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How's Democracy Doing?

An Interview with Charles Taylor



Nader Hashemi
Arab Secularism

Constantin Iordachi
Unwanted Minorities

Marc F. Plattner
Media's Yesterday

Michael Naumann
Privacy's End

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

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Contents

NO. 107 • APRIL – AUGUST 2011

Editorial

Das IWM ist ein Ort, an dem Menschen und ihre Ideen zusammenkommen" – so heißt es oft in unseren Selbstdarstellungen. Dass dies keine leeren Worte sind, zeigt die aktuelle Ausgabe der IWM*post*. Im Anschluß an eine internationale Debatte auf der Bühne des Wiener Akademietheaters zur Frage, wie es derzeit eigentlich um die Demokratie in der Welt und besonders in Europa steht (dazu S. 4), trafen sich der kanadische Philosoph Charles Taylor und der polnische Journalist Sławomir Sierakowski, um Antworten zu finden. Taylor ist Permanent Fellow am IWM, Sierakowski ist als Visiting Fellow zu Gast am Institut. Welche Ideen die beiden zu demokratischen Herausforderungen wie Eurokrise, Populismus, und Nationalismus austauschten, erfahren Sie auf den Seiten 5 bis 7.

Wer über Demokratie spricht, darf über die arabischen Revolutionen nicht schweigen. Die diesjährige Konferenz der Reihe „Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses" setzte sich daher schwerpunktmäßig mit dem politischen Islam auseinander. Zwei Fragen standen im Zentrum der Gespräche: Was bedeutet muslimische Zuwanderung für die säkularen Demokratien Europas? Und umgekehrt: Welche Bedeutung hat Säkularität für die neuen Demokratien im Mittleren Osten? Tariq Modood und Nader Hashemi wissen auf den Seiten 8 bis 10 mehr dazu.

Mit Revolutionen befasste sich auch eine Konferenz des Historikers Timothy Snyder. Sie warf einen Blick zurück ins „lange 19. Jahrhundert" und betrachtete den Entstehungsprozess der ersten Nationalstaaten auf europäischem Boden. Damit sind nicht Frankreich oder Deutschland gemeint, sondern Bulgarien, Rumänien, Serbien und Griechenland. Denn die Wiege Europas, sagt Snyder auf Seite 11, steht am Balkan.

Griechenland war nicht nur einer der ersten europäischen Nationalstaaten. Auch die erste Demokratie ist bekanntlich dort zu finden, die *polis* der Athener. Folgerichtig nehmen Marc Plattners Ausführungen zum Zusammenhang und Zusammenspiel von Demokratie und Medien am Ende dieser IWM*post* dort ihren Ausgang. Lesen Sie, was uns deren gemeinsame Geschichte über die heutige politische und mediale Landschaft erzählt, und erneut über die Frage, wie es der Demokratie geht.

Sven Hartwig

The IWM is a place where people and ideas meet"—that's how we like to describe ourselves. This issue of the IWM*post* shows that we really mean what we say. Following an international debate at Vienna's Akademietheater on the condition of democracy in Europe and in the world today (see page 4), Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor and Polish journalist Sławomir Sierakowski met to exchange their ideas on the subject. Taylor is Permanent Fellow at the IWM, Sierakowski currently Visiting Fellow at the Institute. You can read their discussion about democratic challenges such as the eurocrisis, populism and nationalism on pages 5 to 7.

Whoever talks about democracy should not ignore the ongoing Arab revolutions. This year's conference in the series "Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses" was therefore mainly devoted to political Islam. Two questions were at the center of the talks: what does Muslim immigration mean for European secular democracies? And, conversely, what does secularity mean to the new democracies in the Middle East? Tariq Modood and Nader Hashemi answer on pages 8 and 10.

A conference chaired by historian Timothy Snyder was also concerned with revolutions. Looking back at the "long nineteenth century", the presentations of the invited specialists focused on the revolutionary emergence of the first nation-states in Europe. Surprising though it may be, neither France nor Germany were the first nation-states in the modern sense of the word, but Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Greece. The cradle of Europe, says Snyder on page 11, is therefore located in the Balkans.

Greece, by the way, was not only one of the first European nation-states. As everyone knows, the ancient Greek *polis* of the Athenians was also the first democracy. This is the starting point of Marc Plattner's remarks about the interrelation and interaction between democracy and the media, to be found at the end of this issue. What their common history tells us about today's political and media landscape ultimately leads back to the question: how's democracy doing?

Sven Hartwig

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"Good Jobs" in a "Good Economy"

BY JÁNOS MÁTYÁS KOVÁCS

What will the European labor market look like in the future? Will employment be more secure, more flexible, or perhaps more "flexicure"? Will there be more "green jobs"? Will the changes meet the expectations of the citizens? The IWM takes part in a new project that examines current employment problems in the old and new EU member states—without, of course, intending to turn into an institute of labor economics or a human relations firm. The IWM simply continues to show interest in the cultural aspects of economic life.

Photo: buckaroobay / Flickr

Over the last decade, the IWM has undertaken several comparative research projects on the recent institutional and cultural developments of the ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The ACCESS project focused on the EU accession and asked whether the new member states would serve as cultural assets or rather as liabilities in the Union. This inquiry grew into a large-scale research program on "Eastern Enlargement—Western Enlargement: Cultural Encounters in the European Economy" (DIOSCURI), which was funded by the European Commission. It examined the cohabitation of foreign and indigenous economic cultures in the region. Currently, research continues within the framework of the project "Understanding Nascent Capitalism in Eastern Europe" (CAPITO), funded by the Jubiläumsfonds, which is devoted to investigating the varieties of emerging capitalism in the former Eastern Bloc.

At the moment, the Institute is embarking upon a new research project under the aegis of NEUJOBS ("Employment 2025: How Multiple Transitions Affect the European Labour Market"), which is coordinated by the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. In the period from 2011 to 2013, the contribution of the IWM will be to study—from a comparative perspective—the cultural prerequisites to changes in the labor market by examining "good jobs" in a "good economy" in two old and two new member states of the EU, namely: Hungary, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom.

As to the main thrust of our research, we do not aim to suggest what is to be meant by good jobs and good economies. Rather our team concentrates on how relevant economic and political actors as well as scholars think about "goodness", and what kind of employment programs they devise to attain that. Equally important is the understanding of popular attitudes to work as well as the frictions between them and employment programs. In other words, we compare economic, political and social, academic and popular discourses. The comparison does not stop at the border of ideas, but reaches out to real practices. For the four countries mentioned above, a total of twelve case studies will be prepared in order to grasp the "local value" of employment policies. At this stage, state-of-the-art reports are being completed.

By "employment programs" and "attitudes" we mean, on the one hand, all kinds of normative macro-level documents, such as employment laws, plans, guidelines, chapters of party programs, trade union and NGO agendas, or academic works; on the other, we refer to data presented by public opinion surveys, case studies and the like. They are observed on both macro- and micro levels. The case studies will be based on in-depth interviews, focus groups, participant observation and media review. Thus, a large variety of actors will be studied, ranging from government agencies, parties, and social partners, all the way down to scholars, media representatives and citizens.

The project applies a rather broad definition of culture, which is conceived of a set of values and norms, as well as habits, attitudes, ideas, symbols, etc. The analysis of the various employment discourses will revolve around the concept of the "good job", i.e., the rival definitions of job quality and satisfaction. Besides the conventional aspects of job quality (such as health and safety, skills, learning, career development, stress, work-life balance, equal opportunity, industrial democracy, etc.), those included in the most recent catchphrases (such as flexicurity, employability, life-cycle approach to work, inclusive labor markets, matching skills and jobs, etc.) will be studied. Within the employment programs, we will pay attention to a variety of cultural variables, such as risk vs. security, short-termism vs. long-termism, materialist vs. post-materialist values, individualism vs. collectivism, and traditionalism vs. modernism or post-modernism.

Adopting a comparative approach, we expect to find substantial differences between the individual discourses, the real cases and the countries under scrutiny, and an East-West divergence in particular. Similarly, we assume there to be potential conflicts and frictions within and between the various employment programs; for instance, between their social and ecological, or their economic and social aspects. Are "green jobs" or "ethical jobs" really good jobs? Are "green jobs" also "ethical jobs"? Our research team considers questions like these highly relevant in the current situation of the labor markets in Europe. For, according to many analysts, job satisfaction is stagnating or declining, the demand for job quantity overrides quality considerations, and there is a broad preference for job security, whereas post-materialist values count less and less in defining the concept of the "good job". ◁

NEUJOBS
Employment 2025: How Multiple Transitions Affect the European Labour Market

NEUJOBS is a research project financed by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Program. The project started in 2011 and will be completed in 2015. The objective is to analyze possible future developments of the European labor market(s) under the main assumption that European societies are now facing radical ecological, demographic, geographical and educational transitions that will have a major impact on employment. The IWM contributes to this project within the framework of its research focus "Cultures and Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe".

More at www.neujobs.eu

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A Plan B for Europe

BY CHRISTOPH PRANTNER

Populist politicians, confused voters, weak leadership and the eurocrisis—European liberal democracy seems to be in bad shape. Before a large audience at the Vienna Akademietheater, Emma Bonino, Ronald Dworkin, George Soros, Charles Taylor and Guy Verhofstadt discussed what can be done to overcome democracy's troubles. Their conclusion: Europe needs more democracy to save democracy.

Photos: Philipp Steinkellner

Emma Bonino, the *Pasionaria* of the Italian Radicals, has been known for her straight talking for coming on forty years, and a Sunday at the Vienna Akademietheater was no exception: "We are negating reality", she exclaimed. Her rage was directed above all at politicians who speak half-truths for the sake of a comfortable life. However, it is in the nature of liberalism of any kind to tell people the truth, she said, no matter how hard.

Could this be why liberal democracy is in danger? That was the question discussed by a prominent round of speakers. The Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), the Erste Foundation, the Burgtheater and *Der Standard* were hosting a matinee in the series "Debating Europe", whose guests, alongside Bonino, included George Soros, Ronald Dworkin and Guy Verhofstadt. Moderating the debate was the philosopher and IWM Permanent Fellow Charles Taylor.

Our view of things gets distorted amidst the apocalyptic visions flying around at the moment, continued the Vice-President of the Italian Senate. "Fear is a good way to win elections—and a good way to lose them too. Believe me, I speak from experience. But when, as politicians, we no longer tell things as they really are, who else is supposed to? My aunt or my sister?"

Confusion Instead of Freedom

The Oxford and New York based philosopher Ronald Dworkin also noted liberalism's unpopularity. "The deeper reason for it is the inability of the masses to understand the complexity of many things today." Much of the media, especially in the US, abuses the right to free speech for straightforward disinformation. The consequence is confusion over what freedom means: many in the US, said Dworkin, see freedom as a kind of transcendent value and, above all, as a carte blanche to do whatever they want. The Tea Party movement and others like it thrive on precisely this misunderstanding.

The only things that can help counter this is education. "We need to find a way to bring the complexity of the world into secondary education. The key to maintaining liberal democracy is a well-educated electorate."

"Education might be somewhat too time-consuming a solution to the current crisis", responded the financier and founder of the Open Society Institute George Soros. "What we need now is educated citizens who demand that their governments provide a solution to the problems that are imminent." For example the EU and eurocrisis: the Union was a fantastic success, but now it seems to have run out of steam. Why? "German reunification and the introduction of the euro have been the culminating points until now. Because of numerous miscalculations, what has followed since has been disintegration. The euro, for example, was introduced in the knowledge that it would be incomplete without political union in Europe. Even back then it was possible to predict that what we are seeing today could be the result. Today, the euro creates more disintegration than integration, because Angela Merkel rejected complete solidarity in the eurozone."

For Soros, that was when the eurocrisis began. The project allowed no room for correction of mistakes and no exit clauses: "Things began to go wrong back then. Today we are on the brink of economic collapse. We urgently need a plan B. However, there is none because governments are clinging to the status quo. The European public needs to start applying the pressure and demanding a plan B."

In the opinion of the former Belgian Prime Minister and MEP Guy Verhofstadt, the crisis of liberal democracy is above all connected to weak leadership. People need to be shown a way forward, a way to more integration in the EU, he said. Instead, leading politicians are becoming increasingly nationalist and populist. "They think that's the way to keep their voters. But that's a big mistake because voters prefer populists in the original."

According to the head of the liberal group in the EU parliament, Europe has reached a crossroads: a Europe will emerge either along the lines of the UN or the USA. In the latter case, this would mean it functioned like a federal state that was able to levy taxes and thus attract the interest of citizens.

Silent European Majority

Disagreement came immediately from the Anglo-Saxon side: "People in Europe don't want that. One shouldn't underestimate the tragic dimension of democracy, namely that the best isn't always the most popular. There is a very thin line between strong leadership and ignoring the will of the citizens", countered Ronald Dworkin. To which George Soros added: "In Europe there remains a silent majority for this project. Until now we've only been looking at the right-wing movement. What we also need is a demand for change from the silent majority."

Soros deemed the idea of a United States of Europe to be "utopian", even when Bonino qualified it as a "federation light" ("after all, the eurocrisis is not a financial crisis so much as a political one.") For Soros, the European project has been one of small steps, from the Coal and Steel Community to the Lisbon Treaty. One can only hope, he said, that "the revolutionary energy" (keyword Arab Spring) inherent in every crisis will spark off a public debate in Europe.

As the Americans say, "Never waste a good crisis." Guy Verhofstadt hoped that the weak European leadership would be forced by the euro finally to engage in common politics and to talk to citizens honestly.

And what about liberal democracy? According to Dworkin, "our debate has shown that there is no place in the world where democracy is in better shape than in Europe." "I agree," said Bonino. "But you need to cultivate and protect it. And there is no guarantee that that will happen." ◁

From: ***Der Standard****, June 27, 2011.*
Translated by Simon Garnett.
For the article in German please refer to:
www.iwm.at/iwmpost.htm

Debating Europe
Is Liberal Democracy at Risk?
Vienna, June 26

Emma Bonino
Vice-President of the Italian Senate; Italian Minister for International Trade from 2006 to 2008

Ronald Dworkin
Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, New York University and Oxford University

George Soros
Founder and Chairman of the Open Society Foundations

Guy Verhofstadt
Chairperson of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament; Prime Minister of Belgium from 1999 to 2008

Chair:
Charles Taylor
Professor em. of Philosophy, McGill University, Montréal; Permanent Fellow, IWM

In cooperation with the Burgtheater, Erste Foundation and Der Standard

"Facebook Revolutions don't produce social glue"

BY CHARLES TAYLOR AND SŁAWOMIR SIERAKOWSKI

The challenge for liberal democracy today is to remain liberal democracy, says Charles Taylor in an interview with Sławomir Sierakowski. During their stay at the IWM, the Canadian philosopher and the Polish journalist met to talk about how to achieve this—and how not.

Photo: Vasiliki Varvaki / iStockphoto

Sławomir Sierakowski: Don't you have the impression that liberal democracy is dead? Dead, I mean, in the same way that God is dead in the writings of Nietzsche. The realization has dawned that it was always just a myth. Not only do we now know that there has never been a time when democracy existed—democracy defined not only as an act of voting, but also as genuine participation, as a situation in which the *demos* truly organizes around a political community—but we have also learned to accept this fact.

Charles Taylor: I definitely think that democracy, liberal democracy, is more alive when it's establishing itself. When there's such a thing as *demos* that is taking power from the elites or former rulers—what we might call the Tahrir Square phase. Then we have high participation and a very good understanding what the problems are. But, as we can see in American history and that of several Western European countries, this moment can go on for long. These countries had higher participation during periods when a sort of class war was being fought: Labour and Conservatives in Britain; Socialists and Gaullists in France, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany, and so on. So there was a struggle of a people, a *demos:* peasants and workers against the others, and these others mobilized themselves too. This led to the posing of clear alternatives, a high level of participation. The same thing is happening in India today. Among the Dalits—the lowest strata of the Indian caste system—there's this tremendous sense that democracy is a chance for them to make this very inegalitarian society less so. In the West, the more rich and educated you are, the more you vote; in India, the less you have, the less educated you are, the more you vote: Dalits and women vote more than other social groups. So the challenge for liberal democracy is to remain liberal democracy —particularly with regard to participation—when it has passed beyond the phase of struggle against the various kinds of structures that benefit the elites. Most Western democracies are at this stage and the level of participation is falling.

A misperception of the really existing problems is the greatest threat to democracy

There's something else that can derail democracy, which is happening now in more affluent societies. There are different sources of delusions the people can have, and one of the most powerful of them all is national myth. The power of this myth can lead people to very serious misapprehensions about the world they're in. So that the political struggle gets detached from the real problems that you face. Good examples of this are two very dangerous things happening now in Western Europe. The first is an inability to see that you need immigration, that nobody will be around to pay your pension unless you take people in. Of course, the problem of immigration isn't a simple one, it has its upsides and its downsides that people have to deal with seriously. But instead of that, people tend to move into a simple sense of comfort in their own ethnicities. This and an inability to deal with immigration's downsides is reflected in the rise of radical Right vote, which can be seen here in Vienna, in Denmark and in France perhaps. Not yet Germany, thank God.

The other issue is connected with the economic crisis. Look at what they're doing with Greece right now: driving them into the ground in order to restore confidence in the bond market. But they're never going to get back to growth with that degree of deflation, they're never going to grow enough to pay back the debt. So in two years time we're going to have another crisis, and we're going to drive them further down. What should be done with them is that they should be allowed out of the euro and back to the drachma. It'll be a tough slope, but the drachma will devalue in relation to the euro and they'll be able to re-establish the terms of trade with other countries. And the European Union has to assume the debt for those bonds, otherwise the euro's reputation is going to be ruined. But instead of facing that, Europe is constantly moralizing: "We Ger-

continued on page 6

continued from page 5

mans work hard and those Greeks are only playing around." Germans might indeed work hard, but Germany is also struggling for its survival. In America you have the Tea Party movement. They feel that the US is slipping, that it's no longer a top country in the way it was. And their idea is: "We have to go back to our original values, to the times when everybody stood independently for himself." They're completely blind to the real causes and possible cures for the American situation. This kind of illusion is a great threat to a democracy. In Poland, too, there is a very ugly and stupid nationalism; I'm sorry, but that's what I see from the outside. These are the two greatest threats to democracy: a misperception of the really existing problems and a lack of vital tension between the demos and the rest, which in the past has produced strong public debate and high participation. This is what produces a sense of voter's efficacy, citizens' efficacy. The sense of citizens' efficacy is clearly connected with high participation around certain issues.

Sierakowski: Let's look more closely at these problems. It's obvious that participation is related to contrast. If you have contrast in politics, then people have a reason to choose. Don't you think that the contrasts have disappeared from today's party system? Everywhere, oppositions are simulated: Left and Right, Social Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals all look more or less the same. For me it's clear—you have also made this point—that one of the reasons for this is the domination of the market over democracy. Imagine you are Zapatero and you have to make a decision about taxes. You want to fight the extremely high youth unemployment and to do so you want to raise taxes. But you can't because the financial markets will go mad, your rating will go down and drive your country into bankruptcy. Leftist politics seem impossible in one country. Would you agree that this provides additional fuel to the culture wars, to the rightist backlash, to national myths? Is this the source of rightist populism?

Taylor: Yes, I'd agree. You can see how rightist, populist political parties are gaining strength at the expense of traditional Social Democratic parties. Various frustrations get diverted, for example hostility towards immigrants, and the traditional constituencies of the Left are starting to vote for this kind of party. Perhaps it was also the case in Poland during the period of neoliberalism. But there's another feature of that, maybe not in Poland, but in richer countries. It's not so much that the Left parties are co-opted, but that people's concerns are fragmented into a whole range of different issues. Some care about ecology, others about different aspects of a culture, and so on. You get a fragmentation of issues that in effect means that less energy goes into the single issue—politics. It is very hard to put all these issues into two coherent packages.



Charles Taylor

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

It's an illusion that you can simply ignore politics

Sierakowski: It's often said that the world is more complicated than it used to be, yet for the citizen it has always been complicated. What's new in the present situation?

Taylor: During the heyday of Social Democracy there was some understanding that binding all these issues together were two different philosophies, one based on equality and the other on the free market and certain privileges. Almost everyone accepted that each of these issues could be dealt with in a different way, depending on which philosophy one adhered to. It was not always the case, but the general sense of that's how it felt was very strong. There was a certain kind of *Gestalt* formation of what the issues are about. As soon as you get more affluence in the working class—we're talking now about the 50s and 60s in Western Europe—, when the working class accedes to what was previously reserved solely for the middle class (like home ownership), that *Gestalt* starts to crumble and you get this fragmentation into different sets of issues, which we now expect our governments to deal with. Democratic society might conceivably work like this were it not for two things. The first is that people are backing out of political participation and the second is that these new illusions arise.

The other feature of the shift is the slide towards infotainment in late consumer capitalism—people consume news like entertainment. Media offering that are part of a capitalist system. They seek profit for themselves but at the same time have to be on the "good side". All big corporations advertise themselves like this. Then you have a phenomenon like Rupert Murdoch, the Australian press and media baron, who's active in a number of countries including the UK and the US.

Sierakowski: Would you say that consumer needs are created by the market and that somehow our lives are already sold?

Taylor: I think that on many issues it's true, but not on as many as people on the Left tend to think. Obviously, the details of the things we desire are sometimes created by advertising images and so on. But the fact that we don't look for the bare necessities but desire new things, new products, is something that has to do with the development of the economy—it starts at different moments in different societies. Up until the 1940s, the vast majority of rural people didn't expect to live better than their parents and grandparents, they just wanted to maintain what they had: own the farm and so on. That's also how people used to live in Poland until recently. Then, when you get the world of modern consumer capitalism, completely different kinds of expectations arise: I'm going to have it better than my parents, my children are going to have it better than myself, etc. The border between luxury and necessity blurs and moves: television today is a necessity rather than a luxury. And this is a new set of expectations that comes with the success of industrial capitalism.

Sierakowski: Why is it that people no longer want to conduct their lives according to religion or anything beyond consumer choice?

Taylor: That isn't quite right. That is to assume that consumption does indeed replace something meaningful in their lives. I mean, it can, and that's a very sorry situation. But a lot of people are growing up dreaming about becoming a doctor, working for Médecins Sans Frontières, great stuff. Nonetheless, at the same time they're poled into this consumer world. A very small number of people choose to completely back off, to live in communes and so on. In the lives of everyone of us, there's some kind of balance; but when you aggregate it all, it can turn out to be very bad for democracy. I find a meaning in my life in being a doctor, you find a meaning in your life in writing a novel, she finds a meaning in her life… But these meaningful activities don't coalesce into the political domain, as they did in the course of careers in old social democracies. People back then thought that politics was something important, so it bleached into some kind of solidarity. And for lots and lots of people this doesn't seem to be the case anymore.

Sierakowski: In my opinion, the problem is that God is dead for a large part of the population. Of course, there are islands where tradition and God still provide meaning to people's lives and where community can be created in a traditional way. But the rest is subjected to the market, or its logic—that's the first thing. The other thing, connected to the first, is that social ties are disintegrating. If liberal democracy is finished, then we can also say that society is finished. But you still claim that people don't cease to live meaningful lives: they can be good doctors, they can be good people without God, or without other people.

Taylor: Or rather, without society. I can only be a good doctor because I've learned things from other doctors. I can only be a good writer when I have readers and other writers with whom to exchange ideas. As far as spiritual matters are concerned, they are simply no longer a national issue; they belong to some people who have spiritual feelings, who may form religious groups and so on. But the issue is how that's related to political society.

Sierakowski: Maybe we don't need democracy anymore?

Taylor: Well, we can't do without it because our lives are dominated by political power.

Sierakowski: But still, we prefer self-preservation and security over participation and all those old ways of life. Isn't it true that ideas are impossible without ideologies? What if the real choice is between the atrocities of the twentieth century, together with clear political alternatives, high participation and so on, and no clear alternatives, no politics, no participation, but security and self-preservation? Maybe the fact that we decided to keep at a distance all those things that were dangerous in the last century makes us unable to organize, to create social movements, to engage. Perhaps we don't want to engage, and though we know that it would be better to be an active citizen, the fear of what happened in the twentieth century prevails—so we prefer security and self-preservation.

Taylor: Yes, that could be an explanation for the reaction, but it's an error. We're living in structures that require political authority, keeping the law. Even the frame of the market has to be based on that. If we don't watch how that's moving, then it can

become tremendously destructive. Small groups can lead us into wars, as was the case with Iraq. Or else the system is allowed to move in a direction where there's no solidarity, where social bonds begin to wane, where nothing is done to build them up, where in effect some people are doomed to destitution. And that is also degrading to the environment we live in. It's an illusion that you can simply ignore politics. Another way of putting it is that you can avoid politics only as a free rider. If I just want to write my novels, and there are enough people around me to engage, then nothing wrong is going to happen to me or my children. But in that situation, I'm a free rider, I'm riding on other people's participation. If everybody does this, the consequences would be terrible.

Sierakowski: If we have the free rider problem, then there's also the prisoner's dilemma. In order to solve the prisoner's dilemma you need some sense of trust or solidarity. But in a marketized society there is more competition than solidarity, and trust is disappearing.

Taylor: Well, I don't give up on that. Because people can still have some sense of solidarity, even if it's international solidarity—fundraising for famine or flood for example. But people can even do this nationally, if somewhere in our country a disaster happens.

Sierakowski: When you used this example twenty years ago, thirty even, very often choosing ecology or human rights, it was understandable and convincing. But now, you can see that even green ideas are subject to the instrumental logic of the market. The ecological lifestyle is becoming just another form of consumption. All efforts to preserve Mother Earth are just another niche on the market.

Taylor: Without direction, that's the problem. Take greenhouse gases for example. What the West is trying to do is to introduce a new structure of consensus through carbon trading. You know what it's about: you are allowed to pollute only to a certain degree, unless you buy permission from others who are polluting less. Carbon trading produces tremendous incentives to introduce greener technology and greener energy. The incentives are such that the market begins to work for you, people are putting money into investing in green energy, but the decision has to be made on a political level. What we are now seeing is that because of the crazy Republicans in the US, who have the majority in the Congress, the carbon trading law, that maybe could have gone through in the first two years of the Obama administration, has now been shelved. And because the Americans are doing nothing, nobody feels that they have to do anything either—terrible consequences might arise. The market can handle such things only when it is properly directed.

Sierakowski: What I'm saying is that there's no real difference: the decisions are made, but this doesn't mean that people are making those decisions.


Sławomir Sierakowski

Photo: Jakub Szafrański / Krytyka Polityczna

In a marketized society there is more competition than solidarity, and trust is disappearing

Taylor: I believe we could get on top of this danger, but it will only be through a number of political acts in a number of crucial countries. Some of them are democratic; some that are very important, like China, aren't at all. In Western Europe it is much better, but a lot depends on what the United States does. And that depends on whether they can elect saner people. Maybe they can—but that's a task for democracy.

Sierakowski: Would you say that what Tocqueville called "soft despotism" is the case today?

Taylor: Yes, but only because we allow it to be the case. People are not trapped into this. But it does take new kinds of mobilization and political imagination to get out of it. I put a lot of help into the Obama campaign because I thought that here there were new kinds of imagination and mobilization, both in terms of technique and in terms of slogans and goals. I'm a bit disappointed, because the movement fell apart so quickly, people didn't fully understand…

Sierakowski: …Facebook revolutions?

Taylor: Facebook revolutions can have an immediate effect and can be really important, but they're not something you can build on. They don't produce social glue.

Sierakowski: Who produces social glue today? How can we produce a sense of solidarity, something that is absolutely necessary for any social movement or for a democracy more generally?

Taylor: There is potential motivation still around. If you take a look at polls, you can see a strong sense of national identity. There's no reason why it should be totally captured by the Right.

Sierakowski: But tell me, why in your opinion is the national myth stronger than a sense of solidarity, or even religion?

Taylor: I think it's because democracies were established on a strong sense of common identity: the Polish people, the Czech people, and so on. But it also turns out that the way in which authoritarian regimes were opposed in the past was through links of solidarity. In the European case these were based mainly on language. You can't just re-write history and say, now we're going to have a European identity. As we developed the modern world, it's these identities that have become strong. Their positive side is their link to freedom, to liberal democracy. So in many cases, to call on solidarity you have to call on these.

Sierakowski: But convince me that the popularity of nationalism, rightist populism, of all those ideologies based on ethnicity, is anything more than a return to biology, to something we might call "the modernized state of nature", where once again *homo homini lupus est.*

Taylor: Well, that doesn't fit the reality. If we go back to the individual level, we see that people have different kinds of meanings. The issue is how we create the link between these different meanings, so that people would feel solidarity, a certain link with others, which in turn would lead to collective action, even though these meanings aren't exactly the same. There's always this possible basis. It's not that we've all become total egoists.

Sierakowski: Haven't we?

Taylor: No, most people aren't like that. If you take them one by one, they're really nothing like that. It's something that Obama did: he appealed to something in all these young people, showing them that we can have a more meaningful political life. The slogan "Yes we can" appeals to the sense of impotence that people have in the political world: we would like to have a more just, a more ecological world, but we don't know how to go about it any more. What Obama did was to appeal to all these strong moral ambitions and give people a sense that yes, if we get together, then…

Sierakowski: Yes, but what about the substance, is it still satisfying?

Taylor: It's not exactly the substance that is the problem. It's true that it didn't have the staying power, because people didn't fully understand how these different issues link. In order to have staying power you need political organization. And the Obama political organization, powerful as it was up to November 2008, fell apart when he got elected.

Sierakowski: When we used to have clear alternatives, you could choose a social democratic way of development or a more liberal way of doing things. Now that the substantial difference has disappeared, isn't the choice we have between "Yes we can" and "No, we can't"? Isn't it the de-politicization of politics that produces such choices? Where there's no real choice of political ideas, the one and only choice is between populists and anti-populists.

Taylor: Well, you can't run a campaign on a "these guys are idiots" platform—of course they are, but you can't run a campaign on that.

Sierakowski: In Poland the basic legitimization for Prime Minister Donald Tusk is the fact that he's not Kaczyński. In my opinion that's also the case for Obama: the fact that he's not Bush was probably the most important part of this quasi-ideology.

Taylor: Ok, maybe I should have put it more carefully: certainly, you get some votes from some people just by saying "we're not them". But it's not enough, you also need a positive program, you need to create a new sense of common purpose out of the hunger of all these different individuals for a more meaningful political life. This hunger really does exist. And "Yes we can" appeals to precisely this. ◁

Charles Taylor is Professor em. of Philosophy at McGill University, Montréal, and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. In 2008 he was awarded the Kyoto Prize for arts and philosophy. His most recent book is *A Secular Age*. He is currently working on a new book entitled *Retrieving Realism*.

Sławomir Sierakowski is founder and Editor-in-Chief of the Polish political magazine *Krytyka Polityczna*. He is also a member of the Political Critique group, the most significant left-wing intellectual organisation in Poland. From April to June 2011 he was a Milena Jesenská Fellow at the IWM.

Secularism, Still Alive

BY TARIQ MODOOD

Do Muslim immigrants really threaten European secularism? Do Muslim societies have to become secular to be democratic? The third "Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses" conference questioned widely held beliefs about the Islamic world. British sociologist Tariq Modood explains why it is misleading to talk of a crisis of secularism in Europe as the result of a growing Muslim population.

Photo: Joel Carillet / iStockphoto

Each country in western Europe is a secular state and while each has its own distinctive take on what this means, nevertheless, there is a general historical character, which I call moderate secularism, and a lesser strand. The latter is principally manifested in French *laïcité,* which seeks to create a public space in which religion is virtually banished in the name of reason and emancipation, and religious organisations are monitored by the state through consultative national mechanisms.

The main western European approach, however, sees organised religion as a potential public good or national resource (not just a private benefit), which the state can in some circumstances assist to realise—even through an "established" church. These public benefits can be direct, such as a contribution to education and social care through autonomous church-based organisations funded by the taxpayer; or indirect, such as the production of attitudes that create economic hope or family stability; and they can be to do with national identity, cultural heritage, ethical voice and national ceremonies.

Yet the 1960s till the end of the century saw a particularly strong movement of opinion and politics away from this moderate secularism in favour of the more radical variant. Not only has there been no major, sustained counter-movement but it has broadened out from north-western Protestant/secular Europe into Catholic Europe.

So, for example, the national system of "pillarisation" in the Netherlands, by which Protestants and Catholics had separate access to some of the state's resources emerged in the nineteenth century, declined sharply in the middle of the twentieth and was formally wound up in 1983. The Lutheran Church in Sweden was disestablished in 2000. In the UK, disestablishment of the Church of England was embraced in the early 1990s by key sections of the centre-left. Catholic countries—Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland—in the 1980s and 1990s showed rapid signs of the secularisation characteristic of Protestant Europe.

This is the context in which non-Christian migrants have been arriving and settling and they and the next generation becoming active members of their societies, including making political claims of equality and accommodation.

As the most salient post-immigration formation relates to Muslims, the core element of the challenge is the primacy given to religion as the basis of identity, organisation, political representation, normative justification etc.

Fearful perceptions of Islam are capable of uniting a wide range of opinion into a majority

It is here, if anywhere, that a sense of a crisis of secularism can be found. The pivotal moment was 1988–89 and was marked by two events. These created national and international storms, and set in motion political developments which have not been reversed and offer contrasting ways in which the two western European secularisms are responding to the Muslim presence.

The events were the protests in Britain against the novel *The Satanic Verses* by Sir Salman Rushdie; and in France the decision by a school headteacher to prohibit entry to three girls till they were willing to take off their headscarves in school premises.

The novel *The Satanic Verses* was not banned in the UK, so in that sense the Muslim campaign clearly failed. In other respects, however, it galvanised many into seeking a democratic multiculturalism that was inclusive of Muslims.

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was set up and has been very successful in relation to its founding agenda. By 2001, it had achieved its aim of having Muslim issues and Muslims as a group recognised separately from issues of race and ethnicity; and of being itself accepted by government, media and civil society as the spokesperson for Muslims. Another two achieved aims were the state funding of Muslim schools on the same basis as Christian and Jewish schools; and getting Tony Blair to go against ministerial and civil service advice and insert a religion question into the 2001 Census.

This meant that the ground was laid for the possible later introduction of policies targeting Muslims to match those groups defined by race or ethnicity—or gender. It had to wait a bit longer to get the legislative protection it sought, yet by the time New Labour left office in 2010, it had created the strongest protection against religious discrimination in the EU, including a law against incitement to religious hatred, the legislation most closely connected to the protests over *The Satanic Verses,* though there is no suggestion that it would have caught that novel. Indeed, the protestors' original demand that the blasphemy law be extended to cover Islam has been made inapplicable as the blasphemy law was abolished in 2008—with very little protest from anybody.

These developments have taken place not only with the support of the leadership of the Church of England, but in a spirit of interfaith respect. (Given how adversarial English intellectual, journalistic, legal and political culture is, religion in England is oddly fraternal and lit-

tle effort is expended in proving that the other side is in a state of error and should convert.)

That is one path of development from 1988–89. As can be seen, it was a mobilisation of a minority and the extension of minority policies from race to religion in order to accommodate the religious minority. The other development, namely the one arising from *l'affaire foulard,* was one of top-down state action to prohibit certain minority practices.

From the start the majority of the country—whether it be the media, public intellectuals, politicians or public opinion—were supportive of the headteacher who refused to have religious headscarves in school. Muslims either did not wish to or lacked the capacity to challenge this dominant view with anything like the publicity, organisation, clamour or international assistance that Muslims in Britain brought to bear on Rushdie's novel. The threatened ban against the headscarf was passed with an overwhelming majority by Parliament in February 2004.

A few years later the target of secularist and majoritarian disapproval was the full face veil with just the eyes showing, the so-called niqab or burqa, as favoured by a few hundred Muslim women. This was banned in public places in April 2011. Belgium followed suit in July 2011, and Italy is in the process of doing so. Similar proposals are being discussed by governments and political parties across Western Europe.

Another example of this broad anti-Muslim coalition is the majority that voted in a referendum to ban the building of minarets in Switzerland in 2009. It has been analysed as including those whose primary motivation is women's rights to those "who simply feel that Islam is 'foreign'", who may have no problems with Muslims per se but who are not ready to accept "Islam's acquiring of visibility in public spaces" and generally did not vote "out of a desire to oppress anybody, but because they are themselves feeling threatened by what they see as an Islam invasion" (for the quotations see Religioscope).

So, prejudiced or fearful perceptions of Islam are capable of uniting a wide range of opinion into a majority, including those who have no strong views about church-state arrangements, as indeed has been apparent from the very beginning that Muslim claims became public controversies.


Tu Weiming


Tariq Modood

Fred Dallmayr


José Casanova


Sudipta Kaviraj

Alessandro Ferrara

Peter van der Veer


Alfred Stepan

Photos: Philipp Steinkellner

It means that the current challenge to secularism in western Europe is being debated not just in terms of the wider issues of integration and multiculturalism but also in terms of a hostility to Muslims and Islam based on stereotypes and scare stories in the media that are best understood as a specific form of cultural racism that has come to be called Islamophobia and is largely unrelated to questions of secularism.

The crisis of secularism is best understood, then, within a framework of multiculturalism. Of course, multiculturalism has few advocates at the moment and the term is highly damaged. Yet the repeated declarations from senior politicians of the region that "multiculturalism is dead" are a reaction to the continuing potency of multiculturalism, which renders obsolete liberal takes on assimilation and integration with new forms of public gender and public ethnicity, and now public religion.

Muslims are late joiners of this movement, but when they do so, it slowly becomes apparent that the secularist status quo, with certain residual privileges for Christians, is untenable as it stands. We can call this the challenge of integration rather than multiculturalism, as long as it is understood that we are not just talking about an integration into the day-to-day life of a society but also into its institutional architecture, grand narratives and macro-symbolic sense of itself. If these issues were dead, we would not be having a debate about the role of public religion or coming up with proposals for dialogue with Muslims and the accommodation of Islam.

The dynamic for change is not directly to do with the historic religion nor the historic secularism of western Europe. Rather the novelty, which then has implications for Christians and secularists and to which they are reacting, is the appearance of an assertive multiculturalism which cannot be contained within a matrix of individual rights, conscience, religion freedom and so on. If any of these were different, the problems would be other than they are.

Moderate secularism offers some of the resources for accommodating Muslims

Just as today we look at issues to do with, say, women or homosexuality not simply in terms of rights but in a political environment influenced by feminism and gay liberation, within a socio-political-intellectual culture in which the "assertion of positive difference" or "identity" is a shaping and forceful presence. It does not mean everybody is a feminist now, but a heightened consciousness of gender and equality creates a certain gender-equality sensibility.

Similarly, my claim is that a multiculturalist sensibility today is present in western Europe and yet it is not comfortable with extending itself to accommodate Muslims but nor able to find reasons for not extending to Muslims without self-contradiction.

Political secularism has been destabilised, in particular the historical flow from a moderate to radical secularism and the expectation of its continuation has been jolted. This is not because of any Christian desecularisation or a "return of the repressed".

Rather, the jolt is created by the triple contingency of the arrival and settlement of a significant number of Muslims; a multiculturalist sensibility which respects "difference"; and a moderate secularism, namely that the historical compromises between the state and a church or churches in relation to public recognition and accommodation are still in place to some extent.

To speak of a "crisis of secularism" is highly exaggerated, especially in relation to the state, indeed it is misleading. It is true that the challenge is profound for *laïcité* or radical secularism as an ideology, but as I hope I have shown, the problem is more defined by issues of post-immigration integration than by the religion-state relation per se. The "crisis of secularism" is really the challenge of multiculturalism.

Far from this entailing the end of secularism as we know it, moderate secularism offers some of the resources for accommodating Muslims. Political secularists should think pragmatically and institutionally on how to achieve this, namely how to multiculturalise moderate secularism, and avoid exacerbating the crisis and limiting the room for manoeuvre, by pressing for further, radical secularism. ◁

Tariq Modood is Director of the Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at Bristol University and Visiting Fellow at the IWM. His latest book is *Still Not Easy Being British: Struggles for a Multicultural Citizenship.*

Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses III
IWM, June 9–11

Conference Chair:

Charles Taylor
Professor em. of Philosophy, McGill University, Montréal; Permanent Fellow, IWM

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Shahid Amin
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The conference was supported by the Institut Français de Vienne and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation

The Mosque and the State

BY NADER HASHEMI

Despite the struggle for democracy in the Arab world, most Muslims oppose the idea that a democratic state must be founded on Western secularism. In order to understand the desire that religion play a role in politics, we need to take into account the different histories of that relationship in the West and in the Middle East, says American political scientist Nader Hashemi.

Photos: Philipp Steinkellner

Influential scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis have long argued that the rise of political secularism in the West is due to a set of unique Western cultural attributes. In the oft-cited phrase attributed to Jesus Christ, Christ instructed his disciples to "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."

Compare this passage of early Christian history, where the followers of Jesus were a persecuted minority without any ties to political power, to early Islamic history. In contrast to this purported separation of religion and political power, the prophet Muhammad was both a religious and political leader, establishing in Medina the first Islamic state in 622 A.D.

The historical lesson for comparative secularism that Huntington and Lewis derive is that Islam's political theology is qualitatively—and enduringly—different than Christianity's; the latter being essentially secular in nature. The problem with this perspective is that it does not withstand historical scrutiny.

The origins of our modern understanding of religion-state separation, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition, lie in the 16th and 17th centuries. The political and moral contexts that shaped debates on this topic were the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing Wars of Religion. The key question during this period revolved around the relationship between religious toleration and political order. At that time, the widely-held view was that the two are irreconcilable and, further, that religious uniformity in the public sphere was a prerequisite for peace and social stability. The theme of toleration and its relationship to political life was the burning question of the day, a theme that generated heated debates and intellectual and moral arguments that sought to resolve this question.

Eventually, figures such as John Locke and Pierre Bayle would come to argue that toleration and social peace were indeed compatible on the condition, in Locke's famous phrase, that we "distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other." In other words, religion-state separation was required.

Political secularism thus emerged in the West, not due to a 2000-year-old statement by Jesus Christ, but as a direct result in the early modern period of the crisis of religion in politics and the need to formulate a new way out of this existential dilemma.

Religion is viewed as a possible agent of stability, predictability and a constraint on political power

By contrast, Muslim societies have historically been shaped by a qualitatively different experience. There were no wars of religion and battles over toleration. Instead of being viewed as a source of deep and enduring conflict, in the premodern era religion was often used to limit political tyranny by forcing the sultans and caliphs to restrain their autocratic ambitions by recognizing limits demarcated by Islam and interpreted by religious scholars, in exchange for the conferring of political legitimacy. In some cases that meant bowing completely to those authorities. In May 1807, as one example, the Ottoman Sultan Selim III was deposed after the chief mufti ruled that his modernization policies had violated Islamic principles.

The key point here is that religion-state relations in the Muslim world have bequeathed different historical, political and moral lessons and memories to the faithful. Today, religion is viewed by significant segments of the population not as a natural ally of despotism and a cause of social conflict, but as a possible agent of stability, predictability and a constraint on political power. This partly explains why most Muslims register higher levels of support for religious institutions and religious leaders than those in the West. Historical experience and the lessons learned from it have been remarkably different.

Furthermore, in the modern era, Arab societies have been deeply shaped by the negative experiences of post-colonial authoritarianism. The form of "secularism" associated with these regimes has had a critical impact on perceptions of the relationship between religion and government. The various modernization projects and political systems that emerged from this experience were often justified in the name of secular Arab nationalism: by the late 20th century, they were as politically repressive as they were economically corrupt. Ben Ali's Tunisia, Mubarak's Egypt and Assad's Syria embodied this state of affairs.

Thus for a generation of Arabs, dictatorship, repression, corruption and nepotism embodied a strikingly negative "secular" reality. The turn to Islam as an alternative source for political inspiration and hope was a natural outcome.

As a consequence, reliable polling suggests that most Muslims oppose the idea that democracy must encapsulate a Western form of secularism. Similarly, large majorities support the idea that Shariah should be one source, albeit but not the only source of legislation. While this is shocking to a Western audience, it makes perfect sociological sense from the perspective of the historical experiences of Muslims.

Returning to this history of authoritarianism, it is evident that an open era where Arabs and Muslims could publicly contest political and social norms never existed. State repression, surveillance and censorship have existed for decades with special negative consequences for determining, on ethical grounds, the normative role of religion in government.

To date, these societies have not yet had the opportunity to democratically negotiate the demarcation of mosque and state. To assume, therefore, that this debate has already taken place or that the role of religion in government has been democratically negotiated is to superimpose a Western historical experience on the Islamic world. Analytically, it is also an unhelpful distortion.

All of this suggests the relevance of what Shmuel Eisenstadt called "multiple modernities". Different societies will find their own pathway toward modernity without necessarily replicating the experience of Europe and North America: rather the path forward will be achieved as a result of their own historical experiences and internal debates. One of the huge challenges for Muslim democrats is to develop internal arguments for political secularism by drawing on a historical and religious tradition untouched by the wars of religion or long-standing battles over religious toleration.

As the old political order in the Middle East and North Africa begins to crumble and a new one emerges, for the first time in modern history the opportunity may arise for Arabs to seriously grapple with these questions. In non-Arab parts of the Muslim world such as Turkey, Iran and Indonesia, considerable progress has already been registered. While the coming debates in the Arab world will surely be divisive and acrimonious—just as they were and sometimes still are in the Western experience—the future political stability of the region can only be assured by this political process taking place. ◁

Nader Hashemi is Assistant Professor of Middle East and Islamic Politics at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He is the author of *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy* as well as of *The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran's Future.*

The Birth of Nations

BY TIMOTHY SNYDER

One state for one nation. Historians typically treat the French Revolution or the American intervention in the First World War as turning points in the history of the idea of self-determination. But in fact, nation-states first emerged in the Balkans during the long nineteenth century, says IWM Permanent Fellow Timothy Snyder. He chaired the first in a series of conferences devoted to the significance of the Balkans for modern European history.

Eugène Delacroix: La Liberté guidant le peuple / Montage

The IWM research focus on "United Europe—Divided History" has moved south to consider the Balkans not as an exceptional case but as the mainstream of European history. This subject was chosen because, as the previous focus on the 1930s and 1940s in eastern Europe, it offers the possibility to combine fresh historical scholarship with relevance to contemporary disputes about European and national memory.

Much previous critical work has challenged national stereotypes. This is not the central subject. The hope is not so much to overcome stereotypes by direct confrontation, since this can lead to apologetics and stale ahistorical disputes. Rather the project seeks to take seriously the historical weight of events in the Balkans for modern European history and consider seriously the possibility that the Balkans might be more significant for the rest of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than the rest of Europe was for the Balkans.

Therefore, a series of three to four conferences is planned, devoted to the formation of the nation-state, the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, the interwar and wartime Balkan states, and communism and post-communism.

The first conference, which took place at the Institute from May 26 to 28, 2011, was devoted to the nineteenth century. Three major themes were considered:

First, can the Balkans be seen as the proving ground for the nation-state? In general, histories of Europe treat the French Revolution or the American intervention in the First World War as the turning points in the history of the idea of self-determination, one state for one nation. Though it would be foolish to deny the significance of these moments, during the long nineteenth century the nation-state in fact emerged in the Balkans.

Many of the classic questions of membership in the state and the definition of the nation were posed earlier and perhaps even more articulately in the Balkan cases than they were in Germany or even in France. Romania offers an important early example of legal exclusion of minorities, a theme usually studied in connection with France or Germany. Bulgaria offers an instance of nation-building by cartography, as opposed to the more conventional method of history.

Second, can the Balkans be seen as the origins of a fundamental form of European statehood, the national monarchy? Usually "monarchy" is associated with empire, and "republic" is associated with nation-state. Most of the first nation-states in Europe were in fact monarchies, and almost all were in the Balkans. Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia were all national monarchies.

In southeastern Europe, the interesting development is the assimilation of foreign monarchs within local societies. To be sure, these were all states whose creation was determined or conditioned by the great powers, and most of the monarchies were foreign by origin. But it is not at all clear that the influence was only in one direction. On the scale of Europe, the national monarchy became the model for the greater powers. Italy and then Germany were unified precisely as national monarchies. By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the prosperous democracies in Europe were national monarchies.

Third, can the Balkans be regarded as the laboratory of national economics? It is often forgotten that Balkan ports connected the Habsburg monarchy with the world, in its last bid for global influence and stature through trade and naval might. The Balkan nation-states, once established from the territories of the Ottoman Empire, all faced similar economic problems, which were addressed by a form of nationalist economics. All of the economies were agrarian, and all of the new states lost access to Ottoman market.

In this situation, the only way to create a larger market and thus a larger tax base was to take more territory. Thus the desperate need to improve economies meshed perfectly with the new idea of national revisionism. This pattern, already observable by the middle of the nineteenth century in the Balkans, spread thereafter to much of the rest of Europe. So too with military resolutions of economic problems, justified in economic terms. In the name of matching populations to territories, rulers could aspire to new territories. Thus the origins of the Balkan Wars, and indirectly of the First World War.

The next workhop, envisioned for 2012, will consider the Balkan Wars as a turning point from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries. ◁

Timothy Snyder is Professor of Modern East European History at Yale University and Permanent Fellow at the IWM. His latest book is *Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin,* which is being translated into more than twenty languages. A German translation appeared recently with C.H. Beck Verlag.

The Balkans as Europe, 1821–1914
IWM, May 26–28

Conference Chair:

Timothy Snyder
Professor of History, Yale University; Permanent Fellow, IWM

Participants:

Ivo Banac
Professor em. of History, Yale University

Alison Frank
Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Harvard University

Venelin Ganev
Associate Professor of Political Science, Miami University, Oxford / OH

Constantin Iordachi
Associate Professor and Head of the Department of History, Central European University, Budapest

Ivan Krastev
Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; Permanent Fellow, IWM

Dessislava Lilova
Associate Professor of Cultural Studies, South-Western University "Neofit Rilsky", Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria

Diana Mishkova
Head of the Center for Advanced Studies, Sofia; Professor of History, University of Sofia

Tanja Petrovic
Head of the Institute for Cultural Studies, University of Nova Gorica, Slovenia

Dominique K. Reill
Assistant Professor in Modern European History, University of Miami / FL

Felicia Roşu
Postdoctoral Researcher at the Moore Institute for Research in the Humanities and Social Studies, National University of Ireland, Galway

Maria Todorova
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Unwanted Citizens

BY CONSTANTIN IORDACHI

Who is in and who is out? Nineteenth century Romania and Serbia are examples of the dark side of the nation-state: the exclusion of minorities from civil, economic and political rights. Historian Constantin Iordachi on the oppressive construction of national homogeneity.

Photos: Philipp Steinkellner

In June 2009, during a televised Democratic presidential debate, Senator Hillary Clinton commented favorably upon New York Governor Elliot Spitzer's proposal to grant irregular immigrants the right to acquire driving licenses in the US. Since illegal immigrants *do* drive cars on our roads, she argued, it would actually be safer to document their existence. Clinton's suggestion caused uproar, with Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd pointing out that holding a driving license is a privilege, not a right. Hardliners on immigration matters were quick to add that granting driving licenses to illegal immigrants would present grave security risks, as the measure might be interpreted as legalizing border trespassing.

The question of whether illegal immigrants should have access to driver's licenses or not was in fact part of a larger debate on the status of long-term illegal residents in the US. Should the status of non-citizen residents, most of them illegal immigrants, be regularized? Or should the "undocumented" be deported? Are they an important asset to the American economy or a danger to collective security? Such debates on the status of immigrants are commonplace in national politics, and are heightened in periods of state formation or acute socio-economic crisis; intriguingly, however, they affect traditional countries of immigration, as well.

In the last decades, sweeping social-political changes have placed security at the top of the global political agenda, altering our understanding of its referent objects. During the Cold War, "traditional" security studies were overwhelmingly concerned with the protection of nation-state sovereignty, approached mostly in terms of safeguarding its political and territorial integrity by military capabilities. In the post-Cold War era, new critical research has concomitantly broadened and deepened the agenda of security studies, moving away from solely military concerns to non-military sectors, and from the narrow nation-state perspective towards notions of global and human (individual or collective) security.

In their pioneering study *Security: a New Framework Analysis* (1998), Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, in particular, proposed a new framework of approaching security incorporating five "sectors": military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. To account for the way in which different non-military or non-state sectors become objects of security, they advanced two paramount concepts: "societal security" and "securitization". Societal security refers to the security of "large, self-sustaining identity groups". In turn, the concept of securitization denotes "an extreme version of politicization" in which certain issues are taken beyond the threshold of "normal" or day-to-day routine politics and presented as "existential threats" demanding urgent and extraordinary measures, unconstrained by traditional rules. Securitization can take discursive as well as non-discursive forms, either in the form of self-referential "speech acts" or as a set of techniques of government. In its non-discursive form, securitization refers to the employment of exceptional measures for responding to a perceived outstanding existential threat. As a *technique of government,* securitization refers to various mechanisms of implementing discourses about security, in an ad-hoc or an institutionalized manner.

Over the last decade, the framework of "securitization" generated innovative empirical research on societal security, concentrating mostly on migration and the "war on terrorism". Yet much of this research has focused on the discursive aspect of securitization; at the same time, the institutional mechanisms of securitization, in general, and their link to practices of citizenship exclusion in particular, have been subject to little empirical or methodological reflection.

In addressing this lacuna, my research attempts to link societal securitization more firmly with *discourses* and *practices* of citizenship. A core case study of my book in progress on the making of nation-state citizenship in the Balkans focuses on the exclusion of Jews from citizenship rights in Romania and Serbia during much of the nineteenth century.

Policies of exclusion were in fact widespread in the modern period

The two countries exhibit cases of successful "Westernization" marked by their exit from the Ottoman realm and the gradual consolidation of their internal autonomy under the collective guarantee of the Great Powers until they both obtained full independence in 1878. Yet, among the many similarities between the two countries in their process of nation- and state-building was the exclusion of Jews from significant civil, economic and political rights, which resulted in an effective "decoupling" of their treatment of the Jewish question from the Western "model."

Romania, in particular, was the last country in Europe to grant state citizenship to its Jewish population, significant progress being made only under strong international pressure, leading to partial emancipation in 1878 and to full emancipation in 1918–1919. Serbia did grant its Jews the right to state citizenship but, from 1842 to circa 1878, it nevertheless excluded them from substantial civil and economic rights, full emancipation being achieved only under pressure from the Great Powers.

Why were Jews excluded from citizenship rights in Romania and Serbia? What were the legal and political techniques employed for their exclusion? To date, a majority of the studies that have tackled these questions have focused on discourse analysis, pointing to the importance of anti-Semitism and its instrumentalization as a modern ideology of political mobilization. While underscoring the role played by anti-Semitism in the adoption of anti-Jewish legislation, my work aims at illuminating the *rhetorical* strategies as well as the *institutional* means by which anti-Semitic discourses succeeded in forging a wide political consensus, in gaining public endorsement, and in being implemented in policies of closure, aspects that have so far remained largely under-researched.

I argue that the exclusion of Jews from citizenship was triggered by a process of "securitization", which entailed the social construction of a "Jewish threat" to the ethnic majority's collective "societal security", and its institutionalization in practices of citizenship closure. The demographic expansion of the Jewish population, its religious and linguistic dissimilarity, and its concentration in certain professional fields were perceived by local socio-political elites as a challenge to their economic dominance and an obstacle in the process of nation- and state-building.

Various "securitizing" actors presented Jews as a major threat to the national community, and succeeded in gaining public endorsement for emergency legal measures in order to exclude them from full socio-economic and political rights. Numerous laws implemented an administrative separation between Jews and the "titular" ethnic majority, by forcing Jews into urban concentration and *ghettoization,* and thus further contributing to the socio-economic distinctiveness of the Jewish communities.

This suggests some more general conclusions about the interplay between practices of securitization of certain societal issues and the de-naturalization of various categories of "unwanted citizens". My aim is not to articulate an argument about citizenship policies in the Balkans as "deviant" or "mutant", as compared to their arguably more liberal "Western" counterparts.

Based on a variety of comparative perspectives—ranging from "soft" forms of securitization as illustrated above by the debate on driving licenses to "hard" forms of denaturalizing certain categories of "unwanted citizens"—, I argue that policies of exclusion and de-naturalization were in fact widespread in the modern period, in the East and the West alike, being used as central legal techniques through which states enforce the loyalty of their citizens, discriminate against unwanted residents and construct homogeneous nation-states.

In the current socio-political climate, marked by the rise of rightwing extremism, these historical case studies acquire a strong contemporary relevance. The common thread of these historical or more recent debates on citizenship, immigration and exclusion is that the status of certain categories of inhabitants—be they legal or illegal immigrants, or racial, gender or religious minorities, etc.—is taken out of day-to-day politics and turned into a homeland security issue, closely tied to the "survival" of the nation. Time and again, we are witnessing the uncompromising logic of the securitization of "the Other" in action.

It is a task of social scientists to deconstruct such campaigns of demonizing migrants or "othering" various kinds of minority groups in contemporary Europe and to propose various strategies for de-securitizing those who become targets of radical politics. ◁

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Der Schleier der Vernunft

VON LUDGER HAGEDORN

Wie hielt Jan Patočka es mit der Religion? Dieser Frage war die Konferenz „Christianity Unthought" am IWM gewidmet, die sich auf eine Spurensuche im Werk des tschechischen Philosophen begab. Den Ausgangspunkt bildete Friedrich Nietzsche und dessen verbitterte Kritik an der abendländischen Philosophie als einer Geistesgeburt des Christentums.

Es ist nothwendig zu sagen, wen wir als unsern Gegensatz fühlen – die Theologen und Alles, was Theologen-Blut im Leibe hat – unsere ganze Philosophie…", so Friedrich Nietzsche in Aphorismus 8 seines *Antichrist,* dieser Kampfschrift gegen das Christentum und die mit seinen Werten einhergehende europäische Décadence. In den einleitenden Aphorismen umreißt, bestimmt, begrenzt Nietzsche den Kriegsschauplatz: Wer steht hier gegen wen? Und um was geht es in diesem Krieg?

Er proklamiert die Restitution der hohen, noblen Werte, betreibt die Aufdeckung einer jüdisch-christlichen Verschwörung und versucht sich an der Entlarvung ihrer nihilistischen Tendenzen in der Verneinung des Lebens („Man sagt nicht Nichts: man sagt dafür Jenseits; oder Gott; oder das wahre Leben…", §7). Es geht um die Bekämpfung dieser lebensfeindlichen Tendenz, um das Ethos des wahren Arztes, der nicht mitleidet, sondern „das Messer führt", der „unerbittlich" bleibt in seiner Radikalität, die auf die Umwertung aller Werte zielt. Auf der einen Seite Nietzsche als Fürsprecher des Lebens, als Denker, der den „Instinkt des Lebens" wieder einsetzt, auf der anderen all das, was nach „Theologen-Blut", „Theologen-Instinkt", Moralismus, Idealismus stinkt, eben „unsere ganze Philosophie".

Es gibt etwas Schreckliches an diesem Buch, das vielleicht weniger in seiner Botschaft als seinem Gestus liegt. Nietzsche, der Virtuose der feinen Klinge, der Leichtigkeit und Eleganz zum Prinzip seines Denkens erhoben hat, Nietzsche der Freund und Bewunderer des Mediterranen, der die halkyonischen Tage in Genua zum Inbegriff erfüllten und glückhaften Lebens machte (der Nietzsche der in der Tat *Fröhlichen Wissenschaft*), eben dieser Verächter aller nordisch tumben Gründlichkeit steigert sich hier zu einer Brachialität und Verbitterung, aus der alles Leichte verschwunden scheint.

„Wir sind Hyperboreer", heißt es im zweiten Satz des Buches als Anspielung auf das sagenhafte Volk der Antike, das noch jenseits des Nordwinds wohnen sollte und zu dem man weder zu Lande noch zu Wasser gelangte. „Jenseits des Nordens, des Eises, des Todes", so weiter, „unser Leben, unser Glück". Ein Fürsprecher des Lebens, der sein Glück und sein Leben in Eis und Tod findet – sinnfälliger lässt sich kaum fassen, was an diesem Buch verstörend bleibt.

Und doch: Anders als der reißerische Titel „Antichrist" nahe legt, erschöpft sich die Kritik nicht in einem blinden Kirchensturm. Vielmehr liegt die Stärke selbst dieses polemisch zugespitzten Werkes darin, dass es das Fortwirken des christlichen Weltbildes, seine uneingestandene Übernahme in Philosophie und moderner Wissenschaft offen legt. Neben den beißenden Spott über Paulus oder Luther tritt so fast unterschiedslos die Kritik an Kant und damit stellvertretend an der ganzen modernen Philosophie.

Antiklerikale Karikaturen und Satiren XXXv. Berliner Wespen (1868–1888) / kompiliert und hrsg. von Alois Payer

Jede Auseinandersetzung mit dem Verhältnis von Christentum, Philosophie und moderner Wissenschaft sollte nicht hinter diese Diagnose Nietzsches zurückfallen, indem sie vereinfachenden Dichotomien von Vernunft und Aufklärung vs. Glauben und Mystizismus folgt oder verkennt, inwiefern christliche Werte auch für die aufklärerische Philosophie – und damit für die Kritik selbst – maßgeblich geblieben sind. Diese Forderung gilt ganz unabhängig davon, welche „Lösung" sich aus dieser Diagnose ergeben mag. Nietzsche selbst beschrieb sie in der *Fröhlichen Wissenschaft* mit dem Bild des toten Buddha, dessen fürchterlichen Schatten man auch nach seinem Tode noch Jahrhunderte lang in einer Höhle zeigte. Der Paragraph mündet dann in den Aufruf: Wir müssen auch noch diesen Schatten besiegen!

Gott ist tot, doch sein Schatten überlagert all unser Denken

Ihr Denken ist, so Nietzsche, „eine hinterlistige Theologie" (§ 10), ausgebildet von einem nach wie vor intakten Theologen-Instinkt, der sich vernünftig gibt und (sich selbst) seine wahre Quelle verschleiert. Ein sprechender Titel für diese Kritik wäre, in Anlehnung an Nietzsches Erstlingswerk, „Die Geburt der deutschen Philosophie aus dem Geiste des Protestantismus". Wie schon in der eingangs zitierten Feststellung anklingend, ist erst hier die eigentliche Frontstellung in ihrem ganzen Umfang benannt: Der Kampfplatz liegt *innerhalb* des modernen Denkens, das sich als aufklärerisch versteht, und der Schleier der Vernunft ist einer, der sowohl im Sinne des *genitivus obiectivus* als auch des *genitivus subiectivus* zu verstehen ist.

Nicht allein legt sich der Schleier der Orthodoxie über die Vernunft, sondern auch die Vernunft selbst neigt zur Verschleierung ihres theologisch-spekulativen Grundes.

Jan Patočkas Reflexionen über die Geschichte Europas und seiner geistigen Entwicklung verstehen sich als Betrachtungen aus einer nach-christlichen Epoche. Wenn Sinn so etwas wie eine verbindende und verbindliche Struktur meint, dann hat das Christentum aufgehört, diese sinnstiftende Gestalt zu haben und steht allenfalls für eine fragmentierte individuelle Erfahrung.

Aus diesem Befund ergibt sich, dass die philosophische Aufgabe weder darin bestehen kann, das Christentum zu attackieren, es bloßzustellen, noch es verteidigen oder rehabilitieren zu wollen. Es scheint auch nicht mehr jene Rücksicht zu gelten, die Kant noch in seiner *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* bezeugt, wenn er mit seiner kritischen Betrachtung gerade Raum für den Glauben innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft schaffen will.

Zugleich heißt dies aber keineswegs, dass die Philosophie endgültig aus dem Schatten des Christentums herausgetreten wäre. Jean-Luc Nancy etwa, dessen vor einigen Jahren erschienene Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum weitgehende Parallelen zum Ansatz Patočkas aufweist, überrascht mit der apodiktischen Aussage: "*We are in that shadow…* We are in the nervation of Christianity… *all* our thought is Christian through and through. Through and through and entirely, which is to say, all of us, all of us completely." (Dis-Enclosure, 142).

Im Grunde bestätigt sich hier der Befund Nietzsches, aber in einer grundsätzlich anderen Auslegung: Gott ist tot, doch sein Schatten, vor dem Nietzsche noch vor der Verkündigung von Gottes Tod warnte, überlagert all unser Denken. Was dann bei Nietzsche zur Polemik einer endgültigen Überwindung und Verwindung des Christentums wird, erscheint nun als schlichte Feststellung, wie sehr die Fundamente des abendländischen Denkens, Handelns und Fühlens christlich und nicht einfach austauschbar sind.

Implizit folgt daraus auch eine Kritik des Nietzscheschen Versuchs einer „Austreibung": Es kann nicht darum gehen, eine dominierende geistige Tradition wie das Christentum in seiner Gänze zu widerlegen oder zu bestätigen, wozu der Kritisierende selbst gleichsam außerhalb stehen müsste. (Nancy: „That is the move that we philosophers make too often and too soon", 149). An die Stelle solch einer anmaßenden Bewegung der Widerlegung oder Suspension sollte vielmehr der Versuch einer Dekonstruktion treten – Dekonstruktion als Verbleiben *in* einer Tradition, aber im Sinne eines Lösens, eines In-Bewegung-Setzens ihrer Strukturen, mit denen das Spiel neuer Möglichkeiten und Bezüge gewagt wird.

Am besten lässt sich dies an der Dimension des Geschichtlichen verdeutlichen, die für Patočka wie für Nancy eine stark vom Christentum bestimmte ist. Durch seine Öffnung zur Geschichte hin wird das Christentum zu einer „Religion, die aus der Religion hinausführt", wie es Marcel Gauchet formuliert hat. Auch die moderne Abweichung vom Christentum (Säkularisierung) wäre demnach immer zugleich eine Entfaltung des Christentums.

Patočka verfolgt dies insbesondere an dem gleichermaßen platonischen wie christlichen Gedanken einer „Sorge für die Seele", die für ihn das eigentlich geschichtsbildende Motiv ist. In einem seiner *Ketzerischen Essays* findet sich dazu eine Formulierung, die auch der Konferenz ihren Titel gab: „Weil es seinen Grund in dieser abgründigen Tiefe der Seele hat, ist das Christentum der bislang größte und unüberbotene, wenngleich *noch nicht zu Ende gedachte* Aufschwung, der den Menschen jemals zum Kampf gegen den Verfall befähigt hat." ◁

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Christianity Unthought
IWM, April 7–9

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Nietzsche's Challenge

BY JAMES DODD

For both Nietzsche and Patočka, something essential to Europe comes to an end in the nineteenth century. How we understand this end is crucial for grasping not only the historical meaning of that time, but also, argues philosopher James Dodd, the potential for Christianity to shape our existence in a meaningful way.

Patočka's reflections in the fourth of the *Heretical Essays* on the 19th century are to a great extent political. The long 19th century brings the rise of Revolutionary France, the final demise of the Holy Roman Empire, and the emergence of Russia. Yet Patočka looks back to the 19th century through the experience of the 20th, and in terms of what he considers to be the meaning of its two world wars: namely, the effective exit of Europe from history, thus of its fall as a dominant center of world power.

What is at stake in this exit? This question is complicated. For Patočka, history is not a secure, stable feature of the world, but a break, a rupture. This rupture takes the form, in Patočka's thought, of a modification of human openness into a distinctively problematic horizon of existence. Thus what is at stake is the meaning of the experience of problematicity itself, of whether or not humans embrace their historicity.

Yet, on Patočka's account, with the 19th century also comes a specific kind of self-awareness, one that recognizes that Europe is in a state of decline. Characteristic of the age is the strange experience of the fading of the force of problematicity itself, the unease at our lack of a focused, poignant experience of the human question.

This is where Nietzsche becomes important. It was Nietzsche, Patočka tells us, who expressed in the most profound fashion the consciousness of Europe in a moral crisis. Yet Patočka also shows a certain impatience with Nietzsche. Nietzsche's "titanic gesture of individuality" seems, Patočka tells us, "comical today", even if his "critique of progress and of the Enlightenment as crypto-nihilism remains valid." (*Heretical Essays,* 93). This may be true, but I would argue that there is still a challenge represented by Nietzsche that Patočka might have overlooked, and it has to do precisely with the question of nihilism.


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Photos: IWM

Nihilism is often described as a failure of faith, perhaps in the face of extreme hardship or social and political turmoil. But in Nietzsche's writings we also find the thought of nihilism as an insight and understanding. In the notebooks from the 1880's, nihilism is identified as the collapse of Christian morality, yet the collapse originates in the radicalization of an element that is essential to this morality, namely the demand for *truthfulness.* The Platonic-Christian demand for truthfulness does not simply insist that one not be lied to; it also demands that one should live wholly in and for the truth, as an inwardly established moral solidity of aim and purpose.

Truth, in other words, kills Christianity. But not after its first having been successful. This I think is essential to understanding Nietzsche: it is not enough to understand in what sense Christianity is a mistake, or an error; everything in one way or another is a mistake or an error for Nietzsche. The key is to understand what Christianity achieved, in order to understand the consequences of its collapse, or what must necessarily occur when, in our disciplined drive for revelation and insight, we discover its partiality, or its mendacity.

The collapse is not sudden, but occurs in stages, each of which in some sense is experienced as progress. This progressive purification is on the one hand what Nietzsche calls the greatest antidote to nihilism. The rigor and earnestness of the ascetic ideal embodied in Christianity and its post-religious forms gives human beings meaning. Yet on the other hand, mature nihilism threatens this very meaning. For *its* collapse is not the collapse of partiality, of a failed attempt at achieving the ideal, but rather represents the experience of the collapse of ideals as such. This is for Nietzsche the meaning of the 19th century: "the impracticality of one interpretation of the world [namely, the Christian]—one to which tremendous energies have been dedicated—arouses the suspicion that *all* interpretations might be false." (2 [127]).

The impracticality of the Christian interpretation of the world arouses the suspicion that all interpretations might be false, says Nietzsche

The key issue is the question of response. One is familiar: the affected respond in rage. One is ashamed, nauseated at oneself and at humanity, for having been lied to for all of these millennia about truth, about morality, about the good; so one lashes out, and thereby moves from the one extreme of absolute morality to the other extreme of absolute immorality. Nihilism, as the legacy of the 19th century, thus opens the way for that bizarre combination of utmost superficiality and a deep addiction to the *extreme* that is characteristic of the 20th century.

Yet Nietzsche glimpses another possibility, where extreme valuations *are no longer necessary.* "We can endure", as Nietzsche puts it in a notebook entry from this period, "a considerable *moderation* of that value" (117), that is, the value that would aim at a perspective on the whole.

This in turn lies at the crux of the relation between nihilism and the thought of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's thinking. The eternal recurrence is the thought that the lack of a goal is a permanent state; it is the thought that becoming itself is stamped eternally by the being of *nothing.* Again, response is everything. For those for whom the movement of life is unbearable, Nietzsche explains, this thought is a *curse;* it orchestrates an unbearable intensification of a problematicity that cannot be borne, only protested with blind rage. Yet for the moderate, for those who have *no need* for extreme measures, who are sure of their power and with that have a different perspective on the meaning of finality, the nothingness of nihilism does not negate the world but affirms their power. For in the end, after all, this is all about power.

The challenge of this thought for Patočka is twofold. First, it suggests that even though extreme responses are possible, they are perhaps not necessary; there is a response to the insight of nihilism that is more reserved than the destructive impulses of our devils. Second, it suggests that nihilism does not necessarily entail that step into the abyss of the 20th century, that we are ready, in other words, to be freed from the discipline of ideals for a life that embraces historicity without a guide, without a crutch.

Nietzsche says at one point in his notebooks from 1887–1888 that "one should never forgive Christianity for having destroyed men like Pascal." (11[55]) Christianity provided Pascal with the means for his own self-destruction, making the very possibility that he could "live quietly in his room" unbelievable, as if human existence could be anything but a disaster.

But perhaps what is so difficult about the thought of nihilism is finding a way to recognize in it the possibility that human existence is not a disaster. This would demand from us new habits of mind, new approaches to questioning, that run against the very grain of our thinking—a grain that weaves together those fateful spiritual paths of Socratism and Christianity. ◁

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Cosmopolitanism in the Landscape of Modernity

Monthly Lecture: Galin Tihanov, April 12

Photo: IWM

In his lecture, Galin Tihanov undertook a journey from political philosophy to political reality. Arguing for the importance of world literature, he established a link between the idea of cosmopolitanism and its possible perspectives in the age of globalization. For him, cosmopolitanism is an integral discursive practice which transgresses ideas of universalism, inter-/transnationalism and multiculturalism in its intrinsically pluralist, yet normative outlook. At its core lies the idea of a *demos* without a *polis,* perpetuated by reflexive acts of self-constitution and reconstruction. Its boundaries are set by the struggle for world peace as propounded in Kant's famous essay "Zum Ewigen Frieden". In world literature, cosmopolitanism developed through the broadening of perspectives that was instantiated by the rise of travel reports, that is, "cosmopolitische Wanderungen". This not only transcended the previously unquestioned world of borders, it also laid the ground for a revision of the Eurocentric cultural model. The 20th century authoritarian backlash associated with nationalism and its philosophers—namely, cosmopolitanism's strictest opponent, Carl Schmitt, and his ideas of "competitive pluralism"—was a major blow to the cosmopolitan idea. Cosmopolitanism, in an often anti-Semitic guise, was caricatured as an "internationalist" ideology reeking of Soviet communism. Yet, it subsisted as an experimental, open-ended process, just like the legacy of the Enlightenment has survived until today. This paves the way for Tihanov's "moderately critical" assessment of the potentials of cosmopolitanism in today's world: it is possible to claim its heritage as a discursive practice that traces and reflects upon the recalibrating processes of the *polis.* But at the same time, such a normative perspective is threatened by the commodification of difference in light of the growing dominion of global capital and its intrinsically economic process of globalization. ◁

Elmar Flatschart

Galin Tihanov is Professor of Comparative Literature and Intellectual History and Co-Director of the Research Institute for Cosmopolitan Cultures at the Unversity of Manchester. His new book *A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and Beyond* is forthcoming.

Georgiens Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert

Politischer Salon mit **Gabriela von Habsburg,** 12. Mai

Photo: IWM

Es ist wichtig, das Augenmerk überhaupt auf Georgien zu lenken, es hier bekannter zu machen, speziell jetzt, da überall auf der Welt extrem spannende Entwicklungen stattfinden." Gabriela von Habsburg, seit eineinhalb Jahren Botschafterin Georgiens in Deutschland, sieht „ihr" Land vor zwei wichtigen Herausforderungen: „Erstens die klare Positionierung, wo Georgien in Europa steht, also eine Annäherung und Mitgliedschaft in der EU, zweitens die Mitgliedschaft in der Nato. Wir wissen, dass das eine Weile dauert, aber wird sind gewillt, die Schritte alle zu gehen." Habsburg ist auf untypischem Weg zu ihrem Posten als Diplomatin gekommen: „Mein anderer Beruf, nämlich die Kunst, hat mich dorthin gebracht." Die Tochter Otto von Habsburgs, Kaiser-Enkelin, ist in Bayern aufgewachsen und Bildhauerin. Sie macht monumentale Skulpturen aus Edelstahl. Nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs hatte sie Ausstellungen im Osten, seit Ende der 90er-Jahre eine Professur an der staatlichen Kunstakademie in Tiflis. „Georgien hat mich unendlich begeistert, es ist ein ureuropäisches, urchristliches Land." Nach der Rosenrevolution 2003 machte Habsburg mit ihren Studenten ein Rosendenkmal – „zur Einweihung kam der Präsident und hat mir einen Pass verliehen. Das war für mich eine große Ehre und Überraschung." Die Staatsbürgerschaft erleichterte die Sache, als Präsident Saakaschwili Habsburg Ende 2009 fragte, ob sie Georgien in Deutschland vertreten würde. (…) Georgien sei inzwischen auf dem besten Weg zu einer stabilen, ausgewogenen Demokratie. „Wir haben gerade eine große Verfassungsreform gemacht, sind bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung unter den Ländern in der Region führend, haben ein gutes Rating in ‚doing business'." Mit der EU sei ein Visumerleichterungsabkommen unterzeichnet worden. „Alles umzusetzen, braucht einfach seine Zeit." Zudem leide Georgien noch unter den Folgen des Krieges mit Russland im Sommer 2008. „Tatsächlich sind 20 Prozent unseres Landes von Russland besetzt. Eine halbe Million Flüchtlinge aus diesen Gebieten sind eine Riesenbelastung." ◁

Eva Male, ***Die Presse,*** *12. 5. 2011*

Gabriela von Habsburg ist Botschafterin Georgiens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Moderation:

Timothy Snyder, Professor für osteuropäische Geschichte, Universität Yale; Permanent Fellow, IWM

Christian Ultsch, Ressortleiter Außenpolitik, *Die Presse*

In Kooperation mit Die Presse

As If I Am Not There

Film presentation with **Slavenka Drakulic,** April 27

Photo: IWM

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As If I Am Not There" is a story of a young woman from Sarajevo whose life is shattered the day a young soldier walks into her apartment and tells her to pack her things. Rounded up with the other women from the village and imprisoned in a warehouse in a remote region of Bosnia throughout the war, she quickly learns the rules of camp life. When she is picked out to "entertain" the soldiers, the real nightmare begins. Stripped of everything she has ever had and facing the constant threat of death, she struggles against the hatred she sees around her. In a final act of courage or madness, she decides to make one last stand: to dare to be herself. And this simple act saves her life. It is when she realizes that surviving means more than staying alive that she has to make a decision which will change her life forever. The film, shown at the IWM for the very first time in Austria, is based on Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulic's book of the same title, which covers the war crime hearings at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague. In a discussion after the screening, Drakulic pointed out that rape was acknowledged as war crime only in 2008, and that only recently have abused women been recognized as prisoners of war in the former Yugoslavia. Prior to this, it really seemed as if all those women had not been there. Irish Oscar-nominated director Juanita Wilson has made them visible once again. ◁

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Slavenka Drakulic is a writer, journalist and former Visiting Fellow of the IWM. Her book *Als gäbe es mich nicht* was partly written during her stay at the Institute and was published in German by Aufbau Verlag.

In cooperation with Eurozine
More about the movie at www.asifiamnotthere.ie

The Global City and the National State

Book presentation with **Saskia Sassen** in Sofia, May 12

American sociologist Saskia Sassen is not only a profound expert on the ongoing process of globalization, she herself is somehow globalized. She holds lectures, gives presentations and takes part in conferences all over the world. On the occasion of the presentation of the Bulgarian edition of her book *The Global City,* she visited Sofia to discuss today's changing geopolitical landscape with translator and IWM Alumna Elitza Stanoeva. Sassen traced back her research interests and observed a shift "from the center to the edges"—that is, from the global city to the issues of "territory, authority and rights". One of her key questions is: where does the nation-state end and globalization begin? In the globalized world the role and scope of the nation-state has changed significantly. In her talk, Sassen gave some examples. On the one hand, "national economies" are hard to identify nowadays given the great divergence of incomes within their borders; on the other, "the global" is short of legal regulations. There are hardly any global laws that intervene in national sovereignty and there is no such legal persona as a "global firm". The dilemma of the global vs. the national became obvious in the recent financial crisis. The bailouts of national banks are no evidence of the revival of the nation-state, Sassen emphasized, but rather can be seen as an example of how national governments use national taxpayers' money to rescue a global financial system. ◁

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Saskia Sassen is Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, New York, and a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the IWM. She is the author of numerous books, most recently *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages.*

Elitza Stanoeva is a Bulgarian historian and translator. In 2010 she was a Paul Celan Fellow at the IWM where she translated Saskia Sassen's book *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* from English into Bulgarian.

More on IWM's Paul Celan translation program at: www.iwm.at/fellowships

Religion and the Modern State: Reflections on Indian History

Monthly Lecture: Sudipta Kaviraj, May 24

Photo: IWM

Globalization and immigration have led to a massive increase of religious diversity in Europe. Yet what is new for the "Old Continent" has a very long tradition on the Indian subcontinent: a pluralism of different religious and spiritual beliefs. To prove this point, Sudipta Kaviraj undertook a detailed description of the long-standing interaction of religions in India, recounting four crucial historical episodes: the first instance of religious diversity in India between Hinduism and Buddhism; the arrival of Islam; the emergence of the modern Indian state; and India's approach to secularism today. Kaviraj pointed out that the relationship of religions is different in India than in Europe. Religious structures are not as doctrinaire as they are in Christianity; rather, there is a libertarian practice of religious beliefs, which often appear remarkably similar. For example, both Indian Islam and Hinduism stress limitations to the powers of the political sovereign. Moreover, the Indian state has been confronted with religious diversity since the medieval period. This has generated tolerance towards others' beliefs and fostered the view that the viability of the state depends on its treatment of internal diversity. Indian secularism does not reject religious life but respects all faiths equally and offers minorities collective rights to preserve their cultural forms and beliefs. India has imitated several principles of modern Western state-building, Kaviraj concluded; yet the success of the modern Indian state also owes a great deal to its management of religious diversity. ◁

Frank Epple

Sudipta Kaviraj is Head of the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures Department at Columbia University, New York, and Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

The Transformation of Society

Junior Visiting Fellows' Conference, June 16

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

At the end of each semester, the Junior Visiting Fellows present and discuss the results of their research at the Institute. The conference held on June 16 dealt with societal change in theory and practice. On the one hand, the papers offered critical readings of social structures and historical experiences in dictatorial, colonial, and democratic societies. On the other, they analysed and tried to refine the concepts of critical theory in order to foster a better understanding of social transformation and gender relations.

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Program

Panel 1:
Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Societies
Chair: **Natalia Palisheva**

Olena Palko
The Bolshevik Party with a National Face: Being Ukrainian Among Communists
Discussant: **Lina Klymenko**

Yulia Arskaya
The Deconstruction of Totalitarianism in Russian and German Postmodernist Literature
Discussant: **Marian Madela**

Panel 2:
Comparative Perspectives on Social Transformation
Chair: **Elmar Flatschart**

Natalia Palisheva
The Influence of the Global Context on the Perception of the Sources of Social Inequality: The Example of Political Transformation in Colonial India
Discussant: **Gerald Zachar**

Petr Kuznetsov
The Discursive-Symbolic Social Stratification of the Russian and Austrian Society
Discussant: **Marta Bucholc**

Panel 3:
Critical Social Theory
Chair: **Yulia Arskaya**

Elmar Flatschart
Critical Realism and the Critical Theory of Society: Between Scientism and Historicism
Discussant: **Louise Thiel**

Marta Bucholc
Gender Relations in Norbert Elias's Sociological Theory
Discussant: **Mieke Verloo**

Nora Ruck
Beauty and the Genes? A Feminist Critique of Evolutionary Psychology
Discussant: **Mieke Verloo**

The proceedings of all conferences are available online at: www.iwm.at/jvf_conferences.htm

Moderate Secularism: A European Way

Monthly Lecture: Tariq Modood, June 21

Photo: IWM

Secularism in the West is not a monolithic bloc. Just as there are different religions, there are also different secularisms. France is strongly committed to a concept of secular society named *laïcité,* which signifies the strict separation of state and religion, whereas the US favors an approach the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has described as the "diversity model": the support of all religions through the state. However, as Tariq Modood explained in his lecture, there is also a third way, one he called "moderate secularism." By this he means the relative autonomy of religion and the state, along with some degree of mutual support and influence. According to Modood, this is the most common model in Europe. Yet the increasing presence of other faiths, especially Islam, has created a controversy over whether this liberal model is still suitable. Some politicians, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, favor a re-Christianization of secularism, with Christian values acting as a kind of "defining culture". Others call for a radicalization of secularism, i.e. the total exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Again, Modood suggested a third way, namely the "multiculturalization" of moderate secularism. Multiculturalization means, on the one hand, the transformation of tolerance into interest in and cooperation between different forms of beliefs. On the other hand, it means that representatives of religions create a platform of common ideas and values in order to see where consensus can be reached. Since there are many forms of secularism, however, the question remains whether a multiculturalized version will take hold. ◁

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See also Modood's contribution on page 8.

Tariq Modood is Director of the Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at Bristol University and Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Wiederkehr der Dinge. Zur Aktualität des Fetischbegriffs

Konferenz, 30. Juni–1. Juli


Monique David-Ménard


Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky


Christine Weder


Falko Schmieder


Penelope Deutscher

Photos: IWM

Die Rede vom Eigenleben, von der Macht und Kraft der Dinge ist signifikant in die Diskurse zurückgekehrt. Während ideologiekritische und sozialkonstruktivistische Zugänge versuchten, den Dingen den Schein ihrer Selbstständigkeit zu nehmen, wird nun in den aktuellen Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften der Fetisch als Schlüsselbegriff herangezogen, um das Verhältnis zwischen Menschen und Dingen zu fassen. Die Konferenz nahm diese „Dingkonjunktur" zum Anlass, den Fetischbegriff historisch und systematisch zu befragen. Daher stand in den einzelnen Beiträgen aus Ethnologie und Philosophie, Psychoanalyse und Medientheorie, Kunsttheorie, Ökonomiekritik und Gesellschaftsanalyse nicht die Beschreibung von Dingen als Fetische im Zentrum. Vielmehr ging es um Fragen, die der jeweilige Fetischbegriff einer Disziplin aufwirft, und die das Projekt der Moderne anhand unserer Beziehung zu den Dingen vielfach zur Debatte stellen. Die einzelnen Vorträge erkundeten Orte des Numinosen und Wunderbaren in einer säkularisierten Welt; demontierten traditionelle Konzepte verfügender Subjektivität und technischer Instrumentalität in Bezug auf die Dinge; thematisierten das Verhältnis von Souveränität und Kontrollverlust; stellten die Frage danach, was der Mensch ist und was ihn von nicht-menschlichen Wesen unterscheidet; und verhandelten letztlich das Verhältnis von Konstruktion und Realität, Glauben und Wissen. ◁

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Lesen Sie dazu auch Christine Blättlers Beitrag auf Seite 20.

Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer:

Christine Blättler, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel; IWM

Michael Cuntz, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Monique David-Ménard, Centre d'études du vivant, Université Paris VII Denis Diderot

Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Penelope Deutscher, Northwestern University, Evanston

Adi Efal, Tel Aviv University; Universität zu Köln

Stefan Eisenhofer, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Staatliches Museum für Völkerkunde München

Christoph Engemann, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar

Stephan Grigat, Wien

Hans-Peter Krüger, Universität Potsdam

Gerhard Scheit, Universität Wien

Falko Schmieder, Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung Berlin

Detlev Schöttker, Universität Dresden

Christine Weder, Universität Basel

Die Konferenz fand statt im Rahmen des vom österreichischen Wissenschaftsfonds FWF (P22828-G15) unterstützen Projekts „Die Phantasmagorie als Brennpunkt der Moderne"

Neue Reihe

Ist der Wohlfahrtsstaat am Ende? Schon länger werden sozialstaatliche Leistungen gekürzt, doch mit der Finanz- und Eurokrise scheint sich der Sozialabbau nochmals zu beschleunigen. Doch wenn der Staat die Aufgaben der Lebensführung nicht mehr übernehmen kann, wer dann? Lässt sich Sorgearbeit privatisieren? Wer kann sich das leisten? Eine neue Vortragsreihe beleuchtet, welche Folgen der Niedergang des wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Modells für das Leben des Einzelnen und das gute Leben der Gesellschaft als Ganzer hat – und welche Auswege es gäbe.

Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben

Cornelia Klinger
Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben
27. September 2011

Erna Appelt
Betreuung und Pflege in fragmentierten Gesellschaften
3. November 2011

Birgit Pfau-Effinger
Vermarktlichung, Konsumentenprinzip und „freie Wahl" – Lösung der Probleme von Care?
6. Dezember 2011

Brigitte Aulenbacher
Rationell für sich und andere sorgen – geht das?
28. Februar 2012

Eva Senghaas-Knobloch
Ökonomisierung der Sorgearbeit – fürsorgliche Praxis. Konflikte um nachhaltige Gesellschaftsentwicklung
13. März 2012

Stefanie Janczyk
Arbeit und Leben: Eine spannungsreiche Ko-Konstitution.
17. April 2012

In Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt

Media and Democracy: a Historical Perspective

Political Salon with **Marc F. Plattner,** June 22


Photo: IWM

The current communications revolution is frequently viewed not only as spelling the demise of print media, but also as eroding standards of journalistic professionalism. According to Marc Plattner, however, it would be rash to conclude that these trends are destined to continue. Looking at the *longue durée* of the relationship between democracy and the media, he called attention to the complex pattern of shifts and reversals in the development of the media sector ever since the idea of a free press took root during the Enlightenment. Thus, newspapers tied to particular political parties and social institutions used to be very common until the latter half of the 20th century, which saw the apogée of the liberal model of an independent and politically neutral press. From a historical perspective, the increasing fragmentation of the public and the emergence of more narrow and specialised audiences can therefore be seen as a return to a more partisan media landscape marked by external pluralism among newspapers and broadcasting companies rather than internal pluralism within each one of them. In Plattner's view, this in itself may not be quite as alarming as some media pundits are inclined to think. Nevertheless, the dangers inherent in the rapid and largely unregulated growth of new media are very real to the extent that these channels of communication tend to confirm people's prejudices rather than giving them food for thought. Plattner's historical *tour d'horizon* should not lead us to underestimate those dangers, but rather help us to put them into perspective. Certainly, he is right to caution against the sweeping assumption that the rise of bloggers and "citizen journalists" is tantamount to the end of history. ◁

Manuel Tröster

See also Plattner's contribution on page 23.

Marc F. Plattner is founding Co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy* and Vice-President for research and studies at the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Chairs:

Ivan Krastev, Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and Permanent Fellow, IWM

Norbert Mayer, Editor for Culture, *Die Presse*

In cooperation with Die Presse

Sex After Socialism

BY IVAN BERNIK

Is there a post-socialist sexuality? Unlike the political and economic system, the sexual sphere has not undergone a process of radical transformation in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain, argues Slovenian sociologist Ivan Bernik. Sexuality escaped ideological control and therefore differed little from sexual behavior in the West.

Photo: Joachim F. Thurn / Deutsches Bundesarchiv / Wikipedia

Towards the end of millennium, European history was made in the eastern part of Europe, whereas western societies seemed surprisingly stable. Nevertheless, the concept of revolution, which was widely employed to describe and explain the transformations in the former socialist societies, was also used to grasp change in one particular sphere of western societies.

A number of prominent social theorists, such as Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, Volkmar Sigusch, and William Simon, have argued that these societies experienced a profound transformation in the social and cultural organization of sexuality, amounting to nothing less than a "neo-sexual revolution". In contrast to the revolutionary upheavals in the East, this transformation seemed limited to a marginal social sphere. Nevertheless, it deeply influenced the everyday experiences of the majority of people.

Different versions of the concept of a neo-sexual revolution have agreed that western sexuality rapidly became differentiated from other social spheres (epitomized by Bauman's concept of "free-floating" sexuality and Giddens's "pure relationship"), as well as internally. The latter development is manifested in the emergence of sexualities, i.e. a multitude of sexual lifestyles. These structural changes have enabled a high level of individualization of sexual preferences and sexual behaviour. The need to find one's way through a labyrinth of sexual options has led to a rationalization of sexual behaviour and its demystification.

Concepts of differentiation, individualization and rationalization have dominated the discussion of the neo-sexual revolution. However, they are far from novel and were already being used in classical sociological accounts of occidental modernization. Their application to the field of sexuality has not only suggested that sexuality has finally experienced full-fledged modernization, but also that the modernization of sexuality was delayed in comparison to other social spheres. The neo-sexual revolution therefore merely "synchronized" the transformation of sexuality with trends that already prevailed in other parts of society.

The bold claim that at the end of millennium western societies experienced a transformation of sexuality more radical then the "sexual revolution" of the 1960s has surprisingly little corroboration in surveys of sexual behaviour and attitudes. Survey findings indicate almost unanimously that the transformation of sexuality in the West in the last five decades has been gradual rather than revolutionary.

Moreover, while sexuality has been transformed deeply in some aspects (e.g. the sexual behaviour of women), in others it remains fairly constant (e.g. the high valuation of monogamy). From this perspective, discussions about the neo-sexual revolution have been free floating social theorizing rather than empirical accounts of change.

> *In socialism, sexuality established itself as a relatively autonomous social sphere*

Another peculiarity of discussions about the neo-sexual revolution has been a failure to extend the focus to Eastern European societies. The question whether post-socialist transformation also included the transformation of the social and cultural organization of sexuality, and whether it resembled transformations taking place in the West, has been neglected entirely. Had this question been asked, the answer to it would probably have been fairly straightforward.

For many social scientists, the collapse of the socialist regimes was the ultimate sign of the deep "civilizational incompetence" of socialist societies, an incompetence unconvincingly veiled by "fake modernity" (Piotr Sztompka). The inability of these societies to adapt to the conditions of modernity was felt even in the most "remote" social spheres, including sexuality. From this perspective, the prevailing patterns of sexual life inherited by post-socialist European societies from their historical predecessors were very different from those established in the West by the neo-sexual revolution. In other words, the modernization of post-socialist sexuality not only lagged behind the West, but also behind the modernization of most other social spheres.

The weakness of this explanation of (post-)socialist sexuality lies in its assumption that, due to the ambitions of rulers to organize society as "one huge factory and office", socialist societies were highly homogenous and petrified. It neglects the fact that these ambitions were far from being entirely accomplished.

This became obvious in the 1980s, when the "second society"—a clear sign of the complexity and dynamism of socialist societies—contributed to the destabilization of the socialist order. But many aspects of social life escaped political and ideological control much earlier, at least in Central European socialist societies. Among them was sexuality.

This is not to imply that sexuality was "free-floating", i.e. that the pace and direction of change in sexuality took place outside a wider social and cultural context. Conditioning circumstances ranged from the fact that "mature" European socialist societies were industrialized (which, among other things, meant rapid urbanization, rising educational levels, and growth of consumerist expectations), to policy measures related to social security and care, gender equality and family planning. The transformation of sexual morality was above all conditioned by the politically induced loss of influence of religious institutions. European socialist regimes contributed to the demise of restrictive sexual morality without being able or willing to impose their own alternative.

It can be argued, then, that in socialist societies structural conditions and policy measures together caused a gradual change in the social and cultural organization of sexuality, a change that was basically congruent with trends prevailing at the time in western societies. Nevertheless, there were also differences in the development in sexuality between the East and West. These differences are above all related to the fact that, in socialist societies, sexuality was never a prominent public topic and that barely any social movements existed advocating change in the field of sexuality.

This claim about the "western" character of socialist sexuality is corroborated by the results of surveys on sexual behaviour conducted in a number of socialist and post-socialist European societies (Starke and Weller in East Germany; Klavs as well as Bernik and Hlebec in Slovenia). Even research data from Soviet Russia suggests that changes in the sexual behaviour of Russians were similar to those in the West, but had a "less finite character and, because of political and ideological restrictions, took place largely 'undercover'" (Valeriy Chervyakov and Igor Kon). Surveys also indicate that the transformation of sexuality in western and (former) socialist societies differed not in the direction of change, but in its pace (Haavio-Mannila in Estonia; Schmidt et al. in East Germany).

Considering theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, it can be concluded that "socialist" sexuality did not embody "civilizational incompetence" or the petrifaction of socialist societies, but on the contrary was an expression of spontaneous social dynamism that could not be stifled by political and ideological surveillance.

This implies that, in socialism, sexuality had already established itself as a relatively autonomous social sphere. This, in turn, helps explain why the transformation of sexuality was not strongly related to post-socialist transformation. It also implies that no revolutionary change in the social and cultural organization of sexuality in post-socialist societies will take place in the foreseeable future, but only increasing differentiation, individualization and rationalization, with all the mixed blessings these processes bring. ◁

Ivan Bernik is Professor of Sociology at the University of Ljubljana and a member of the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences. He has recently given a seminar in the IWM series "Faces of Eastern Europe".

Serbia's Guilty Pleasures

BY VUKŠA VELIČKOVIĆ

Who's afraid of turbo? The notorious music genre that became synonymous with Serbia's nationalist regime of the 1990s has anything but disappeared, says the journalist and IWM Alumnus Vukša Veličković. Turbo-folk continues to play the role of both hero and villain—as Serbia's best known "brand" and as skeleton in its closet.

Photo: Nathan McClunie / iStockphoto

After several years of investigation, the Serbian authorities have issued an indictment against one of the country's biggest music stars—Svetlana Ražnatović, who performs under the name "Ceca". Charged with embezzling funds from a football club that she co-owned, and for illegal possession of firearms, the singer initially faced a sentence of up to 15 years in prison, but managed to strike a deal with the prosecution to repay parts of the sum under conditions of house arrest.

Many see Ceca's indictment as a symbolic end to the era of "turbo-folk"—the infamous musical culture that provided the soundtrack to Serbia's criminal-nationalist establishment of the 1990s. Ceca was the iconic figure of this movement, and her nationally-broadcast wedding to the Serbian paramilitary leader Zeljko "Arkan" Ražnatović in 1995 became cemented as a literal example of the metaphorical marriage between Serbian pop culture and crime during the Milošević era.

Turbo folk's reputation as the Serbian cultural menace *par excellence* is well-earned on multiple levels. Musically, it is viewed as an unattractive hybrid—a kitsch style created by the collision of Balkan folk and cheap Western dance beats, and further corrupted by what is seen as "oriental" flair. Turbo-folk's lyrical emphasis on sex, money and fame is also considered suspect—and held responsible for spreading "moral disease" throughout Serbian society. From a political perspective, it has been argued that the music is the sheer embodiment of the nationalist ideology of Milošević, as if created by his regime itself.

Fast forward a decade, however, and turbo-folk still holds a preeminent place on the Serbian cultural map, which seems largely unchanged.

While urban rock culture had not recovered from its 1990s limbo, turbo-folk has evolved, strengthened and expanded its dominance, suggesting that there might not be a direct link between it and the ideology of the Milošević regime. Would Serbian mass culture be unmistakably different today if, in the 1990s, its ruling elite had been democratic, civic and anti-nationalist? Would turbo-folk be no more?

There is reason to think not. The "turbo" element that came to dominate the already massively popular folk music in Serbia in the 1990s had more to do with globalization and MTV than with Serbia's political regime. Songs about quick romance and the fast life together with eroticized imagery can hardly be isolated from wider post-communist and, indeed, global phenomena. While the regime did indeed ostentatiously promote turbo-folk in the state-controlled mass media, both as escapism and for whipping up nationalist euphoria, it is unclear whether there was anything inherent in turbo-folk culture itself that appealed exclusively to nationalist or authoritarian sentiments.

Turbo-folk still holds a preeminent place on the Serbian cultural map

In fact, if Milošević's regime did manipulate the public through turbo-folk, it was at the same time manipulating turbo-folk itself. The fusion of culture and power in Serbia in the 1990s was achieved through merging politics and entertainment into a seamless whole. Ultimately, it was not so much that folk superstars embodied certain politics, but that nationalist politicians became superstars in the way folk singers were.

Chat shows on Serbian television at the time would often consist of a popular actor or actress, a couple of turbo-folk singers and a regime politician. In one notorious episode of the prime time show *Minimaksovizija* on TV Politika in 1991, the archetypal turbo-folk star Dragana Mirković sits bewildered next to Vojislav Šešelj—the leader of the then-emergent ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party. Much to the amusement of the studio audience, Šešelj tells an obscene joke about piercing a Croat's skull with a "bullet through the forehead". However, the joke achieves the desired effect only in the context and proximity of the show's complement of guests. Had it just been the politician alone "having a laugh", the stunt would remain an example of warmongering political rhetoric. However, in the presence of a popular folk singer, Šešelj's ultra-extremist discourse is both neutralized and legitimized, entering the terrain of entertainment: war and politics become part of the *estrada*.

Twenty years later, the armed conflicts and political repression of that era are no more. With Ratko Mladić in the Hague and Serbia on its way into the EU, Serbia's political landscape has instead been fully circumscribed by the larger world of mass entertainment, with its tabloids and "Big Brother" TV. The iconography of turbo-folk is swiftly spreading across local borders, to neighboring Croatia, a case not so much of switching sides as of shifting meanings in mass culture.

What critics of turbo-folk fail to acknowledge is that within this "corrupted" cultural concept there is space for asserting multiple—and often conflicting—ideas and practices. Analyzing the case of Bosnian Muslim turbo-folk star Sinan Sakić in the Belgrade newspaper *NIN* in 2006, journalist Zoran Ćirjaković reflected on the "orientalist" cultural discourse of today's liberal Serbia, emphasizing the complex and sometimes controversial roles that turbo-folk artists can maintain in different socio-political environments. Sakić is dismissed both by Serbian liberal circles and Bosnian Islamists—by the former for being too Oriental and Islamist, by the latter for being too liberal and essentially anti-Islamist. Describing the diversity of Sakić's audience at a concert in Belgrade's Tasmajdan park, Ćirjaković found in turbo-folk the expression of multi-ethnic and multicultural tolerance—the very same values to which Serbia's liberal elite aspires.

On the other hand, in her performance *This Is Contemporary Art,* staged in Vienna in 2001 (with singer Dragana Mirković in the leading role), Serbian artist Milica Tomić dislocated turbo-folk from its status as a local genre and placed it into the larger international art scene, stressing how the music "has paved a way for globalization to enter isolated and excluded Serbia." Renegotiating dominant cultural narratives, Tomić's performance drew on turbo-folk's potential for inter-cultural dialogue by providing a rare occasion for the Serbian diaspora in Vienna to "become visible in Austrian public life."

Yet turbo-folk's capacity for asserting disparate and "subversive" values is probably best captured by turbo-folk itself. Commenting in the daily tabloid *Kurir* on the violence during the Belgrade Gay Pride festival in 2010, Ceca's unofficial successor, Jelena Karleuša, surprised everyone by publicly denouncing the discourses of homophobia and Serbian nationalism. The fact that a turbo-folk star—and an icon for Serbia's transgender population, for that matter—wrote a series of articles infused with liberal and anti-nationalist ideas might come as a surprise, but Karleuša's subsequent appearance in a prime-time political talk show alongside members of the Serbian liberal elite turned her into everyone's favorite guilty pleasure. It further underpinned turbo-folk's peculiar position in Serbian culture today as simultaneously the dominant mainstream and its own subversion.

Over a decade since the political upheavals of 2000, the notorious musical genre that became synonymous with Serbia's nationalist regime has anything but disappeared. Turbo-folk continues to play the role of both hero and villain—it is the best-known Serbian "brand" and, at the same time, the skeleton in its closet. Typically labeled as a form of oriental backwardness, it is likewise regarded as a feature of westernization, trans-Balkanism and globalization. Seen through feminist spectacles, it bounces back as a transgender subversion. Defined as mainstream Serbian culture, it appears simultaneously as its obscene undertext, hidden in underground clubs virtually absent from the mass media.

The multiple layers of meaning inscribed in turbo-folk today require a re-evaluation of existing paradigms that regard it solely as the cultural embodiment of Serbian nationalism-authoritarianism. Its continuing vitality and, above all, alignment with the zeitgeist might not be entirely the fault of the now-deposed regime. Ceca may be under house arrest, but even before she struck her deal, a new league of celebrities and "erotic queens" had taken the stage to replace her. And the picture looks oddly familiar. One might think that Serbia is still living its turbo-folk. ◁

You can read this and many other contributions in the new Milena Jesenská Blog on the IWM website at www.iwm.at/jesenskablog

Vukša Veličković is a Serbian writer, journalist and cultural critic. He is Creative Director and Editor-in-Chief of *Bturn* magazine (www.bturn.com) and contributes frequently to *Prestup* magazine and B92.net. He is also a performing artist and the author of several novels. In 2008, he was a Milena Jesenská Fellow at the IWM.

Vom Simulakrum zum Fetisch

VON CHRISTINE BLÄTTLER

Ein Fetisch muss nicht unbedingt aus Lack und Leder sein. In den Kulturwissenschaften dient er dazu, das Verhältnis von Menschen und Dingen zu beschreiben. Dort hat der Begriff derzeit Konjunktur. Warum das so ist, erklärt die Philosophin und IWM Alumna Christine Blättler.

In den gegenwärtigen Geistes-, Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften wird der Fetisch als Schlüsselbegriff herangezogen, um das Verhältnis zwischen Menschen und Dingen zu fassen. Dieser Fokus mag erstaunen, sind doch Aufklärung und Wissenschaft einst angetreten, den Aberglauben auszutreiben. Und obwohl die Geisteraustreibung auch in postkolonialen Zeiten gerade aus den Geisteswissenschaften praktiziert wird, kehrt der Fetisch machtvoll in die aktuellen Diskurse zurück: eine Gesellschaft, welche die einseitige Rationalität sowie deren irrationale Kehrseite umfassend erfährt, beseelt die Dinge nicht nur im Alltag, sie animiert sie auch in der Wissenschaft und lädt sie im Namen eines neuen Materialismus mit Geist auf.

Liest man diese Konjunktur des Fetischbegriffs symptomatisch, lässt sich an ihr ein Paradigmenwechsel beobachten: der Fetisch verspricht, die Defizite von konstruktivistischen Ansätzen zu beheben. Diese Defizite verkörpert exemplarisch das Simulakrum, welches noch bis vor kurzem ebenfalls als Leitbegriff gehandelt wurde.

Heute wird das Simulakrum vornehmlich mit Jean Baudrillards Denken der Simulation verbunden: Simulakra bevölkern das Reich des Hyperrealen, medial konstruierte künstliche Welten, in denen es weder Ursprünge noch Realitäten von etwas gibt. Die vorherrschende Rezeption von Baudrillard hat die Ansätze von Gilles Deleuze und Pierre Klossowski in den Hintergrund treten lassen, die beide ihr Denken im Kraftfeld des Simulakrums entwickelt haben. Doch auch medientheoretisch ist der ontologische und epistemologische Kern nicht zu überhören: Realität gibt es nicht pur, ohne Zutun des Menschen, und deren Erkenntnis schon gar nicht. Anstatt dies zu beklagen, setzten die Denker der Simulation auf die menschliche Schaffenskraft.

Warum das Simulakrum nun ausgedient zu haben scheint, lässt sich an drei Punkten festmachen. 1. Konstruktion, die konstruktive Leistung eines tätigen Subjekts, sei diese bewusst oder unbewusst. 2. Körperlosigkeit, wie sie der von Michel Foucault so genannte Diskurs über die Stofflichkeit der körperlosen Dinge zum Ausdruck bringt. 3. In Frage gestellte Realität, die in einer Indifferenz von Realität und Fiktion kulminieren konnte. Gerade der Vorwurf des Antirealismus oder Hyperkonstruktivismus hatte dazu beigetragen, dass sich eine Abkehr vom Paradigma des Simulakrums abzeichnete.

Im Gegenzug ist ein neues bzw. erneutes Interesse an subjektunabhängigen Entitäten, unmittelbarer Körperlichkeit und fragloser Realität zu verzeichnen. Hier scheint sich der Fetisch als neue Leitfigur anzubieten: obwohl menschengemacht, beansprucht er eine subjektunabhängige Seinsweise, besitzt einen konkreten, direkt erfahrbaren Körper, und seine dingliche Realität ist unangefochten. Man hat wieder einen richtigen Untersuchungsgegenstand, nicht mehr verstellt, weder durch ein konstruierendes Subjekt noch eine entfremdete Gesellschaft. Ontologisch unabhängig und epistemologisch evident.



Photo: Romuald Hazoumè: Reconfiguring an African Icon. Odes to the Mask / rocor / Flickr

Eine Gesellschaft, welche die einseitige Rationalität sowie deren irrationale Kehrseite umfassend erfährt, beseelt die Dinge

Dabei gibt es durchaus Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen dem Konzept des Simulakrums und demjenigen des Fetischs. Worin sie sich treffen, ist erstens in der Absage an die Repräsentation, den Verweisungscharakter der Dinge und damit auch an eine Identitätsbeziehung zwischen Urbild und Abbild: das Simulakrum setzt auf den konstruktiven und differentiellen Anteil an der Welt, der Fetisch betont umgekehrt das sich selbst Manifestierende und Subjektunabhängige.

Die zweite Gemeinsamkeit liegt darin, dass beide Unverfügbarkeit affirmativ thematisieren. Das Simulakrum nutzt unbeherrschbare Phantasmen als Kräfte und wandelt sie künstlerisch um; es lässt ein Urbild epistemologisch nicht mehr über ein Abbild herrschen; schließlich entzieht es die ganze Realität dem Zugriff. Unverfügbarkeit wird nun ebenfalls am Fetisch begrüßt, zuvorderst an der Macht der Dinge, deren Eigenleben, die sich einem normierenden oder zurichtenden, aber eben auch konstruierenden Subjekt widersetzen.

Gegenüber dem Simulakrum mit seinem freien Flottieren der Signifikanten werden diese beim Fetisch nicht nur metaphorisch, sondern genauso wörtlich dingfest gemacht. Denn im Fetisch sind exemplarisch Ding und Bedeutung, Körper und Sinn, Signifikant und Signifikat untrennbar miteinander verbunden – der Fetisch auch hier als ein „Klebstoff" (Hartmut Böhme), allerdings epistemologisch gewendet in dem Sinne, dass er auch gegenüber einem Kollektiv Ding und Bedeutung zusammenhält.

Wenn der Fetischbegriff in der Beziehung zwischen Menschen und Dingen bzw. Menschen unter sich die Defizite des Simulakrums zu beheben verspricht, ist dies insofern problematisch, als damit die folgenden Merkmale des Fetischs mitgetragen werden: heilig, unverfügbar, unmittelbar.

Heilig – der heutige Fetischbegriff knüpft an das ethnologische sakrale Objekt an; die Phänomene, auf die er zielt, sind allerdings profaner Natur: Objekte der wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung, technische Dinge oder Kunstwerke, aber auch Alltagsgegenstände wie Autos und Zigaretten.

Sie sollen etwas in Anschlag bringen, was Michel Leiris das „Heilige des Alltagslebens" nannte. Damit verweisen sie auf eine „eigentliche" magische Verfasstheit und Irrationalität des Menschen auch in der Moderne; Modernekritik wird entsprechend als Kritik an der Rationalisierung und Technisierung der Welt geübt. Darin äußert sich einmal ein geschichtsloses Verständnis – der Mensch ist auch in der Moderne genauso irrational wie immer schon. Zum anderen wird dabei vergessen, wie komplex die Moderne als spezifische Epoche ist und sie sich nicht auf „instrumentelle Vernunft" reduzieren lässt.

Unverfügbar – der Fetischbegriff bietet eine Alternative zu demjenigen Zugriff, der Objekte verdinglicht, über sie verfügt und sie beherrscht. Damit erfasst er affirmativ, was ein individuelles oder kollektives Subjekt übersteigt. Bei einem Amulett ist es die ihm zugeschriebene Kraft, beim Berliner Schlüssel seine Handlungsanleitung, die begrüßt wird.

Wenn die Erfahrung des alltäglichen Heiligen dadurch charakterisiert ist, dass es um eine spezifisch ambivalente Erfahrung geht, kann dies als Faszination nachvollzogen werden, wie im ästhetischen oder erotischen Kontrollverlust. Die Erfahrung von Ohnmacht ist etwas anderes, zudem werden hier Größenunterschiede sehr wohl relevant; die von Bruno Latour vertretene nur quantitative Differenz zwischen einem Schlüssel und einem Atomkraftwerk markiert auch eine qualitative Differenz, wie sich gerade an der Frage der Unverfügbarkeit erweist.

Unmittelbar – wenn der Prozess von Herstellung, Objektivierung und Verselbständigung von Dingen nicht mehr als dynamischer Zusammenhang reflektiert wird, sind wir bei dem, was Marx mit dem ökonomischen Fetisch zu kritisieren suchte: etwas Gemachtes gibt vor, natürlich zu sein. Der Vermittlungsprozess mit dem konstitutiven Anteil seitens individueller oder kollektiver Subjekte entfällt.

Nicht zu unterschätzen ist, dass auch mit dem affirmativen Fetisch eine Art Kapitalismuskritik getätigt und gerade damit nach einer ökonomischen Alternative gesucht wird: die abstrakte Wertform, auf die sich das Simulakrum noch bezog, wird verabschiedet, denn der Fetisch hat nicht nur in der Welt des verfügenden Gebrauchs, sondern auch in der profanen Welt des Tausches keinen Ort.

Mit den drei Merkmalen lässt sich der Fetisch vor allem als Symptom verstehen: seine Konjunktur und Verwendungsweise zeigt offenbar kollektive Wünsche und Ängste an, die ernst zu nehmen sind. Sie in ihrer Komplexität zu analysieren und differenziert auf den Begriff zu bringen, vermag der Fetisch nicht. Doch seine Wiederkehr als Zeitgeist weist auf signifikante Probleme hin, die es auch theoretisch zu erfassen gilt. ◁

Christine Blättler ist Professorin für Wissenschaftsphilosophie an der Universität Kiel und war von 2009 bis 2011 Visiting Fellow am IWM.

Fellows and Guests *04–08 2011*

Clemena Antonova
Lise Meitner Fellow
(June 2011–May 2013)

Lecturer in Art History and Theory, American University in Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad; FWF project leader

Pavel Florensky and the Nature of Russian Religious Philosophy

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Vladimir Arsenijević
Milena Jesenská Fellow
(January–April 2011)

Writer and columnist, Croatian weekly *Novosti* and Serbian web magazine *Pescanik*

Between a Rock and a Hard Place—the Ever-Changing Face of Europe

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Yulia Arskaya
Alexander Herzen Fellow
(January–June 2011)

Assistant Professor of Russian Language and Linguistics, Irkutsk State University

The Understanding of Totalitarianism in Russian and German Postmodern Literature

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Rajeev Bhargava
Visiting Fellow
(June–November 2011)

Director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

Forms of Political Secularity Before Modern Indian Secularism

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Jadwiga Biskupska
Józef Tischner Junior Fellow
(July–December 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in History, Yale University

A Nation Undone: Nazi Policy and the Subjugation of Warsaw

Christine Blättler
Lise Meitner Fellow
(August 2009–July 2011)

Professor of Philosophy of Science, University of Kiel; FWF project leader

The Phantasmagoria as a Focus of Modernity: Genealogy and Function of a Philosophical Concept

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Ian Blaustein
Junior Visiting Fellow
(October 2010–April 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Autonomy, Conscience, and Self-Deception

Marta Bucholc
Bronisław Geremek Fellow
(September 2010–June 2011)

Academic Teacher of Sociology, University of Warsaw

Finding our Way Through Language. Weber and Wittgenstein on Politics and Science

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Elmar Flatschart
Junior Visiting Fellow
(March–August 2011)

Doktorand der Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien; ÖAW DOC-Stipendiat

Staatstheorie. Zur Kritik von Fetischismus und Abspaltung des Politischen

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Mila Ganeva
Guest (July 2011)

Professor of Germanic Studies, Miami University, Oxford / OH

Fashion Among the Ruins: the Politics of Distraction in Post-War Berlin

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Ludger Hagedorn
FWF Project Associate
(December 2010–November 2012)

Research Assistant in Philosophy, Södertörn University, Stockholm

Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka's Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

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Sudipta Kaviraj
Visiting Fellow
(May–August 2011)

Head of the Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures Department, Columbia University, New York

God and Modernity: Religious Imagination in Early Modern Bengal

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Marek Kornat
Visiting Fellow
(July–December 2011)

Professor of History of International Relations, Cardinal Wyszyński University, Warsaw

National States and Diplomacy in East-Central Europe in the Inter-War Period, 1918–1939

Pyotr Kuznetsov
Alexander Herzen Fellow
(January–June 2011)

Postgraduate student of Social Philosophy, Irkutsk State University

Features of Social Stratification of the Austrian and Russian Society: Discursive Symbolic Aspects

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Mladen Lazić
CAPITO Project Associate
(May 2011)

Professor of Sociology, University of Belgrade

Changing the Class Structure in Serbia, 1989–2010

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow
(March 2008–August 2011)

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Free University Berlin; FWF project leader

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in *Naturphilosophie* Around 1800

Aura Matei
CAPITO Project Associate
(March–May 2011)

Researcher at the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development Eleutheria, Bucharest

Romanian Capitalism: a Socio-Economic Perspective

Tariq Modood
Guest (June 2011)

Director of the Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, University of Bristol

Secularism and the Accommodation of Muslims in Western Europe

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Natalia Palisheva
Alexander Herzen Fellow
(January–June 2011)

Postgraduate student of History, Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University

The Influence of the Global Context on the Perception of the Sources of Social Inequality

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Olena Palko
Junior Visiting Fellow
(September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, National Academy of Sciences, Kiev

National Communism: an Attempt to Compare the Ukrainian and European Experience

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Mark Pickering
Junior Visiting Fellow
(September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Kant's Phenomenalism: Apriority, Necessity, and Psychologism in the *First Critique*

Stefan Popov
Visiting Fellow
(August–December 2011)

Executive Director, RiskMonitor Foundation, Sofia

Policy Metaphors, Policy Failures: Organized Crime, Anti-Corruption, and Good Governance

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Oleksiy Radynski
Milena Jesenská Fellow
(July–September 2011)

Editor-in-Chief of *Krytyka Polityczna,* Kiev

The End of Sports

Sandor Sajo
Paul Celan Fellow
(July–December 2011)

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest

Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Phénoménologie de la perception (French > Hungarian)

Marci Shore
Visiting Fellow
(May–August 2011)

Associate Professor of History, Yale University

The Self Laid Bare: Phenomenology, Structuralism, and Other Cosmopolitan Encounters

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Sławomir Sierakowski
Milena Jesenská Fellow
(April–June 2011)

Editor-in-Chief of *Krytyka Polityczna,* Warsaw

From "Antipolitics" to "Postpolitics" in the "New Europe"

Martina Steer
Guest (June 2011)

Gastprofessorin für Geschichte, Universität Wien

Erinnerung transnational. Die Moses Mendelssohn Jubiläen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert

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Ksenia Timofeeva
Paul Celan Fellow
(July–September 2011)

Freelance translator, St. Petersburg

Hans Joas: Die Entstehung der Werte (German > Russian)

Sarah Tobin
Junior Visiting Fellow
(September 2010–June 2011)

Ph.D. candidate in Anthropology, Boston University

Is It *Really* Islamic? Piousness and Religious Life in Amman, Jordan

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Daniel Treisman
Visiting Fellow
(September 2010–June 2011)

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Economics and Public Opinion in Russia During and After the Crisis

Varia

Career

Christine Blättler, a Visiting Fellow at the IWM until July this year, has been appointed Professor of Philosophy of Science at the Christian-Albrechts University, Kiel.

One step further on the academic career ladder is also **Susanne Lettow.** She was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM from March 2008 to August 2011 and has been appointed Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the Free University, Berlin. We wish both of them all the best in their new positions.

Goodbye

We say goodbye to **Marie-Thérèse Porzer,** who has been in charge of event management at the IWM for the last two-and-a-half years, and who was also assistant to the managing director Susanne Fröschl and, since 2010, to the rector. She was responsible for most of the major events of the IWM, about which you can read more in this issue. We would like to thank her for doing a great job and are pleased that she will remain closely connected to the Institute, since she got married to **Sven Hartwig** from Public Relations in September.

Our colleague **Claudia Zimmer** is also leaving the IWM. She has served as Office Manager at the Institute since 2006 and has taken care of all issues concerning departmental administration and maintenance. With her great knowledge of office procedures, people skills and enthusiasm she was a major asset to the team. We wish her all the best for her future.

Hello

Hello to our new interns **Matthias Beyer** and **Michael Windisch!** Matthias is studying philosophy at the University of Koblenz and joins the IWM from August to September. After that he will resume his studies at Charles University, Prague. Michael began his internship in September and is enrolled in philosophy at the University of Vienna. Their predecessor **Frank Epple** will continue to work at the Institute as receptionist and assistant to the staff while finishing his diploma thesis in philosophy at the University of Vienna.

As Personal Assistant to the Rector, **Sabrina Krzyszka** is now taking care of Professor Michalski's agenda. Prior to her new job at the IWM, she was Personal Assistant to the former German presidential candidate Gesine Schwan in Berlin. She moved to Vienna with her partner and daughter in August this year; we are very happy to welcome her to the Institute.

We also warmly welcome **Renée Gadsden** and **Leonard Novy,** who will both join the team in October. Renée grew up in New York City and is a freelance art historian, artist and curator. In addition to having been a moderator at the Austrian radio station FM4, she was also an assistant professor at Vienna's University of Applied Arts. At the IWM, she will support the reception and other areas of the Institute's administration.

Leonard will be the new Director of Research and Development at the IWM. He studied history and politics at Humboldt University Berlin, Cambridge and Harvard. After graduation he worked as project manager at Bertelsmann Foundation. We are pleased to have Renée and Leonard on board!

Welcome back

Luise Wascher is back from maternity leave and will be responsible for the event management at the IWM. Together with her colleague **Sabrina Krzyszka** she will take care of debates and conferences at the Institute.

IWM Publications

Photo: Anna Jermolaewa

Transit 41 (Sommer 2011), **Kunst und Politik / Klimapolitik / Zukunft des Journalismus**
Mitherausgeberin: Cornelia Klinger

Die Beiträge zu „Kunst und Politik" fragen nach dem Ort und der Funktion der Kunst heute. Was bleibt vom auratischen, einzigartigen und utopischen Charakter des Kunstwerks im Zeitalter von Massenproduktion und -konsumption? Wie unterscheiden sich heute die zweckfreien Kunstwerke von anderen, nämlich zweckbezogenen ästhetischen Produkten, von Design, Werbung, Unterhaltung? Was ist aus der Funktion von Kunst geworden, Avantgarde, Kritik oder ein Gegenentwurf zu sein? Und braucht eine Gesellschaft, die sich ganz und gar auf Zukunft hin orientiert und permanenter Innovation verschreibt, überhaupt noch Kunst als „Avantgarde"?

Mit Beiträgen von:
Uwe Hebekus, Daniel Hornuff, Andreas Huyssen, Cornelia Klinger, Verena Krieger, Bojana Pejic. Sowie Dipesh Chakrabarty, Peter Demetz, Klaus Dörre, Sebastian Oberthür, Thomas Schmid, Timothy Snyder, Paul Starr. Die Photographien stammen von Pipo Nguyen-duy

Transit 42 (Winter 2011/12), **Wohin geht Rußland?**
Mitherausgeber: Ivan Krastev

Stillstand oder Wandel? Das kommende Heft von *Transit* versucht eine Diagnose der gegenwärtigen politischen und sozialen Situation Russlands.

Ivan Krastev
Totgesagte leben länger
Autokratie im Zeitalter der Unzufriedenheit

Stephen Holmes
Weder autoritär noch demokratisch

Die Politik der Alternativlosigkeit oder Wie Macht in Russland funktioniert
Ein Interview mit **Gleb Pavlovsky,** geführt von **Ivan Krastev** and **Tatiana Zhurzhenko**

Rossen Djagalov
Der Antipopulismus der postsowjetischen Intelligentsia

Vladislav L. Inozemtsev
Ist Russland modernisierbar?

Yekaterina Kuznetsova
Russland in die EU? Ja, nein oder vielleicht

Samuel A. Greene
Gesellschaft ohne Bürger

Anna Jermolaewa
Photoessay

Ilya Budraitskis
Staatsgewalt und „Extremismus" in Russland

Zakhar Prilepin
Denn sie wissen nicht, was sie tun

IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences

Vol. 30:
Anne Dwyer / Marta Bucholc (eds.)
Disappearing Realities. On the Cultural Consequences of Social Change

With contributions by:
Marta Bucholc, Anne Dwyer, Julia Hertlein, Jan Kühne, Olena Palko, Anastasia Platonova, Olga Tyapkina and Iryna Vushko

All volumes of the series are published online: www.iwm.at/jvf_conferences.htm

Milena Jesenská Blog

The Milena Jesenská Fellowship program, which is supported by the ERSTE Foundation, enables journalists to work on larger projects of European social, political or cultural relevance and thereby to strengthen investigative journalism and press freedom. The Milena Jesenská Blog provides a new platform for the works of these journalists and allows them to exchange their ideas and views with a wider public.

Recent contributions:

Oleksiy Radynski
Not a Single Word About Football

Mykola Riabchuk
Dichtung und Wahrheit

Cynthia L. Haven
"Invisible You Reign Over the Visible": Julia Hartwig's Reality Mysticism

Zsuzsa Balazs
Reclaiming Public Spaces

Ashley Ahearn
Military Zones Mean Boom for Biodiversity

Vukša Veličković
Serbia's Guilty Pleasures: Who's Afraid of Turbo?

Merlijn Schoonenboom
From Nymph to Playboy Bunny

More at www.iwm.at/jesenskablog

Publications of Fellows and Guests

Erika Abrams
Paul Celan Fellow in 2010

Jan Patočka, "La science philosophique de la nature chez Aristote" (extrait), in: *Les Études philosophiques,* July 2011/3

Clemena Antonova
Lise Meitner Fellow

Re-contextualizing Holy Images in Early Soviet Russia: Pavel Florensky's Response to Lenin's "Plan for Monumental Propaganda", in: Uwe Fleckner (ed.), *Der Sturm der Bilder,* Berlin: Schriften des Internationalen Warburg-Kollegs, 2011

Christine Blättler
Lise Meitner Fellow

Le lieu de la technique dans le politique. Un coup d'oeil sur l'ensemble technico-social, au cours du XIXe siècle, in: Philippe Mustière and Michel Fabre, *Jules Verne. Science, technique et société: de quoi sommes-nous responsables?,* Nantes: Coiffard Libraire Éditeur, 2011

Marta Bucholc
Bronisław Geremek Fellow

De la politique neotribale, in: *Sociétés. Revue des Sciences Humaines et Sociales,* 2/2011

Elmar Flatschart
Junior Visiting Fellow

Meso-Theorie des Staates ohne kategoriale Kritik? Rezensionsessay zur Jessop'schen Staatstheorie, in: EXIT!, 8 (2011)

Kleine Reflexion des Re-Thinking Marx Kongresses, in: EXIT!, 8 (2011)

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow

Bio-Technosciences in Philosophy: Challenges and Perspectives for Gender Studies in Philosophy (in Chinese), in: *Diogenes* (China), 53/1 (2011)

Krzysztof Michalski
Rector

The Flame of Eternity: An Interpretation of Nietzsche's Thought, Princeton University Press, forthcoming



© Princeton University Press

The Flame of Eternity provides a new interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy and his concepts of eternity and time to which his reflections on human life are inextricably linked to. Nietzsche argues that humanity has long regarded the impermanence of our life as an illness in need of curing. It is this "pathology" that Nietzsche called nihilism. Arguing that this insight lies at the core of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, Michalski maintains that many of Nietzsche's main ideas take on new meaning and significance when viewed through the prism of eternity.

Dragan Prole
Paul Celan Fellow in 2010

Stranost bića, (Die Fremdheit des Seins), Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2010.

Humanost stranog čoveka, (Die Humanität des fremden Menschen), Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2011

Oleksiy Radynski
Milena Jesenská Fellow

Alterzionism: Backwards to Red Zion, in: Sebastian Cichocki and Galit Eilat (eds.), *Cookbook for Political Imagination. An Official Catalogue of the Exhibition "…and Europe will be stunned" for the Polish Pavilion at the 54th Biennale of Art in Venice.* Warsaw / Berlin: Zachęta National Gallery of Art / Sternberg Press, 2011

Julia Riegler
Nora Ruck
Junior Visiting Fellows

Dressur des Körpers und Widerstand des Leibes?, in: Maria K. Wiedlack und Katrin Lasthofer (Hrsg.), *Körperregime und Geschlecht,* Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2011

Timothy Snyder
Permanent Fellow

Bloodlands. Europa zwischen Hitler und Stalin, München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2011

© Verlag C.H. Beck

Timothy Snyder erzählt in seinem Buch drei miteinander verknüpfte Geschichten – Stalins Terrorkampagnen, Hitlers Holocaust und den Hungerkrieg gegen die Kriegsgefangenen und die nichtjüdische Bevölkerung – wie sie sich zur gleichen Zeit und im gleichen Gebiet zugetragen haben: in den „Bloodlands", zwischen Russland und Deutschland.

Snyders Buch, das inzwischen in viele Sprachen übersetzt wurde, eröffnet einen anderen Blick auf die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Nicht nur unser Bild vom Holocaust erweist sich als unvollständig und westlich verzerrt. Auch die Geschichte Europas gewinnt ein verlorenes Terrain im Osten zurück: die gemeinsame Erinnerung an 14 Millionen Tote und die größte Katastrophe der modernen Geschichte.

Am 20. Oktober um 18:00 Uhr präsentiert Timothy Snyder ***Bloodlands*** *am IWM und diskutiert über sein Buch mit der Wiener Historikerin Sybille Steinbacher.*

Steve Sem-Sandberg
Milena Jesenská Fellow in 2008

Die Elenden von Łódź, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 2011

© Klett-Cotta Verlag

Die Elenden von Łódź ist ein Buch über Macht und Machtlosigkeit. Im Rückgriff auf die Chronik, die die Bewohner des Gettos von Łódź von 1941 bis kurz vor ihrer Deportation nach Auschwitz 1944 verfassten, hat der schwedische Schriftsteller Steve Sem-Sandberg einen vielstimmigen Roman geschrieben, der neben der zentralen Figur des Judenältesten Rumkowski das Leben zahlreicher Gettobewohner porträtiert und ihnen so ein Gesicht gibt. Das Buch ist nun auch auf Deutsch erschienen.

Über ***Die Elenden von Łódź*** *spricht Steve Sem-Sandberg mit dem Schriftsteller Martin Pollack am 24. Oktober um 19:00 Uhr in der Hauptbücherei Wien. Ulrich Matthes liest ausgewählte Passagen.*

Changing Media, Changing Democracy

BY MARC F. PLATTNER

We are living in the midst of a communications revolution. YouTube, Twitter and "citizen journalism" have outrun newspapers, radio and television as sources of first-hand information. How does this affect democracy? At a "Political Salon", hosted by Die Presse and the IWM, political analyst Marc F. Plattner surveyed the ever-changing relationship between democracy and the media.

Photo: Susan Lesch / Wikipedia

Over the past couple of decades there have been breathtaking advances in communications technologies and in the ways of applying them—a few short years ago no one could have foreseen the explosive growth of Facebook or Twitter. What is more, these kinds of innovations seem to be continuing at an accelerating pace. Clearly, these advances have added effective new tools to the arsenal of people challenging authoritarian rule, though they also are being used by their oppressors.

The new technologies are having an impact on the politics of democratic countries as well, notably on political campaigning and fundraising. Above all, they are affecting the way in which public opinion is formed and transmitted. The growing popularity of online media is largely responsible for the decline in the readership and the profitability of newspapers.

It would be rash at this point to predict the demise of the newspaper; indeed, it would be folly to presume to know along what path emerging communications technologies will take the media in the years ahead. But precisely because the future is so uncertain, it is an especially appropriate moment to engage in broader reflections about the relationship between democracy and the media.

Democracy was born in the cities of ancient Greece, where there were no media in our sense of the word. Political discussion and debate in the Greek *polis* were carried out face to face in the popular assembly, which both made the laws and decided on all questions of public policy, including issues of war and peace. In part because democracy was understood as requiring the citizen body to be able to assemble and to deliberate, this form of government was long considered feasible only in city-states.

As late as the middle of the eighteenth century, such eminent political thinkers as Montesquieu and Rousseau contended that only very small polities could function as democracies.

Modern democracy, by contrast, was based on the new principle of "the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election" (*Federalist* 9). Representative democracy was born in the era of print media. The term "media" itself, of course, did not come into use until much later. For centuries people spoke instead of "the press", using a term describing the technology of printing to refer to means of communication based upon the printed word.

The great seventeenth-century battles in England in favor of the liberty of the press focused on the licensing of printers. As is clear from both John Milton's *Areopagitica* and John Locke's private memorandum on the renewal of the Licensing Act, the enemy of the freedom to publish was the ecclesiastical authorities as much as the state.

The Licensing Act, which was actually renewed by Parliament in 1692—after the Glorious Revolution—but then allowed to lapse in 1694, was meant to forestall the publication of heretical and schismatic works as well as seditious or treasonable ones. The struggle to support the liberty of publishing was intimately connected to the great liberal project of the Enlightenment.

Representative democracy was born in the era of print media

But Enlightenment-oriented support for a free press by no means implied a call for unfettered individual liberty, let alone for democracy. This is apparent from what is generally considered the first law explicitly providing for press freedom—a 1766 Swedish royal "Ordinance Relating to Freedom of Writing and of the Press."

It begins by noting "the great advantages that flow from a lawful freedom of writing and of the press", in that "an unrestricted mutual enlightenment in various useful subjects not only promotes the development and dissemination of sciences and useful crafts but also offers Our loyal subjects greater opportunities to gain improved knowledge and appreciation of a wisely ordered system of government."

Though it abolished prior censorship, however, this royal Ordinance also affirmed severe legal penalties for publications that "contain blasphemy against God" or "disparaging opinions of Us and of Our Royal House."

If we turn to one of the earliest official North American affirmations of the principle of liberty of the press, a 1774 letter from the Continental Congress to the people of Quebec, we find very different political language and the inclusion of several political aims besides that of Enlightenment.

The letter lists five rights "without which a people cannot be free and happy", beginning with the right of the people to have a share in their government through representatives of their own choosing. The inclusion of the fifth right, the "freedom of the press", is explained as follows:

"The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs."

The explicitly political functions attributed to the press here include spreading liberal notions about government, facilitating communications between the people and unity among them, and exposing and hence constraining the behavior of public officials. In the ancient *polis* these functions would not have required written or printed media. But something like a free press is needed to perform them if a people spread out over a large territory seeks to govern itself.

The idea of the large republic is an eighteenth-century American political innovation that receives its first comprehensive articulation in the *Federalist* papers. Arguing against the traditional association of republics with small polities, the authors of the *Federalist* contend that by "extending the sphere" of republican government, one makes it less vulnerable to the dangers of faction and hence better able to secure the rights of its citizens: as *Federalist* 51 puts it, "the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government."

The sphere that James Madison proposed to extend had to be, by its very nature, a "public sphere"—not in Habermas's class-bound but high-flown sense of a rational-critical "bourgeois public sphere", but simply as an arena in which self-governing citizens were able to discuss the political issues confronting

continued on page 24

continued from page 23

them. And for this the press was indispensible.

Curiously, the *Federalist,* though it was itself originally published serially in newspapers, has almost nothing to say about the role of the press. The first serious and sustained analysis of the press's role in a democracy is provided by Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America.*

In the second volume, Tocqueville asserts that, having examined America's institutions, written laws, and forms, he will now consider the sovereign power that stands above them all—that of the people. There follow three chapters devoted to political parties, the press, and political associations, respectively. These three domains—today we generally refer to them as political parties, the media, and civil society—provide the channels through which the opinions of the people are formed and transmitted. They are not formally part of the government and typically go unmentioned in constitutions, except insofar as bills of rights prohibit the state from infringing upon the freedoms of press, association, and assembly.

Yet despite their mostly sub-constitutional or extra-constitutional status, experience has shown that modern democracies cannot work without them and that they have profound effects upon the quality and sustainability of democracy.

Because these three domains linking society with the state are not constitutionally mandated, they are susceptible to great changes over time. As these domains are interlinked, changes in one of them usually affect the other two. Moreover, alterations in the shape of the wider society inevitably have an impact on the character of these informal institutions.

This is especially true with regard to the media, which also are powerfully influenced by economic developments and by advances in technology. That, of course, is why the traditional term "the press" has been superseded by references to "the media", reflecting the transformative emergence of radio and television broadcasting as leading sources of news and opinion.

It is clear that the character of the media varies among different democratic societies and that, in all of them, it has changed significantly over time. As Paul Starr shows in his 2004 book *The Creation of the Media,* in the US the media developed quite differently than in Europe and underwent a number of transformations from the colonial era up through the twentieth century.

And as Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini show in *Comparing Media Systems,* also published in 2004, the media systems of Western democracies differ substantially among themselves, and all have evolved over time.

One key variable that distinguishes media systems both across countries and over time is the way in which they interact with the related domains of political parties and civil society. American newspapers went from striving to be neutral during the colonial era (when they were more dependent on government goodwill and revenue), to espousing a political line during the Revolution and its aftermath, to forging direct ties with political parties in the 1830s, to becoming increasingly independent toward the end of the century.

In most European countries a more partisan press continued to flourish well into the twentieth century, before beginning to decline. Hallin and Mancini use the term "political parallelism" to describe "the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society."

Among the most striking examples of this phenomenon are Denmark in the early twentieth century "when each town had four newspapers, representing the four major political parties", and the Netherlands as late as the 1960s, where a long tradition of separate Catholic, Protestant, and Socialist publications was even incorporated into the public broadcasting system, with time on the public radio channels divided among groups linked to these communities.

The latter pattern yields what Hallin and Mancini call "external pluralism", in which individual media organs represent the views of particular segments within the society, but the media as a whole embodies a wide range of diversity. By contrast, countries where each of the leading media organs aims at balance and diversity within its own reporting are said to embody "internal pluralism".

Hallin and Mancini identify three broad models of media systems: 1) the Polarized Pluralist model characteristic of Southern Europe, 2) the Democratic Corporatist model of Northern Europe, and 3) the Liberal Model of the North Atlantic countries—but they argue that globalization and other factors are generating a worldwide convergence toward the Liberal Model.

This is a model characterized by a politically "neutral" and commercial press, internal pluralism, information-oriented journalism, and strong professionalism. And indeed, that is the direction in which things seemed to be tending at the time that they wrote, with American-style journalism at the height of its global prestige and increasingly making inroads in other parts of the world.

Today, however, there are growing signs that this model is being eroded in America itself, partly as a result of new technologies. So if America remains at the leading edge of media development, it may well be that the Liberal Model is not destined to supersede the others after all.

I would argue that this model reached its apogee in the United States during the last third of the twentieth century. In 1972, I participated in a study of television news coverage of the Democratic Party's hotly contested presidential primary elections. In those days the political influence of the half-hour evening news programs of the three commercial broadcast networks was enormous. Most Americans received their news from television, and these three programs played a key role in shaping the political agenda and the dynamics of election campaigns.

Our study did not turn up significant differences in coverage among the three networks. In fact, they often seemed to follow one another's lead. But what our study did reveal was a kind of ongoing tension, even antagonism, between the candidates and the journalists.

Although the network news departments undoubtedly aimed at objectivity, one could argue that their viewpoint broadly represented that of the liberal part of the establishment. But be that as it may, the antagonism between the candidates and the newsmen was not a partisan one. It came rather from the efforts of the reporters to fit what the candidates did and said into the dramatic themes that they used to shape their news stories.

So when candidates tried to put forward their policy views, the reporters either ignored them or interpreted their statements chiefly as efforts to improve their competitive position or to win over a particular group of voters. And when the newsmen asked questions of the candidates, these most often focused on why their campaign was doing worse or better than expected—with the expectations, of course, having first been established by the media themselves.

The candidates were understandably frustrated at their inability to present their messages to the voters without having them filtered and often distorted. And the overall tendency of the coverage certainly was calculated to foster the cynicism of the voters. In future years, of course, the candidates and their aides would become much more adept at "spin", but this only led the newsmen to make greater efforts to expose the insincerity of their claims, with results that were hardly more edifying.

During this period, the prestige of journalists soared, and the media not only put greater stress on their watchdog role in uncovering scandal and malfeasance, but staked a broader claim to represent the people against the government in power. In a sense, the media sought to take upon themselves the role of the opposition, which had once been occupied by the party out of power.

Of course, their proclaimed commitment to objectivity and non-partisanship did not permit them to put forward alternative policy choices, but they did not shy away from efforts to set the political agenda. Although voices on both ends of the political spectrum attacked the "hegemony" of the mainstream media, their criticism largely failed to gain traction.

The predominant understanding—and above all, the self-understanding—of journalists that emerged was of a noble caste of high-minded and objective professionals dedicated to taking the side of the people against an incompetent or ill-intentioned government. This is the model that, propelled by the portrait of heroic journalists uncovering the Watergate scandal, began to spread to other democracies.

Today, however, the situation is beginning to look very different, with newspapers steadily losing circulation, partisan cable news shows gaining audiences at the expense of the networks, and the rise of the new media.

The old self-confidence, even arrogance, of what some now label the "legacy media" is giving way to uncertainty and self-doubt. The new media heroes are bloggers and "citizen journalists". Many more voices, representing a much wider spectrum of views, are able to find their way into the public discussion. Politicians are experimenting with new ways of circumventing the major media outlets and more directly reaching the voters. For the moment, at least, the technological and economic trends that are driving these changes show no signs of being reversed.

The result promises to be a much more diverse and pluralistic public sphere. In the historical context of the United States, one might even speak of a kind of return toward the more fragmented and partisan media landscape that prevailed in the nineteenth century.

But as many observers, and not just members of the legacy media, are noticing, these developments, even if one regards them as positive in many respects, also have a downside.

The media that dominated the latter half of the twentieth century had some significant virtues. They did encourage high standards of professionalism and genuine efforts at objectivity—qualities that are not likely to be cultivated by the pundits on the cable news stations or the amateur journalists using the new media. Moreover, the late twentieth-century media offered generally reliable sources of information and fostered an arena of public discourse that encompassed a wide range of citizens. There is reason to fear that the more fragmented media world now emerging will lead to ever more specialized niche audiences, and to citizens getting their information only from sources that reflect their own predilections and political views.

These concerns are prompting a new appreciation for an older but mostly forgotten function of the media in a democracy—bringing citizens together and giving them the sense that they are part of a common enterprise.

As I wrote at the outset, we cannot know where today's communications revolution will lead. My speculation that we are heading toward a more pluralistic but also more fragmented media environment, even if it is well-founded, may reflect only a momentary trend. But if this trend continues to gain strength, it will pose some real dangers. So there is reason to think hard about what could be done to counter media tendencies that threaten to erode the shared civic arena essential to democracy.

Yet, reflection on the historical relationship between the media and democracy also cautions against excessive alarm. For this relationship has undergone many transformations over the centuries, and yet democracy has continued to advance and to prosper. ◁

Photo: IWM

There is reason to fear that the more fragmented media world now emerging will lead to citizens getting their information only from sources that reflect their own political views

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Der gläserne Bürger

VON MICHAEL NAUMANN

Was wir auf Laptops schreiben, was wir über Mobiltelefone, iPads und Smartphones empfangen, versenden oder bewahren – im digitalen Zeitalter ist alles irgendwo gespeichert. Der Einzelne gerät damit zunehmend in Gefahr, Objekt staatlicher Ausforschung und wirtschaftlicher Profitinteressen zu werden. Es drohe das Ende der Privatsphäre, warnte der Publizist Michael Naumann beim diesjährigen Fellow's Meeting des IWM.



Photo: Hans-Peter Widera / iStockphoto

Vor 25 Jahren beschäftigte ich mich, ganz im Zeitgeist befangen, am Queen's College in Oxford mit „revolutionary consciousness". Ein zum positivistisch-biologischen Scherz aufgelegter Verfassungsrechtler namens Marshall, der einmal ein großer Profi-Fußballspieler in Blackpool war, was mir sehr imponierte, winkte ab: „That's just a misfiring of neurons." Anders gesagt: Freie Willensentscheidung gab es in seiner Begriffswelt womöglich ebenso wenig wie ihre teleologische Entgleisung.

Und doch hätte er als guter Brite nicht bestritten, dass es Freiheit gibt. Ihren Ursprung in der Ideengeschichte zu verfolgen, ist hier nicht meine Absicht. Von Kants Unterscheidung der passiven und positiven Freiheit bis zu Isaiah Berlins Definitionen dieses Ideals, von der inneren zur äußeren Freiheit, von der Willens- bis zur Handlungsfreiheit – vor uns liegt eines der schönsten Themen der Philosophie. Einigen wir uns einfach auf ein klares Wort von Leszek Kołakowski, der einmal schrieb, dass dem Menschen Freiheit gebührt. Die Rebellionen in der arabischen Welt beruhen nicht auf geistesgeschichtlichen Reflexionen, sondern ganz sicher auf dieser unumstößlichen Wahrheit, für die Menschen zu sterben, aber auch zu töten bereit sind.

Wer das Wort „Freiheit" in die mächtige Suchmaschine des Internet-Konzerns „Google" auf Deutsch eingibt, erhält 24 Millionen Nennungen in weniger als einer Sekunde. Auf Englisch tauchen 424 Millionen Treffer auf, in 0,07 Sekunden. Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte vom 10. Dezember 1948 nennt „Freiheit" dreizehn Mal, alle anderen Rechte sind ihr nachgeordnet. Interessant im Zusammenhang der zeitgenössischen Digitalisierung unseres Lebens ist Artikel 12 der Menschenrechtserklärung, und über seine gegenwärtige Unterminierung möchte ich heute sprechen:

„Niemand," so heißt es da, „darf willkürlichen Eingriffen in sein Privatleben, seine Familie, seine Wohnung und seinen Schriftverkehr oder Beeinträchtigungen seiner Ehre und seines Rufes ausgesetzt werden. Jeder hat Anspruch auf rechtlichen Schutz gegen solche Eingriffe oder Beeinträchtigungen."

Dieser rechtliche Schutz sollte vom Staat gewährt werden. Doch er schickt sich an, das Gegenteil zu tun. Im Jahr 2008 hat der Deutsche Bundestag mit den Stimmen der Großen Koalition das so genannte BKA-Gesetz verabschiedet. Der innenpolitische Sprecher der Sozialdemokraten, Dieter Wiefelspütz, hält es für das „beste Polizeigesetz, das es in der Welt gibt." Der ehemalige Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, Hans-Jörg Geiger, meint hingegen: „Der Einzelne gerät zunehmend in Gefahr, Objekt staatlicher Ausforschung zu werden." Keineswegs, antwortete der damalige Innenminister Wolfgang Schäuble: „Verdächtigungen gegen den Rechtsstaat sind unangemessen." Doch wer bestimmt das rechte Maß, wenn nicht die Verfassung und ihr höchstes Gericht?

Informationelle Selbstbestimmung ist ein Kern individueller Freiheit

Das Gesetz, das am 1. Januar 2009 in Kraft trat, genehmigt dem deutschen Bundeskriminalamt mit 5560 Beschäftigten die denkbar größten staatlichen Eingriffe in das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht, in die Pressefreiheit, in die Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung und in das so genannte Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität informationstechnischer Systeme – also der Computer, der Smartphones und aller anderen ähnlichen Geräte im Büro und zu Hause. Beschnitten wird, dies nebenbei, auch das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht von Berufsgeheimnisträgern wie Ärzten, Anwälten und Journalisten (nicht jedoch von Geistlichen und Abgeordneten.)

Präventiv tätig werden kann das BKA zur Abwehr internationaler terroristischer Verbrechen. Wohin und auf wen die Beamten ihren Verdacht auch lenken, das Gesetz steht ihnen bei, und niemand, auch nicht die Bundesanwaltschaft, kann sie aufhalten. In den Worten des Kommentators der *Süddeutschen Zeitung,* Heribert Prantl:

„Der Staat setzt auf Prävention – und er nimmt Mittel dafür in Anspruch, die früher nur gegen konkrete Verdächtige angewendet werden konnten. Dieser Präventionsstaat muss, das liegt in seiner Logik, dem Bürger immer mehr Freiheiten abnehmen, um ihm dafür vermeintliche Sicherheit zu geben; das trägt den Hang zur Maßlosigkeit in sich, weil es nie genug Sicherheit gibt."

So verlagert sich die passive Freiheit von etwas (nämlich von staatlicher Kontrolle) zur Freiheit des Staates, sie zu reduzieren. Politischer Machtzuwachs des Staates ist immer identisch mit Machtverlust seiner Bürger. Gegen das maßlose Gesetz haben Journalisten, unter ihnen auch ich, ebenso wie Ärzte und Anwälte in Karlsruhe vor zwei Jahren eine Verfassungsbeschwerde eingelegt. Sie ist angenommen worden, doch das Urteil lässt auf sich warten. Die Beschwerde führt fünf wesentliche Gründe an.

Erstens verändert das Gesetz die alte, vom Grundgesetz geforderte Sicherheitsarchitektur der Republik. Die verkörperte ein Gleichgewicht zwischen gesellschaftlichen Sicherheitsinteressen und individuellen Freiheitsinteressen, wobei Letztere den politischen Maßstab setzten. Die grundsätzliche Zuständigkeit der Länder für polizeiliche Gefahrenabwehr, aber auch die Trennung zwischen Polizeivollzugsbehörden und Nachrichtendiensten diente der Sicherung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte. Staatsmacht kann Übermacht werden, wenn sie konzentriert in einer Behörde versammelt wird.

Zweitens weicht das Gesetz das Trennungsgebot zwischen dem BKA und dem Bundesnachrichtendienst auf. Es droht ein polizeilicher Machtkomplex neuen Typs zu entstehen, halb CIA, halb FBI. Wer die größte Baustelle Europas, das neue BND-

Fortsetzung auf Seite 26

Fortsetzung von Seite 25

Zentrum in Berlin, betrachtet, wird notgedrungen an die Stasi-Zentrale in der Berliner Normannenstraße erinnert, die entschieden kleiner war.

Drittens erlaubt das BKA-Gesetz erhebliche präventive Eingriffe in die Freiheit des Einzelnen – zum Beispiel durch Wohnraumüberwachung mit Mikrofon und Kamera. Der so genannte „Spähangriff" mit Kleinstkamera hebt nicht nur die Privatsphäre von Verdächtigten auf, sondern auch von Besuchern, die vom Tatvorwurf gegen den Wohnungsbesitzer nichts wissen. Ein intimerer Eingriff des Staates ins Privatleben ist nicht vorstellbar. Dabei macht das Gesetz keine Ausnahme und keinen großen Unterschied zwischen der so genannten Zielperson und „Begleit- oder Kontaktpersonen". Die Zielperson auszuwählen, liegt im Benehmen der Behörde.

Viertens erlaubt der Paragraph 20k des BKA-Gesetzes den „verdeckten Eingriff in informationstechnische Systeme" zur Abwehr terroristischer Straftaten. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hatte im Frühjahr 2008 festgelegt, dass es ein Grundrecht auf die Vertraulichkeit von computergespeicherten Datenmengen gibt. Das BKA-Gesetz lässt offen, wie bei Online-Invasionen durch die Behörde Daten ausgeschlossen werden können, die mit dem jeweiligen Verdacht nichts zu tun haben. Da nicht nur in das Privatleben Verdächtiger eingebrochen werden kann, sondern auch in den informationellen Kernbereich von Ärzten, Journalisten und Anwälten, die mit gefährlichen Personen in Kontakt geraten könnten, ist hier das Gebot der Verhältnismäßigkeit weit überschritten. Darüber hinaus müssen Betroffene von den Abhör-, Lausch- und Spähangriffen nicht informiert werden, auch wenn sie sich als sinnlos erwiesen haben. Es liegt ganz im Verwaltungsermessen, den Grundrechtsträgern irgendwann oder auch gar nicht mitzuteilen, dass ihre Grundrechte vom Staat massiv verletzt worden sind.

Fünftens relativiert das BKA-Gesetz den Schutz von Personen, die aufgrund ihres Berufes zur Verschwiegenheit verpflichtet sind. Das Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen Ärzten und Patienten, Anwälten und Mandanten, Journalisten und Informanten unterliegt fortan dem Misstrauensrecht von BKA-Beamten. Die ärztliche Schweigepflicht, die freie Judikatur und die Pressefreiheit sind gefährdet, wenn Polizisten das Recht haben, in das Berufs- und Redaktionsgeheimnis einzudringen, um Informationen zu erzwingen. Das BKA-Gesetz widerspricht eklatant dem *Cicero*-Urteil des Verfassungsgerichts, das besagt, dass auf Redaktionen kein staatlicher Zugriff „ausschließlich mit dem Ziel der Ermittlung von Informanten erfolgen darf."

Die Verfassungsbeschwerde zielt auf die staatliche Einschränkung des Rechts auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung. Sie ist ein Kern individueller Freiheit. Doch ihre wesentlich größere Gefährdung kommt inzwischen aus dem Raum des digitalen Kapitalismus. Und damit komme ich auf den zweiten Teil meiner Ausführungen: den zeitgenössischen Zustand unserer Gesellschaft, in der der Bürger nicht mehr weiß, wer was wann und bei welcher Gelegenheit über ihn weiß, um ein älteres Verfassungsgerichtsurteil zur Volkszählung aus dem Jahr 1983 zu zitieren.

Der Facebook-Generation scheinen Diskretion und Privatheit unbekannt zu sein, und ihre Eltern ahnen, dass der Staat schon längst viel mehr über sie weiß, als er in Wirklichkeit benötigt. Was er sonst noch braucht, kann er googeln.

„Sie haben keine Privatsphäre mehr. Finden Sie sich damit ab!", wusste Scott McNealy, der damalige Chef von Sun Microsystems, schon vor zwölf Jahren. Die elektronisch vernetzten Bürger der Bundesrepublik und auch Österreichs leben in einem geheimnislosen Land. Die kapitalstarken Netzmultis sind die wahren Wissenden der Moderne. Ihre Such- sind gigantische Machtmaschinen.

Was wir auf Laptops schreiben, was wir über Mobiltelefone, iPads und Smartphones empfangen, versenden oder bewahren – alles ist irgendwo gespeichert. Die amerikanische Warenhauskette „Walmart", der größte Arbeitgeber Amerikas, hat kürzlich den Software-Entwickler „Kosmix" gekauft, der sich darauf spezialisiert hat, die endlosen Datenmeere des Internets zu durchpflügen, um persönliche Vorlieben der „User" zu eruieren. Dass diese Kenntnisse lediglich dazu dienen, statt blauen mehr gelbe Gießkannen anzubieten, ist nicht anzunehmen.

Mitten in der Entwicklung stehen Computerprogramme, die normale Twitter-Texte sortieren, um Verhaltensweisen der Adressaten und Absender zur Nutzung durch Fremde zu offenbaren. Wer sich zum Beispiel über sein Smartphone mehrfach verabredet und immer wieder zu spät kommt, kann von den neuen Softwaren-Anbietern einem möglichen Kreditgeber des „Users" als „unzuverlässig" oder einem potenziellen Arbeitgeber als „prinzipiell unpünktlich" gemeldet werden – gegen eine Gebühr, versteht sich.

Seit Jahren entwerfen die kommerziellen Herrscher des Internets komplexe Algorithmen, die alle Individualität von ganz normalen Netzbenutzern mit ihren gigantischen Computeranlagen in einen rechtsfreien Raum befördern, der zahlungskräftigen Produktanbietern offensteht. Sie können ihre Waren spezifischen Zielgruppen mit einer Genauigkeit anbieten, die dem Persönlichkeitsprofil des prospektiven Kunden bis auf das i-Tüpfelchen entspricht.

Das Eingangsschild in jenen rechtsfreien Raum heißt „Big Data". Hier ist alles versammelt, was in der mobilen Welt versendet wurde. In einem Jahrzehnt rechnet man mit einem weltweit gespeicherten Datenvolumen von 35 Zetabyte – das wären 10 hoch 21 Bytes, oder ungefähr so viel, wie jemals in der Geschichte der Menschheit gesprochen worden ist, sofern es vertextet worden wäre.

Der binäre Kapitalismus ist total. Nicht mehr die Ware steht im Schaufenster, sondern der Mensch als Käufer und Verkaufter. Dass alle jene Programme auch totalstaatlichen Systemen dienen können und auch dienen, ist unvermeidlich.

Als Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts die Kundenberater der Dresdner Bank davor gewarnt wurden, Männern mit gestreiften Hemden und weißen Hemdkragen Kleinkredite zu gewähren, war derlei hausinterne Vorwarnung nur lächerlich. In Zukunft helfen Algorithmen weiter. Die Kombination demografischer Daten mit der Aufnahme von Hausbauhypotheken und der Zahlungsmoral sozialer Gruppen mag vor der nächsten Bankenkrise globalen Ausmaßes schützen – dass dabei die Entscheidungsfreiheiten der betroffenen Bankkunden massiv eingeschränkt werden, ohne dass sie es wissen, ist absehbar und wirft neue Rechtsfragen auf. Doch die Rechtsprechung der zivilisierten Welt verhält sich zur digitalen Zukunft wie einst die Buschtrommel zum Telefon.

„Unzulässig ist es", so urteilte das Bundesverfassungsgericht im Jahr 1969, „einen Menschen zwangsweise in seiner ganzen Persönlichkeit zu registrieren und zu katalogisieren." Genau das geschieht im Cyberspace unserer Tage. Der Siegeszug des profitgetriebenen Internets hat die Autonomie und Freiheit seiner Nutzer unterhöhlt. In ein paar Jahrzehnten werden wir uns ohnmächtig fragen, was das einmal war: das Recht, Geheimnisse der eigenen Person zu bewahren, selbst zu entscheiden und den Staat und die Warenwirtschaft fernzuhalten aus einem freien Leben in Selbstbestimmung.

Wer fast alles über den anderen weiß, muss ihm nicht mehr vertrauen. Doch eine Gesellschaft ohne Vertrauen ist eine voller Misstrauen, genauer, eine Angstgesellschaft ohne die Freiheit, anders zu entscheiden, anders zu leben und anders zu sein als in der Welt von Big Data vorgesehen. Dies ist die Zukunft, die vor uns liegt – es sei denn, wir entdecken einen Ausweg, der ganz einfach klingt und deshalb utopischer ist als jenes Bild des Zukunftsstaates im Stand des Allwissens. Sich abzumelden aus der Welt des Internets, auf den Ausknopf zu drücken – das wäre es. Doch leider muss ich zugeben, dass dieser Text auch auf dem Computer entstanden ist, allerdings nicht in der Art und Weise, die derzeit einige deutsche Politiker Ruf und Karriere gekostet hat. ◁

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

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

Die kapitalstarken Netzmultis sind die wahren Wissenden der Moderne

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