changes as a result. The five-year carbon budgets will give as much power to the UK's Department of Energy and Climate that the

Treasury enjoys. It would be the first time that such massive financial resources are spent outside the immediate control of the Treasury.

Climate policy makes sense only when it is a long-term policy. On the other hand, only short-term objectives have a real meaning. It is much easier to undertake an obligation when it comes to activities for which 2050 is the horizon, but then none of the current governments will be in power to give account.

Climate change is a relatively recent project for the European Union as well. Issues of the environment never played a role in European integration comparable to the biggest projects of its own enlargement and the single market, although the EU succeeded in the fight against acid rain with the key role of the large combustion plants directive. Energy policy also tended to have a traditionally national character, which has been reflected in the reservation to the Treaty of Lisbon according to which decisions on the energy mix remain in the hands of the member states.

Climate policy filled a void in the EU following the failure of the constitutional project and the completion of the process of enlargement. Not surprisingly the European Commission President Barroso met with Europe's spiritual leaders last year to discuss climate change. Climate policy has been for the Commission an important means to enhance its status and play an active international role. A number of member states are equally interested in pushing the climate agenda. Six EU foreign ministers in a letter on 12 Septem-

30 percent reduction as compared to 1990, which the Commission considers necessary from the point of view of limiting the temperature growth to below 2 degrees Celsius, corresponding to levels of the pre-industrial period. The point of the 20 percent reduction is still under discussion. It is meant to put pressure on the EU's economically advanced partners to follow in declarations on sizeable cuts in emissions. From a global perspective, the EU's ambitions make sense only when the rest of the world takes similar measures, which means de-carbonisation of the Chinese and Indian economies. The choice of 2020 as a point of reference assumes that the objectives are to be reached on the basis of existing technologies – particularly, energy from renewable sources and bio-fuels, rather than nuclear energy, tidal wave energy or CCS.

This project will be even more important now that the Copenhagen conference ended in a fiasco. The difference is that the outcome will be worked out in a fierce international competition. The results of Copenhagen show that international relations are unlikely to be driven by mutual persuasion, however well-intentioned. The essence of the envisaged deal was for the more ambitious declarations on emission reductions to fuel universal subscription to the global effort in a virtuous snow ball effect. This policy was based on an excessively optimistic assumption that everyone would have enough trust to believe that others will do at least their fair share of the overall effort. The freeloader position proved to be way too attractive for a number of the key stakeholders. It turned out once more that good intentions require sticks and carrots at the same time. It will be difficult to build a positive vision on that basis. At the same time it remains necessary. Anthony Giddens was right, recalling in his *Politics of Climate Change*, that Martin Luther King did not say: "I had a nightmare." He said "I had a dream." ◀

The market itself is not in a position to address the challenge

ber 2009 called the building of a low-emission economy "Europe's fundamental mission in the twenty first century."

The EU energy and climate package was of a political nature, and this was reflected in the adoption of the easily sellable 20-20-20 targets. In spite of its enormous consequences, the package was approved much more easily than the charged liberalization package where issues such as unbundling generated huge tensions among the largest member states. When it comes to emission reduction by 20 percent, it was always meant to be the first step to a

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