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What If Journalism Disappears?

Discussions on Democracy and the Media



Ivan Krastev
Authoritarian Paradox

Daniel Treisman
Russia's Soul Revisited

Yevgenia Albats
Politkovskaya's Legacy

Julian Stallabrass
Culture for Sale

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner with courtesy of The New York Times

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Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen
Institute for Human Sciences

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Editorial

Was wir über die Welt wissen, wissen wir durch die Medien. Ob 9/11, Klimawandel oder Finanzkrise – wir haben in Fernsehen und Radio davon gehört oder in Zeitungen und im Internet darüber gelesen. Aber die Medien informieren nicht nur, sie kontrollieren auch. Watergate und Wikileaks sind nur zwei Beispiele für die Funktion der Medien als „watchdog" der Mächtigen. Als „Vierte Gewalt" sind sie unverzichtbarer Bestandteil demokratischer Gesellschaften. Doch Medienmogule wie Rupert Murdoch oder Silvio Berlusconi und restriktive Mediengesetze, wie zuletzt in Ungarn, schränken die Pressefreiheit ebenso ein, wie sinkende Auflagen und eine zunehmende Boulevardisierung sie ökonomisch gefährden. Wie die Medien unsere Demokratien beeinflussen und wie umgekehrt Medien von politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen beeinflusst werden, darüber wurde im Herbst im Burgtheater und bei einer Konferenz des IWM in Wien gesprochen, nachzulesen ab Seite 4. Die gute Nachricht: Unabhängiger Journalismus wird nicht verschwinden. Die schlechte: Diese Unabhängigkeit ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich.

In der „gelenkten Demokratie" Putins war sie das freilich nie. Russland hält den 140sten Platz im aktuellen Pressefreiheitsindex von Reporter ohne Grenzen. In einer Rede im österreichischen Parlament am 6. Oktober erinnerte die Moskauer Journalistin Yevgenia Albats an ihre vier Jahre zuvor ermordete Kollegin Anna Politkowskaja. Über die Drohungen, Schikanen und Übergriffe, denen kritische russische Journalisten auch heute noch bei ihren Recherchen ausgesetzt sind, lesen Sie ab Seite 23.

Doch es ist nicht die Kontrolle der öffentlichen Meinung allein, die autoritäre Regime, wie jenes in Russland, überleben lässt. Wem es nicht passt, der kann ja gehen. Und genau das haben zwei Millionen Russen im letzten Jahrzehnt getan. Statt auf Reformen zu drängen, verlässt die gebildete Mittelschicht das Land und stärkt damit jenen Autoritarismus, den sie eigentlich ablehnt, schreibt Ivan Krastev auf Seite 18.

Sieht er das Glas der Demokratie in Russland halb leer, ist es für Daniel Treisman auf Seite 17 hingegen halb voll. Russland befinde sich nicht auf einem Weg zurück in quasi-sowjetische Zeiten, sondern immer noch in einem Transitionsprozess, an dessen Ende es eine ganz normale Demokratie mit Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit sein wird. Wann es soweit ist, werden wir vermutlich aus den Medien erfahren, und am besten von den russischen Journalisten selbst.

Sven Hartwig

What we know about the world we live in, we know through the media. 9/11, climate change or the financial breakdown—we watched it on TV, heard it on the radio or read about it in the newspapers and on websites. But the media is not merely a passive recorder of events, it is rather the public's eyes and ears. Watergate and Wikileaks are just two examples of the media's crucial role as a „watchdog" that monitors governments and exposes wrongdoings. The press as the „fourth estate" is therefore an essential part of democracy. However, press freedom has increasingly been exposed to pressure. On the political level by Berlusconian or Murdoch-style media moguls or—as recently in Hungary—by restrictive new media laws; on the economic level by steadily dropping circulations and a culture of freebie journalism. How the media influence our democracies and how they, in turn, are influenced by political and economic interests was at the center of a debate held at the Vienna Burgtheater and an international conference. You can find reports of what was discussed there on pages 4 onwards. The good news: independent journalism will not disappear. The bad news: its independence cannot be taken for granted anymore.

The latter held of course always true for Putin's so-called "sovereign democracy". Russia is at rank 140 in the "2010 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index". In a speech at the Austrian Parliament on October 6, the Russian journalist Yevgenia Albats commemorated her fellow reporter Anna Politkovskaya, who was assassinated four years ago. In her contribution on page 23, Albats describes the threats, harassments, and assaults that critical journalists are facing in Russia today.

But it is not only control of public opinion that helps authoritarian regimes to survive. The new authoritarianism offers an emergency exit: who doesn't like it here can simply leave—and that's exactly what two million Russians did in the last decade. But with the well-educated middle class leaving the country instead of pushing for reforms, it is strengthening the regime that it rejects, observes Ivan Krastev on page 18.

While for him the glass of democracy in Russia seems half empty, Daniel Treisman sees it half full (on page 17). He claims that Russia is not on its way back to Soviet times but in the middle of a transition process. In the end, it will be a normal democracy with freedom of press and of opinion. When this will finally come true we will presumably learn from the media, and hopefully from the Russian journalists themselves.

Sven Hartwig

In Search of Europe

BY CLEMENS WERGIN

In times of crisis, the quality of a relationship is on trial. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis this has also held true for the EU and its member states. At a discussion in Berlin Kurt Biedenkopf, Gianfranco Fini, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Monika Maron agreed that a shared notion is what the union now lacks for a common future. "Concord and Discord. Europe and Its Nations" on October 28 was the second in a series of European Debates organized by the IWM in the run-up to Poland's EU presidency.

From left: K. zu Guttenberg, G. Fini, A. Smolar, M. Maron, W. Cimoszewicz, K. Biedenkopf

Photo: Die Welt

As the tensely awaited EU summit in Brussels got off to a start, several well-known politicians and intellectuals met at the Axel Springer headquarters in Berlin to discuss the state of the continent. Organized by the Welt Group and the Institute for Human Sciences, the title of the discussion was "Concord and Discord. Europe and Its Nations". Indeed, there had been plenty of discord in the run-up to the summit.

Thomas Schmid, the publisher of *Die Welt,* saw in the EU conflict the harbingers of a new era. "The EU used to be a union based on peace and prosperity; it has now become a union based on austerity and cuts", he said in his introduction. This might not be pleasant, but necessary it certainly is.

Europe Needs Nation States

The conflict over the Euro stability pact was also a stand-off between the Berlin-Paris alliance and Brussels. Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, the German defense minister, didn't want to accept a contradiction between a central state and individual nation states. "Are not the nation state and Europe necessarily co-dependent? Is there really a contradiction here, or is it more a case of finding the right balance?"

Guttenberg recalled the fact that Europe's emergence was the result of the development of nations towards the end of the Middle Ages. This is what distinguished the late Middle Ages from Antiquity, when nations did not exist. "We will make progress in Europe only if national belonging remains the binding force," said Guttenberg. After all, so far neither a European people nor a European public sphere actually exists.

Begun thus, the debate then moved onto the question of whether the European project generates enough solidarity among citizens. Moderator Aleksander Smolar, from the Institute for Human Sciences, observed an identity crisis. However another problem, he said, is that Germany, formerly the altruistic motor for European unity, has become a normal country that, like any other, defends its national interests.

Europe Needs a Myth That Unites

The Italian Parliamentary President Gianfranco Fini also expressed his concerns over the issue of identity. "How many Europeans do you think have an answer to the simple question: what is the strong idea, the myth, the flag that one can lift from Lisbon to the Baltic states?" From the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to 1989, peace—the pledge "never again"—was the great myth and idea that brought Europe together.

From 1989 until recently, the myth was the reunited Europe. However today, said Fini, the question as to the Big Idea is harder to answer. Neither political structures nor a lack of rules or treaties can be blamed. Rather, what's missing is quite simply a political idea. Moreover, when it comes to the problems that worry citizens most, every country tries to go its own way.

These include, first of all, economic stagnation, together with unemployment and dropping standards of living. Second, all nations produce less wealth and possess fewer resources for maintaining the public sector; on top of this come problems with the integration of immigrants. Last, terrorism continues to be a threat to EU countries. For citizens, all these areas are of the utmost importance, yet for none of them does there exist a European policy. That needs to change.

Beware of a Uniform Europe

Former president of the state of Saxony, Kurt Biedenkopf, was of another opinion. "If we make Europe completely uniform, we will destroy it," he said. Europe is facing an identity crisis because, from the very beginning, the project has been based too strongly on economics alone. At its conception, the hope behind the united Europe was not only peace, but also "peace in freedom", he recalled. Throughout the debate, Biedenkopf emerged as a convinced advocate of small units best able to offer citizens opportunities for identification: "There are no alternatives to a united Europe, however there are many alternatives as to what should be done where."

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, member of the Polish Senate and former Polish prime minister, thought that Europe should look for new projects in order to overcome the crisis. For example, enlargement to the Balkans, because of the problems that still exist there. The development of a common foreign policy also needs to be brought forward.

Cimoszewicz's concerns focused especially on Europe's competitive advantage at a global level. This was not only a technical problem but also the result of a weak identity. "If we don't strengthen European identity, then we won't be able to stand as strong partners opposite other global powers."

For Citizens, European Politics Remains Faceless

It was left to the novelist Monica Maron to change the perspective and observe Europe from the point of view of the citizens. At the beginning, Thomas Schmid had asked whether the EU is "something one can experience". Maron thought not. "People are generally only aware of the EU when it comes to funding, seeing it either benevolently or with mistrust, depending on whether or not one belongs to the beneficiaries," she said. "Unlike national politics, European politics remains faceless."

Nor has the Greek situation exactly boosted confidence in the EU. A particularly grave example of the EU's disregard for the wishes and needs of citizens is the way Turkey's EU accession bid is being handled, according to Maron. "All western European countries have problems with large groups of immigrants from Islamic countries", says Maron. At the same time, Turkey's EU accession is talked about as if it were a *fait accompli,* "without any consideration of the will and the capacity of European nations for taking it on."

The fact that it's not even known exactly what the reasons are for the difficulties with this immigrant group means that Turkish entry would be a "human experiment of vast proportions, whose outcome can't be predicted, yet which could not be corrected." Picking up on this, Fini regretted that the EU had failed to make a reference to Europe's Christian-Jewish culture in the Lisbon Treaty. That, he said, would have helped to provide Europeans with a common identity. ◁

From: ***Die Welt,*** *October 29, 2010. Translated by Simon Garnett. For the article in German please refer to our website: www.iwm.at > Publications > IWMpost*

European Debates
Concord and Discord. Europe and Its Nations
Berlin, October 28

Welcome:
Thomas Schmid
Publisher of the Welt Group

Introduction:
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg
Defence Minister of Germany

Discussants:
Kurt Biedenkopf
Former Prime Minister of Saxony; Member of the Board of Patrons, IWM

Gianfranco Fini
President of the Chamber of Deputies in the Italian Parliament; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Italy

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz
Member of the Polish Senate; former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Poland

Monika Maron
German writer and Lessing Prize laureate in 2011

Chair:
Aleksander Smolar
Vice-President of the Board, IWM; President of the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

Patronage: Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Organization: IWM, Welt Group. Media partners: *Corriere della Sera, Der Standard, Gazeta Wyborcza, wyborcza.pl, biweekly.pl.* Cooperation partners: Polish National Audiovisual Institute. Sponsors: Energa, Orange, Telekomunikacja Polska

Platform Agnostics and Cathedral Builders

BY MICHAEL FREUND

From left: B. Keller, E. Mauro, N. Lemann, P. Starr, B. Hombach

There is no chance for democracy without free media. Yet this freedom has to be constantly defended against the culture of freebie journalism, political censorship and media monopolies. In the packed Vienna Burgtheater, Bodo Hombach, Bill Keller, Ezio Mauro, Paul Starr and Nicholas Lemann discussed the fragile relationship between "Democracy and the Media" at the third IWM European Debate on November 21.

Politicians might not be afraid of laws, but they certainly fear investigative journalism. This is precisely why the latter is essential, and why the collateral damage it causes matters less than its positive influence on democracy.

This statement of basic principle from Bodo Hombach, CEO of the Essen-based WAZ Media Group, opened a debate on "Democracy and the Media" on a Sunday morning at the Vienna Burgtheater. Organized by the Institute for Human Sciences and a number of European newspapers, the discussion was part of a three-day conference. On the inaugural evening event at the Federal Chancellery, *Der Standard* publisher Oscar Bronner and Thomas Schmid, publisher of the Welt Group, had given self-critical speeches about the role of the media in democratic society.

The debate at the Burgtheater concentrated on the print media, as could already be inferred by the people sitting on the podium. Ezio Mauro, Editor-in-Chief of *La Repubblica,* delivered a strong declaration of faith in print publications. They had survived the technological revolution of radio and television and today stand like cathedrals able to illuminate current events in a way the online flow of information cannot achieve.

The New York Times Editor-in-Chief Bill Keller adopted a more open attitude. He defined himself as a "platform agnostic": whatever channel consumers prefer, be it print, online or apps—this is of secondary importance to the task of managing a complex news-creating apparatus.

Against the Culture of the Freebie

Twenty years ago or so, things looked rosy for many media companies. Princeton sociologist Paul Starr provided a brief historical retrospective in order to give extra urgency to the question of how we intend to overcome the current crisis of journalism. Will American society move in the European direction and accept, if not government money, then at least the philanthropic model?

We're already there, Keller interjected: his paper's cooperation with the ProPublica Foundation had already brought in a Pulitzer Prize, after all. Moderator Nicholas Lemann, Dean of the School of Journalism at Columbia University, asked Keller—in front of a full house—when *The New York Times* would be introducing an online model ("just between us"). Not revealing any details, Keller announced that an online pay scheme would be ready in December.

Hombach also considered a crossover from "the culture of the freebie" to apps or similar models a sensible idea, both in economic and in journalistic terms. Mediocre content, according to the chief executive of the WAZ Media Group, whose subsidiaries include the Austrian newspapers Krone and Kurier, is too expensive to be free and too poor for quality.

But who will pay for quality? The fact that young people today only use online media is not the main problem, according to Starr. The danger is far more that particularly the less informed classes only click on sites of special interest to them and thus are lost as politically attentive citizens.

Alarming Monopoly

The fact that it's possible to feel informed through the echo chamber of one's own prejudices is something that also worries Keller. The shouting matches on cable TV, meaningful though they still might be in terms of viewer figures, do not bode well. This problem will of course also affect Europe, said Starr; "Schadenfreude" ("so as also to use a German word on this stage") is misplaced.

As far as declining standards are concerned, Mauro then became considerably more concrete. He read a long list of Berlusconi's damage limitation measures following the escort girls scandal, as well as his attacks against critical media. Amusing though it was, it was serious enough to be heard in Brussels.

For Hombach, the alarming media monopoly of the Italian Prime Minister is on a par with the influence of oligarchs on print and television in the new democracies: in both cases, media subservience is the aim. The European Council needs to keep an eye on both: "No chance for a liberal democracy without a free media."

That was something all podium members had no problem agreeing on. However, while Starr considered the death of independent journalism possible, Keller expressed his confidence in the responsibility of readers and viewers: "If the market demands quality, then that's what it will get." ◁

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European Debates
Democracy and the Media
Vienna, November 21

Bodo Hombach
CEO of the German WAZ Media Group, Essen

Bill Keller
Editor-in-Chief of *The New York Times*

Ezio Mauro
Editor-in-Chief of *La Repubblica*

Paul Starr
Professor of Sociology at Princeton University

Chair:
Nicholas Lemann
Dean of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, New York

Patronage: Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Organization: IWM. Media partners: *Corriere della Sera, Der Standard, Gazeta Wyborcza,* Welt Group, *wyborcza.pl, biweekly.pl.* Cooperation partners: Burgtheater, Erste Foundation, Polish National Audiovisual Institute. Sponsors: Energa, Orange, Telekomunikacja Polska

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

Bad News for the News

BY PAUL STARR

The good news is: the digital revolution has revitalized journalism. The bad news: nobody wants to pay for it. With the Internet undermining the economic basis of professional reporting, the freedom of the press in Western democracies is at stake, warns American sociologist Paul Starr in his statement at the Burgtheater.

Paul Starr

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

The digital revolution, as great as its wonders are, is a mixed blessing for democracy. It has unquestionably been good for freedom of expression—for the free expression, that is, of opinion. It has also been good for freedom of information—that is, for making previously secret or inaccessible information more widely available. But it has not been uniformly good for freedom of the press, if we understand that freedom as referring not merely to the formal legal rights but to the real independence of the press as an institution.

The digital revolution has been good for freedom of expression because it has increased the diversity of voices in the public sphere. It has been good for freedom of information because it has fostered a culture that demands transparency. But the digital revolution has both revitalized and weakened freedom of the press. It has revitalized journalism by allowing new entrants into the media and generated promising innovations, and in countries where the press has been stifled, that effect is the most important.

But in the established democracies, the digital revolution has weakened the ability of the press to act as an effective agent of public accountability by undermining the economic basis of professional reporting and fragmenting the public. If we take seriously the idea that an independent press serves an essential democratic function, its institutional distress may weaken democracy itself.

That is the danger that confronts us in the advanced societies: throughout the post-industrial world, the news media face a long-term crisis that social theory did not anticipate.

Beginning in the 1970s, theories of post-industrial society projected a flourishing and happy future for the fields associated with the production of knowledge and information. The most influential theories of contemporary political development also did not anticipate a crisis in the news media that would pose a problem for democracy. As the 20th century came to a close, the collapse of communism gave rise to increased confidence—even triumphalism—about the future of liberal democracy and its institutions. The new media initially seemed to reinforce that confidence. As the digital revolution developed, its theorists argued that it inevitably creates a more open, networked public sphere, thereby strengthening democratic values and practices.

In short, all of these perspectives have suggested that in the post-industrial world, a free press and democracy would thrive together.

Social theorists were not alone in their optimism. The professionals and executives in the news media were also confident about the prospects for growth in their industry.

Through the last decades of the 20th century, the economic trends supported these expectations. Like the other knowledge-producing professions, journalism expanded, and the news media prospered. With personal computers and the Internet, the costs of producing and distributing media of all kinds diminished, and previously marginalized groups and individuals could bypass the old mass-media gatekeepers in reaching a wider public.

In the US, the number of journalists has fallen from 56,000 to 40,000

But in recent years, the contemporary transformation has taken a darker turn for journalism and for democratic government more generally. Several long-term trends have combined to weaken the finances of the news media and to reduce professional employment in journalism. A recent OECD study reports that over the decade ending in 2007, the number of newspaper journalists declined 53 percent in Norway, 41 in the Netherlands, 25 in Germany, and 11 percent in Sweden, while holding steady in France and Britain. In the US, the number of journalists has fallen from 56,000 to 40,000.

Everywhere, the media are under severe financial stress. The data on revenue for newspapers, magazines, and other news media in the rich democracies typically show a pattern of growth through the last three decades of the 20th century, a peak around the year 2000, and then a decline in the past decade.

The expectation that the news media would flourish in post-industrial society failed to take into account certain economic realities, social trends already in progress, and emerging technologies. The prevailing optimism ignored the reality that information, including news, is a public good and that public goods tend to be systematically under-produced in the market.

The prevailing optimism failed to consider that the news media had been able to overcome the public-goods problem, with varying degrees of success, only because existing communication technologies had limited the ways for the public to find information and entertainment and for advertisers to reach consumers. And even though it should have been clear that new technologies would expand the choices for both advertisers and the public, hardly anyone anticipated that in this new environment, the public would fragment, the audience for public-affairs news would shrink, advertisers would be able to reach their markets without sponsoring news, and the traditional commercial basis for financing journalism would be shattered.

The changes in the public and the demand for news are showing up in generational differences. Older generations that formed their habits decades ago continue to read print newspapers and watch television news at an appointed hour, but young people are not forming those habits in the first place. As a result, the traditional media find themselves living off aging audiences, even as they continue to supply most of the original reporting.

These developments are not playing out exactly the same way everywhere. With its primarily commercial media and very high level of generational change, the US may be more exposed to a crisis in the news media than are European countries with strong public-service broadcasting institutions and slower rates of generational change in media use. After a period when the media in Europe were moving closer to an American model, the media in America may be moving in a more European direction—not with government subsidies, but with more philanthropic support. American journalism is also becoming more partisan, more polarized, and more distrusted.

It is all very humbling for the American news media, which have not exactly been modest about their achievements. Their current troubles may cause a certain *Schadenfreude* here in Europe, where at least in Austria and some other countries things may appear more stable. But to use a phrase from a famous Austrian-American economist, Joseph Schumpeter, the gales of creative destruction are blowing, they are likely to sweep everywhere, and how much creation and how much destruction there will be remains to be seen. What may be good for the news media as businesses may not always be good for democracy; in fact, what may be good for the business of news may not always be good for journalism. Democracy may need to find new ways both to support journalism and to guarantee its independence. ◁

This article is extracted from a longer essay, "An Unexpected Crisis: The News Media in Post-Industrial Democracies", which will appear in a forthcoming volume on ***Media, Politics and the Public*** *by the Axess Programme on Journalism and Democracy.*

Paul Starr is Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University and Co-Editor of *The American Prospect.* His most popular book is *The Creation of the Media.*

Journalism That Matters

BY BODO HOMBACH

The medium is not the message. Whether the media carve their news in stone, cast them in lead type or display them in pixels on the screen, is beside the point. The point is the content and its readability and usability in people's lives. Bodo Hombach, on stage at the Burgtheater, is not afraid of the Internet but of bad journalism.

Bodo Hombach

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

In a democracy, journalism has the task of guaranteeing a plurality of information and opinions, of portraying the reality of life in all its complexity, of promoting fundamental democratic values and of facilitating an exchange of views, with the aim of making compromise and consensus—two of the attributes of civil society—visible and understandable.

In modern society, freedom and freedom of the press are synonymous. It is not possible to conceive of an open, free civil society without an independent press. Freedom is like the air we breathe. As long as there is enough of it, we do not think about it. We recognize its value only when it suddenly disappears.

In a democracy, a free press is not a show put on for the benefit of society; rather it is an intrinsic part of democratic society.

Freedoms that no one exercises, quietly disappear. They evaporate from the paper on which they are written. The writing fades until it is no longer legible. A responsible press prevents this from happening by making use of these freedoms every day. It keeps society awake and "in practice".

David Hume knew this when he wrote about us back in the middle of the 18th century: "The spirit of the people must frequently be rouzed, in order to curb the ambition of the court; nothing so effectual to this purpose as the liberty of the press, by which all the learning, wit, and genius of the nation may be employed on the side of freedom, and every one be animated to its defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can maintain itself against the monarchical, it will naturally be careful to keep the press open, as of importance to its own preservation."

Politicians and parties only submit to elections every four years. The press submits to the criticism and decision of its readers every day.

In the power struggle of political and economic forces, social freedoms are restricted in an alarming manner. This is why we need a press that does not primarily represent its own interests, but can act as an advocate for the common good.

It is said that the litmus test for the humanity of a society is how it deals with the weak and with marginal groups. Similarly, we can judge the quality of a newspaper, or a radio or television station, by whether it gives a voice to the silent, emboldens the weak and discovers ideas that may not become important until decades later.

Democracy thrives on a plethora of alternatives. Free thinking and free expression produce this abundance, and people can form majorities and decide. If it turns out to be the wrong choice, there are others on the table. You do not have to put all your eggs in one basket. The motto of a democratic society is not "either … or", but "both … and". Democracy is not a form of government that takes majority decisions on anything and everything. It lets as many viable alternatives as possible exist side by side. The media can accompany and support this process of unfolding possibilities.

Modern dictatorships no longer use rallies, systems of informers and torture chambers. They hang sweet fly traps in the countryside and sit back and wait. Mass society does not harm its freedom through attacks—it takes a friendly approach.

The media are a channel for social processes, whilst at the same time being a part of and a portrayal of society. The messenger is also the message. This ambivalence gives rise to influence and responsibility.

Media and politics are dependent on one another. They act in the same play in front of the same audience but in different roles. If they are too much in agreement, the plot weakens.

I expect the media to inform, educate and entertain—in that order. The media should make it possible for me to participate in public life. So there are two main things they need to give me: a realistic panoramic view of the world I live in, and guidance through educated choice and competent analysis. One is the broad view, the other in-depth. One increases the complexity of what I perceive, the other should reduce it meaningfully, without producing dreadful simplifications. I do not want a dizzying spin through space; I want a rational orbit.

Of course, even the press is capable of misusing its power. It can deliberately distort the picture of reality. It can say what those in power want to hear, or remain silent on issues they do not want mentioned. In the battle for audience ratings, circulation figures and click rates, there is a great temptation to cater only for the taste of the majority.

There is more to the press than noble aims and idealized examples. In most cases, it is not attempting to edify or educate, but to inform people of the latest events. It is not allowed to sell itself, but must sell, so is forced to stimulate the interest of its readers and satisfy their curiosity.

It is often no longer the factual argument that counts, but simply whether a political figure "comes across" on television. Politics is becoming an event, at which the stage lighting and scenery must be right above all else. What is important in the long term is seldom entertaining. Politics is always part performance. But when politics becomes just second-rate entertainment, it loses its seriousness. Eventually, people will be fooled into thinking that all politics is frivolous and without consequence. Any politician who is prepared to sacrifice meaning for popularity, does so at the expense of politics as a whole.

We can judge the quality of a newspaper, or a radio or television station, by whether it gives a voice to the silent and emboldens the weak

We have no shortage of diversion and distraction. What we do have is an increasing lack of inner cohesion, public spirit and solidarity.

Recognizing and accepting the value of freedom of the press also means resisting the increasing loss of shame, respect, dignity and privacy. Instead of aiding and abetting these trends, the media should exert voluntary self-control by stepping on the brakes and reining in their own muck-rakers. A democratic state disintegrates not only as a result of its opponents' desire for power, but also by slowly relinquishing its perception of mankind.

No shape, no anchor, no respect. Hypothesis: the increasing interconnectedness of events in the world demands "civility". The public in any form is an arena and driving force for civilization. However, there is as yet no evidence of this. Instead, in the Internet we are observing a trend towards uncouthness, and hardly anyone seems to mind, or at least no one has the courage to protest against it. Is this cultural decline as entertainment?

We are observing a narrowing in the range of topics discussed. There is less diversification; more reduction and escalation. Quality is being lost through gossip and shallow entertainment. Politicians often respond with calculated stage management. They speak in empty formulae and clichés. Behind every politician lurks the shadow of his press adviser. If he is not careful, he will end up a star or starlet of the entertainment industry.

However, this is not a law of nature. I believe quite simply with childlike defiance that people will not be fobbed off forever with increasingly bad media offerings. They want to be taken seriously. They do not want to be led by the nose to the nearest shop counter. We already have a switch-off rate as well as viewing figures, and the first one is growing. More and more people are discovering the value of their limited time on this earth and do not want to waste it on second-rate entertainment and pink candyfloss.

We have recently seen how a small, parasitic class within the international banking industry was able to bring the global economy to the brink of disaster. The shock of this realisation will, hopefully,

have a lasting effect. In fact, people no longer believe that "Daddy will make it all right", as Helmut Qualtinger's lyrics have it. As a notorious optimist, I detect a trend from passive weariness towards a new grass-roots mobility. The Stuttgart 21 rail project, the new nuclear debate, the public pressure that forced a close-run presidential election in Germany, and the pent-up integration debate are—trouble-makers aside—signs of life for grass-roots democracy. I see great opportunities here for the press to hone its tools, practise its moves and prove its indispensability.

We live in a globally connected information society. Communication is not just a key technology and important economic factor, it is also a central cultural technology, without which we cannot continue to live together as we do now or to deal with the future. The great socio-political tasks that await us—sustainable use of resources, security, participation and generational equality—can only be solved through joint efforts. Only a thoroughly informed society capable of dialogue will find a consensus.

The subject expertise of politics calls for the right handling and communication.

High circulation figures and audience ratings are no argument against journalistic and editorial quality. Just as electoral victory is no evidence of populism. In both cases, the crucial criterion is customer focus. We have to keep asking ourselves: is this about problem solving or cheap propaganda?

The huge expansion and diversification of the media sector is making it more and more difficult to reach a mass audience. Media democracy therefore also means competing for public attention. To succeed in this world, you have to understand the game rules of the media system and know how to use them to your own advantage. This includes being able to deal with changes in people's media consumption habits.

It is astounding how clumsily governments deal with important topics in public. Even though we are now surrounded by media experts who do not let a word go through unchecked, people react in totally unexpected ways. Politicians dig themselves into avoidable holes with their eyes wide open. Often, it is not even the white papers or large-scale projects that generate widespread resentment and protests, but the lack of transparency in the run-up to decisions being taken.

There is a natural tension in the fact that, in a democratic state, political decisions have to negotiate their way along a long and complicated path through parliamentary and party committees. Meanwhile, the media are outside champing at the bit. They want quick results because they work according to different rhythms. It is becoming increasingly difficult to portray the great arc of political decisions in media reports. This entices the media into looking for superficial conflicts. Sometimes they launch campaigns and then report on their own topics, becoming both prosecutor and judge.

We should remember once in a while that one of the secrets behind democracy's success is its inertia and unglamorous ordinariness. Those who find this too boring should pick one of the dictatorships of this world. There are enough of them. They could find life suddenly becomes very exciting.

As American landing troops approached the Somali coast under cover of darkness, they were suddenly lit up by floodlights. CNN was already there and wanted to report live. Broadcasting technology like cable and satellite are shrinking the distance between an event and its media coverage to practically zero. We need to rediscover slowness and patience. In the Gulf War, an on-board camera accompanied a cruise missile to its target. What we need is a little slack between the event and our awareness of it—a space in which an experienced journalist can use his perspective and character to help put the event in its proper context.

If you want a free civil society, you have to organise it as a society of dialogue. A society of dialogue needs a tight, highly transparent flow of information involving all the powers and groups interested in the common good. This is a wonderful *raison d'être* for media that want to retain their freedom through responsibility.

We media professionals usually see journalism from a purely media-specific point of view. But in practice things are very different. The target audience for our work is also a reader, listener, viewer or user. He exists, so to speak, within the media network. He reads the newspaper, watches television, goes to the cinema or buys books, and maybe even reads them. But despite all this, he is still an indivisible person. When reading, he does not forget what he heard ten minutes ago, and when listening, he remembers what he saw yesterday.

The publishers have learnt this now. "Diversify or die!" is the invisible motto written above their offices. You can now get newspapers, films, books, CDs and online content from one media organisation. Cross-media capability is becoming a key attribute for media producers.

Broad surveys reveal astounding findings. Hot topics like employment, the climate and finance, which dominate our headlines, rank much lower in the charts. People's main concern, for instance, is the erosion of solidarity in society and the decline in manners.

This also weakens democracy's resilience. Anyone who has to sit on slashed seats on the train every day, who looks through scratched windows at house walls plastered in graffiti, whilst reading every day in the newspaper that corruption, tax evasion and greed are becoming widespread among the elites, and who finally observes that politicians and parties are just pulling the rug out from under each other instead of tackling the problems, needs to have an unshakeable democratic character.

I am an optimist, in other words a pessimist with experience of life. Our role is not to decide on the course of technological development. That will be decided between the inventors and the users. Whether we carve our messages in stone, beat them out on hollow tree trunks, paint them in miniature on sheepskin, cast them in lead type or display them in pixels on the screen, is beside the point. The point is the content and its readability and usability in people's lives. They are a fairly motley crew, have an insatiable hunger, good teeth and a strong stomach. They pursue their vital interests honestly and ruthlessly. They have always baffled sensitive cultural critics.

In a world in which the powerful can no longer protect themselves by being better informed than their subordinates, hierarchies are becoming flatter and flatter. Over time they will gradually disappear as a power construct and transform into a multipolar system of talents and functions. In future, leadership positions and claims will only be able to justify themselves by offering a more convincing meaning to life. In all spheres of politics, science, economics and culture, the issue is no longer to bring people into submission, but to motivate them by giving them a meaningful answer to fundamental questions concerning the meaning of life. The society of the future will no longer see its citizens as a security risk to the powerful, but as its most valuable potential. Power is based on persuasion.

Ten commandments for media professionals and politicians:
1. Do not consume more happiness than you produce!
2. Freedom of opinion is not only a blessing, but also an imposition. (Enzensberger)
3. Believe in those who seek the truth. And doubt everyone who has found it. (Tucholsky)
4. Protect human rights and rights of freedom wherever they are in danger.
5. May he who is attacked by all find peace with you. (Lessing)
6. There are two sides to everything, and usually a third as well.
7. The opposite of the truth is not entirely wrong either.
8. A metaphor that appears apt to you may be completely worthless.
9. Human cleverness is a trap that truth does not fall into.
10. Love, and do what you will. (Augustine) ◁


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
Ezio Mauro


Nicholas Lemann

In the battle for audience ratings, circulation figures and click rates, there is a great temptation to cater only for the taste of the majority

Photos: Philipp Steinkellner

Bodo Hombach is CEO of the WAZ Media Group, Germany's third largest newspaper and magazine publisher. Prior to that Hombach served as the EU Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe in Brussels.

Troubles in the Newsroom

BY IRINA NEDEVA

Do we have to say goodbye to democracy's watchdog? The media is definitely going through a difficult patch. Newspapers lose their readers, journalists lose their jobs, and the press loses its freedom to populist governments and media moguls. At the IWM conference "Social Solidarity, Democracy and the Media" (November 19–20) at Vienna's Museum of Young Art scholars and editors reported the latest news on the news.

Once a happily married couple, media and democracy have nowadays begun to face troubles. Not only do young people tend to prefer the Internet over printed newspapers, the circulation of which is dropping steadily, the media itself is no longer the same. Democracy is changing, too. As with a couple in crisis, the question of who to blame will not promote understanding of what is going on.

So what is going on? The traditional role of the media was and is seriously threatened by the financial crisis as well as the transformation brought forth by technological change—most notably, the ease of access to news and information provided by the Internet. The production and consumption of news has thus changed dramatically.

No one doubts that journalism played an important role in the founding and functioning of democracy by helping citizens to make informed choices and decisions. The question posed during the conference was: how will the changed media landscape affect democracy? And, conversely: what is the impact of the current state of democracy on the media?

Digital Revolution

Internet means speed and ease in gathering information from both the consumer's and producer's point of view. One of the sessions of the conference surveyed the transformations caused by technology. Victoria De Grazia remarked that the digital revolution can be compared to the introduction of modern printing in the 15th century. Then, as now, the main question is: "how do the massive shifts in collecting and conveying information affect how we come to know what we know and how we evaluate what we think we know?"

Cyberspace changes the daily routine of journalists. Nevertheless a survey conducted by Marcel Machill shows that non-computer-aided research in journalism has not been displaced by the Internet. Even more so, the telephone continues to be the most important research tool for reporters. For Machill, "a bigger concern for the state of the media is the fact that the Internet increases the self-referentiality of the media in the acquisition of new information."

The Internet also changes the role of the producer and the consumer of news in so far as it allows everyone to be a medium. Readers and citizens may contribute by sending photos, comments, and stories. Although this may have positive effects for democratization, the quality of these media could suffer.

Making or Losing Money

The effects of the media's economic crisis were also discussed in depth. According to Leonard Downie, interaction with the public is increasing on the Internet and the effect should not be underestimated, but: "who is ready to pay for the information—the public, businesses, governments?" And, relatedly, how much revenue for content on the websites of the newspapers will make a difference?

Reduction in the size of the US newsrooms has been drastic. Currently, they are two to three times smaller than in the 1970s. As a result, journalists are facing increasing fears of losing their jobs, which makes them not only anxious but also reluctant to risk reporting the "bad and uncomfortable news". This could be a real threat to non-biased, independent, "watchdog"-type information, which is essential in a democracy. The mix of public and private, profit and non-profit institutions, which is backing investigative reporting, is already visible on the US scene and may be viewed as a resource for supporting news coverage. But it is not easy to predict to what extent the public is ready to pay for quality information.

American vs. European Concerns

The press has been a special actor in US democracy, but is this still the case with newspaper revenues, which are constantly decreasing?

According to Nicholas Lemann the reduction in staff in the newsroom already affects the quality of investigative journalism and leads to a fragmentation of the media and its audience. Furthermore, as Kenneth Prewitt argued, the professionalism of journalistic education could also be affected as new generations of news producers will not need any special education.


Sheila S. Coronel


Michael Naumann

Photos: IWM

Even if it were true that "it is no easier to take the coverage of news for granted", for Piet Bakker, there is still no need to despair since newspapers are still significant—at least for Northern Europe as the polls show. European concerns are different from those in the US. The European worries concerning the state of the media focus more on the effects of power concentration, populism and censorship by governments.

The Shadow of the Government

If we bring the Italian case into focus, we can clearly see that newspapers are in danger not only for financial and technological reasons but also due to the concentration of the ownership of broadcasting in the hands of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. The result is either tabloid journalism or sensationalist broadcasting, which begins to alter the overall perspective of the news. Independent newspapers face severe problems in Italy. Therefore, the fusion of political and business interests and its effects on the media must be seriously monitored.

Italy is certainly an extreme case but it is not just an isolated example. Bodo Hombach, who took part in the public debate at the Burgtheater, recalled the experience of the German WAZ Media Group in South-Eastern Europe, where another problem arose in connection with the question of power: the oligarchs in some parts of the region had made their money in other business segments but held onto the media in order to reinforce their personal political and economic goals.

Post-Democracy and the Voiceless

In the pluralized societies of the West, the differentiation of life worlds and the separation of citizens is increasing, a trend which is accelerated by the new digital media landscape. More and more readers, listeners, and viewers turn their back to the public sphere. Consequently, they rarely meet with counterarguments and real opposing views. Especially in the free space of the Internet, users meet only those who are like them.

If those are citizens that share the post-democratic feeling of mass distrust, disillusionment and political alienation, the Internet adds to a serious transformation of democracy: the shift—as Ivan Krastev has put it—from a democracy of trust to a democracy of the management of distrust.

While these post-democratic attitudes were carefully considered, there was also some optimism about the media's ability to provide a voice to the voiceless, to the people whose concerns are often ignored.

For the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, new technology means the liberation of news and information, said Sheila Coronel. The Internet creates opportunities to smuggle information to and from people who live in dictatorships. While in Western democracies the quality of reporting often suffers due to the Internet, the web has a revolutionary impact for people who live in autocracies.

The interactive and participatory effects of the web may have a strong impact on political realities even in Europe, provided that there is a critical mass of citizens willing to change the system, as was shown in the Romanian examples given by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. One could call a rally in Bucharest while sitting in Berlin provided there are enough people who realize that their interests are at stake. As new communities are no longer founded on a geographical bases, solidarity experiences new dimensions.

Finally, the idea remains that the media, as the "fourth estate", makes governments accountable by revealing their dirty secrets, thus assisting the public in making better informed choices.

Significantly, the conference was held just prior to the arrest of Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, and shortly before the adoption of the controversial media law in Hungary. However, the trends had been there for a long time. It is certain that the hard times for the once happy marriage of democracy and the media cannot be understood by merely blaming a newborn child called the Internet. ◁

Participants **Piet Bakker,** Professor in Mass Media and Digitalisation, Hogeschool Utrecht +++ **Charlie Beckett,** Director, Polis, LSE +++ **Oscar Bronner,** Publisher, *Der Standard,* Vienna +++ **Sheila S. Coronel,** Professor of Professional Practice in Investigative Journalism, Columbia University +++ **Leonard Downie,** Vice President-at-Large, *The Washington Post* +++ **Michael Fleischhacker,** Editor-in-Chief, *Die Presse,* Vienna +++ **Carl Henrik Fredriksson,** Editor-in-Chief, *Eurozine,* Vienna +++ **Victoria De Grazia,** Director, The European Institute, Columbia University +++ **Alfred Gusenbauer,** former Chancellor of Austria +++ **Ira Katznelson,** Professor of Political Sciences and History, Columbia University +++ **Ivan Krastev,** IWM Permanent Fellow +++ **Nicholas Lemann,** Dean, The School of Journalism, Columbia University +++ **Agnieszka Liszka,** Spokeswoman, McKinsey & Company, Warsaw +++ **Marcel Machill,** Professor of Journalism, University of Leipzig +++ **Paolo Mancini,** Professor for Political Science and Media, University of Perugia +++ **Dunja Mijatovic,** Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE, Vienna +++ **Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,** Professor of Democracy and Governance Studies, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin +++ **Michael Naumann,** Editor-in-Chief, *Cicero,* Berlin +++ **Katherine S. Newman,** Dean, Zanvyl Krieger School of the Arts and Sciences, Johns Hopkins University +++ **Ton Nijhuis,** Scientific Director, Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam +++ **Claus Offe,** Professor of Political Sociology, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin +++ **Gerard Pfann,** Professor in Econometrics of Markets and Organizations, Maastricht University +++ **Kenneth Prewitt,** Vice President, Global Centers, Columbia University +++ **Thomas Schmid,** Publisher, Welt Group, Berlin +++ **Klaus Schönbach,** Professor of Communication Studies, Vienna University +++ **Michael Schudson,** Professor of Communications, Columbia University +++ **Gerfried Sperl,** former Editor-in-Chief, *Der Standard,* Vienna +++ **Paul Starr,** Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, Princeton University +++ **Piotr Stasinski,** Deputy Editor, *Gazeta Wyborcza,* Warsaw +++ **Theodore Zahov,** Chairman, Economedia, Sofia +++ **Jan Zielonka,** Professor of European Politics, University of Oxford +++ The conference was generously supported by the Austrian Ministry for Science and Research, the Austrian Ministry for Economy, Family, and Youth, Duitsland Instituut, and Erste Foundation

The Watchdog Barks Online

BY SHEILA S. CORONEL

American and European newspapers are in crisis as their readers and advertisers migrate to the Internet. Elsewhere, however, technology has had a liberating effect and enabled journalism to uncover corruption, criminality and injustice. Media expert Sheila S. Coronel on the promises—and perils—of the booming online journalism.

In the United States and many parts of Europe, there is much doom and gloom about the future of journalism. This is due in large part to new technologies that have transformed the way news is produced and consumed, in the process upending the revenue streams that have supported quality reporting. The upheaval has been most painful in the US: after decades of robust profits, American newspapers are in crisis as their readers and advertisers migrate to the Internet. Since the Watergate scandal in the 1970s, US newspapers have been the bearers of the torch of investigative reporting. With papers now in their death throes, there is a lot of anxiety: will the journalism that holds powerful institutions and individuals accountable survive the digital age?


Leonard Downie


Thomas Schmid

Elsewhere, however, technology has had a liberating effect and enabled the journalism that exposes wrongdoing in high places. In countries that are still muzzled by authoritarian rule or that have made the uneasy transition from dictatorship to democracy, technology has allowed journalists and citizens to access more information than they ever had in the past. New tools like blogging software, Twitter, Google Earth and You Tube have provided avenues for hard-hitting accountability journalism, which is seldom seen in the newspapers and broadcast networks subject to state or corporate control. But real challenges remain, including the safety of journalists and the financial sustainability of watchdog reporting.

From Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe, from post-Soviet Russia to post-Mao China, a new breed of independent watchdog reporters are using blogs, mobile phones and social media to expose corruption and criminality in the commanding heights of power. In these countries, online journalists are uncovering the follies of the mighty with a freedom and zeal not usually seen in the mainstream press.

Some examples: In China, journalists and citizens have gone online to publish news that would otherwise be censored, like melamine-tainted milk that made hundreds of thousands of babies ill in 2008 or shoddy schoolbuildings that collapsed in an earthquake, killing thousands of students.

In Russia, blogger Alexander Malyutin trolled government documents posted online; last spring, he wrote about a tender for an $ 800,000-golden bed on the interior ministry's website.

The Tunisian blogger Astrubal used amateur plane-spotting websites to trace the flights taken by the presidential plane. Tunisians knew that their president had an aversion to flying. It was the First Lady who used the aircraft to fly to the shopping capitals of Europe.

In Bahrain, a blogger tracked the expansion of the royal family's property using Google Earth. Dissident Burmese journalists also used satellite images freely available online to map the extravagant homes of officials of the Burmese junta. They posted the images on You Tube, from where they were downloaded, copied on disks and smuggled into Burma, where Internet access is very limited.

In Mexico, the anonymous blogdenarco is documenting the predations of drug cartels—something which mainstream reporters do only at their own peril. More than 30 Mexican reporters have been murdered by drug gangs in the last four years. So far, blogdenarco's anonymity has protected its publisher from being gunned down.

In many other ways, technology has been a boon to investigative journalists worldwide. Thanks to the explosion of information on the Internet, reporters have been able to mine massive amounts of data that have been released by governments and international organizations like the World Bank. They have used data analysis and visualization software to help readers make sense of large amounts of information. The Internet has also made it possible for a reporter following the corruption trail in say, Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, or Bulawayo in Zimbabwe to go online and search corporate records in Switzerland, Singapore or the Cayman Islands.

Technology has likewise made it cheaper, easier and safer for reporters to collaborate across borders, using tools like Skype and Document Cloud (which enables them to share and work on documents online), as well as project management and encryption software. It has also made it possible to mobilize audiences for reporting, as the *Guardian* in the UK did when it asked readers to help its staff sort 200,000 pages of documents showing the expenses MPs charged to taxpayers.

Then there is Wikileaks, whose use of anonymizing software has allowed whistleblowers to make public documents that would otherwise have been kept utterly secret. Celebrated by some, condemned by others, Wikileaks shows both the promise and the perils of new technologies.

For better or for worse, the Internet is a loosely regulated space. In a networked information age, the tools for gathering, processing and disseminating information have been democratized, wielded not just by professional journalists but also by citizens and activists driven by various agenda. Wikileaks provides a glimpse of the kind of things that will flourish in the relative anarchy of the Internet—entities for which a category or name has yet to be invented.

In a networked information age, the tools for gathering, processing and disseminating information have been democratized

For sure, governments have tried to censor Internet content, although savvy "netizens" have used tools like proxy servers to overcome restraints. Watchdog reporting is constantly evolving and taking on new, unorthodox forms. In China, journalists are resorting to microblogs, posting sentence fragments, photos or videos online, often through mobile phones, in order to break controversial stories and evade censorship. In the US, investigative reporters are developing mobile apps and sophisticated data sites that allow users to access not just stories in narrative form but also as structured data.

The reality is that the Internet provides a home to both crusading journalists and raving extremists. Advantage or disadvantage, the Internet has no editor. Vested interests—including government and corporations—have a strong online presence and use the Internet for propaganda and spin. Pseudo-watchdog sites sponsored by commercial or state interests have also been set up. And the truth is that a lot of public-interest reporting is drowned out in the cacophony of voices that fill the Net.

No doubt, digital technologies have empowered groups and individuals and allowed them to defy restrictions normally imposed on the press. But they are also left vulnerable to legal harassment and physical harm. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 69 bloggers, Web-based reporters and online editors were in prison by the end of 2010, accounting for half of all journalists in jail worldwide.

The numbers of imprisoned Internet journalists has been rising in the last decade, according to the Committee. Web journalists are also particularly susceptible to "libel tourism," that is, to being sued in overseas jurisdictions where laws are more onerous, on the ground that what is published locally has a global audience online. Because they operate mostly as individuals or as part of small Web-based entities, they cannot rely on the legal and other support infrastructure available to those on the staff of large news organizations.

It is true that many Web journalists have avid followers who can be mobilized in the face of harassment and attack. In November, Russian journalist Oleg Kashin was brutally beaten up by two men as he was leaving a dinner party. Unlike other attacks on Russian journalists, the assault generated loud protests as Kashin was also a popular blogger with a loyal following. Yet as Kashin's and other examples show, a blogger's popularity does not deter attacks or harassment suits. The expectation is that violence and lawsuits against online journalists will increase as their reach and influence expand.

In authoritarian regimes and dysfunctional democracies, therefore, ensuring a future for watchdog journalism means protecting independent journalists so they will stay alive or out of jail. But almost everywhere, even in places where journalists are safe, the long-term viability of accountability journalism remains in doubt. So far, there is no revenue model that can sustain expensive, time-consuming and research-intensive watchdog reporting on the Internet. The experiments currently being undertaken—a mix of funding from foundations, public institutions, citizen contributions as well as advertising and subscriptions—remain uncertain.

Despite all these, the urge to uncover wrongdoing remains strong. Wherever power is abused, the compulsion to expose the harm that has been done can seldom be totally suppressed. Technology enables exposure, but it does not diminish the legal, physical and financial risks for those who dare speak truth to power. ◁

Sheila S. Coronel is Professor of Professional Practice in Investigative Journalism and Director of the Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism.

Is Big Brother Watching Us?

VON BIRGIT BAUMANN

Julian Assange oder George Orwell? Über die Bedrohung der Bürgerrechte in Zeiten von Wikileaks und Vorratsdatenspeicherung diskutierten am 5. Dezember Joachim Gauck, Otto Schily, Hans-Christian Ströbele und Rolf Tophoven in der Reihe „Europa im Diskurs". Wie weit staatliche Überwachung und journalistische Enthüllung gehen dürfen, blieb auch bei der Debatte im Wiener Burgtheater umstritten.

Von links: R. Tophoven, J. Gauck, A. Föderl-Schmid, H.-C. Ströbele, O. Schily

Photo: IWM

Joachim Gauck ist ein besonnener Mann. Am Sonntagvormittag, im Wiener Burgtheater, jedoch entfährt dem DDR-Bürgerrechtler und ehemaligen rot-grünen deutschen Präsidentschaftskandidaten bald ein empörtes „Das ist unerhört!" Der so gescholtene Hans-Christian Ströbele, „linker" deutscher Grüner der ersten Stunde, nimmt es gelassen. Er muss sich im Laufe der Debatte noch Härteres anhören.

Es ist ein heikles Thema, das das hochkarätige Panel unter Leitung von *Standard*-Chefredakteurin Alexandra Föderl-Schmid im Rahmen der Reihe „Europa im Diskurs" diskutiert: „Bedrohte Freiheit? Überwachung und Terrorangst im Rechtsstaat." Oder anders gefragt: Dürfen Bürgerrechte zugunsten der Verteidigung von Sicherheit gekappt werden? Und: Wie weit darf die Informationsfreiheit der Presse in unsicheren Zeiten gehen? Ebenfalls auf der Bühne: der ehemalige deutsche Innenminister Otto Schily (SPD) und Terrorismus-Experte Rolf Tophoven.

„Katastrophe für die Diplomatie"

Im Gespräch ist natürlich Wikileaks mit seinen umstrittenen jüngsten Enthüllungen der US-Diplomatendepeschen, aus denen Medien nun weltweit zitieren. „Richtig und wichtig" findet Ströbele diese. Denn: „Das ist Pressefreiheit, diesen Mut muss man haben." Das eben empört Gauck. Er weist darauf hin, dass es sich bei den Daten um gestohlenes Material handelt. „Das kann ich nicht akzeptieren, dass das gefeiert wird, das ist ein elementarer Verlust von Recht."

Dann ein Vorgang mit Seltenheitswert: Schily, einst auch ein Grüner, muss seinem alten Kampfgefährten und nunmehrigem Widersacher Ströbele ein bisschen Recht geben: „Wenn man durch solche Veröffentlichungen erfährt, wie es etwa wirklich in Abu-Ghraib zugeht, dann bin ich schon dafür." Die aktuellen Enthüllungen jedoch bezeichnet er als „Katastrophe für die Diplomatie". Schily findet auch nicht, dass die Presse alles veröffentlichen darf, was ihr zugespielt wird: „Nicht wenn dadurch aktuelle Ermittlungsverfahren gefährdet werden."

Tophoven hingegen sieht das Problem anderswo: „Die USA sind seit den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 traumatisiert und sammeln alle Daten, die sie bekommen können. Wenn, wie im Falle der Wikileaks-Dokumente, drei Millionen Menschen Zugriff haben, dann ist keine Diskretion mehr zu wahren. Das ist ein inneramerikanisches Problem."

Nicht der Beginn des Spitzelstaates

A propos Datensammeln. Das wollen auch Staaten in Zeiten erhöhter Terrorgefahr. Im Visier: Telekommunikationsdaten, die länger als bisher gespeichert werden sollen. Schrecklich findet Ströbele das: „Es darf nicht sein, dass eine aktuelle Warnung vor erhöhter Terrorgefahr wie wir sie in Deutschland haben, dazu missbraucht wird, Freiheitsrechte einzuschränken."

„Ich sehe keine Einschränkung", erwidert Tophoven und erklärt: „Wenn eine klare nachrichtendienstliche Lage vorliegt, dann muss der Staat handeln." Der islamistische Terror sei eine „Weltbedrohung", Terroristen operierten „mit Hightech und Kalaschnikow", da müsse man auch „mit Hightech darauf reagieren."

Gauck möchte derlei Maßnahmen zumindest erklärt bekommen: „Wenn der Staat Rechte beschneidet, dann muss es verhältnismäßig sein. Ich will tragfähige Belege, was das Ganze bringt." Da kann Ex-Innenminister Schily aushelfen: Jene vier Algerier, die im Jahr 2000 einen Anschlag auf den Straßburger Weihnachtsmarkt geplant hätten (der dann vereitelt wurde), hätte man „nicht ohne Telekom-Überwachung gefasst". Ströbele widerspricht, worauf Schily recht unwirsch wird.

Moderatorin Föderl-Schmid würde nun auch gerne wissen, ob eine konkrete Zahl von Fällen vorliegt, wo die Speicherung von Telekommunikationsverbindungen zur Festnahme von Terroristen geführt habe. „Die gibt es sicher", sagen Schily und Tophoven unisono. Nur leider hat sie gerade niemand parat.

Problematisch sei ja nicht das Ausspähen von Terroristen, meint Ströbele. Ihn stört, dass bei der Speicherung von Telefon- und Internetverbindungen so getan werde, als seien „82 Millionen Deutsche Schwerverbrecher", deren Daten man zur Strafverfolgung brauche. „Was ist dagegen einzuwenden, wenn man ein Verbrechen aufklären will?" ruft daraufhin Schily erbost und wird von Tophoven unterstützt: „Man kann das doch nicht so darstellen, als gebe es den Orwellschen Überwachungsstaat."

Auch Gauck findet, dass Ströbele da eine „hysterische Welle aufbaut", warnt aber einmal mehr davor, die Bürgerinnen und Bürger über neue Maßnahmen im Anti-Terror-Kampf nicht genug aufzuklären: „Sie müssen wissen, dass etwa die Speicherung von Telekommunikationsdaten nicht der Beginn eines Spitzelstaates ist." Da ist er sehr sensibilisiert, die „Übermacht der herrschenden Klasse" habe man in der DDR jahrzehntelang erdulden müssen, sagt der Bürgerrechtler.

Ein „schlagendes" Argument dafür, warum die EU-weit propagierte Vorratsdatenspeicherung doch in Ordnung sei, liefert Schily dann noch: „Mit Verlaub, Herr Ströbele, der Sachverstand aller europäischen Innenminister ist sicher etwas größer als der eines grünen Abgeordneten."

Nacktscanner unsinniger Aktionismus

Und es könnte ja noch privater, ja sogar intimer werden bei der Terrorbekämpfung. Was halten die Diskutanten also von sogenannten Nacktscannern, von denen an US-Flughäfen schon 69 eingesetzt werden? Terrorforscher Tophoven hat diesbezüglich wenig Scham und Berührungsängste: „Ich bin für solche Geräte, wenn damit verhindert wird, dass ich von Terrormaßnahmen betroffen werde." Dann erzählt er von einem Nacktscanner am Moskauer Flughafen, den er schon durchlaufen habe. Tophoven: „Wenn es mir keiner gesagt hätte, hätte ich es überhaupt nicht gewusst."

Gauck bekennt, dass ihm das „völlig schnurz-egal" wäre, er gehe ja auch auf den FKK-Strand. Und vielleicht könne man „die kostbaren Geschlechtsteile verdecken". Nein, das sei unmöglich, klärt Ströbele auf. Er hält Nacktscanner für unsinnigen „Aktionismus". Denn: Wozu Nacktscanner bei Passagieren, wenn man andererseits das Frachtgut nicht ordentlich kontrolliere? Das sei vor einigen Wochen anhand der Paketbomben aus dem Jemen deutlich geworden. Trotz Durchleuchtung habe man den Sprengstoff zunächst nicht gesehen.

Schily, in dessen Amtszeit als deutscher Innenminister (1998 bis 2005) die Verschärfung vieler Anti-Terrorgesetze fiel (Stichwort „Otto-Katalog"), mag sich mit den Nacktscannern auch nicht recht anfreunden: „Das muss man abwägen. Ich wäre nicht dafür, dass sich dann alle entkleiden. Da wäre eine Grenze überschritten."

Bedauerlich findet die Runde übrigens, dass Innenministerin Maria Fekter (ÖVP) ihre Teilnahme an der Diskussion wieder abgesagt hat. Doch für sie und andere besorgte Österreicher hat Tophoven noch einen Trost: „Österreich ist für den islamistischen Terrorismus nicht relevant."◁

Aus: ***Der Standard,*** *6. Dezember 2010*

Europa im Diskurs
Bedrohte Freiheit? Sicherheit und Terrorangst im Rechtsstaat
Wien, 5. Dezember

Joachim Gauck
Von 1990 bis 2000 Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR

Otto Schily
Ehemaliger Innenminister Deutschlands

Hans-Christian Ströbele
Abgeordneter der Grünen im Deutschen Bundestag

Rolf Tophoven
Leiter des Instituts für Terrorismusforschung und Sicherheitspolitik

Moderation:
Alexandra Föderl-Schmid
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

Die Reihe ist eine Kooperation von IWM, Burgtheater, Erste Stiftung und *Der Standard*

Puzzling Identities

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences with **Vincent Descombes,** November 15–17



Photo: IWM

Identity and its crisis were in the center of three lectures held by Vincent Descombes, one of the foremost French philosophers.

Who's Who? Descombes began by asking why we keep speaking of an identity crisis, since it seems that having an idea of what I am cannot be derived from the knowledge I have of which individual I am among human beings. He distinguished three kinds of identification: by way of an identity judgment; by way of a psychological fusion; by way of a reconfiguration of my self-image around significant links to people and places around me.

Myself and My Self. Is "being oneself" a matter of individuation over time or of having found one's own place in the world? Descombes argued that the phrase "being oneself" is equivocal. In one sense the question of the subject ("who?") is a matter of individuation and has nothing to do with subjectivity. Any informative answer to the question "Who are you?" has to be given in the third person. There is another sense of "being oneself" as one can ask whether I was entirely myself when I did or said something incongruous: the question is certainly not whether I was the same man. Here the question "who?" is no longer the question about the identity of the agent, it is the circumstantial "who?"

Collective Identities. Starting from the current view that "one's identity" is what is at stake in a "struggle for recognition", Descombes examined the logic of recognition: what is the object of the attitude we call "recognizing (one's) identity"? Who can ask for recognition? Theories of recognition cannot provide us with a coherent account of ourselves as social beings without a robust notion of collective identity. The shift from taking a stand in the singular ("I") to the collective ("We") requires the setting of a "social imaginary"—it has to be understood as an institutional creation. ◁

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In cooperation with Institut Français de Vienne. Descombes' lectures will be published jointly with Harvard University Press, Suhrkamp Verlag (Berlin), and Znak Publishers (Cracow).

Vincent Descombes is Directeur d'études at the Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron in Paris and teaches at the University of Chicago. Latest book: *Dernières nouvelles du Moi.*

On Responsibility

Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture with **Claus Offe,** November 18

Photo: IWM

Responsibility has become a central issue to modernity. Unlike in former societies, disasters, injustices and inequalities cannot be seen as god-given anymore but have to be viewed as consequences of human decision-making. Whereever decisions are made, there is responsibilty involved: Someone is responsible to someone (or even "all of us") for—or refraining from—doing something. At the same time it is becoming more and more difficult in modern societies to identify the persons responsible as processes of decision-making have become increasingly complex and obscure. Who is actually to blame for the melting of the polar ice caps or the breakdown of the financial markets? As Claus Offe pointed out, we can recognize a worrying contradiction nowadays: on the one hand the awareness that there must have been a decision increases the demand for responsibilty and its fair sharing. On the other hand, due to attributional problems, one can observe a decrease in the "supply of responsibility". For decades, it has been the welfare state that balanced the demand and the supply side by taking care of the negative consequences of modernity. However, with the chronic need of most governments to unburden the state budget by replacing state-sponsored programs with voluntary ones or with the growing "third sector", services have become unevenly distributed and inadequately monitored. Social processes of individualization and globalization aggravate the shrinking supply of responsibility further. Offe emphasized that moralizing appeals will not be enough to revitalize responsible actions. What is rather needed is a public policy that encourages, enables and supports a civil society to assume responsibilty. ◁

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Claus Offe is Professor of Political Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin.

From Islamic Theocracy to Militant Secularism

Monthly Lecture: Chris Hann, October 11

Photo: IWM

British anthropologist Chris Hann explored the ways in which policies of militant secularism coexist with Islamic theocracy in eastern Xinjiang, namely by an association of secularism and modernity with Han Chinese and Islam with ethnic (*minzu*) minorities. Because of these sets of associations, the Han Chinese are upheld as model citizens in close relationship with the government. Whereas the ethnic minorities are lumped together as one Muslim group, despite their internal differences, and are treated with suspicion by the state. Hann outlined the historical precedent for this kind of organization. He described the geography of the area, and began by highlighting the major characteristics of eastern Xinjiang in the presocialist era, including a diverse Muslim population that did not share a common native or home language in this region. During the Maoist era, Muslims suffered under government limitations on religious expression. In the 1980s, the state allowed certain forms of religious expression, but only those in which they could control processes and outcomes: restoring mosques, establishing religion in terms of national and secular identities, training state-sponsored religious authorities, and co-opting religious holidays. Despite the lack of evidence of a "fundamentalist" Islam, the government continues to take a stance that all ethnic minorities in eastern Xinjiang are both Muslim and part of the Uyghur separatist movements. Hann concluded with an ethnographic examination of the Hua, which are more ethnically similar to the Han Chinese but Muslim. Despite sharing a religion with the Uyghur, they are linguistically and culturally separate. The case demonstrates that secular life and religious adherence are not easily separated, and suspicions that these Chinese Muslims are "fundamentalist" are unfounded. ◁

Sarah Tobin

Chris Hann is Director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale. His new book *Economic Anthropology. History, Ethnography, Critique* is forthcoming.

Refeudalisierung

Monatsvortrag: Sighard Neckel, 23. November

Photo: IWM

Als im Herbst 2008 der Zusammenbruch der amerikanischen Bank Lehman Brothers die größte weltweite Wirtschaftskrise seit 1929 auslöste, waren die vermeintlich Schuldigen schnell identifiziert: die global agierenden Finanzjongleure und ihre „spektakuläre Spekulation" (Urs Stäheli). Doch es war weniger die individuelle Gier, als vielmehr eine neuartige Struktur des kapitalistischen Wirtschaftssystems, die zur Krise führte. Es habe sich, so Sighard Neckel in Anlehnung an Jürgen Habermas, ein paradoxer „Strukturwandel des Kapitalismus" hin zu einer „Refeudalisierung der Ökonomie" vollzogen, der die Steigerungslogik des Profits von jeglichen Begrenzungen befreite. Das ermöglichte die Ausdifferenzierung einer quasi-ständischen Managerklasse, die durch ein – den mittelalterlichen Pfründen nicht unähnliches – Anreizsystem von Boni und Aktienoptionen zu hoch riskanten Investitionsentscheidungen getrieben wurde. Anders als noch der von Friedrich von Hayek beschriebene wirtschaftliche Archetypus des „unternehmerischen Unternehmers", tragen heute das Risiko dieser Entscheidungen jedoch nicht die Manager selbst, sondern die Gesamtgesellschaft: Wenn die Banken crashen, stehen aus Steuergeldern finanzierte „Rettungspakete" schon bereit. Die fatale Folge: Gerettet werden damit genau jene Strukturen, die eine Rettung überhaupt erst nötig machten. ◁

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Sighard Neckel ist Professor für Soziologie an der Universität Wien.

Narrative der Gleichzeitigkeit

Monatsvortrag: Karl Schlögel, 14. Dezember

Jede geschichtliche Darstellung tendiert zu einem Primat der Zeitlichkeit", so Karl Schlögel zu Beginn seines Vortrages. Die andere Dimension von Geschichte, nämlich jene des Raumes, wird von den meisten Historikern zumeist ebenso vernachlässigt wie jene, die nach der angemessenen Erzählweise von historischem Geschehen fragt. Diesem Missstand möchte Schlögel abhelfen. Nicht mit einer allgemein gültigen Theorie, die leicht versucht wäre in geschichtsphilosophisches Fahrwasser zu geraten, sondern mit Lösungsansätzen die er aus dem Atelier seiner eigenen historischen Arbeit gewinnt. Konkreter Ausgangspunkt in Schlögels Vortrag war dabei die Frage, wie die politischen Ereignisse im Moskau des Jahres 1937 in die Form einer angemessenen historischen Darstellung zu bringen seien. Da besonders die Stadt ein Ort der Gleichzeitigkeit ganz heterogener Prozesse ist, bewegte sich Schlögels Suche nach dem passenden narrativen Modell in eine Vielzahl von Richtungen, um schließlich bei Michail Bulgakow fündig zu werden. Moskau 1937 wurde erzählbar, weil nun eine Darstellungsform gefunden war, die nicht nur dem Bewusstsein der Zeitgenossen zu entsprechen schien, sondern auch der Simultanität der Ereignisse. Die Leichtigkeit, mit der die Literatur Räume erschaffen kann oder fiktiv wiedergibt, muss dem quellenlastigen Historiker zwar verwehrt bleiben. Doch die Historiographie kann von ihr lernen, dass Geschichte immer in einem spezifischen räumlichen Zusammenhang spielt, dessen jeweilige Kontur an ihr mitschreibt. Im Raume, so Schlögel, lesen wir die Zeit. ◁

Gerald Zachar

Karl Schlögel ist Professor für Osteuropäische Geschichte an der Europa-Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder. Für sein Werk *Terror und Traum: Moskau 1937* erhielt er 2009 den Leipziger Buchpreis zur Europäischen Verständigung.

China's National Climate Policy

Series: Climate Politics and International Solidarity with **Yu Jie,** September 28

Photo: IWM

Made in China" are not only most of our comsumer goods but also the bigger part of the world's greenhouse gases (GHG). The so-called "workbench of the world" has exceeded the US as the worst climate offender and together both states account for more than 40 percent of global CO2 emissions. At the Copenhagen summit China was among those that blocked a Kyoto follow-up treaty. At the same time, China has set an ambitious mitigation target that mandates 40 percent reduction in emission of GHG between 2005 and 2020 and 20 percent reduction in energy intensity. Furthermore, "China's National Climate Change Program" makes provisions for a massive investment in green technologies. Climate activist Yu Jie was critically assessing these promises in her presentation stating that the country fell short of its annual milestones, set in energy policies, so far and faces serious challenges meeting its goals. One of them is the strong dependence of the country's industry on coal. Thus, as economic growth rates continue to increase, the demand for energy is also likely to rise. Additionally, there are political obstacles. The urbanization of publicly owned land is one of the main income sources for local governments. This fuels the demand for products of energy intensive industries. But up to now only 7 per cent of China's energy comes from renewables. However, Yu Jie remained optimistic: China has become a major producer and exporter of "clean" technologies. Made in China, therefore, seems not only part of the problem but also part of the solution. ◁

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In cooperation with Grüne Bildungswerkstatt

Yu Jie headed the policy and research program of the NGO "The Climate Group" in Beijing.

Commentary: **Alexander Van der Bellen,** Spokesperson of the Austrian Green Party for International Developments and Foreign Policy.

Chair: **Franz Fischler,** President of the EcoSocial Forum Europe and former EU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries

Realismus heute

Serie: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Juliane Rebentisch,** 5. Oktober

Realismus in der Kunst heute? Will man sich dieser Frage nähern so ist zunächst zu klären, was unter „Realismus" zu verstehen ist und in welchem Sinne der Bezug zu einem „heute", also dem Gegenwärtigen der Kunst hergestellt werden kann. Ausgehend von einer „Wiederbelebung der Realismusdiskussion in der Kunst" stellte Juliane Rebentisch zwei Achsen der Abgrenzung auf, die ihren Begriff eines gegenwärtigen Realismus in der Kunst einerseits von einem „reinen" (nicht-künstlerischen) Realismuskonzept und andererseits von modernen Theorien des Realismus in der Kunst unterscheiden. Der „unreine Realismus" in der Kunst ist bestimmt durch die Dialektik aus Treue, als dem Bezeugen der Wirklichkeit aber auch dem Eingriff in die Realität durch das Erzeugen von Bildern. Denn der künstlerische Wirklichkeitsbezug ist potentiell interventionistisch, als kritisches Projekt hat der Realismus einen doppelten Charakter, er äußert sich in Zeugenschaft und Transformation. Will man die konkreten und aktuellen Potentiale künstlerischer Wirklichkeitsbezüge aufspüren, bieten die Realismuskonzepte moderner Kunsttheorien, wie jene von Lukács, Bloch und Adorno, kaum verwendbare Erklärungsansätze. Denn die zentralen Tendenzen der gegenwärtigen künstlerischen Produktion, die Rebentisch unter die Begriffe „Entgrenzung" und „Erfahrung" zusammenfasst, lassen sich in den modernen Konzepten nicht bestimmen. Dagegen schlägt Rebentisch vor, den künstlerischen Bezug zur Realität als Kritik der Repräsentation zu begreifen. Der Realismus in der Kunst liefert keine Bilder der Wahrheit, sondern bringt die politische Wirklichkeit der Repräsentation selbst ins Bewusstsein. ◁

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In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

Juliane Rebentisch ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin im Exzellenzcluster „Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen", Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main.

Das „machtgeladene" Kunstwerk

Serie: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Friedrich Balke,** 9. Dezember

Photo: Relief der Gradiva / Wikipedia / Rama

Die Gradiva, „die Voranschreitende", zeichnet sich als antikes Relief wie viele Verwandte ihrer Epoche durch eine dem Stil eigene Anmut aus. Aufgegriffen durch Wilhelm Jensen 1903 in seiner gleichnamigen Novelle, wurde die Ausstrahlung dieser Frauenfigur zum Thema kunstphilosophischer Diskurse, die um die Frage kreisen, warum sich der Betrachter von der Erscheinung angezogen fühlt. Friedrich Balke deutete in seinem Vortrag das Ding als einen über Macht, Kraft und Potential verfügenden Gegenstand. Innerhalb eines sozialen Kontexts hat jedes Objekt einen ihm zugewiesenen „Funktionszusatz" und ist so eingebettet in ein Netz von Bedeutungen. Kann also einem Kunstwerk eine bestimmte Art von „Personenhaftigkeit" zugesprochen werden, welche durch die erzeugte Wirkung des Objektes in einem Beziehungsfeld von Kunstobjekt und Betrachter entsteht? Für eine Antwort zitierte Balke den Kunstanthropologen Alfred Gell, der Kunstobjekte nicht als „self-sufficient agent, but only secondary agents in conjunction with certain specific (human) associates" interpretiert. Die Hingabe und Faszination, mit welcher sich der Betrachtende einem ästhetischen Gegenstand zuwendet, erweckte in seiner Beziehung zwischen ihm und dem Künstler auch die Aufmerksamkeit der Psychoanalyse. Bemüht, über die „Objektbeziehung" auch auf den Schaffenden eines Werkes schließen zu können, analysierte Sigmund Freud 1907 in einem Kommentar zu Jensens Novelle die Protagonisten des literarischen Werkes. Die Anhänglichkeit eines Betrachters an ein Kunstwerk bezeichnete Freud als „Wahn", womit er die Handlungsmacht des Werkes selbst über den Betrachter sichtbar werden ließ. ◁

Sarah Kohlmaier

In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

Friedrich Balke ist Professor für Geschichte und Theorie künstlicher Welten an der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. In Kürze erscheint von ihm *Philosophie und Nicht-Philosophie: Gilles Deleuze – Aktuelle Diskussionen.*

EU Leadership on Climate Change

Series: Climate Politics and International Solidarity with **Sebastian Oberthür,** October 27

Photo: IWM

EU leadership in the international fight against climate change was shaken at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, which failed to establish a post-Kyoto agreement. At the recent conference in Cancún, which took place shortly after Sebastian Oberthür's lecture, the EU and the other participating countries again did not agree on a follow-up treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. Since the current commitments expire at the end of 2012, the next UN conference will be the last opportunity to seal a new set of Kyoto pledges. Sebastian Oberthür thus recommended several steps the EU could take in order to regain its position as a driving force in climate politics. As only a middle-sized political but large economic player the EU could, for instance, introduce trade restrictions for countries that have an insufficient climate policy. The building of alliances with progressively developing and developed nations as well as the fostering of international cooperations in specific fields of climate politics could be further strategies. This also includes the conclusion of bilateral agreements in addition to UN treaties. Finally, the EU must increase its domestic efforts, which means the development of a long-term strategy against climate change and more ambitious targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases. "As climate change is not waiting for us", Oberthür emphasized, the EU should act swiftly to revitalize its leadership in climate politics. The 2011 UN convention in Durban might be the planet's last chance. ◁

red

Sebastian Oberthür is Academic Director of the Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussels. His latest publication is *Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance.*

Introduction and Chair: **Gabriele Moser,** Spokesperson of the Austrian Green Party for Infrastructure and Transport.

Selling the Museum

Series: Art—Society—Politics with **Julian Stallabrass,** November 9

The "Tate" is not just the name of the most successful museum of contemporary art worldwide—it is a highly branded and effective business. With its products, its commercial campaigns, its corporate design, and its strategies of displaying and commenting the works of art, it serves as a paradigmatic example of a trend that not only affects the realm of art: what does it mean to "brand" a museum? What does it mean in relation to art and what does it reveal about today's society? Julian Stallabrass took the example of the Tate's offensive branding strategies as a starting point to reflect upon these questions. His further examinations linked "branding" to developments in artistic and curatorial strategies but also to more general social and economic changes. The museum, formerly known as a central institution for education and the display of national culture, has become a venue for light entertainment. Contemporary art, formerly perceived as an elitist crypto-critical opposition to the mainstream of mass culture, today attracts millions of visitors and competes with commercial leisure sites. In the "branded museum" the anti-aesthetic and radical aspects of art are being pushed away. "Art busting" attacks, flashmobs, graffiti and vandalism are being used by people who feel they have lost a counterpoint to commercialization and the establishment. Yet in the context of a neoliberal transformation of the state and the post-Fordist restructuring of society, art simply has become more business-like just as business has become more art-like. ◁

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In cooperation with the Renner Institut.
See also Stallabrass' contribution on page 21.

Julian Stallabrass is a writer, curator and photographer. He teaches Modern and Contemporary Art History at the Courtauld Institute of Art in London.

Genealogies of Life

Workshop, October 15–17

Photos: IWM

This second workshop within the research project "The Symbolic Power of Biology" focused—like its predecessor in 2009—on the relations of science, culture and society. In his opening lecture, Dominique Lecourt discussed the various political and ethical claims that have been made on Darwin's theory since its inception. He stressed that political discourse and the social sciences often attribute underlying "truths" to science while making their specific uses of it invisible. The following workshop addressed the question of how concepts of the life sciences circulate in different fields of knowledge and how they are positioned within broader cultural transformations with respect to the life sciences of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In addition to the "use" of natural history by thinkers of political economy, such as Hume and Smith, the emergence and the circulation of concepts of generation, degeneration and reproduction was widely discussed, in particular with regard to concepts of gender which changed dramatically during this period. Another emphasis was laid on the intersection of concepts of sex and race, and on the transformation of scientific inquiries on "racial" differences, in particular skin colour, in the period between the 17th and 19th centuries. By bringing together these perspectives, the workshop contributed to the development of a critical understanding of the cultural history of biology and the role philosophy plays in it. ◁

Susanne Lettow

The workshop was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) with friendly support of Institut Français de Vienne. Read a contribution by Peter Hanns Reill in the next issue of the IWMpost.

Participants
Marlen Bidwell-Steiner, Vienna University
Jocelyn Holland, University of California, Santa Barbara
Dominique Lecourt, Université Denis Diderot – Paris 7
Sandra Lehmann, Vienna
Susanne Lettow, IWM, Vienna
Renato G. Mazzolini, University of Trento
Peter Hanns Reill, University of California, Los Angeles
Margaret Schabas, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
Joan Steigerwald, York University, Toronto
Andrew Wells, University of Edinburgh

Verkennende Gewalt

Workshop mit **Thomas Bedorf,** 21.–22. Oktober

Photo: IWM

Warum erschießt ein 17-jähriger seine Mitschüler, wie zuletzt geschehen im deutschen Ort Winneden? Unmotivierte Ausbrüche von Gewalt geben uns Rätsel auf. Stets stellt sich die Frage nach dem Grund. War es vielleicht ein Schrei nach Aufmerksamkeit? Doch in welchem Verhältnis steht dieses Motiv zum Ausmaß der Tat? Fragen wie diese sind der Ausgangspunkt für Thomas Bedorfs Buch *Verkennende Anerkennung – Über Identität und Politik,* in dem er sich mit Erklärungsansätzen von Gewalt beschäftigt. Am IWM stellte er seine Thesen vor und diskutierte mit Nachwuchswissenschaftlern. Anknüpfend an Überlegungen von Axel Honneth und Judith Butler identifizierte Bedorf zwei analytische Sichtweisen von Gewalt: die der ausgeschlossenen und jene der eingeschlossenen Gewalt. In der ersten Sichtweise – bei Honneth – stösst Gewalt Personen zu, z. B. in Form der Diskriminierung von Homosexuellen, Migranten oder Frauen. In der zweiten – bei Butler – werden Subjekte durch Normen erst erzeugt, sind diesen unterworfen und wenden somit Gewalt auf sich selbst an. Anerkennung, so Bedorf, sei dann eine dreistellige Beziehung, das heisst Personen „erkennen" sich nicht nur gegenseitig, sondern sie „erkennen sich als etwas" an. Anerkennung sei zwar etwas Alltägliches, aber deswegen noch nichts Triviales, sondern vielmehr ein riskantes, kämpferisches Spiel. Es gehe nicht nur um die Bestätigung der Identität von Anderen, sondern auch um die Bestätigung der eigenen Identität. Gewalt ist Bedorf zufolge dann das Ende des Anerkennens: „Die vielfältigen Erscheinungsformen der Gewalt sind nicht ein Schrei nach Anerkennung, sondern eine Unterbrechung des Spiels der Anerkennung." Der Amokläufer macht in diesem Spiel nicht mehr mit, und genau das bringt seine schreckliche Tat zum Ausdruck. ◁

Christina Fürst

Mit freundlicher Unterstützung des FWF

Thomas Bedorf ist Gastprofessor für Philosophie an der Universität Wien. Sein Buch *Verkennende Anerkennung* ist 2010 im Suhrkamp Verlag erschienen.

Vermarktlichung von Gefühlen

Workshop, 8. Oktober

Photo: IWM

Die „Vermarktlichung von Gefühlen" ist ein Signum des derzeitigen Neoliberalismus: Der Einsatz von Gefühlen, insbesondere im Dienstleistungssektor, soll Gewinne steigern, das stete Engagement für den Beruf erfordert Gefühle als Ressource der Kreativität, das „unternehmerische Selbst" soll auch ein emotionales Selbst sein. Die (Trans-) Aktionen im Kapital- und Geldmarkt sind ebenfalls mit Gefühlen verbunden – die Akteure handeln nicht rational, d. h. emotionslos, wie die Finanzkrise zeigte. Nicht zuletzt werden auch zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen zunehmend marktförmig organisiert. Der Workshop setzte sich mit diesen Themen aktueller „Gefühlsarbeit", also der Arbeit mit und am Gefühl, auseinander. Sighard Neckel zeigte in historischer Perspektive auf, dass die Gier keine dem Kapitalismus fremde Qualität ist, sondern ein Strukturprinzip kapitalistischen Handelns. Franz Eder entwickelte das Argument, dass sexuelle Erregung in der Nachkriegsgeschichte zur Ware und Sexualität eine Strategie der „Selbstführung" der Menschen im Kapitalismus wurde. Gertraude Krell wiederum zeigte am Beispiel von Management-Handbüchern auf, wie paradox die Strategie der In-Wert-Setzung von Emotionen ist: Gefühle werden zwar als Produktivkraft, aber zugleich auch als eine Gefahr gesehen – und sie werden im Management-Diskurs vergeschlechtlicht. Daniela Rastetter präsentierte Ergebnisse einer Studie über Gefühlsarbeit im Dienstleistungsbereich. Die Regulierung von Gefühlen führe zu emotionaler Dissonanz, also zur Moderierung und Zurückhaltung wirklicher Gefühle. Hildegard Nickel stellte die Frage nach der Handlungs- und Kritikfähigkeit der Menschen im Prozess des Umbaus der Erwerbswelt, der als „Subjektivierung" bezeichnet wird.

Teilnehmer/innen
Ulrich Bröckling, Universität Leipzig
Arlie Hochschild, University of California, Berkeley
Gertraude Krell, FU Berlin
Sighard Neckel, Universität Wien
Hildegard M. Nickel, HU Berlin
Otto Penz, Universität Wien
Daniela Rastetter, Universität Hamburg
Birgit Sauer, Universität Wien

Trotz emotionaler „Übergriffe" auf den „Arbeitskraftunternehmer" gebe es Widerständigkeit gegen emotionale Vereinnahmung. Den Abschluss des Workshops bildete ein Vortrag von Arlie Hochschild, der Pionierin der Forschung über Gefühlsarbeit. „Emotional Capitalism", so ihre These, erobere die privaten Beziehungen der Menschen und setze diese in Wert – die professionelle Ehevermittlung, die berufsmäßige Organisation von Familienfeiern und Leihmutterschaft sind Beispiele, wie die kapitalistische Logik im Inneren der Menschen Raum greift. ◁

Birgit Sauer

In Kooperation mit dem Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Wien

Politics, Critique and Representation

Junior Visiting Fellows' Conference, December 16

At the end of each semester, the Junior Visiting Fellows organize a conference to present and discuss the findings of their research at the Institute. This time the symposium dealt with politics, critique, and representation, with a special focus on challenges to dominant discourses. Tracing the long trajectory from 17th-century Imperial Austria to the postmodern world, the papers offered critical readings of literary texts, historical documents, and public debates. Major themes included the dynamics of empires and the interplay of nationalism, communism, and freedom in Eastern Europe. ◁

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Junior Visiting Fellows' Conference Program

Panel 1:
Arts, Politics and Representation

Anne Dwyer
Between "National Enthusiasm" and "Cultural Cosmopolitanism": Russian Formalist Treatments of Empire

Jan Kühne
Nathan the Wise and the Fool: Sammy Gronemann's Lessing in Israel

Irina Nedeva
Just Before the End: The Bulgarian 1968 and Tzvetan Stoyanov

Panel 2:
Critique and Responsibility from Kant to the Present

Mark Pickering
The Distinction Between Representation and Object in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Julia Hertlein
Critique in Context

Panel 3:
Towards Modernity: Early Modern Republicanism and Modernizing Empires

Tomasz Gromelski
Obsessed with "Wolność": Freedom in Polish History, Historiography and Modern Political Discourse

Iryna Vushko
Policing the Empire: Social Control and Austrian Police During the Napoleonic Wars

Panel 4:
Empire in Context

Olena Palko
The Origins of Ukrainian National Communism

Olga Tyapkina
Small Towns as a Phenomenon of Historical Urbanization

The proceedings of all Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences are available on the IWM website. Please refer to www.iwm.at/JVF_conferences.htm

Our Choice—Leaving Fear Behind

Anna Politkovskaya Memorial Lecture with **Yevgenia Markovna Albats,** October 6

Which countries are the world's most dangerous places for journalists? Afghanistan? Iraq? Both answers are correct. However, straight after them, is today's Russia. Putin's "sovereign democracy" ranked a shameful 153 (out of 175) in the "2009 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index". In 2010, the situation for journalists improved only little, with Russia now occupying the 140th place. Anna Politkovskaya , who was assassinated on October 7, 2006, is among hundreds of journalists who were killed in Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Krasnodar or elsewhere in the Federation in recent years. She wrote against the war in Chechnya and was one of the sharpest critics of the regime. In 2001, she spent several months at the IWM as Milena Jesenská Fellow to complete her book *A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya*. In her memory the Kreisky Forum and the IWM regularly invite Russian intellectuals to discuss democracy and human rights. At this year's Anna Politkovskaya Memorial Lecture, Yevgenia Albats reported on the current situation of journalists in Russia. In a very personal speech she emphasized that "killing the messenger" is still a tool regularly employed by the Russian rulers to suppress dissent and to neutralize any political mobilization outside state control. Yet she also made clear that Russian journalists are fearless and will continue to report "all the news that's fit to print." ◁

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In cooperation with the Bruno Kreisky Forum and Sciences Po, Paris. See also Albats' contribution on page 23.

Yevgenia Markovna Albats is Editor-in-Chief of the Russian weekly *The New Times*.

Welcome: **Barbara Prammer,** President of the Austrian National Council.

Respondent: **Marie Mendras,** Professor at the Department of Government, LSE.

Chair: **Tessa Szyszkowitz,** Moscow correspondent of the Austrian weekly *Profil*.

Die Kartographie der Zeit

Präsentation einer Geschichtssoftware mit **Hans-Rudolf Behrendt, Thomas Burch** und **Martin Weinmann,** 6.–7. Dezember

Mit seiner *Synchronoptischen Weltgeschichte* hatte der Historiker und Kartograph Arno Peters 1952 eine neue Darstellungsform historischen Wissens vorgelegt. Seine Weltkarte der Zeit umfasst fünftausend Jahre Geschichte aus allen Kulturen und wurde zu einem Bestseller. Hans-Rudolf Behrendt, Thomas Burch und Martin Weinmann haben nun aus dem Buch ein Computerprogramm entwickelt, das unter dem Titel *Der Digitale Peters* (DDP) im April 2010 erschienen ist. Bei ihrer Präsentation am IWM zeigten sie, wie der Kartographie der Zeit am Rechner neue Visualisierungsmöglichkeiten zuwachsen, die es dem Historiker wie dem interessierten Laien erlauben, Geschichte auf ganz neue Weise zu erschließen, nicht mehr als lineare Erzählung, sondern als ein Netz tausender, gleichberechtigter Ereignisse, dessen Fäden man selbst verkettet. Auf die Präsentation folgte am nächsten Tag unter dem Titel „Herodot. Geschichtssoftware" ein Workshop, bei dem die Autoren mit Historikern und Informatikern über die Perspektiven der Weiterentwicklung des Programms und mögliche Kooperationen diskutierten. Mehr unter www.derdigitalepeters.de. ◁

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In Kooperation mit dem Büro w, Wiesbaden

Hans-Rudolf Behrendt, ist Mathematiker und Mitinhaber der Firma Aladin Computersysteme GmbH.

Thomas Burch ist Informatiker und Geschäftsführer des Kompetenzzentrums für elektronische Erschließungs- und Publikationsverfahren in den Geisteswissenschaften an der Universität Trier.

Martin Weinmann ist Philosoph, Büchermacher, Autor und Produzent. Bis 2005 war er Cheflektor beim Verlag Zweitausendeins.

Is There an Efficient Non-Populist Conservatism?

Tischner Debate in Warsaw, December 10

Times are a changin'"—fast and drastic change has not only become a symptom of our time but also a political slogan, as Barack Obama's presidential campaign showed. Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, Polish parliamentarians Joanna Kluzik Rostkowska and Grzegorz Schetyna, as well as the sociologist Mirosława Grabowska and the journalist Tomasz Lis discussed at Warsaw University whether conservatism can still be an effective political strategy and an appealing worldview for voters in an ever-changing society. In his introductory speech,

Karel Schwarzenberg

Photo: K. Szuba

Schwarzenberg strongly emphasized that conservatism must not turn into populism to remain relevant in today's political landscape. One of the main characteristics of populism is its messianic promise to turn the world into a better place by presenting citizens with simple solutions for complex problems. Conservatism, on the contrary, tries to improve society by protecting and building on what has been achieved so far, explained Schwarzenberg. Thus, it offers voters at least a hunch of stability and reliability in a rapidly changing world. This is exactly what many Polish voters want, confirmed Mirosława Grabowska, referring to recent polls. In particular, the traditional family model is highly-valued, equally important, however, is personal freedom. A liberal variation of conservatism could thus be successful in Poland, added Kluzik Rostkowska. The journalist Tomasz Lis remarked that conservative politics are currently gaining ground in Poland as well as in other countries due to the fact that in periods of crisis people rather go for security and stability. This popular tendency, he concluded, even Obama had to accept after his election: change seems less attractive in times of change. ◁

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Tischner Debate in Warsaw

Introduction:
Karel Schwarzenberg, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

Participants:
Mirosława Grabowska, Director of the Center for the Study of Public Opinion, Warsaw
Joanna Kluzik Rostkowska, Member of the Polish Parliament
Tomasz Lis, Editor-in-Chief of *Wprost*
Grzegorz Schetyna, Spokesperson of the Polish Parliament

Chairs:
Marcin Król, Warsaw University
Krzysztof Michalski, IWM

Organizer:
University of Warsaw, IWM

Partner:
National Audiovisual Institute

In cooperation with:
Erasmus of Rotterdam Chair, Institute for Applied Social Sciences

Media partners:
Gazeta Wyborcza, Newsweek, TVN24, Onet.pl, Jedynka Polskie Radio, *Dwutygodnik, Res Publica Nowa*

God Is Not Dead

BY NICHOLAS BROOKS

The secular age did not bring about the end of religion. There rather seems to be a resurgence of faith in many parts of the world. The IWM International Summer School 2010, held in Italy from July 4 to 17, addressed the implications the new turn to religion has on public discourse in Western and non-Western societies.

Cortona, Italy

Photo: IWM

The IWM's summer school on "Religion in Public Life" convened at the beginning of July in the hills of Tuscany. Given the school's thematic focus and the constant chatter about secularism and post-secularism, it is appropriate that the school took place in what was for a longtime, but is no longer, a Benedictine monastery. What structure there is in the following reflections owes to my interest—shared by many others at the school—in understanding the fate of religion in the modern world. A related concern is the attempt to understand the status of the so-called "turn to religion" in the academy, now already a decade old. But so far as reflections go, what I offer here is also a recapitulation of what I saw and heard at a memorable and in some ways momentous gathering of scholars.

If anything unites those working within the "turn to religion," it is the conviction that classic secularization theory is inadequate. Notwithstanding the many cases of declining religious observance over the last centuries, it is clear that the death of religion was in part a theorist's best guess. Consequently, the theory of secularization and much of what underpinned it is increasingly called into productive kinds of questioning. What is post-secularism, after all, other than an attempt to occupy that space from which scholars can question secularism and the presuppositions that give birth to it?

A West / non-West Comparison

Such a space was afforded at the summer school by the West / non-West comparison broached by Charles Taylor, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Sudipta Kaviraj. That, as Chakrabarty and Kaviraj argued, India's being modern can hardly be disputed despite the persistence and permutation there of various forms of religion, stands as a distant confirmation of Taylor's reassessment of the fate of Western religion in his book, *A Secular Age*. Among the things Taylor argued there was that the history of the modern West cannot be understood as bringing about the end of religiosity. Modernity in the West and the "buffered selves" that densely populate it, authorize religion insofar as what was once accepted as an unmediated fact of existence is now made into a possibility and pushed off to an *other* reality (the transcendent). With some melancholy, Taylor suggests that this self's way of seeing the world as an enclosed immanent order and religion as referring to things beyond it, may close off access to religious sensibilities that were once common. This is the price paid, so it seems, by selves that have been instructed into the discipline and ethical sense that support capitalism and the modern state.

Taylor's vision is compelling and grand but, as he admits, hardly a global story. As Chakrabarty and Kaviraj insisted, while the Indian path to modernity might be unimaginable apart from the colonial experience and its corresponding Western influence, an account of India's modernity must go beyond the Western model. In a series of highly suggestive discussions at the summer school, Chakrabarty and Kaviraj offered some interesting ways to understand the Indian trajectory in particular. Among these, I would like to draw attention to the way that the comparison between West and non-West yielded results for our understanding of religion in the modern world. Chakrabarty and Kaviraj disputed the applicability of the secularization thesis to Indian history in a way that I take to be roughly parallel to the way that Taylor does for the modern West.

Like Taylor, they suggested that religion has certainly not disappeared in modern India, and in the case of the Bharatiya Janata Party has even become a resource for modern politics. But they imagine that religiosity in modern India has undergone and continues to undergo a series of shifts. In Kaviraj's terms (speaking only of Indian Hinduism), one such shift could be imagined as the transition from a "thick," comprehensive religiosity that grasps the world as an articulated whole, to a modern comparatively "thin" religious sense, where religion remains but is crucially de-centered. It lays claim to only parts of the whole. Since the demands of modernity (political mobilization, for example) seem to play a part in this shift, the tantalizing question presents itself as to what extent the fate of religion in India is tied up with the emergence of new kinds of modernist selves that may map onto or adjust Taylor's description of the "buffered self."

Of course, the lingering promise of the discussion is not its potential merely to confirm, disconfirm, or globalize Taylor's account, but the way that it opens up grounds for comparing modernization and secularization understood as diverse and increasingly diversifying processes. The foundation thus laid contributes to what could be called a post-secular theory of modernities.

An Archaeology of Religious Forms

Once the transition is made from a secularist to a post-secularist viewpoint for which religion is not something emptied of meaning or destined to disappear, it becomes possible to perceive the religious foundations of things no longer or not merely religious in a parochial sense.

The theologian Friedrich Wilhelm Graf suggested that searching evaluations of such pieces of modern furniture as "the public" involves the attempt to grasp not only their philosophical justification, but their "implicit theology." As our discussions with Krzysztof Michalski about the early Heidegger and Giorgio Agamben's commentary of Paul's Epistle to the Romans showed, modern notions of authenticity and time reveal their meaning in novel ways, once their roots in religious and theological ideas become visible. At issue here, of course, is not proving that such things are truly religious so much as it is to uncover their deep history and motivating force.

Religion, Political Philosophy, and the Public

The turn to religion necessitates that scholars take religion seriously as a phenomenon of investigation. Scholars interested in culture, identity, and politics will have to contend (and are already contending) with this imperative. As our discussions with Michael Sandel, Nilüfer Göle, José Casanova, and Marcin Król suggest, political philosophy faces particularly acute challenges in this regard.

The recent controversies in France and elsewhere over the public place of religion help bring to light the shortcomings of some of the most important figures of the political-philosophical canon. According to the tradition from Hobbes to Jefferson and from Kant to Rawls, religion enters the public, if it must at all, only after suffering significant restrictions. Needless to say, such a situation creates gaps between their public and private selves that people can and often enough do find unbearable. If, however, it is obvious that not all religious symbols, claims, and practices can without some oversight be allowed within the public enclosure, political philosophers are thrown back upon the hardly novel but nonetheless foundational problem of translation. By translation I mean the way that religion is worked up and made available, in this case, for public consideration. The question is how religion can be conceptualized in a way more productive and attuned to the specific claims of religious people. Is there a way to rethink the rules of the public such that religious views, doctrine, and even theological justifications are not simply voided as inadmissible?

We should ask what it would mean if religion was no longer considered the primary perpetrator of unreason. If Jürgen Habermas and others are to believed, the fate of Western politics may even depend on making religion a source—rather than the opponent—of the public good. ◁

Summer School Religion in Public Life Cortona, Italy, July 7–14, 2010

Seminar 1:
Religion and Multiple Modernities

Dipesh Chakrabarty
Professor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations and the College, University of Chicago; IWM Visiting Fellow

Sudipta Kaviraj
Professor of South Asian Politics and Intellectual History, Head of the Department of Middle Eastern and Asian Languages and Cultures, Columbia University; IWM Visiting Fellow

Charles Taylor
Professor em. of Philosophy, McGill University, Montréal; IWM Permanent Fellow

Seminar 2:
Religion and Democracy

José Casanova
Professor of Sociology and Head of the Program "Globalization, Religion and the Secular", Georgetown University

Marcin Król
Professor of the History of Ideas and Philosophy, Dean, Faculty of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University

Seminar 3:
God in Contemporary Debates

Friedrich Wilhelm Graf
Professor of Systematic Theology and Ethics, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich

Krzysztof Michalski
Professor of Philosophy, Boston and Warsaw Universities; Rector of the IWM

Seminar 4:
The Role of Faith in Public Discourse

Nilüfer Göle
Director of Studies, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris

Michael Sandel
Professor of Government, Harvard University

Evening Lecture:
State and Religion in Italy

Giuliano Amato
Professor for Constitutional Law, Rome; former Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior of Italy

The Invisible Minority

BY GERHARD BAUMGARTNER

Only 10 percent of all Austrian Roma and Sinti survived the Holocaust. Traumatized and distrustful, many of them rebuilt their lives in secrecy. After decades of invisibility, they now finally seem to belong to Austrian mainstream culture. Yet, as the recent expulsions of Roma in France have shown, such a happy end is rather the exception than the rule in Europe.

Like all Central European countries, Austria has a sizeable Roma community. Between 30,000 and 50,000 Roma are estimated to be living in the eastern parts of the state, mostly in and around Vienna and in the provinces of Lower Austria and Burgenland. Their number can only be estimated because, in contrast to most neighboring countries, the Roma minority of Austria is basically invisible: there are no Roma slums and ghettos in the suburbs, no communities of underprivileged and unemployed Roma living primarily on social welfare. Unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary, Austria does not have what, in the quickly radicalizing discourse of the last decade, has come to be referred to as the "Roma problem".

Austria had similar difficulties dealing with its Roma population during the interwar years, especially in the easternmost province of Burgenland, which was only annexed to Austria in 1921 and which exhibited many of the structural deficiencies of neighboring Hungary. Among these was the fact that the substantial group of Roma residents, mostly impoverished agricultural workers, had no land whatsoever of their own, instead serving as a regional labor reservoir for local farmers and big manorial estates, improving their meager incomes from harvest work, and by working as musicians, itinerant craftsmen and peddlers during the winter months. Against dearly held romantic prejudices, by the end of the 19th century the vast majority of Central European Roma had settled down permanently and did not roam the countryside in what was considered to be a typically "Gypsy fashion" by bourgeois society.

Even their western European counterparts, the so-called Sinti, only migrated for a certain part of the year, and usually followed long established routes revolving around traditional country fairs, pilgrimages and seasonal markets. In Austria in the years leading up to WWII, only about 3000 people belonged to this category, whereas nearly 10,000 Roma lived in 130 settlements in the province of Burgenland, in some villages making up between 25 and 40 percent of the local population.

Administering the poor and implementing the poor laws constituted one of the major tasks of national police forces at the beginning of the 20th century. In many countries, this brought the Roma and Sinti under increasing surveillance from the police and public welfare agencies. The first full identity cards in the modern sense of the word, containing fingerprints and a photograph, were issued by the French police in 1913 for French "Gypsies". Switzerland established the first detention camp for "Gypsies" and other migrants in 1924, and when the International Criminal Police—a forerunner of today's Interpol—was founded in Vienna in 1923, one of its main objectives, apart from putting a stop to human trafficking, was a better control of the European Gypsy population. "Gypsy persecution" provided excellent career opportunities for ambitious police officers keen to be at the forefront of international police work, with its new scientific methods of detection. With the help of the local administration, the majority of Central and Western European "Gypsies" thus became catalogued and registered in racially motivated databases before the beginning of WWII.

Photo: Gerhard Baumgartner

The first full identity cards were issued by the French police in 1913 for French "Gypsies"

The late 1930s were characterized by a fatal combination of three factors. First, the global economic crisis had caused thousands of unemployed workers to stream from the industrial centers back to their hometowns and villages, and pushed the majority of the Roma out of rural labor markets. Second, completely inappropriate welfare legislation burdened local communities with looking after the local poor and destitute resulting in numerous and violent conflicts. Third, a radically racist anti-"Gypsy" discourse accompanied the rise of fascist parties, especially Hitler's National Socialists, branding all Roma and Sinti as "work-shy", "asocial" and as "born criminals".

Under war conditions and Nazi rule, this rapidly escalated into a policy of genocide and extermination, with local administration providing data about "their Gypsies", police forces arresting whole families, forcing them into special detention camps, and then deportation into extermination camps—organized and paid for by regional social welfare agencies, who wanted to get rid of these "unproductive" elements of society.

Only 10 per cent of all Austrian Roma and Sinti survived the Holocaust—less than 1500 persons. Traumatized and impoverished, they tried to rebuild their lives. Mistrusting everyone, they even kept their language secret. When, during the economic boom of the 1960s, many migrated to the industrial centers around Vienna, Graz and Linz, they often changed their telltale "Gypsy" names to more ordinary sounding German ones and tried to pass themselves off as Yugoslav guest workers—all in order to escape still rampant anti-"Gypsy" prejudices. For decades they became completely invisible.

Only after official recognition as an Austrian National Group in 1993 did many Austrian Roma come out of hiding. Official recognition as a minority opened access to certain public funds and motivated another group of Roma to risk a gradual "coming out" of their own. After having lived in Austria for up to 25 years, many so-called "guest workers" from former Yugoslavia started to reveal themselves as Roma in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several Roma cultural associations tried for years to encourage more and more immigrants from South-Eastern Europe to profess their Roma origins.

But since doing so would improve neither their legal nor their social status, many people of Roma origin were reluctant. They preferred to suffer from the usual Austrian "reservations" against immigrants from the Balkans and Turkey rather than from anti-"Gypsy" prejudices. Unrecognizable, they remained within the fold of the segregated Austrian "guest worker" society.

A distinctive change in the average Austrian's attitude towards "Gypsies" only set in after 1995. On February 5th, 1995 a bomb planted by a rightwing fanatic at the entrance of a small Roma settlement in Burgenland killed four young men. The overtly racist attack—the bomb was attached to a signboard reading "Roma back to India"—was the first politically motivated assassination in Austria since 1945 and it shook the whole country.

For the Austrian Roma and Sinti, it marked the beginning of a new era. For the first time in history, the state and its representatives openly and courageously sided with the Roma victims against the perpetrators. The Chancellor rushed to Burgenland to assure the Roma community of the government's full support. The victims were given a quasi-state burial, with all high ranking officials of state attending, and the coffins were conducted to the local cemetery by the President of the Republic with more than 1000 sympathizers in attendance. The assassination also triggered intensive education programs as well as a public discussion about the history of Austrian Roma, their current situation, traditional Roma culture and prevailing racist prejudices.

In recent years, this has emboldened more and more young people of Roma origin positively to identify with their roots, a fact also illustrated by the fantastic increase of professed Romanes speakers in the Austrian census, which leapt from three in 1981 to over 6000 in 2001.

The Roma have finally arrived in Austrian mainstream culture. They have become an officially recognized minority group, and prejudiced or even racist remarks about Roma are now considered severe transgressions of "political correctness". Openly racist public discourse about so called "Gypsy-crime", as is typical in Hungary or Slovakia, have no place in Austrian public life. Many Austrians fear that developments in these countries might, under certain circumstances, deteriorate into open persecution. The major ingredients for a repetition of such a catastrophe—severe economic crisis, an inapt welfare system and a racist discourse—are all present. ◁

Gerhard Baumgartner is an Austrian historian and journalist. He is a member of the Austrian Historical Commission, which is appointed by the government to study all aspects of the country's restitution efforts to victims of the Nazi era. Baumgartner held a seminar in the IWM series "Faces of Eastern Europe".

Beyond Horror and Mystery

BY DANIEL TREISMAN

Two souls, alas, are dwelling in Russia's breast. The one is dark, brutal and corrupt, the other mysterious, exotic and inscrutable. Visions like these have shaped the country's image over decades. Yet in order to better understand Russia today, neither of these views will get us very far. American political scientist Daniel Treisman explains why.

Illustration: nicooley / istockphoto

Much of the writing about Russia that is published today in the West—whether journalistic, historical, or in some other genre—fits into one of two well-established traditions. These traditions, which cross-fertilize, have come to define the country's image. They set up expectations in the reader's mind that an author ignores at his peril.

The first approach is to focus on the dark side of Russian reality, to show the country as a source of cathartic thrills, a land of disasters. Russia, in this view, is a place where governments have always been brutal and corrupt, where human nature has been twisted into grotesque forms. A kind of historical freak show, its shadows contrast with the brilliance of European civilization.

This vision is not new. Since the first English explorers seeking an Arctic route to China washed up near Arkhangelsk in 1553, one of Russia's main exports has been unflattering descriptions of itself. Its peasants, early visitors wrote, were drunkards, idolaters, and sodomites; its emperors tyrannical; its forests a breeding ground for witches. The idiom climaxed in the polemics of Astolphe de Custine, a reactionary French marquis who visited in the 1840s, ingratiated himself with the tsar, and came home complaining that his conception of absolute monarchy had been ruined.

The dark view is not a monopoly of foreigners. There is also a powerful homegrown tradition of relishing the country's awfulness. "Oh, Lord, how wretched our Russia is," Pushkin is supposed to have exclaimed after reading Gogol's satirical masterpiece *Dead Souls*. His contemporary, the philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev, saw Russia as a "blank page in the intellectual order" that existed only to "teach the world some great lesson." Modern variations abound. All Russians, writes the novelist Viktor Yerofeyev, are "the children of torture… the descendants of those beaten with the knout."

At its gentlest, the dark vision surfaces in the sense that in Russia ambitious projects, however nobly intended, always go wrong. A kind of gravitational force pulls towards failure. "We wanted the best," said then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in the mid-1990s, explaining some policy disaster, "but things turned out as always." "We set our sights on communism," wrote the philsopher Aleksandr Zinoviev, "but ended up in Russia."

Such views often rest on a frame of historical determinism. Russians, it is said, are victims of their past. Enslaved for more than two centuries by the Mongols, ruled for another four by absolutist emperors, then subjected to communist dictatorship, Russians missed the formative experiences of Western civilization—the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. Serfdom imparted a servility to the Russian character that individuals can only expunge with great effort—as Chekhov put it, "squeezing the slave out, drop by drop."

The second common approach to Russia is to turn mystical when the country is mentioned, to exult in paradoxes and wallow in the exotic. Russia, it is said, is unique and unknowable. Unlike other parts of the world, it does not share its secrets with social scientists and statisticians.

Most such accounts quote the 19th Century romantic poet Fyodor Tyutchev, author of intense verses about wailing winds, dew before dawn, and stars in the mist. Russia is beyond human comprehension, Tyutchev wrote in his most famous quatrain, unmeasurable by the yardsticks of science, an entity in which, like God, "one can only believe." Tatyana Tolstaya, a contemporary novelist, describes Russia as "an accursed but bewitching place." Its "inner geometry is decidedly non-Euclidean," its roads "are Möbius strips," its parallel lines "cross as many times as you like."

From such paradoxes, Russia's mystifiers usually proceed to a discussion of the "Russian soul." The soul of a Russian, according to the philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev, is a jumble of opposites—despotic yet anarchistic, cruel yet humane, Dionysian yet ascetic: "In the Russian soul, there is a sort of immensity, a vagueness, a predilection for the infinite, such as is suggested by the great plain of Russia." In short, an easy place to get lost.

One of Russia's main exports has been unflattering descriptions of itself

As a way to understand Russia today, neither of these approaches gets us very far. The dismal view of Russian history can draw on considerable evidence. Still, it is an exaggeration. It is easy to forget the context and contrast Russia's defects to an idealized conception of other countries.

For instance, one does not often hear of Poles squeezing out their serf mentality, even though serfdom was not abolished in the Kingdom of Poland until three years after it ended in Russia proper. In both Prussia and Denmark, serfs actually made up a larger proportion of the population. Those who emphasize Russia's tradition of autocracy certainly have a point. Yet one should not forget the variety of town assemblies, councils of nobles, and elective bodies that recur throughout the country's past, from the medieval veches to the 19th century *zemstva*. Circumscribed and insecure as these bodies were, they do still constitute a bright corner in the canvas of absolutism.

To readers of Chaadayev and Custine, the flowering of literature, music, and painting in 19th Century Russia would have seemed impossible. Custine, who spoke no Russian, was nevertheless certain that: "The air of this country is unfavorable to the finer arts." Besides Pushkin, the air proved sufficient to support the writers Gogol, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, and Chekhov, the composers Tchaikovsky and Musorgsky, and the painters Levitan and Repin.

Recent history casts doubt on the more extreme versions of cultural determinism. Before 1992, many thought Russians too distrustful, collectivist, and hostile toward private initiative to produce a class of entrepreneurs that could flourish in a market economy. They were wrong. Russia's new businessmen learned overnight how to make money and showed all too much initiative and commitment to the profit motive. The pessimists thought Russians' values irredeemably authoritarian. Yet in poll after poll Russians have shown that—although the word "democracy" has acquired negative connotations—large majorities favor freedom of speech, freedom for opposition parties, and free and fair elections.

Of course, the past matters; but the footprints do not control the walker. Countries are always both reliving and escaping from their histories, and those histories are not single narratives but albums of distinct and often mutually contradictory stories that offer multiple possibilities for development.

As for the mystifiers, they surely have the right to sell their onion domes and spiritual intensity to the West, just as one hundred years ago Diaghilev, with his *Ballets Russes,* marketed the "mysterium of Russia" to pre-World War I Parisian audiences. Yet, the exoticism and paradoxes quickly come to seem old. They do not lead anywhere. Nor are they original. The "Russian soul," it turns out, is second-hand, adapted in the 1820s and 1830s from the "German soul" and "German spirit" of Schelling and Hegel.

The connection is worth considering. If German history teaches anything it is that cultures can change, quite dramatically and very fast. One hundred years of palpitations over the German psyche—in its Hegelian, Nietzschean, and Wagnerian versions—seemed to some historians to have paved the way to Auschwitz. Then, suddenly, after 1945, Germans turned out to be quite capable of sustaining a quiet, pragmatic, bourgeois democracy. If the Germans, why not the Russians?

Russia's politics and society are as susceptible as those elsewhere to careful observation, measurement, and reasoned interpretation. A generation of work by social scientists from both Russia and the West has already shown this. When examined closely, the sometimes chaotic motion of the last two decades turns out to contain clear and quite intelligible patterns that are in many ways similar to those found in other countries. Most of the sinister features that upset critics are, unfortunately, typical of countries at intermediate levels of economic development. Russia is unique. But it is unique in the way that France and Malaysia are unique—no more, no less. ◁

Daniel Treisman is Professor for Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Visiting Fellow at the IWM. He recently published the book *The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev.*

Authoritarianism 2.0

BY IVAN KRASTEV

Contemporary authoritarian regimes, such as in Russia, are no longer held together by the fear factor anymore. The weakness of the resistance to authoritarianism today seems to be less a fruit of effective repression than of the very openness of these regimes, argues Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev.

Illustration: Benedicto116 / Wikipedia

In her famous November 1979 article in *Commentary,* "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Jeane Kirkpatrick argued that totalitarian regimes grounded in revolutionary ideology are not only more repressive than traditional authoritarian regimes but are much harder to liberalize or democratize. In her view, ideology is a source of transcendental legitimacy for these regimes, giving them some of the qualities of theocracies.

Ideology also served as a means of securing the ruling elite's coherence. The notion of "the correct party line," as Ken Jowitt has argued, did for Leninist regimes what democratic procedures had done in the West. The existence of a ruling party rooted in an ideology was vital to solving the problem of succession, the most dangerous source of instability in autocratic regimes. The ruling ideology also served as a tool for political mobilization. As the history of the Soviet Union shows, it was sometimes easier to die for the regime than to live under it. The heroism of the Soviet people during World War II provided the ultimate demonstration of the power of the ideological authoritarians.

The notion of ideology as a source of strength for autocratic regimes is so much a part of the Cold War's legacy in the West that one is surprised to encounter the post-Soviet elite's view of communist ideology as one of the old regime's weaknesses. The USSR's collapse showed that ideology corrodes autocratic regimes in two ways: it feeds the reformist delusions of the elite, and it gives the regime's opponents a language and a platform by holding up an ideal against which the regime can be measured and found wanting.

During the last twenty years, thousands of books have been published on the nature of Mikhail Gorbachev's revolution. But for my argument, the key point is that Gorbachev started his reforms not because he had lost faith in communism, but because he remained a true believer, who was firmly convinced that the genuine socialism he hoped to install would prove itself decisively superior to the democratic capitalism of the West. Reforms from above often are generated by rulers' misperceptions; not their accurate grasp of reality.

Ideology not only breeds reformist delusions on the part of elites, it also gives the opposition a discourse that it can use to press the regime from below. As a rule, dissidents in the Soviet bloc were former believers; before opposing Marxist regimes root and branch, they had often criticized these regimes in the language of Marxism itself. One cannot fully understand the power of the Prague Spring or of Solidarity's "self-limiting revolution" without understanding the self-consciously "dialectical" nature of these movements. The revolutions of 1989 were the *joint* product of communist elites who contributed to the demise of their own regimes by genuinely trying to reform them *and* of oppositionists who fueled the regimes' demise by pretending to want reform when in reality they had come to desire complete uprooting.

Resisting Putin's regime is so difficult precisely because of its lack of any ideology beyond a meaningless mélange of Kremlin-produced sound bites. Public relations experts are not fit for the role of ideologues because an ideology, unlike an ad campaign, is something in which its authors must believe. The new authoritarian regimes' lack of any real ideology explains their tendency to view themselves as corporations. In order to stay in power, they try to eradicate the very idea of the public interest. In this context, the glorification of the market does not undermine the new authoritarian capitalism; it can even strengthen it. If the public interest is nothing more than the unintended outcome of millions of individuals pursuing their private interests, then any sacrifice in the name of the public interest is a waste.

The new authoritarian regimes' lack of any ideology also partly explains why the democratic world is reluctant to confront them. They do not seek to export their political models, and hence they are not threatening. The new authoritarian regimes do not want to transform the world or to impose their system on other countries. So the axis of conflict today is no longer the free world versus the world of authoritarianism—it is rather the free world versus the world of free riding.

The emergence of an exit-minded middle class in Russia is at the heart of the regime's survival capacity

Also lurking behind the belief that authoritarianism is doomed to the slow death of reform or the sudden death of collapse is the assumption that the opening of borders must be fatal to autocracy. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Adolphe de Custine, the French aristocrat who went to Russia in 1839 looking for arguments to support his conservatism and came back as an advocate of constitutionalism, had already claimed that "the political system of Russia could not withstand twenty years of free communication with Western Europe." His proposition is a common belief today: open borders allow people to see a different way of life and to struggle to achieve it, thus encouraging demands for change. Open borders also make it easier for people to organize with help from abroad.

But do open borders really destabilize authoritarian regimes? Joseph Stalin, of course, very much believed so. He sent to the gulag millions of Soviet soldiers whose only crime was that they had seen Western or even Central Europe. But Putin is not Stalin. He does not try to govern Russia by preventing people from traveling; he governs it by allowing them to travel. While open borders place some limits on a government's ability to manipulate and persecute, they also afford opportunities to promote the survival of the regime.

Almost forty years ago, economist Albert O. Hirschman, in his brilliant little book *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,* explained why railways in Nigeria had performed so poorly in the face of competition from trucks and buses. In his view, consumers, such as the customers of the Nigerian railways or members of organizations can offer two opposing responses to the deterioration of the goods they buy or the services they receive. The first is *exit*—simply the act of leaving, such as buying another shampoo, resigning from the party, or departing from the country. *Voice,* by contrast, is an act of complaining or protesting. As Hirschman points out, however, the easy availability of exit, like the easy availability of trucks and buses in the Nigerian case, tends to diminish the use of voice, because exit requires less time and commitment.

Exit is particularly attractive for middle-class Russians who have managed to become consumers and at the same time are discouraged about the potential for collective action. Russia's demographic situation—its aging and shrinking populace—and Russia's weak national identity have made exit a very natural option for those who are disappointed with the regime. The emergence of an exit-minded middle class in Russia is at the heart of the regime's survival capacity. Russian economist Leonid Grigoriev recently suggested that more than "two million Russian democrats have left the country in the last decade." Voting with one's feet by leaving Russia because it is undemocratic is not the same as voting to make Russia democratic.

In fact, Hirschman's explanation may be the key to understanding why it is so difficult to resist Putin's authoritarianism. It explains the failure of reforms and the resulting loss of the reformist spirit in Russia. Paradoxically, the opening of the borders and the opportunity to live and work abroad have led to the decline of political reformism. The people who are most likely to be upset by the poor quality of governance in Russia are the very same people who are the most ready and able to leave Russia. For them, changing the country in which they live is easier than reforming it. Why try to turn Russia into Germany, when there is no guarantee that a lifetime is long enough for that mission and when Germany is but a short trip away? The opinion polls demonstrate that Russia's middle class prefers to work abroad and to come home to Russia during the holidays to see their friends and relatives.

Comparing the outburst of reformist energy in the 1980s with the lack of such energy today makes me believe that, while the sealing of the borders destroyed Soviet communism, the opening of the borders helps the new Russian authoritarianism to survive. The Soviet system locked its citizens in. Changing the system was the only way to change your life. Today's Russia, on the other hand, very much resembles the Nigerian railways—it will remain inefficient as long as there is enough oil money to compensate for its inefficiency. The major reason why Russians are reluctant to protest is not fear; it is because the people who care most have already left the country or have resolved to do so in the near future—or they may simply have moved to the virtual reality of the Internet (Russians on average spend twice as much time using online social networks as their Western counterparts). The consequence is that there is no critical mass of people demanding change.

Where will all this lead? It is not easy to predict. But I would say that the future of dysfunctional authoritarian regimes like the one we see in Russia today is less likely to eventuate in democracy than in decay. It is not "after Putin, the deluge," but "after Putin, the dry rot." ◁

Ivan Krastev is Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. This article is based on the Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on Democracy in the World which Krastev delivered in Washington D.C. on October 19, 2010.

Fellows and Guests *09–12 2010*

Erika Abrams
Paul Celan Fellow (July–December 2010)

Freelance translator, Paris

Jan Patočka: Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie d'Aristote à Hegel (Czech > French)

Stefan Auer
Guest (September 2010)

Director, Innovative Universities European Union Centre, La Trobe University, Melbourne

Why Boundaries Matter in a Borderless Europe

Patryk Babiracki
Józef Tischner Fellow (August–December 2010)

Assistant Professor of History, University of Texas-Arlington

Staging the Empire: Soviet-Polish Cultural Initiatives in Propaganda, Science and the Arts, 1943–1957

Christine Blättler
Lise Meitner Fellow (August 2009–July 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Potsdam; FWF-project leader

The Phantasmagoria as a Focus of Modernity; Genealogy and Function of a Philosophical Concept

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Ian Blaustein
Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2010–March 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Autonomy, Conscience, and Self-Deception

Sanja Bojanic
Paul Celan Fellow (July–December 2010)

Freelance translator, Belgrade

Luce Irigaray: Speculum de l'autre femme (French > Serbian)

Marta Bucholc
Bronisław Geremek Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Academic Teacher of Sociology, University of Warsaw

Finding Our Way Through Language. Weber and Wittgenstein on Politics and Science

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Anne Dwyer
Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2010–March 2011)

Assistant Professor of Russian Studies, Pomona College, Claremont

The Gates of Europe: Cultural Traffic Between the Late Habsburg and Romanov Empires

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Tomasz Gromelski
Bronisław Geremek Fellow (September 2010–March 2011)

Postdoctoral Fellow, European University Institute, Florence

The Concept of Civic Duty in Early Modern Eastern and Western Europe

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Julia Hertlein
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–February 2011)

Doktorandin der Soziologie, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

Erfahrung und Kritik: Eine (notwendige) epistemologische Komplizenschaft?

Jan Kühne
Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2010–March 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Jewish Studies, European Forum of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Sammy Gronemann— A Study in Satire, Secularism, and the Sacred

---

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow (March 2008–February 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Paderborn; FWF-project leader

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in *Naturphilosophie* around 1800

Iris Mendel
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–February 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, University of Vienna; ÖAW DOC-Team stipendiary

Epistemologies of Resistance. The Politics of Epistemology in the Social Sciences

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Irina Nedeva
Milena Jesenská Fellow (October–December 2010)

Senior editor, Bulgarian National Radio, Sofia

"Translating the West"— Risks and Pleasures

Olena Palko
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, National Academy of Sciences, Kyiv

National Communism: an Attempt to Compare the Ukrainian and European Experience

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Mark Pickering
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Kant's Phenomenalism: Apriority, Necessity, and Psychologism in the *First Critique*

Anastasia Platonova
Alexander Herzen Fellow (September–December 2010)

Lecturer in Philosophy, Tomsk State University of Architecture and Building

The Ethic of Responsibility in Technogenic Civilization: the Problem of the Subject

---

Julia Riegler
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–February 2011)

Doktorandin der Philosophie, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

„…und dann ist da unten zu". Eine empirische Rekonstruktion des Phänomens chronischer Schmerzen beim Geschlechtsverkehr aus feministischer Perspektive

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Nora Ruck
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–February 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Psychology, University of Vienna; ÖAW DOC-Team stipendiary

The Beautiful Body in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility

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Leo Schlöndorff
Junior Visiting Fellow (April–September 2010)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy and German Philology, University of Vienna; ÖAW DOC-Team stipendiary

Modern and Postmodern Apocalypse in Fiction and Science

Kornelia Slavova
Paul Celan Fellow (July–September 2010)

Associate Professor of American Studies, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia

Donna L. Dickenson: Body Shopping. Converting Body Parts to Profit (English > Bulgarian)

Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow (November 2007–October 2010)

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Vienna; FWF-project leader

The Many Faces of Violence: Toward an Integrative Phenomenological Conception

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Katharina Steidl
Junior Visiting Fellow (April–September 2010)

Doktorandin der Kunstgeschichte, Akademie der Bildenden Künste Wien; ÖAW DOC-Stipendiatin

Bilder des Schattens. Fotogramme zwischen Zufall, Berührung und Imagination

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Sándor Tatar
Paul Celan Fellow (October–December 2010)

Chefbibliothekar, Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Budapest

Jan Assmann: Die Zauberflöte. Oper und Mysterium (Deutsch > Ungarisch)

Sarah Tobin
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Anthropology, Boston University

Is It *Really* Islamic? Piousness and Religious Life in Amman, Jordan

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Daniel Treisman
Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Economics and Public Opinion in Russia During and After the Financial Crisis

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Olga Tyapkina
Alexander Herzen Fellow (September–December 2010)

Professor of Urban History, Altai State Technical University, Barnaul

Small Towns as a Phenomenon of Historical Urbanization

Iryna Vushko
Junior Visiting Fellow (September–December 2010)

Researcher in History, Lviv, Ukraine

From *Politicum* to Policing: Police in East-Central Europe, 1740–1848

Sara Zorandy
Paul Celan Fellow (July–September 2010)

Freelance translator-interpreter, Budapest

Meir Avraham Munk: History of My Life (Hungarian > English)

Varia

And the award goes to…

He referred to it as only a "sketchy treatment" but in fact, **Charles Taylor's** *A Secular Age* proves to be no less than the most comprehensive account of Western secularization. For this outstanding study, the Canadian philosopher and IWM Permanent Fellow received the Bruno Kreisky Prize for the Political Book of the year 2010. The award ceremony is going to take place in early June at the Renner Institute; we are looking forward to it!

Congratulations also to **Yaroslav Hrytsak!** The Ukrainian historian, who was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2009, received the 2010 Anton Gindely Prize for culture and history in Central, Eastern and South-East Europe awarded by the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research and the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM). Professor Hrytsak's commemorative speech "More Wrong Than Right" dealt with the changes in the Ukrainian politics of memory and can be downloaded at the IDM website.

Finally, we are very pleased to announce that the **Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Bulgaria** and the IWM jointly established a new program awarding fellowships to young Bulgarian researchers in the humanities. The program is named after the eminent Bulgarian intellectual, writer and literary historian Tsvetan Stoyanov, who would be 80 this year. The program will start in fall 2011.

We warmly welcome…

In January we received cheerful news from former IWM Visiting Fellow **Margherita Angelini:** "siamo molto felici di annunciare che il 5 gennaio 2011 alle 11.02 è nata la bellissima Lara!" For all of those who are not fluent in Italian we are happy to translate that gorgeous Lara was born in Venice on January 5. All our best to her and to her proud parents!

There was another addition to an IWM related family. **Barbara Abraham,** who had been in charge of project management at the Institute for many years, gave birth to little Julia on November 22, 2010. We hope to see both of them at the Institute one of these days.

Time to say goodbye to…

A warm farewell to **Anna Müller,** who—after an internship in spring—had joined the Institute's staff as a project assistant from August to November 2010. She greatly supported the event management and PR sections in carrying out IWM's European Debates series. Now she is back in Berlin, where she does such astonishing things as organizing discursive boxing performances and shooting artistic documentaries. We hope she benefited as much from her experience here as we did from her contribution.

Goodbye also to **Sarah Kohlmeier** and **Gerald Zachar,** who joined the team as interns from December 2010 to February 2011. Sarah studied Social and Cultural Anthropology at Vienna University, Gerald at Paris University. We wish them all the best for their future.

Erratum

In the last issue of the IWM*post* we announced that Peter Forstmoser had been appointed member of the Financial Control Commission of the Institute. This was correct. Unfortunately however, we were wrong in that he succeeded Dr. Gertrude Brinek. His predecessor is **Gerald Rainer,** whom we would like to thank sincerely for his long-standing and excellent consultancy. We apologize for the confusion.

You can find the Travels & Talks on our website: www.iwm.at > Fellows

Publications of Fellows and Guests

Erika Abrams
Paul Celan Fellow

Jan Patočka and the Heritage of Phenomenology, edited with Ivan Chvatík, Berlin/New York: Springer, 2010

Christine Blättler
Lise Meitner Fellow

Kunst der Serie. Die Serie in den Künsten, München: Fink, 2010

Demonstration und Exploration. Aspekte der Darstellung im wissenschaftlichen und literarischen Experiment, in: Michael Gamper, *Experiment und Literatur,* Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010

„Zwischen Marx und Fourier". Walter Benjamins Begriff der Phantasmagorie, in: *Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie,* 2 (2010)

Das Experiment im Spannungsfeld von Freiheit und Zwang, in: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* 58/6 (2010)

Zuzan Búrniková
Robert Bosch Fellow 2003

Au Pair, with Daniel Miller, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010

Dipesh Chakrabarty
Visiting Fellow in 2010

Europa als Provinz. Perspektiven postkolonialer Geschichtsschreibung, Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2010

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow

Philosophiegeschichte als Verflechtungsgeschichte, in: *Zeitschrift für kritische Theorie,* 30/31 (2010)

Bio-Technosciences in Philosophy, in: *Diogenes,* 225/1 (2010)

Krzysztof Michalski
Rector

The Fragility of It All, in: *Agelaki,* 15/3 (2010)

Papiez by sie temu sprzeciwili, in: *Polska,* 16 (2010)

Polski Kosciol ubogi duchem, in: *Gazeta Wyborcza,* September 6, 2010

Zrozumiec przemijanie, Warsaw: Biblioteka kwartalnika Kronos, 2011

Логика и время. Хайдеггер и современная философия, Russian translation of *Heidegger i filozofia współczesna* (Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy) and *Logika i czas* (Logic and Time), Moscow: Territoria Budushchego, 2010

Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow

Racism—On the Phenomenology of Embodied Desocialization, in: *Continental Philosophy Review* (in print)

L'Europe et ses violences, in: *Revue philosophique de Louvain* (in print)

Birgit Sauer
QUING Project

Framing and Gendering, in: Dorothy McBride und Amy G. Mazur (eds.), *The Politics of State Feminism,* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010

Reforming University, Re-Gendering Careers, in: Birgit Riegraf et al. (eds.), *Gender Change in Academia,* Wiesbaden: vs Verlag, 2010

Demokratie und Geschlecht, in: Peter Wahl und Dieter Klein (Hg.), *Demokratie und Krise – Krise der Demokratie,* Berlin: Dietz, 2010

Das Private des Sozialen? Mechanismen der Geschlechterpolitik im Neoliberalismus, in: Andrea Grisold et al. (Hg.), *Neoliberalismus und die Krise des Sozialen. Das Beispiel Österreich,* Wien: Böhlau, 2010

Going Public? (Re)presentation of Women's Policy in the Media, in: Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten and Katrin Voltmer (eds.), *Public Policy and Mass Media,* Oxon: Routledge, 2010

Timothy Snyder
Permanent Fellow

Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, New York, Basic Books, 2010



© Basic Books

Americans call the Second World War "The Good War". But before it even began, America's wartime ally Joseph Stalin had killed millions of his own citizens—and kept killing them during and after the war. Before Hitler was finally defeated, he had murdered six million Jews and nearly as many other Europeans. At war's end, both the German and the Soviet killing sites fell behind the iron curtain, leaving the history of mass killing in darkness. *Bloodlands* is a new kind of European history, presenting the mass murders committed by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes as two aspects of a single history, in the time and place where they occurred: between Germany and Russia, when Hitler and Stalin both held power.

Manuel Tröster
Program Coordinator

Essays on Christian Meier, in: *Classical Review,* 60/2 (2010)

IWM Publications

Transit 40 (Winter 2010/11), **Das Zeitalter der Ungewissheit**
Religion und Politik in Zeiten der Globalisierung

Vor etwas mehr als 20 Jahren brach das Sowjetimperium zusammen. Kurz danach trafen sich am IWM Historiker aus West und Ost, um über eine neue europäische Geschichtsschreibung nach dem Ende der Teilung nachzudenken. Das Forschungsprojekt „Rethinking Post-War Europe", geleitet vom britischen Historiker Tony Judt, markierte einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Historiographie. Judt starb am 6. August 2010. Das neue Heft von Transit ist seinem Gedächtnis gewidmet. Zusammen mit seinem Kollegen Timothy Snyder hat er kurz vor seinem Tod seine Erinnerungen festgehalten; in gemeinsamer Reflexion versuchen die beiden Autoren, die biographischen Episoden in den historischen Kontext des 20. Jahrhunderts einzubetten (*Thinking the Twentieth Century,* 2011). In Transit 40 ist vorab das Kapitel über die Begegnung mit Osteuropa nachzulesen. Tony Judt war auch ein eminent politischer Kopf. In seinen letzten Jahren plädierte er leidenschaftlich für die Erneuerung der Sozialdemokratie in unserem „Zeitalter der Ungewissheit". Die Frage nach der Tragfähigkeit der sozialen Solidarität angesichts der gegenwärtigen Krise des Kapitalismus bildet den Schwerpunkt des neuen Heftes.

Mit Beiträgen von:
Timothy Snyder, Tony Judt, Cornelia Klinger, Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuß, Jacques Rupnik, Robert Kuttner, Katherine S. Newman, Roman Frydman und Michael D. Goldberg, Jan-Werner Müller, Mario Vargas Llosa. Photoessay von Tobias Zielony.

Józef Tischner
Der Streit um die Existenz des Menschen, Berlin: Insel Verlag 2010

© Insel Verlag

Der Priester und Philosoph Józef Tischner, Vordenker der Gewerkschaft Solidarność, gilt als einer der wichtigsten polnischen Intellektuellen des 20. Jahrhunderts. In den Jahren vor seinem Tod wandte er sich noch einmal seinen theologischen und philosophischen Lebensthemen zu. Im Dialog mit Kant und Descartes, Kierkegaard, Levinas und Sartre, aber auch in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Werken Warlam Schalamows und Witold Gombrowiczs stellt er radikale Fragen: Hat der Mensch im Zeitalter des totalitären Terrors, in der Epoche von Auschwitz und Kolyma, nicht seine Menschlichkeit verloren? Müssen die Begriffe des Guten, die Vorstellungen von Gerechtigkeit, Freiheit und Verantwortung neu gedacht werden?

Tischner (1931–2000) war Gründungspräsident des IWM.

IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences

Vol. 28:
Shelby Carpenter / Michal Biletzki (eds.)
Themes of Displacement

Vol. 29:
Maren Behrensen / Lois Lee / Ahmet S. Tekelioglu (eds.)
Modernities Revisited

"Modernity" as a singular, uniform phenomenon has been replaced by a pluralized understanding in which there are as many modernities as there are experiences of it. This collection of essays attempts to understand the two phases of modernity theory in light of one another—as collaborators rather than competitors. Rather than choosing between classical modernity or multiple modernities, the collection explores ways in which these two models can be combined.

With contributions by:
Maren Behrensen, Antonio Ferrara, Grzegorz Krzywiec, Lois Lee, Sorin Gog, Leonardo Schiocchet, Leo Schlöndorff, Elitza Stanoeva, Katharina Steidl, Ahmet S. Tekelioglu, Andrea Thuma

All volumes of the series are published online: www.iwm.at/JVF_conferences.htm

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Paul Celan Translation Program

Justyna Górny
Paul Celan Fellow

Karin Hausen: Porzadek plci. Studia historyczne (Geschlechterordnung. Historische Studien), Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton 2010

Project Syndicate

Ivan Krastev
The Balkans' New Normal
(December 2010)

Timothy Snyder
Stalin, Our Contemporary
(November 2010)

Charles Taylor
Solidarity in a Pluralist Age
(September 2010)

www.project-syndicate.org

Tr@nsit ONLINE

New contributions

Burkhard Liebsch (Universität Leipzig)
Zur Konfiguration menschlicher Geschichte, Gewalt und Gemeinschaft

Katherine S. Newman (Princeton University)
Obama and the Crisis: What Does the Future Hold?

Timothy Snyder (Yale University; IWM)
Brutality in Belarus

Stefan Troebst (Universität Leipzig)
Lebendige Erinnerung an die Diktatur. Was Europas Süden und Osten gemeinsam haben

www.iwm.at/transit_online.htm

Selling the Museum

BY JULIAN STALLABRASS

What do Apple, Coca Cola and Tate Modern have in common? They are all among the list of top global brands. But can museums be marketed in the same way as iPhones or soft drinks? British art historian Julian Stallabrass, who held a lecture in the Institute's series "Art—Society—Politics", says no and explains why the ideas of "brand" and "museum" don't go together.

Ólafur Elíasson's "The Weather Project" at Tate Modern

Photo: Bjoss / Wikipedia

While museums have long had names, identities and even logos, their explicit branding by specialist companies devoted to such tasks is relatively new. The brand is an attempt to stamp all the products of an organisation with the same swiftly recognisable identity to act as an assurance of reliable quality. Yet what does the branding of the museum mean, how far does branding spread into its general operations, and what does branding do to the way art works act on viewers, and to viewers' thinking about them?

The branding of the museum is associated with neoliberal economies, such as the UK and the US, and is less developed in those nations where the state takes a more interventionist role in the direction of culture. Branding, as we shall see, is one response to attracting the transient, insecure and protean populations that the neoliberal attack on the state, welfare and the trade unions brings about, and indeed celebrates as the virtuous, adaptable avatars of the reign of fleet-footed, ever-mutating finance capital.

I will take Tate as the main example here, especially Tate Modern, simply because it is the most successful, innovative and professional branded museum. Its fortunes, following rebranding by the consultancy Wolff Olins in 1998, have been remarkable. Tate as a whole has become a highly recognisable global brand. Tate Modern is by far the most popular museum of modern and contemporary art in the world—the viewer figures oscillate depending on the popularity of individual shows but now hover close to 5 million a year. By comparison, in 2009, the Centre Pompidou in Paris attracted about 3.5 million visitors, the Museum of Modern Art about 2.6, and the Guggenheim New York about 1.2 million.

While Tate Modern will be the focus of this piece, no particular criticism of that institution is implied: it is rather that the museum offers a symptomatic vision of a possible future, and a logical response to the neoliberal climate. As museum-goers, we may look to Tate just as Europeans used to look to the US to glimpse their future as consumers.

Branding is a fundamentally affirmative device. It must be simple, unitary and positive

Branding is a shorthand assurance of quality in an environment where the old forms of local reputation no longer function. Mobile populations in large cities cannot readily avail themselves of gossip about the reputation of the shops and services around them. So tourists head to Starbucks for a standard and consistent experience. Brands are also useful for inculcating trust, since, under the sign of the logo, a certain form of service and behaviour is supposed to be guaranteed. Would you trust your credit card details to a company in Seattle? If it's called "Amazon", probably yes. Increasingly, brands sell life styles (or at least images of them) as well as products. The branded environment of Starbucks is sold as much as its coffee.

In the process of rebranding, Wolff Olins put Tate through a thorough rethinking of all its operations. As the company put it in its own account of the rebranding exercise: "With help from Wolff Olins, Tate reinvented the idea of a gallery—from a single, institutional museum, with a single, institutional view, to a branded collection of experiences, sharing an attitude but offering many different ways of seeing."

The Tate's previously staid status as a solid national institution, a single building with a well-known permanent collection, should be remembered—hard though it is to recover when faced with the current vision of a slick, opportunistic and publicity-hungry cultural behemoth.

Wolff Olins also stated that their aim was to project "an open, modern, forward-looking experience which is as much about entertainment and enjoyment as it is about culture and art." The implied opposition here is telling. Tate sees itself as competing directly with other commercial attractions.

Among the many components of Tate's brand are:

• The name: what had been known as "The Tate Gallery" became "Tate" (and in London, "Tate Britain" and "Tate Modern").

• Slogans: at the launch of Tate Modern, it was "Look Again, Think Again", and there have been many others since.

• Logos: immediately recognisable, of course, as logos have to be, but variable in colour, blurriness, positive or negative lettering.

• Packaging: the architecture of Tate Modern has itself become a logo, and Tate is hardly alone in this, with signature buildings widely recognised as brand identifiers.

• The interior environment, which has a uniformity of design that extends to colours, font, and even the Paul Smith uniforms for the front-of-house staff, the result being that the Tate interior is as recognisable and standard as Starbucks'.

• Tate's own advertising and marketing of a range of branded products from those that are somewhat art-related (sketchpads and pencils) to those that would appear to have little connection to the museum's supposed purpose (mince pies at Christmas).

Less visible is brand promotion and protection through proxies. Wally Olins, a Wolff Olins partner, has written a book-length statement on branding, which stresses that the brand is a communications device for promoting the same consistent message about corporate identity to all concerned parties—consumers, suppliers, workers and, of course, the press (see *The Brand*

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Handbook). Tate runs a very effective publicity machine, which places regular positive stories in the press, and also has the ability to kill hostile stories. The British newspapers are full of PR "stories" placed by powerful branded art institutions, particularly Tate and the British Museum. They are indeed the regular victims of PR agencies which pass publicity off as news, since they increasingly lack the time, resources or will to check facts or offer opposing views.

The branding of the museum opens up opportunities for cross marketing, in which an alliance of brands (McDonalds and Disney is one common combination) is supposed to elevate all involved. At the launch of Tate Modern, six million disposable coffee cups were made for Coffee Republic cafes bearing the doubtful pun, "Latate". Other collaborations have followed.

Another form of cross-branding takes the form of "sponsorship" or "partnership", where the aim is not directly the marketing of products (unless one counts exhibitions) but rather the mutual elevation of brands, although this may be more or less one-sided. In the partnership with British Telecom over the Tate's website, BT attempted to acquire a reputation as being the kind of forward-looking and creative company that would appreciate contemporary art, while the Tate borrowed the mantle of BT's tech-savvy character. In the alliance with BP, to which we will return, it is hard to see what the Tate brand gained (other than, of course, money to fulfil its vision), while it is plain that BP, like any oil company, is anxious to be thought of as culturally concerned—anything to distract attention from the filth, corruption and oppression that inevitably accompanies its core activity.

In these alliances, curation is once again affected. In a board explicating Carsten Höller's *Test Site* (2006–7), in which multi-storey slides took thrilled and scared visitors down the height of the Turbine Hall, curatorial and sponsors' statements appeared side by side in the same font, without clear separation. A passage from the latter read: "Creativity and vitality are important parts of Unilever's corporate mission and lie at the heart of everything we do and everything we produce: from Dove and Flora to Wall's ice cream."

While sponsor's statements used to be separated from those of the museum, usually by being printed on a different board, here the corporation and the art institution seem to speak with the same affirmative voice.

In a climate in which art is becoming more business-like, as business becomes more art-like, the artist is the paragon of the self-fashioning expected in the "new spirit of capitalism"(Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello). Endless adaptability is expected in rapidly changing economic, social and technological conditions. The essential "property" is the self, and everyone should be a producer of themselves, responsible for their body, image and destiny. The artist, whose works are (ideally at least) physical and conceptual manifestations of a carefully honed subjectivity is in this sense a ready-made brand.

Branding is a fundamentally affirmative device. It may be dark or edgy, or "alternative" or "cutting edge" but it must be simple, unitary and positive. The brand's maintenance requires professionalism, judged by business standards, at all levels of the organisation, which must radiate the positive. The brand is an assurance to the customer of consistent quality, and must itself be consistent. Wally Olins puts the matter with clarity: branding is a "co-ordinating resource" that makes an organisation's activities "coherent", and its strategy "visible and palpable". This affirmative and consistent character sits oddly with much of the Tate's contents. It may be remembered that at least some modern and avant-garde art is (or was) negatory, anti-aesthetic, contentious, contradictory, made in critique of other works of art, radical, anti-instrumental and uncomfortable. Its display in the branded museum environment may serve to downplay these qualities, and to misrepresent them historically.

There is in branding an outright conflict with the museum's educative role, which should involve critique of its contents, critique of the museum, discrimination, complication, and the acknowledgement of historical and contemporary contradictions. Branding is good for none of these things, nor can it be, since they are anathema to it.

In business as a whole through the 1990s and beyond, there has been a marked growth in the use of branding. Wally Olins' book identifies two main reasons for this: first, that the shift from advertising to branding is about speaking to not just the consumer of a product but, as we have seen, to all those involved in its manufacture, distribution and progandising; second, that in the many markets where there are few differences between products on rational grounds of pricing, quality or service, branding becomes all.

In her book *No Logo,* Naomi Klein offers another explanation: the move into branding was the result of the sundering of producers and consumers in a locale due to out-sourcing. Where under a Fordist regime, the workers in Detroit could afford to buy the cars that they made, and trust in a company was brought about in part by that connection between producers and consumers, it is broken when those jobs are exported to places where wages are very low. Branding has been developed as the fundamental role of business in the attempt to artificially repair the bond.

It is worth asking whether there is a similar divide between producers and consumers in the contemporary museum. The old model was founded on the powerful ideology of a coherent national culture, and on a class of cultured types, including artists and opinion makers, who shared enough common ground to conduct a rational conversation about that culture. In postmodern times, this model has been eroded by transnational mass culture and consumerism, the micro identities formed by that consumerism (which may be put on and cast off like cheap clothing), mass tourism, immigration and emigration, and the ideologies of identity politics and multiculturalism. The museum has had to deal with the consequences of a combination of neoliberal economics and globalisation, the two being linked especially through outsourcing: the flows of people driven into exile by increasing inequality and environmental catastrophe, conflict and failed states at one end of the scale of inequality, and the rootless hyper-rich art fair hoppers at the other. All of these factors have produced an erosion of identifiable and stable national cultures, especially in the art world, which both exemplifies and progandises for globalisation.

This is not, of course, to argue for a return to the former condition, or to say that there are no salutary features of the new. Yet the ideal of an integral connection with a like-minded audience, founded on privilege and national identity, has been lost. The loyalty even of middle-class audiences for contemporary art is not guaranteed, despite the apparent popularity of contemporary art. The appeal to this divided, mobile audience, the capture of which is demanded by government and corporate "partners", is left to the status of the brand and its marketed products.

There is, though, a serious contradiction in this promotion of the museum brand. As with brand marketing, the identification produced among the museum audience is shallow, precarious and ambivalent, contains little deep trust, is easily damaged, and contains a large dose of hostility, which is due to the justified feeling of being manipulated. The danger is that the cynicism that surrounds all commercial culture is extended to art.

Olins notes that corporate messages can get confused as suppliers and workers are "pushed hard" (in other words, exploited) in a competitive environment, since this may conflict with the public ethos of the brand. This is just the nerve that many subvertisers push on, in "advertising" Nike sweatshops, for example. In Tate, there are signs of minor vandalism of the branded environment, an expression perhaps of disaffection with the homogenised environment, and the attempt to introduce some grit into the gears. More seriously, the alliance with BP has presented Tate with the problem that its brand is brought into oily proximity with the devastated ecology of the Gulf of Mexico. At Tate Modern's tenth birthday celebrations, a group called "Liberate Tate" brought into the Turbine Hall black helium balloons attached to oil-smeared bird corpses and rotting fish. The danger of a unified and consistent brand image is that, when something goes awry, the entire enterprise may be sullied.

The broader point is that the conditions of the brand are impossible to control, even within the Tate buildings, and certainly not outside them. The neoliberal state, outside of certain ghettos for tourists and the very rich, lacks the will or the money to make the public space which the brand must inhabit coherent, clean and free of vandalism—let alone beautiful. The "assured quality" of the brand constantly runs up against the degraded environment that the system in which it inheres produces, to comic and critical effect.

Julian Stallabrass

Photo: IWM

The state should provide museums with funds sufficient to free them from having to act like businesses

There are steps that museums could take, particularly collectively, to mark out a space for themselves which would be attractive precisely because it would be distinct from the branded environments that increasingly dominate everyday urban experience. One would be to engage in more open criticality and self-critique, and to open dialogue with the public. If there was more of a distance between the institution and its "product", that would make both seem less like products. The default curatorial stance within the branded museum is one of celebration. There are many more interesting alternatives. This is not to argue for "institutional critique" on the part of artists, for it still takes place within the mutual elevation of museum and artist's brand. It is rather that the museum, unlike the branded enterprise, must be a place for the clamour of competing and contradictory voices.

Branding is also, of course, fundamentally to do with money, and the political decision taken by the neoliberal state to force museums into the arms of private "partners". There is a contradiction in this strategy, based on the state's wish to see art salve the social divisions opened up by unrestrained market forces. If the state is serious about the benefits of art as a true counter to business culture, it should provide museums with funds sufficient to free them from having to act like businesses. It may well be that the assumption that high culture will civilise the lumpen masses, and will summon up the grounds for social cohesion amongst divided and alienated populaces is an illusion. Yet so long as the state believes it, there is leverage to demand a different museum and with it a different art. In this rethinking, the faint hope may be held that various over-familiar features of the neoliberal art world may weaken: the branded celebrity-artist, the vacuous and decorative work of art, the reflex lauding of the virtues of neoliberalism and globalisation that are in any case forced upon us, and lastly the quality-assured casing for such phenomena, the branded art museum itself. ◁

Read more contributions to the lecture series on art and politics in the forthcoming issue of the Institute's journal ***Transit.***

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Leaving Fear Behind

BY YEVGENIA MARKOVNA ALBATS

Killing the messenger has become something of a routine in today's Russia. With eleven reporters murdered in 2010 alone, the country is turning into one of the world's most dangerous places for journalists. Yevgenia Markovna Albats gives an insight into journalist's daily struggles with Putin's so-called "sovereign democracy". She held this year's Anna Politkovskaya Memorial Lecture, which was jointly organized by the Kreisky Forum and the IWM, at the Austrian Parliament.

Photo: Srdjan Srdjanov / istockphoto

What made Anna Politkovskaya a symbol of true, courageous and honest journalism, recognized all around the globe? The answer is: She was fearless.

One may argue that courage and fearlessness are virtues that are fundamental to real journalism, especially when it comes to covering war-torn nations or failed states. Yet we should take into account that Anna Politkovskaya grew up in a totalitarian state in which, for decades, institutionalized violence was a method of running the country; in which fear on the part of the population, intellectuals included, allowed the Soviet regime to exist and thrive for over 70 years. Except for the very few who dared to openly oppose the omnipotent state—those called dissidents—fear was a survival tool passed from generation to generation. "Don't speak your mind, keep your mouth shut, don't stand out in the crowd"—these were the lessons our parents taught us. The alternative was known: at best a ruined life with no career whatsoever, at worst a prison sentence and a labor camp. Anna was fearless.

Anna and I became acquainted in September 1980, when we were both freshmen studying journalism at Moscow State University. We were new out of high school, both eager to go into newspaper journalism. Though the two of us had different backgrounds, we quickly became friends, and despite many differences we managed to maintain that friendship over more than 25 years. Until Anna was assassinated on October 7, 2006, in the elevator of her building, just one house down from where I live.

The two of us belonged to distinctly different strata of the supposedly egalitarian and cosmopolitan Soviet society. Her family belonged to the top party *nomenklatura;* her father was a representative of the Ukrainian Republic to the United Nations, and afterwards served as a ranking official at the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow. I was from a family of Soviet professionals: my father was a top-secret scientist in the Soviet military-industrial complex and my mother was an actress and then an anchor with the state-owned central broadcasting station.

Being of Jewish origin in the country of state-sponsored anti-Semitism, my future in the Soviet Union was predictable—either immigration or opposition, with no chance of a decent career by Soviet standards. That is to say that I did not have many choices. Anna did. By virtue of her having been born into a family belonging to the Soviet aristocracy, she was supposed to have a bright future. Yet she chose a different and very difficult path.

While still a university student she married into the "wrong family". Her father, the party apparatchik, did not approve of the man of her choice. Anna faced a difficult situation: either to fight the prejudice imbedded in her own family, or to submit. She chose to fight—as she always did for the next 25 years. With only 50 rubles per month in her pocket, the rate of the student's stipend (less than 50 dollars in the official exchange rate at the time), she left the luxury life behind. Instead, she chose to work as a cleaner in an elementary school to support her family and her baby boy, who was sitting in the stroller while Anna mopped the floors.

Russian authorities are doing their best to suppress dissent and to neutralize any political mobilization outside state control

Did these circumstances form her character, or did she already have a personality that years later led her to cover the war in Chechnya? I have no answer to that. Yet I know no one else in my circle of liberal and non-liberal journalist colleagues who was as passionate and as persistent as Anna in defending the rights of people in misery. She traveled to Chechnya time and again, crossing frontlines in the trunks of the Soviet-made Zhiguli; she dressed in local clothes with a scarf covering most of her face so as to pass for a Chechen woman. She reported from refugee camps and villages about the agonizing lives of forgotten citizens and the crimes committed against humanity by army officers of the country she called "home". On many occasions, she came close death: once she was almost shot by some crazy Russian officer who pronounced her guilty without trial and personally sentenced her to death. She was accused of being unpatriotic, criticized for supporting those on the other side of the frontlines, chastised for writing about people declared enemies solely because of their nationality or religion, be it Chechen or Ingush, or simply Muslim.

These "patriots" made her life extremely difficult, but they could not stop her. She only became stronger and more passionate in doing what she believed was right. It was Anna's personal, individual choice. She chose to leave fear behind, even though she knew better than anybody that her life was the price for her decision.

In the early evening of October 7, 2006, I received a call from the editor of *Novaya Gazeta,* Dmitri Muratov: "Politkovskaya has just been assassinated!" I can see it now as if it happened yesterday: I am running over—police, people, then Anna lying on a stretcher, covered with the white cloth… The very day that President Putin turned 54. Anna considered Putin personally responsible for murdering the peaceful people of Chechnya. Someone did Putin a favor. Politkovskaya was shut off forever.

A couple of weeks later, Irena Lesnevskaya, the owner and publisher of *The New Times,* called me and said: "We should do something. Let's publish a political weekly—so we will have some place to breathe." The first issue of my magazine came out on February 12, 2007, with a cover story on the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko. The ex-KGB colonel and fierce critic of Putin was poisoned by radio-active plutonium in London in November 2006.

33 months after Anna was murdered, on July 15, 2009, Natalia Es-

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temirova, a human rights activist from Chechnya, and one of Anna's most trusted sources in the region, was also assassinated. Neither Politkovskaya's nor Estimirova's killers, nor those behind the assassinations, have been found. I'm sure they will not be as long as the current regime in Russia exists.

Yet neither Anna Politkovskaya nor Natalia Estemirova were extraordinary cases in the way their careers ended. To kill a reporter or to harm him or her in various ways has become something of a routine in Russia.

According to a recent study conducted by the Glasnost Foundation, a Moscow-based think-tank which monitors issues related to the freedom of press, 21 reporters have been killed and another 150 harmed in different ways in the last decade. Some, like Michail Beketov, editor of the local newspaper for the Moscow suburb of Chimki, barely escaped with their lives (Beketov was beaten to the point where he is now in a vegetative state); others, like Alexander Artemiev, a Moscow-based reporter for the internet journal *Gazeta.ru,* were lucky to get away with a warning (a broken arm in Artemiev's case).

Surprisingly, most crimes against reporters were not committed in the war-torn Russian Caucasus. Moscow and the Moscow region are now the most dangerous places for journalists: seven reporters were killed and 94 harmed in Moscow and its urban hinterland in the last 10 years. In only five of the 83 regions which currently comprise the Russian Federation have journalists gone unharmed in the last decade. In 61 regions, journalists have faced criminal charges, in 55 regions they have been detained (again, with Moscow in the lead); in 43 regions they have faced censorship.

The first issue of *The New Times,* appeared on the stands in February 2007. When the fourth issue came out a month later, Vladislav Surkov, then as now deputy head of the Presidential Administration, called my publisher Irena Lesnevskaya and asked her to fire me. This time the cover story was devoted to paramilitary youth groups created and sponsored by the Kremlin to fight the "Orange Revolution". My publisher said no, and from that moment on the print advertisement market was closed for us.

On December 16, 2007, Natalia Morar, then a 23 year-old investigative journalist and graduate of the Moscow State University's Department of Sociology, was stopped at Moscow international airport on returning from an assignment in Israel.

A week earlier, on December 9, 2007, *The New Times* had published her piece "Black Cashbox of the Kremlin", uncovering corruption among top Kremlin officials during the 2007 parliamentary campaign. Before that, Morar had conducted a year-long investigation into the money-laundering activities of high ranking Russian officials. At least 1.5 billion dollars were illegally moved across the border to profit corrupt officials, each and every one of whom is still in office.

Morar, a citizen of the former Soviet Republic of Moldova and born in the USSR, has been banned from entering the Russian Federation ever since. On the orders of the FSB, the successor of the KGB, she was declared a danger to the security and health of the Russian people.

Her husband, Ilya Barabanov, is one of the best investigative journalists in Russia. He is a deputy editor-in-chief of *The New Times* and his reporting on corruption among law enforcement officials in Russia has just received an award for excellence from Reporters Without Borders. Nine months ago, I had to ban Barabanov from reporting on Chechnya or anything related to the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: I was informed that he was on the hit-list, at number 19.

To cut a long story short: the Russian Federation ranks a shameful 153 (out of 175) in the 2009 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index—behind Afghanistan. During recent years, Russia has held second place for the amount of reporters killed or harmed—a number exceeded only in Iraq.

Yevgenia Markovna Albats

Photo: Kreisky Forum

It takes courage for journalists to do what they must do: report the news and defend those whose basic right to human dignity is violated.

So the question is: what is the purpose of the ongoing assault on journalists? Why kill the messenger?

After all, those in power need information about the goings-on in the country as much as anyone else. The USSR was a showcase for the catastrophic side-effects that a closed society creates, not only for ordinary citizens, but for the authorities as well. Lack of information led to wrong decisions and to the wrong distribution of resources, and plunged the one-time superpower into bankruptcy and eventual collapse. There are several reasons for the situation surrounding the media in today's Russia and none of them is inherently "Russian". In other words, Russia perfectly exemplifies other autocracies around the world.

Much research exists on autocratic regimes. Such regimes are constantly torn between the desire to keep a tight rein on society and the necessity of keeping the country open for foreign money and investors—first and foremost from the Western world. Look at Russia: on one hand, it fails from day to day to respect universal human rights and morals; on the other, it fights hard to be a significant voice at the G20 and to become a member of the WTO. On the one hand, it violently suppresses any signs, no matter how weak, of ground-level political protest and mobilization; on the other, it supports sanctions against Iran, putting itself at odds with the autocratic Arab world and siding with the democratic United States and Europe. Nothing of the sort was imaginable when the USSR still existed.

Like any contemporary autocracy, the Russian government does not seek full and total control over the minds of its citizenry, as was the case in the Soviet Union. Venezuela—another authoritarian petro-state—seeks markets in the Western world and allows free media outlets here and there, and even some political competition. Even in communist-controlled China talks about the necessity for political reforms have begun, as recently announced by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao. This readily suggests that closed politics backfire because they produce institutions harmful to the development of business and economies as a whole. Many authoritarian states, including Russia, attempt to kill two birds with one stone by controlling the media and opposition, but creating an aura of freedom in which businesses and foreign investors are welcome. But as we all know, old habits die hard.

With the collapse of the Soviet regime the media was quickly consumed by different groups, which used it for their own interests. However, the multiplicity of interests did allow a plurality of voices and coverage. By the end of the 1990s, the Russian state controlled only 46 percent of the country's media. Even the most powerful media tools, such as TV-networks, were in private hands—those of the "oligarchs". Channel One, which covers 97 percent of households across all eleven time zones, was *de facto* owned and controlled by Boris Berezovsky, who back in 1999 sided with the government, but by the end of 2000 found himself in exile. The same happened to Vladimir Gusinski, former owner of the TV-channel NTV, which in 1999 covered over 60 percent of Russian households.

In Russia today, the state and state-affiliated companies like Gazprom control close to 100 percent of the TV networks and an absolute majority of the print media. In this way, Putin's regime has consolidated its power, grabbed most of the nation's resources—above all oil and gas—and put an end to regional power centers, of which the recent firing of the Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov was the last stroke. Thanks to the oil and gas windfall profits over the last decade, most Russians have moved out of absolute poverty (15 percent of Russians now live below the poverty line, as opposed to 25–30 percent in 1999); still, few feel satisfied with their quality of life, and even fewer feel safe when thinking about their future and the future of their children. Overall, Russia as a nation feels more hopeless and less safe than any democratic nation in the world.

One reason for this situation is the huge wealth discrepancy in today's Russia. According to official data released by the State Bureau of Statistics, 10 percent of Russians account for almost 30 percent of all income in the country, whereas the poorest 10 percent share just 2 percent. Russia's Gini coefficient, which shows the distribution of family income, was 41.5 in 2008 and 42.2 in 2010, as compared to 25 in Scandinavian states and 50 in Sub-Saharan Africa or the oil-rich Gulf States. These numbers alone suggest a huge potential for political conflict in the country. However that is precisely what the current regime is afraid of: any open politics, any real political competition is a threat to its existence.

Hence, as is often the case in authoritarian-type regimes, the Russian authorities are doing their best to suppress dissent and to neutralize any political mobilization outside state control. In the USSR, the same was done by means of institutionalized violence, i. e. mass repressions, and a powerful ideology. Authoritarian regimes lack any ideology *per se* and are reluctant to conduct mass repressions, since that very hammer is most dangerous for elites themselves. As a result, they make sure that dissent is silenced or marginalized, that people in one region of the country are unable to relate to one another in their misery, that they blame local barons for their misfortunes rather than the political system as such.

"Killing the messenger" is a rational tool employed by the Russian rulers. The majority of those in power came from the ranks of the Soviet KGB, the USSR's political police. They saw with their own eyes how Glasnost destroyed the system of power which no one expected to collapse so quickly—virtually in a matter of four years. The KGB people lost their power and their luxurious lifestyle as compared to other Russians. Now they are afraid to experience the same thing as they did in the early 1990s.

Reporters, who by nature of their profession serve the public as channels of information, are a threat to the current regime. It takes courage for journalists to do what they must do: report the news and defend those whose basic right to human dignity is violated. Yet the decade and more of freedom experienced in the 1990s has not been forgotten in the hearts and minds of the Russian people.

Authoritarian regimes tend not to last long—according to comparative studies, the mean life-span of authoritarian regimes is eleven years. We have already survived ten. Sooner or later, people in my country will overcome their cowardice, they will realize that fear and silence impedes the future of their own children.

I am not sure if I will live long enough to see an avenue or a plaza named after Anna Politkovskaya in her home city. But I know for sure that her courageous life was not lost in vain. Anna showed that one can overcome the survival instinct, fear in favor of the higher good. Democratic journalists in Russia are doing their best to ensure her memory prevails in the present and the future. To report news that befits a press worthy of the name, to do what we must do regardless of the risks involved: that is Anna's legacy, and we must preserve it. ◁

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