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Editorial

Was Sie schon immer über „Gender" wissen wollten, aber nie zu fragen wagten – in dieser Ausgabe finden Sie Antworten.

Mehr als vier Jahre lang hat ein vom IWM koordiniertes Team um die Politikwissenschaftlerin Mieke Verloo im Rahmen des EU-Forschungsprojekts „QUING – Qualität in integrativer Gleichstellungspolitik" Diskriminierungen von Frauen in den 27 Ländern der Europäischen Union sowie Kroatien und der Türkei untersucht, Antidiskriminierungsstrategien bewertet und Empfehlungen für eine bessere Umsetzung von Richtlinien zur Gleichbehandlung erarbeitet. Beteiligt waren 63 Forscherinnen und Forscher aus 12 Ländern. Im März wurde das Projekt abgeschlossen, und wie es um die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter in Europa derzeit steht, können Sie nun auf den Seiten 5 bis 7 lesen.

Um die Demokratie scheint es auf den ersten Blick gut zu stehen. Nachdem vor mehr als zwanzig Jahren mit dem Fall der Berliner Mauer der Osten Europas einen demokratischen Aufbruch erlebte, fällt nun die „arabische Mauer", also jene, die die Menschen im Nahen und Mittleren Osten von Freiheit und politischer Mitbestimmung getrennt hat. Doch während im arabischen Frühling für Demokratie gekämpft wird, scheint es in Europa zu einem Rückschlag für die Demokratie zu kommen: Wirtschaftskrise und Populismus lassen das Vertrauen in demokratische Institutionen wie die Wahlbeteiligung sinken, der öffentliche Raum zerfällt, Xenophobie ist auf dem Vormarsch. Wie es angesichts dessen um „Die Zukunft der Demokratie" bestellt ist, untersucht das IWM unter der Leitung von Ivan Krastev in einem gleichnamigen, neuen Forschungsschwerpunkt. Mehr dazu auf den Seiten 3 und 4.

Russland und die Demokratie – das war immer schon eine schwierige Beziehung. 2012 stehen Präsidentschaftswahlen an, die aber nur eine eingeschränkte Wahlmöglichkeit zu bieten scheinen: Putinismus mit oder ohne Putin. Nina Khrushcheva und Daniel Treisman analysieren auf den Seiten 13 und 14, ob sich nach den Wahlen etwas ändern wird und was sich ändern müsste. Timothy Snyder wirft zusätzlich einen Blick in die Vergangenheit Russlands, und erinnert uns mit dem Vergleich der mörderischen Regime Stalins und Hitlers an eine der größten Stärken von Demokratien: sie führen keine Kriege gegeneinander.

Sven Hartwig

Everything you always wanted to know about gender (but were afraid to ask)—in this issue you can find the answers.

For more than four years, the research project "QUING – Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies" studied discrimination against woman in the 27 member states of the European Union as well as in Croatia and Turkey, developed anti-discrimination strategies and formulated recommendations for an improvement of the implementation of equal treatment policies. The project was headed by political scientist Mieke Verloo and coordinated by the IWM. 63 researchers from 12 countries took part in it. QUING was completed in March this year and you can now read on pages 5 to 7 about the state of the art of gender equality in Europe.

Democracy, at first sight, seems to be doing quite well. After Eastern Europe experienced a democratic awakening with the fall of the Berlin Wall more than twenty years ago, it is now the "Arab Wall"—that is, the one separating the Near and Middle East from freedom and political participation—which is being torn down. Yet, while people are fighting for democracy in the ongoing Arab Spring, it seems that the economic crisis and political populism have led to a backlash against democracy in Europe: trust in democratic institutions as well as voters' turnout is decreasing, the common public space is fragmenting, xenophobia is gaining ground. What "The Future of Democracy" could look like under these circumstances will be on the agenda of a new IWM research focus headed by Ivan Krastev. More on that on pages 3 and 4.

The relationship between Russia and democracy has always been a difficult one. Presidential elections will be held in 2012 but the alternatives for voters are rather limited: they can either vote for Putinism with or without Putin. On pages 13 and 14, Nina Khrushcheva and Daniel Treisman analyze whether the elections will change the country and what has to be done for the country to change. In addition, Timothy Snyder takes a look onto Russia's past. With a comparison between the murderous regimes of Stalin and Hitler he finally reminds us of one of the biggest advantages of democracies: they don't go to war with one another.

Sven Hartwig

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Democracy in the Age of Populism

BY IVAN KRASTEV

The ongoing collapse of Arab authoritarianism is a striking manifestation of democracy's appeal. However, at the same time, democracy seems to be in crisis in Europe: trust in democratic institutions is declining dramatically, whereas populism is on the rise. The new IWM research focus "The Future of Democracy", headed by Bulgarian political scientist and Permanent Fellow Ivan Krastev, analyzes these alarming trends and explores the grounds for democracy's triumphs and troubles.

Photo: istockphoto.com / Joel Carillet

Egyptian protesters at Tahrir Square in 2011

Photo: istockphoto.com / alexbiondi

Demonstration in Italy against Berlusconi's extensive control over the media in 2009

In February 2011 British newspapers came out with nervous headlines. A Populus poll on identity and extremism had discovered that a huge number of Britons are ready to support an anti-immigration nationalist party if it is not associated with violence or a fascist imaginary. France received its shock a month later when an opinion poll showed that if elections were to be held today, the far-right leader Marine le Pen would win the first round. And while the rise of the far-right in Britain and France is still taking place in the opinion polls, in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria, it has happened already on election day. Anti-immigration sentiments are re-shaping European politics. Contrary to the expectations of some political observers, the economic crisis did not weaken but rather strengthened the appeal of identity politics.

In Central and Eastern Europe, where immigration is still not the major issue, populist uprising is taking the form of anti-elite and anti-Roma rage. In Hungary the center-right government of the former dissident Viktor Orbán made many in Europe uneasy when it used its constitutional majority to curb the powers of independent watchdogs, reinstate censorship in the media and nationalize the private pension funds. Twice in Bulgaria in the last decade an extra-parliamentary party has won parliamentary elections on an anti-elite ballot, making the country the poster boy for the trend of making elections less about a choice between policy alternatives and more about public executions of parties in power.

There is a feeling that we have reached what the economist Alexander Gerschenkron once called a "nodal point"—that is, a point where, in a relatively short period of time, we witness, experience and perhaps even participate in an aesthetic, ideological, strategic and finally institutional redefinition of the very meaning of democracy. Something irreplaceable has worn out in the democratic machine.

Democracy—understood as the self-government of equals—is now universally valued, and no powerful alternative exists today to societies governed by the will of the people, expressed in free and fair elections. The ongoing collapse of Arab authoritarianism is a striking manifestation of democracy's appeal. However, at the same time, democracy is in crisis in Europe. At present, European societies have vague hopes and clear fears. What we observe is the emergence of a "threatened majority" as the major force in politics. In the 1990s, many Europeans were shocked to realize what an important role demographic fears played in the process of the former Yugoslavia's disintegration. Currently we are observing that demographic statistics are becoming a major factor in Western European politics as well. Political debates are preoccupied with birth rates of the various immigrant communities, the percentage of immigrant children who are school dropouts and the number of minority children in secondary schools. Ageing European publics are torn between the need to welcome immigrants in order to preserve their welfare state and the fear that the inflow of immigrants will destroy the cultural identity of European societies.

The central political paradox of our times is that the factors that once contributed to the success of democracy are the ones that threaten it today. Thus, the crisis of trust in democratic institutions in Europe is not the outcome of the failure of the democratization of our societies; it is the result of the success of democratization.

"As I was browsing through *The Open Society and Its Enemies* after many years," wrote Polish political philosopher Leszek Kołakowski three decades ago, "it struck me that when Popper attacks totalitarian ideologies and movements, he neglects the reverse side of the threat. By that I mean what could be called the self-enmity of the open society—not merely the inherent inability of democracy to defend itself effectively against internal enemies by democratic means alone, but more importantly, the process by which the extension and consistent application of liberal principles transforms them into their antithesis." Kołakowski's emphasis on the self-poisoning nature of open societies is critically important for understanding the current troubles in the house of democracy.

What we are witnessing is 1968 in reverse

The crisis that European democracies are facing today is not a transient phenomenon—a mere result of the negative effects of the economic crisis or the failure of leadership in our societies. The crisis we are facing is rooted in the fact that our societies are more open and democratic than ever before, but it is precisely this openness that leads to the ineffectiveness and lack of trust in democratic institutions. We probably have reached the moment when "democracies of trust" are replaced by "democracies of mistrust," as the historian Pierre Rosanvallon has put it. And the question is no longer how elites can restore the trust of the people, but rather how a lib-

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continued from page 3

eral democracy can function in an environment in which elites will be permanently mistrusted regardless of what they do or how transparent the governing mechanisms are.

In the 1960s, many liberals feared that democratic institutions were hostage to the authoritarian culture in which they were immersed. Today, it is the opposite problem. Citizens' rights are protected better than ever, people have access to more information than ever, they are free to travel and practice their lifestyles, but there is a growing fear that "the democratization" of society over the last forty years has led to the paralysis of democratic institutions. Democratic societies are becoming ungovernable and it seems that they have lost the idea of common life and public interest. Trust in politicians has reached the bottom. The extension of citizens' rights and freedoms does not produce a feeling of empowerment. Democratic institutions are more transparent than ever, but they are less trusted than ever. Democratic elites are more meritocratic than ever, but they are more hated than ever. Managing mistrust is what democracies are about today.

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

The rise of populism and mistrust of the elites have reduced European politics to the clash between the anti-corruption rhetoric of the public and the anti-populist rhetoric of the establishment. There is no new collective utopia that has captured the public's imagination. A majority of people tend to view all that governments do simply as corruption, while governments tend to respond to any demand for policy change with the accusation of populism. Instead of bringing new life to the political left or the political right, the current economic crisis challenged the very notion of a left-right structured democratic politics. Europe and the world have gone populist. But this is a strange version of populism: people revolt, not with a clear idea of what they want to change, but with the idea of revenge and punishment.

The rebels of today do not oppose the status quo of yesterday—they try to preserve it. This pro-status quo radicalism was clearly observed on the streets of Paris last year when students protested against the increase of the pension age even though the pension age in France is one of the lowest in Europe. One gets the impression that Europe is populated only by immigrants and current or future pensioners. What most people fear, however, is not the status quo. They fear change. What we are witnessing is 1968 in reverse. Then students on the streets of Europe declared their desire to live in a world different from the world of their parents. Now students are on the street to declare their desire to live in the world of their parents.

In order to make sense of the current state of democracy, we should re-think the unintended consequences of the five revolutions that shattered our world since 1968.

First, there was the cultural revolution of the 1960s, which put the individual at the center of politics. Second, there was the market revolution of the 1980s that de-legitimized the state as an economic actor. Third, the Central European revolutions of 1989 reconciled the cultural revolution of the 1960s (resisted by the Right) and Regan's market revolution of the 1980s (rejected by the Left), and made us believe that liberal democracy is the end of history and the natural state of humanity. Fourth, there was the revolution in communications brought by the spread of the Internet. And finally, the revolution in the neurosciences made political consultants believe that the manipulation of emotions—and not rational discourse—is at the heart of democratic politics.

Managing mistrust is what democracies are about today

In their early stages all five of these revolutions were critically important for deepening our democratic experience. The cultural revolution of the 60s dismantled the authoritarian family and gave new meaning to the idea of the free individual. The market revolution of the 80s contributed to the global spread of democratic regimes and the collapse of communism. The revolutions of '89, rather than marking the end of history, were a turning point in Europe's experiences with democracy. They did succeed in reconciling liberalism and democracy in Europe. The Internet revolution gave a new impulse to civic activism and radically changed the way we think and act. And the new science of the brain brought emotions back to our understanding of politics and political deliberation.

These same five revolutions, however, are at the center of the current crisis of democracy.

The cultural revolution led to the decline of a shared sense of purpose. The politics of the 60s devolved into an aggregation of individual claims upon society and state. Identity began to colonize public discourse: private identity, sexual identity, cultural identity. The backlash against multiculturalism is a direct result of the failure of the 1960s to provide a shared view of society. The rise of anti-immigrant nationalism is a dangerous trend. However, it represents the desire for community and common life much more than simply resentment against foreigners. It also signals that the clashing demands in modern societies cannot be negotiated and resolved if we try to reduce politics to the politics of rights.

The market revolution of the 80s made societies wealthier than ever, but it broke the positive connection between the spread of democracy and the spread of equality. From the late 19th century until the 1970s, the advanced societies of the West were all becoming less unequal. Reagan's revolution of greed reversed this trend and led to an obsession with the creation of wealth and cultivated an anti-government passion that is at the center of the crisis of the governability of Western democracies today. The people's revolt against the elites, that is at the core of the populist condition of today, is a direct result of the fact that the majority of citizens tend to perceive the political and social changes accompanying the "neoliberal decades" as a time of emancipation for the elites but not for the masses. In the brave new markets-regulated world the elites broke free of ideological, national and community constraints. The rise of off-shore elites was the dark side of the success of the market revolution.

By declaring democracy the normal state of society, the Central European revolutions of '89 dramatically raised our expectations for democracy's deliveries, thus sowing the seeds of future dissatisfaction. It was common sense after 1989 to believe that the introduction of free elections and the adoption of liberal constitutions were enough to secure peace, to enhance economic growth, to reduce violence and corruption. But the reality turned out to be more complex. China demonstrated that authoritarian states have the capacity to deliver high levels of growth over a long period of time. The failure of democratization in many so-called Third World countries demonstrated that free elections are not enough to bring order and prosperity. And the experience of Eastern Europe signals that the border between democracy and authoritarianism is the least protected border in Europe. The euphoria—and afterwards the frustration—that the "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space generated is the best example that the utopia of normalcy, which was at the heart of the revolutions of 1989, is ill-suited for the world of the 21st century.

The Internet revolution fragmented the public sphere and redrew the borders of the political communities to which we have chosen to belong. The paradox of this revolution is that, while it guaranteed an open flow of information, at the same time it stimulated the emergence of echo chambers that threaten to disintegrate the public sphere. While the Internet revolution empowered people to stand against those in power, it did not contribute to strengthening the deliberative nature of the democratic process.

The least noticed revolution was affected by new studies of the human brain and new marketing technologies that re-shaped our view of democracy. The neurosciences helped us better understand how people think, but they also became an instrument for the manipulation of people. When mourning the decline of the public intellectual or the anti-intellectual nature of today's democratic politics, we should remember that one of the key discoveries of the neurosciences, in the words of the psychologist Drew Westen, was that "the dispassionate mind of the 18th century philosophers allows us to predict between 0.5 and 3 percent of the most important political decisions people will make in their lives." The discoveries of the neurosciences resulted in a radical break from the tradition of politics based on ideas. Karl Rove (George W. Bush's political consultant) has replaced Karl Popper as the new prophet of democratic politics.

In short, we do not live anymore in a world that is structured around a clear-cut opposition between democracy and autocracy.

Instead, what should bother us are the internal contradictions of democratic societies themselves. What we should fear is the self-enmity of democracy. It would be a major mistake to analyze the current rise of populism in Europe as a kind of pathology or passing phenomenon. Populism is here to stay. We live in the age of populism, and the tensions between the directions of society's democratization and its impact on the effectiveness of democratic governance will shape democracy's future. ◁

Ivan Krastev is Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and Permanent Fellow of the IWM. He is also a Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. On June 26, the debate "Is Liberal Democracy at Risk?" at the Vienna Akademietheater deals with the topic of this research focus. Participants are Emma Bonino, Ronald Dworkin, George Soros and Guy Verhofstadt. Charles Taylor chairs the discussion. You can read more on that in the next IWM*post*.

Are We All Equal?

BY MIEKE VERLOO

Gender equality is a common value of the European Union. Yet among its member states, many examples of discrimination of women can still be found. The IWM research project QUING assessed the content and implementation of gender equality policies in the 27 EU countries plus Croatia and Turkey. As comparison shows, often assumed south-north or east-west divisions prove to be false. Spain and Finland are forerunners whereas Denmark or Poland are far behind.



Illustration: Kriszán, A. et al.: "Framing Gender Equality in the European Union and Its Current and Future Member States", in: *LARG Report*, 56.

The QUING-research project comes to an end in 2011. What were the project's aims? And what were its achievements? The dual aim of its research activities was to assess both the content and quality of gender equality policies in the geopolitical context of the European Union. In view of ongoing gender inequality in Europe, it is crucial to develop a clear picture of measures currently operating in the various European states for reducing or abolishing gender inequality. A specific feature of the QUING-project is its view of gender as always being linked to other inequalities. The label gender+ is used to recall that "gender never comes alone", but that it is always shaped by structures of racism, capitalism or heteronormativity. By asking what defines good quality gender+ equality policies, the project not only contributes to debates on gender and policy theory and challenges comparative research methodology, but also enables a better-founded political debate and more effective gender equality policy-making in the future.

In the QUING-project we have narrowed our research focus down to policy fields of core relevance to gender+ equality issues. These include targeted gender equality policies and policies on gender equality mechanisms, such as those that legitimize non-employment (e.g. leave regulations and work-life reconciliation measures), policies on intimate citizenship (e.g. polices on marriage, divorce and reproductive rights), as well as policies on gender-based violence.

The QUING-researchers have made 120 country-level reports. This huge number consists of four reports for each of the 27 EU member states, for two candidate states (Croatia and Turkey) and for the European Union itself; a *State of the Art Report* of existing literature; an *Issue History Report* that maps the history of gender equality policies since 1995, including its main debates and actors; an *Intersectionality Report* on how gender equality policies deal with inequalities other than gender; and a *Context Report* that maps relevant political opportunities and actors. For each country project, researchers have selected, coded and analyzed 50–80 crucial gender equality texts. A total of 381 laws, 342 policy plans, 893 parliamentary debates and 381 civil society texts have been systematically studied using Critical Frame Analysis, a methodology specially developed in the project that builds on experience from the previous MAGEEQ project (see www.mageeq.net). This analysis enabled the identification of the frames—i.e. the specific understandings of the meaning of gender equality—present in the texts. This then allowed comparison across countries and across issues. The table above, shows that it is not possible to make straightforward south-north or east-west divisions. Highest rank is given to countries that—in the period 1995–2009—have the most transformative frames in their gender+ equality policies. That means they can be considered to have the highest chance of promoting gender equality. Clearly visible is the position of the European Union among the highest ranked. In contrast, a mix of old and new member states have very low scores. Overall, this shows the tremendous variety of the European landscape and the potential for the improvement of gender+ equality policymaking and the quality of people's lives. Further analysis is clearly necessary to this end.

The QUING-project has also been engaged in two other activities linked to gender equality. One has been a focus on gender training as a developing professional field. Here, manuals were produced and expert meetings held, leading to a database (taken over by EIGE, the European Gender Institute in Vilnius) and communities of practice that will support development of this field. The second additional activity has been to make a start with the collection and accessibility of core feminist texts in Europe, leading to the FRAGEN (FRAmes on GENder) database that has found its home with QUING-partner Aletta in Amsterdam. As with the other research activities, this is finished as a project, but otherwise very much alive. ◁

Mieke Verloo is QUING-Research Director at the IWM and Professor in Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues at the Radboud University Nijmegen. Her most recent book is *The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality.*

QUING
Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies

The QUING-project aimed at assessing the current content, quality and problems of gender+ equality policies in the 27 EU member states as well as in Croatia and Turkey. Furthermore, it formulated recommendations and standards for gender trainings. The project was launched in 2006 and was completed in early 2011. More on the project can be found at www.quing.eu.

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Humboldt University, Germany
National Center for Social Research, Greece
Central European University, Hungary
Aletta—Institute for Women's History, the Netherlands
Radboud University, the Netherlands
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Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
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Mind the Gap!

VON LISA WEWERKA

Mehr Geschlecht als gerecht. Bei der Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und Männern sind Deutschland, Österreich und die Schweiz nur europäischer Durchschnitt. Das war das Fazit des Workshops „Gender Plus" am IWM, bei dem die Ergebnisse der QUING-Studie für den deutschsprachigen Raum vorgestellt wurden. Besonders groß ist der Gender Gap in der Arbeitsmarkt- und Familienpolitik.

Auch im hundersten Jahr des Weltfrauentags, der am 8. März 2011 stattfand, gehören Ungleichheiten zwischen den Geschlechtern nicht der Vergangenheit an. Das wurde bereits drei Tage zuvor, am 5. März, deutlich: am Equal Pay Day. Das ist jener Tag, bis zu dem Frauen in der Europäischen Union arbeiten müssen, um den Verdienst der Männer im vorangegangenen Kalenderjahr zu erreichen.

Doch Frauen werden nicht nur beim Einkommen benachteiligt, und sie erfahren Diskriminierung auch nicht nur aufgrund ihres Geschlechts. Als Person haben sie immer auch eine Herkunft, eine Hautfarbe, einen Körper mit bestimmten Befähigungen oder Beeinträchtigungen, eine Religion, eine sexuelle Orientierung. Frauen befinden sich somit immer an der Schnittstelle verschiedener Diskriminierungen und sind daher oft von intersektioneller, das heisst Mehrfachdiskriminierung betroffen, als schwarze Frau, als lesbische Frau, als muslimische Frau. Und diese Diskriminierungserfahrungen unterscheiden sich. So erlebt beispielsweise eine Migrantin eine andere Ungleichbehandlung als eine Frau mit einer Behinderung. Intersektionalität bedeutet jedoch nicht, Diskriminierungen zu hierarchisieren. Vielmehr zeigt der Begriff auf, dass Benachteiligungen in bestimmten Fällen nicht allein durch die Kategorie Geschlecht erklärt werden können, sondern andere ungleichheitsgenerierende Strukturen in die Erklärung miteinbezogen und daher auch andere Lösungen gefunden werden müssen.


Birgit Sauer


Uta Meier-Gräwe


Ulrike Lunacek

Photos: IWM

Ungleichheit vergleichen

Mehrfachdiskriminierung, unterschiedliche Diskriminierungserfahrungen von Frauen und Lösungsansätze standen auch im Mittelpunkt des Workshops „Gender Plus. Gleichstellungspolitiken im intersektionellen Kontext". Wissenschaftlerinnen, Politikerinnen, Juristinnen und Praktikerinnen aus Österreich, Deutschland und der Schweiz trafen sich, um Politiken der Geschlechtergleichstellung in diesen Ländern zu vergleichen und über die Ergebnisse des am IWM koordinierten EU-Forschungsprojekts QUING (Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies) zu sprechen.

Das aus internationalen Expertinnen und Experten bestehende QUING-Forschungsteam hat über fünf Jahre die diversen Gleichstellungsstellungspolitiken in den 27 Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union sowie Kroatien und der Türkei untersucht. Im März dieses Jahres wurde das Projekt abgeschlossen. Ein Teil der Forschungsergebnisse wurde nun am IWM präsentiert und bildete den Ausgangspunkt für die Diskussion über die deutschsprachigen Länder.

Bereits zu Beginn wurden Gemeinsamkeiten, aber auch zahlreiche Unterschiede in der Gleichstellungspolitik sichtbar. Das zeigt schon ein oberflächlicher Blick. So wurde in Deutschland im Jahr 2011 der erste Gleichstellungsbericht der Bundesregierung veröffentlicht. Im Gegensatz dazu hat die österreichische Regierung bereits 1975 einen Frauenbericht publiziert. Allerdings: der vierte Frauenbericht kam erst 2010, nach einer fünfzehnjährigen Pause heraus. In der Schweiz wiederum gibt es gegenwärtig keine Bestrebungen, eine unabhängige Sachverständigenkommission mit dem Erstellen eines Frauen- bzw. Gleichstellungsberichts zu beauftragen.

Mutterschaft als neue Benachteiligung

Das erste Panel des Workshops, der von QUING-Forschungsleiterin Mieke Verloo und Birgit Sauer, Forschungsleiterin für Österreich, eröffnet wurde, befasste sich mit „Intimate Citizenship", also der Frage nach Rechten in Intimbeziehungen. QUING-Mitarbeiterin Doris Urbanek, Jutta Wagner vom deutschen Juristinnenbund, die Schweizer Gender Mainstreaming Trainerin Zita Küng, EU Parlamentarierin Ulrike Lunacek und Elisabeth Holzleithner von der Universität Wien sprachen über die diversen nationalen Regelungen von Partnerschaft, Scheidung und Sorgerecht in europäischen Ländern. Gefordert wurden klare rechtliche Regelungen, die sich nicht diskriminierend auf Frauen auswirken. Zum Beispiel gibt es in vielen Ländern keine rechtliche Anerkennung und Regelung von gleichgeschlechtlichen Partnerschaften. Anderes findet sich gar nicht erst auf der politischen Agenda, wie im Fall der Schweiz das Thema Zwangsheirat.

„Nicht-Erwerbstätigkeit", das heisst Politiken, die explizit vom Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt freistellen war das Thema des zweiten Panels. Im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion zwischen Uta Meier-Gräwe, Mitglied in der Sachverständigenkommission für den ersten Gleichstellungsbericht Deutschlands, Gesine Fuchs von der Universität Zürich, der Wiener Gleichbehandlungsanwältin Sabine Wagner und Erna Appelt von der Universität Innsbruck stand zunächst die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft im politischen Prozeß. Diese liefere wichtige Impulse im Bereich der Gleichstellung, es fehle aber an verbindlichen Bestimmungen zur Einbeziehung zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen und an finanzieller Unterstützung. Birgit Sauer verwies allerdings auf die Problematik der Zersplitterung der Zivilgesellschaft, gerade in Österreich.

Was die Rolle des Staates für die Erwerbs- oder Nicht-Erwerbstätigkeit von Frauen betrifft, zeigen die QUING-Ergebnisse, dass es in den deutschsprachigen Ländern insbesondere konservative Wohlfahrtsstaatsstrukturen sind, die diskriminierend wirken, da sie für Frauen Anreize schaffen, die Erwerbsarbeit lange zu unterbrechen. Auch fehlende Leistungen in der öffentlichen Versorgung mit Kinderbetreuung führen oftmals zu einem Ausscheiden von Frauen aus dem Erwerbsarbeitsmarkt, einem erschwerten Wiedereinstieg oder zur Aufnahme von prekären Arbeitsverhältnissen, um eine Vereinbarkeit von Erwerbs- und Familienleben zu bewerkstelligen. So wird in der Schweiz Kinderbetreuung als Privatsache angesehen, und auch in Deutschland gibt es starke Anreize zur Nicht-Erwerbstätigkeit von Müttern. Uta Meier-Gräwe plädierte deswegen dafür, die Privilegierung von Männern in der Diskussion über Nicht-Erwerbstätigkeit in den Blick zu nehmen, und Sabine Wagner wies darauf hin, dass in Österreich der Familienstand und damit implizit auch die Mutterschaft als Diskriminierungsgrund in die Antidiskriminierungsgesetzgebung im Jahr 2004 aufgenommen wurden. Gesetzlich wird damit nachgeholt, was empirische Ergebnisse bereits vorher zeigten: Muttersein ist eine neue Ungleichheitsstruktur in der Gesellschaft.

Schattenseiten der Verrechtlichung

Auf die Schattenseiten der vielfach geforderten Ausweitung der Verrechtlichung von Gleichstellung kam im Abschlußvortrag des Workshops Gabriele Wilde zu sprechen. Diese gehe auf Kosten von politischer Mobilisierung und Demokratisierung, sagte sie. Insbesondere innerhalb der Europäischen Union drohe eine Verdrängung des demokratischen Souveräns durch juridische Strukturen und Prozesse. Wilde plädierte für die Eröffnung neuer politischer Handlungsmöglichkeiten durch ein gesellschaftsbezogenes Verständnis von Demokratie: eine Re-Politisierung nationaler Gesellschaften, ein offenes politisches Leitbild und eine Dezentralisierung von politischen Prozessen. Ein Standpunkt, der in der anschließenden Diskussion nicht unwidersprochen blieb. Gerade die EU habe durch neue rechtliche Vereinbarungen zur Gleichstellung und Antidiskriminierung beigetragen. Während umgekehrt die gegenwärtigen politischen Entwicklungen in manchen Mitgliedsstaaten Regierungen an die Macht brächten, die eine Verschlechterung der Stellung von Frauenpolitik befürchten ließen. Die rechtliche Absicherung von Errungenschaften im Bereich der Gleichstellung und Antidiskriminierung wird somit wohl auch für den 101. Weltfrauentag im nächsten Jahr ein Thema bleiben. ◁

Workshop Gender Plus: Gleichstellungspolitiken im intersektionellen Kontext IWM, 31. Januar

Teilnehmerinnen:

Erna Appelt
Professorin für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Innsbruck

Gesine Fuchs
Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Zürich

Uta Meier-Gräwe
Mitglied der Sachverständigenkommission für den Ersten Gleichstellungsbericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Professorin für Wirtschaftslehre, Universität Gießen

Elisabeth Holzleithner
Assistenzprofessorin für Rechtsphilosophie, Universität Wien

Zita Küng
Leiterin von EQuality – Agentur für Gender Mainstreaming, Zürich

Ulrike Lunacek
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Birgit Sauer
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Mieke Verloo
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Jutta Wagner
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Sabine Wagner
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Gabriele Wilde
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Mit Unterstützung der Europäischen Kommission und des österreichischen Ministeriums für Wissenschaft und Forschung

From Insiders to Outsiders

BY ANDREA KRIZSÁN

Implementing gender requires gendering implementation. While women's advocacy groups are those who put discriminations on the political agenda, they are often marginalized in the policy-making process. QUING*-Researcher Andrea Krizsán takes a look at Eastern Europe and shows how gender equality can go astray.*


Elisabeth Holzleithner


Mieke Verloo


Gesine Fuchs

Photos: IWM

Violence against women was the flagship issue for feminist transnational advocacy networks. The global campaign on violence against women successfully challenged some of the core concepts of post-World War II human rights instruments and widened them to include violence by non-state actors and within the sphere of the family, which were seen as an exclusively private realm beforehand.

By 1992 the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was complemented with Recommendation 19, which stated that "Gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." Violence was defined here to include most importantly: family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision, trafficking in women, sexual harassment and compulsory sterilization.

Since then, norms on violence against women and particularly violence in the family, one of its most severe and frequent forms, have spread widely across Europe and beyond. While the resulting policy reforms are generally appreciated as a feminist success aimed at freeing women from gender discrimination and empowering them, concerns have increasingly been raised by prominent scholars and activists about the co-optation of feminist values in the process of translating the feminist agenda to policies at work in national contexts.

What are the core policy values at stake here, what does their co-optation mean in terms of gender equality, and can we speak about co-optation in the Central and Eastern European policy contexts?

These are some of the questions that have been addressed by IWM's QUING (Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies)-project throughout its activity. QUING looked into explaining gender equality policy processes and the quality of gender equality policy outcomes in 29 countries of Europe.

Gender-based violence, including domestic violence, is one of the policy fields analyzed within the project. Its qualitative analysis of gender-based violence policy debates identifies different ways of framing domestic violence. Some frames explicitly discuss domestic violence within the framework of gender inequality and propose remedies within that context (e.g. the Swedish Act on Violence Against Women).

Another identified set of policy frames openly contests the main tenets of a gender equality understanding of domestic violence, for example, by prioritizing perpetrators' rights over victims' rights, by introducing double standards on violence in the private and public realm and downplaying the importance and severity of domestic violence, or by prioritizing family integrity over individual victim's rights.

Domestic violence is not discussed as a form of gender discrimination

Finally, a variety of frames, that have the widest presence in European laws and policies, resonate with gender equality thinking on domestic violence by sanctioning family violence, restraining perpetrators and proposing complex multi-stakeholder intervention, but without spelling out explicitly the connections between domestic violence and gender inequality.

By the early 2000s feminist activism had brought domestic violence to the policy agendas of Central and Eastern European countries as well. As a result of feminist NGO-advocacy, policies and laws were passed in almost all countries of the region by the mid-/late 2000s.

The Budapest QUING-team analyzed domestic violence policy development in five CEE countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. They investigated how transnational norms are adapted to become national policies in these countries and whether these policies serve the objectives of gender equality and women's empowerment that were initially proposed by the transnational feminist movement, or whether fears about co-optation are justified in the cases of these countries.

Domestic violence laws and policies were adopted in all five countries. Bulgaria passed its domestic violence law in 2005, shortly followed by a national action plan, Croatia adopted its law in 2003, Hungary adopted a parliamentary strategy on domestic violence in 2003, followed by a law on restraining orders for perpetrators in 2009, Poland adopted its law in 2005, while Romania adopted a law and a national action plan in 2003 and 2004, respectively.

While feminist advocacy groups played an important role at various stages of policy-making, findings show that outcomes of the process have not been linking domestic violence evidently to gender inequality in any of the cases. Yet, only one country, Romania, follows both in its law and in its action plan, a policy framework that contests gender equality ideas, i.e. the family protection frame, which places the highest emphasis on family integrity over individual rights.

The other four countries frame their policies in terms that are indifferent to gender equality. Domestic violence is not discussed as a form of gender discrimination and the prevalence of female victims is, moreover, rarely established. But resonance between gender equality objectives and this indifferent framing can be noted in the actions that are proposed.

Does this bring co-optation? Does it mean that these laws are not promoting gender equality and that they fail to protect women in the sense proposed by domestic violence policy pioneers of the early autonomous "shelter movement" or later by international norms?

This is by far not evident: Croatia and Bulgaria are discussed by feminist activists as good practice cases of the region, while Hungary and Poland are seen as failures. An explanation, therefore, must lie outside the content of laws and policies.

The analysis situates laws in their particular contexts and looks beyond content of policies to policy-making and implementation processes. Good practice models of domestic violence policy, such as the Duluth model in Minnesota, point to the importance of coordinated community response in which the state and NGOs co-own the policy process—both in the adoption of new policies and in its implementation. The sociologist Myra Marx Ferree argues that gender equality aims are best served by a two-pronged approach in which both the governance of gender (gender equality content of policies) and the gender of governance (participation of gender equality voices) matter.

Both in Croatia and Bulgaria, gender equality groups participate in the process of developing the law and policy at all stages, but also in its monitoring and amendment. They are core actors in implementation with an important steering role in coordinating action against domestic violence. The context of participatory implementation and ownership of the policy-making process provide a reading of gender equality policies framed in different terms that could protect against co-optation.

Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, illustrate patterns of co-optation. In Poland, from the early years of domestic violence policy development, contesting frames played a prominent role in the debates.

In the process of legal development, but even more so in the process of implementation of the new policy, gender equality groups play a limited role, while groups and organizations representing the anti-alcoholism approach, which frames domestic violence as a manifestation of alcoholism, and others representing family protection frames or perpetrator-oriented frames, are the most prominent actors and recipients of implementation resources. Gender equality groups remain largely marginalized in policy processes, without having ownership over them or a steering role in coordinating implementation.

The Hungarian story is somewhat similar: while gender equality groups have been insiders in the process from its early stages, they are increasingly marginalized and placed in the position of outside critics.

Meanwhile, representatives of contesting frames on family integrity and children's rights in favor of a two-parent family model, regardless of violence, are the main coordinators of implementation processes and beneficiaries of resources. Content and framing of shelters, awareness-raising campaigns, service providers and police trainings are all shaped at the implementation level.

In this context the gender equality in different frameworks of Hungarian and Polish domestic violence policies gains co-opted meaning in the implementation process, which is ultimately contradictory to objectives of gender equality frames.

The research shows that gender equality content of laws and policies can be conveyed in multiple ways. Explicit gender equality framing is important and desirable, but the innate tendency of policy-making to generalize or simplify policy compromises may often result in the adoption of domestic violence policies that do not use explicit gender equality language, and yet may resonate with its main objectives. Findings show the vulnerability to the co-optation of policies framed in this way and the potential of participatory forms of policy-making and implementation to guarantee against such co-optation. Once again, inclusive forms of governance are shown to matter. ◁

Andrea Krizsán is Research Fellow at the Center for Policy Studies of the Central European University in Budapest. She has been one of the researchers of the QUING-project. A new book *Institutionalizing Intersectionality. Comparative European Analyses* is forthcoming. This article is based on research carried out together with Raluca Popa.

Russian Politics in a Time of Economic Turmoil

Monthly Lecture: Daniel Treisman, January 25

Photo: IWM

Russia is beyond human comprehension, wrote romantic poet Fedor Tiutchev in the 19th century. His countryman Petr Chaadaev saw Russian history as a void that served to teach a lesson to the rest of the world. Daniel Treisman rejected both the "mystical view" and the "dark view" of Russian economic and political developments. Russia can, in fact, be understood with the help of rational thought. More productive than spreading tales of gloom and doom is to compare Russia's mixed record of democratization to other nations at similar stages of economic development, such as Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, or Malaysia. In the last 25 years Russia has returned to the world. Once an inefficient and inhumane Marxist dictatorship, the Russian Federation is now a highly mobile society, where more Russians travel and study abroad than ever before. Of course, Putin and Medvedev often display less than democratic tendencies. Treisman insisted that this has less to do with a Russian tradition of authoritarianism than with the economic development of the country. There are strong correlations between the popularity of Russia's leaders, the health of the Russian economy, and indexes of economic sentiment. What does this mean for the future? Much depends on the economy and on how long Putin and Medvedev can keep pensions and workers in cash if the GDP keeps going down. Much also depends on the rulers themselves: Yeltsin used his moment of popularity to institute democratic reforms. The next generation of Russian leaders might decide to do the same. ◁

Anne Dwyer

See also Daniel Treisman's contribution on page 14

Daniel Treisman is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Visiting Fellow at the IWM. He recently published the book *The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev.*

Grüner Kapitalismus: Ausweg aus der Krise?

Monatsvortrag: Klaus Dörre, 22. Februar

Photo: IWM

Ist die weltweite Wirtschaftkrise – wie man gelegentlich in deutschen Vorstandsetagen anzunehmen geneigt ist – nicht bereits überwunden? Ist ein „Green New Deal" (Nicholas Stern), also der nachhaltige Umgang mit endlichen Ressourcen, eine Lösung nicht nur für die ökologische, sondern auch für die ökonomische Krise? Und ist das Gebot der ökologischen Nachhaltigkeit überhaupt mit kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsprinzipien vereinbar? Wie sehr wirtschaftliche und ökologische Aspekte miteinander verflochten sind und stets auch in ihrer sozialen und politischen Dimension gedacht werden müssen, belegte Klaus Dörre in seinem Vortrag anhand zahlreicher Beispiele. Vom Niedriglohnsektor in Deutschland, dem Konsumverhalten von Hartz-IV Empfängern bis hin zu den Theorien eines Karl Marx, Meinhard Miegel oder James K. Galbraith – Dörre zog alle Register der makro- und mikroökonomischen Analyse und skizzierte zwei mögliche Zukunftsszenarien in der gegenwärtigen globalen Krisenlage: Entweder gelingt es uns, ökonomisches Wachstum nachhaltig zu gestalten, oder Gesellschaften, die kein Wachstum ausweisen, müssen wirtschaftlich, sozial, kulturell und politisch stabilisiert werden – was die weitaus schwierigere Alternative wäre. Ganz gleich in welche Richtung das Pendel schwingen mag, alle Basisinstitutionen der Gesellschaft werden, so Dörre, vom künftigen Wandel betroffen sein. Als Soziologe gab er überdies zu bedenken, dass Konsumverhalten an gesellschaftliche Normen gebunden ist und forderte die Verwirklichung einer egalitäreren Gesellschaft, denn diese sei ein Garant für ökologisch nachhaltiges Wirtschaften. Mit mehr Demokratie, der Wiederbelebung von wirtschaftsdemokratischen Prinzipien und der Einführung neuer Wohlstandsindikatoren könnte nämlich die ökologisch-ökonomische Doppelkrise gemeistert werden. Ob Dörres Entwurf Gehör findet, wird sich zeigen, wenn die nächste Krise kommt. ◁

Gerald Zachar

Klaus Dörres Vortrag zum Nachlesen im kommenden Heft 41 von ***Transit.***

Klaus Dörre ist Professor für Arbeits-, Industrie- und Wirtschaftssoziologie an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena. Sein neues Buch *Green New Deal: Ein Ausweg aus der Krise?* erscheint Anfang 2012 im Suhrkamp Verlag.

Der Rechtsradikalismus in Ungarn und seine geistigen Wurzeln

Monatsvortrag: Krisztián Ungváry 22. März

Photo: IWM

Die Präambel der neuen ungarischen Verfassung (…) beginnt mit den Worten: „Gott segne die Ungarn." Im Folgenden werden wiederholt die Größe der ungarischen Nation und deren historische Verdienste um den Schutz Europas beschworen. Der Name des Staates heißt nicht mehr, wie bisher, Republik Ungarn, sondern nur noch Ungarn. Einzigartigkeit und Sendungsbewusstsein sind historische Konstanten im ungarischen Selbstverständnis. Im Aufstieg der rechtsradikalen Partei Jobbik („Die Besseren"), die bei den Parlamentswahlen vor einem Jahr mit fast 17 Prozent drittstärkste Kraft wurde, findet dieses Selbstverständnis eine extreme Ausformung. Der Historiker Krisztián Ungváry glaubt, dass die neue Verfassung auch eine Reaktion von Premier Viktor Orbán auf die Herausforderung durch Jobbik ist. „Die Frage ist, ob Orbán selbst daran glaubt oder ob er ein so großer Zyniker ist", meinte Ungváry in einem Vortrag am IWM. Er selbst neige zu letzterer Antwort. Orbán sei offenbar zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass man die Wähler so dumm wie möglich halten müsse, nachdem alle Politiker gescheitert seien, die ihnen zu viel Denken zugemutet hätten. Mit Projekten wie der neuen Verfassung wolle Orbán Jobbik unter Kontrolle halten. Denn die Rechtsextremen könnten eine „tödliche Bedrohung für Fidesz" werden, nämlich dann, wenn die Regierung aufgrund der angespannten Staatsfinanzen Maßnahmen treffen müsse, die den Lebensstandard breiter Bevölkerungsschichten senken, und daraufhin, wie einst die Sozialisten, der Lüge bezichtigt würde. Ungváry erinnerte daran, dass es in den 1920er-Jahren, als Folge des „Friedensdiktats" von Trianon, in Ungarn mehr als 40 mehr oder weniger explizit „nationalsozialistische" und antisemitische Parteien gab. Einige von ihnen waren, nur scheinbar paradox, auch antifaschistisch ausgerichtet: „Sie sahen in den Deutschen die größere Gefahr als in den Juden." „In den Dörfern nagen die Schwaben (angesiedelte Deutsche), in den Städten die Juden an der Existenz des Magyarentums", habe es damals vielfach geheißen. In der antisemitischen und Roma-feindlichen Ausrichtung von Jobbik und anderer, noch extremerer Gruppen sieht Ungváry die „moderne" Form dieses quasi traditionellen ungarischen Rechtsextremismus: „Für sie sind die Zigeuner die Roboter, die Werkzeuge der Juden, die die Magyaren aus den Dörfern vertreiben." Generell werde Modernität als etwas Schädliches dargestellt – mit modernsten Mitteln wie dem Internet. ◁

Josef Kirchengast, ***Der Standard,*** *24. 3. 2011*

Krisztián Ungváry ist Historiker, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter des Instituts für die Erforschung der ungarischen 1956er Revolution, und Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Stiftung „Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen" in Budapest.


Stephen Holmes


Nina L. Khrushcheva


Ivan Krastev

Photos: IWM

Is Russia on the Edge of Change?

Discussion with **Steven Holmes, Nina L. Khrushcheva** and **Ivan Krastev,** February 14

Succession is the most dangerous source of instability in authoritarian regimes. Since a change at the top may end up in a change of the regime as such, authoritarian rulers often try to stay in power as long as possible or to make arrangements for their comeback. With the presidential elections in Russia on the horizon, the Bruno Kreisky Forum and the IWM invited a group of outstanding political thinkers to discuss whether the country will see a regime change, an ongoing Putinism without Putin, or simply a comeback of Putin as president. Nina Khrushcheva emphasized that Russians have a very limited choice in 2012. They either have to support marginal opposition candidates, who have no coherent message as to how to provide an alternative to the country's current leadership. Or they can vote for the tandem of Putin and Medvedev, which ultimately means that the system of the so-called "managed democracy" will be preserved. With no alternatives at hand, elections in Russia are becoming a sort of military exercise, said Stephen Holmes. These are mere demonstrations of the legitimacy of the regime, not a source of it. Since a crucial ingredient of democracy is that parties can lose their voters' support, the forthcoming elections in Russia are not really democratic. However, as Ivan Krastev remarked, Putin is not the one who is likely to overestimate the power of authoritarianism. As a former KGB officer, he had a front-row seat in watching the Soviet Union collapse. Yet not only the voters' choices are limited, also Putin's are. Russian politics—as nearly all authoritarian regimes—have no exit option, no possibility of retirement, which means that Putin is forced to stay in power. The end of Putin as a politician would also be the end of political Putinism. Presumably, he will try to avoid both of these scenarios. ◁

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A cooperation of the Bruno Kreisky Forum, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports, the Centre for Liberal Strategies, and the IWM with the support of the European Council on Foreign Relations

See also Nina L. Khrushcheva's contribution on page 13

Stephen Holmes, Professor of Law, New York University

Nina L. Khrushcheva, Professor of International Affairs at The New School; Senior Fellow of the World Policy Institute, New York

Ivan Krastev, Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberals Strategies, Sofia; Permanent Fellow, IWM


Claudia Schmied


Gaston Salvatore


Alexander Pereira


György Konrád

Photos: IWM

Steckt Europa in einer Kulturkrise?

Reihe: Europa im Diskurs, 20. März

Im Fußball gibt es das auf die unterschiedliche Finanzkraft der Clubs anspielende geflügelte Wort, dass Geld keine Tore schieße. Was indes nicht bedeuten muss, dass kein Geld besser ins Ziel trifft. So griff der ungarische Schriftsteller György Konrád, der im Kalten Krieg in seiner Heimat mit zehnjährigem Publikationsverbot belegt war, in der unter dem Thema „Steckt Europa in der Kulturkrise?" stehenden Diskussion im Burgtheater zu einer Fußballmetapher. Das Vertrauen in die „fragwürdige Mannschaft von Menschen, die nur Probleme schaffen", also die Künstler, so Konrád, sei für Subventionsgeber nicht viel größer, als wenn Zensur herrsche.

Ganz so launig ging es dann in der Veranstaltung nicht immer zu. Zu verschieden waren die Positionen der vier Diskutanten aus ebenso vielen Ländern: Bundesministerin Claudia Schmied, Alexander Pereira (Intendant des Opernhauses Zürich und designierter Intendant der Salzburger Festspiele), und der italienische Autor und Rudi-Dutschke-Freund Gaston Salvatore, wie auch eben György Konrád.

Alexander Pereira etwa meinte, dass in der Kultur Geld sehr wohl Tore schießen würde: „Zehn Prozent mehr Geld macht die Differenz aus, ob ein Haus mittelmäßig ist oder sehr gut." Dabei plädierte Pereira für ein über die staatliche Subvention hinausgehendes Modell: „Man muss den historischen Fehler korrigieren, der nach dem Krieg gemacht wurde und bis heute nachwirkt. Die Politik hat versucht, durch Kultur ihre Legitimation zu erlangen, nach dem Motto: Kultur ist unsere Leistung. Wir brauchen aber heute die Solidarität zwischen Staat, privaten Förderern und Wirtschaft."

Der Einwand von Salvatore, diese Integration nichtstaatlicher Geldgeber führe zu Interventionen, bezeichnete Pereira als „Unsinn": „In meinen vielen Jahren in Zürich gab es keinen Versuch der Einmischung. Wir brauchen die Synergien der drei Bereiche – Geld erzeugt natürlich Kreativität. Wenn ich mehr Geld habe, kann ich natürlich auch mehr produzieren." Mischfinanzierungen würden schließlich auch selbstbewusster gegenüber Subventionsgebern machen. (…)

Im Grunde, sagte Pereira, bringe dieser Ansatz „einfach mehr Freiheit, auch etwas für die Moderne zu tun. Konkret: Ich werde in Salzburg jedes Jahr eine Uraufführung bringen. Vielleicht werde ich scheitern. Aber auch deshalb kämpfe ich um mehr Geld. Alles nur vom Staat zu wollen, ist aber nicht richtig, man muss sich überlegen, wo sonst noch Geld wartet. Und dieses Geld ist da."

Ministerin Schmied wollte in diesem Punkt keinesfalls widersprechen: „Sponsoren sind natürlich eine Entlastung. Die Frage bei meinem Budget ist ja auch: Wie kann ich etwas für die zeitgenössische Kunst tun? Bis zu 75 Prozent des Budgets gehen ja in Schätze der Vergangenheit. In den zeitgenössischen Bereich entsprechend weniger. Es ist nicht gelungen, hier mehr Balance zu schaffen. Grundsätzlich ist es aber immerhin gelungen, das Kulturbudget zu halten. Es kann natürlich nie genug Geld für Kultur geben. Aber jede Budgetverhandlung ist natürlich auch ein Verteilungskampf zwischen den Ressorts."

Es handelt sich allerdings um einen Verteilungskampf, der nicht in allen europäischen Staaten mit gleich langen Spießen geführt wird. Während Deutschland und Frankreich ihre Kulturbudgets erhöhen und das österreichische gleich bleibt, reduziert Italien seine Ausgaben für Kultur um 40 Prozent; und in Ungarn ist die staatliche Einflussnahme auf den Kulturbereich durch die Auswechslung unliebsamer Kulturverantwortlicher Dauerthema. (…)

Bundesministerin Schmied nahm ganz am Schluss den Begriff Hoffnung, den Salvatore ins Spiel gebracht hatte, noch einmal auf. Nämlich die Hoffnung auf eine Kultur des Miteinander, die Salvatores Landsmann Pier Paolo Pasolini in seinen *Freibeuterschriften* als Gegenpart zu der Einstellung jener sieht, „die das Leben der anderen als ein Nichts und das eigene Herz lediglich als einen Muskel betrachtet". ◁

*Ljubisa Tošić, **Der Standard,** 21. 3. 2011*

Steckt Europa in einer Kulturkrise?
Burgtheater Wien, 20. März

Claudia Schmied
Ministerin für Unterricht, Kunst und Kultur der Republik Österreich

György Konrád
Ungarischer Schriftsteller

Alexander Pereira
Intendant des Opernhauses Zürich

Gaston Salvatore
Schriftsteller und Publizist

Moderation:
Alexandra Föderl-Schmid
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

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Von links: V. Reding, J. Pröll, D. Droutsas, D. Snower, A. Föderl-Schmid

Photo: IWM

Der umkämpfte Euro und die Zukunft der Union

Reihe: Europa im Diskurs, 20. Februar

Wenn ein Fahrrad nicht fährt, dann fällt es um. Und wenn über etwas nicht gesprochen wird, dann existiert es auch nicht. In der Welt der Europäischen Union ist dies alles selbstredend nicht der Fall. Und gemäß dieser quasi politischen Seinslehre geht es der Union logischerweise blendend – auch wenn sie sich derzeit, wie manche sagen, in der größten Krise seit dem Abschluss der Römischen Verträge befinde.

In der Reihe „Europa im Diskurs" ging es um den gegenwärtigen Befindlichkeitsstand der Union, der sich dieser Tage weniger in radfahrerischem Fortkommen als in europäischen Währungsfragen ausprägt. Das IWM, die Erste Stiftung, das Burgtheater und *der Standard* hatten geladen, und Viviane Reding sagte gleich zu Beginn: „Der Euro ist unser Bollwerk, unsere Burg." Er habe in wirtschaftlich schwierigen Zeiten gezeigt, was er kann, und werde auch weiterhin bestehen. Darin stimmen laut der EU-Kommissarin sogar die Mehrheit der Österreicher überein, die sich in einer Umfrage zu 78 Prozent für den Euro aussprechen und sich pro Jahr allein 300 Millionen Euro an Wechselkursspesen ersparen.

„Wenn man eine gemeinsame Währung hat", sprach Reding weiter, „dann bekommt man über kurz oder lang auch eine gemeinsame Art zu denken und zu handeln." Wie weit diese Gemeinsamkeiten gehen können, darüber allerdings gingen die Meinungen auf der Bühne des Burgtheaters auseinander: Finanzminister Josef Pröll erklärte, der Euro sei eine „extrem junge Währung mit extrem politischem Charakter". In der Krise habe der Euro es erstmals ermöglicht, dass nicht ein Land seine Probleme – durch Abwertung – auf andere abwälzen konnte. Er, Pröll, sei dementsprechend auch für eine starke Koordination in Brüssel, aber eine gemeinsame europäische Wirtschaftsregierung, wie sie Deutschland und Frankreich vorschwebt, sei zumindest mittelfristig „politische Fiktion". Pröll: „Brüssel wird keine Lohnpolitik oder Pensionspolitik für die 17 Euroländer machen." Kommissarin Reding wurde deutlicher: Alleingänge einzelner Länder, gemeint waren Paris und Berlin, seien verzichtbar. „Das schadet Europa, wenn einige den anderen ein Diktat auferlegen."

Dimitris Droutsas, der griechische Außenminister, dagegen machte im wirtschaftlichen Integrationsdruck, den der Euro erzeuge, auch einen politischen Integrationsdruck aus. „In Zukunft müssen wir uns die Frage stellen, ob wir nicht auch einen weiteren Schritt zur politischen Integration machen müssen."

Eine Antwort darauf verlangen auch die Finanzmärkte: Und Droutsas sowie Pröll verlangen, dass eine solche beim kommenden Europäischen Rat im März in Brüssel klipp und klar gegeben wird.

Pröll: „Wir müssen beim Rat ein Signal setzen. Der ständige Krisenmechanismus der Union muss pfeifen." Droutsas: „Was notwendig ist, ist eine klare, mit einer Stimme verbreitete Botschaft." Wieviel der permanente Rettungsschirm ab 2013 Österreich denn kosten werde, konnte Pröll nicht sagen. „Ich will nicht lügen." Das werde erst in den kommenden Wochen definitiv geklärt. (…)

Dennis Snower, der Chef des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel, forderte noch eine andere Maßnahme: Es bedürfe auch einer nachhaltigen Fiskalpolitik. „Wir brauchen eine unabhängige Schuldenkommission, die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten dazu anhält, ihren fiskalpolitischen Verpflichtungen nachzukommen und vereinbarte Schuldenquoten einzuhalten." (…)

Pröll und auch Reding widersprachen heftig. „Ich habe das ungute Gefühl, dass wir neben den im Lissabon-Vertrag neudefinierten Institutionen Parallelveranstaltungen gründen", befürchtete der Vizekanzler. Und die EU-Kommissarin sekundierte: „Wir haben Gremien genug, wir müssen nur darauf achten, dass diese auch funktionieren. Eine Rückkehr zum Intergouvernementalen schadet allen, denn dort entscheiden die Sünder über die Sünder."

Überdies: Seit Jänner gebe es drei neue EU-Finanzkontrollinstitutionen und das so genannte europäische Semester, in dem die Nationalstaaten regelmäßig ihre Budgetpläne zur Kontrolle nach Brüssel vorlegen müssen. Wer dabei vom Pfad abweicht, muss mit Sanktionen rechnen.

Strafzahlungen, so warnte Ökonom Snower, seien ein negatives Signal: „Das ist so, als ob ich jemandem, der gerade eine Beule in sein Auto gefahren hat, noch eine weitere hineinschlage." Viel eleganter sei, die Regierungen zu einem Fahrplan zu nötigen, in wirtschaftlich guten Zeiten zu sparen und Schulden abzutragen.

Was könne den Bürgern noch zugemutet werden, fragte die Moderatorin, Standard-Chefredakteurin Alexandra Föderl-Schmid. „Eines muss klar sein: Wir retten mit diesem Geld Europa und die europäische Idee und nicht Griechenland oder irgendwelche Banken", antwortete Pröll. (…) ◁

Christoph Prantner,
Der Standard, *21. 2. 2011*

For the full article in English refer to:
www.iwm.at > IWMpost

Der umkämpfte Euro und die Zukunft der Union
Burgtheater Wien, 20. Februar

Dimitris Droutsas
Außenminister der Republik Griechenland bis 2011

Josef Pröll
Vizekanzler und Finanzminister der Republik Österreich von 2008 bis 2011

Viviane Reding
Vizepräsidentin der Europäischen Kommission; EU Kommissarin für Justiz, Grundrechte und Bürgerschaft

Dennis J. Snower
Präsident des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft Kiel

Moderation:
Alexandra Föderl-Schmid
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

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The Construction of Gender

BY PETER HANNS REILL

Men are from Mars, women are from Venus. The idea of an unbridgeable gulf separating males from females, which has become part and parcel of European culture, was established in late eighteenth century natural philosophy. Yet, there were alternative visions of gender, says historian Peter Hanns Reill.

Traditional accounts of science have usually cast it as a concerted attack upon prejudice, the triumph of impartial, objective understanding over pure subjectivity. However, with the rise of post-modernism, this view has been severely undermined, leading many post-modernists to see all so-called objective statements as inherently subjective, part of Foucault's idea of the power/knowledge dyad.

The question of gender construction has played a crucial role in these debates focusing on whether biological science could be "objective" or is simply an ideology that, in this case, legitimized gender prejudice. In this discussion, the period from the late Enlightenment to early Romanticism appears crucial, for it was then that the "scientific" study of gender was established and incorporated into the newly formed discipline of "biology." Biology's gender constructions seemed to valorize long-held prejudices about the differences between males and females.

According to interpreters such as Thomas Laqueur and Claudia Honegger, two crucial moments took place in the late Enlightenment and early Romanticism that consolidated prejudicial stereotypes of male and female qualities in modern culture. The first was what Laqueur called the creation of the two-sex model, which assumed an essential biological difference between men and women; the second was what Honegger described as "biologizing" this model, authorizing these artificial gender distinctions with the stamp of scientific objectivity. For Honegger and Laqueur, the major steps taken in objectifying gender prejudice occurred in the Enlightenment, casting the Enlightenment in its now familiar post-modernist guise, as the moment that sired modernity, usually defined negatively.

Many of the points these authors make appear plausible. Certainly, by the 1820s or 30s, the typical prejudicial stereotypes of male/female differentiation had become part and parcel of general European culture, advanced by pastors, poets, scientists, moralists and cultural commentators.

However, the ways in which these shifts have occurred and the almost automatic assumption that they were produced during the Enlightenment and only further elaborated, substantiated, and institutionalized in the nineteenth century appears to me to be an oversimplification.

For this reason, I wish to look at how gender was conceived by Enlightenment Vitalists, an activity usually cast within the framework of their discussion of generation or artistic creation, and then recast by Romantic thinkers, who sought to determine the "moral" and intellectual essences of the sexes. In so doing, I hope to draw a differentiation between the gender constructions of the late Enlightenment and Romanticism, specifically the thought of Romantic German *Naturphilosophie*.

Photo: istockphoto.com / Chris Lamphear

Enlightenment Vitalists called for the necessary interaction of masculine and feminine powers to produce a higher union

My general argument is that the gender models Enlightenment Vitalists and Romantic Naturphilosophen proposed were driven by their contrasting epistemological assumptions concerning nature, matter and life. Though both movements agreed upon certain principles, namely that matter could be infused with active, goal-directed forces and that mechanistic explanations were inadequate to account for the phenomenon of life, they disagreed upon the epistemological conclusions they drew from their redefinition of matter and force.

Enlightenment Vitalists assumed an "organized body" to be composed of a congeries of interacting life forces, which worked together in harmonic cooperation. They proposed a model of nature in which matter and force were joined yet not identical. Hence their basic metaphors were founded upon the images of mediation and indeterminacy. These assumptions informed their models of gender and gender relations.

At the heart of many of their works was the idea that though male and female powers or principles were different, they were part of a reciprocal interaction in which male and female forces were linked, for "every pure separation contradicts the analogy of the laws of nature." The image of androgynous mediation is thus central to their construction of gender, reinforcing the late Enlightenment ideal of harmony. For this reason, many Enlightenment Vitalists called for the necessary interaction of masculine and feminine powers to produce a higher union. "For only by combining the characteristics of the two sexes can perfection be generated", as Humboldt has put it.

The Romantic Naturphilosophen proclaimed an opposing epistemological ideal and hence a contrasting definition of gender and gender relations. They assumed an identity between matter and mind and believed it possible to uncover the secrets of nature using the tools of philosophical reflection, in which mind's activities were believed to be identical to the processes of nature.

Rather than turning to mediation, they essentialized the gender relations they discerned and proclaimed a biology of sexual differentiation in which the male and female principles were radically opposed and could not interact, an opposition that constituted a universal principle in nature. Unlike the Enlightenment Vitalists, the Romantic Naturphilosophen established an unbridgeable gulf separating males from females and constructed strict hierarchies based upon this essential polarity, hierarchies supposedly enshrined in nature.

By looking at the differences between the gender constructions established by Enlightenment Vitalists and Romantic Naturphilosophen, one can better understand the complexities of how competing visions of gender were created within the emerging fields of the life sciences and then biology.

This comparison also calls into question explanations derived from Foucault's idea of a late eighteenth-century episteme shift in which the new disciplines of linguistics, biology and economics were generated. Certainly, the supposed episteme shift Foucault described does not characterize the German thinkers he used to justify it, many of whom had turned to *Naturphilosophie* to structure their vision of what a new science could and should explain.

In fact, one could argue that the Naturphilosophen consciously returned to a way of constituting the order of things that corresponds to Foucault's "classical" era of Leibniz and Descartes. Their search for a new universal *mathesis,* for one-dimensional Pythagorean certainty in a world seemingly filled with chaos, found its clearest expressions in the new definitions of gender they had forged. ◁

Peter Hanns Reill is Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles, and was a participant in the conference "Genealogies of Life", which took place at the IWM in 2010. He is the author of *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment.*

The Gender Police

BY MAREN BEHRENSEN

Is she a he? Gender verification tests are still very common in professional sports. But their presumed benefit—ensuring fair competition for female athletes—is virtually nonexistent compared to its potential harms, argues Maren Behrensen.



Photo: istockphoto.com / Felix Möckel

During the Athletics World Championships 2009 in Berlin, two athletes drew most of the public attention: Usain Bolt for his world records in the men's 100m and 200m and Caster Semenya for the allegations that she was "not really a woman" but a "hermaphrodite", following her resounding victory in the women's 800m.

The focus had begun to fall on Semenya a few weeks before the event, when she clocked 1:56.72 at the African Junior Championships in Mauritius, setting a new national record and making her the world's leading athlete in the 800m. At the World Championship, she beat this time—and the competition—by almost 1.5 seconds, pushing her personal best to 1:55.45. A media frenzy then ensued when news leaked that the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) had ordered Semenya to undergo a gender verification test. The suspicions about her sexual identity were fueled by her "male appearance" and the fact that she had developed from a promising junior athlete into a world-class middle distance runner in under a year.

The allegations against Semenya triggered strongly-worded denials from South African officials, outrage from intersex groups at her treatment by the public, and, predictably, complaints from her opponents. When news leaked to the media in September 2009 that tests had shown that Semenya was intersex, neither the IAAF nor Athletics South Africa (ASA) officially commented on the issue. However, the IAAF announced that Semenya would be able to keep her world title and the prize money and on July 6, 2010, eleven months after the World Championships, finally decided that Semenya was eligible to compete in women's events.

Semenya's treatment by the media and by sports officials exemplifies what is wrong with the practice of gender verification testing (GVT) in professional sports. GVT is institutionalized homo-, trans-, and interphobia in scientific disguise. The presumed benefits of GVT—the discovery of male and intersex impostors—are virtually nonexistent, while the harm they inflict is tangible: namely, the public humiliation of intersexed athletes, who often are not aware that they have an intersex condition.

"Sex testing" is institutionalized homo-, trans-, and interphobia in scientific disguise

The term "intersex" is an umbrella concept. It covers a range of conditions from "true hermaphroditism"—the presence of both male and female gonadal tissue—to hormonal imbalances which affect the development of the external genitalia: in some varieties of a condition called Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), the adrenal glands produce excess male hormones instead of corticoids. One intersex condition which appears to be relatively common among professional athletes is Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS). Persons with AIS have a Y-chromosome and fully developed testes, but while the testes produce testosterone and other male hormones, their body cannot absorb these substances and develops a female phenotype with female external genitalia.

An athlete with AIS, the Spanish hurdler Maria Patiño, helped end the IAAF's policy of compulsory GVT. Patiño "failed" a GVT in 1985—where a Y-chromosome and undescended testes were discovered—and fought a legal battle which lasted two years, until she was finally allowed to compete again. Medical experts who came to her defense argued that, since Patiño's body could not use any of the excess testosterone that her testes produced, it made no sense to disqualify her for a presumed competitive advantage.

In 1991, the IAAF abandoned compulsory GVT—the International Olympic Committee followed suit in 1999—but it reserves the right to order individual tests in cases of a challenge to or suspicion about an athlete's sexual identity. This is what happened to Caster Semenya.

Undeniably, there is a significant performance gap between world-class male and world-class female athletes. If men and women were to compete against each other in professional athletics, women would effectively be forced out of the competition. When we consider Semenya's winning time at the World Championships in context, it becomes clear that she belongs in the women's competition. Had she competed in the men's 800m, she would have been eliminated in the first of three rounds and finished third-to-last in the final rankings. Her time was more than two seconds higher than the current women's World Record (1:53.28) and more than one second higher than the current women's African record (1:54.01).

Incidentally, the world record in the women's 800m was set in 1983 by the Czech Jarmila Kratochvilova. Twenty years ago or more, when this record was set along with eleven others in women's athletics, the doping of female athletes with male hormones was common practice, especially but not exclusively in the communist bloc. In light of the IAAF's persistent refusal to acknowledge the blatant use of performance-enhancing drugs in the 1980s and erase these records, the worry about the slight advantages intersex athletes might have seems inconsistent and hypocritical.

During the more than 23 years in which GVT was compulsory, there was not a single case of a male or intersex "impostor." There is no evidence that those intersex athletes who have been exposed in the media enjoyed an advantage over other female athletes significant enough to make them clearly ineligible to compete with other women.

For instance, at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta—the last Summer Olympics with mandatory GVT—eight of 3387 athletes "failed the sex test." All eight were subsequently cleared to compete. Moreover, intersexed persons with visible anomalies to their external genitalia would likely be deterred from competing in professional sports by routine anti-doping controls, where athletes have to urinate in front of an official. Indeed, the IAAF's guidelines state that these routine anti-doping controls are sufficient to discover "impostors." Thus GVTs contribute virtually nothing to the task of ensuring fair competition.

These tests, especially since they have become selective, reinforce homo-, trans-, and interphobic attitudes, which are anyway rampant in professional sports. The fact that GVTs can be ordered in response to a "challenge" by another team or individual competitor fosters a climate in which any successful athlete who does not conform to stereotypical images of femininity becomes suspect. Despite the efforts to keep GVTs confidential, results and rumors are often leaked to the press—as in Caster Semenya's case—and it becomes impossible to protect the athlete's privacy and dignity. Even when the process is kept confidential, having her sexual identity challenged and scrutinized is likely to be a traumatizing experience for any athlete ordered to submit to a GVT.

Given their virtually nonexistent benefits and their serious potential for harm, GVTs should be abandoned altogether. Under current circumstances, an athlete's psycho-social sex is sufficient to determine her eligibility: if she identifies as female, she ought to be allowed to compete with other females. ◁

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Change Nobody Believes in

BY NINA L. KHRUSHCHEVA

Russia is gripped by election fever. But whether Putin or Medvedev win the presidential race in 2012 is beside the point. Political change in Russia will not come from the top. It will rather come from the bottom, says Russian-American political analyst Nina L. Khrushcheva. Yet before that can actually come about, the country needs to overcome numerous legacies from the past.

Photo: istockphoto.com / Mikhail Olykaynen

Modernization is the order of the day in Russia. The plan is that nano-technology and the Skolkovo innovation center, known as the Russian Silicon Valley, will rapidly propel the country into the twenty-first century. Questions aside, however, as to whether technical modernization will actually succeed at all, will this kind of modernization be enough to change Russia?

Change certainly needs to depend more on political modernization. But where is that going to come from? From Russia's real strong man, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin? Or from President Dmitry Medvedev, whose claim to political power is that he is a champion of technological innovation? Will it come from the top, as in the past in Russia? Or will it come from the bottom, as we have witnessed in Africa and the Middle East?

Recently, Anatoly Chubais, the father of Russian privatization in the 1990s and current head of the country's nano-technology conglomerate RosNano, suggested that prospects for political modernization are dim. "Today," he said, "no demand for it exists. Such demand requires a social group to promote it."

Igor Yurgens, chairman of the Institute of Contemporary Development and protégé of modernizer-in-chief President Medvedev, has similar doubts about political change in Russia. Russians, he suggests, "are not citizens, but a sort of tribe." The archaic character of Russian society is unlikely to change before 2050, according to Yurgens.

Russian politicians have always been fond of assigning a due date for change: Nikita Khrushchev once memorably promised to build communism by 1980. We are still waiting. But what matters here is a common perception that Russians are not ready to assume the responsibilities of citizenship. Once again, Western-style democracy depends on the will of an enlightened and benevolent czar.

Many hope that modernization will indeed come from Medvedev. The general thinking goes: once he brings about his modernizing reforms, Russia will step up as the world's technological leader. Then people will follow willingly, forgetting centuries of serfdom and dictatorship of the proletariat, followed by the political chaos and economic free-fall of the 1990s and the decade of Putin's managed democracy. This is a classic case of Russian wishful thinking—the idea that in a few years Russia's technological development will overtake America, China, India and the rest is like believing Joseph Stalin when he insisted that it was possible to build communism "in one country" in a few decades.

This kind of top-down approach never really worked. Neither Stalin, nor Khrushchev, nor even the chaotic capitalism of Yeltsin were ever able to uproot Russia's culture of indifference and subordination, for precisely the reason that they insisted on top-down change and expected the Russian people to simply acquiesce *en masse*.

Since no change can come from either Medvedev or Putin, what about the Russian opposition? With its current leaders—Boris Nemtsov, the former head of the now-defunct Union of Right Forces, Mikhail Kasyanov, a former prime minister, Garry Kasparov, the chess master, and Edward Limonov, the notorious neo-Bolshevik and imperialist writer—the opposition may appear to be offering a few options. Their existence supposedly supports the idea that the presidential election campaign of 2012 is officially underway: the existence of a choice of candidates should, under normal—i.e. non-Russian circumstances—indicate that change is nigh. However, the problem is not only that the opposition is weak, it is also significantly less popular among the general public than either Putin or Medvedev.

Non-political public initiatives represent the country's best hope for political modernization

Russians dissatisfied with the system are therefore faced with a very limited choice in 2012. They either have to support marginal opposition candidates, who have no coherent message as to how to provide a credible alternative to the country's current leadership. Or they can settle for the hope that modernization will come from the top, and support the leadership of the system, which they oppose in the first place.

There is nothing new in the mistrust of the masses expressed by people like Chubais or Yurgens, or in Medvedev's putative desire to impose modernization from the top. (Khrushchev's "thaw" and Gorbachev's *Perestroika* happened the same way and, as promising as they were originally, ultimately failed to change Russia's general perception of power—the czar versus the people as "a sort of tribe".) Yet in the last few years a challenge seems to have emerged to that historical status quo: Russia is now witnessing organized resistance to the familiar top down formulas.

Beyond the opposition, numerous non-political public initiatives have sprung up recently to protest specific government policies, leading inevitably to confrontation with the existing political order. To be sure, such initiatives have not yet become substantial. But it is these people—motorists, volunteer ecologists and charitable-campaign organizers—rather than Russia's politicians who represent the country's best hope for political modernization.

If Egypt or Tunisia are any indication, then change for Russia can only come from the bottom up. Yet before that happens, before the public becomes really involved in Russia's political future (either in 2012 or by 2050), the country faces another major challenge: a change of mentality, both among our leaders and our people as a whole. To achieve political modernization with long-lasting results, Russia needs to overcome a number of legacies from the past.

The first challenge is Russia's enormous geography: nine time zones (since last year's presidential decree, previously there were eleven) are not viable for the country's modernization. Conversely, the problems faced by St Petersburg, a relatively modern city close to Finland, have little to do with those of the enormous and cold Siberia.

The second challenge is Russia's proud evocation of the outdated symbols of state power—for instance its coat of arms, the double-headed eagle, inherited from the early days of the Russian empire—as if they were an appropriate representation of the contemporary nation. The double eagle as symbol of Russia's domination over East and West is not in tune with current realities.

The third—enormous—challenge is Russia's ideology and identity. Despite Medvedev's modernizing aspirations, the Putin state often acts as if it were still in the fifteenth century; as if Putin himself were the direct descendant of the Byzantine kings and Moscow the Third Rome, now with Mercedes and supermarkets. Just like Byzantium centuries ago, Russia believes it is a divinely ordained nation, destined to withstand the decay and destruction of the West. Yet Christian Orthodoxy, the faith upon which the glory of the Byzantine Empire was based, is not, as a state religion, conducive to keeping step with the political developments of the contemporary world. After all, Orthodoxy's propounded beliefs—for example, the superiority of spirit over reality—clash with progress, the indispensable feature of modernization. ◁

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Russia's Tom Sawyer Strategy

BY DANIEL TREISMAN

Innovate or die? Although they agree about little else, Russia's current leaders and their liberal critics share one firmly-held belief: to secure high growth rates and create jobs, the country must leap to the cutting edge of knowledge. But there are easier ways to prosperity, says American political scientist Daniel Treisman.

In the old days, Russia could get by merely exploiting its oil and gas deposits. But not any more. At least, that is what one hears both in the Kremlin and among Moscow's dissident intellectuals. Today, to increase its prosperity, Russia must leap to the cutting edge of knowledge, investing in nanotechnology, lasers, genetic engineering, superconductors, and other information-rich products and processes.

Innovation—like motherhood and national holidays—has become such a universal value that to question the current fashion is to ask for trouble. So let me be clear: supporting science should be a priority in its own right.

But as a strategy for boosting economic growth, investing in high technology may end up disappointing its advocates. A look at the economic history of other countries suggests the need for a little realism.

Consider Great Britain, the powerhouse of the Industrial Revolution. Between 1700 and 1820, according to the best available estimates, Britain's GDP per capita grew by 36 percent, adjusted for inflation. Impressive, perhaps—until one realizes that in the same period colonial Brazil grew by 41 percent, and the provincial outposts of Canada and the US by 110 and 139 percent respectively.

Or take the US, whose researchers have dominated the period since World War II. Between 1950 and 2008, US GDP per capita grew by 226 percent. Again, that might sound like a lot until one notices that the average for all countries was 261 percent. American growth fell far behind not just the Asian miracle economies of China (1,401 percent) and Singapore (1,167 percent), but even Southern European late developers such as Greece (754 percent).

Even these figures exaggerate the contribution of technological innovation. Most of the growth in Britain and the US during these periods had other causes. According to the economic historian Nicholas Crafts, only a little more than one third of the increase in Britain's GDP during the Industrial Revolution reflected higher productivity—and only part of that third can be attributed to technological progress. Dale Jorgenson, the preeminent expert on US productivity, writes that, despite the revolution in information technology, less than 12 percent of America's growth in recent decades has come from innovation.

In fact, the most innovative economy in each era usually has one of the *slowest* growth rates. Why do revolutionary inventions not have a larger impact?

Illustration: Frontispiece of *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* from 1876

Without liberalizing reforms, innovation hubs will have little impact on the economy

For one thing, new discoveries often take a very long time to change the way businesses operate. Massive investments are required to replace outmoded capital equipment. Steam power—the signature breakthrough of the Industrial Revolution—had its biggest impact on growth, according to Crafts, "about one hundred years after Watt's famous invention." In the late 19th Century, it took decades for factories to be reorganized to exploit electric power.

Beyond the expense and difficulty of replacing capital equipment, a variety of other obstacles often delay the commercialization of new ideas. Vested interests and regulators with a taste for red tape conspire to block change.

What matters most for growth is not where new ideas first appear but where they are developed. And this depends less on the brainpower of scientists or the extent of state research funding than on the quality of the business environment.

In countries with relatively secure property rights, competitive markets, and liberal regulations, discoveries—even if they come from elsewhere—can be commercialized quickly and profitably. In such settings, entrepreneurs are willing to risk making major capital investments and pioneering new products. By contrast, where property rights are insecure and markets distorted by monopolists and corrupt bureaucrats, even if local inventors hold patents they will look to more welcoming environments to develop their inventions.

A simple conclusion follows: even if Russian scientists have brilliant ideas, unless the country undergoes major reforms of its economy and state those brilliant ideas will be exploited first *somewhere else.* Innovation hubs and technology centers are not substitutes for the politically challenging liberalizations needed to improve Russia's business environment. Without liberalizing reforms, those innovation hubs will have little impact on the broader economy. They will supply ideas to the mass production meccas of China and India.

Although crucial for the world as a whole, technological innovation is actually one of the hardest ways for countries to develop. It is favored only by those countries that have already used up all the easier pathways to prosperity.

What are those easier pathways? In Moscow these days, referring to "catchup growth" is considered in bad taste. The general feeling is that Russia should find a way to win the race without first overtaking the leaders.

So let me pose a concrete question: would Russians prefer a growth rate of 2.7 percent a year, as in the US, or of 8.0 percent a year, as in China? Very rapid growth, when it does not come from raw materials booms, is almost always the result of applying technologies, business models, and management techniques that have already been shown to work elsewhere. Given the very low productivity in some Russian sectors—and in some firms within given sectors—there are huge opportunities for gains of this kind.

What is needed to bring about such growth? The answers are familiar and obvious. They also overlap with the conditions for the successful development of innovations. Competition—so managers must struggle to outperform their rivals. Secure property rights—so entrepreneurs will risk buying expensive capital equipment. Business-friendly regulations—to attract foreign investors with know-how.

In a famous chapter in Mark Twain's novel *Huckleberry Finn,* Tom Sawyer decides to free a slave who has been locked up in a shed. Rather than simply use the key, Tom decides that he will dig his way underneath the door with a kitchen knife because that will be more of an adventure. It would certainly be an adventure for Russia to expand its economy by means of revolutionary breakthroughs in nanotechnology and genetics. Supporting science is an important goal for any country.

But… there are easier ways to grow. ◁

A Russian version of this article appeared in ***Moskovskie Novosti.***

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Hitler vs. Stalin: Who Was Worse?

BY TIMOTHY SNYDER

All in all, Hitler's war and Stalin's terror have murdered about 20 million people. Given that the Nazis and the Stalinists tended to kill in the same places, between Berlin and Moscow, and given that they were, at different times, rivals, allies, and enemies, we must take seriously the possibility that some of the death and destruction brought onto these lands was their mutual responsibility, argues Timothy Snyder.

Cartoon on the Hitler-Stalin Pact by David Low (*Evening Standard,* September 20, 1939)

Illustration: British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, www.cartoons.ac.uk

In the second half of the twentieth century, Americans were taught to see both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as the greatest of evils. Hitler was worse, because his regime propagated the unprecedented horror of the Holocaust, the attempt to eradicate an entire people on racial grounds. Yet Stalin was also worse, because his regime killed far, far more people, tens of millions it was often claimed, in the endless wastes of the Gulag.

For decades, and even today, this confidence about the difference between the two regimes—quality versus quantity—has set the ground rules for the politics of memory. Even historians of the Holocaust generally take for granted that Stalin killed more people than Hitler, thus placing themselves under greater pressure to stress the special character of the Holocaust, since this is what made the Nazi regime worse than the Stalinist one.

Discussion of numbers can blunt our sense of the horrific personal character of each killing and the irreducible tragedy of each death. As anyone who has lost a loved one knows, the difference between zero and one is an infinity. Though we have a harder time grasping this, the same is true for the difference between, say, 780,862 and 780,863—which happens to be the best estimate of the number of people murdered at Treblinka. Large numbers matter because they are an accumulation of small numbers: that is, precious individual lives.

Today, after two decades of access to Eastern European archives, and thanks to the work of German, Russian, Israeli, and other scholars, we can resolve the question of numbers. The total number of noncombatants killed by the Germans—about 11 million—is roughly what we had thought. The total number of civilians killed by the Soviets, however, is considerably less than we had believed. We know now that the Germans killed more people than the Soviets did. That said, the issue of quality is more complex than was once thought. Mass murder in the Soviet Union sometimes involved motivations, especially national and ethnic ones, that can be disconcertingly close to Nazi motivations.

It turns out that, with the exception of the war years, a very large majority of people who entered the Gulag left alive. Judging from the Soviet records we now have, the number of people who died in the Gulag between 1933 and 1945, while both Stalin and Hitler were in power, was on the order of a million, perhaps a bit more. The total figure for the entire Stalinist period is likely between two million and three million. The Great Terror and other shooting actions killed no more than a million people, probably a bit fewer.

It was a war that Hitler wanted but it began with a German-Soviet alliance

The largest human catastrophe of Stalinism was the famine of 1930–1933, in which more than five million people died.

Of those who starved, the 3.3 million or so inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine who died in 1932 and 1933 were victims of a deliberate killing policy related to nationality. In early 1930, Stalin had announced his intention to "liquidate" prosperous peasants ("kulaks") as a class so that the state could control agriculture and use capital extracted from the countryside to build industry. Tens of thousands of people were shot by Soviet state police and hundreds of thousands deported. Those who remained lost their land and often went hungry as the state requisitioned food for export. The first victims of starvation were the nomads of Soviet Kazakhstan, where about 1.3 million people died. The famine spread to Soviet Russia and peaked in Soviet Ukraine. Stalin requisitioned grain in Soviet Ukraine knowing that such a policy would kill millions. Blaming Ukrainians for the failure of his own policy, he ordered a series of measures—such as sealing the borders of that Soviet republic—that ensured mass death.

In 1937, as his vision of modernization faltered, Stalin ordered the Great Terror. Because we now have the killing orders and the death quotas, inaccessible so long as the Soviet Union existed, we now know that the number of victims was not in the millions. We also know that, as in the early 1930s, the main victims were the peasants, many of them survivors of hunger and of concentration camps. The highest Soviet authorities ordered 386,798 people shot in the "Kulak Operation" of 1937–1938. The other major "enemies" during these years were people belonging to national minorities who could be associated with states bordering the Soviet Union: some 247,157 Soviet citizens were killed by the NKVD in ethnic shooting actions.

In the largest of these, the "Polish Operation" that began in August 1937, 111,091 people accused of espionage for Poland were shot. In all, 682,691 people were killed during the Great Terror, to which might be added a few hundred thousand more Soviet citizens shot in smaller actions. The total figure of civilians deliberately killed under Stalinism, around six million, is of course horribly high. But it is far lower than the estimates of twenty million or more made before we had access to Soviet sources.

At the same time, we see that the motives of these killing actions were far more often national, or even ethnic, than we had assumed. Indeed it was Stalin, not Hitler, who initiated the first ethnic killing campaigns in interwar Europe.

Until World War II, Stalin's regime was by far the more murderous of the two. Nazi Germany began to kill on the Soviet scale only after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the summer of 1939 and the joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland that September.

About 200,000 Polish civilians were killed between 1939 and 1941, with each regime responsible for about half of those deaths. This figure includes about 50,000 Polish citizens shot by German security police and soldiers in the fall of 1939, the 21,892 Polish citizens shot by the Soviet NKVD in the Katyn massacres of spring 1940, and the 9,817 Polish citizens shot in June 1941 in a hasty NKVD operation after Hitler betrayed Stalin and Germany attacked

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the USSR. Under cover of the war and the occupation of Poland, the Nazi regime also killed the handicapped and others deemed unfit in a large-scale "euthanasia" program that accounts for 200,000 deaths. It was this policy that brought asphyxiation by carbon monoxide to the fore as a killing technique.

Beyond the numbers killed remains the question of intent. Most of the Soviet killing took place in times of peace, and was related more

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

or less distantly to an ideologically informed vision of modernization. Germany bears the chief responsibility for the war, and killed civilians almost exclusively in connection with the practice of racial imperialism. Germany invaded the Soviet Union with elaborate colonization plans. Thirty million Soviet citizens were to starve, and tens of millions more were to be shot, deported, enslaved, or assimilated.

Such plans, though unfulfilled, provided the rationale for the bloodiest occupation in the history of the world. The Germans placed Soviet prisoners of war in starvation camps, where 2.6 million perished from hunger and another half-million (disproportionately Soviet Jews) were shot. A million Soviet citizens also starved during the siege of Leningrad. In "reprisals" for partisan actions, the Germans killed about 700,000 civilians in grotesque mass executions, most of them Belarusians and Poles. At the war's end the Soviets killed tens of thousands of people in their own "reprisals," especially in the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine. Some 363,000 German soldiers died in Soviet captivity.

Hitler came to power with the intention of eliminating the Jews from Europe; the war in the east showed that this could be achieved by mass killing. Within weeks of the attack by Germany (and its Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, and other allies) on the USSR, Germans, with local help, were exterminating entire Jewish communities. By December 1941, when it appears that Hitler communicated his wish that all Jews be murdered, perhaps a million Jews were already dead in the occupied Soviet Union. Most had been shot over pits, but thousands were asphyxiated in gas vans. From 1942, carbon monoxide was used at the death factories Chełmno, Bełżec, Sobibór, and Treblinka to kill Polish and some other European Jews. As the Holocaust spread to the rest of occupied Europe, other Jews were gassed by hydrogen cyanide at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Overall, the Germans, with much local assistance, deliberately murdered about 5.4 million Jews, roughly 2.6 million by shooting and 2.8 million by gassing (about a million at Auschwitz, 780,863 at Treblinka, 434,508 at Bełżec, about 180,000 at Sobibór, 150,000 at Chełmno, 59,000 at Majdanek, and many of the rest in gas vans in occupied Serbia and the occupied Soviet Union). A few hundred thousand more Jews died during deportations to ghettos or of hunger or disease in ghettos. Another 300,000 Jews were murdered by Germany's ally Romania. Most Holocaust victims had been Polish or Soviet citizens before the war (3.2 million and one million respectively). The Germans also killed more than a hundred thousand Roma.

All in all, the Germans deliberately killed about 11 million noncombatants, a figure that rises to more than 12 million if foreseeable deaths from deportation, hunger, and sentences in concentration camps are included. For the Soviets during the Stalin period, the analogous figures are approximately six million and nine million.

These figures are of course subject to revision, but it is very unlikely that the consensus will change again as radically as it has since the opening of Eastern European archives in the 1990s. Since the Germans killed chiefly in lands that later fell behind the Iron Curtain, access to Eastern European sources has been almost as important to our new understanding of Nazi Germany as it has been to research on the Soviet Union itself. (The Nazi regime killed approximately 165,000 German Jews.)

One side killed more because provoked or in some sense aided by the other

Apart from the inaccessibility of archives, why were our earlier assumptions so wrong?

One explanation is the cold war. Our wartime and postwar European alliances, after all, required a certain amount of moral and thus historical flexibility.

In 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union were military allies. By the end of 1941, after the Germans had attacked the Soviet Union and Japan the United States, Moscow in effect had traded Berlin for Washington. By 1955, the alliances had switched again, with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together in NATO, facing off against the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, including the smaller German Democratic Republic. During the cold war, it was sometimes hard for Americans to see clearly the particular evils of Nazis and Soviets. Hitler had brought about a Holocaust, but Germans were now our allies. Stalin too had killed millions of people, but some of the worst episodes, taking place as they had before the war, had already been downplayed in wartime US propaganda, when we were on the same side.

We formed an alliance with Stalin right at the end of the most murderous years of Stalinism, and then allied with a West German state a few years after the Holocaust. It was perhaps not surprising that in this intellectual environment a certain compromise position about the evils of Hitler and Stalin—that both, in effect, were worse—emerged and became the conventional wisdom.

New understandings of numbers, of course, are only a part of any comparison, and in themselves pose new questions of both quantity and quality. How to count the battlefield casualties of World War II in Europe, not considered here?

It was a war that Hitler wanted, and so German responsibility must predominate; but in the event it began with a German-Soviet alliance and a cooperative invasion of Poland in 1939. Somewhere near the Stalinist ledger must belong the thirty million or more Chinese starved during the Great Leap Forward, as Mao followed Stalin's model of collectivization. The special quality of Nazi racism is not diluted by the historical observation that Stalin's motivations were sometimes national or ethnic. The pool of evil simply grows deeper.

The most fundamental proximity of the two regimes, in my view, is not ideological but geographical. Given that the Nazis and the Stalinists tended to kill in the same places, in the lands between Berlin and Moscow, and given that they were, at different times, rivals, allies, and enemies, we must take seriously the possibility that some of the death and destruction wrought in the lands between was their mutual responsibility. What can we make of the fact, for example, that the lands that suffered most during the war were those occupied not once or twice but three times: by the Soviets in 1939, the Germans in 1941, and the Soviets again in 1944?

The Holocaust began when the Germans provoked pogroms in June and July 1941, in which some 24,000 Jews were killed, on territories in Poland annexed by the Soviets less than two years before. The Nazis planned to eliminate the Jews in any case, but the prior killings by the NKVD certainly made it easier for local gentiles to justify their own participation in such campaigns.

As I have written in *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin,* where all of the major Nazi and Soviet atrocities are discussed, we see, even during the German-Soviet war, episodes of belligerent complicity in which one side killed more because provoked or in some sense aided by the other. Germans took so many Soviet prisoners of war in part because Stalin ordered his generals not to retreat. The Germans shot so many civilians in part because Soviet partisans deliberately provoked reprisals. The Germans shot more than a hundred thousand civilians in Warsaw in 1944 after the Soviets urged the locals to rise up and then declined to help them. In Stalin's Gulag some 516,543 people died between 1941 and 1943, sentenced by the Soviets to labor, but deprived of food by the German invasion.

Were these people victims of Stalin or of Hitler? Or both? ◁

This piece originally appeared in ***The New York Review of Books*** *blog, NYRblog (blogs.nybooks.com).*

Timothy Snyder is Professor of East European Modern History at Yale University and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. His latest book *Bloodlands* appears in a German translation titled *Bloodlands: Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin* (C.H. Beck Verlag) in July 2011.

Banking with Allah

BY SARAH TOBIN

No gambling, no speculation, no interest. Islamic banking is different. And it is booming. But can it really reconcile Islam and Capitalism? American anthropologist Sarah Tobin is not convinced.

The application of Islamic ethics and Islamic Law, or *Shari'a,* to the economic sphere goes back to the very founding of Islam and to the life of the Prophet Muhammad during the 7th century.

The early responses to the demands for an "Islamized" approach to the economy did not greatly emphasize the more productive aspects of the economy such as banking functions and procedures, investment methods and types, or contractual arrangements for entrepreneurship. Rather, early responses by Muslim societies focused on ethics of consumption and certain lifestyle developments.

Amongst them were pork prohibitions and the required purification of animals for eating, as put forth in the Qur'an (5:3), "Forbidden to you (for food) are: dead meat, blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been invoked a name other than that of Allah." There were also early invocations against alcohol and gambling. On this the Qur'an also states, "The devil wants to provoke animosity and hatred among you through intoxicants and gambling, and to distract you from remembering Allah, and from observing the prayers." (5:91). Furthermore, women's dress and comportment were an early subject for regulation: "And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what must ordinarily appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands…" (24:31).

The economic demands on the early Muslim communities resulted in regulations on what to eat, drink, and wear. They did not speak to where one should bank, how to invest, or what constitutes an Islamic contract.

Over the course of several centuries, Western countries—where Islam is not a dominant, indigenous religion—developed and secured economic power on the global stage. They are setting the terms for the global economy's development and growth, and are establishing the means by which others may participate in its lending schemes and profit-sharing endeavors.

As a result, it was relatively late in the Muslim engagement with Western economic powers that there emerged a broad-based and self-conscious concern with formulating a systemic Islamic response to modern economic challenges, particularly with regard to the production of distinctly Islamic goods and services rather than the early vetting of "Islamicness" in the realms of consumption.

Photo: istockphoto.com / dblight

Islamic banking is more often an Islamic veneer on economic practices, rather than a substantially different economic offering

This challenge of the modern, capitalist, Western-dominated financial system has resulted in the active creation of new, "Islamized" financial technologies—from new regulations on authorized Islamic trade to an environment of public ethics and consensus that value certain types of contemporary investments as distinctly "Islamic."

Islamic economics has even become a social science in itself, and as such has attempted to meet the discipline's rigors while upholding certain Islamicly-derived ideological, cultural, and political ends.

There are two methods for financial operations that have emerged as central to the aims of an Islamic economics. They include: the prohibition of interest and regulation of the religious injunction on almsgiving and taxation, or *Zakat.*

Most often discussions of the "Islam" in Islamic economics, therefore, center on how Islamic law, or *Shari'a,* is interpreted and enacted in contemporary Islamic banking in these two realms. Discussions center around whether or not banks are free from interest rates and payments, dealings in forbidden, or *haram,* investments, and in speculation. They also center on whether the bank's profits have been sufficiently purified through almsgiving. The "Islam" in Islamic banks is ultimately conceived of as residing in the financial methods of banking and its moral outcomes.

As a result, Islamic banking has boomed, catching the attention of religious figures and politicians alike.

In 2008, the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano,* indicated that Islamic banks could help restore confidence among clients of conventional banks during the global financial crisis. Developing Paris as the new "capital of Islamic finance" sat high on the agenda for French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde. Multinational banks are offering more Islamic "windows" that provide Islamic banking services and products among the otherwise interest-reliant banks. HSBC, Deutsche Bank, UBS, and Citibank are only a few. Islamic banking is now big business, with more than 250 banks operating in 40 countries and holding assets in excess of 250 billion USD.

At first glance, Islamic banking and finance holds out a lone hope for growth in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The case of the Dubai defaults tells another story, however.

Dubai World announced on November 25, 2009, that it could not repay 25 billion USD in Islamically-financed debts as anticipated. Though assisted by neighboring Emirate Abu Dhabi, Dubai has yet to see the anticipated growth rate of 13.5 percent. More than a year later, Dubai has yet to recover from the roughly 500 canceled real estate projects, rescheduled debt payments, and has submitted proposals to sell off the three largest indigenous businesses: Jumeirah Hotels, Emirates Airlines and DP World. Despite the promises, Islamic banks have not proven immune from economic failures.

Can Islamic banking and finance bridge the gap between the terms set forth for economic engagement by the West and the desire for a religiously meaningful economics?

Beyond the practical issues of trying to take centuries-old sources for religious injunctions and applying them to a context far beyond that found at the advent of Islam, there are three critiques of the broader Islamic economics movement worth mentioning.

First, there remain questions about minorities and women. Certainly religious minorities have been subject to the invocation of Islamic law in their treatment by Muslim majorities, even though the rules governing such treatment were historically of local custom and extra-Qur'anic origins. Today, women too are challenging their traditional representation in Islamic law. Not to be seen as mere critics of Islamic economics, the same women are also challenging the simultaneous freedom promised by capitalism and the systematic devaluation of women's labor in capitalist markets.

However, much of these debates are occurring outside of the production of Islamic economics. Together, they leave open much about the role of non-Muslim minorities and women as users of Islamic economic services, their subjections to taxations and *Zakat* requirements, and their abilities to gain access as producers and administrators of Islamic economics.

The second critique is that efforts at the Islamization of the economy more frequently result in cosmetic changes to financial service offerings rather than the intended structural revolution. As witnessed in the Dubai case, Islamic banking and finance is more often an Islamic veneer on economic practices, rather than a substantially different economic offering. Despite providing—what is to some—an appropriate and favorable alternative, Islamic economics proposes production reforms that are not fundamentally altering the dominant, Western economic systems.

The final critique is that contemporary Islamic economics misses a major aspect of the economy and ignores the historical roots of its emergence in consumption. That is, the front lines of Muslim engagement with the economy are located more centrally in dealings with ethical constraints or issues of lifestyle—the everyday lives of Muslims—than what type of financial services they may utilize in a one-time purchase or whether they get a set 3 percent payback on their savings accounts or a variable profit-share.

Though Islamic banking and finance is—despite its current boom—a niche market and a small percentage of the world economy, Muslims themselves constitute approximately 1.5 billion people worldwide. With the shift to defining Islamic economics in terms of Islamic banking and finance, contemporary Islamic economics has very little to say about the primary points of debate on an ethically-informed, modern—and consumptive—Muslim lifestyle, much less about holding out hope for an Islamic economic revolution.

In light of the recent events in North Africa and the Middle East, where structural change is playing out in the political realms, practitioners of Islamic economics are missing out on an opportunity to become relevant with the same kinds of energy for revolution in the economic lives of Muslims around the world. ◁

Sarah Tobin graduated at Boston University and holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology. She carried out fieldwork in Jordan from 2007 to 2009 and is currently a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Fellows and Guests *01–03 2011*

Vladimir Arsenijevic
Milena Jesenská Fellow (January–March 2011)

Writer and columnist, Croatian weekly *Novosti* and Serbian web magazine *Pescanik*

Between a Rock and a Hard Place—the Ever-Changing Face of Europe

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Yulia Arskaya
Alexander Herzen Fellow (January–June 2011)

Assistant Professor of Russian Language and Linguistics, Irkutsk State University

The Understanding of Totalitarianism in Russian and German Postmodern Literature

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Zsuzsa Balazs
Milena Jesenská Fellow (January–March 2011)

Editor at *HVG Magazine*, Budapest

Cultural "Guerilla" Movements for Regaining Public Places in the Cities of Europe

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Christine Blättler
Lise Meitner Fellow (August 2009–July 2011)

Professor of Philosophy of Science, University of Kiel; FWF project leader

The Phantasmagoria as a Focus of Modernity; Genealogy and Function of a Philosophical Concept

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Ian Blaustein
Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2010–April 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Autonomy, Conscience, and Self-Deception

Marta Bucholc
Bronisław Geremek Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Academic Teacher of Sociology, University of Warsaw

Finding Our Way Through Language. Weber and Wittgenstein on Politics and Science

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Anne Dwyer
Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2010–March 2011)

Assistant Professor of Russian Studies, Pomona College, Claremont

The Gates of Europe: Cultural Traffic Between the Late Habsburg and Romanov Empires

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James Dodd
FWF Project Associate (April 2011)

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, The New School for Social Research, New York

Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka's Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

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Elmar Flatschart
Junior Visiting Fellow (March–August 2011)

Doktorand der Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Stipendiat

Staatstheorie. Zur Kritik von Fetischismus und Abspaltung des Politischen

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Tomasz Gromelski
Bronisław Geremek Fellow (September 2010–March 2011)

Postdoctoral Fellow, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence

The Concept of Civic Duty in Early Modern Eastern and Western Europe

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Ludger Hagedorn
FWF Project Associate (December 2010–November 2012)

Research Assistant in Philosophy, Södertörn University, Stockholm

Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka's Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

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Julia Hertlein
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–March 2011)

Doktorandin der Soziologie, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

Erfahrung und Kritik: Eine (notwendige) epistemologische Komplizenschaft?

Jan Kühne
Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2010–March 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Jewish Studies, European Forum of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Sammy Gronemann—A Study in Satire, Secularism, and the Sacred

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Pyotr Kuznetsov
Alexander Herzen Fellow (January–June 2011)

Postgraduate student of Social Philosophy, Irkutsk State University

Features of Social Stratification of the Austrian and Russian Society: Discursive Symbolic Aspects

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Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow (March 2008–August 2011)

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Free University Berlin; FWF project leader

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in *Naturphilosophie* Around 1800

Aura Matei
Project Associate (March–May 2011)

Researcher at the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development Eleutheria, Bucharest

Romanian Capitalism: a Socio-Economic Perspective

Iris Mendel
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–March 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, University of Vienna; ÖAW DOC-Team stipendiary

Epistemologies of Resistance. The Politics of Epistemology in the Social Sciences

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Natalia Palisheva
Alexander Herzen Fellow (January–June 2011)

Postgraduate student of History, Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University

The Influence of the Global Context on the Perception of the Sources of Social Inequality

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Olena Palko
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, National Academy of Sciences, Kiev

National Communism: an Attempt to Compare the Ukrainian and European Experience

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Mark Pickering
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–April 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Kant's Phenomenalism: Apriority, Necessity, and Psychologism in the *First Critique*

Irina Prokhorova
Alexander Herzen Fellow Guest (February 2011)

Publisher of the journal *New Literary Observer* and Director of the publishing house NLO; President of the Mikhail Prokhorov Foundation, Moscow

The Anthropology of Closed Societies

Julia Riegler
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–March 2011)

Doktorandin der Philosophie, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Team Stipendiatin

„…und dann ist da unten zu". Eine empirische Rekonstruktion des Phänomens chronischer Schmerzen beim Geschlechtsverkehr aus feministischer Perspektive

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Nora Ruck
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–March 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Psychology, University of Vienna; ÖAW DOC-Team stipendiary

The Beautiful Body in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility

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Anastasiya Ryabchuk
Paul Celan Fellow (January–March 2011)

Lecturer at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy; Ph.D. candidate at EHESS and NaUKMA

Pierre Bourdieu / Loïc Wacquant: An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (English > Ukrainian)

Sarah Tobin
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Anthropology, Boston University

Is It *Really* Islamic? Piousness and Religious Life in Amman, Jordan

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Daniel Treisman
Visiting Fellow (September 2010–June 2011)

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Economics and Public Opinion in Russia During and After the Financial Crisis

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Irina Chechel Varskaya
Guest (January 2011)

Associate Professor, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow

Varia

Orders and Merits

Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski visited Harvard University on February 28, not only to meet with faculty and students. He also met with Yale historian and IWM Permanent Fellow **Timothy Snyder,** to whom the Minister presented the Bene Merito Medal for his most recent book *Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin.* The medal is awarded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Polish or foreign civilians in recognition of their work towards strengthening Poland's position within the international arena.

During her stay at the IWM as a Junior Visiting Fellow anthropologist **Sarah Tobin** did not only give an interview on her fieldwork in Jordan to *science.ORF* as well as write a contribution to the IWM*post,* which you can find on page 17 of this issue. She also successfully defended her dissertation titled "Everyday Piety: Negotiating Islam and the Economy in Amman, Jordan" at Boston University on March 25. She is now Dr Sarah Tobin and we all know how important these titles are in Austria. Congratulations!

For her book *Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* **Tatiana Zhurzhenko,** an IWM Alumna from 2001, was awarded the AAUS (American Association for Ukrainian Studies) Prize for the Best Book 2010 in the field of Ukrainian studies.

Farewell

For more than twelve years, he was the voice and the face of the IWM reception. On April 26, fellows and colleagues said good bye to **Ted Paul** and wished him all the best for his retirement with a glass of champagne in the IWM Cafeteria. However, we are pleased that he will not leave the Institute completely as he promised to be back as needed to cover vacations. In the meantime, he will pursue his passion and will be gone fishing. We wish him a big catch!

Challenges

Taking on the challenge of this year's **Vienna City Marathon,** eight IWM runners, including a fellow, staff, interns, and friends, formed two teams to participate in the relay competition. Spurred on by tens of thousands of cheering spectators along the route, both teams managed to beat the magic four-hour threshold. Congratulations to Yulia Arskaya, Maria Dienst, Klaus Gröll, Susanne Fröschl, Manuel Tröster, Maximilian Wollner, Gerald Zachar, and Claudia Zimmer. Feel free to get in touch if you wish to join us next year.

IWM Publications

Photo: Tobias Zielony

Transit 40 (Winter 2010/11), **Das Zeitalter der Ungewissheit**
Religion und Politik in Zeiten der Globalisierung

Vor etwas mehr als 20 Jahren brach das Sowjetimperium zusammen. Kurz danach trafen sich am IWM Historiker aus West und Ost, um über eine neue europäische Geschichtsschreibung nach dem Ende der Teilung nachzudenken. Das Forschungsprojekt „Rethinking Post-War Europe", geleitet vom britischen Historiker Tony Judt, markierte einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Historiographie. Judt starb am 6. August 2010. Dieses Heft von *Transit* ist seinem Gedächtnis gewidmet. Zusammen mit seinem Kollegen Timothy Snyder hat er kurz vor seinem Tod seine Erinnerungen festgehalten; in gemeinsamer Reflexion versuchen die beiden Autoren, die biographischen Episoden in den historischen Kontext des 20. Jahrhunderts einzubetten (*Thinking the Twentieth Century,* 2012). In Transit 40 ist vorab das Kapitel über die Begegnung mit Osteuropa nachzulesen. Tony Judt war auch ein eminent politischer Kopf. In seinen letzten Jahren plädierte er leidenschaftlich für die Erneuerung der Sozialdemokratie in unserem „Zeitalter der Ungewissheit". Die Frage nach der Tragfähigkeit der sozialen Solidarität angesichts der gegenwärtigen Krise des Kapitalismus bildet den Schwerpunkt des Heftes.

Mit Beiträgen von:
Timothy Snyder, Tony Judt, Cornelia Klinger, Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuß, Jacques Rupnik, Robert Kuttner, Katherine S. Newman, Roman Frydman und Michael D. Goldberg, Jan-Werner Müller, Mario Vargas Llosa. Photoessay von Tobias Zielony.

Transit 41 (Sommer 2011), **Kunst und Politik / Klimapolitik / Zukunft des Journalismus**
Mitherausgeberin: Cornelia Klinger

Die Beiträge zu „Kunst und Politik" fragen nach dem Ort und der Funktion der Kunst heute. Was bleibt vom auratischen, einzigartigen und utopischen Charakter des Kunstwerks im Zeitalter von Massenproduktion und Massenkonsumption? Wie unterscheiden sich heute die zweckfreien Kunstwerke von anderen, nämlich zweckbezogenen ästhetischen Produkten, von Design, Werbung, Unterhaltung? Was ist aus der Funktion von Kunst geworden, Avantgarde, Kritik oder ein Gegenentwurf zu sein? Und braucht eine Gesellschaft, die sich ganz und gar auf Zukunft hin orientiert und permanenter Innovation verschreibt, überhaupt noch Kunst als „Avantgarde"?

Mit Beiträgen von:
Uwe Hebekus, Daniel Hornuff, Andreas Huyssen, Cornelia Klinger, Verena Krieger, Bojana Pejic. Weitere Beiträge von Dipesh Chakrabarty, Peter Demetz, Klaus Dörre, Sebastian Oberthür, Thomas Schmid, Timothy Snyder, Paul Starr. Die Photographien stammen von Pipo Nguyen-duy

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IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences

Vol. 28:
Shelby Carpenter / Michal Biletzki (eds.)
Themes of Displacement

Vol. 29:
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Modernities Revisited

Vol. 30:
Anne Dwyer / Marta Bucholc (eds.)
Disappearing Realities. On the Cultural Consequences of Social Change

With contributions by:
Marta Bucholc, Anne Dwyer, Julia Hertlein, Jan Kühne, Olena Palko, Anastasia Platonova, Olga Tyapkina and Iryna Vushko

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Gagging the Messenger

BY MIKLÓS HARASZTI

Press freedom in Hungary was yesterday. With a new media law the government has muzzled its watchdog and yet provided Europe with another example of how fragile democracy can be. The alterations to the law, requested by the European Commission, will do little to prevent the "Orbánization" of the country's media landscape, writes human rights advocate Miklós Haraszti.

Photo: Greens / EFA in the European Parliament

Hungary's accession to the 6-month EU presidency in January drew international criticism of the country's new media law, which required news organizations to register with a new media authority chosen by parliamentarians of the ruling party; and also to respect "human dignity" and cover public issues "properly" or face fines. The law became a flash point for EU concerns over a shift away from rule of law in Hungarian politics since Viktor Orbán came to power in 2010.

The country has since agreed to four changes to the law, requested by the EU Commissioners. However, the Government resists further changes, demanded in unison by the OSCE's Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Parliament, and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.

The aim of this note is to provide an analysis of the main deficiencies of the new law and the implications of the amendments.

First of all, it is misleading to talk only about the last one or two acts of the so-called "media law package" introduced by Fidesz MPs in June and November of last year. The Hungarian media laws have been complemented by at least five crucial legislative acts since June 2010. All were passed in a hurry before the end of the year without any consultation with other parties and professional bodies, despite their loud requests and protests.

The Hungarian Government claims that no part of the new laws/system is unprecedented in Europe after the Fall of the Wall; but in fact, the main features that restrict freedom and pluralism of the media are all unprecedented. And the combined effects of these acts are restrictions and violations of European standards in media governance unknown since Communist times.

Here are the main points of the package, which sets up the new system:

• It amended the Hungarian Constitution to remove a requirement for parliament to uphold media pluralism, calling instead for "a citizen's right to 'proper' or 'adequate' information".

• It set up the National Info-Communication Authority and the five-member, Fidesz-only Media Council, both headed by the same person named personally by Viktor Orbán, with authority over all audiovisual, print and Internet-based media.

• It also subordinated all public-service media to this person, practically re-nationalizing them.

• It passed the "Press and Media Act", a law on the rights and "duties" of the press, and "the Media Law", establishing detailed sanctions for breaches of standards of "comprehensive, factual, up-to-date, objective and balanced coverage" on local, national and European issues that may be of interest to the Hungarians inside or outside the country, to be enforced by the Media Council.

The new laws run counter to basic precepts of European press freedom and human rights standards

Even after the amendments, the language of the law still reads that "It is a task for the entirety of the media system to provide authentic, rapid and accurate information on such affairs and events." The Media Council's unprecedented powers of content control over all media, including the print and the online press, have been left untouched.

However, in exchange for exempting on-demand media from the duty of "balanced coverage", a notion of "proportionality" was accepted by the Commission to be enforced in the linear media (TV and radio stations), the meaning of which is not defined and thus potentially oppressive. It could mean mandatory proportionality when "balancing" the coverage of different political forces, or may simply refer to the need of differential enforcement of the "balance" principle at TV channels with different reach. In any case, it can be defined and applied arbitrarily by the politically homogeneous Media Council.

The new laws run counter to many of the most basic precepts of European press freedom and human rights standards. In fact, any reduction in the protection of pluralism is in direct opposition to Article 11 of the EU Charter of Basic Rights.

Actually, any "tasking" (except for the public-service media) is a restriction of the watchdog function of the media in a democracy. That is why, twenty years ago, abolishing all such tasking provisions from the constitutions and the laws in formerly communist Europe was the symbolic act of democratization.

The single media governance pyramid is also unprecedented, and would be even if it were not operated by the ruling party alone, and did not extend to all media, including private, public and online services. The media regulatory boards, all named or dominated by candidates of the ruling party, have been made into a rubber-stamp, protected by strict secrecy rules; the various boards in effect are "departments" of the Authority which is practically a Media Ministry.

Other requirements call for media organizations to register (softened by the EU agreement to within 60 days of operation rather than before), and the government's right to request any information at any time, denying journalists or news organizations the right to protect confidential sources of leaked classified information.

However, perhaps most troubling for journalists is the Media Council's power to punish (and, before that, to interpret freely!) some new, broadly defined transgressions (earlier explicitly rejected by the Constitutional Court), for example: "insulting" any group, any minority and any majority; "hurting" public order, family values, religion, etc.

In the agreement with the European Commission, "offending" individuals, groups, minorities, and majorities has been removed from the list of sanctioned content, leaving only incitement to hatred or discrimination against them in the text. But the agreement also left in place the Media Council's power to punish "insults" of the listed "values", and the vagueness leaves the danger that they will be arbitrarily applied.

The Council's punitive power over speech content comes on top of (and unrelated to) that of the criminal and civil judiciary. However, unlike in regular civil or penal courts, the punishments meted out by the Media Council cannot be disputed on their merit when appealed, as only so-called "administrative courts" provide any judicial overview of the Council's rulings. These special courts are only authorized to declare if the Council has or has not acted within the boundaries of the new media laws.

The EU agreement finally exempted foreign media from the fines for content offences, thus creating a double standard against the Hungarian media, for whom these fines remain in force.

However, to my mind, the single greatest danger for the freedom and pluralism of the media in Hungary lies in the arbitrary licensing provisions, the parallels of which can only be found in some post-Soviet countries. Based on these provisions, the authorities can shape the media ownership landscape as they please. Also, by keeping the owners dependent on the unaccountable will of a politically homogenous regulatory body, these arbitrary rules already force the owners of the audiovisual media to hold their editors away from content that is critical of the government. ◁

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The Story Behind the Story

BY THOMAS SCHMID

Journalism isn't going away. However, as the newspaper crisis shows, another kind of journalism is needed: one which goes into detail, tells great stories, provides background, poses questions and turns answers into even more questions. Thomas Schmid, who held a speech at last year's IWM conference on "Democracy and the Media" at the Austrian Chancellery, calls for a revival of journalistic virtues.

Photo: istockphoto.com / Anthony Bagget

When people talk about journalism nowadays—and particularly when journalists talk about journalism—a chorus of lamentation usually rises to the heavens. One has the impression of attending a funeral service rather than a celebration among colleagues.

As everybody knows, there is much to bemoan all over the world. Catchphrases may suffice: the good old printed newspaper, the big problem child, is faring notoriously badly. No publisher has yet found the magic solution to compensate for the demise of print media faced with the gush of income from online products. By the way: I do not believe for one second that this demise is inexorable.

Journalism seems to have become a sickly profession in which one must expect evil tidings on a daily basis. This eats away at the self-confidence of journalists, whom you have to imagine as the melancholy, brooding type.

Obviously, their pride has been hurt. For something like a century, journalists were in a cosy position, even if not held in high esteem. They had special access to the realm of news, often they maintained good contacts to politicians and other VIPs, they knew more than others, they were cleverer than hoi polloi. They could rest assured in the feeling that they had an authoritative and even sovereign function to fulfill.

During my stint at a grand old newspaper, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* I was able to witness the remnants of this sense of importance with bemused fascination. The journalists at the FAZ viewed themselves, at least so it seemed ten years ago, as the magistrates of news analysis with a national mandate. They did not have to follow the readers; rather, the readership had to follow them.

Everybody knows that that era is over. Nowadays journalists have to take arms against a sea of troubles and impertinence. More than anything else, it is the change in media technology that aggravates them. Suddenly they are running behind events. No longer part of the avant-garde, they seem to have become the derriere-garde. The chores of journalists have been industrialized; they have become a cog in the machine, and this has debased their work in the eyes of many. The journalist nowadays is a round-the-clock-contractor who produces mass commodities.

The pure speed at which news is being handled, the dumbing down which is so often deplored—these are not our fate

You are all familiar with this complaint—and I only mention it in passing, in order to add that I do not share this pessimism the tiniest bit. Although I do acknowledge that what you see in editorial offices these days is not always edifying or uplifting.

However, I believe that more opportunities than dangers have arisen thanks to the Internet. I am not merely referring to easier access to information or the new possibilities of visual design. I am mostly referring to the fact that, in the future, it will be possible to create a much more intelligent kind of journalism, a journalism which will be able to dig much deeper. The pure speed at which news is being handled, the dumbing down which is so often deplored—these are not our fate.

Having said this, I now want to turn to the question of whether we ourselves have not created the phenomenon we like to call the crisis of journalism—whether we journalists have not at least contributed our share to it. Let me show what I mean by referring to a privileged playing field of traditional journalism: political journalism.

In democratic countries, at least, politics occupies two storeys, the first of which rests firmly on the ground. Everything that happens can easily be viewed from the outside. And what do we see there?

If we believe the journalistic reports that reach us every day, we see first and foremost people who are incessantly quarrelling with one another. They compete, they lie, they cheat, they defraud their colleagues, they hide their true intent—and never, ever are they interested in political aims, only in their personal gains. They are just like you and me, that is: mean, devious, ignoble.

Let me cite a topical German example. Since October 2009 we have been governed by a coalition of conservatives and liberals. Although both sides had described and evoked such a constellation as their alliance of choice, at the beginning it was a disaster: a complete blank as regards content, no clarity and much name-calling. For the majority of journalists this came in handy. When something goes wrong it always appears much more interesting than a roaring success.

By last summer almost all the professional soothsayers were absolutely certain that the government was at the end of the line. One prognosis was more dramatic than the other as to when the coalition would break down. But of course

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the government was nowhere near the end—it even managed to get a few things right. And suddenly, we were rubbing our eyes: no trace of a collapse any more. Why this false appraisal and why the astonishment?

The augurs had only watched the surface of politics, where scandals are rampant. This was driven by the base motives of many observers, who, if I may say so, are passionate backseat drivers and view politics only from the perspective of possible failure.

I could easily add the Italian example to the German one. In Italy, too, the media—even quite serious papers like *Corriere della Sera* or *La Repubblica*—blow up the daily quarrels in the Palazzo, the Montecitorio, in parliament and endless press conferences out of all proportion. In the end, they resemble a horror painting which the genius of George Grosz could not have painted in more lurid colors.

Behind all this is a very foolish concept of timeliness: basically, the completely insane idea that politics only happens in the now, in the present. This, of course, is influenced by the speed with which news is handled today. Every little discord, every flea must be turned into an elephant in a milieu where noise, sensation and catastrophe trump everything. In the end, the readership might even conclude that this is the stuff, the content of politics. This kind of journalism loses sight of the greater context.

Or rather—let me return to the metaphor of the two storeys—this kind of journalism disregards the second and more important layer. Beneath the ground floor there is the cellar. And through the cellar flows the broad and slow stream of history. Even in times of globalization, when the velocity of events increases, most of the problems that politics has to deal with are old and not new.

In Italy, for instance, this is the old conflict between the North and the South. This imbalance is much more significant than the ballet which Berlusconi, Fini, Bossi, Casini, D'Alema and Bersani perform with such sprightliness before our eyes. Shortly before the 150th anniversary of the unification of Italy, the country is asking itself what connects it at heart.

The same holds true for Germany. Here the old question of how much freedom Germans can and will tolerate is much more decisive than any speculation as to whether Angela Merkel still holds the reigns or whether she will soon be pushed aside by younger and smarter people. By no means do I wish to vilify political soap operas; they are often quite amusing.

But one must not overlook the fact that our politicians—whether they want to or not—are constantly dealing with questions such as whether Germans, in these uncertain times, should put safety above everything else. Everything revolves around matters such as demography, the welfare state, industrial progress. Do we dare to put our railway stations underground or should we leave everything as it is?

Photo: Welt Gruppe / Ludwig Rauch

A journalism that persistently sticks to the topic will retain its old audience and attract a new one as well

I would like to risk advancing one thesis. A journalism with hope in the future and in its readership must decide to do more than simply splash around in the frothy surf of anxiety that prevails today. It must put such matters aside and address the aforementioned questions. If it does not do this, it is demanding too little from its readership. Certainly, journalists must also be paddlers. But in the future it will be more important to know how to dive. It is increasingly about the story behind the story.

Today's journalists have to be fast. They cannot afford to be anything else in this era of high-speed turnover of news. But simply being fast is not a solution in itself. The journalists of today have to stick to traditional virtues: calmness, distance, time for reflection. For this reason, journalists have to fight—and fight with passion.

Allow me to offer another German example. For decades, politicians and journalists have been growing closer together. So close that it has not always been good. Gerhard Schröder would never have become chancellor had he not surrounded himself with a horde of journalists who found his new casual style fantastic and exciting. Each side helped the other, even though it went unmentioned and perhaps to some was not even apparent. Journalists grew close to an alpha male who supplied them with exciting political stories. And they profited from the radiance of this unusual and self-confident man.

It is obvious that such closeness can be problematic. Ever since the German government relocated to Berlin a short two decades ago, this closeness has become even more intense. Politicians and journalists have become intertwined—to the detriment of both politics and journalism.

By no means do I wish to glorify the past. However—all journalistic curiosity aside—perhaps it was better when parties and politicians discussed legislation, reforms, coalitions, and so on in relative isolation, and only went public when they had something substantial in their hands. Then was the proper time for public debate. This, thank God, avoided a blow-by-blow approach to the story.

In today's hectic world, we are doing harm to both the political and journalistic worlds. It is obvious that journalism is drowning in sea of petty sensationalism. Society is getting older and older. How can it nevertheless remain young, curious and innovative?

This is an enormous topic that encompasses nearly every aspect. Many laws need to be changed, and sooner or later a new pension system must be created. We will have to address questions of life expectancy and the depopulation of certain regions. Culturally speaking, we will have to get used to the concept of "young" old people, who no longer conform to the centuries-old rule dictating that the elderly must reside on the fringes of society or outside society itself.

Topic for topic, we are concerned with the worlds of our own inner life experiences and perceptions. What a vast amount of material! It is here we find the stories, the puzzles, the solutions, the dilemmas. I am certain that a journalism that persistently sticks to the topic will retain its old audience and attract a new one as well.

But the hectic closeness of politics and journalism also harms politics. Keeping with my metaphor of two storeys: every ambitious politician finds it advantageous to remain as long and as visibly as possible on the ground floor, where he or she can be seen. What they do below this level is of no interest to anyone. The result is that the public remains unaware of actual political dealings—the grinding of the great political machine. (There are, of course, politicians who like it this way.)

Politicians are constantly in the media spotlight. This forces many of them to do things just to please the media. It is not what they do that counts, but what they pretend they are trying to do. Politicians cater to the media. And they go so far as to make political decisions based primarily on media considerations. It is hard to find a politician who does not complain that the political world has been taken hostage by the media. They consider this to be an ironclad law in the modern world from which there is no escape.

I am sorry to have to say this. Because I am in no way prone to cultural pessimism. The world is not getting better or worse – just different. And there are always good opportunities. Even today. New technologies offer us opportunities we once only dreamed about. To go into great detail, to tell great stories, to explore yet undiscovered worlds, to provide background, to pose questions, to practice observation languages and to turn answers into even more questions. The wealth of possibilities available to us today is fantastic. All we have to do is do it.

So why don't we? ◁

A German version of this essay will be published in issue 41 of IWM's journal ***Transit.***

Thomas Schmid is the publisher of the WELT Group, Berlin. He worked for various newspapers, among them as editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*. From 2006 to 2010 he was Editor-in-Chief of *Die Welt*.