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Nikolay Petrov

Will Putin's Russia Survive till 2014?

George Soros

The Tragedy of the European Union

Charles Taylor

Beyond Toleration

Mark Lilla

The New American Class Divide

Tania Antoshina, "Blue Cities", installation. Photo: Ivan Kozlov.

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Contents

NO. 110 • MAY – AUGUST 2012

Photo: Ivan Kozlov

The front page shows the installation "Blue Cities" by Tania Antoshina, which was first presented in Perm (Russia) in the exhibition "Rodina" ("Fatherland", curator: Marat Guelman) at the PERMM (Perm Museum of Contemporary Art, www.permm.org). Opened in November 2011, the exhibition provoked a fierce controversy. While many considered it a collection of the most powerful contemporary art works addressing national identity, opponents denounced it as anything from "made for export" to "national treason". The exhibition later travelled to several cities in Russia, accompanied by public denouncements and (sometimes successful) popular demands for its prohibition. Catalogue: issuu.com/vitamin_group/docs/rodina_katalog

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Under Cover:

BY FYODOR LUKYANOV

The 20th century made Russia accustomed to being a superpower, an arbiter of the fate of the world. Today its influence has shrunk dramatically, but Russia cannot openly resign from its geopolitical status as a global power. In this article, Fyodor Lukyanov shows how, behind the façade of ambitious foreign-policy gestures, Russia is in fact devising its new international identity.

Russia's foreign policy is a source of constant speculation and misunderstandings in the West. They have especially increased after Vladimir Putin returned to the post of president. But if we strip away emotions and stereotypes associated with both Putin and the historical perception of Russia, we will see that the Kremlin's international policy is not what it is believed to be. Russia's foreign-policy identity is changing—Russia is finally departing from its Soviet-era global self-perception. This is a painful process, and to facilitate it the Russian authorities are creating a smokescreen.

If we use the classical phrase by Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov, Russian foreign minister in the mid-19th century, Russia is again "collecting itself". The post-Soviet era, when Russia's foreign policy was meant to prove that the country had been removed prematurely from the list of global players, is over. Russia did its best and has returned to the ranks of countries that cannot be ignored. Yet Russia is not the Soviet Union, and it will never be a superpower again in the sense that the USSR was a superpower. Russia's task for the years to come is to narrow the horizon and transform into an influential yet regional power. But this will be no small power, as the Russian "region" represents the whole of Eurasia, a huge space, where it will have to find a niche for itself.

Changing the space where the game is played is a difficult process. On the one hand, this is a psychological problem: over the 20th century, the Russian mind became accustomed to perceiving Russia as the arbiter of the destinies of the world—ideologically and geopolitically. A sharp renunciation of this status may provoke an unpredictable reaction, including even outbursts of revanchism. On the other hand, a demonstrative withdrawal from the "Big Game" would be taken by many people as a surrender and would definitely be a voluntary renunciation of instruments that could be applied to ensure favorable conditions for wielding power at regional level. For example, if Russia retains levers of global influence, it can swap its constructive position on some issues for non-interference by other major countries in the sphere of its vital interests.

Moscow's policy today is, in fact, a skillful imitation of striving for global status, intended to conceal the narrowing of the sphere of its immediate interests. Here are the three most glaring examples of this imitation.

BRICS is a witty construct which allows Russia to wrap its entire policy in a veil of new globalism. The formalization of this alliance of countries, which are by all criteria totally different from one another, is impossible. But this is not really necessary, because the very fact, or even the perception, of any joint activity by several major countries pursuing independent policies attracts the anxious attention of other actors. An amazing paradox has occurred with regard to BRIC/BRICS. The very idea to unite these different countries into one group belongs to the Goldman Sachs investment company, which came up with it almost 10 years ago to advertise its own services in emerging markets. Since then, the investment meaning has been lost; however, the countries united by the acronym eagerly seized the idea and filled it with a different meaning—a geopolitical one. The secret of the success of a format that was artificially invented by bankers and taken up by politicians in those countries lies not in its viability but in that it has personified the hidden yet growing fear of the West that it may lose its global leadership. For Russia, which no one views as a formidable BRICS member in economic terms any longer, this is a perfect opportunity to assert itself as a potential architect of a new world order, even if it is not going to participate in its creation, and to alleviate the suffering of those Russians who take heavily Russia's parting with its imperial grandeur.

Another example is Syria, where we are witnessing a major diplomatic collision. Its ultimate goal, however, is not at all what it seems to be. Contrary to the belief of many people in the West, Moscow is not defending its economic or geopolitical positions in the Middle East. In fact, it seems to be withdrawing from the region. After all, Russia has nothing to do there without the socialist ideological content of Soviet policy and without the geopolitical greed that was characteristic of the Soviet Union in the era of its all-out competition with the U.S. That part

Russia's New Foreign Policy

Photo: innesi.livejournal.com

The Tolkai airfield (Samara Oblast) was abandoned by the Russian army in 2009.

of the world is turning into an unpredictable powder keg, which the United States and Europe, in contrast to Russia, cannot leave despite the risks involved—it is a sphere of their vital interests. By refusing to budge on Bashar al-Assad, the Kremlin is sending a signal that no problem can be solved anywhere without its assistance and that the West should better keep this in mind for the future. And if the New and the Old Worlds get bogged down there, so much the better: Washington and Brussels would have less time and strength to entice territories that Russia is not going to leave, first of all, countries of the former Soviet Union.

And finally, the Eurasian Union, which is nothing more than a hollow name. In fact, it is not about some "special path" across the boundless steppes or about restoring an empire. It has nothing to do with the ideology of Eurasianism, which is based on the tradition of anti-Western cultural and political thinking of the 19th and 20th centuries, although its adherents are happy about Putin's proposal. Rather, it will be patterned after the European integration of the mid-20th century in its original form. The only country whose membership would be economically feasible and politically advantageous is Ukraine, but this is not Eurasia at all. Central Asian countries standing in line for membership, above all Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have received hints that they are not welcome yet. But the name itself pleases the ear, because it evokes dreams of a big project. Incidentally, there are doubts even about Kiev—many say that, with Ukraine as a member, Russia would simply have a Trojan horse which would sabotage everything it can. Until recently, Uzbekistan played this role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (a military-political alliance led by Russia).

Under cover of distracting maneuvers, Russia is formulating its new international identity.

Under cover of distracting maneuvers, Russia is formulating its new international identity. Relegation to the regional league is a shock. It is neither easier nor more difficult to play there; it simply requires different skills. The Kremlin masterly performs intricate maneuvers in the UN Security Council or in negotiations on strategic offensive arms reductions. But to curb Tajikistan in 2011 for the confiscation of a Russian plane and the arrest of its pilots, Moscow had to resort to very clumsy tactics. Russia's chief public health official, Gennady Onishchenko, publicly expressed suspicions then that Tajik migrants coming to Russia were bringing many diseases with them. Simultaneously, it was made clear to Dushanbe that Moscow might start deporting Tajik migrants, which would have exploded Tajikistan. The pilots were released. But the seizure of assets of Russia's MTS telecommunications company in Uzbekistan in the summer of 2012 nonplused the authorities. Moscow does not know what to do in such a case. However, emotions apart, the trajectory of post-Soviet development in Russia's foreign policy is quite natural. Over time, Russia will develop the required skills and ability to match its desires to its capabilities.

Generally speaking, Putin's foreign policy, which until recently enjoyed broad, almost universal, support in the country is exhausting itself. It is reactive, that is, it responds almost exclusively to external impulses, rather than generating initiatives of its own. It is mostly cautious, although richly flavored with harsh statements. Its central notion is prestige—strengthening it is valuable in itself. Putin's Russia values freedom of action and seeks to avoid binding alliances by constantly maneuvering between the West and the East. Its predominantly anti-Western rhetoric goes hand in hand with a desire to cooperate mainly with Western partners. Russians appreciate that Putin has restored the nation's self-confidence after the humiliations and failures of the 1990s. However, the universal policy towards "revival in general" and the strengthening of prestige does not meet the full range of Russia's interests, and soon there will arise a demand for a more purposeful and prudent foreign policy, aimed at achieving concrete goals. But the formulation of these goals will most likely not bring about a strong unity of views, as before. Society is becoming more mature and is no longer willing to follow the general party line. ◁

Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of *Russia in Global Affairs* and was a Fellow at the IWM under the *Russia in Global Dialogue* Program in August 2012.

ⓘ Russia in Global Dialogue

Does Europe get Russia right? And does Russia get the world right? In the two decades after the end of the Cold War, the intellectual interaction between Russia and Europe has intensified a lot, but paradoxically what we witness recently is a constant failure to come up with a common conversation. Europe's current debate on Russia is solely focused on what Russia lacks—democracy, rule of law, modernization—, and there is a tendency to view Putin's Russia as a paperback edition of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Russian public debate is not immune to conspiracy theories in trying to explain the changes in the modern world.

There is an urgent need for re-engagement between Russia's debate on the directions of the world and Europe's debate on the choices that Russia faces.

The newly established 'Russia in Global Dialogue' fellowship program at The IWM, supported by the Open Society Foundations, is an attempt to answer this need.

May 21, 2012
Svetlana Boym: "Between Nostalgia and Freedom: Reflections on Immigrant Art". *See page 23*

May 29, 2012
Nikolay Petrov: "Modern Russia: Still Life Transforms into a Dynamic Movie". *See article on page 4*

Alexander Etkind.
See article on page 6

Fyodor Lukyanov.
See article on page 2

Boris Mezhuev.
Forthcoming

Will Putin's Russia Survive till 2014?

BY NIKOLAY PETROV

Ever since the outburst of protests and political discontent around the December 2011 elections in Russia, the country seems to be on the verge of change. But what kind of change? Will civic unrest, which persists with a varying, but hardly increasing intensity, bring about democratization, or will it induce Putin to introduce measures that strengthen his control? Russian political analyst Nikolay Petrov presents his reading of recent developments.

Photo: Alexander Demianchuk / REUTERS

Opposition supporters take part in the "March of Millions" protest rally in St. Petersburg, September 15, 2012.

Elections pose a serious challenge for hybrid regimes like the Russian one. One would not expect that the Kremlin cares much today about the 2016 elections, but this is in fact the case. The political crisis, which has started on the eve of the 2011/2012 electoral cycle, has not come to an end yet. As authorities did not manage to increase their legitimacy in those elections, they are now forced to carry on with populist policies. While the political protests of an active minority of citizens continue, and while the Kremlin keeps using the conservative majority as its base of support, the situation in Russia starts resembling ongoing, if not permanent, electoral campaigning.

Given the political turbulences, early parliamentary elections (i.e. before 2016) cannot be ruled out. A deepening of the political crisis some years before the presidential elections scheduled for 2018 (with the possibility of the replacement of the leader) is even more probable. Elections for the Moscow city council are scheduled for 2014, and they will certainly have impact at the national level, as the capital is leading the way in electoral protest.

From May 2012 onwards, with mass political protests continuing despite the elections having passed, the Kremlin's actions, including lawmaking, have become an increasingly reactive 'tightening of screws'. In his long after-inauguration interview on September 6, 2012, Putin did not say a word about political reforms. It seems that no final decision has been taken yet about how to transform the political system. This final decision is to be made, on the one hand, in light of the results of the regional elections in October and, on the other hand, when it is clearer if political protests will keep growing, or fade.

A systemic crisis

Russia is now in a deep multidimensional systemic crisis. *The political crisis* manifests itself in the decreasing legitimacy of the government, which is very personalistic and lacks strong institutions (Putin's weakening shows a crisis of the system of delegative democracy), and in the inability of the authorities to fix the problem of political protests. *The economic crisis* is apparent when we look at the growing difficulties for both elites and society as a whole. For the former, stagnation and the shrinking 'pie' to be shared mean that the new 'hungry' elites cannot be fed without hurting old ones; as a result, tensions and inner-elite conflicts are on the rise. For society, they reveal the inability of the government to continue with populist policies and the need to cut off some of the social benefits, which will provoke further socio-economic protests. *The management crisis* becomes obvious when we see the incapacity of the government to carry through the needed reforms which have already been announced, including pension reform, communal services reform, and the expansion of Moscow. The government formed after Putin's inauguration in May is good in terms of keeping the balance between major elite groups, but does not represent a team capable either to spell out or implement any strategy. It becomes paralyzed and incapable of taking any serious decisions when interests of different groups collide.

While it is clear that authorities cannot survive six more years without solving the burning problems, the question is for how long they can muddle through.

Trends

There are a number of important coinciding trends in Russia today.

Firstly, *the phase of initial redistribution of property in favor of Putin's elites is over,* so a redistribution mechanism should be established to feed hungry young elites, and this should happen without provoking uncontrolled inner-elite conflicts, which is not an easy task. For the first time in the 12 years of being in power, Putin has to face the fact that—due to the prolonged economic crisis—the national wealth that is shared among the business and political elites has ceased to grow, and will probably not start to grow again anytime soon. The principle of taking wealth from others and sharing it with your most loyal servants, which worked so well during Putin's first two presidential terms, no longer works: there is simply not enough to share. To avoid an unruly battle, Putin has to carry out some redistribution: to give the new, hungry members of the elite a piece of the pie, he has to take some from the old members. Judging by the scale of the reshuffling in the security and law enforcement bodies, primarily in the Internal Affairs Ministry, there is no shortage of new members of the elite who want a piece of the pie. The Kremlin has tried to present this redistribution of wealth as an "anti-corruption campaign", and the pro-

posed legislation to bar politicians from shifting assets abroad is just a part of this strategy.

Secondly, there is the *nomenklatura-elite problem.* The existing mix of a nomenklatura and an elite personnel system lacks reproduction mechanisms as these systems are aging and no longer capable to deliver. The current Russian wishy-washy system was in large part inherited from the Soviet nomenklatura apparatus, and thus preserves a certain similarity to its predecessor. However, today there are no resources dedicated to Soviet-style repression, and without this "stick"—that is, without an external mechanism of control and selection—today's "nomenklatura" is inevitably transformed into an elite.

The efficiency of the state personnel is declining rapidly, urging for a choice to be made between a nomenklatura-based reproduction mechanism, which would mean a system of purges that cannot be welcomed by Putin's elites, and an elite-based reproduction, which would mean growing political competition and diminishing direct interference.

Further, there is the *center-regions problem.* Shifts in relations between the center and the regions can be described as oscillation, with the pendulum moving in the direction of the center throughout most of Putin's years. Starting from mid-2011, however, the pendulum has changed direction and is moving towards the regions. The role and influence of the regions and their political elites are increasing, thus leading to a gradual large-scale reconfiguration of power.

The *move from a 'federation of corporations' to a 'federation of regions'* is another important trend. Putin's system of a 'verticalization of power' has reached its logical limit, hence a phase of horizontalization is coming, which entails the dismantling of the princedoms-corporations (an almost medieval system with autonomous or semi-autonomous players) and their transformation into princedoms-regions.

And finally, the *crisis of energy superpower politics* and the *deterioration of Russia's image in the West* create a new background for foreign policy and affect domestic politics as well.

Ignoring these challenges, the Kremlin and Putin continue to act within the old paradigm, either not noticing the fast changes, or being incapable to react adequately to them, thus provoking crisis phenomena.

Putin's role

After 12 years in power, Putin seems to be 'too old' to learn to adjust to the new situation. His declining popularity puts him in a position where he is not capable to undertake the necessary reforms, even if he understands the need. Putin's growing inability to fix the most important systemic problems will sooner or later force the elites to choose: either to keep loyal to the leader (who is transforming from the biggest provider of stability and legitimacy into an obstacle to change) or to secure the elite's survival by replacing him. The problem for the elites is that they cannot replace Putin in his capacity of a supreme arbiter who is keeping the balance between major clans, because a candidate from any clan is unacceptable to all others. The way out is to distribute the powers concentrated in Putin's hands among major groups. But the highly personalistic system cannot offer guarantees that their respective agreements will be kept. One can expect that in order to solve this dilemma, the elites would create an organ à la Politbureau, where the interests of its various groups are represented and compromises can be reached.

Although the numerous replacements in the government do not play an essential role, there are two spheres where we see essential shifts: the gas sector and the 'power block' of the Interior Ministry and the security service. Being the skeleton of the system, they are personally controlled by Putin. The forms of this control, however, have undergone serious changes in 2012. Putin has taken control over the state security apparatus personally, refusing the role of a moderator, suggested by the security service, FSB. The emphasis was put on the Interior Ministry, a step which—in light of the mass protests—looks rational. The federal leadership of the Ministry has been replaced by new appointees from the regions, who—unlike in the past—are responsible not to their curators from FSB, but to Putin personally.

Igor Sechin, Putin's most trusted ally, who was considered to be the informal leader of the 'siloviki' till 2007, continues to be in charge of the oil and gas sector through the newly established Commission on Strategic Fuel and Energy Sector Development and Ecological Security. This commission, where heads of different elite clans are represented, resembles a Politbureau for this sector.

The near future

The near future will be defined first of all by the October 14, 2012 elections and by the protests: the continuing political protests in the big cities, and the emerging socio-economic protests in the provinces. Both reveal a serious mistake of the Kremlin, which has chosen the wrong tactics of fighting the consequences rather than the causes of the protests, while not being able to even successfully suppress the demonstrations.

There are three main ingredients of the reactive current strategy pursued by the Kremlin: to avert the escalation of the mass protests; to prevent a split in the elites and secure their continuous loyalty; and to maintain the support of the conservative majority for the regime against the oppositional minority.

The way the Kremlin tries to suffocate the mass protests is by preemptively threatening their leaders and trying to discredit them. This strategy reveals a lack of understanding of the nature of the protests: the Kremlin apparently believes that the protests are organized by a few instigators, whereas in fact they have a broad basis. Not only does this tactics not help to end the protests, it can even prove to be counterproductive in case that a dialogue with the protesters becomes unavoidable.

As to the second tactical goal, the Kremlin has surprised many with its recent legislative initiative that would prohibit officials from owning property or opening bank accounts abroad. This could be seen as an attempt to offer some kind of liberal, anti-corruption gesture in the midst of a whole series of recently passed repressive laws, such as the law labeling foreign-funded non-governmental organizations as "foreign agents". Most likely, however, the anti-corruption campaign is an attempt to further bind United Russia at all levels, in order to avoid the emergence of defectors or a split in the elite.

This is precisely where the campaign to discredit the Just Russia Deputy Gennady Gudkov comes into play. The Kremlin is using him as an example to show all disloyal and doubtful people what can happen to them if they criticize President Vladimir Putin and the ruling regime too sharply.

Finally, playing the conservative card, the Kremlin significantly decreases its own room for maneuver in the future, while provoking a radicalization of both the supporters of the regime and the opposition, including radical nationalism and other forms of extremism.

The October elections

All eyes focused on the October 14 regional elections to see whether the Kremlin would start to modernize the political system after December's State Duma vote and the resulting protests had exposed a crisis of confidence in the authorities. The stakes grew higher when Vladimir Putin's decisive victory in the March presidential election failed to strengthen the Kremlin's authority and the government's legitimacy slid in subsequent months, raising new questions about its ability to improve the sluggish economy.

By all appearances, the October elections will not buttress the authorities' legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Rather than responding to pressing challenges by making the political system more open and competitive, the Kremlin has found new ways to outmaneuver the opposition while maintaining its hold on power.

The authorities, realizing that voters during the presidential election would not tolerate the type of brazen falsification of results used in the State Duma elections, used a different tactic in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the two main bastions of protest sentiment. They took maximum advantage of administrative resources while avoiding direct falsification whenever possible.

This time, the authorities found ways to lower voter turnout, made wide use of "spoiler" parties to dilute support for opposition candidates, entered candidates who were obviously unqualified or who generated support before pulling out of the race at the last minute, mobilized masses of state workers to vote for specific candidates, and employed various other tricks. With these measures, the Kremlin managed to achieve the re-election of the incumbent governors in each of the five regions where elections were held, even though some were obviously weak and unpopular.

United Russia made a strong showing in legislative elections in a dozen or so regions and regional capitals. However, it would be naive to interpret that as a victory for the authorities or a comeback after the party's poor performance in the December elections. United Russia's apparent success was at least partly the result of fewer candidates having been allowed to run, while the real victor was propaganda, not the Kremlin.

Municipal elections differ significantly from regional elections because local voters base their choices not so much on candidates' party affiliations as on their concrete leadership qualities. As a result, many candidates favored by the federal government ran on the ballot as independents rather than as United Russia members.

An interesting example can be seen in the Sverdlovsk region, one of the most democratic and, therefore, most challenging regions for the Kremlin. In the mayoral race in Nizhny Tagil, victory went to United Russia candidate Sergei Nosov, who won 90 percent of the vote. But that landslide was a result of his personal popularity rather than of his party membership; United Russia simply pegged him as its candidate because he was the clear favorite. It is revealing that in the nearby city of Degtyarsk, the deputy mayor supported by United Russia lost by a wide margin to the Just Russia candidate. And because United Russia simply lent its support to strong politicians, it is no surprise that its candidates lost in only three of the 17 mayoral races in the region.

Probably a better indicator of United Russia's real popularity is the outcome of the legislative elections in four municipalities where the party garnered no more than 50 percent of the vote.

The irony is that by staging elections like those held in October, the authorities actually deprive themselves of the very legitimacy they could gain from honest elections. Of what value is an electoral victory when voters boycott because they see no one worth supporting? Although some in the Kremlin claim that opposition politicians proved to be unpopular, the real reason for their defeat is that they were prohibited from running in most races.

The authorities face a huge political risk, especially during times of crisis, in depriving the people of a peaceful mechanism for effecting a change of leadership. They are leaving citizens no other option but to dismantle the system entirely in order to bring new people into office.

What the regional elections have demonstrated is that the entire party system is in trouble, not just United Russia. Several recently registered parties simply drowned in the sea of Kremlin tricks and stratagems, and succeeded only in biting off a few votes that normally go to the Communist Party and Just Russia, both of whose opposition stance is questionable. As a result, three of the six regional legislatures elected on October 14 consist of only two parties: United Russia and the Communist Party.

Thus, despite contrary claims by United Russia leaders, the party looks no stronger now than before the elections. What is more, the other three parties represented in the State Duma now appear to be weaker, largely due to concerted efforts by the Kremlin. Of the 57,000 candidates registered in the elections, only 11,000 candidates were put forward by those three parties combined, while United Russia alone had 22,000. The Patriots of Russia party came in fourth place with 700 candidates. Incidentally, that party acted largely, though not entirely, as a spoiler in the elections, meaning that the Kremlin might one day use it to replace Just Russia as a spare party of power.

One can say that the results of the regional elections point once again to the need for an overhaul of the political system. But the authorities are unwilling to admit that and appear unable to accomplish it. They are too busy trying to hold on to power today to think about tomorrow—or prepare for it.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Russian political system in its present shape can hardly survive until 2014, and will be either radically transformed from within or replaced by a different system due to its inability to manage the country. The next few years will be marked by two general trends: changes in the relationship between the government and society on the one hand, and between Moscow and the regions on the other. It seems that the Kremlin is determined to defy logic by working against current trends and implementing counterproductive measures that offer little promise for improving the situation in the country.

One can expect growing political turbulences in the near future. At the same time, the Kremlin will have to seek mass support to increase the legitimacy it needs to go forward with political and economic reforms, which by definition go against the interests of the already existing paternalistic majority. In other words, while trying to fix the most urgent problems, the Kremlin maneuvers itself into a dead end. ◁

Nikolay Petrov is Scholar in Residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and was a Fellow at the IWM under the *Russia in Global Dialogue* Program in May 2012.

Colonizing Oneself: Imperial Puzzles for the 21st Century

BY ALEXANDER ETKIND

In May 2012, Russian literary scholar Alexander Etkind came to the IWM as a Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow and talked about his recent work "Internal Colonization. Russia's Imperial Experience" (Polity, 2011). Below you can read why he wrote this book.

Illustration: Burlaki na Volge / yaplakal.com

Studying imperial Russia, scholars have produced two stories. One concerns a great country that competes successfully, though unevenly, with other European powers, produces brilliant literature, and stages unprecedented social experiments. The other is one of economic backwardness, unbridled violence, misery, illiteracy, despair, and collapse. I subscribe to both of these at once. But scholarship is not a dual carriage way. We need to find a way to coordinate the different stories that we believe in. My solution is a kind of Eisensteinian *montage* interwoven with an overarching principle, namely "internal colonization". I propose this concept as a metaphor that makes the Russian Empire comparable to other colonial empires of the past. In this way, the two Russian stories are turned into one: the story of internal colonization, in which the state colonized its people.

In 1904, the charismatic historian Vasilii Kliuchevsky wrote that Russian history is "the history of a country that colonizes itself." At that moment, this formula of Russia's self-colonization had already had a long history in Russian thought. Enriched by twentieth-century colonial and postcolonial experiences, we can draw further conclusions. Russia has been both the subject *and* the object of colonization and its corollaries, such as orientalism. The state has been engaged in the colonization of foreign territories and it has also been concerned with colonizing its heartlands. Peoples of the Empire, including the Russians, have developed anti-imperial, nationalist ideas in response. These directions of Russia's colonization, internal and external, have sometimes competed and have sometimes been indistinguishable.

Exploring the historical experience of the Russian Empire before the revolutionary collapse of 1917, I illuminate its relevance for postcolonial theory. However, I turn the focus onto Russia's internal problems, which have not previously been discussed in postcolonial terms. Since the 1990s, scholarly interest in the causes and results of the Russian Revolution has paled in comparison to the explosion of research on the Russian Orient, orientalism, and Empire.

Russia has been both the subject and the object of colonization.

Led by Edward Said, postcolonial scholars have emphasized the significance of oceans that separated the imperial centers from their distant colonies. In some of these writings, overseas imperialism feels different—more adventurous, consequential, and repressive—in a word, more imperialist, than terrestrial imperialism. However, before the advent of railways and the telegraph, terrestrial space was less passable than the high seas. In times of peace, it was faster and cheaper to transport cargo from Archangel to London by sea than from Archangel to Moscow by land. In times of war, shipments of troops and supplies proved to travel much faster from Gibraltar to Sebastopol than from Moscow to the Crimea. In the early nineteenth century, it was four times more expensive to supply the Russian bases in Alaska by transporting food across Siberia than to carry it by sea around the world. It took two years for Russians to transport fur across Siberia to the Chinese border; American ships did the job in five months. Technically and psychologically, India was closer to London than many areas of the Russian Empire were to St Petersburg. And there were no subjects living on the high seas, no strange, poor people who had to be defeated, tamed, settled and resettled, taxed, and conscripted. Two theoretically opposing but, in practice, curving and merging vectors of external and internal colonization competed for limited resources, human, intellectual, and financial. The oceans connected, while land divided.

In Lev Tolstoy's story, "How much land does a man need?," a peasant

goes from "overpopulated" Central Russia to a colonized steppe in Bashkiria, where friendly nomads offer him as much land as he can encircle in a day. He walks and runs from sunrise to sunset and dies of exhaustion when he completes the circle. He is buried on the spot: this, enough for a grave, is how much land man needs, says Tolstoy. But he himself bought one estate after another, subsidizing his agricultural experiments with the royalties from his novels.

Things move fast in the postcolonial world. Just a few decades ago, the idea that Ukraine or even Central Asia were colonies of the Soviet Empire evoked furious resistance on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the 1990s, postcolonial experts still debated the reasons for not applying their concepts to the emerging countries of the post-Soviet space. The current literature resolves these problems but reveals new ones. Focusing on ethnicity, nationalism, and sovereignty in this part of the world, many scholars have turned their backs on the peculiar institutions of the Russian Empire that defined the life of northern Eurasia for several centuries and brought it to its twentieth-century turmoil. Russian serfdom provides a good example. A central subject for nineteenth-century Russian politics and historiography, it is reduced to a footnote in the twenty-first-century textbooks of Russian history. Abolished at the same time as American slavery and involving much greater numbers, serfdom must have had at least as deep and lasting an impact. However, nothing similar to the North American attention to the legacy of slavery has emerged. This double standard in academia is surprising.

Serfdom has become an increasingly unpopular subject in post-Soviet historiography; the contrast between the non-existent Serfdom Studies in Russia and the booming Slavery and African American Studies in the US could not be stronger. In what remains the best study of serfdom, the American historian Stephen Hoch researched the archive of a large estate near Tambov, a black-soil region of European Russia and a proverbial territory of the Russian interior. In the early nineteenth century, the peasants' productivity and diet on this estate were equal to or better than what was common in Germany or France. The difference lay in their motivation, property rights, and principles of management. Since neither the land nor a major share of the production belonged to the peasants, they worked under the threat of corporal punishment, which was used routinely. According to Hoch's data, in about 1826, 79 percent of males were flogged at least once, and 24 percent twice a year. For more serious misdemeanors, peasants were also shaved on one side of the head.

Founded in 1636, Tambov was a fortress that protected the Muscovite state from the nomadic tribes that had populated this land before the Russians invaded it. Tambov was thus a contemporary of Williamsburg (1632), an early center of plantations in Virginia, and of Cape Town in South Africa (1652). Near Tambov, however, the security situation made stable agriculture impossible for 100 years after its foundation, and a plantation-type economy impossible for another 100 years after that. Centrally located, the estate that Hoch studied was still far from the markets; it took a week to deliver grain to the river hub, and to transport it to Moscow took months. Forced resettlements of serfs populated this land, and immigration continued into the nineteenth century. Even then, demographic growth on this estate did not compensate for the draft of recruits and the flights of serfs. Though the estate was relatively rich, it could not meet imperial demands. It is counterintuitive to consider Tambov as a colony, but anywhere else in the world a land that was populated by forced settlers at a time of high imperialism and, in addition, cultivated under the permanent threat of the lash would be so designated. It so happens that scholars of the Russian peasantry have rarely addressed its particularity from a colonial perspective.

According to classical definitions, colonization (and its ideological system, colonialism) refers to the processes of domination in which settlers migrate from the colonizing group to the colonized land, while imperialism is a form of domination that does not require resettlement. Theoretically, definitions of colonization do not specify whether any particular migration evolved within national borders or beyond them, or whether such borders even existed at the time. In practice, however, and also in intuition, colonization has usually meant travel abroad. Against this backdrop, the concept of internal colonization connotes the culture-specific domination inside national borders, actual or imagined.

Kant never left Königsberg, but history entered it in all its brutality.

But what does it mean exactly, to colonize oneself? Human grammar distinguishes between subject and object, while human history does not necessarily do so. Self-imposed tasks—self-discipline, internal control, colonization of one's own kind—are inherently paradoxical. Languages, including scholarly ones, get into trouble when they confront these self-referential constructions. In the twenty-first century, scholars of globalization meet the same logical difficulties as scholars of Russian imperial history met in the nineteenth century. Of course, I hope that the world of the future will be no more similar to imperial Russia than it will be to British India. But the experience and experiments of the Russian Empire can still teach us some lessons.

Proponents, victims, and heretics of colonization—internal or external—constitute a multicolored, paradoxical crowd. Let us look briefly at Immanuel Kant, a subject of the Russian crown from 1758 to 1762. Russian troops took Königsberg after the bloody battles of the Seven Years War, annexed the city, and then unexpectedly retreated. Along with all city officials, professor Kant took an oath to the Russian Empress. Kant was then in his "gallant phase," worldly, fashionably dressed, and in demand, if not at balls, then at dinner parties. In his writings and lectures from this and slightly later periods, there are signs of his discontent with philosophy and intellectual life, a midlife crisis of a sort. Historian Anthony La Vopa discerns "an element of self-caricature, and indeed of self-hatred" in Kant's lectures during the occupation and his writings that followed the withdrawal of Russian troops. Among the explanations for this important though temporary crisis, one comes from the postcolonial tradition. Under a colonial regime, local intellectuals often registered similar feelings of internal splitting, doubling, and self-hatred. Much of twentieth-century existential thought came out of these situations, in Algeria and elsewhere. Reinstating Kant in occupied Königsberg helps us understand his relation to this tradition. For those who believed in self-reliance and an inner light, it was difficult to live under foreign rule. Whether the reason was anxiety or trauma, the fact is that the occupation created a writing block in Kant. Immediately after the abrupt end of the occupation, in 1762–3, Kant's publications burst forth. Relying on the writings of a Russian officer, Andrei Bolotov, who worked in the headquarters of the occupying army and took private lessons of philosophy with one of Kant's rivals, I have reconstructed the uneasy relations between the colonizers and the colonized in the city of Kant. He never left Königsberg, not even once, but history entered it in all its brutality, and the experience of living as a subaltern, under Russian occupation, influenced Kant's later thinking.

Employed by Bismarck, Lenin, and Hitler; mentioned by Weber, Foucault, and Habermas (and, with slightly different wording, developed by nineteenth-century Russian historians), the concept of internal colonization has a deeper genealogy than is usually assumed. To be sure, extending the postcolonial edifice, which has never been very coherent, to the immense space of the Russian Empire, requires not just an "application" of pre-existing ideas, but their deep refashioning. Doing so might help us to understand not only the Russian imperial experience, but also, the unused potentialities of postcolonial theory. ◁

Alexander Etkind is Reader in Russian Literature and Cultural History at King's College, Cambridge, UK. He was Guest at the IWM under the *Russia in Global Dialogue* Program in May 2012.

Books in perspective

The IWM occasionally organizes debates about books written or edited by IWM Fellows, or related to the Institute's research fields.

May 22, 2012
Alexander Etkind:
"People or Territory?"
Presentation of the book *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience,* Cambridge: Polity 2011.

June 4, 2012
"Eternity, God and Nietzsche"
A conversation between **Krzysztof Michalski** and **Charles Taylor** on the occasion of the publication of *The Flame of Eternity: An Interpretation of Nietzsche's Thought,* Princeton University Press 2011, by Krzysztof Michalski.

The Tragedy of the European Union

BY GEORGE SOROS

On September 9, 2012, US financier and philanthropist George Soros was a guest of the Institute for Human Sciences. In a talk on the future of the euro, Mr. Soros presented his vision of how the European financial crisis can be solved. His considerations were commented by Austrian Minister of Finance Maria Fekter and subsequently discussed with an audience of invited guests.

Photo: IWM

Europe has been in a financial crisis ever since 2007. When the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers endangered the credit of financial institutions, financial markets had to be put on artificial life support. That meant substituting the credit of the state for the financial credit that was no longer accepted by the markets. The emphasis on sovereign credit revealed a flaw in the construction of the euro that had remained unrecognized either by the markets or the European authorities until then. By transferring their right to print money to the European Central Bank, the member states exposed their sovereign credit to the *risk of default.* This put some of them into the position of third world countries that had become heavily indebted in a foreign currency. It has also rendered the commercial banks whose balance sheets were loaded with the bonds of the weaker countries potentially insolvent. So the euro crisis is a direct consequence of the global financial crisis of 2007–8.

There is a close parallel between the euro crisis and the international banking crisis of 1982. Then the IMF and the international banking authorities saved the international banking system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default but at the cost of pushing them into a lasting depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.

Today Germany is playing the same role as the IMF did then. The setting differs, but the effect is the same. The creditors are in effect shifting the whole burden of adjustment on to the debtor countries and avoiding their own responsibility for the imbalances. Yet they were largely responsible not only for the faulty design of the euro but also for continuing to enforce rules that aggravated the situation.

The euro crisis was a composite of banking and sovereign debt problems which were tied together like Siamese twins as well as divergences in economic performance which gave rise to balance of payments problems within the Eurozone. The authorities did not understand the complexity of the crisis, let alone see a solution. So they tried to buy time.

Usually that works. Financial panics subside and the authorities realize a profit on their intervention. But not this time, because the financial problems were combined with a process of political disintegration. When the European Union was created, it was the embodiment of an open society—a voluntary association of equal states that surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good. The euro crisis is now turning the European Union into something fundamentally different.

The member countries are divided into two classes—creditors and debtors—, with the creditors in charge. As the strongest creditor country, Germany is emerging as the hegemon. Under current policies debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums for financing their government debt and this is reflected in their cost of financing in general. To make matters worse, the Bundesbank remains committed to an outmoded monetary doctrine that is deeply rooted in Germany's traumatic experience with inflation. The Bundesbank recognizes only inflation as a threat to stability and ignores deflation, which is the real threat today. Germany insists on imposing austerity on debtor countries. This can easily become counterproductive because a reduction in GDP causes an *increase* in the debt ratio.

There is a real danger that a two-tier Europe will become permanent. Both human and financial resources will be attracted to the center, and the periphery will become permanently depressed. Germany will even enjoy some relief from its demographic problems by the immigration of well-educated people from the Iberian Peninsula and Italy instead of less qualified "Gastarbeiter" from Turkey or Ukraine. But the periphery is seething with discontent.

This is not the result of some evil plot but of a lack of coherent policies. German politicians, however, have started to figure out the advantages it has conferred on Germany and this has begun to influence their policy decisions. As time passes, there are increasing grounds for blaming Germany for the policies it is imposing on Europe, while the German public is feeling unjustly blamed. This is truly a tragedy of historic significance. As in ancient Greek tragedies, misconceptions and the sheer lack of understanding have unintended but fateful consequences.

Germany, as the largest creditor country, is in charge but refuses to take on any additional liabilities; as a result, every opportunity to resolve the crisis has been missed. The crisis spread from Greece to other deficit countries and eventually the very survival of the euro has come into question. Since a break-up of the euro would cause immense damage, Germany is doing and will continue to do the *minimum* necessary to hold the euro together.

Most recently, Chancellor Merkel has backed Mario Draghi and left Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann isolated on the Board of the European Central Bank. This will enable the ECB to put a lid on the borrowing costs of countries that submit to an austerity program under the supervision of the Troika. That will save the euro but it is also a step towards the permanent division of Europe into debtors and creditors. The debtors are bound to reject a two-tier Europe sooner or later. If the euro eventually breaks up in disarray, it will destroy the common market and the European Union. Europe will be worse off than it was when the effort to unite it began, because of a legacy of mutual mistrust and hostility. The later it happens, the worse the ultimate outcome. That is such a dismal prospect that it is time to consider alternatives that would have been inconceivable until recently.

In my judgment, the best course of action is to persuade Germany to choose between either leading the creation of a political union with genuine burden sharing or leaving the euro.

Since all the accumulated debt is denominated in euros it makes all the difference who remains in charge of the euro.*) If Germany left, the euro would depreciate. The debtor countries would regain their competitiveness; their debt would diminish in real terms and, with the ECB in their control, the threat of default would disappear and their cost of borrowing would fall to a level comparable with that of the UK. The creditor countries, by contrast, would encounter stiff competition in their home markets from the euro area and incur losses on their claims and investments denominated in euro. The extent of their losses would depend on the extent of the depreciation; therefore creditor countries would have an interest in keeping the depreciation within bounds. After initial dislocations, the eventual outcome would fulfill John Maynard Keynes' dream of an international currency system in which both creditors and debtors share responsibility for maintaining stability. And Europe would escape from the looming depression.

The same result could be achieved, with less cost to Germany, if Germany chose to behave as a benevolent hegemon. That would mean 1) implementing the proposed European banking union; 2) establishing a more or less level playing field between debtor and creditor countries by first establishing a Debt Reduction Fund and eventually converting all debt into eurobonds; and 3) aiming at *nominal* growth of up to 5%, which would allow Europe to grow its way out of excessive indebtedness. However, this would entail a greater degree of inflation than the Bundesbank is likely to approve.

Whether Germany decides to lead or leave, either alternative would be better than creating a two-tier Europe. ◁

*) *Debt issued under domestic law can be re-denominated into the domestic currency, debt issued under foreign law cannot.*

In cooperation with ***Die Presse*** *and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance*

Investor and philanthropist **George Soros** is founder and chairman of the Open Society Foundations.

Comments on "The Tragedy of the European Union"

Carl Aiginger

Georg Soros condenses the problems of the euro with his remarkable ability to boil down a complex issue to its essential components. I would like to comment on two points. The first one connects the fate of the euro with that of the European project as such, and the second one is that there are two, and only two, alternatives for rescuing Europe.

The emphasis on the fact that an eventual break-up of the euro will destroy the common market and the European Union is essential, and I agree wholeheartedly with this point. Soros correctly states that, in this case, Europe would be worse off than before the effort to unite actually began because the break-up would leave a legacy of mutual mistrust and hostility.

The message that the future of the euro cannot be separated from the future of Europe is not a trivial statement. Many scholars and politicians suggest that Europe can live without the euro (or with a much smaller number of "core" members, namely the 'virtuous' northern ones). This is simply not true since, if you reverse the dynamics of integration, they will never develop again. If the southern European countries are amputated from the Union, others will simply follow, and the market will start to speculate on who is next. Southern Europe is the bridge to Africa, to the Arab world, to the Black Sea Area, to Central Asia etc. Today Europe is the largest economic region in the world, and together with its neighbors it is a region growing faster than the US, keeping an approximate share of 30–35% of world output, higher than that of the US and China in 2050. Europe, defined as a club of 5–7 nations (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria plus possibly France), will have less than 10% of world output in 2050. It will shape neither international institutions nor globalization (something many Americans would love).

George Soros' second main message is that Europe has two, and only two, options.

The first one is that Germany becomes a "benevolent dictator". Ignore the additional comment of "like the US". In some phases, the US was a benevolent dictator: the Marshall Plan enabled European reconstruction after WWII and rescued Europe from socialist (communist) dominance. This was benevolent dominance (driven also by the not completely altruistic goal of preventing the spread of communism). But periods in which benevolence dominated US policies are rare episodes. One must only look at Vietnam, South Africa, and Chile. Even if US benevolence after WW II is appreciated, no dominance in history was purely benevolent in the long run or for the majority of the people. So let us forget the suggestion of Germany becoming a benevolent dictator.

The alternative is for Germany to leave the Eurozone. Certainly, the way Germany behaves today, i.e. beggaring its neighbors by reducing wages, social costs and environmental standards, is not the way a leading economy should behave, neither in its own interest, nor in terms of showing solidarity in a community. Furthermore, Germany advocates its "low road model" of fiscal prudence and low inflation to all other countries. It is true that Germany currently displays higher growth and lower unemployment than other "less virtuous" countries, but that is after a

Photo: IWM

full decade of being the sick man of Europe. Germany can never be a benevolent dictator since it oscillates between a depressive mood and exuberance depending on short-term performance. But maybe it can be as benevolent as the US. Look at the precondition for Germany's help to Greece, namely the enforced promise of Greece not to terminate the contracts to buy weapons and aircraft from Germany.

Leaving the euro is not feasible. If Germany left the euro, its new currency would appreciate in the short run, putting Germany back to its position in 2000, when it had lost its single growth-driving machine—the competitiveness of its exports. Germany has a weak education system, according to the Pisa ratings, somewhere in the middle at best. It has rather inward-oriented universities and lacks high-tech industries (while being excellent in medium-tech). If Germany left, the Netherlands, Austria, and Finland would probably also ponder leaving or would at least peg their currency to the German euro (which would be a club of "Germany plus friends", with Germany totally dominating). What France would do in this case is totally unclear since France is politically and historically pegged to Germany, even if it does not share the German goals of thriftiness and has twin deficits in public finances and external trade.

So Germany can neither become a benevolent dictator nor leave the euro. And George Soros knows this. He uses the dichotomy as a helpful provocation. Germany should know that, being the strongest member of the Eurozone, it cannot pursue a strategy of preventing any long-term solution of debt mutualization or a banking union and of limiting transfers to peripheral regions. If it does not cooperate in the long run (creating a banking union, defining the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort, pursuing a pro-growth strategy in a consolidation period), Germany itself will eventually suffer even if the last three years looked good. Alternatively, Germany could cooperate with other countries, especially in Scandinavia, to switch to a high road strategy, leading Europe to a better model than the US (which would be more inclusive and more sustainable[1]). Furthermore, Germany should know that, if it chooses to take a separate path alone, all its virtues will be futile in the face of globalization. Its share of world trade will decrease from year to year, becoming a homogenous but very small allotment with a share of between 3% and 4% of the world economy.

Having agreed with one message and having accepted the alternative of Germany "dictating or leaving" as a fruitful provocation, I allow myself a critical remark about George Soros' wording (and his title): we should not jump too quickly from a problem Europe has to solve to the scenario of Europe breaking up and forecast a tragedy (many people will remember the title and forget the content). I do not want to speculate about the end of US society if the growth of income disparity and the rise of poverty in the US continue, or if a wealthy minority can persuade the US electorate that health insurance is bad and lower taxes for billionaires relative to secretaries is a natural thing. The use of the word "tragedy" in a critique engenders to a large extent a self-fulfilling prophecy, especially if it relates to a subject watched carefully by the financial markets. I personally like to reserve the word tragedy for large unsolvable problems. But I know that George Soros, who is in principle less negative about the euro than most US and UK citizens, may transform the word tragedy into some form of energy for reform.

Fortunately, the US will survive even if the majority of people have stagnant or declining incomes and the minority benevolently sponsor the poors. And Europe will survive even if nationalist and populist politicians prevent the euro from replacing the dollar as the leading currency in the next decade (after which the Renminbi will take over). George Soros' analysis will help Europe find a better way to repair its governance system. The message that the future of the euro decides the future of Europe is as helpful as the hidden message that Germany is currently blocking reforms and needs to change its policy in its own interest. The suggestion that the new growth path should be different from the current one (more dynamic, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more stable with financial markets, thus serving the real economy) is my own, and I would like to offer it to George Soros as a compensation for his rather bleak insights. ◁

1) see the wwwforEurope project: www.foreurope.eu

Karl Aiginger is director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Professor of Economics and coordinator of the project "A new growth path for Europe" within the 7th European Framework Program.

Ewald Nowotny

Misdiagnosing the causes of any crisis is costly. To give the right medicine, it is critically important to distinguish between the symptoms and the root causes of the crisis. Following the argument of George Soros, the transfer of monetary policy competencies to the ECB without establishing a true fiscal union lies at the heart of the crisis in Europe. It exposes sovereign credit of the (weaker) member states to the risk of liquidity runs, contagion and self-fulfilling

Photo: IWM

default; for they are lacking an implicit guarantee from their central banks that cash will always be available to pay out creditors. Many other design flaws add to the complexity of the current situation.

The rationale of the European monetary unification process was not only based on an economic cost-benefit analysis. Economic grounds were to be seen *together* with the strong political will for integration on the part of policy-makers, which is deeply rooted in the traumatic history of Europe. Monetary unification was seen as a vehicle to strengthen integration and coordination in other fields. And the established governance structures of the economic policy coordination procedures were not designed on the basis of theoretically optimal economic policy considerations. They were the outcome of a political compromise. The crisis has laid bare its fundamental and deep flaws, errors that were well articulated by some economists even in the very beginning of the planning period of EMU.

The institutional flaws have now been identified, and in the last few years there was growing consensus on the necessity to fix them.

Effective crisis resolution can be boiled down to two elements. First, a mechanism for *provision of liquidity* is key, above all, to correct the dysfunctions of interbank and capital markets. Several steps have been taken, including the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) and the set-up of the OMT (Outright Market Transactions), the new program of the ECB to purchase government bonds in the secondary market without announcing any limits in advance.

Second, liquidity provision requires *strict conditionality* to avoid moral hazard, for instance by establishing elements of a fiscal union, such as the fiscal compact. Unconditional funding of some member states and banks, though in some urgent cases reasonable on economic grounds, would lack political support and democratic legitimacy. The integrated supervision for European banks can also be seen as part of conditionality. Further, a banking union, comprising a centralized banking supervision mechanism, as well as a resolution regime to ensure that unsecured creditors rather than taxpayers bear the cost of future bank failures serve the purpose of breaking the diabolical negative feedback loops between national sovereign and banking crisis.

The measures taken so far undoubtedly fall short of optimal crisis resolution mechanisms that are designed by economists on a drawing board. And they were not set timely and decisively enough. But they do reflect the maximum possible, given the numerous constitutional and political constraints economic policy-makers are facing today in Europe. Considering these constraints, progress has been remarkable. Building and reforming institutions as well as transferring sovereignty to the center require an inclusionary democratic process. It takes time to win the minds of European citizens. But time is in precariously short supply, given the risks of liquidity runs and contagion. Striking the right balance between effective and timely crisis management and striving for political acceptability of the measures taken is an extraordinary challenge economic policy-makers are faced with in the upcoming months.

The analytical part of George Soros' considerations is quite appreciable, as well as his visible empathy for the European Project. Crisis resolution requires joint responsibility of all the member states while each has to deliver their maximum for the benefit of the whole. But there is doubt whether his recommendation of Germany leaving the euro (in case it rejects to fully back the euro, to act as a benevolent hegemon) may be part of a reasonable and viable solution at all. Any exit from the euro incurs huge and uncontrollable risks and involves balance sheet adjustments in the course of the redenomination of assets and liabilities, irrespective of the origin of the country leaving. And it might find imitators, which puts the whole European project at risk. Given the severe hardships this option would create for Germany, the recommendation can be viewed as a wake-up call rather than a proposal to be taken seriously. But addressing just Germany with this call is probably too narrow a perspective.

Restructuring long-established economic imbalances and governance arrangements takes time. Buying time is a reasonable way to go. ◁

Ewald Nowotny is Governor of the Austrian National Bank.

Comments on "The Tragedy of the European Union"

Margit Schratzenstaller

George Soros offers an excellent analysis of the causes and consequences of the current euro crisis. Particularly fruitful—not only in terms of explanatory power, but also with a view to possible solutions for the current crisis—is the fact that Soros simultaneously addresses political as well as economic aspects instead of exclusively focusing on the economy. It is this predominant focus on the economic dimension of the current crisis shared by the majority of re-

Photo: IWM

cent analyses and the recommendations derived from them which severely limits their acceptance as well as their chances of success. In particular, I share Soros's aversion to the currently emerging two classes of member states with a clear hierarchy: on the one hand, there are the creditor countries acting as controllers, who are ranking high in the new EU hierarchy, and on the other hand, at the bottom of the EU hierarchy, there are the debtor countries, the recipients of support conditional on the implementation of strict economic adjustment programs controlled by creditor countries. Such a hierarchy is the breeding ground for anti-EU and nationalistic sentiments on either side: the population in creditor countries, the majority of which have themselves been implementing budget consolidation measures for some time now, is increasingly feeling exploited in the face of the seemingly bottomless financial needs of debtor countries while experiencing tax increases and budget cuts themselves. The population in debtor countries is blaming creditor countries, and particularly Germany, for the burden imposed on them by their consolidation and economic adjustment programs.

There is, however, one huge deficit in the current debate and the recent reform efforts on the EU level, namely the complete absence of a political and economic vision as to where Europe is striving to stand after having overcome the current crisis. This deficit is in fact threatening Europe's future, and is not addressed by Soros, though it would actually make his case even stronger. Such a vision beyond pure economics and beyond the crisis is needed particularly for the young generation all over Europe, who will be shaping the continent's future. One of the most important preconditions to hold Europe together, i.e. to avoid a break-up, and to enable a degree of political and economic integration allowing the European Union in general and the Eurozone in particular to function economically, is to avoid that the young become and/or perceive themselves as a lost generation. A vision for a sustainable Europe needs to incorporate a view on Europe's most pressing problems. These do not only comprise the current record youth unemployment, the deficits in competitiveness in the so-called European periphery countries, the high indebtedness of the public and the private sector, and the dysfunctionalities in financial markets. In addition, such a vision needs to account for the ongoing climate change, increasing income and wealth inequality within and between European countries, as well as high and persisting gender inequality. ◁

Margit Schratzenstaller is senior researcher at the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO).

Wilfried Stadler

Europa befindet sich in einer Doppelmühle zwischen einem noch unzulänglich sanierten Bankensystem und einer immer brisanter werdenden Staatsschuldenkrise. Gewonnen werden kann dieser Kampf nur bei gleichzeitiger Nachadjustierung bisheriger Konstruktionsdefizite des Euro und konsequenter Sanierung des Finanzsystems. Die Arbeiten an beiden Fronten benötigen Zeit zur Umsetzung. Jeder Versuch radikaler Sofortheilung wäre mit unermesslichen Folgekosten eines unkontrollierten Zusammenbruchs des Euro und des globalen Finanzsystems verbunden.

Der Kauf von Zeit durch Interimsmaßnahmen hat sich bisher schon aus diesem Grund gelohnt. Echte Stabilisierung und neuerliches Wachstum werden jedoch nur erreichbar sein, wenn Klarheit über das langfristige Ziel besteht. Solange diese fehlt, setzt sich die Fragmentierung des Euro-Finanzmarktes fort, bis es zu einem zwar verzögerten, aber kaum weniger teuren, ungeordneten Zerfall von Euroland kommen müsste.

George Soros hält den bisherigen Weg für gescheitert und sucht einen Ausweg in der Klärung der Rolle Deutschlands. Strikt dichotomisch fordert er, Deutschland müsse entweder eine führende Rolle als Allesretter des europäischen Projekts übernehmen oder den Euroraum verlassen („Lead or Leave"). Die beträchtlichen Risiken dieses Konzeptes lägen allerdings kaum unter jenen eines Totalzerfalls der Währungsunion.

Der Schlüssel für einen Weg aus der Doppelfalle liegt daher in jenem Ansatz, den zuletzt die Europäische Zentralbank mit ihrem Tabubruch des unbegrenzten Anleihenkaufs unter strengen, vom ESM in seiner Funktion als faktischer Europäischer Währungsfonds überprüften Spielregeln beschritten hat. In Kombination mit eigenständigen, europäischen Schritten zu einer solideren Finanzmarktarchitektur eröffnete er die Chance auf eine langfristig tragfähige Basis der Gemeinschaftswährung.

Systemische Ursachen des Euro-Problems

Als die Finanzkrise im September 2008 nach dem Vorbeben der „Subprime"-Krise vollends zum Ausbruch kam, brachte dies nicht nur der „Realwirtschaft" handfeste Probleme. Auch die Staatshaushalte wurden von den hohen Folgekosten des Wachstumseinbruchs, der Bankenrettungen und Konjunkturstützungsprogramme erschüttert. Während die USA ihre rasant gestiegenen Refinanzierungserfordernisse mit Hilfe von Sondermaßnahmen der Notenbank bis heute zu äußerst niedrigen Zinskosten eindecken, geriet Europa übergangslos in eine komplexe, vieldimensionale Staatsschuldenkrise mit stark auseinanderlaufenden Zinskosten in den Mitgliedsstaaten. Fundamentale Schwächen in den bisherigen Konstruktionsmerkmalen der Gemeinschaftswährung wurden plötzlich überdeutlich sichtbar.

Als im Juli 2011 erstmals ausgesprochen wurde, dass ein Staatsbankrott des Euro-Mitgliedslandes Griechenland nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann, löste das eine massive Vertrauenskrise aus. Die Kosten für die Platzierung von Staatsanleihen der Euro-Länder passten sich nun – entgegen der ein Jahrzehnt lang gepflogenen Praxis – wieder der individuellen Verschuldungskapazität

Photo: GODANY

jedes einzelnen Staates an. Diese an sich normale Reaktion der Märkte wurde zu einem massiven Problem, war es doch in der fast ein Jahrzehnt währenden Phase der Zinsangleichung zwischen den Euro-Ländern zu sehr engen gegenseitigen Verflechtungen gekommen. Diese können nicht kurzfristig aufgelöst werden, ohne das Bankensystem und die mit ihm schicksalhaft verbundenen Staatshaushalte zusammenbrechen zu lassen.

Die in immer dichteren Abständen geschnürten Garantiepakete und Schutzschirme reichten bis zum Befreiungsschlag der EZB im September 2012 zur Wiederherstellung von Gläubigervertrauen nicht aus. Es kann letztlich erst dann wieder wachsen, wenn all jenen Ländern, die ihren Budgetkurs diszipliniert einhalten, eine deutliche Senkung ihrer vorübergehend überhöhten Zinslasten in Aussicht gestellt wird. Das Zeitfenster für einen solchen pragmatischen Mittelweg zwischen unerwünschter Schuldenunion und ungeordnetem Zerfall der Eurozone konnte schon wegen der zentrifugalen Eigendynamik auf den europäischen Märkten nicht unbegrenzt offen bleiben.

Antworten auf eine zu früh gestellte Frage

Europa sieht sich im Gefolge der Finanzkrise zur Beantwortung einer existentiellen Frage gezwungen, von der man gehofft hatte, sie würde sich mit der Zeit von selbst beantworten: Reicht ein Währungsverbund oder bedarf es einer Fiskalunion?

Da der konsequente Ausbau zum europäischen Bundesstaat mit vollständiger Fiskalunion wohl auf absehbare Zeit nicht mehrheitsfähig sein dürfte und andererseits der Rückfall in ein von nationalistischen Strategien geprägtes Patchwork-Europa keine wünschenswerte Option ist, wird die Suche nach einem Mittelweg zur Überlebensfrage: Wie kann nach dem externen Schock der Finanzkrise an einem europäischen Staatenbund *sui generis* weitergebaut werden, der noch auf absehbare Zeit über gemeinsame Verträge und Spielregeln funktioniert, zugleich aber zukunftsoffen für vertiefende Integrationsschritte bleibt?

Ob das gelingt, hängt entscheidend von der Analyse des bisherigen Geschehens ab. Sieht man die Verantwortung für die Sanierung des Staatsschuldenproblems einzig und allein bei den Mitgliedsstaaten, dann nimmt man konjunkturellen Abschwung und höhere Arbeitslosigkeit auch in jenen Ländern in Kauf, die sich zu seriöser Haushaltspolitik und rigiden Sparprogrammen durchgerungen haben.

War der ursächliche Auslöser der Schuldenkrise hingegen ein systemischer Schock – eben die Finanzkrise mit ihren Folgekosten –, erscheint auch die Suche nach systemischen Lösungen legitim. In diesem Kontext ist der von der EZB Anfang September 2012 getroffene Entschluss nachvollziehbar, Staatsanleihen auf den Sekundärmärkten unbegrenzt anzukaufen, um das Zinsniveau insbesondere für Spanien und Italien zu verringern. Die gleichzeitige Selbstbindung der EZB an einen Gleichklang mit dem ESM stellt sicher, dass die Unbegrenztheit nicht so wörtlich ausfallen wird müssen, wie sie klingt. Denn die Notenbankintervention greift letztlich nur, wenn auch der an die Beschlüsse der Parlamente gebundene ESM beim jeweils betroffenen Staat in Aktion treten kann.

Auf wenigstens indirekte Weise hat so die Europäische Zentralbank unter selbst auferlegten Bedingungen die Rolle eines „Lender of Last Resort" nicht nur für Banken, sondern auch für die Länder der Eurozone übernommen und befreit sich damit von einem entscheidenden Ausstattungsnachteil gegenüber der amerikanischen Notenbank.

Dauerhafte Finanzmarktstabilität wird am Ende nur bei konsequenter Verknüpfung einer gemeinschaftlichen Lösung der Staatsschuldenkrise mit entschlossener Reformarbeit im Finanzsystem erreichbar sein. Erst so eröffnet sich den verantwortlichen Politiker/innen eine neue Chance auf Legitimierung ihrer Arbeit am zuletzt aus dem Tritt geratenen Projekt Europa. ◁

Wilfried Stadler ist Unternehmensberater, Wirtschaftspublizist und Honorarprofessor an der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien.

Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses IV

CONFERENCE REPORT BY AGNIESZKA PASIEKA

Under the lead of Charles Taylor, the IWM organized its fourth conference on 'Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses' in June 2012. The three-day meeting proved the subject of secularization to be far from exhausted and demonstrated that the challenge to the comprehension of relations between secular and religious regimes lies not only in present-day socio-political developments, but in the very nature of social sciences. Conference presentations and discussions promoted critical reflection on those elements of the scholarly toolkit which, rather than widening our understanding of the studied phenomena, narrow it down.

The meeting consisted of four panels, dealing with different, albeit complementary, aspects of religion, secularization and secularism. The first panel, entitled 'Intercivilizational Comparisons of the Trajectories of Secularization and Modernization', took under scrutiny the dynamics of religious and ethnic identities in societies that traditionally belong to one of the Eastern Christian churches. The second session addressed the relation between religion and violence, engaging with both scholarly explanations of this relation and with the question of how violence is experienced and accounted by the people involved in it. Apart from dealing with the problem signaled in its title, the third session—'Secularity and Its Consequences for Social Sciences'—also discussed a parallel phenomenon, namely the influence of social sciences on (the politics of) secularity. The latter problem was further taken up in the last panel, entitled 'Secularist Regimes in the West', which focused mainly on the French concept of *laïcité* and its outcomes for the situation of Muslim migrants. Throughout the conference, participants strove to bridge reflections and findings from different disciplines—such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, theology and political sciences—, demonstrating both the importance and the necessity of an interdisciplinary perspective. Likewise, while referring to the latest scholarship on religion and secularization, speakers did not fail to look for novel readings of the classics, from the Scottish empiricists to Max Weber.

In the following, I shall highlight some recurrent topics of the conference. One of them was the discussion on the role of social sciences in the study of religion. Another was the problem of the conceptualization of social reality. Discussions proved that, as a matter of fact, each of the

Photo: IWM

descriptive and/or analytical concepts available may be interpreted and used in manifold ways—which also suggests that it might be misinterpreted and mis-used. Leaving aside the never-ending debate on how (if at all) to define religion, participants explored different possible understandings of the idea of 'belonging', 'religious identity' and '(religious) choice'. In so doing, they demonstrated these concepts to constitute a complex matrix of meanings, in which individuals', communities' and scholarly understandings intersect. Apart from emphasizing the importance of the socio-political contexts in which concepts are formed and used, several speakers called attention to the fact that the meaning of notions such as 'populist' or 'sectarian' may vary dramatically from place to place.

In a similar vein, conference participants showed that some of the attempts to best render social reality result in limiting, rather than broadening, its understanding. For example, does the emphasis on 'collective' aspects of some religious identities permit to understand the latter's persistence and specificity, or does it it rather prevent us from seeing the individual experience behind it, thus precluding the very process of understanding 'others' and the translation of human experiences by transforming the 'specific' into the 'exceptional'? Or, do the constant attempts to avoid committing the sin of 'Eurocentrism' lead to an inclusion of new perspectives, or is the very discussion on a 'European bias' itself biased, as it usually leaves out Eastern and South-Eastern European perspectives? In other words, the debates over the concepts—both their understanding and their usage—proved that the studies on religion and secularization mirror the dilemma which lies at the heart of social science, namely the problem of how to depict and explain social reality without, on the one hand, simplifying the picture of the social world by essentializing and reifying things, and, on the other hand, without rendering it intelligible by repeating *ad nauseam* that the reality is 'more complex'.

Connected with that problem was the second recurrent subject of the discussions, namely the problem of how observed facts can challenge widespread assumptions on the dynamics of religion and secularization. An outstanding example is France and the idea of *laïcité*. It was emphasized that although church-state relations in France are often presented as a model to be followed, a closer look reveals many drawbacks, which become even clearer in the context of debates on Islam, migration and accommodation of religious diversity. The image of 'secular' Europe and the 'secular' scholarship it produces was controversially discussed, especially when compared with countries such as India and Turkey, which, it was suggested, may constitute both a mirror and a lesson for many Western countries (and Western academia). At the same time, discussions proved the need to be careful while translating premises and observations from one context to another. It was shown, for instance, that dominant churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, may act in favor of other religious communities in one context but perceive them as a threat to their position in another. This observation provoked a lively debate on the over-legalization of religious policies and the difficulty to establish what kinds of practices are more beneficial in regulating relations between religion and politics—whether such issues should be dependent on court decisions, parliamentary debates or democratic referenda.

Another recurring issue was the question of scholarly responsibility, and particularly the fact that scholarly findings today tend to expand beyond the field of science, influencing not only mass media representations but also state discourse and policies. Crucially, such an expansion of scholarly knowledge often entails an abuse of this knowledge for purposes which are at odds with the intentions of social scientists'. 'Citizenship tests', debates on assimilation and discussions on (in)compatibility of different 'cultures' are only few examples of this particular transfer of knowledge.

This short overview clearly demonstrates the Janus-faced character as well as the difficulty to provide a clear-cut reading of the problems addressed. What it illustrates, too, are the contradictions inscribed into religious studies: striving to determine causal factors and explanatory categories, scholars end up questioning the very foundation of the explanatory project. Convinced that the normative discourse on secularization is a past story, researchers still find it hard to pursue the idea of value-free scholarship on religion. While being acknowledged as a discipline which helped to secularize the study of religion, social sciences have turned out to be still 'not robustly' secularized. However, it also seems to me that precisely the tension between the world's—and the scholarship's—disenchantment with religion and the different ways of their constant 're-enchantment' constitutes the most inspiring source of scholarly explorations. ◁

Agnieszka Pasieka holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from Martin Luther University, Halle/Saale, and was a Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM from October 2011 to July 2012.

Conference Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses IV

In June 2012 Charles Taylor convened the fourth conference under the auspices of his research focus "Religion and Secularism".

The series was launched in 2009, when the first meeting focused on the definition of secularization, secularism and various religious responses to developments in modern societies. The second meeting in 2010 continued to explore some of these notions but also introduced new questions to the discussion, i.e. regimes of secularism, analogues of secularization and associated religious developments outside the West, religious mobilization, and religion and violence. The third conference in 2011 went on to evaluate the terms used to describe secularity, secularism and forms of belief. In particular, the participants investigated more deeply the traditions, modes of religion and secularity of India and China as well as addressing the controversial issue of conceptions of an Islamic state. The fourth colloquium was devoted, among other things, to intercivilizational comparisons of the trajectories of secularization and modernization.

Charles Taylor: Beyond Toleration

LECTURE REPORT BY CLEMENA ANTONOVA



Photo: IWM

In many ways, the highlight of the IWM conference "Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses IV" (14–16 June 2012, see p. 11) was the talk given by Charles Taylor on the second day of the event. Taylor, one of the most eminent philosophers of our time and a Permanent Fellow at the IWM, was introduced first by Krzysztof Michalski, who congratulated Taylor on his 80th birthday (the evening was framed as a celebration of that jubilee), and then by Akeel Bilgrami (Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University). Bilgrami expressed the sentiment of many who are familiar with Taylor's work when he said that "even if you do not agree with his ideas, you have to admire him".

The title of Taylor's lecture, "Beyond Toleration", played on the major theme running through the presentation, namely that while nowadays we tend to think of ourselves as being beyond toleration, we face the real danger of falling below, i.e. becoming intolerant. An important notion in this process is what the speaker called "democratically-induced exclusion".

The structure of Taylor's talk is representative of much of his work. Just as in his award-winning *A Secular Age* (2007) he tells us the story of the rise of modern secularism from its medieval roots, so his lecture at the IWM took us back in history to the emergence of the concept of toleration, particularly religious toleration, in Antiquity, before tracing its evolution to the present day. The idea that certain kinds of religious practices, pursued by individuals or minority groups, endanger the whole of society goes back to a remote past. One of the two charges brought against Socrates was that he was inventing new gods, a crime carrying the death penalty. The most obvious victims of this attitude in the Roman Empire were the Jews and the Christians. Later, the "Wars of Religion" play on the same theme. Examples from history can be multiplied, but the Edict of Nantes for the toleration of Protestants in sixteenth-century France stands as a watershed. Even though it was eventually revoked by Louis XIV, the reaction against its suppression by large sections of the population, Protestants as well as Catholics, is revealing about a new understanding of political legitimacy, which is still very much the norm.

The history of the concept of toleration brings us to the problems it poses and, indeed, exposes in its contemporary uses. From a key value, toleration gradually acquired strongly negative connotations that made it a highly sensitive term. The implication that there is something disturbing and not quite right about what you tolerate, that you are, as it were, making an exception leaves many people (particularly those who are being "tolerated") offended. To explain this development Taylor adds further dimensions to his "story". Two alternatives to toleration have emerged in our time—first, what Taylor calls "the regime of rights" and, second, multiculturalism. Surely, people resent being "tolerated" if they consider their actions, practices, etc., a right. Further, from the perspective of multiculturalism, diversity has a positively-loaded meaning. If minority groups add richness to the community they share in, again, it is not very likely that they will accept the notion of toleration applied to them.

It is here—in the context shaped by the concepts of toleration, rights, and multiculturalism—that the crux of the matter lies, according to Taylor. Arguments for democratically-induced exclusion, which frequently rest on solid moral ground, can wittingly or unwittingly lead to "regimes of zero tolerance", in Taylor's words. His two examples are glaring illustrations of the problem he draws attention to. For the great majority of people, female genital mutilation and honor killings are not just unacceptable, but morally reprehensible. It is easy to understand the conviction that reactions against these practices, inspired by a commitment to basic democratic values and ethical norms, would carry. To make a stand against such practices seems required by the regime of rights and, indeed, by normal human decency. Such arguments are very characteristic of Islamophobia in Western societies. They rely, however, on a set of false generalizations and misconceptions. A whole religious (or other) minority group is associated with practices which may be followed only by a few. Are these practices religious in nature or are they a custom? By looking into such questions we de-stabilize, challenge, and unsettle many of the presuppositions that underlie arguments of democratically-induced exclusion. By ignoring them, we let the real danger that we fall below toleration lurk in the background of our societies.

At the end of the lecture, we came back full circle to an idea voiced at the very beginning. Centuries of intolerance have been sustained by the notion of purity. The Gods invented by Socrates were dangerous because they could, as it were, "contaminate" the spiritual world of the ancient Greeks. Nowadays, our fears grow from a rather different concern—we are afraid that those coming from outside might corrupt our democracy. "The cultural fear of the new, coded as a threat" appears to be with us, as much as it was with ancient peoples. ◁

Clemena Antonova is lecturer in Art History and Theory at the American University in Bulgaria and Lise Meitner Fellow at the IWM, where she pursues a project on Pavel Florensky and the nature of Russian religious philosophy.

Participants

Rajeev Bhargava, Director, Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi
Jonathan Benthall, Honorary Research Fellow, University College, London
Akeel Bilgrami, Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University, New York
Maria Birnbaum, Department of Social and Political Theory, European University Institute, Florence
John Bowen, Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor in Arts & Sciences, Washington University, St. Louis
Craig Calhoun, Professor of Sociology, University of New York; President of the Social Science Research Council, New York
Faisal Devji, Reader in Modern South Asian History, St Antony's College, Oxford
Alessandro Ferrara, Professor of Political Philosophy, Università degli Studi di Roma 'Tor Vergata'
Nilüfer Göle, Directrice d'Etudes, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologiques (CADIS), Paris
Chris Hann, Director, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale
Slavica Jakelić, Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, University of Virgina, Charlottesville
Sudhir Kakar, psychoanalyst and writer, Goa, India
Li Qiang, Professor, School of Government, Beijing University
Jocelyn Maclure, Professor of Philosophy, Université Laval, Québec
David Martin, Professor emeritus of Sociology, London School of Economics
Olivier Roy, Professor of Social and Political Theory, European University Institute, Florence
Kristina Stöckl, APART Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Universität Wien; Visiting Fellow, Robert Schuman Center of Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence
Charles Taylor, Professor emeritus of Philosophy, McGill University, Montréal; Permanent Fellow, IWM, Vienna
Tu Wei Ming, Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy and of Confucian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge/Mass.
Michael Warner, Professor of English and American Studies, Yale University, New Haven/Conn.

Program
Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses IV

Thursday, June 14

Welcome and Introduction:
Charles Taylor, McGill University, Montréal; IWM, Vienna

Intercivilizational Comparisons of the Trajectories of Secularization and Modernization
Apart from taking further the comparisons with India, China, and the Islamic world undertaken at previous conferences, this section was designed to 'zoom in', as it were, and take account of some of the important differences between societies central to, or closely related to, the 'West', most notably those of Eastern (or Greek) Orthodox religion.

Introductions:
Chris Hann, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale
Slavica Jakelić, University of Virginia, Charlottesville
Chair:
Kristina Stöckl, Universität Wien; European University Institute, Florence

Friday, June 15

Religion and Violence
Following up on earlier discussions that had centered on jihadism, this panel looked at other contexts in which religion has turned violent (or violence has recourse to religion).

Introductions:
Sudhir Kakar, Goa, India
David Martin, London School of Economics
Chair:
Faisal Devji, St Antony's College, Oxford

Secularity and Its Consequences for Social Science: an Interdisciplinary Approach
The issue of the nature of secularity merges with the vexed issue of how to study religion, one that affects sociology, political science, and history. Some propose to explain religious phenomena with the methods of socio-biology; others propose a reduction to economic or political considerations, whereas a growing body of scholars insists that any reductive account is simply inadequate.

Introductions:
Olivier Roy, European University Institute, Florence
Craig Calhoun, New York University
Chair:
Nilüfer Göle, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris

Lecture: Beyond Toleration
Speaker:
Charles Taylor, McGill University, Montréal; IWM, Vienna
Commentator:
Akeel Bilgrami, Columbia University, New York

Saturday, June 16

Secularist Régimes in the West
Being a crucial normative issue, the problem of defining the proper form of a secularist (laïque) régime was the focus of this concluding section. In particular, the discussion centered on legislation that is now being made or proposed in many Western societies concerning Muslim women's dress and other similar issues.

Introduction:
John Bowen, Washington University, St. Louis
Chair:
Alessandro Ferrara, Università degli Studi di Roma 'Tor Vergata'

With the generous support of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and the Institut Français de Vienne

Säkular oder postsäkular?

ZUR DIVERGENZ DER PERSPEKTIVEN VON JÜRGEN HABERMAS UND CHARLES TAYLOR **VON MARTIN ENDRESS**

Es ist heute viel von einer „Wiederkehr der Religion" die Rede. Die einen begrüßen sie, andere warnen vor ihr. Wo ist der Ort der Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft? Wie soll sie es mit der Religion halten? Über diese Fragen haben in letzter Zeit besonders Jürgen Habermas und Charles Taylor nachgedacht. Letzterer spricht von einem „säkularen Zeitalter", ersterer von einer „postsäkularen Kultur". Der Autor geht den Hintergründen dieser beiden gegenläufigen Diagnosen nach und setzt sie kritisch zueinander ins Verhältnis.

Die Religion ist in aller Munde. Entweder wird ihre „Wiederkehr" gefeiert oder aber die „Abkehr" von ihr ausgerufen – wobei beide Diagnosen zwischen Jubel und Warnung, zwischen Verzweiflung und Befreiung changieren. Diese Unentschiedenheit ist nicht nur eine Frage der jeweiligen „religiösen Musikalität", sondern ganz ebenso des jeweiligen Verständnisses von dem, was moderne Gesellschaften im Kern auszeichnet. In herausragender Form prägen diese Fragen insbesondere die jüngeren Arbeiten von Jürgen Habermas und Charles Taylor. Ihre Beiträge scheinen geradezu gegenläufige Diagnosen zu stellen: Während Taylor von einem „säkularen Zeitalter" spricht, identifiziert Habermas eine „postsäkulare Kultur".

Eine vergleichende Diskussion ihrer Beiträge muss deshalb die Ebenen auseinanderhalten, auf denen beide argumentieren. Taylor geht es um die Analyse der Veränderungen des menschlichen Selbst-, Sozial- und Weltverhältnisses im Zuge von Prozessen sozialen Wandels hin zu den Gegenwartsgesellschaften des nordatlantischen Typs. Habermas dagegen geht es um die Frage der Relevanz des Ausdruckspotentials religiöser Sprache(n) im Kontext eines strukturell auf diskursive Geltungsansprüche im Sinne weltanschaulicher Neutralitätskriterien zugeschnittenen Verständigungshorizontes. Dieser Unterschied im Ansatz der Analysen von Habermas und Taylor zeitigt Konsequenzen insbesondere für den Blick beider Autoren auf die spezifische Figuration, die sie mit dem Titel „Modernität" versehen: Habermas würdigt das unvollendete Projekt der Moderne im Kern als in seinen Elementaria zu bewahrende Erfolgsgeschichte. Taylor dagegen analysiert das Unbehagen an der Moderne, die er als ein fehlgeleitetes Projekt, im Kern als eine Verlustgeschichte betrachtet, insofern in deren Verlauf „heilsame und notwendige Wahrheiten über die *conditio humana* in Vergessenheit geraten" seien. Ist für Habermas die Entfaltung des gesellschaftlichen Strukturtyps der (westlichen) „Modernität" also ein Synonym für Fortschritt und Befreiung, so ist dieser in Taylors Augen Dokument der ‚Selbstenthauptung' einer möglichen gehaltvolleren, umfassenderen Modernität. Taylor wehrt sich gegen die selbstgefällige Verschüttung von Vollzugsmöglichkeiten des menschlichen Selbst-, Sozial- und Weltverhältnisses im Kontext der abendländischen Modernitätsvariante, während Habermas diese Modernitätsvariante bei allen identifizierbaren Vereinseitigungen als Versprechen bewahren will.



Photo: Erik Ravelo / Colors magazine "The Christ of Havana"

Irreduzibilität des Religiösen

Taylors umfassender Strukturphänomenologie der Genese von Modernität zufolge ist Säkularisierung *per definitionem* weder als ein notwendiger noch auch als ein automatischer, quasi selbstverständlicher Weg zur Aufklärung und zu einer vernunftgeleiteten Lebensform führender Weg zu beschreiben. Sie kann ganz ebenso zu totalitären Vereinseitigungen im Namen der Religionsfreiheit bzw. der Religionslosigkeit führen, und hat es getan. Säkularisierung bringt Taylors Auffassung zufolge gerade eine neue Karriere religiöser Orientierungen hervor – und zwar sowohl historisch wie in der Gegenwart. Sie kann damit in seinen Augen eben gerade nicht *in toto* als in Opposition zu religiösen Lebenshaltungen stehend begriffen werden. Die Säkularisierung der abendländischen Zivilisation vollzieht sich für Taylor als Effekt der in diesem Kulturkreis forcierten Aufhebung bzw. Nivellierung der Differenz von Alltag und Charisma, d.h. von religiös anspruchslosen Laien und religiös avancierten Virtuosen – mit dem Effekt einer Aufwertung des einfachen Gläubigen. Die neue ‚Unmittelbarkeit' zu Gott, die im Zuge dieser Aufwertung persönlicher Glaubensbeziehungen entdeckt wird, entwertet objektiv die Dimension institutioneller Vermittlung. Säkularisierung ist Taylors Auffassung zufolge deshalb auch nicht einfach als eine Geschichte des befreienden Niedergangs glaubensmäßiger, metaphysischer und spiritueller Überzeugungen zu verstehen. Unklar bleibt für eine solche Betrachtungsweise nämlich der normative Grund, von dem her eine entsprechende Befreiungsdiagnose gestellt werden könnte. Insgesamt spitzt Taylor seine Dekonstruktion in feiner Ironie auf die These vom „Mythos der Aufklärung" zu, demzufolge die Aufklärung aus dem Dunkel des Offenbarungsglaubens in das helle Licht reinen Vernunftwissens geführt habe.

Taylors Argumente richten sich gegen das, was man einen ‚anti-religiösen Affekt' bei Habermas nennen könnte. Gegenläufig zu Habermas möchte Taylor nicht die potentiellen negativen Folgen vermeintlich vor-diskursiver Behandlungen öffentlicher Belange erörtern, sondern eher umgekehrt die potentiellen negativen Folgen der (in seinen Augen unbegründeten) Privilegierung einer rein diskursiv-rationalen Erörterungstypik ins Zentrum seiner Überlegungen rücken. Entsprechend dieser Kritik an einem (kantianisch) vereinseitigten Verständnis der europäischen Aufklärung geht es Taylor darum, diese im Kern als Prozess einer elementaren Strukturverschiebung menschlichen In-der-Welt-Seins, also der grundlegenden Neujustierung des menschlichen Selbst-, Sozial- und Weltverhältnisses zu deuten. Für Taylor geht es unter dem Titel ‚Säkularität' nicht um das Verhältnis von Gesellschaft und Staat angesichts „säkularisierter öffentlicher Räume" und auch nicht um das Phänomen des „Niedergang[s] des Glaubens und der praktizierten Religion" in der Moderne, sondern um die Frage nach den „Bedingungen des Glaubens", um „eine neue Gestalt der zum Glauben veranlassenden und durch Glauben bestimmten Erfahrung". Taylor zufolge handelt es sich um eine in existentieller Hinsicht völlig andere Situation.

Religiosität als abzuarbeitender Restbestand

Demgegenüber begreift Habermas den Prozess sozialen Wandels hin zum Strukturtyp moderner Gesellschaften nicht nur generell als Prozess gesellschaftlicher und kultureller Rationalisierung, sondern konnotiert seine Beschreibung dieses Prozesses grundsätzlich positiv, insofern er darin sowohl die Befreiung der autonomen Vernunft als auch ihre differenzierte gesellschaftliche Institutionalisierung identifiziert. Problematisch wird es Habermas zufolge erst dann, wenn diese Rationalisierungsprozesse sich vereinseitigen, also monomanisch den zweckrationalen bzw. nutzenkalkulatorischen Rationalitätstyp dominant setzen. Dafür steht bei Habermas das Stichwort einer „Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt", einer systematischen Unterwanderung und Auflösung der sozio-kulturellen und sozio-moralischen Grundlagen menschlicher Gemeinschaftsbildung und Solidarität durch die alles überlagernden ‚Rationalitäten' kapitalistisch globalisierter Märkte, bürokratisch-zentralisierter Administrationen und systematischer Verrechtlichungen aller, auch religiöser Lebensbereiche in fortgeschritten modernen Gesellschaften.

Während für Taylor nicht erst bestimmte Zuspitzungen und Zuschnitte des okzidentalen Rationalisierungsprozesses ein Problem darstellen, sondern dieser Prozess selbst, stellt sich für Habermas die Analyse unserer Gesellschaften als im Kern säkular als *conditio sine qua non* ihrer Etablierung als demokratischer politischer Gesellschaften unter dem Signum der Gleichheit von im Medium des Rechts vereinigten Bürgerinnen und Bürgern dar. Die Stoßrichtung seiner Argumentation richtet sich auf „eine weltanschaulich neutralisierte und in diesem Sinne säkulare Ebene der Verständigung", deren es in seinen Augen „für das Gelingen einer interkulturellen Verständigung über Grundsätze der politischen Gerechtigkeit für eine multikulturelle Weltgesellschaft" bedarf. Die Frage nach der Signatur von Postsäkularität erfährt hier im klaren Unterschied zu Taylor eine metatheoretische, letztlich diskursanalytische Wendung. „Postsäkular" wird bei Habermas zur Chiffre für einen Typus von Reflexivität, d.h. für einen „Bewußtseinswandel", der a) von einer ‚bis auf Weiteres' bleibenden Bedeutung von Religion ausgeht, der b) den Beitrag von Religionen als ergänzenden sensiblen „Interpretationsgemeinschaften" in pluralistischen Gesellschaften respektiert und der c) im Kontext der laufenden Umwandlung gerade auch europäischer Gesellschaften zu Einwanderungsgesellschaften die Eingewöhnungsschwierigkeiten für durch eher traditionelle Religiosität geprägte Migranten in säkularen Gesellschaften berücksichtigt. Zugespitzt formuliert: Empirische Evidenzen lassen Habermas für

Fortsetzung auf Seite 15

ⓘ Lecture Series: Beyond Myth and Enlightenment

The "return of the religious" has haunted recent intellectual debates. What does the new presence of religion mean for the modern self-conception that equates the "modern" with the "secular"?

Organized Crime: A Flawed American Concept

BY STEFAN POPOV

Stefan Popov spent six months as a Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2011/12, doing research on the concepts of organized crime and anti-corruption policy. This text to a great extent derives from the work he conducted at the Institute.

The concept

There are many different concepts of organized crime. Nowadays they are continuing to multiply and to produce theoretical paradigms around themselves. Despite all differences, what most of those definitions agree upon is that, first, organized crime is about illegal activity; second, this activity is aimed at making profit; third, it is systematic in character and sustained over time; and finally, it is based on a conspiracy of a group of people.

This definition has been produced as a result of a conceptual move from crime to unconventional crime; then to an idea of the organization of crime; further on, to organized crime; and finally, to the organized criminal group. At the first level, we have a vague understanding of what is inadmissible and criminal. At the second level, we make a distinction between conventional and unconventional crime. At the third level, unconventional crime is qualified as organized crime, which refers to processes and phenomena in social contexts, but does not yet indicate a bearer, an agent. And at the fourth level, organized crime is rendered more concrete through the figure of the organized criminal group. This fourth step is unavoidable at the moment when the concept of organized crime is to be codified in a penal code.

This move presents a monstrous reduction. The phenomenon of the organization of crime relates to a very broad and complex societal process. Substituting the subject of the criminal group for this process is a brutal simplification made for the purpose of meeting requirements of the penal code. To become subject to the penal code, a perpetrator, an agent is needed. Hence the move from the phenomenon of the organization of crime to the collective agent, i.e. the criminal group. This group-agent raises many questions and also creates difficulties, confusions, and contradictions, and we need to ask ourselves how this has happened and what has actually happened.

A frame from "The Enforcer", a film by Bretaigne Windust (1951), with Humphrey Bogart and Roy Roberts

Photo: IMDE

An American story

'Organized crime' is an American concept that was subsequently exported outside America (see Woodiwiss, 2003) and, eventually, became a global metaphor of criminal justice policy. Its story was an American story almost until 1990, when it began to expand exponentially and acquired global dimensions.

The concept of organized crime appeared in the US for the first time around 1895–1896, above all in the sermons of the social moralists. Later, in 1919, the wave of moral reformism led to the prohibition of alcohol. This epochal event, the Eighteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, is one of the most paradoxical acts known in the history of democratic governance.

After World War II, in 1950, the Senate established a committee, chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, to investigate crime in the US. In its report it claimed that a national crime syndicate had come into existence. It was big enough to cover the whole territory of the Union.

The next committee, operating in 1957–1963, and chaired by Senator John McClellan, managed to convince Joe Valachi, a minor mafioso, to testify about organized crime. The Valachi hearings were published in unprecedented numbers. They were also the first to provide empirical evidence and offer a picture of how the 'national crime syndicate' operated.

In 1967 President Johnson established the next crime commission. It was politically very ambitious and quickly put together a rather amusing report. The commission claimed that not only did the crime syndicate exist, it also consisted of exactly 24 groups dispersed evenly across the territory of the US. The hysteria over organized crime reached its peak at that time.

It is this report that led, in 1969–1971, to the adoption of the first ever legislation against organized crime, the so-called RICO laws (from the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). To persuade Congress to pass RICO, President Nixon introduced an emotional resolution insisting that without this legal instrument the Americans and their country were doomed. In this resolution Nixon declared that to prevent the death of the US, the 24 core groups of La Cosa Nostra had to be liquidated.

In 1983–1986, the Reagan administration established yet another commission chaired by Judge Irving R. Kaufman. It developed the view that organized crime was not just a specific American phenomenon. It involved international tendencies, even though the latter might be structurally identical to the American ones. In fact, the American view was extrapolated to the outside world for the first time in this phase. This turn happened in the context of the war on drugs declared by Reagan.

Consequences

The consequences of this American story of the concept are hard to underestimate. The possibility of the organization of crime has been reduced to a constructed agent which can be introduced into the penal codes but which is sociologically flawed.

The very idea of an "organization of crime" is a non-trivial idea. And limiting the possibility expressed through it to a rather ordinary objective structure such as organized criminal groups is a giant reduction. As a result, significant sectors of the organized crime process remain outside the visual field of the policy sphere. For example, sectors of politics and of public administration that are largely infiltrated by crime remain beyond the scope of this concept.

Let us look more closely at the structure of the concept itself.

At the first level, we have a criminal act which lawyers call a predicate crime. This is crime per se—for example, smuggling, forced prostitution or money laundering. These actions constitute conventional felonies as covered by the standard penal code.

At the second level, the concept of the organized criminal group comes into play. It performs the acts defined at the first level. The very participation in an organized crime group is criminalized; it is also a crime. A given individual may not be laundering money on his or her own, but if he/she is a member of a money-laundering group, he/she may be charged with participating in it.

Still, in the context of democratic penal codes, the organized criminal group remains a loose metaphor. In constitutional states, group guilt is inadmissible and the penal code follows the requirement that guilt must be individual. Hence the third level: individualizing guilt and applying it to individuals, to the individual members of the group.

This three-layered concept and the relations within the structure create many uncertainties and difficulties.

The main flaw of the image of the criminal group is the transformation of a social process that is quite complex into an external threat on which one can wage war. The militarization of the policy process is sometimes present in a highly perspicuous way in political discourse: President Reagan waged his famous "war on drugs" and, twenty years later, President George W. Bush declared his infamous "war on terror". The application of such policy metaphors can result in excesses whereby the expression "war" is taken in a literal way and, as was the case with the Iraq War, leads to a full-fledged war on the ground. This risk also holds for organized crime groups.

Contrary to the initial objectives, the reduction of organized crime as a societal process to an organized criminal group as a collective subject has created a problematic concept that gradually took root in penal codes. The three-layered concept proves difficult to understand and apply, especially in new democracies. I would not blame prosecutors, investigators, and courts for failing to easily and quickly secure effective convictions for organized crime.

Further, unconventional crime has been perceived and conceptualized as an external threat to society. This harmful and misleading presumption has been widely and aggressively promoted in public. The fact, however, is that unconventional crime has never been an external threat. One can safely say that virtually in all countries it has been a complex risk process originating and unfolding within societies.

The concept of the organized criminal group inevitably creates a militarized context for criminal justice policies. They are conducted as warfare, hence the popular war metaphors mentioned above. Of course, since this is a false image, such policies turn out ineffective and develop rather on a symbolic level. The policy direction, which involves either symbolic or real warfare, or even both, seems unavoidable, however:

external threats necessitate military operations and they have to be undertaken. In countries like Bulgaria, Special Forces undertake massive and very aggressive campaigns against criminal networks, police in balaclava helmets attack alleged criminal headquarters, make tens or hundreds of arrests, and this leads to nothing except spectacular images for media consumption.

And finally, this logic asks for an inevitable empowerment of the police and, generally, of the institutions of criminal justice policy at the expense of ignoring crime prevention based on a careful study of the relevant factors. The unification performed by the concept of an "organized crime group" directly leads to a strengthening of the role of the police, which, under civilian conditions, becomes an equivalent of the army.

The most unconventional aspect of this concept is the transformation of a social form into a criminal one. According to the classical principles of modern rule of law, only individuals can be bearers of guilt. Guilt is individual by definition, absolutely; even etymologically, insofar as 'individual' means 'indivisible'. In this sense, guilt must be reduced to a perpetrator who cannot be 'divided' further. The presumption of European modernity is that the human individual is the final instance that can bear guilt. By introducing the concept of 'organized crime', however, the individual has been replaced with a social relationship. And it is this social relationship that becomes the bearer of criminal acts, the perpetrator. This move creates a serious problem for the criminal justice process.

The introduction of a social relationship poses a peculiar problem, namely, the need to construct the identity of a group. This of course is a hermeneutically interesting problem, but it is beyond the powers of the traditional investigating magistrate, prosecutor, and judge. They must somehow imagine this agent, but unlike the identical individual, that agent is different and specific in each case, not identical and not indivisible. And it is only after the identity—that is to say, the agency—of the group has been constructed that the prosecution and, ultimately, the courts can take action and determine the individual guilt of each member. Establishing the identity of the group implies depicting the internal command mechanisms, dynamics, arrangements, and all other factors and conditions that integrate the criminal conduct of the group. The very life of the group needs to be depicted. But this is a task that has to be performed on a case-by-case basis. And it is a very difficult task.

A policy bubble?

If we look at the twentieth century, we will notice a distinct tendency towards an accumulation of international legal instruments, of international juridification. The expansion of legal instruments at the international level is liberal-democratic in character. It is related to the presumption that entire categories of problems, which used to be solved in a political way, on an ad-hoc basis, by means of concrete negotiations, skillful diplomacy or brute force, can be regulated and given statutory solutions by inscribing them into some legal framework. The expansion of the concept of organized crime groups must also be reviewed in this broad context, focusing less on the local formation of the concept than on its global role.

This also holds for the expansion of criminal justice instruments, and generally, for the expansion of international criminal law.

In the initial stages of developing an international criminal law, the latter was associated with a rather narrow purpose. The aim was to extend prosecution and bring to justice the top command, which was not directly involved in wartime crimes but was responsible for them. The general idea of the Nuremberg trial was to trace the chain of command up to the highest levels that do not include direct perpetrators. That is why at the main trial at Nuremberg, the defendants were 22 'major war criminals', who were tried for being at the top of the Nazi chain of command.

This standard—tracing the chain of command of political crimes—was later applied also to the phenomenon of the organization of crime. It was introduced in a wholly pragmatic way, with the aim to charge those who—like Al Capone, for instance—cannot be caught because they are not direct perpetrators. The purpose was to reach up to the highest command of a criminal organization.

At present, however, there are serious disputes and divisions over this transformation of unconventional crime into a collective subject of the criminal group. In certain contexts, notably at some stages of US criminal justice policy after WWI, it achieved a relative success. At present, however, scientific and policy communities are becoming increasingly critical of this concept, regarding it as another public-policy bubble.

The main reason for this is that the price seems to be too high. Even from the point of view of criminal justice policies, the paradigm carries serious flaws. For it limits the phenomenon of the organization of crime to the point of excluding various other criminal processes, such as massive bank accounting frauds, state institution capture in new democracies, high-level political corruption, etc. Unconventional crime is in fact much broader, more interesting, diverse, and complex.

In the epochal and epic story of the policy concept discussed here, there are also big winners: the Hollywood movie industry in the first place. The idea of organized crime has inspired some of the most popular stories in movie history. Not the least, the genre has endowed US gangsters with a sense of heroic identity and made quite some of them addicted moviegoers. ◁

Stefan Popov is founder and Executive Director of RiskMonitor, a non-profit, non-governmental public policy institute in Sofia, working on the reduction, control and prevention of organized crime and high-level political and institutional corruption.

Fortsetzung Martin Endreß von Seite 13

eine gewisse Übergangszeit noch für ein Schutzprogramm von religiösen Weltverständnissen plädieren. Der Bedarf für Religion bzw. für religiöse Sprache ist einer bis auf Weiteres: Sie wird benötigt, bis die säkulare Sprache einer diskursivierten Vernunft ihr Ausdruckspotential vollumfänglich entfaltet hat und so sämtliche Lebensvollzüge und Weltverhältnisse vollgültig und transkulturell verständlich zu explizieren vermag.

Ausgrenzender Humanismus?

Die im Kern fundamentale Differenz zwischen Habermas und Taylor liegt in der Ausdeutung des Anpassungsdrucks des westlichen Modernitätstypus durch kulturelle Pluralisierungsprozesse: Für Taylor scheint er auf eine Aufforderung zu erweiterter religiöser Sensibilität hinauszulaufen, für Habermas dagegen Anlass zur Forcierung einer Übersetzung in säkular-diskursive Sprachspiele zu sein. Der Annahme nicht substituierbarer Relevanz religiösen Weltzugangs bei Taylor steht somit bei Habermas eine Relevanzannahme „bis-auf-Weiteres" gegenüber.

Taylors Kritik am Säkularisierungstheorem setzt im Unterschied zu Habermas nicht intern, sondern extern an. Taylor votiert „gegen [die] Verstümmelung" menschlicher Resonanzfähigkeit unter der Herrschaft des „ausgrenzenden Humanismus". Eines Humanismus, der den modernen Menschen der Fähigkeit zur Transzendenz zu berauben scheint. In der Privilegierung menschlichen Vernunftvermögens liegt für Taylor der Aufstieg der Leitidee dieses „ausgrenzenden Humanismus" begründet, dessen Verdrängung des Religiösen unter der Formel der Autonomie dann als Selbstbestimmung, Selbstbeherrschung und Selbststeuerung des neuzeitlichen Subjekts gefeiert wird. Für Taylor, der sich in seinem gesamten Werk der hermeneutisch sensiblen Erhellung menschlicher Lebensformen widmet, kann eine Analyse, die sich der Selbstbeschreibung unserer Gegenwart als einer säkularisierten zuwendet, die damit behaupteten Konturen weder einfach differenzierungsanalytisch verbuchen (also als Geschichte der institutionellen Trennung von Staat und Kirche mit der Etablierung der weltanschaulichen Neutralität des neuzeitlichen westlichen Staates), noch kann sie diese in seinen Augen einfach verfallsgeschichtlich als Erosion gläubiger Welthaltungen und (institutionell geformter) gläubiger Praxis (‚des Glaubens') deuten. Vielmehr muss eine phänomenal adäquate, hermeneutisch sensible Beschreibung Taylor zufolge den abendländischen Säkularisierungsprozess – wenn er sich denn als historisch vollzogener nachweisen lässt – als Prozess der Veränderung des menschlichen Welt-, Sozial- und Selbstverhältnisses aufzeigen können. Taylors Verständnis von Säkularität zielt nicht wie dasjenige von Habermas auf die analytischen Konturen einer Diskursform, sondern auf einen Modus des Weltzugangs.

In zeitdiagnostischer Absicht haben wir es Taylor zufolge deshalb auch nicht im Kern mit der Frage der Legitimationsgrundlagen zu tun, sondern mit einer Veränderung der Formen menschlichen Erlebens. Die Verlustanzeige gilt einem „Gefühl der Fülle [fullness]", einem „Zustand des Erlebens" in „unmittelbarer Gewißheit", den wir – so Taylor – im Zuge der westlichen Zivilisationsgeschichte „großenteils verschlissen haben". Es geht Taylor damit um eine im Vergleich zu Habermas ganz anders gelagerte Ebene der Untersuchung und des Blickes auf Prozesse der Säkularisierung. Taylors systematische These hat zumindest den Vorzug, dass sie aufgrund ihrer Sensibilität für Erfahrungskonstellationen beides erklären kann: sowohl den Niedergang etablierter, traditioneller Formen des Religiösen wie auch die Karriere neuer Formen religiöser Weltbezüge – eine Gleichzeitigkeit des vermeintlich Ungleichzeitigen gerade in denselben Regionen der Welt wie etwa in Europa. Es geht Taylor um eine Schicht menschlicher Existenz, die von den Prozessen, die gewöhnlich unter dem Etikett „Säkularisierung" verbucht werden, im Kern betroffen ist und deren Veränderungen seiner Auffassung zufolge damit zugleich den zentralen Aspekt dieses irrigerweise zumeist ausschließlich auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene verorteten Wandels ausmachen.

Erweiterung der Vernunft vs. Sehnsucht nach Transzendenz

Ein Vergleich der Auffassungen von Taylor und Habermas hinsichtlich der Frage der (Post-)Säkularität führt damit auf sechs Differenzpunkte. Ihre Positionen unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich 1) ihrer Reflexionsebenen, 2) des jeweiligen analytischen Focus, 3) der jeweils leitenden Modernitätsperspektive, 4) der eingenommenen Perspektive zu einer Kritik der Aufklärung, 5) der Einschätzung der Relevanz von Religion sowie 6) des die Argumentationen anleitenden Verständnisses von Säkularität. Und insgesamt kommt sicherlich die grundsätzlich eingenommene Perspektive als Differenzmarkierung zwischen beiden hinzu: Während Habermas mit dem Blick einer als lernbegierig begriffenen diskursiven Vernunft analysiert, die ihren Artikulationsrahmen extensiv erweitern möchte, beobachtet Taylor aus dem Horizont einer Motivlage menschlichen Lebens, die sich aus den Quellen einer „Sehnsucht" für eine „über das Immanente hinausgehenden" Perspektive, aus einem originären Gemeinschaftsbedürfnis und dem Ringen um eine „bedeutungsvolle Sprache" speist. Das eine wie das andere lässt sich nicht gegeneinander ‚verrechnen', und beide lassen die scheinbar gegenläufigen Diagnosen von Habermas und Taylor als unterschiedlichen Phänomenorientierungen geschuldet erkennen. Den konstitutiven Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Religiosität geht jedoch nur Taylor nach. ◁

Martin Endreß ist Professor für Soziologie an der Universität Trier. Der Beitrag basiert auf einem Vortrag, den der Autor am 3. Mai 2012 in der Reihe *Beyond Myth and Enlightenment. Re-thinking Religion in the Modern World* am IWM gehalten hat.

"Quiet Invaders" Revisited

BY GÜNTER BISCHOF

On June 19, 2012, Austrian historian Günter Bischof presented to the IWM community and guests the results of his research on Austrian immigrants/refugees to the US "from the Burgenländer to Schwarzenegger".

New York, 1942: conference of the Austrian Association: Schuschnigg, Cernin, Zernatto, Rott, Hildebrand, Fuchs

Photo: Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes

In 1968 the American cultural diplomat E. Wilder Spaulding, who had served in Vienna for a number of years during the postwar occupation, published his book *Quiet Invaders.* His principal argument was that Austrian immigrants to the United States learned English quickly and assimilated easily into American society. They did not associate much with fellow Austrians once they had established themselves in American society and no longer identified with their homeland. Consequently, most Americans know little about the distinguished community of Austrian-Americans of the first (e.g. Josef Schumpeter, Karl Lazarsfeld) or second (e.g. Eliot Spitzer, Ben Bernanke) generations, maybe with the exception of Arnold Schwarzenegger.

While research on the immigration history of Austrians in the vast process of the "peopling of America" usually concentrates on quantitative social history (push and pull factors), biographical and prosopographical scholarship is rare. The Graz sociologist Christian Fleck's *Transatlantische Bereicherung: Die Erfindung der empirischen Sozialwissenschaft* (2007) is a rare example where a cohort of Austrian (and German) sociologists is studied in great detail, as are essays in Friedrich Stadler's massive study of World War II refugee cohorts *Vertriebene Vernunft.* Kati Marton's very readable prosopography *The Great Escape: Nine Jews Who Fled Hitler and Changed the World* (2007) is a model study of a collective biography of a cohort of Hungarian refugees to the U.S. and Great Britain in the 1930s (among them Leo Szilard and John v. Neumann), all of whom had spectacular careers of great distinction. A selection of Austrian immigrant biographies to the U.S. will show that Spaulding's thesis of rapid assimilation is too simplistic.

The migration patterns of Austrian immigrants to the U.S. have been extended and complex, ever since Protestants were expelled from Salzburg in 1734 and settled near Savannah, Georgia. Between 1820 and 1960, some 4.2 million "Austrians" (including all ethnic groups from the late Habsburg Monarchy) left for the U.S. for religious, social, economic and political reasons. On the eve of World War I, immigrants from the Dual Monarchy were the largest immigrant cohort to the U.S. As the noted Vienna migration historian Annemarie Steidl has shown, between 1901 and 1910, 2.1 million people emigrated from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to the U.S. (some 20 percent were Polish, 15 percent German, and 14 percent Hungarian and Czech, respectively). In the five years after World War I, before the U.S. established strict quota laws to reduce immigration, 24,300 Burgenländer emigrated to the U.S. and continued the exodus from one of the poorest regions of Hungary/Austria. Today some 80,000 descendants of Burgenländer live in the U.S. (many in the Chicago area).

In the 1930s the trickle of Jewish refugees from Austria grew into a flood after the Anschluss. Between 1938 and 1941, 29,000 Austrian Jews managed to snag visas to the U.S. (among them 418 Jews who were fired from Austrian universities). After the Anschluss, the U.S. Mission in Vienna was downgraded to a Consulate and became a flash point of human misery. Between March 21 and April 1, 1938, only 800 among 25,000 mostly Jewish visa applicants were interviewed. Raoul Hilberg, who would become one of the most famous historians of the holocaust after the war, and his family were among them.

The strict quota law of 1924 stopped a mass influx of Jewish refugees to America. The U.S. wanted productive potential citizens who would not become "public charges." Immigrants needed "affidavits" from American relatives or friends promising to take care of them if they could not find a job. The Austrian Socialist leader Josef Buttinger, from the wealth of his wife Muriel Gardiner, admirably provided dozens of Austrian political refugees with affidavits and often with a free apartment upon arrival in New York. American Foundations like Ford and Rockefeller along with wealthy private donors helped hundreds of academics find jobs at universities and partially paid their salaries. However, some writers like Friedrich Torberg never adjusted to the U.S. and returned after the war.

During the post-World War II occupation decade, 4,000 to 5,000 young Austrian women married American soldiers and left with them for the U.S. ("Ami whores", "GI-brides"). In the desperate hunger years after the war, American soldiers were not only attractive as young men (when few young men were available in Austria), but they also offered the promise of material well-being and a better future. Some of these women returned when marriages failed. Most stayed and raised families. In the first two postwar decades, the trickle of Austrian ski champions and ski instructors from before the war turned into another exodus. Dozens of young Austrian skiers developed ski schools and ski resorts all over the U.S. (Pepi Stiegler in Jackson Hole, WY and Pepi Gramshammer in Vail, CO). Thus, Austrian ski pioneers helped develop the American Alpine skiing industry.

With the growing prosperity of postwar Austria, fewer Austrians left the country to look for a better life overseas. When Schwarzenegger left in 1968, Austrian emigrants to the U.S. no longer used up their country's allotted immigrant quota. He and Wolfgang Puck, who emigrated in the 1970s and became a celebrated chef and restaurateur in Los Angeles, went to the U.S. with a minimum of education and a maximum of dormant entrepreneurial skill. They were still young men hungry for material advancement and quick riches. Owing to their success as bodybuilder/actor and chef, they correspond to the notion of quick assimilation, even though it took Schwarzenegger 15 years to attain American citizenship.

More recently, the trickle of Austrians emigrating to the U.S. is looking for honing their professional skills in research labs and universities. Many of them end up in American institutions of higher learning because of more advanced professional training and promising academic and/or business careers. But some return home again if the right job offer comes from back home. Norbert Bischofberger is an outstanding example of spectacular success in Silicon Valley in the biotechnology sector. This organic chemist

first went to the U.S. for postdoc research in California and Harvard in the 1980s. When the start-up Gilead Science offered him the job as research director, he joined and led the company to great success with compounds such as Tamiflu and Aids pharmaceuticals.

As Christian Fleck has shown, many factors contribute towards Austrians *"establishing"* themselves in the U.S. Cosmopolitan open-mindedness is crucial (*Heimweh* is fatal), as is age. Among the refugees of the 1930s, younger people assimilated more quickly than older people. Some professions adjusted more easily than others: mathematicians (Kurt Gödel and members of the *Wiener Kreis*), chemists (Carl Djerassi) and physicists (Viktor Weisskopf) quickly felt at home, being familiar with the research labs of their American colleagues, whereas doctors and lawyers needed to pass professional entrance exams and encountered many obstacles to relaunching their careers (the lawyer Robert Kann became a historian). Immigrants who brought some wealth adjusted more quickly than poor arrivals. Many of those who had been victimized—such as the shoah survivor Ruth Klueger—clearly had no intention of ever returning again to their native Vienna. Writers such as Franz Werfel and Stefan Zweig found it impossible to write in a new language, Vicky Baum quickly succeeded. Some, like Schwarzenegger and the scholar Harry Zohn, felt as though mentally they had been born Americans and therefore took like fish to water when they came to the U.S. The Burgenländer and shoah survivors had the advantage of entering within larger "we groups", others could not identify with such familiar in-groups.

Spaulding's *Quiet Invaders* continues to be a good starting point to study Austrian immigrants to the U.S. but it is high time to refine and differentiate his arguments by both identifying distinct immigrant cohorts and assessing individual life stories. ◁

Günter Bischof is a native of Austria and holds a PhD in American History from Harvard University. He is research professor of history and director of Center Austria at the University of New Orleans. He was an IWM guest scholar in June 2012.

Fellows and Guests *05–08 2012*

Clemena Antonova
Lise Meitner Fellow (June 2011–May 2013)

Lecturer in Art History and Theory, American University in Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad; FWF project leader

Pavel Florensky and the Nature of Russian Religious Philosophy

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Tamara Banjeglav
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Balkan Studies, University of Ljubljana

(Re)Membering War Victims. Commemoration Practices and Divided Memory of Victimization in Post-War Croatia

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Karol Berger
EURIAS Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Osgood Hooker Professor in Fine Arts, Stanford University

After Reason: Wagner contra Nietzsche

Günter Bischof
Guest (June 2012)

Professor of History, University of New Orleans

'Quiet Invaders' Revisited: A Collective Biography of Austrian Immigrants to the United States in the 20th Century and Their Contributions to America

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Hanna Bonnekoh
Guest (August–September 2012) „Jugend denkt" Program

Student in Medicine, Charité University, Berlin

Svetlana Boym
Guest (May 2012), Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow

Curt Hugo Reisinger Professor of Slavic and Comparative Literature, Harvard University

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Tihomir Cipek
Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow (January–June 2012)

Professor of Political Science, University of Zagreb

Founding Myth and Democratic Order in Croatia

Sergej Danilov
Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (April–June 2012)

Journalist; PR consultant, Forum of Independent Opinions (www.fnn.sk); Project Coordinator, Institute for Intercultural Dialogue (www.ipmd.sk), Bratislava

Education as the Limit. The Case of Ilona Horváthová

James Dodd
Patočka Research Associate (June–July 2012)

Associate Professor of Philosophy, The New School for Social Research, New York

Europe, Critique, and Religious Life. Jan Patočka's Reflections on Christianity

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Irina Dolgopolova
Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2012)

Associate Professor of Economics, Baikal National University of Economics and Law, Irkutsk

The Relationship between Democratic Institutions and Human Capital Development in Eastern Europe

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Alexander Etkind
Guest (May 2012), Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow

Reader in Russian Literature and Cultural History, Department of Slavonic Studies, King's College, Cambridge

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Ludger Hagedorn
Research Fellow, IWM, Vienna (December 2010–February 2013)

Lecturer in Philosophy, New York University Berlin

Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka's Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

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Marion Heinz
Guest (June 2012)

Professor of Philosophy, University of Siegen

Philip Howe
EURIAS Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

Associate Professor of Political Science and Fulbright Program Advisor, Adrian College, Michigan

Well-Tempered Discontent: Democratic Institutions and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in a Multinational Empire

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Helena Jedrzejczak
Józef Tischner Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2012)

PhD candidate in Sociology / History of Ideas, University of Warsaw

The Political Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer

Tom Junes
Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (December 2011–September 2012)

Visiting Lecturer in History, KU Leuven; Visiting Researcher, Warsaw University

Rebellion, Hope, and Frustration: Coming of Age When the Cold War Ended

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Julia Komleva
Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2012)

Assistant Professor of History, Ural State University, Yekaterinburg

Forming a "Supranational" Consciousness: the Experience of Educational Policies in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire during the Nineteenth Century

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Katherine Lebow
Visiting Fellow (July–December 2012)

Historian, Vienna

The Nation Writes: Polish "Social Memoir" and the Project of Everyman Autobiography from the Great Depression to the Holocaust

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Sokol Lleshi
CEU Junior Visiting Fellow (April–July 2012)

PhD candidate in Political Science, Central European University, Budapest

Archiving Communism: Institutional Memory Production in CEE: The Cases of the Czech Republic and Romania

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Fyodor Lukyanov
Guest (August 2012), Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow

Editor-in-chief of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs,* Moscow

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Olha Martynyuk
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Ukrainian History, National Technical University of Ukraine "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute"

Ethnic Conflict, Urban Development, and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie in Late Imperial Kiev

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Boris Mezhuev
Guest (July 2012), Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow

Assistant Professor of Russian Philosophy, Moscow State University

"Perestroika 2" as a Neurosis. What Prevents Russian Political Modernization?

Margus Ott
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (July–September 2012)

Translator, PhD candidate in Philosophy, University of Tallinn, Estonia

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Selected Writings, French / Latin > Estonian

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Agnieszka Pasieka
Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–July 2012)

Postdoctoral Fellow in Social Anthropology, Institute of Slavic Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

Seven Ways to God. The Dynamics of Religious Pluralism in Rural Southern Poland

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Claire Perryman-Holt
Junior Visiting Fellow (June–August 2012)

Doctorante, Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, rattachée au Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin

The Question of History: Patočka as Reader of Heidegger. The "Crisis" of 20th-Century Europe from a Phenomenological Perspective

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Nikolai Petrov
Guest (May 2012), Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow

Scholar in Residence (Political Science, Carnegie Moscow Center

Russia in the World. Scenarios for the Future

David Petruccelli
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in History, Yale University

International Criminal Policing in Europe, 1890–1950

Irina Prokhorova
Guest (May 2012)

Founder and Director of the journal *New Literary Review;* and of the NLO publishing house, Moscow

Russian Society in Quest of Its Path for Freedom

Elizabeth Ann Robinson
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Speaking in Circles: Metaphysics and Mathematics in *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*

Ben Roth
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

The Narrativizing Self

Nora Ruck
Guest (July–September 2012)

Lecturer in Psychology, University of Vienna

Socio-Scientific Controversies on Gender and Gender Differences in Context

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Oleg Shenderyuk
CAPITO Research Associate (July–August 2012)

BA Student in Economics and Mathematics, New York University Abu Dhabi

Is There Such a Thing as Eastern European Capitalism?

Natalia Skradol
Junior Visiting Fellow (March–August 2012)

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Center for German Studies, European Forum, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Discursive Framing of Zones in Europe

Wojciech Starzyński
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (April–June 2012)

Adjunct, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

Jan Patočka, Irena Krońska: The Patočka—Krońska Correspondence (1958–1973), French / Czech > Polish

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Martina Steer
Visiting Fellow (February–November 2012)

ÖAW APART-Stipendiatin (Geschichte)

Memory Transnational. The Moses Mendelssohn Jubilees, 1829–1986

Fellows and Guests

The IWM offers a place for research and scholarly debate across borders and disciplines. Its various fellowship programs are thus a fundamental part of the Institute's work. Each year, 50–60 Visiting Fellows, Junior Visiting Fellows and Guests—mainly from Eastern and Western Europe as well as from North America—are awarded fellowships to pursue their individual research projects while working in residence at the IWM as members of an international and multidisciplinary academic community. The IWM strives to provide conditions that allow the fellows to make significant progress in their research and to profit from the intellectual stimulation of the Institute's seminars, lectures and other events. Since its inception in 1982, the IWM has hosted more than 1,000 scholars, journalists and translators.

Form without Substance. Post-Communist Orthodoxism in Romania

Series "Colloquia on Secularism" with **Cosmina Tănăsoiu,** May 23, 2012

Photos: courtesy of the author

Contrary to expectations that religion would have been rendered obsolete by repressive measures, ideological indoctrination and imposed atheism, its post-communist resurgence surprised by its intensity, scope and symbolic presence. This public expression of faith has been welcomed (as a sign of democratization), challenged (as a source of intolerance and backwardness), and promoted by certain institutionalized religious actors, from national/state Churches to political actors. The vacuum left by an ideology which provided both political credo and social tenets was filled by a religious fervor equally self-centred and jealous of competition. By 2012, this revival can only partly be explained as a substitute for state ideology. In Romania, post-communist Orthodoxism is the expression of a society searching for absolution and direction in the uncertain reality of transition, promoted by a Church[1] seeking to secure its base and restore its economic power (its profits have overtaken those of McDonald's Romania), and by political actors, regardless of their ideological color, in search of legitimacy. Moreover, a large share of those declaring themselves religious (over 90%) or Orthodox (87% at the last census) did not mature in classes of Marxism-Leninism but to the beat of a consumerist society.

This newly found religiousness is consumed according to a religious calendar, and defined more by ritual, mysticism and superstition (Romanians list luck, health and desperation as their main reasons for going to church) than spirituality. High levels of public trust (opinion polls constantly register over 80% trust for the Romanian Orthodox Church), self-professed religiosity and overwhelming public presence (clergy, religious symbols, rituals and discourse) do not guarantee electoral success, or determine social norms. Certain social indicators question a potential correlation between structural developments (ratio of new churches, public policy provisions), symbolic presence, and religious radicalization. Average Romanians (including clergy) seem to follow loosely the spiritual and moral teachings of the Church, given abortion rates ("a crime" in the Patriarch's words), divorce rates, children born out of wedlock, belief in the power of luck to change destiny, in horoscopes, healers and the evil eye, and low levels of charity and voluntary commitments are often derided as *muncă patriotică* (patriotic work), alluding to the organized activities of the communist party. Religious practice manifests itself through church attendance and social conventions, such as wearing crosses and making the sign of the cross while passing by a church. Churches (including yards and nearby streets) are packed on important religious holidays (Christmas, Easter), family occasions (weddings, christenings, funerals, wakes), *hrams* (parish fairs held in honor of the patron saint of individual monasteries/churches) or pilgrimages. The extent of religious services secured for private occasions is a sign of social status and financial power. In the process, religion is consumed rather than experienced, thus becoming a lifestyle appendix devoid of any spiritual dimension. During these festivities of grand religious pomp, it is not uncommon to witness crowd behavior showing little concern for the other: trivial vocabulary, conversations on mobile phones, and elbowing neighbors in the quest for quicker access to icons, benediction, Holy Water, or wafer. Random interviews at such events often reveal limited knowledge of religious dogma among parishioners (e.g., "Christmas is Santa's day"). Religious festivities have become social events one attends formally, reducing commitment and spirituality to conforming to religious ceremonial conventions.

Religion is consumed rather than experienced, thus becoming a lifestyle appendix devoid of any spiritual dimension.

Self-entrusted with the moral regeneration of the nation following the atheist decadence, the Church poses as a martyr of ideological repression, which supposedly entitles it to reparations as well as a greater public presence. Its record, however, is chequered and public disclosure of its ethical minimalism, from collaboration (e.g., the opening of the former Securitate archives has exposed several high-level Orthodox clergy as informers) to tacit acceptance of Ceaușescu's megalomaniac urban planning, which included the demolition of churches and monasteries, undermines its moral legitimacy. Although its evangelic message remains grounded in an archaic vocabulary ill suited to post-communist reality, the Church itself has adapted its offering, stimulating religious tourism and its sources of revenue. The Church is not an adept of asceticism. The current patriarch has stated that the canon laws do not prohibit the pursuit of economic power. The project of a national cathedral (baptized the Cathedral for the Salvation of the Romanian People) has been criticized in terms of cost (estimated between 400 million and 1 billion euros), location (for environmental—it was initially planned to be built in a public garden—or symbolic impact—being close to Ceaușescu's Palace, the current Parliament), style, and size, and has been challenged in court. It has been promoted over the years as a remedy for moral decadence and lately as a panacea for the economic crisis, as new hotels, restaurants and religious boutiques are expected to emerge.

The collusion between politics and religion (which renders the Church lobbying effective in terms of public policy, integrating it into a clientelistic environment that distributes privileges) is yet to lead to a theocracy or the emergence of an army of God. Politically, it remains an electoral strategy rather than an agenda. At the social level, the quasi unanimous attachment to Orthodoxy is participatory rather than behavioral and reflects an identity allegiance rather than a faith-based choice. Consequently, being Christian Orthodox does not necessarily hold one to canon law but it merely asserts one's belonging to a community defined as Orthodox. According to the Church's own official message, there is a symbiotic relation between "Orthodoxism, nation and country", forged over time and providing a basis to chastise all outsiders. ◁

Cosmina Tănăsoiu

1) While constitutional provisions guarantee freedom of religion and plurality of faiths (art.29), the Romanian Orthodox Church remains the "national" Church enjoying disproportionate benefits (e.g. state subsidies, property restitution, property rights, especially against the Greek-Catholic Church, formal representation in Parliament, recognition as defender of Romanian identity).

Cosmina Tănăsoiu is Associate Professor of European Politics at the American University in Bulgaria, and was guest at the IWM in May 2012.

Colloquia on Secularism

In this series, directed by IWM Fellow Clemena Antonova, scholars from various disciplines discuss questions related to our research focus *Religion and Secularism.*

May 23, 2012
Cosmina Tănăsoiu: "Religion and Public Space in Post-Communist Romania"

June 22, 2012
Ivan Christov: "Secular Aspects of Patriarch Photius' Spiritual Legacy"

With the kind support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF)

Secular Aspects of Patriarch Photius's Spiritual Legacy

Series "Colloquia on Secularism" with **Ivan Christov,** June 26, 2012

Photius, the ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, is popularly known for having initiated the schism of the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches. He is also famous as a great bibliophile, who collected an enormous library, consisting of both religious and secular works. It is, in fact, thanks to Photius that a significant number of classical texts have come down to us. While this is well known, Ivan Christov called attention to the thought-provoking discrepancy between Photius's official views in his capacity of a high-ranking cleric and his philosophical positions, expressed in his letters and other writings.

After giving an overview of the *Bibliotheca* of Photius, a collection of twenty-five manuscripts comprising the Patriarch's paraphrases of books, bibliographical notes and commentaries, Christov focused on Photius's doctrine of God as *actus purus* (pure energy), a notion deriving from Aristotle and interpreted along Neoplatonic lines. What makes this doctrine curious is that it smacks of the Catholic view on the subject, as for instance expressed by Thomas Aquinas, which was vehemently opposed by Byzantine theologians. As Christov observed, the doctrine is profoundly foreign to the spirit of Eastern Orthodox theology. That Photius, who was notorious for his anti-Western and anti-Roman positions, should have indulged in such ideas is intriguing and can be explained, Christov suggested, by the admixture of secular and religious aspects in Photius's thought.

Finally, the impression that Christov's talk left was that of a fascinating medieval thinker, who was highly representative of Byzantine intellectual developments but also—and, arguably, more interestingly—stood apart from his milieu in the unusual, and even eccentric, views that he frequently advanced. Photius is clearly important for understanding the problematic reception of pagan, secular learning in Byzantium, a civilization which, unlike the West, never lost touch with its classical heritage. ◁

Clemena Antonova

Ivan Christov is Head of the Department of Historical and Systematic Theology at Sofia University and one of the main authorities on ancient and medieval philosophy in Bulgaria.

Humanitarian Crisis Response: The EU's Role and Responsibility

Political Salon with **Kristalina Georgieva,** May 31, 2012

Photo: IWM

Commissioner Georgieva opened the talk by a paradoxical observation: there is a prevailing conviction that an egoistic Europe, one that turns its back to the world, has emerged out of the crisis. But is this really true? A recent Eurobarometer survey demonstrates that, despite the crisis, the EU remains the most important force for good in the world, providing 45–55% of humanitarian assistance. What is striking is that despite the hardship that the economic crisis brings to people's lives, the support of EU citizens for this policy is growing: in 2010 79% of EU citizens were in favor of continuous humanitarian aid, and in 2012 a striking 85% supported it. Austria, surprisingly, shows somewhat lower levels of support for foreign aid, namely 77%, which is still rather high. Accordingly, Europeans are overwhelmingly proud of the humanitarian work done by the European Union, and they do care about the rest of the world.

The needs are overwhelming throughout the globe. Natural disasters—a result of global climate change—have grown five times in recent years. Humanly created disasters are always there, too: 20–30 countries are involved in a conflict at any time, and 100 millions of people are striving for their survival. In this context, the EU shows a strong capacity to respond to disasters. Its "civil protection mechanism" is 10 years old by now, and proves very effective (Haiti, Afghanistan, etc.). The EU is, moreover, a world leader in terms of aid policies. On food assistance, for example, the EU has pioneered a policy change: from delivering food (previously the EU agricultural surplus was provided as aid) to providing cash and vouchers to women, thus avoiding dependency. Neutrality, impartiality, and independence underlie the EU humanitarian aid policies. In humanitarian aid, commissioner Georgieva concluded, it is crucial to be in the right place at the right time with the right kind of help.

In the following discussion, important questions were raised: "does the EU take political stands when offering humanitarian aid?" Commissioner Georgieva explained that her task is to provide the right assistance where it is most needed, regardless of political circumstances. "How is the efficiency of humanitarian aid checked and how is corruption prevented?" Firstly, the EU never gives money to government, and, secondly, one third of the projects are checked every year. As a result, the track record of EU foreign humanitarian aid is excellent. The "errors" are below 3%, which means current practices are remarkably efficient. "When does a crisis take your full attention? What is the role of the media in creating a sense of urgency?" The media certainly plays a role, but EU humanitarian aid is most of all about the "forgotten crises" (e.g., Myanmar refugees to Thailand), crises that no one talks or writes about. "Why does the EU provide aid to the whole world? Why is there no division of labor between developed countries in providing aid?" There is a certain division of labor, and the EU performs a sort of community function, as many aid organizations do not have offices or representations on the ground. "There is a criticism that humanitarian aid prolongs wars …" Commissioner Georgieva agreed that such criticism is present, but stated that her ambition was to set the incentives right, so as to stimulate development and prevent the creation of dependency. ◁

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Kristalina Georgieva is the current EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response. A Bulgarian citizen, economist by education and politician by calling, before taking on the post of EU Commissioner, she was Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the World Bank Group.

Discussants:

János Mátyás Kovács
Permanent Fellow, IWM; External Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Science, Budapest

Christian Ultsch
Head of the Foreign Politics Department of *Die Presse*

ⓘ Political Salons

The Political Salon is a discussion forum on current political and social questions that is organized in cooperation with the Austrian daily newspaper *Die Presse*. Started in 2004, the discussions with renowned politicians and scholars take place in the Institute's library and are hosted by journalists of *Die Presse* and Permanent Fellows of the IWM.

May 8, 2012
Irina Prokhorova: "Between Dog and Wolf: Russian Society in Quest of Its Path for Freedom"

May 15, 2012
Mark Lilla: "The New Class Divide and the American Election" *See article on page 26*

May 31, 2012
Kristalina Georgieva: "Humanitarian Crisis Response: The EU's Role and Responsibility"

September 9, 2012
George Soros: "The Tragedy of the European Union" *See article on page 8*

*In cooperation with **Die Presse** and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance*

Russian Society in Quest of Its Path for Freedom

Political Salon with **Irina Prokhorova,** May 8, 2012

Photo: IWM

After a season of elections and protests, frustrations and hopes, the real question, Irina Prokhorova claimed, is not what the new government will do, but where Russian society is heading to.

In her opening statement, Prokhorova reminded the audience that at the end of November 2011, a week before the parliamentary elections, journalists, sociologists and political analysts alike unanimously lamented the total public apathy and the absence of civil society in Russia. Within a fortnight, however, a protest movement emerged and kept growing, reaching its culmination in March 2012, during the Russian presidential campaign. How was this possible? Prokhorova showed that during the last twenty years everyday life has profoundly changed and quite a variety of independent cultural and social activities have developed and accumulated in the fabric of Russian society. She then addressed the perspectives and challenges that Russian society is currently facing in its struggle with an authoritarian regime, sparking a vivid debate with the discussants and the audience. ◁

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Irina Prokhorova is a literary critic and cultural historian; founder and editor of the New Literary Observer magazine and director of the publishing house with the same name in Moscow. Over the past decade, and until today, Prokhorova has been actively engaged with philanthropy. In 2004, upon her initiative, the Prokhorov Fund was established, to support contemporary Russian culture. She was honored by the Government of the Russian Federation for the New Literary Observer magazine (2002), and received the Liberty Prize for her contribution to the development of Russian-American cultural relations (2003). In 2005, Ms. Prokhorova became Chevalier de l'Ordre des Arts et des Lettres (France), and a laureate of the Andrey Belyi prize for literature (2006).

During the past presidential elections in Russia, Irina Prokhorova became actively involved in the campaign of her brother, the entrepreneur Mikhail Prokhorov. In the course of the campaign, she spectacularly won a debate against famous filmmaker and Putin supporter Nikita Mikhalkov, an event that gained her wide popularity across the country and beyond.

Discussants:

Ivan Krastev, Permanent Fellow, IWM; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

Michael Laczynski, *Die Presse*

Die Hoffnung der Städte: Hamburgs Zukunft als europäische Metropole

Reihe: Stadtgespräche mit **Olaf Scholz,** 4. Juli 2012

Photo: IWM

Wien und Hamburg sind in mehrerlei Hinsicht gut vergleichbar: Beide Städte genießen als eigenständige Bundesländer ein hohes Maß an politischer Autonomie, haben in der jüngeren Vergangenheit einen beachtlichen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung genommen und erwarten entgegen der demographischen Gesamtentwicklung in Mitteleuropa für die kommenden Jahrzehnte einen Anstieg ihrer Einwohnerzahl auf jeweils knapp zwei Millionen.

Angesichts des prognostizierten Wachstums stellte Hamburgs Bürgermeister Olaf Scholz die Vision eines dynamischen Arbeitsmarkts vor, der es insbesondere jungen Paaren erlauben müsse, berufliche Wünsche und private Lebensentwürfe in Einklang zu bringen. Dadurch erhalte auch der Prozess der gesellschaftlichen Gleichstellung von Männern und Frauen einen wichtigen Impuls. Ähnliches gelte für die Integration von Zuwanderern, deren Gelingen für die nachhaltige Entwicklung der Stadt essentiell sei.

Hamburger Einbürgerungskampagne

Mit Blick auf die Versäumnisse der Arbeitsmigrationspolitik der 1960er- und 1970er-Jahre unterstrich Olaf Scholz, dass man Einwanderer vor allem als Hoffnungsträger erkennen müsse. Unter den 1,8 Millionen Einwohnern der Ankunftsstadt Hamburg seien 400.000 Immigranten oder deren Kinder. 200.000 Menschen, die in der Hansestadt leben, hätten bislang keinen deutschen Pass, davon würden 137.000 aber schon so lange in Deutschland leben, dass sie eigentlich längst die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft erwerben könnten. Aus diesem Grund gab er als Bürgermeister den Anstoß zu einer breit angelegten Integrationsinitiative, welche alle diese Menschen persönlich dazu einlädt, Deutsche zu werden. Scholz betonte, dass die Hamburger Einbürgerungsaktion darauf abziele, das Engagement von Zuwanderern zu fördern und sie zu einem Bekenntnis zum deutschen Staat und zur deutschen Gesellschaft zu bewegen. Infolge der Initiative habe sich die Zahl der entsprechenden Beratungsgespräche mittlerweile verdoppelt, die Zahl der Anträge sei um ein Drittel gestiegen.

„Schlechte-Laune-Parteien" auf Stimmenfang

Besonders spannend wurde die Diskussion an diesem Abend beim Thema Fremdenfeindlichkeit und deren politischen Auswirkungen, einerseits in Hamburg und andererseits in Wien. Dabei warf Stadtrat Ludwig die Frage auf, warum politischer Protest in Deutschland eher links und in Österreich tendenziell rechts sei. In diesem Zusammenhang gab er zu bedenken, dass die rechtsgerichtete FPÖ neben nationalen Themen auch stark soziale Fragen anspreche. Das Konzept der Freiheitlichen gehe anscheinend vor allem bei jenen auf, die das Gefühl haben, vom politischen Establishment nicht mehr vertreten zu werden. Laut Ludwig dürfte die Linke in Deutschland in ähnlicher Weise das gleiche Publikum ansprechen.

Scholz stellte demgegenüber die grundsätzliche Frage, warum es in einer Gesellschaft mit großem Wohlstand einen Markt für „Schlechte-Laune-Parteien" gebe. Zwar habe man bislang noch keinen erfolgreichen Weg gefunden, damit umzugehen, doch sei es wichtig, in dieser Auseinandersetzung nicht auf Angst, sondern auf Hoffnung zu setzen und insbesondere beim Thema Integration herauszuarbeiten, dass erfolgreich gestaltete Zuwanderung eine entscheidende Voraussetzung für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und gesellschaftlichen Frieden sei.

Wien wächst nach außen, Hamburg nach oben

Ein zentrales Zukunftsthema, das beide Metropolen verbindet, ist der Bau von bezahlbarem Wohnraum. Für Hamburg formulierte der ehemalige deutsche Arbeits- und Sozialminister (2007–2009) das ehrgeizige Ziel, künftig 6.000 neue Wohnungen pro Jahr zu schaffen. Dies sei auch eine Antwort auf Fehler vergangener Jahre, in denen es absurderweise einen Baustopp für Wohnungen gab. Die Wohnungsbauoffensive solle sich keineswegs auf die Erschließung von Brachflächen beschränken, sondern verstärkt darauf setzen, in die Höhe zu expandieren: Anstatt wie bisher 3-stöckig, solle in Zukunft eher 6-stöckig gebaut werden, so Scholz. Dabei gehe es um familiengerechtes, ökologisch verträgliches, modernes, einfallsreiches Bauen für Menschen, die stadtnah inmitten guter Infrastruktur wohnen wollen.

Ähnliche Bestrebungen verfolgt unterdessen auch Wien mit Blick auf weiteres Wachstum nach außen. Ludwig hob in diesem Zusammenhang das Projekt des großen Erweiterungsgebietes ‚Seestadt Aspern' hervor. Auf dem Areal eines ehemaligen Flugfeldes werden dort 8.500 Wohnungen errichtet – inklusive eigenem See, eigenem Park und eigener U-Bahn-Anbindung. Das Konzept sieht zudem die Entwicklung einer *smart city* vor, in der alle Formen der erneuerbaren Energie zum Einsatz kommen, von der Geothermie bis hin zur Solartechnologie.

Bildung für die Zukunft

Nicht minder bedeutsam als die Baupolitik sind für die künftige Entwicklung der Städte die Bereiche Bildung und Kinderbetreuung. Hier setzt Hamburg auf ein umfassendes Angebot von der Kinderkrippe bis zum Schulabschluss. Anders als in Deutschland üblich, werde die Halbtags-Kinderbetreuung künftig kostenlos sein, so Scholz. In Volksschulen werde es kleine Klassen von maximal 23 SchülerInnen geben, in schwierigen Gebieten solle die Obergrenze gar bei 19 liegen. Mit dem Ziel guter und für alle bezahlbarer Bildung seien zudem am anderen Ende der Bildungskette die Studiengebühren abgeschafft worden. Auch diese Maßnahmen fügen sich somit ein in die Bemühungen der Hansestadt um verbesserte Integration und Chancengleichheit. ◁

Manuel Tröster, Meropi Tzanetakis

Olaf Scholz ist Erster Bürgermeister der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg.

City Talks

Die gemeinsam mit dem *KURIER* veranstaltete Reihe „City Talks" thematisiert Städte als Brennpunkte und Katalysatoren gesellschaftlicher Herausforderungen und Erneuerung. Bürgermeister internationaler Metropolen diskutieren Visionen und Lösungsstrategien moderner Stadtpolitik.

4. Juli, 2012
Olaf Scholz: „Die Hoffnung der Städte: Hamburgs Zukunft als europäische Metropole"

Einführung: **Leonard Novy**
Diskussion: **Michael Ludwig,** Wiener Stadtrat für Wohnen, Wohnbau und Stadterneuerung; **Helmut Brandstätter,** Chefredakteur des *Kurier*

The Dissonances of Memory: Talking Past Each Other in Europe

Monthly Lecture with **Leonidas Donskis,** May 30, 2012


Photo: IWM

In his lecture, Leonidas Donskis focused on new dissonances of memory in Europe. According to the Lithuanian philosopher, we are witnessing how a sinister tendency is gaining strength in Europe as well as in the United States as politicians find themselves preoccupied with two domains that serve as a new source of inspiration: privacy and history. Birth, death, and sex would be the new frontiers on the political battlefields, Donskis argued. As politics is losing its ability to translate our moral and existential concerns into rational and legitimate action for the benefit of society and humanity, and instead is becoming a set of managerial practices and skilful manipulations of public opinion, it is not unreasonable to assume that a swift politicization of privacy and history promises the way out of the present political and ideological vacuum, he explained. Donskis concluded that new dividing lines and memory clashes over the interpretation of key events and dates, such as 1945, 1956, and 1968, would be one of the outcomes of this process. ◁

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Leonidas Donskis is Member of the European Parliament (MEP), philosopher, political theorist, historian of ideas, social analyst, and political commentator. As a public figure in Lithuania, he has acted throughout the years as a defender of human rights and civil liberties.

In Cooperation with the Embassy and the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Lithuania

Antijüdische Gesetzgebungen in Europa 1933–1945 im Vergleich

Monatsvortrag von **Christian Gerlach,** 5. Juni 2012


Photo: IWM

In den letzten Jahren ist die Rolle einheimischer Regierungen und Bevölkerungen bei der Verfolgung und Vernichtung der Juden in den 1930er- und 1940er-Jahren zunehmend in den Blick gekommen. Doch bei der Frage, inwieweit es sich um ein gesamteuropäisches Phänomen handelte, fehlen systematische länderübergreifende Forschungen noch weitgehend. Gerlach verglich in seinem Vortrag einen Ausschnitt, nämlich die antijüdischen Gesetzgebungen jener Zeit, in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern im Hinblick auf zeitliche Abfolge, Schwerpunkte und Absichten. ◁

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Christian Gerlach ist Professor für Geschichte am Historischen Institut der Universität Bern.

Monthly Lectures

Once a month Visiting Fellows and invited scholars give public lectures in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

May 30, 2012
Leonidas Donskis: "The Dissonances of Memory: Talking past Each Other in Europe"

June 5, 2012
Christian Gerlach: „Antijüdische Gesetzgebungen in Europa 1933-1945 im Vergleich"

Phenomenology and Religion

Fellows' Seminar with **James Dodd,** June 21, 2012


Photo: IWM

What can phenomenological philosophy tell us about religion? One must be careful to balance the potential *promise* with the *limits* of a phenomenological approach to a reflection on religious life. The limits have to do with the philosophical tendency to allow religion to speak, or even to appear in reflection, only to the extent to which it provides philosophy with an insight into its own possibility and truth. For if the question of religion is in part the question of the conditions for a *meaningful* religiosity, then on some level we are forced to face the fact that we have become addicted to philosophy, that reason has convinced us that any genuine question of meaning always already belongs to philosophical thinking, which thus has the final say on matters of meaning. What is meaningful is only what can be understood. Religious meaning thus threatens to appear as a mere extension of philosophy, to the point where a "philosophy of religion" threatens to become just another introduction to philosophy. There is a long history in the Judeo-Christian tradition of turning to Greek philosophy, only to become disillusioned with this tyranny of Athens with respect to what counts as meaningful. Whether or not a phenomenological approach, one that seeks to allow religious life to become manifest to reflection on its own terms, represents a new chapter in this history is an important, but also complex question. Martin Heidegger's early phenomenology of religious experience is a case in point, and in many ways it is both emblematic and inconclusive. There is the promise of a new kind of reading, a new kind of witnessing of the sense of the religious; this finds a fascinating engagement with the letters of Paul and the writings of Augustine. Yet at the same time there is a clear sense in which the categories of a specifically *philosophical* anthropology dominate Heidegger's analysis, where the religiosity of a Paul or an Augustine become gradually inconsequential.

The attempt to answer the question of whether phenomenology offers a new path is also bedeviled by a tendency to become lost in abstractions. There is no such thing as a pure philosopher, or a pure phenomenologist, and the thought of someone like Heidegger draws from many sources, and some of those sources are religious in character. At most the example of Heidegger shows us that, if we want to embark on a serious philosophical reflection regarding the potential for a renewal of religion in modern life, then in turn we need to take seriously the possibility that philosophy itself might be what stands in the way of such a reflection. Whatever the flexibility of phenomenological philosophy might otherwise be, it does not preclude this problem without further ado. The challenge of finding a manner of philosophical articulation that remains true to religious life is not a mere question of flexibility. It has to do with the intersection of human existence and truth, so basic to the human condition. ◁

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James Dodd is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the New School, New York, and affiliated to the IWM as a Patočka Research Associate. He worked in residence at the Institute in June and July 2012.

Fellows' Seminar

In the course of each semester, Visiting and Junior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminar, which provides an opportunity to reflect on their current work and to get feedback from the Institute's academic community.

May 16, 2012
Natalia Skradol: "Introducing the Concept of the 'Zone' to an Analysis of Work Camps in Germany"

June 13, 2012
Martina Steer: "The Making of Transnational Memory: Moses Mendelssohn as lieu de mémoire in the 19th and 20th Centuries"

June 21, 2012
James Dodd: "Phenomenology and Religion"

June 27, 2012
David Petruccelli: "International Criminal Policing in Europe, 1890–1950"

International Criminal Policing in Europe, 1890–1950

Fellows' Seminar with **David Petruccelli,** June 27, 2012


Photo: IWM

In his talk, David Petruccelli gave a brief overview of his dissertation project, which examines the internationalization of policing in interwar Europe. In particular, his work centers on the specific context of East Central Europe after the First World War, when the collapse of the large European land empires into a variety of new states prompted concerns about how to manage the uprooted and often impoverished populations of the region. The legacy of the former Habsburg Empire was a crucial component in the founding of the International Criminal Police Commission (now known as Interpol) in Vienna in 1923. Petruccelli's project explores the work of this commission, the League of Nations, and several national and municipal police forces in organizing institutions and practices to fight international crime between the wars. It also looks at the socio-political realities behind international crime, and the interaction between these realities, official perceptions of them, and practices on both sides of the law. After giving an overview of his research, Petruccelli presented a specific case from the Viennese city archives illustrating the nature of police cooperation in this period. The story of a jewelry store burglar captured in Vienna in 1926 by virtue of fingerprints left at a crime scene after nearly a decade of thefts in Hungary, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia showed how police cooperation worked in practice while bringing to life the perceived need for improved police communication across state lines that led to the founding of the International Criminal Police Commission. ◁

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David Petruccelli is PhD candidate in History at Yale University and was *Junior Visiting Fellow* at the IWM (September 2011–June 2012).

Is There an Eastern European Capitalism? Emergent and Established Capitalisms Compared

Seminar "Faces of Eastern Europe" with **Aura Matei,** May 15, 2012

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

The debate on varieties of capitalism is currently being enriched by research on the emerging capitalist economies of Eastern Europe. In her presentation, Aura Matei raised the following questions: where are these economies located on the "liberal versus coordinated" continuum defined by this paradigm? Are the typologies of established capitalism useful in describing the institutional configurations of Eastern European economies? Do these economies converge to the American or Continental European models?

Matei's research aims to answer these questions by employing fuzzy-set analysis to identify similarities and differences in the institutional set-up of a large group of Eastern and Western European economies. In her talk, she covered four institutional arenas: property regimes, market regulation, welfare regimes and the political economy of the selected countries. The analysis resulted in two new types: liberal hybrid and coordinated hybrid forms of capitalism. Matei finished her presentation by situating her home country, Romania, in the new typology. ◁

red

Aura Matei is Researcher at the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development Eleutheria, Bucharest, and PhD student at the Faculty of Sociology of the University of Bucharest. Her research on Eastern European capitalism was partly conducted in spring 2011, when she worked in residence at the IWM as a CAPITO Research Associate.

Institutional Memory Production in East Central Europe: Archives, Legitimation, and Continuity between Regimes

Seminar "Faces of Eastern Europe" with **Sokol Lleshi,** May 24, 2012

Photo: IWM

In his presentation, Sokol Lleshi gave an overview of recent developments in dealing with the communist past in East Central Europe. In the last five or six years, former socialist countries have established 'Institutes of Memory', whose aim is to address the ignoble past of the *ancient regime*. As Claus Offe has noted, any instance of regime change involves a dialectic process reckoning with the legacy of the past in the effort to build a new legitimate order. Lleshi addressed the question of how the emergence of Institutes of Memory (usually mandated by the state), which he considers as 'institutional sites', to use a Foucauldian concept, are implicated in institutional memory production and the legitimating processes of the new democratic regimes.

The discussion focused on the structural micro-foundations of these Institutes of Memory, and how they differ from other institutions that are a repository of memory, such as museums, or archival organizations in exile like the ones gathered by oppositional movements and containing samizdat literature. Students of memory construction consider efforts to deal with the past as within the ambit of the 'politics of memory' research. Accordingly, the establishment of Institutes of Memory is seen as driven by social groups or political elites crafting a particular representation of the past. If such a process is initiated by political parties or ruling elites, allegations of instrumental use or abuse of the past emerge. If it is initiated by grass-root social movements or social groups who aim to rectify a representation of the past, they are considered as counter-memory contesting the dominant narrative of power.

Another theoretical approach is that of Transitional Justice, which is an encompassing perspective, glossing over the specificity of particular cases. Lleshi pointed out that the 'language' of transitional justice and mechanisms, such as the truth commissions that were formative in building the new social order in post-military regimes in Latin America and the post-Apartheid regime in South Africa, were not replicated in East Central Europe. The post-communist countries in the region have instead opted for the establishment of state-mandated Institutes of Memory and for administering the documents of the Secret Services.

Ultimately, beyond the loose framework of 'politics of memory' or the transitional justice approach, lurks a process of crafting a new cultural legitimacy for the democratic regimes, in which civil society organizations, the state, the institutional legacy of the secret service archives and, of course, the Institutes of Memory themselves are involved. ◁

red

Sokol Lleshi is PhD candidate in Political Science at Central European University, Budapest, and was *Junior Visiting Fellow* at the IWM from April to July 2012.

Religious Pluralism in Poland, or How to Study the Non-Being?

Seminar "Faces of Eastern Europe" with **Agnieszka Pasieka,** June 6, 2012

Photo: IWM

In her seminar talk, Agnieszka Pasieka discussed the conditions of religious pluralism in Poland as a country that is predominantly Catholic. Thus, she looked at the role that the close relationship between the Catholic Church and the Polish state plays in shaping religious pluralism. How do religious minorities respond to state/church policies and discourses and how do they negotiate their position within the homogenous Polish realm?

Pasieka presented the findings of an ethnographic study of a multireligious rural area. Based on that study, she discussed three deeply entangled issues. Firstly, what do local manifestations of religious pluralism tell us about a broader context of majority-minority relations, and to what extent does the situation of non-Catholics in the studied area reflect nation-wide phenomena? The second point was about the necessity to problematize the dichotomy 'majority-minority' and recognize those spheres of social life and those experiences which contest religious divisions. This led her to the third point, namely the analysis of the post-1989 processes of (re)writing history and the question of their implications for the dynamics of religious pluralism. ◁

red

Agnieszka Pasieka holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the Martin Luther University, Halle/Saale, and was *Junior Visiting Fellow* at the IWM (October 2011–July 2012).

ⓘ Seminar "Faces of Eastern Europe"

In this seminar series, Fellows and Guests discuss issues connected with the economies, polities and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

May 15, 2012
Aura Matei: "Is There an Eastern European Capitalism? Emergent and Established Capitalisms Compared"

May 24, 2012
Sokol Lleshi: "Institutional Memory Production in East Central Europe: Archives, Legitimation, and Continuity between Regimes"

June 6, 2012
Agnieszka Pasieka: "Religious Pluralism in Poland, or How to Study the Non-Being?"

June 12, 2012
Julia Komleva: "Instilling Identity in the Late Russian Empire: Teaching History or Telling Fairytales?"

June 19, 2012
Günter Bischof: "Quiet Invaders Revisited. Biographies of Austrian Immigrants/Refugees to the US from the Burgenländer to Schwarzenegger"
See article on page 16

June 20, 2012
Tamara Banjeglav: "Competing Memories, Contested Histories. Constructing (Official) Narratives of the Past through Commemorative Practices in Post-War Croatia"

June 26, 2012
Irina Dolgopolova: "Modeling the Relationship between Economic Development and Political Democracy"

Competing Memories and Contested Histories in Post-War Croatia

Seminar "Faces of Eastern Europe" with **Tamara Banjeglav,** June 20, 2012

In her presentation, Tamara Banjeglav analyzed commemorations and commemorative practices relating to the 'Homeland War' in Croatia (1991–1995), particularly to the concluding military operation 'Storm'. Referring to recent research on war memory and commemorations, she attempted to show how the dominant (official) narrative on and memory of the war in Croatia is often challenged by oppositional counter-narratives.

Photo: IWM

The official narrative in post-war Croatia centers on the idea that Croatia was attacked by rebel Serbian forces and the Yugoslav National Army and that it defended its sovereignty and achieved independence by winning the 1991–1995 war. Based on this narrative, the Croatian state built two identity versions: that of a heroic victim, attacked by rebel Serbs and Yugoslav National Army forces, and that of a victorious hero who stepped into the war in self-defence and, in the end, won it. However, Banjeglav's research shows how narratives of the past shared by different social groups undermine this dominant narrative and reveal irruptions of (unwanted) memory.

Thus, Banjeglav argued that the official narrative on the war in Croatia was deconstructed and contested by oppositional narratives, which can be discerned by looking at unofficial counter-commemorations and celebrations of war events. In her presentation, she looked at the role that these events play in the construction and deconstruction of the official narrative about the 'Homeland War'. Banjeglav also analysed how the official narrative is challenged and contested by certain transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials and indictments for war crimes before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and how this contestation is reflected in official commemorative practices. ◁

red

Tamara Banjeglav is PhD candidate in Balkan Studies at the University of Ljubljana and was Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM from January to June 2012.

Between Nostalgia and Freedom: Reflections on Immigrant Art

Seminar "Faces of Eastern Europe" with **Svetlana Boym,** May 21, 2012

Photos: Svetlana Boym

Polish-American artist Krzysztof Wodiczko wrote that a contemporary immigrant can become an "unintentional prophet" who dreams of a better private refuge and also of a better public democracy that could welcome strangers like himself. The immigrant/stranger remains a key figure of twentieth and twenty-first-century modernity. At the same time, experiences of immigration complicate and embarrass our theoretical metaphors, bringing in inconvenient political and personal histories. The immigrant is always a trickster who balances the experience of loss with an improbable hope.

The immigrant subject remained central to Svetlana Boym's scholarship and to her art work as it moved from the reflection on nostalgia and its concomitant discontent to the cross-cultural approach to the experience of freedom as a form of co-creation in a public world. "In my Viennese work-in-progress, the immigrant subject confronts personal histories and mysteries. It took me more than twenty-five years to remember my own forgetting of my first transit through Vienna in the early 1980s. After my departure from the Soviet Union, I was a refugee ("a non-resident alien") in an extraterritorial camp for Soviet Jews, which existed in an undisclosed location on the outskirts of Vienna in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 2012, through archival work, I discovered the address of the camp and revisited this extraterritorial site at the crossroads of many inconvenient histories, realizing many ways in which the landscape of transit and the experience of immigration has haunted my work." ◁

red

Svetlana Boym is Professor of Comparative Literature and Associate of the Harvard School of Design and Architecture at Harvard University. She was Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow at the IWM in June 2012.

Svetlana Boym, "Vienna (June 2012)", from the series "Instant Allegories", www.svetlanaboym.com.

Guest contribution by Mark Lilla
continued from page 26

so discussed in the early 1960s has come to poor white America, proving that the culture of poverty is not a racial issue. This is especially clear in statistics on marriage, family structure, and crime. (The following figures are for white adults aged 30–50.)

There has been a fairly steady decline in marriage in the US ever since 1960, but now a new class distinction has opened up. In 1960, the percentage of unmarried poor adults was only 10% higher than that of rich adults. Today, the difference is 40%. Roughly half of poor adult Americans are unmarried today, while 90% of the rich are married. This difference carries over into divorce: divorce rates of the poor in 1960 were only 4%, and even lower for the rich. Today rates of divorce for the poor are 7 times higher than those of the rich. (Again, the statistics are limited to whites.)

These changes have obviously affected poor children and the environments in which they are raised. Only 3% of children of rich parents are brought up by a single parent today, while 20% of poor children are. The difference is even more pronounced if we take education into account. Fully 60% of white children born to mothers without a high school education have no fathers present.

Little surprise, then, to learn that poor whites are now much more likely to go to prison than ever before. In 1970, 2 out of every 1000 poor white males were in prison. Today, it is 10 out of every 1000: a fivefold increase.

Charles Murray has done a real service by bringing these statistics to a wider public. But in his book he also offers an idiosyncratic interpretation of them that may not persuade many readers. He argues that the real source of the social erosion he documents is a *moral* decline of the poor, even if the original causes of poverty are economic. He points out a real paradox. The richest 20% of educated white Americans actually live fairly traditional lives: they are more likely to stay married, have children, hold steady jobs, attend church, and vote. But because they are also overwhelmingly liberal in their political outlook, they do not preach the very virtues they practice. Contemporary liberals no longer express moral judgments about out-of-wedlock births, marital infidelity, men's responsibility to get married and work, and women's responsibility to find husbands to help them raise children. The liberal rich, Murray insists, have created a set of moral norms that harm the poor, but not themselves.

And there is much truth to this, though very little to do about it, since these new norms are widely shared in the population. All the more reason, one would think, to double efforts to raise people out of poverty economically through government help. Murray's conclusion is just the opposite: what is required, he insists, is the "remoralization" of America, which also means encouraging religion and promoting conservative social values. It also means cutting back on social programs and moving toward a more libertarian society, where people have no choice but to be responsible for themselves. Good luck with that.

My own view is that both Noah and Murray are right in their diagnoses of the economic and cultural sources of the new class divide in America. I also think they are unrealistic about the possibility of either economic or cultural reform in the near future. The picture of class in America today is terrible and will not get better soon.

More interesting for me is to see the construction of two competing narratives about inequality that reflect the two governing political mentalities in contemporary America. Liberals have constructed a picture for themselves in which 99% of Americans are pitted against the richest 1%, who are the source of all America's problems. And they want to stick with policies that derive from the Great Depression: expand the welfare state, increase economic regulation, raise taxes, and so on. I am for most of those things. But I am also baffled by the fact that liberals will not recognize the fact that contemporary America is not Depression America: we are a different country with different kinds of people with different sorts of problems, and they do not just derive from money. They are also about culture, which liberals still cannot address. And this reinforces Murray's point: the American liberal elite is really detached from the lives of the poorer Americans they want to help.

Conservatives are right to see a real cultural shift in America over the past 75 years, and to connect it to the new class divide. But rather than work to close that divide, they have consistently exploited social issues for electoral gain and put forward radical economic programs that further benefit the rich and corporations. In this duplicitous game they have convinced many middle and lower class Americans that freer markets, lower taxes, and no public health care is what America needs to grow and be free—when in fact, these conditions just make the situation worse. If conservatives were really serious about the new poor, they would help them get educated and protected so they can reenter mainstream society, while preaching their moral reform at the same time.

So to all these other divides in contemporary America we can add another: the *political* class divide between clueless liberals and dishonest conservatives. Unfortunately, this divide will have to be bridged before any of the others can be addressed. ◁

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1) *The Great Divergence: America's Growing Inequality Crisis and What We Can Do about It,* Bloomsbury Press, 2012.
2) *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010,* Crown, 2012.

Mark Lilla teaches History of Ideas at Columbia University, New York.

New Calls for Application

The majority of IWM fellowships are awarded in open competition, involving calls for application and evaluation by expert juries. Research proposals are currently invited for the following fellowship programs:

Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators 2013/2014
Paul Celan Fellowships support translations from Eastern to Western, Western to Eastern, or between two Eastern European languages of canonical texts and contemporary key works in the Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Studies.

Deadline for application:
January 31, 2013

Józef Tischner Fellowship 2013
The Józef Tischner Fellowship is awarded to junior researchers from Poland and younger Polish-American scholars and is open to all academic disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Deadline for application:
January 15, 2013

Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists 2013/2014
The Milena Jesenská Fellowship program offers European journalists time off from their professional duties in order to pursue in-depth research on a topic of their choice. Projects should have European, rather than merely local, relevance, and may cover political, social, economic, and cultural issues.

Deadline for application:
February 15, 2013

Bronisław Geremek Fellowships 2013/2014
The Bronisław Geremek Fellowship program aims to foster the study and reflection of the Polish national heritage in the context of European tradition. The fellowships enable Polish senior and junior scholars to work on a research project of their choice and are open to all academic disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Deadline for application:
February 15, 2013

For more information, please refer to: www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm

Books, Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests *05–08 2012*

Tomasz Kamusella
The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012 (Paperback edition)


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In 19th- and 20th century Central Europe, unlike anywhere else in the world, national movements and politicians turned language into the paramount instrument of politics, and of statehood and nationhood legitimization. In this order of things, each nation wishing to be recognized in the international arena must possess its own unique national language. Once a nation is lucky enough to have gained its own nation state, not only is the national language to become the new polity's sole official language. What is more, it cannot be shared in that function with any other state across the globe. During the 20th century, this specifically Central European 'deification' of language justified the destruction of entire states deemed as 'non-national', vast unprecedented border changes, and instances of ethnic cleansing involving tens of millions. The violent parallel break-ups of Yugoslavia and Serbo-Croatia bear witness to the continuing destructive potential of language politicization.

The author is Lecturer in Central European History at the University of St Andrews, UK, and worked on this book as an IWM Junior Visiting Fellow in 2005.

János Mátyás Kovács and **Violetta Zentai** (eds.)
Capitalism from Outside? Economic Cultures in Eastern Europe after 1989
Budapest: Central European University Press 2012


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Does the capitalism emerging in Eastern Europe need as solid ethnic or spiritual foundations as some other "Great Transformations" in the past? Apparently, one *can* become an actor of the new capitalist game without belonging to the German, Jewish, or, to take a timely example, Chinese minority. Nor does one have to go to a Protestant church every Sunday, repeat Confucian truisms when falling asleep, or study Adam Smith's teachings on the virtues of the market in a business course. Instead, one may just follow certain quasi-capitalist routines acquired during communism and import capitalist culture (more exactly, various capitalist cultures) in the form of down-to-earth cultural practices embedded in freshly borrowed economic and political institutions. Does capitalism come from outside? Why then do so many analysts talk about hybridization?

This volume offers empirical insights into the current cultural history of the Eastern European economies in three fields: entrepreneurship, state governance and economic science. The chapters are based on large case studies prepared in the framework of an eight-country research project (funded by the European Commission, and directed jointly by the Center for Public Policy at the Central European University and the Institute for Human Sciences) on East-West cultural encounters in the ex-communist economies.

Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki
Between the Brown and the Red—Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentieth-Century Poland
Polish and Polish-American Studies Series
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press 2012

© Ohio University Press

In this study of the relationship of nationalism, communism, authoritarianism, and religion in 20th century Poland, Mikołaj Kunicki shows how the country's communist rulers tried to adapt communism to local traditions, particularly ethnocentric nationalism and Catholicism. Focusing on the political career of Bolesław Piasecki, a Polish nationalist politician who started out as a fascist before the war and ended up as a procommunist activist, Kunicki demonstrates that Polish communists reinforced the ethnocentric self-definition of Polishness and—as Piasecki's case proves—prolonged the existence of the nationalist right.

The author is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame and worked on this book when he was an IWM Junior Visiting Fellow in 2005/06.

Sandra Lehmann
Wirklichkeitsglaube und Überschreitung – Entwurf einer Metaphysik
Wien: Verlag Turia & Kant 2012

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Begriffe wie „Singularität", „Ereignis" oder „Überschreitung" sind in den zurückliegenden Jahren zu Knotenpunkten der philosophischen Diskussion geworden. Die Autorin bezieht sich auf diese Konzepte, begründet sie aber von einer ganz anderen Seite. Ihr Ausgangspunkt ist eine neue Fassung des Wirklichkeitsbegriffs, den sie mit und gegen die Bezugsgrößen der klassischen Antike, des deutschen Idealismus und der Phänomenologie entwickelt.

Die Autorin ist freie Philosophin in Wien. Sie arbeitete an diesem Buch als Visiting Fellow im Rahmen des APART-Programms der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zwischen 2006 und 2009.

Clemena Antonova

"Icon Theory and the Culture of the Russian Silver Age (1880s–1920s)", lecture at the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies, Cambridge, July 26, 2012.

Tamara Banjeglav

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Günter Bischof

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Sergej Danilov

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Cornelia Klinger

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János Mátyás Kovács

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Boris Mezhuev

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"'Were We All People?'": review of *The Auschwitz Volunteer* by Witold Pilecki, in: *The New York Times,* June 22, 2012.

„Grand Old Marxists", *NYRBlog,* August 28, 2012.

"How Historians Can Rewrite the Future". On the occasion of the publication of *Thinking the Twentieth Century,* Timothy Snyder recalls, in an interview for *The Atlantic* (February 2, 2012), his collaboration with Tony Judt and the legacy he left behind.

IWM*post* has reported extensively on Timothy Snyder's work *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin,* published in 2010. Meanwhile, the book was awarded numerous prizes, including the following: Literature Award, American Academy of Arts and Letters; Leipzig Book Prize for European Understanding; Phi Beta Kappa Emerson Book Award; Gustav Ranis International History Prize; Prakhina Foundation International Book Prize; Jean-Charles Velge Prize; Tadeusz Walendowski Book Prize.

Bloodlands also received the following Books of the Year and Press Distinctions: *The Independent, The Financial Times, The Economist, The Telegraph, The New Statesman, The Atlantic,* BBC *History Magazine, The Seattle Times, History Today, The Jewish Forward, Reason Magazine. Editor's Pick, New York Times Book Review; Die Welt,* Book of the Week; NRC *Handelsblad,* Book of the Week, *El País,* Book of the Week; NDR Sachbuch des Monats; *New York Times* non-fiction bestseller, *Der Spiegel* non-fiction bestseller; *Gazeta Wyborcza* non-fiction bestseller (Poland); *Dziennik Polski* bestseller (Poland), *Wall Street Journal* no. 1 hardback history bestseller.

For more information please visit *bloodlandsbook.com.*

Manuel Tröster

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The New American Class Divide

BY MARK LILLA

On May 15, 2012, US historian of ideas and essayist Mark Lilla was guest at the IWM in a Political Salon. In his introductory statement, based on two recent books, he talked about the growth of social inequalities in the United States and the consequences that this has for American society and politics.

Photo: Paul Sableman / Flickr

There is a great deal of talk in the United States—finally—about the new class divide in our society. While this is welcome, it is striking how differently America's warring intellectual and political parties are interpreting this disturbing development.

The two books that have received the most attention recently are *The Great Divergence*[1] by Timothy Noah, a liberal journalist and television commentator, and *Coming Apart* [2] by Charles Murray, a conservative social science researcher. Their pictures of the growing inequality in America are surprisingly similar and can be summarized together:

Income

Income inequality in most OECD countries has grown rapidly in recent decades but most spectacularly in the United States. In the post-war years of 1945–73 there was a steep decline in inequality as incomes rose across the board. That decline ended due to the oil crisis, but over the next ten years the American income distribution was fairly stable.

Beginning in the 1980s, though, a new income gap emerged and has continued to widen with alarming speed. American families in the top 1% of the distribution have doubled their real incomes since 1990, while there has been no change for the bottom 75% of American families. The top 1% now earn an astonishing 24% of American national gross income (before taxes and benefits), a figure that has not been so high since the Great Crash of 1929. More astonishing still, the top 1/10th of 1%—what Noah calls "stinking rich"—receive 10% of all national income. Of those earning these salaries, over 60% are executives or managers or financiers.

So we know where the income has gone. But where has it shifted from? Revenue data show that most of the loss happened in the middle income range. While the poorest Americans did not improve their lot, welfare and especially tax credits have held their incomes fairly steady. As a result, the United States is developing a camel-shaped income distribution, with more people at the top and bottom, and fewer in the middle. One indicator of this change is that the top 1% now pay roughly 30% of all income taxes, while the bottom 50% only pay roughly 2%. (These figures are only approximate, though, since they leave out different forms of taxation and benefits apart form the federal income tax.)

Mobility

While income inequality has generally been higher in the United States than in other OECD nations, Americans are convinced that a high level of economic mobility equalizes chances for most citizens. And in fact, the US used to rank near the top in mobility among those nations. But no longer: the US is now near the bottom within the developed world, with only Great Britain and Italy having less intergenerational mobility. In fact, American children are more likely to belong to the same income class as their parents than to belong to the same weight class. In other words, the money-making "gene" is stronger today than the weight gene.

Causes

When it comes to analyzing the causes of increasing inequality, there is surprising agreement between Noah and Murray over some of the basic factors. Both recognize that the deindustrialization of the American economy has robbed middle-income earners of steady work, and given that fewer and fewer American workers belong to unions, those who have manufacturing jobs have not seen their incomes rise. They also agree that high rates of immigration, both legal and illegal, have depressed wages by expanding the workforce, as has the entry of many women into the workplace over the past fifty years. All in all, the kind of jobs and wages that used to allow for high economic mobility are no longer available.

Noah and Murray also pay attention to how, in this new situation, families in the upper income range are able to pass along their advantages to their children. Since more and more jobs in today's economy require education and mental dexterity, children with educated parents are more likely to be prepared from an early age, with more attention paid to their schooling and to developing the habits of the modern workplace. Murray also confronts a sensitive topic, the growing gap in intelligence scores between rich and poor. He explains this development in terms of what geneticists call "homogony," though Murray sees it as a social process rather than a purely biological one. He argues that in a knowledge-based economy that distributes advantages according to intelligence, there is greater likelihood that high-intelligence elites, who tend to attend the same schools and work in the same places, will marry and have children with those of the same class, producing children with a greater genetic likelihood of having a higher IQ. This advantage will obviously increase with each succeeding generation, so long as intelligence is more rewarded than, say, good looks or strength. In sum, the cultural advantages now bestowed upon intelligence are becoming genetic advantages, which only widens the gap between rich and poor from generation to generation

Broadly speaking, then, Noah and Murray are in general agreement about the nature of inequality in America today and many of its causes. Where they differ markedly is how they think government and society at large should respond. Noah is an old-fashioned liberal Democrat, who limits the range of his proposals to the ones liberals have advanced ever since the New Deal in the 1930s. He thinks taxes should be raised back to the Reagan-era level (which was actually fairly high) and that the money should be spent on creating government jobs and establishing pre-school programs for young poor children, which are shown to work. He thinks new financial regulations need to be put in place to control the excesses of global capitalism and would like to see unions strengthened (though he does not say how that could be done). His only really novel proposal is that price controls should be put on college tuition, which is quite expensive now and has pushed many middle-income families deeply into debt.

Some or all of this is certainly worth doing. But Noah, like many of his liberal colleagues, shows an astonishing lack of attention to the new *culture* of inequality in America, whose causes are not just economic. This is a departure within the American liberal tradition. In the early 1960s, for example, the American sociologist Michael Harrington published a heart-rending book, *The Other America,* which showed that the poor are not just poor, but live in a culture of poverty that is difficult to break out of. This made a large impression on President Kennedy and subsequently shaped the expansion of the welfare state by President Johnson. But later in the 1960s the idea of a culture of poverty was rejected by more radical liberals, who claimed that it stigmatized the poor, failed to take into account their cultural diversity, and shifted attention from the economic sources of inequality. A sort of silence was imposed about culture and inequality in America, which conservatives like Murray began to break in the 1980s.

Murray's most recent work builds on decades of work on poverty, employment, IQ, and education, and is rich in statistics and illustrations. Here are a few of his main points:

Two new white classes

Because discussions of inequality are so wrapped up with race and racism in America, Murray made the interesting decision to limit his research to white America. And what he finds is that in the past 40 years two classes of white Americans living in separate worlds have emerged. This is new. As one can see in American movies, there was a powerful myth of a universal white American "middle class" down through the 1960s. In terms of income, this was false, but in terms of culture there was some truth to it. With the economic boom that followed the Second World War, white Americans really did share a world—in terms of religion, morals, popular culture, even cuisine—no matter what economic class they came from. (Murray humorously points to the bland middle-American food Presidents Truman and Eisenhower enjoyed, and their love of Westerns.) That cohesive white culture is now gone, Murray argues. To demonstrate this, he compares statistically the *cultural world* of the top 20% of the population (the "rich") with that of bottom 30% (the "poor").

The new cognitive elite

The economic advantages of a college degree in the US are well known. But those who get it also now become part of a class whose habits and customs are more adapted to the new economy and society in which we live. The rich have fewer children than the poor, have them later in life, are healthier, weigh less, and watch less television. They also more and more tend to live together. One of the more surprising and disturbing statistics Murray reports is that the US is becoming much more geographically segregated than in the past, and this has significant socio-economic effects. For example, in 1960, 40% of the jobs in Manhattan's neighborhoods (excluding black Harlem) were in manufacturing; today, only 5% of them are. This explains why in central New York City you just do not see working class people any more, unless they work in restaurants or are tourists. The clustering is so extreme that today 15% of all jobs in Manhattan are in the financial sector. More astonishing still, while in 1960 only 16% of the Manhattan adult population had attended college, today it is 75%.

Social pathologies

Murray's next argument is that the culture of black poverty that was

continued on page 24