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# IWMpost

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*International Conference on*

## The Destruction of Scholarly Knowledge?

*Ivan Krastev*
Global Politics of Protest

*Ina Merdjanova*
European Islam

*Szilárd Borbély*
Die Mittellosen / Lob der Quitte

Photo: Shaiith / iStock

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**Institute for Human Sciences**

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# Editorial

Das Gefühl der Krise scheint derzeit allgegenwärtig zu sein. Wie Nancy Fraser im Rahmen der Patočka Gedächtnisvorlesung 2013 anschaulich aufgezeigt hat, ist die gegenwärtige Krise sowohl politisch als auch ökonomisch, ökologisch und gesellschaftlich. Ob sich die Wissenschaft – angesichts zunehmender Kommerzialisierung und Bürokratisierung – ebenfalls in einer Krise befindet, war Gegenstand einer internationalen Konferenz in Wien. Dementsprechend widmen sich die Beträge von Agata Lisiak, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun und Stefan Collini den Herausforderungen, vor denen traditionelle Medien und Institutionen der Wissensvermittlung heute stehen.

Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt setzt sich mit der Krise der Demokratie auseinander. Während Ivan Krastev die weltweiten Protestbewegungen der letzten Jahre zum Anlass nimmt, um über neue Formen des politischen Widerstandes nachzudenken, spürte Jan-Werner Mueller in den IWM Lectures in Human Sciences, zusammengefasst von Matthew Specter, dem Phänomen des Populismus nach – ein Faktor, der in der ungarischen Politik eine zentrale Rolle spielt, wie die Analyse der jüngsten Parlamentswahlen von András Bozóki zeigt. Um populistische Strategien geht es auch im Beitrag von Carl Henrik Fredriksson. Er setzt sich am Beispiel der „Wiener Türkenbelagerung" von 1683 mit der Frage auseinander, warum das Projekt einer gemeinsamen europäischen Öffentlichkeit bislang gescheitert ist. Dabei verdeutlicht gerade der Aufsatz von Ina Merdjanova über Muslime am Balkan, dass der Islam innerhalb Europas auf eine lange, eigenständige Tradition zurückblickt, welche das Vorurteil widerlegt, der Islam sei nicht mit demokratischen Werten vereinbar.

Im Artikel von Jarosław Kuisz geht es um die Wiederentdeckung einer eigenständigen, osteuropäischen Variante des Liberalismus, die über ein enges wirtschaftliches Verständnis hinausgeht. Über die heutige Relevanz eines anderen Begriffs, nämlich jenen des Patriarchats, wurde im Workshop anlässlich des 60. Geburtstags von Cornelia Klinger diskutiert. Wie die Beiträge von Susanne Lettow, Andrea Roedig, Birgit Sauer und Ewa Majewska zeigen, sind Begriffe wie Patriarchat oder Geschlecht nach wie vor unverzichtbar, um Gesellschafts- bzw. Herrschaftskritik zu üben. Ein konkretes Beispiel dafür ist Erna Appelts Artikel über das österreichische Care-Regime.

In Gedenken an Szilárd Borbély, Paul Celan Visiting Fellow 2013, findet sich in dieser Ausgabe, neben einem Nachruf von János M. Kovács, ein Auszug aus seinem Roman *Die Mittellosen*. ◁

*red*

The current sense of crisis seems to be omnipresent these days. As Nancy Fraser vividly illustrated during the Patočka Memorial Lecture 2013, the present crisis has political and economic, as well as ecological and social dimensions. Given the growing tendencies of commercialization and bureaucratization, an international conference in Vienna discussed the question whether scholarly knowledge itself is in a time of crises. The contributions by Agata Lisiak, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Stefan Collin in this issue are thus devoted to the challenges traditional media and knowledge institutions are facing today.

Another focal point deals with the crisis of democracy. Whilst Ivan Krastev takes the worldwide protest movements of the past few years as a starting point to think about new forms of political resistance, Jan-Werner Mueller focused in his IWM Lectures in Human Sciences, summarized by Matthew Specter, on the phenomenon of populism. As the analysis of the parliamentary elections of 2014 by András Bozóki shows, this factor plays a key role in Hungarian politics. Populist strategies are also the topic of Carl Henrik Fredriksson's article which explores the difficulties in creating a common European public sphere by referring to the "Turkish Siege of Vienna" in 1683. The essay written by Ina Merdjanova on the history of European Islam in the Balkans particularly refutes the prejudice of Islam being incompatible with democratic values.

The rediscovery of an independent, East European model of liberalism that goes beyond a purely economic understanding is at the heart of Jarosław Kuisz's article. A workshop on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Cornelia Klinger discussed the contemporary relevance of the concept of patriarchy. As the contributions by Susanne Lettow, Andrea Roedig, Birgit Sauer and Ewa Majewska show, concepts such as patriarchy or gender are still essential when it comes to critically reflecting on power relations and social inequalities. The article by Erna Appelt on the Austrian care regime in times of neoliberal modernization is such an example.

In memoriam Szilárd Borbély, who was a Paul Celan Visiting Fellow in 2013, this issue also includes an obituary by János M. Kovács as well as an excerpt from this book *The Dispossessed*. ◁

*red*

# The Global Politics of Protest

BY IVAN KRASTEV

*"Some three centuries ago, David Hume was surprised 'to see the easiness with which the many are governed by the few.'*[1] *I have been surprised to see the easiness with which the many have risen against the few—and the easiness with which the many have gone home afterward", says Ivan Krastev in his most recent book* Democracy Disrupted. The Global Politics of Protest.

Photo: Marko Djurica / Reuters

**Erdem Gunduz stands in a silent protest at Taksim Square (Istanbul) in June 2013, inspiring hundreds of others to follow his lead.**

In the five short years between Occupy Wall Street and Vladimir Putin's "Occupy Crimea," we witnessed an explosion of protests all around the world—the Arab Spring, Russian Winter, Turkish Summer, and the dismembering of Ukraine all were part of the protest moment. Each of these demonstrations—and many less monumental ones—was angry in its own way, but the protests are also a worldwide phenomenon.

Do they signal a radical change in the way politics will be practiced? Or are they simply a spectacular but ultimately insignificant eruption of public anger? Is it the technology, the economics, the mass psychology or just the zeitgeist that's caused this global explosion of revolt? Do the protests prove the technologically amplified power of citizens? Or, alternatively, do they mark the decline of the political influence of the middle class and its growing discontent with democracy? Will it be the empowering energy of the protests or the conservative backlash against them that will shape the future of democratic politics?

What strikes any observer of the new wave of revolutionary politics is that it is a revolution without an ideology or a project. Protesting itself seems to be the strategic goal of many of the protests. Failing to offer political alternatives, they are an explosion of moral indignation. In most of the protests, citizens on the street treat politics not so much as a set of issues but as a public performance or a way of being in the world. Many protesters are openly anti-institutional and mistrustful toward both the market and the state. They preach participation without representation. The protest movements bypass established political parties, distrust the mainstream media, refuse to recognize any specific leadership, and reject all formal organizations, relying instead on the internet and local assemblies for collective debate and decision making.

In a way the new protest movements are inspired by mistrust in the elites, empowered by mistrust in leadership, constrained by mistrust of organizations, and defeated by the protesters' inability to trust even each other: "This is an obvious but unspoken cultural difference between modern youth protest movements and those of the past. […] Anybody who sounds like a career politician, anybody who attempts to use rhetoric, or espouses an ideology, is greeted with visceral distaste."[2]

Mistrusting institutions as a rule, the protesters are plainly uninterested in taking power. The government is simply "them," regardless of who is in charge. The protesters combine a genuine longing for community with a relentless individualism. They describe their own political activism almost in religious terms, stressing how the experience of acting out on the street has inspired a revolution of the soul and a regime change of the mind. Perhaps for the first time since 1848—the last of the pre-Marxist revolutions—the revolt is not against the government but against being governed. It is the spirit of libertarianism that brings together Egypt's anti-authoritarian uprising and Occupy Wall Street's anti-capitalist insurrection.

*What strikes any observer of the new wave of revolutionary politics is that it is a revolution without an ideology or a project.*

For the protesters, it is no longer important who wins elections or who runs the government, not simply because they do not want to be the government, but also because any time people perceive that their interests are endangered, they plan on returning to the streets. The "silent man" in Taksim Square, Istanbul, who stood without moving or speaking for eight hours, is a symbol of the new age of protests: He stands there to make sure that things will not stay as they are. His message to those in power is that he will never go home.

While it is popular for Europeans to compare the current global protest wave with the revolutions of 1848, today's protests are the negation of the political agenda of 1848. Those revolutions fought for universal suffrage and political representation. They marked the rise of the citizen-voter. The current protests are a revolt against representative democracy. They mark the disillusionment of the citizen-vot-

er. The current protests function as an alternative to elections, testifying that the people are furious; the angry citizen heads to the streets not with the hope of putting a better government in power but merely to establish the borders that no government should cross.

But is a protest really a better instrument than elections for keeping elites accountable? Can we be confident that people will amass on the streets in large numbers whenever the public interest is violated? Could it not be that the next time the government crosses the line, there will be too few protesters and the effort will fail? How can we be sure that elites will not capture future protests in the same way that they have captured elections? Is the strategy of permanent protest more promising than the once popular dream of permanent revolution?

Despite their myriad demonstrations of civic courage, creativity, and political idealism, the protests are not the solution to the politics of unconditional demands. They are a form of adjustment to it. In most cases, they have not introduced new political actors or restored trust in politicians or public institutions. On the contrary, the protests have turned a mistrust of institutional norms into a norm of its own. The protests are likewise an insurrection against the institutions of representative democracy but without offering any alternatives within the democratic system or openness to non-democratic alternatives. The wave of protests is leaderless, finally, not because social media have made leaderless revolutions possible, but because in our libertarian age the ambition to challenge all forms of political representation have made unwelcome political leaders of any stripe. Google's Eric Schmidt thus may well be right when he predicts that "the future will be full of revolutionary movements" but short of "revolutionary outcomes."[3]

Democracy has been disrupted. But to what end? So far, we appear to have no idea—beyond disruption itself. ◁

1) David Hume: *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, New York: Cosmo, 2006, p. 29.*

2) Paul Mason: *Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions, London: Verso, 2012, p. 45.*

3) Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen: *The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business, New York: Knopf, 2013.*

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**Ivan Krastev** is IWM Permanent Fellow and Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. His latest books in English are: *Democracy Disrupted. The Global Politics of Protest* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); *In Mistrust We Trust: Can Democracy Survive When We Don't Trust Our Leaders?* (TED Books, 2013; forthcoming are translations of the book in Polish, Serbian and Bulgarian); *The Anti-American Century,* co-edited with Alan McPherson, (CEU Press, 2007).


## Lessons of the Protest Wave in Europe
## April 26–28, 2014, Barcelona / June 5–6, 2014, Berlin

The research project "The Lessons of the Protest Wave in Europe", initiated by the Centre for Liberal Strategies and the IWM and supported by Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung and Open Society Initiative for Europe, organized three seminars in 2014 which explore the experience of the current protest waves in Russia, Turkey, Spain, Ukraine and Bulgaria, and their impact on European politics.

While the first round table, hosted by the Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona, focused on the various activists and their motives, the seminar in Berlin, hosted by the Robert Bosch Stiftung, concentrated on the perspectives of the protest's critics and how the governments' diverse responses re-shape European politics. The third seminar in fall 2014 will be held in Sofia and analyze how the protests change the perception and work of NGOs.

### Program Barcelona

April 26, 2014

*Opening Remarks:*
**Ivan Krastev**

**Session I: Where Does the Protest Come From?**

**Session II: Mobilization and Organization**

**Session III: Outcomes**

**Session IV: Parties and Protests**

*Chairs:*
**Leonard Benardo**
**Maria Lipman**
**Gokce Tuyluoglu**

**Public Discussion: Lessons of the Protest Wave in Europe**

**Ivan Krastev**
**Oleksandr Sushko**
**Ayse Akalin**
**Maria Lipman**
**Jaume Asens**

*Chair:*
**Jordi Vaquer**

April 27, 2014

**Session V: The Protest in the National Political Context: The Analysts' Perspective**

**Oleksandr Sushko**
**Gokce Tuyluoglu**
**Daniel Smilov**
**Kirill Rogov**
**Juan Luis Sánchez**

April 28, 2014

**Session VI: Reflections on the Character and Significance of the Protest Wave**

**George Soros**
**Ira Katznelson**
**Scott Carpenter**
**Istvan Rev**
**Ivan Krastev**

*Chair:*
**Jordi Vaquer**

### Participants Barcelona

**Jaume Asens**
Lawyer (Human Rights and Social Movements); Spokesperson of the Defence Commission at the Barcelona Bar Association

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**Yevhen Bystrytsky**
Executive Director, International Renaissance Foundation (IRF), Ukraine

**Scott Carpenter**
Deputy Director, Google Ideas

**Murat Çekiç**
Director, Amnesty International, Turkey

**Vera Dakova**
Program Officer, Central/Eastern Europe and Russia, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

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Sociologist, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona; Editor, ROARMAG

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Former Deputy Director, European and Comparative Law Center, Ministry of Justice of Ukraine

**Mikhail Fishman**
Political Journalist and Observer, Moscow

**Mischa Gabowitsch**
Sociologist and Historian; Research Fellow, Einstein Forum, Potsdam

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Executive Director, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

**Francisco Jurado**
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**Ira Katznelson**
Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University; President, Social Science Research Council, New York

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Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; IWM Permanent Fellow

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CEO, Community Volunteers Association (TOG), Istanbul

**Vladyslav Kyrychenko**
Ukrainian Public Figure and Businessman; Co-founder, Dignity Direct Action Movement and Ukrainian Reserve Army

**Maria Lipman**
Chair, Society and Regions Program, Carnegie Moscow Center

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Journalist and Activist

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### Program Berlin

June 5, 2014

*Welcome and Introduction:*
**Sandra Breka**

**The Protests as Seen by the Activists. The Protests as Seen by the Government**

*Opening Remarks:*
**Ivan Krastev**

**Session I: Why Did People Go to the Streets and What Did They Achieve? Critics' Perspective**

**Soli Özel**
**Kancho Stoychev**
**Marta Romero**

*Chair:*
**Ivan Krastev**

June 6, 2014

**Session II: The Protests and the Diverse Responses of the Governments. Five Experiences in Comparative Perspective**

**Galip Dalay**
**Gabriel Elorriaga**
**Boris Popivanov**
**Gleb Pavlovsky**
**Mikhail Pogrebinksy**

*Chair:*
**Daniel Smilov**

**Session III: Protests and the Future of Democracy**

*Chair:*
**Daniel Smilov**

**Session IV: Lessons learned…**

*Chair and Closing Remarks:*
**Ivan Krastev**

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Sociologist; Founder, BBSS Gallup International

**Coşkun Taştan**
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# "Vienna Has Fallen!"

BY CARL HENRIK FREDRIKSSON

*How much in common must a community have? Quite a lot, says Carl Henrik Fredriksson, editor-in-chief of* Eurozine. *At the very least a common public sphere. Because without it, Europe's publics will be an easy prey for those who know how to play the strings of history.*

**Installation "Kanak Attack. Die dritte Türkenbelagerung?" by Feridun Zaimoglu at the Vienna Kunsthalle**

With 19.7 % of the vote, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) contributed significantly to the far-Right surge in the 2014 European elections. Though the party's performance fell short of its leadership's expectations, the FPÖ gained as much as 7 % and two additional seats in the European Parliament compared to the 2009 elections. Only France's National Front (25.0 %) and the Danish People's Party (26.6 %) attracted more voters in the far-Right camp.

This was the latest in a series of electoral successes for the FPÖ since Heinz-Christian Strache was elected chairman in 2005, following a split with Jörg Haider, who went on to found a new political party (the Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). Most, if not all, of the campaigns that helped Strache re-establish the FPÖ as one of Austria's leading political parties have in one way or the other focused on Turkey and Turkish immigrants. In the run-up to the recent European elections, one of the rhyming campaign slogans was the somewhat blunt "Türkei nicht dabei", keep Turkey outside! But it started much earlier—and in a rhetorically more sophisticated manner.

## Kanak Attack. The Third Siege of Vienna?

On 7 March 2005, German writer and artist Feridun Zaimoglu opened his installation "Kanak Attack. Die dritte Türkenbelagerung?" at the Vienna Kunsthalle. Zaimoglu, who is of Turkish origin, had dressed the walls of the former stables of the Habsburg Empire, now the centerpiece in Vienna's Museumsquartier, in 420 blood red Turkish flags.

A similar installation in Zaimoglu's German hometown Kiel had passed without much ado. Vienna, however, was an altogether different matter. It didn't take long before the public was mobilized: for and against Zaimoglu's "provocation"—mostly against. The *Berliner Zeitung* reported that the Viennese, described as being "deeply traumatized since 1683", were in shock. The FPÖ called on the director of the Kunsthalle to step down. Strache himself demanded that the project be stopped and asked what the Turks would have said if the Hagia Sophia had been wrapped in Austrian flags. Newspaper articles were illustrated with photoshopped images of the St. Stephan's Cathedral with the cross at the top of the tower replaced by a crescent. And a slogan was launched: "Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden." Vienna must not become Istanbul.

A few years earlier, FPÖ—then under Haider—had used a similar formulation: "Wien darf nicht Chicago werden!" That slogan was central to a classic law-and-order campaign, making use of the cliché of Chicago as a kind of Gotham City, suffering under organized crime, gangland problems and a high homicide rate. But this was something else: "Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden." Everyone—or at least more than enough people—knew what was at stake. It was 1683 all over again and high time to show who was "ein echter Wiener", a real Viennese.

The emotive reference to the Turkish sieges of Vienna (1529 and 1683) was no novelty in Viennese and Austrian politics; there are numerous examples of how these historical events have been reactivated in the present as vehicles for projecting contemporary fears and political programmes. In 1895, mayor-to-be Karl Lueger launched his election campaign by noting that "today we remember Vienna's liberation from the Turks, and let's hope that we'll be able to ward off a woe that is even greater than the Turkish danger, namely the woe of Jews". More than a hundred years later, and almost 500 years after the first siege of Vienna, the ground for FPÖ's 2005 campaign was prepared by Kurt Krenn, Bishop of St. Pölten, who launched the concept of a "third Turkish siege" when he told the *Oberösterreichische Rundschau* in 2002 that "we've already had two Turkish sieges, and now there's a third. It's just of a different type." And this one, he added, is even more "dangerous", since it comes from within.

These were the "good and evil spirits" that Feridun Zaimoglu brought to life on his projection screen, the flags on the walls of the Kunsthalle. And the resonance was strong, so strong that no spin-doctor would have been able to neglect it. With a campaign revolving around the slogan "Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden", the FPÖ got 14.8 % of the vote in the 2005 municipal elections in Vienna. This was less than the party had received four years earlier, but considering the volatile situation after the split with Haider, the emotionally charged campaign certainly helped Strache to avert a much bigger loss.

## Viennese Waltz in Luxembourg—and Istanbul

That very same autumn the debate about opening EU membership talks with Turkey reached its peak. Shortly before the decisive EU summit in Luxembourg, due to take place at the beginning of October 2005, 24 member states were for, only one against: Austria. Foreign minister Ursula Plassnik, who insisted that an alternative to full membership be written into the text regulating the negotiations, was under pressure from all sides. In the night of Monday 3 October, after having secured a fast track for Croatia into the EU, Plassnik finally gave up and her Turkish colleague Abdullah Gül could get on a plane to Luxembourg to join the celebrations.

The next day—under the headline "Viyana Valsi", Viennese Waltz—Turkey's biggest daily newspaper *Hürriyet* wrote: "Two times in history we have had to turn around at the gates of Vienna. Now we go to Europe on the road of peace and cooperation." In an accompanying analysis, *Hürriyet* wondered whether Austria's stubborn resistance should be explained as a classic "small-country syndrome" or simply as just as classic xenophobia—or indeed as a untreatable trauma that lingers on, long after the Turkish sieges of Vienna.

In fact, the headline of center-left daily *Milliyet* the same day—"Vienna Has Fallen!"—suggests that there might be traces of such a trauma in Istanbul as well. For it is hard to interpret this triumphant proclamation as anything other than an expression of relief at the late gratification, the long due compensation for a historical defeat. *Milliyet* was setting the record straight.

The reference is the same: 1683, the second siege of Vienna. And it is no doubt a potent reference in both Turkey and Austria. The perspectives, however, are exact opposites. The interpretative matrixes in which the reference gets its meaning are so different from each other that it is almost impossible to think of them as parts of one and the same system, of the same public sphere. And yet, that is exactly what we have to do.

Turkey might be further away from EU membership today than it was ten years ago, but that does

*continued on page 24*

Photo: Steve Wyckoff, 2005

# Free and Unfair: The Hungarian Elections

BY ANDRÁS BOZÓKI

*Hungary's parliamentary elections in April 2014 saw a 61% turnout, the lowest since 1998. The high abstention rate was a sign of disaffection with Hungarian politics: four-tenths of the electorate believed it was left without a genuine political choice.*



Illustration: Peter Schrank

Fidesz, the rightwing populist party led by Viktor Orbán, received 45% of the votes, giving it a strong mandate to continue to govern. Thanks to the disproportional voting system introduced by Fidesz, the party retained its two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, of a total of 8 million citizens eligible to vote, only 2.1 million cast their ballot for Fidesz; this was 8% (or 600,000 voters) less than in 2010. Orbán's description of the new electoral system as the manifestation of "national unity" is therefore clearly implausible. However, Orbán's charismatic leadership and his anti-European, Christian-nationalist rhetoric have managed to forge an alliance between conservative voters and the lower middle class, which expects the state to halt its existential decline. In 2002 and 2006—when the previous election system was still in place—this solid, two million-strong voter base didn't suffice for a Fidesz victory. This time, it secured the party a supermajority.

The alliance of leftist opposition parties came second with 26% of the vote. Led by Attila Mesterházy, the alliance is made up of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Together *(Együtt),* Dialogue for Hungary (PM), the Democratic Coalition (DK) and the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP). Since the previous elections, the alliance has managed to increase its vote by nearly 300,000, receiving a total of 1.2 million votes. Nevertheless, its performance at the polls is seen as a crushing defeat. In the last four years, the left has been unable to reinvent itself from the ground up. It has failed to communicate a clear identity or program; its leaders, who are engaged in constant rivalry, decided to field a joint list only at the last minute. The primary message of the alliance was a desire to run Viktor Orbán out of office; it had nothing to offer in terms of a genuine and positive vision. The list was dominated by MSZP politicians, held responsible by voters for the policy failures in the period up to 2010. Following their defeat, the leaders of the coalition parties announced that they would be running separately in the European parliamentary elections in May.

The third place went to far-right party Jobbik, with 20.5% of the vote. This represents some one million voters, 3% (100,000 votes) more than in the previous election. The results for individual constituencies show that in half the country Jobbik beat leftwing candidates. Several newspapers commented that the elections were a great victory for Jobbik, which promotes Hungarian nationalism, radicalism, anti-globalization and racism. Analysts blamed Orbán for the growing support of rightwing extremists and said that Europe could no longer ignore the far-right. In the months before the elections, Jobbik assumed a more moderate tone, campaigning with the slogan of "livelihood, order and accountability" and muting its standard racist message. It not only ran successfully in the poorest, north-eastern region of the country, but also managed to gain new positions in counties in the west. Today, Jobbik is a party with a national presence and the potential to capture the political center.

*Today, Jobbik is a party with a national presence and the potential to capture the political center.*

The green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP), came last with 5.2% of the vote. Although this falls short of the party's 2010 performance, it may grant green policies a new lease of life. Keeping an equal distance from both the rightist and the leftist bloc, LMP sent middle-of-the-road, anti-establishment message to its voters during the campaign.

The OSCE found that the elections themselves were effective and largely transparent, but cast doubt on the legitimacy of Orbán's landslide victory, commenting on the "undue advantage" enjoyed by Fidesz and the lack of freedom for the opposition during the campaign. The European Parliament, the European Council, the United States, and several EU member states have also openly criticized this abuse. The German government demanded that Orbán observe "fundamental rights" and govern responsibly. The *Financial Times* leader column suggested that Hungary's EU partners could not continue to greet each outrage with embarrassed silence.

## Violating the Principle of Equal Vote

The electoral laws were passed in 2011 without meaningful public debate, in violation of both Hungarian and international practice. Constituency boundaries were shifted around to make leftwing districts more populous than rightwing districts, causing a leftwing vote to carry less weight. Different rules apply to Hungarian nationals abroad and so-called "Trianon" Hungarians living beyond state borders. Moreover, under the new system extra mandates are added to the list of the winning party, which makes the regulation extremely disproportionate. These rules violate the principle of equal vote. There has also been a failure to properly regulate a number of important areas connected to campaign financing, such as the campaign activities of satellite organizations. Using public funds, Fidesz outsourced part of its campaign to a civic organization with close ties to the party, the Civil Alliance Forum (CÖF). Thanks to new financing regulations, the transparency of the system and its accountability have been compromised.

The Media Council set up by Fidesz is not politically neutral. The acquisition of media companies by investors with close ties to Fidesz undermines the plurality of the media and forces journalists to self-censor. Regulations introduced by Fidesz prohibit commercial television stations from running financed promotions, but this did not stop government ads being aired. The majority of television channels broadcast reports that are biased towards Fidesz. Together, these factors grant the government significant and unfair advantages and restrict citizens' access to proper information. The result has been a loss of public confidence in the electoral system. Fidesz not only campaigned as a party, as is usual in any multi-party democracy, but the Fidesz-controlled state administration also "campaigned" by using taxpayers' money and creating an uneven playing field. The boundaries between party and the state became blurred. This violates the principles about fair competition laid down in OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Document.

The lower middle classes and the poor, victims of the discriminative governmental social policies of the past four years, have been compensated with utility-cost cuts. While advertising on utility-cost cuts are delivered regularly to all Hungarian citizens, the burden of special taxes is borne by various segments of the population in isolation. The majority of the public has been convinced by the media that, despite permanent economic stagnation, "Hungary has been performing better" over Fidesz's four-year term.

Today, the Hungarian public is constantly reminded by its political leaders of the importance of national pride. Individual rights, and the democratic institutions that protect them, have taken a backseat to constitutionally endorsed policies of collective identity and cultural uniformity. With government propaganda about "order", "home", "fatherland" and "family" drowning out all other voices, many are voting with their feet: In the past four years, half a million people have left the country. ◁

**András Bozóki** is Professor of Political Science at the Central European University. His recent book *Virtual Republic* was published in Hungarian in 2012. Before the elections, Bozóki gave a lecture at the IWM entitled "Broken Democracy, Nationalist Populism, and Predatory State" (in cooperation with the Department of Political Science, University of Vienna). This text was previously posted on IWM's blog *Transit Online* on April 15.

# Threats to Scholarly Knowledge

CONFERENCE REPORT BY AGATA LISIAK

To the outside world, the Ivory Tower may appear to be standing tall and strong. The higher education sector is growing steadily, as the ever higher numbers of students, new academic degrees, and scholarly institutions indicate. Newspaper headlines and politicians constantly remind us that we live in a knowledge society. Media articles and policy reports enthusiastically announce new records: more information is available than ever before, access to information has never been cheaper and faster, more people than ever hold academic degrees. And yet, there is little enthusiasm to be found in academia itself. Scholarly knowledge is perceived to be endangered, the threat coming from, among other things, commodification, digitalization, information overload, and the bureaucratization of higher education institutions. Seen from the inside, the Ivory Tower seems to be crumbling.

Photo: Christian Mikes

A different type of tower served as the venue for the conference "Threats to Scholarly Knowledge". In the sky-lounge of a steel-and-glass building owned by the University of Vienna, two dozen representatives of universities, research centers, and publishers convened to discuss the state of scholarly knowledge today. Well aware of their many privileges as tenured academics in affluent Western countries, the participants acknowledged how rare their species has become as "adjunctification" and austerity policies drastically change the face of academia. Over two days, academics, publishers, and journalists addressed four major themes: the democratization of knowledge, the new economy of knowledge, knowledge technologies, and knowledge institutions under pressure.

## Gatekeepers: Old and New

Our expectations regarding information are often contradictory. We celebrate access and participation but want someone or something to guide us through the mass of information we encounter. We want gatekeepers, but don't want to be restricted by them. Historically, gatekeepers of information have been criticized both for lacking objectivity and subjectivity. In contrast, the contemporary gatekeeper—the algorithm—appears to offer neutrality. Or so we are inclined to assume, since very few of us understand how they actually work. But can there be such thing as neutral algorithm? Over the course of the conference, it became very clear that the technology we use operates according to rules that are complex and far from transparent, of which most of us have only the shallowest understanding.

Today, information is no longer selected on the basis of authority but of affinity. Search engines give us suggestions generated from records of our existing preferences. They are designed not to expand our horizons, but to give us what we already like. Despite the hitherto unimaginable volume of easily accessible information, the mechanisms with which to obtain it appear to operate in schematic, more or less predictable ways. The role of academic gatekeepers (universities, professors, publishers) has changed dramatically: today it is no longer about deciding *who* obtains *how much* knowledge, but about providing *context* for information that is obtainable through search engines.

## Information and Knowledge

Some conference participants considered it their responsibility to teach students that information and knowledge need to be combined with understanding, and that understanding is a process. Others pointed out that young people know very well how to deal with the surge of information: they do not believe everything they read and see, and are much more likely to be skeptical about content on the internet than their parents, grandparents—and teachers. In the public debate at the Burgtheater that concluded the conference, Lawrence Lessig compared today's young internet users to Soviet citizens: they do not trust everything they read in state newspapers, but compare various sources of information, and try to make sense of the world through triangulation. Still, navigating through immense volumes of information does remain a challenge. The democratization of access to information is a

## Conference
## Threats to Scholarly Knowledge
## April 4–5, 2014, Vienna

### Program

April 4, 2014

*Welcome and Introduction:*
**Cornelia Klinger**
**Anita Traninger**

**Session I: The Democratization of Knowledge**

*Introduction:*
**Lisa Anderson**
**Dominique Cardon**
**Michael Fleischhacker**
**Daniel Innerarity**
**András Kornai**

April 5, 2014

**Session II: The New Economy of Knowledge**

*Introduction:*
**Nicholas Lemann**
**Ziyad Marar**
**Sara Miller McCune**

**Session III: Knowledge Technologies**

*Introduction:*
**Antonio A. Casilli**
**Wendy Chun**
**Henry Farrell**
**Kathleen Fitzpatrick**
**Klaus Mainzer**

**Session IV: Knowledge Institutions Under Pressure**

*Introduction:*
**Stefan Collini**
**Margaret Levi**
**Wolfgang Rohe**
**Alexander Van der Bellen**

**Wrap-up Session**

**Cornelia Klinger**
**Anita Traninger**

*Conference Chairs:*
**Ira Katznelson**
**Kenneth Prewitt**

*In cooperation with Columbia University, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and SAGE Publications.*

### Participants

**Lisa Anderson**
President, The American University, Cairo

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**Dominique Cardon**
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**Wendy Hui Kyong Chun**
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**Henry Farrell**
Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University

**Kathleen Fitzpatrick**
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**Michael Fleischhacker**
Journalist and author; former editor-in-chief, *Die Presse,* Vienna

**Daniel Innerarity**
Professor of Political and Social Philosophy, University of the Basque Country, Spain

**Ira Katznelson**
Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University; President, Social Science Research Council; Deputy Chair, IWM Academic Advisory Board

**Cornelia Klinger**
IWM Acting Rector; Professor of Philosophy, University of Tübingen

**András Kornai**
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**Lawrence Lessig**
Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School; Director, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University

**Margaret Levi**
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**Wolfgang Rohe**
Member of the Executive Team and Director, Centre for Science and Humanities, Stiftung Mercator, Essen

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**Alexander Van der Bellen**
Professor of Economics, University of Vienna; Commissioner for Universities and Research, The City of Vienna

wonderful thing, but it may not necessarily mean the democratization of knowledge.

## Uses of Scholarly Knowledge

In recent years, in connection with austerity policies, "public interest" has repeatedly been invoked to justify the de-funding or even obliteration of certain branches of science and the university departments devoted to them. Public debate on science and learning has been dominated by a new vocabulary of accountability in education and research. In neoliberal newspeak, institutions of knowledge are compared to businesses. This explicit association of the market and science is dangerous because it imperils those subject areas that do not produce direct economic value. However, as Anita Traninger remarked, it is naive to suppose we can decide today what knowledge will be useful in ten or twenty years. She drew attention to the different temporalities of knowledge—knowledge that is immediately useful and knowledge "to be used" in the future—and argued that this distinction needs to be communicated to the world beyond academia, especially to funding institutions.

If scholarly knowledge is to be useful, it has to be presented in an accessible way; that is, in a language that people who are not experts in that field can understand. Many scholars who see themselves as having a public role have taken to writing blogs in order to reach wider audiences. It is important to remember, however, that many academic bloggers—such as those publishing on *The Monkey Cage*—can afford to write their posts because they are tenured faculty members and can devote their time to any scholarly activity they wish. *The Monkey Cage,* as contributor Henry Farrell admitted, is sustainable only because it exists within a specific academic and economic system. The adjunctification of academia means that many scholars have little chance of sustaining themselves through writing: they juggle various teaching jobs with publishing in journals, leaving them little time, and even less energy, to write on the side for no pay.

For young scholars in particular, publishing in journals is part of a strategy to obtain tenure-track positions in an increasingly competitive environment. Due to decreasing budgets, university libraries have cut down on subscriptions, but—because of prestige and other factors—keep subscriptions to the established journals. As a result, academics and students using university libraries have only limited access to journals beyond the most established publications. Consequently, the scholarly journals to which libraries do not subscribe become less attractive for prospective authors. Clearly, there is an urgent need to break this vicious cycle and to develop new, sustainable models of academic publishing.

Another issue debated was the peer-review process. In the peer-review model as it exists today, a significant amount of knowledge gets lost. The reader never learns how the end product—i.e. the published work—has been created; there is no record of the influence the commentators and editors had on the paper and what kind of new knowledge emerged out of the exchange between author and reviewers. Attempts have been made in some of the more progressive online journals to record and communicate the development of ideas and to engage in academic collaboration; however, these are still too sporadic to set a trend.

## In Transition

The initial premise of the conference, as Cornelia Klinger recalled in her concluding remarks, was that we are witnessing fundamental changes in knowledge systems and that these changes are the result of technological revolution. Over the course of two days, however, it became evident that the revolution is also a societal and economic one. We are in a transitional state characterized by diminishing public funding of scholarly knowledge and the ever-growing influence of the market. In which direction should academia move? Klinger drew an analogy between knowledge work and care work. In developed countries, care used to be carried out (mostly by women) without remuneration; today, it is increasingly paid work (carried out by immigrant women hired by middle-class women). When care becomes marketized, how do we value affective labor such as loving gestures and kind words? Surrendering knowledge to the market could pose similar challenges. We need a third way, though we have only a vague idea of what it might look like and where it will lead.

Perhaps, proposed Klinger, we should start by abandoning binary thinking about how science is funded. Rather than distinguishing between public and private money, it may be preferable to look at the goals and the spirit behind funding. Public funding is misdirected if designed to increase state power; private funding is misdirected if designed to increase corporate power. Regardless of the source of funding, knowledge should serve the wealth of people, create new things and extend human capabilities.

*The more we know,*
*the more disoriented we seem to be.*

## The Destruction of Scholarly Knowledge!

Although most conference participants agreed that we are on the brink of something new, some issues remained contested. There was no definite consensus, for example, on the definitions of knowledge and information and their distinction (or lack thereof). However, dissensus is not necessarily a bad thing. Several speakers argued that it drives science (and democracy). The challenge is to present dissensus to the public—to make sure the public understands that academia is not unanimous on various issues.

The conference ended with a debate at the Burgtheater entitled: "The Destruction of Knowledge?" Cornelia Klinger reminded her interlocutors and audience of an important historical fact: the perception that scholarly knowledge is under threat is by no means new, as Husserl's lectures on the crisis of European sciences, published in 1937, demonstrate. Why are we talking about a crisis, Klinger asked, if we know, and are capable of, more than ever before? The more we know, the more disoriented we seem to be. This confusion is hardly surprising, however, if we bear in mind that we are living in a transitional phase. So what should our next move be? Should we let the Ivory Tower crumble and build something new on its ruins? Or should we try to rescue it at all cost?

Sociologist Armin Nassehi enthusiastically—and provocatively—proposed the destruction of knowledge. He understands knowledge as a representation of the world, a representation that could be otherwise. According to Nassehi, the destruction of knowledge is the precondition not only for the creation of new knowledge, but for reflexive handling of the knowledge we now possess. Lawrence Lessig added that what we knew a hundred years ago (e.g. that women are too emotional to vote) we know today to be absolutely wrong. Destruction of knowledge is a good thing, then; it is a prerequisite for progress. Yet, as Klinger promptly noticed, "old" knowledge is revised not only by scholars, but also by people on the streets. There was plenty of "scientific evidence" at the beginning of the 20th century that women naturally suffer from hysteria and were thus unable to participate in politics. Women had to march, to give speeches, to organize themselves, to write petitions, and often to risk their lives before they were recognized as worthy of casting a vote. Science is traditionally conservative and reinforces the status quo. The speakers gathered on the stage in the Burgtheater replaced the question mark in the title of the debate with an exclamation mark: The Destruction of Knowledge! ◁

**Agata Lisiak** is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Sociology at Humboldt University in Berlin (Project TRANSFORmIG) and lecturer at Bard College Berlin. From September 2013 to June 2014 she was a EURIAS Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

## Debating Europe / Europa im Diskurs
## January 19 / March 16 / April 6, 2014
## Burgtheater, Vienna

Photos: Matthias Cremer

Since 2008, the series *Debating Europe* brings leading politicians, scholars and intellectuals together on stage to discuss pressing questions of European relevance. The public debates are jointly organized by the Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation, the newspaper *Der Standard* and the IWM.

Die Matinee-Serie *Europa im Diskurs* bringt seit 2008 führende Persönlichkeiten aus Politik und Wissenschaft auf die Bühne des Wiener Burgtheaters, um über aktuelle europäische Fragen zu diskutieren. Die Reihe ist eine Kooperation von IWM, Burgtheater, ERSTE Stiftung und der Tageszeitung *Der Standard*.

Sonntag, 19. Januar 2014

### Wie wirkt 1914 nach?

Am 28. Juni 1914 wurde der Thronfolger von Österreich-Ungarn, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajewo ermordet. Dieses Attentat war der Auslöser für den Ersten Weltkrieg, der eine epochale Zäsur mit enormen Folgen für die ganze Welt war. Fast 40 Länder waren in irgendeiner Form beteiligt, an die 70 Millionen Menschen standen unter Waffen, 17 Millionen Opfer waren zu beklagen. Die erste Debatte der Serie *Europa im Diskurs* in diesem Jahr fragte nach den noch heute spürbaren Nachwirkungen von 1914.

**Eduard Habsburg-Lothringen**
Autor und Kommunikationsberater

**Biljana Srbljanović**
Serbische Schriftstellerin und Dramaturgin

**Manfried Rauchensteiner**
Professor für Österreichische Geschichte, Universität Wien; ehem. Direktor, Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Wien

**Timothy Snyder**
IWM Permanent Fellow; Bird White Housum Professor of History, Yale University

*Moderation:*
**Alexandra Föderl-Schmid**
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

Sonntag, 16. März 2014

### Driften Europa und Amerika auseinander?

Jahrzehntelang galten die EU und USA als engste Verbündete. Doch dieses Verhältnis ist getrübt. Obama richtet mehr außenpolitische Aufmerksamkeit auf den pazifischen Raum, Europa gerät ins Hintertreffen. Die Europäer sind zudem über das Ausmaß der Überwachung durch die amerikanischen Geheimdienste empört. Ist das Vertrauen durch die NSA-Abhörmaßnahmen nachhaltig gestört? Gibt es noch gemeinsame sicherheitspolitische Interessen? Was verbindet die beiden Kontinente heute noch? Diese Fragen standen im Mittelpunkt der zweiten Burgtheaterdebatte 2014.

**Lee A. Brudvig**
Gesandter der US-Botschaft, Wien

**Martin Schulz**
EU-Parlamentspräsident; Fraktionsvorsitzender der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Europas (SPE)

**Hans-Christian Ströbele**
Deutscher Bundestagsabgeordneter (Die Grünen)

**Werner Weidenfeld**
Professor für Politikwissenschaft; Politikberater

*Moderation:*
**Alexandra Föderl-Schmid**
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

Sonntag, 6. April 2014

### Die Zerstörung des Wissens?

Wir leben in einer Wissensgesellschaft. Mehr Menschen als jemals zuvor haben Zugang zu Wissen und Bildung. Doch wie verändert sich das, was wir unter Wissen verstehen, durch die digitale Revolution? Wer bestimmt angesichts von Wikipedia, Google oder Twitter was Wissen ist? Welche Art von Wissen wird so zur Grundlage politischer und gesellschaftlicher Entscheidungsprozesse? Und wie sollen die traditionellen Bastionen des Wissens – die ‚alten Medien', Verlage, Schulen, Universitäten – damit umgehen? Die Frage, ob die Demokratisierung und Vermehrung des Wissens langfristig gesehen die Zerstörung des Wissens bedeutet, war Gegenstand dieser Diskussion.

**Cornelia Klinger**
IWM-Rektorin *ad interim;* Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Tübingen

**Lawrence Lessig**
Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School; Mitbegründer von „Creative Commons"

**Sara Miller McCune**
Gründerin, SAGE Publications; Präsidentin, McCune Foundation, Ventura / CA

**Armin Nassehi**
Professor für Soziologie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

*Moderation:*
**Nicholas Lemann**
Professor für Publizistik, Columbia University

*Videos zu den Debatten auf: www.iwm.at*

# Knowledge Technologies: Threat = Promise?

**Comment** by **Wendy Hui Kyong Chun**

Photo: Christian Mikes

What does it mean to combine knowledge and technology in one phrase? To make knowledge describe technology, so that knowledge—a noun—becomes an adjective? Most importantly, what does it mean to make knowledge describe a technology that few—if any of us—really know?

As I argue in *Programmed Visions: Software and Memory,* it is very strange that computers—understood as software-hardware machines—have become a metaphor for the mind, for culture, for ideology, for biology, and for the economy. Cognitive science, as Paul Edwards has shown, initially comprehended the brain-mind distinction in terms of hardware and software.[1] Molecular biology conceives of DNA as a series of genetic "programs." More broadly, some have described culture as "software," in contrast to the "hardware" of nature. Although technologies such as clocks and steam engines have historically been used as metaphors to conceptualize our bodies and culture, software is unique in being a metaphor for metaphor itself. Back in 1976, Joseph Weizenbaum argued that computers have become metaphors for all "effective procedures," that is, for anything that can be solved in a prescribed number of steps, such as gene expression and clerical work.[2] As a universal imitator-machine, it encapsulates a logic of general substitutability: a logic of ordering and creative, animating disordering.

The clarity offered by software as metaphor should make us pause, however. Not only does software empower, it also engenders a sense of profound ignorance. Who really knows what lurks behind our smiling interfaces, behind the objects we click and manipulate? Who completely understands what their computer is doing at any given moment? As our machines disappear, become flatter and flatter, the density and opacity of their computation increases. The less we know, the more we are shown; the more we are shown, the friendlier our machines become. What is today called programming would have been considered scripting when I was in school. Of the kids in my class, it was those who were the closest to knowing machines (and who went on to become assembly language programmers) that today are the forty-somethings being cast off unwanted by Silicon Valley. As social media takes over, they are the ones most in danger of becoming unemployed.

But it is not enough merely to say that software as metaphor for metaphor troubles the usual functioning of metaphor, i.e. the clarification of an unknown concept through a known one. The bizarre and illogical association of computers we cannot understand with "understanding" itself, the equation of rationality with unknowability, makes computation a powerful tool. Computation combines what can and cannot be seen, what can be known and not known—separates interface from algorithm, software from hardware. It becomes a metaphor for everything we believe is invisible yet which generates visible effects, from genetics to the invisible hand of the market; from ideology to culture.

In particular, I want to argue that dealing directly with the limitations and possibilities of technology opens up ways of engaging with scholarly knowledge and teaching, for teaching has never been about relaying content. If scholars feel forced to compete with Google and Wikipedia, they are doing something profoundly wrong. Michael Fleischhacker articulated it well when he stated that what is being threatened is not scholarly knowledge but our current business models of scholarly knowledge.

It is the unknowable that provides the impetus for both knowledge and technology. Scholarship has always been about using what we do know—and methods of knowing—to reach towards what we cannot know definitely, towards things that require hypotheses. In the natural and physical sciences, a lot of the early courses are indeed focused on memorization and relaying content. But the later courses help students create the big picture: to weigh evidence and create a model of the world based on separate and often conflicting facts. In other words, students are taught how to make inferences from complex situations, in order to deal with what Daniel Innerarity describes as knowledge that is fully accessible but not derivable from personal experience.

As global climate change shows, there is real uncertainty about the future. While all models agree that global climate change is happening, they predict different outcomes. This dissent, which is part of scholarly knowledge, is not easily communicated beyond scholarship. However, as the debate over global climate change reveals, scholars' failure to explain scientific dissent to the public puts them in peril. Many decent and smart climate scientists have been attacked for "hiding" evidence; many are afraid to publicly disagree with a prediction because any disagreement is trumpeted as proof that there is no consensus on climate change—as if consensus is what drives science and democracy.

In order to displace this reductive understanding of "knowledge technologies" and to rescue it from the concept of "surveillance", we need to engage with technology even more closely. We need to engage with its contradictions and use it to create learning experiments, without giving up the goal of creating democratic forms of knowledge and teaching. Teaching, that is not about one head speaking to many listeners, but about creating a community of teachers and students. ◁

[1] *See Paul N. Edwards:* The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, *Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996.*

[2] *Joseph Weizenbaum:* Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, *San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976, p. 157.*

**Wendy Hui Kyong Chun** is Professor and Chair of Modern Culture and Media at Brown University.

# Knowledge Institutions under Pressure

**Comment** by **Stefan Collini**

Photo: Christian Mikes

Any attempt to understand the main ways in which the institution of the university may be said to be 'under pressure' throughout the developed world necessarily entails reflection on the long history of relations between universities and their host societies. We should not allow ourselves to be panicked into assuming that the pressures perceived to bear on universities now are entirely new or entirely bad. Many of the changes that have taken place in universities and their position in society in the past few decades have been expressions of a broader process of democratisation and expansion which I believe we should welcome, and therefore we should not characterise all recent changes as loss or see the contemporary university as in sad decline from some presumed golden age. Nonetheless, there are some pressures which have taken particularly powerful forms in the present.

One of the deep characteristics of individualist market democracies is that the combination of a reductive economism in public policy and an ostensible egalitarianism in public debate in effect cloaks a kind of practical relativism. Only those goals which follow from the aggregation of expressed wants then have legitimacy, something that necessarily favours the quantitative and the instrumental. The chief consequences of this as far as universities are concerned include a damaging short-termism, an emphasis on measurable forms of accountability, and a loss of both trust and autonomy. And these consequences shape, in their turn, the regimes of funding, assessment, and governance under which universities increasingly labour.

This situation is not altogether new, but it is now under-written by an increasingly aggressive form of economistic reasoning that is dominant in policy and media circles. This makes it ever more difficult to find effective ways to legitimate the values of education and scholarship in non-reductive terms in contemporary public debate. All I can do here is gesture towards some of the obvious ways of attempting to respond to this situation.

The first is to focus attention on the unexamined premises of the goal of economic 'growth' itself. What is it good for, how much do we need, who is 'we' in this case, and so on? By raising questions about the human purposes economic prosperity is meant to serve, we open a small window through which discussion of other human values can be let in, values which the university exists to promote.

A second no less general response is to insist that many of the matters of greatest importance cannot be *measured* but must be *judged.* In making this case, it is important to be clear that judgement is not simply a matter of subjective opinion: if it were, we would immediately be back with the implicit relativism of aggregate expressed preferences. Judgements depend on reasons and some reasons can be better than others. In this respect, making an adequate case for universities draws upon some of the very capacities that universities exist to develop.

A third, equally general, strategy is to identify and build upon the ways in which ordinary citizens do in their daily lives implicitly endorse values other than the prevailing economism. In a range of ways, from hopes for their children to concern for the environment, and from everyday curiosity to thwarted yearnings, most people do practically entertain values which are consonant with those which, ultimately, universities depend on and try to foster. It is important to keep trying to engage such values in addressing publics that go beyond policy and media circles.

And finally, let me suggest three more specific tactics which may be particularly relevant to debate within universities. The first is not to allow the running of these institutions to be entirely handed over to the cadre of professional managers which has grown so powerful in the last couple of decades in particular. This means that senior academics have to be willing to take their turn at these administrative tasks and to embody the self-governing ideals of collegiality rather than accepting the definition of a career purely in terms of so-called 'research achievement'.

The second is to try to make clear, in the face of much contemporary disparagement, that scholarly disciplines are the indispensable foundations of any broader or so-called 'inter-disciplinary' enterprises, and that, institutionally speaking, academic departments are the units best placed to make sure these disciplines prosper from generation to generation. Disciplines are, of course, contingent and time-bound creations, not timeless essences, but they have taken their current forms for good intellectual as well as historical reasons. Thematic clusters and problem-focussed programmes have their place, but they by and large have the effect of empowering managers and the managers' control of funding at the expense of the long-term support of disciplines and appointments sustained in the little republics that are university departments.

Third, we need constantly to make the case for scholarship and the scholarly career alongside 'research'. The latter is often construed on a scientific model as being confined to the discovery of 'new findings'; it is inherently project-focused and not intimately related to the accumulated intellectual capital that is a scholarly career. We need to emphasize the distorting effect which a regime of constant competition for external funding can have by comparison to the long-term benefits in terms of fruitful reading and thinking which the system of tenure and sabbatical leave encourages. A career is something built by a person, a scholar; it is not simply a sequence of funded projects, and a profession is not in good health where the main index of individual success comes to consist of the amount of time a scholar is away from their home institution.

I'm well aware that all of these are ambitious and even idealistic prescriptions. But if people like us don't try to make this case, then we shall bear some of the responsibility for diminishing the value of the academic institutions from which we have benefited and which we have a duty to hand on to future generations. ◁

**Stefan Collini** is Professor of Intellectual History and English Literature at the University of Cambridge

# We the People: On Populism and Democracy

REPORT ON JAN-WERNER MUELLER'S IWM LECTURES IN HUMAN SCIENCES 2013. BY MATTHEW SPECTER

Photo: iStock / Ilbusca

**A man holding a puppet representing the populist leader of the Italian five stars party Beppe Grillo during a carnival celebration parade in Borgosesia, Italy.**

Just days after the Ukrainian protests on the Maidan began, Jan-Werner Mueller, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, delivered the IWM's 2013 Lectures in Human Sciences on the subject of populism. As ordinary people in Ukraine struggled for democracy on a European model, Mueller identified the recent strength of populist challengers in Hungary, France, Greece, Finland and the Netherlands as a symptom of real weaknesses and tensions within Europe's democracies which require real attention: they are no mere passing political pathology to be chalked up to the post-2008 economic crisis. Mueller's *raison d'etre* for the lectures was that the analysis of populism is mired in media clichés and liberal psychologizing: not all populists are economic losers or consumed with resentment, fear or hatred. A fresh look was needed at both the "inner logic" of the concept (the claims populists make), and the "historical logic" by which populist movements unfold (their conduct).

## Playing with Fire: The Populist Difference

In the first two lectures, Mueller explored the inner logic of populism, arguing that the core feature of the populist imaginary is a certain view of the people. Populist parties determine which part of the demos is authentic and which not, and thereby divide and exclude polities into parts sorted by "moralized claims around work and what people deserve." "Populists imagine a fully homogeneous entity called 'the people' which can be represented without remainder … Anyone who disputes this claim to full representation is not 'a part' of the people but literally 'apart.'" In Mueller's interpretation, the populist imaginary is synecdochic: by a *pars pro toto* logic, it substitutes parts for wholes, without acknowledging the elision.

But the claim to represent more than particular interests—to speak for the whole, or the common good, in other words—is not unique to populists, Mueller acknowledged. What is distinctively dangerous about populist political parties is that even when they respect the outcomes of elections as legally valid, they continue to contest their legitimacy. When populists say, "We're not just the legitimate opposition; we're the only legitimate actor in the game," they are "playing with fire." Invoking the higher reality of "the people" as the source of all true legitimacy will always do damage to the symbolic and moral status of real democratic institutions, he warned.

But it turns out that the populists' siren song of synecdoche is just one symptom of a deeper problem of political perception: populists also "take too literally the fictions" of liberal democracy. What are these fictions? That majority rule conveys the one authentic will of the people; that the "common good" can be definitely identified; and that winners of elections supply representatives with determinate mandates. Mueller draws a sharp distinction between those who correctly understand the epistemic status of liberal democracy, and those who do not. Quoting Hans Kelsen and Claude Lefort, but also clearly indebted to Habermas, Mueller explained that this kind of literalism runs afoul of the shared understanding that political judgments are necessarily fallible. "Who the people really are is, and should remain, an open and contestable process." Populists gravely by "breaking" this "chain of contestation." Mueller provoked by concluding that populists' naïve literalisms indicate that they "do care about democracy" sincerely. But this is no apology for populism. Mueller says that liberal democrats need to "fail better," in the words of Samuel Beckett, if they are to prove their commitment to democratic ideals.

## How Populism Unfolds in Different Historical Contexts

Mueller emphasized that he was not interested in identifying something like what scholars called "the fascist minimum," nor a deterministic model of how populists attain power or govern. Rather, he focused on certain patterns which seem distinctive to populism and which form the basis of a hypothesis about process. First, populist actors tend to emerge when party hegemonies are breaking down. Berlusconi's emergence in Italy in the early 1990s is a good example. Second, populists reward their supporters by handing out state offices. While mass clientelism is not unique to populists, the inner logic of populism, i.e., the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic people, generates a "moral surplus" that enables populists to politicize the state apparatus with "a clean conscience." As Mueller summarized this attitude, "We're only taking care of *these* people, because *only* these people are *the* people." He clarified that the populist imaginary can function quite differently in a non-liberal, non-democratic context, where the rhetoric of a unitary people can help enable the constitution of a people that will ultimately need representation, but which first needs to be "talked into existence."

Today's populist moment in Europe can be traced, Mueller argued, to the political architecture institutionalized in Western Europe after the Second World War. Totalitarianism taught Western Europe's founding generation to distrust popular sovereignty and find ways to contain its dangerous potential. Distrust of parliaments led to great responsibility being placed in the hands of constitutional courts. This model spread to Southern Europe in the 1970s and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. And Mueller asserts that today's populist parties are not symptomatic of economic but rather political crisis, brought on by the conspicuous failures of technocratic EU governance. Thus Mueller noted that technocracy and populism are intertwined, but not only as cause and effect; the two have become "mirror images of the other," borrowing from the other's political repertoire. As he summarized, both oppose party squabbling, both imagine singular solutions, and both envision a passive populace which delegates authority to representatives. Both are apolitical: after delegation, nothing more needs to be said. He also noted that technocracy has become more moralizing as populists have become more businesslike.

In this provocative lecture series, Mueller combined high theory with empirical political judgments about contemporary political parties. His conclusion: populists' conceptions of representation are deeply undemocratic and dangerous, but liberal democrats need to listen to what today's populists are saying, because they point to real failings in the system, including its distortion by technocratic governance. ◁

### IWM Lectures in Human Sciences

**The IWM launched this series of public lectures in 2000. Selected lectures are published in English (Harvard University Press), German (Suhrkamp Verlag) and Polish (Kurhaus Publishers).**

**Jan-Werner Mueller** is Professor of Politics at Princeton University, where he is the Founding Director of the Project in the History of Political Thought.

**Matthew Specter,** Associate Professor of History at Central Connecticut State University, was an IWM Visiting Fellow in 2013.

# A Feminist Critique of Capitalism as a Theory of Solidarity?

REPORT ON NANCY FRASER'S JAN PATOČKA MEMORIAL LECTURE 2013. BY EWA MAJEWSKA

The current sense of crisis—economic, ecological, political, social—has prompted many critical theorists to revisit the problem of capitalism. In her Patočka Memorial Lecture, held at the Museum of Applied Arts (MAK) on November 7, 2013, Nancy Fraser proposed a rethinking of the political agency of capitalism. Entitled *Crisis, Critique, Capitalism: A Framework for the 21st Century,* Fraser's socialist feminist analysis reconsidered the critical and political potential of non-commodified areas of life, such as intimate relations, nature and care. Referring to Jan Patočka's idea of the "solidarity of the shaken", she explored the potential for common ground between people "shaken" by political and economic upheaval, including those as different as a phenomenologist and a Marxist feminist. Below, the ideas developed in Fraser's lecture are placed in the wider context of her theoretical work.


Crisis, Critique, Capitalism—
Patočka Memorial Lecture by Nancy Fraser 2013

Photo: MAK / Katrin Wißkirchen

## Capitalism and Crisis

The Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski opened his *magnum opus* on Marxism, published in the late 1970s, with an oft-quoted sentence: "Marx was a German philosopher". It was a multilayered declaration of sentiments shaped by the Polish context, in which Marx had been subjected to serious misunderstandings, both by his official supporters, the apparatchiks of the communist state, and by his enemies, for whom Marx was merely a bad economist used by his followers to legitimize the wrongs of the Soviet system. Kołakowski's contribution was to allow philosophical analysis of an author perceived among certain generations of eastern European authors and politicians, regardless of their position towards communism in general and state socialism in particular, as an economist or political polemist. Regardless of how we read Marx today, the ability to see philosophical content in the thought of those who represent definitive political positions, who engage in debates on capitalism and crisis, and who offer alternatives, even if utopian, remains inspiring, after all the declared "ends" of politics, philosophy and culture.

## What is Critical Theory Today?

In this sense, the American Nancy Fraser could also be called "a German philosopher". Her lecture accentuated some of the crucial and well-known elements of German philosophy. Broadly emphasizing the fundamental character of critique, utopia and social justice, the distinction between marketized and non-marketized aspects of human existence and the appeal to capitalism's beyond were more concrete elements connecting the topic of the lecture with a long line of German thought. Fraser's analysis of the dialectic between productive labor fully colonized by neoliberal markets, on the one hand, and affective labor and subject formation by means of households, public institutions and the private sector, on the other, invokes the analysis of *Sittlichkeit* in both Kant and Hegel. The presumption that the current state of affairs can be overcome was a clear reference of the idea of freedom, which has preoccupied German philosophy for over two hundred years.

## The Resistance of Non-Commodified Spheres of Life

In her Vienna lecture, Fraser emphasized that a good theory of the crisis of capitalism should combine a critical, Marxist analysis with feminist insights concerning reproduction, ecology and political power. Like the proletariat in Marx's theory, the non-commodified zones of affective labor "do not merely mirror the commodified zones, but rather embody grammars of their own". For Fraser, capitalism is more than the economy and should be seen as an institutional order. This post-Weberian perspective allows an analysis of the role of the law within capitalism, so often overlooked in the Marxist tradition and so carefully analyzed by Jürgen Habermas and scholars associated with critical legal studies. Laws protecting property and the stability of contracts preserve individual liberties but are used to limit social struggle and exploit workers, thus sharpening social divides and enabling the accumulation of capital. Fraser emphasized the necessity of a critical approach to law, which recognizes it as means of recognition while relativizing its significance.

## Towards a Feminist Critical Theory of Resistance

At the same time, I would like to suggest that Nancy Fraser is predominantly a feminist scholar. Her emphasis on gender and its constitutive role in the division between capitalist production and its enabling conditions—the non-commodified sectors of reproduction, both in the human realm and in the realm of nature or the non-human—clearly mark her position as feminist. However, and this should be stressed, Fraser's analysis of reproductive labor not only draws attention to its downsides, but also and predominantly to its potential as a zone of resistance and change. Here she differs from feminist scholars who speak either of the complete commodification of women (Luce Irigary) or of affective labor (Arlie Hochschild). Moreover, while Black feminists and socialist feminists have recognized the potentials of reproductive labor, they have emphasized the necessity of overcoming the division between "production" and "reproduction", treating both aspects as elements of a single moment of exploitation, and thus as targets of a single struggle. In the double-system theory developed by Fraser in her debates with Axel Honneth over recognition and redistribution, she considered two systems of oppression—gender and capital; now, she proposes a "multi-strand" critique that embraces further factors of oppression.

## A Critical Subsumption of the Feminist "We"

Another possible disagreement between Fraser and other feminists, including poststructuralist and postcolonial thinkers, is the issue of the undifferentiated, unproblematized, monolithic feminist "we" applied throughout the Vienna lecture and in her texts published in *The Guardian* and other publications last year. The feminist debate over the subject of oppression is long and complicated and I refer only to the observation of the Marxist feminist Gayatri Spivak, who argued in *Can the Subaltern Speak?* that the poststructuralist premise of dismantling the (European) subject often leads to its reinstatement as general Subject. According to Spivak, certain feminist critiques and supposedly anti-authoritarian theories reiterate Eurocentric presumptions while claiming to deconstruct them. This argument, an expression of doubt concerning the position of the critical subject, was promptly addressed by Fraser in the opening section of her lecture.

## Toward the "Solidarity of the Shaken"

How did Fraser's lecture, a clear tribute to the German philosophical tradition, connect with Jan Patočka, the Czech philosopher and prominent member of the anticommunist opposition of the 1960s and 1970s? Fraser addressed this question at the start of her lecture, giving a truly inspiring demonstration of her ability to connect with a representative of a different philosophical tradition, namely phenomenology, and with a different political tradition, liberalism. She also—and for many of her listeners this proved the most valuable part of her lecture—read Patočka's work in a way that Friedrich Nietzsche once called "modern", displaying not archivist piety and heroic praise but interest in the contemporariness of the subject. In this way, Patočka's reference to the "solidarity of the shaken" became a response to contemporary crisis, in which global upheavals eradicate stability, forcing alienated individuals to search for community—one that cannot be built on sameness, but must proceed in a reflexive, mediated fashion.

For Fraser, the idea of the "solidarity of the shaken" was a way of connecting at the moment of a transformation of the global order. Detached contemplation of imminent catastrophe combined with uncritical preservation of one's privilege is one possible reaction to the fact that, as Fraser put it, "capitalism's orientation to endless accumulation threatens to erode its own conditions of possibility". This reaction, so popular in recent European theory, can be countered with another, more responsible one: to work on a theoretical and practical realization of the "solidarity of the shaken". This encompasses both critical analysis of capitalism and the utopia which, as Theodor Adorno often emphasized, allows thinking as such. ◁

## Jan Patočka Memorial Lectures

**Since its foundation in 1982, the IWM has promoted the work of Czech philosopher and human rights activist Jan Patočka (1907–1977). Since 1987, the Institute regularly organizes lectures in his memory, a selection of which has been published in German by Passagen Verlag, Vienna.**

**Nancy Fraser** is Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Philosophy and Politics at the New School for Social Research in New York, where she is also chair of the Department of Philosophy and Politics. Over the last twenty years, she has published numerous books on the topics of justice, democracy, oppression and feminism.

**Ewa Majewska** is a feminist philosopher and lecturer in gender studies at the University of Warsaw. She is the author of several books and articles on feminist social and cultural theory. In 2013/14 she was a Bronisław Geremek Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

# Events in Retrospect *10 2013–03 2014*

## October

### October 2

**Protest Politics in Post-Communist South-Eastern Europe**

**Marius Ioan Tatar**
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Oradea

### October 9

**Yutlantis and Literary Fiction**

**Aleš Debeljak**
Professor of Cultural Studies, University of Ljubljana

### October 15



**Überdenken und Eingedenken. Zu Jacques Derridas Religionsbegriff**

**Jean Greisch**
Philosoph und Theologe, Paris

### October 16

**Patočka und Voegelin über den Anfang der Neuzeit**

**Jan Frei**
Research Fellow, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague

### October 22

**Generational Shifts in Russian Politics and Media from the 1980s to the Present**

**Arkady Ostrovsky**
Moscow Bureau Chief, *The Economist*

### October 23

**Aiming at a Moving Target, yet Again? Exploring the Bulgarian Protests**

**Mariya Ivancheva**
PhD in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest

### October 24

**Europe. What Comes Next?**

**Giuliano Amato**
Judge, Constitutional Court in Italy; former Prime Minister of Italy

### October 28

**Kenedi Goes Back Home**

*Introduction:* **Kristina Racz**
PhD candidate in Balkan Studies, University of Ljubljana

### October 30

**Normalizing Narratives: Collective Memories of the Bombing in Serbia**

**Kristina Racz**
PhD candidate in Balkan Studies, University of Ljubljana

## November

### November 4

**Women's Embodied Narratives of the Holocaust**

**Louise Vasvari**
Professor em. of Comparative Literature and Linguistics, Stony Brook University, New York

### November 6

**The Living Subject: Towards an Interdisciplinary Social Scientific Method**

**Natalie Smolenski**
PhD candidate in Anthropology and History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

### November 7

**Crisis, Critique, Capitalism—A Framework for the 21st Century**

***Patočka Memorial Lecture***
**Nancy Fraser**
Professor of Philosophy and Politics, New School for Social Research, New York
*(see p. 11)*

### November 12

**Locating Migrants: Locality, a Blind Spot in Migration Scholarship**

**Ayşe Çağlar**
Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna

### November 13

**Between Shipyard Ruins and Post-Solidarity Nostalgia: Some Notes on Political Agency**

**Ewa Majewska**
Lecturer in Gender Studies, University of Warsaw

### November 14

**Religionsgeschichte als Religionskritik? David Hume und die Folgen**

**Hans Joas**
Permanent Fellow, Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS)
*In Kooperation mit dem Karl-Renner-Institut*

### November 15

**Hungary at the Crossroads**

**Gordon Bajnai**
Former Prime Minister of Hungary; Leader, *Together2014*

### November 18

**Inside the Revolution: "A Journey into the Heart of Venezuela"**

*Introduction:* **Mariya Ivancheva**
PhD in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest

### November 20

**Neoliberale Modernisierung am Beispiel des österreichischen Care-Regimes**

**Erna Appelt**
Professorin für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Innsbruck *(siehe S. 15)*

### November 25–27

**We the People: On Populism and Democracy**

***IWM Lectures in Human Sciences***
**Jan-Werner Mueller**
Professor of Politics, Princeton University
*(see p. 10)*

### November 28

**Nationalist Tendencies in Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe**

**András Földes**
Journalist, *Index.hu,* Budapest

### November 29

**Why Syria Matters: The Moral Case for Intervention**

**Nader Hashemi**
Associate Professor, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver

## December

### December 2

**Unfinished Utopia: Excavations and Reflections of a Socialist City**

**Katherine Lebow**
Research Fellow, Vienna Wiesenthal Institute
**Dariusz Kowalski**
Filmmaker, Medienwerkstatt Vienna
**Timothy Snyder**
IWM Permanent Fellow; Professor of History, Yale University

### December 4

**Schmitt, Grewe and the Third Reich: The Legacy of Nazi Lawyers for Contemporary Debate**

**Matthew Specter**
Associate Professor of History, Central Connecticut State University

### December 5

**Every Nation Needs a Velvet Underground. Tschechische Subkultur der 70er Jahre**

**Heinke Fabritius**
Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin, Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Geschichte und Kultur Ostmitteleuropas, Universität Leipzig
**Aleš Havlíček**
Politikwissenschaftler, Verlagsleiter, Filmemacher und Zeitzeuge
**Ludger Hagedorn**
Research Director, IWM; Lecturer in Philosophy, New York University Berlin

### December 10

**Why Does Karl Marx Matter?**

**Timothy Snyder**
IWM Permanent Fellow; Professor of History, Yale University

### December 11

**Reflections on the Role of Ideas and Agency in Europe**

***Junior Fellows' Conference***

Photos: IWM; www.zilnikzelimir.net

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**Monthly Lectures**
**Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.**

**Colloquia on Secularism & Beyond Myth and Enlightenment**
**These lecture series, supported by the FWF and jointly organized with the University of Vienna (Institute for Philosophy and Institute for Political Sciences), discuss the fate of religion in a secular age.**

**Political Salons**
**The Political Salons, jointly organized with *Die Presse* and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, are a discussion forum on current political and social questions.**

**Debates at the Burgtheater**
***Debating Europe,* organized in cooperation with the Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation and *Der Standard,* is a matinée series of public debates.**

**Conferences and Workshops**
**The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.**

# Events in Retrospect *10 2013–03 2014*

## December

### December 12

**Care – was uns alle betrifft und sich doch gegen Politisierung sperrt**

***Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben***
**Karin Jurczyk**
Leiterin, Abteilung Familie und Familienpolitik, Deutsches Jugendinstitut, München
**Judith Schwentner**
Abgeordnete zum Nationalrat, Sprecherin für Frauen, Soziales und Entwicklungspolitik
*In Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt Wien*

### December 17

**Die Qual nach der Wahl – wie entwickelt sich Deutschland?**

**Alexander Graf Lambsdorff**
FDP-Vorsitzender im Europäischen Parlament

### December 18

**The World at Stake: Roman Ingarden's Philosophical Friendships**

**Marci Shore**
Associate Professor of History, Yale University

## January

### January 14

**The Pussy Riot Case and Russian Post-Secularism**

**Dmitry Uzlaner**
Associate Professor, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow

### January 15

**Stuck in the Middle With Daoud: The Nixon Doctrine and US-Afghan Relations**

**Gregory Winger**
PhD candidate in Political Science, Boston University

### January 16–17

**Political Modernity and Contemporary Orthodox Theology**

***Workshop*** *in cooperation with the University of Vienna*

### January 19

**Wie wirkt 1914 nach?**

*(siehe S. 8)*

### January 21

**A 'Holy Alliance' Against Secularism: Debates on Religious Freedom in Europe and the US**

**Pasquale Annicchino**
Research Fellow, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Florence

### January 22

**"Illiberal Liberals": The National Liberal Heirs in Central Europe**

**Oskar Mulej**
PhD candidate in History, Central European University, Budapest

### January 23

**(Mis-)Representing Post-Soviet Protest**

**Mischa Gabowitsch**
Research Fellow, Einstein Forum, Potsdam

### January 29

**"Nationalizing" the Past and the Social Relevance of History in Contemporary Ukraine**

**Volodymyr Sklokin**
Assistant Professor of History, International Solomon University, Kharkiv

### January 30–February 1

**The Balkans as Europe II: From the Treaty of Berlin to the Balkan Wars**

*Keynote Speech:* **Martin Ivanov**
Fellow, Institute for History, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

## February

### February 12

**The Idea of Political Representation. Reconstructing the Conceptual Frame**

**Kinga Marulewska**
PhD candidate in Political Science, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń

### February 18

**Ist die Moderne wirklich ein Vorgang der Entzauberung?**

**Markus Gabriel**
Direktor, Internationales Zentrum für Philosophie, Universität Bonn

### February 19

**Ukraine, Maidan, and the Future of Europe**

**Mykola Riabchuk**
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Political and Nationalities' Studies, Academy of Sciences, Kiev

### February 26

**Europe after the End of Europe**

**Ludger Hagedorn**
Research Director, IWM; Lecturer in Philosophy, New York University Berlin
*Generously supported by the FWF*

## March

### March 3

**Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism**

**Ina Merdjanova**
Senior Researcher and Adjunct Assistant Professor, Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin *(see p. 19)*

### March 4

**Der Geschmack von Asche. Das Nachleben des Totalitarismus in Osteuropa**

**Marci Shore**
Associate Professor of History, Yale University
**Martin Pollack**
Journalist, Schriftsteller und literarischer Übersetzer

### March 5



**Paysage, Culture et Mémoire**

**Marc Augée**
Anthropologist; former President, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales
*In cooperation with the Institut Francais d'Autriche*

### March 6

**Eurasian Integration: Russia's Bid for a Regionalized Hegemony?**

**Aliaksei Kazharski**
PhD candidate in European Studies and Policies, Comenius University, Bratislava

### March 8–9

**Kritik des Patriarchats**

**Workshop** *(siehe S. 14)*

### March 13

**Russian and European Experience in Public Financial Law**

**Andrey Evdokimov**
Deputy Director General for Legal Affairs, LLC Legal Company ELITA, Lipetsk

### March 16

**Driften Europa und Amerika auseinander?**

*(siehe S. 8)*

### March 18

**Zwischen Blindheit und Hellsichtigkeit. Ästhetik als Theorie der Moderne**

**Cornelia Klinger**
IWM Rektorin *ad interim;* Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Tübingen
**Herta Nagl-Docekal**
Professorin i.R. für Philosophie, Universität Wien
**Ludwig Nagl**
Ao. Universitätsprofessor i.R. für Philosophie, Universität Wien
**Ruth Sonderegger**
Professorin für Philosophie, Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien
**Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann**
Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Duisburg-Essen

### March 19

**"Vienna Has Fallen!" Diverging Narratives and the Prospects of a European Public Sphere**

**Carl Henrik Fredriksson**
Editor-in-chief, *Eurozine* *(see p. 5)*

### March 20

**A New Eurasian Union: Mission Impossible**

**Vladislav Inozemtsev**
Professor, Moscow State Lomonossov University

### March 25

**Enlightenments Obscured? On Legacies and Pitfalls of Rationalism**

**Philipp Blom**
Author, journalist, translator, Vienna

### March 26

**Broken Democracy, Nationalist Populism and Predatory State: Hungary before the Elections**

**András Bozóki**
Professor of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest *(see p. 6)*

### March 27

**The State of Democracy in Europe. Normative and Performance Aspects**

**Radosław Markowski**
Professor of Political Science, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw

Photos: IWM

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**Fellows' Seminars**
**In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.**

**Seminars Faces of Eastern Europe**
**This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.**

**Russia in Global Dialogue**
**This lecture series, supported by Open Society Foundations, aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.**

**Books in Perspective**
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# Kritik des Patriarchats

VON SUSANNE LETTOW, ANDREA ROEDIG UND BIRGIT SAUER

Dorothea Tanning. Portrait de famille, 1954, Copyright © 2013 The Dorothea Tanning Foundation: www.dorotheatanning.org

Anlässlich des 60. Geburtstags von Cornelia Klinger diskutierten am 8. und 9. März Weggefährtinnen, Kolleginnen und Freundinnen mit ihr über die Frage, ob und in welchem Sinne eine Kritik des Patriarchats aktuell ist, beziehungsweise was es heute überhaupt bedeutet, von „Patriarchat" zu sprechen. In den 1970er und 80er Jahren spielte der Begriff zwar eine zentrale Rolle für die feministische Theorie und Politik, doch seither ist er weitgehend sang- und klanglos aus der Sprache des Feminismus und der Geschlechterforschung verschwunden, er wurde gewissermaßen aus der feministischen Theorie „verbannt", wie Cornelia Klinger 2008 schrieb. Dem Patriarchatsbegriff erging es wie einer Reihe anderer Großbegriffe, die als universalistisch, zu wenig kontextsensibel und daher unbrauchbar galten. Cornelia Klinger hat in ihren philosophischen und gesellschaftstheoretischen Schriften allerdings immer wieder darauf hingewiesen, dass Gesellschaftskritik, insbesondere die feministische, gar nicht ohne solch umfassende Begriffe wie Patriarchat, Herrschaft, Gewalt und Geschlecht auskommen kann. Sie ermöglichen es, Zusammenhänge zwischen einzelnen lokalen und spezifischen Erfahrungen von Ungleichheit und Ungerechtigkeit zu erkennen und zu benennen. Auch und gerade gegen eine Theoriebildung, die sich in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten in erster Linie auf das Besondere und Einzelne, auf Pluralisierung, Differenzierung und Fluidität von Machtverhältnissen konzentrierte, hat Cornelia Klinger immer wieder die intellektuelle und politische Notwendigkeit hervorgehoben, Strukturzusammenhänge zu begreifen. Um der „Einkerkerung im Bestehenden entgegenzuwirken", schrieb sie einmal, brauchen wir beides: abstrakte Begriffe, die die Wirklichkeit analytisch zerlegen, und spekulative Begriffe, die Zusammenhänge herstellen und Denken und Handeln orientieren können. Dabei geht es auch um eine historische Perspektive, die es ermöglicht, zugleich die langfristige Stabilität von Verhältnissen als auch ihre Veränderlichkeit und Prozesse der Subversion zu verstehen. Herrschaftsanalyse und Herrschaftskritik scheinen also die Fähigkeit vorauszusetzen, politisch-theoretische Allgemeinbegriffe wie Ausbeutung, Unterdrückung, Kapitalismus, Imperialismus zu bilden, die die strukturelle Ähnlichkeit und Verbindung zwischen ansonsten höchst unterschiedlichen Praktiken und Erfahrungen in den Blick rücken.

Ist der Begriff des Patriarchats dafür geeignet? Kann das Konzept „gerettet" werden und lohnt sich eine feministische Theoretisierung? In welcher Form lässt sich der Patriarchatsbegriff sinnvoll verwenden und auf welche historischen Perioden und geographischen Orte bezieht er sich? Wie verhält er sich zu anderen Kritikbegriffen wie „Androzentrismus" oder „männliche Herrschaft"? In welchem Verhältnis stehen Gesellschaftsanalyse und die Analyse symbolischer Formen von Literatur, Kunst, Philosophie?

Cornelia Klinger wies darauf hin, dass in einer neuen Konzeption der kritischen Kategorie „Patriarchat" männliche Herrschaft zeitlich und lokal differenziert zu betrachten sei, feministische Theorie also von unterschiedlichen Formen der Männerherrschaft ausgehen müsse. Bei diesem Workshop machten sich nun Wissenschaftlerinnen an eine solche Rettungs- und Theoretisierungsaktion des Patriarchatsbegriffs und beleuchteten aus ganz unterschiedlichen disziplinären Perspektiven, in ganz differenten Zeithorizonten und in vielfältigen gesellschaftlichen, kulturellen

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## Workshop: Kritik des Patriarchats 8. und 9. März 2014, Wien

### Program

8. März 2014

*Einführung / Auftakt:*
**Birgit Sauer**
**Susanne Lettow**
**Andrea Roedig**

**Mieke Verloo:**
*Patriarchy—Who Is That?*

**Verdienen und Bezahlen: Zur Ökonomie des Patriarchats**

**Erna Appelt:**
*(Selbst-)Regulierung als postmodernes Patriarchat?*

**Silvia Kontos:**
*Generativität und Geschlecht*

*Moderation:*
**Katharina Pühl**

**Machen und Sein: Natur, Technik, Materie**

**Waltraud Ernst:**
*Zwischen Patriarchat und Emanzipation – Cornelia Klingers Beiträge zu einem feministischen Naturbegriff*

**Mona Singer:**
*Patriarchat und Technik – feministische Cyborgvisionen gegen die „Natur des Menschen"*

*Moderation:*
**Isabell Lorey**

**Schreiben und Streiten: Fiktionen gegen das Patriarchat**

**Dagmar Fink:**
*‚To Boldly Go Where No Man Has Gone Before'. Geschlechtervorstellungen in queer_feministischer Science Fiction*

**Urte Helduser:**
*‚Literarische Patriarchatskritik' (bei Elfriede Jelinek und Marlene Streeruwitz)*

**Karina Kellermann:**
*Subversive Herrschaft im „Tristan" Gottfried von Straßburgs*

*Moderation:*
**Herta Nagl-Docekal**

9. März 2014

**Geben und Nehmen: von Widerständigkeit und Involviertsein**

**Ingvild Birkhan:**
*Das Andere, die Frau und die Gabe*

**Margit Leuthold:**
*Frauen und Reformation*

*Moderation:*
**Christine Blättler**

**Geben und Nehmen: von Widerständigkeit und Involviertsein II**

**Irene Nierhaus:**
*Politiken des Wohnens: Von un/ordentlichen Bewohner_innen*

**Friederike Hassauer:**
*Der gute Patriarch und seine Grenzen*

*Moderation:*
**Gudrun-Axeli Knapp**

**Hauen und Stechen: Zum Schluss**

**Ruth Sonderegger / Andrea Roedig:**
*Der Patriarch im Film – Ein Macho-Slam*

### Teilnehmerinnen

**Erna Appelt**
Professorin für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Innsbruck

**Ingvild Birkhan**
Lektorin für Philosophie und Leiterin der interuniversitären Koordinationsstelle für Frauenforschung, Universität Wien

**Christine Blättler**
Professorin für Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Christian Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

**Waltraud Ernst**
Universitätsassistentin, Institut für Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung, Johannes Kepler Universität Linz

**Dagmar Fink**
Externe Lektorin, Institut für Kunstgeschichte, Universität Wien

**Friederike Hassauer**
Professorin für Romanistik, Universität Wien

**Urte Helduser**
Akademische Rätin, Institut für Neuere Deutsche Literatur, Philipps-Universität Marburg

**Karina Kellermann**
Apl. Professorin für Ältere Deutsche Philologie, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

**Gudrun-Axeli Knapp**
Professorin für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Universität Hannover

**Cornelia Klinger**
IWM Rektorin *ad interim;* Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Tübingen

**Silvia Kontos**
Professorin für Soziologie und Frauenforschung, Hochschule RheinMain, Wiesbaden

**Susanne Lettow**
Privatdozentin für Philosophie, Universität Paderborn

**Margit Leuthold**
Senior Researcher, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien

**Isabella Lorey**
Gastprofessorin zu Geschlecht und Politischer Theorie, Universität Basel

**Herta Nagl-Docekal**
Professorin i.R. für Philosophie, Universität Wien

**Irene Nierhaus**
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**Katharina Pühl**
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**Andrea Roedig**
Philosophin und freie Publizistin, Wien

**Birgit Sauer**
Professorin für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien

**Mona Singer**
Professorin für Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Universität Wien

**Ruth Sonderegger**
Professorin für Philosophie und ästhetische Theorie, Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien

**Mieke Verloo**
Professor of Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen; IWM Non-Resident Permanent Fellow

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und politischen Kontexten Facetten von Männerherrschaft.

### Wir alle sind das Patriachat

Die Eingangsfrage, wer denn das Patriarchat sei, beantwortete Mieke Verloo provozierend mit „wir alle", da alle an der Produktion und Reproduktion des Systems der Ungleichheit zwischen Männern und Frauen beteiligt seien. Im Themenblock „Verdienen und Bezahlen: zur Ökonomie des Patriarchats" argumentierte Erna Appelt mit einer ähnlichen Intention, dass es die Stärke des (post-)modernen Patriarchats sei, Ungleichheitsstrukturen in die Selbstregulation der Individuen zu verlagern und sie so zu einer Selbstverständlichkeit zu machen. Silvia Kontos hob eine gleichsam „vergessene" Dimension patriarchaler Strukturen hervor, nämlich die soziale Organisation von Generativität. Vermehrt entbrennen in jüngster Zeit wieder Geschlechterkämpfe im „Streit um die Ressource Kind". Waltraud Ernst rekonstruierte im Anschluss daran Cornelia Klingers feministischen Naturbegriff als eine emanzipatorische Perspektive zur Überwindung männlicher Herrschaft. Dies wurde kontrastiert durch Mona Singers Ausführungen über Post- und Transhumanismus. Im Tagungsblock „Schreiben und Streiten" stellte Dagmar Fink emanzipative Geschlechterutopien in queer-feministischen Science Fiction Romanen vor. Karina Kellermanns Interpretation des „Tristan" wies Spuren subversiver Herrschaft im Werk nach. Urte Helduser analysierte die Dresdener Rede der Schriftstellerin Sibylle Lewitscharoff als eine aktuelle Form des Anti-Feminismus oder gar Neubegründung eines patriarchalen Diskurses. Die nächsten Inputs beschäftigten sich mit dem Konflikt zwischen „Widerständigkeit und Involviertsein" von Frauen. In kulturhistorischer Perspektive diskutierte Ingvild Birkhan die Zusammenhänge von Geben, Sorgen und Frauen. Margit Leuthold zeichnete die bedeutsame Rolle von Frauen in der Reformation nach – nicht allein für die Kirche, sondern für die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung insgesamt. Irene Nierhaus führte in Orte des modernen Wohnens des beginnenden 20. Jahrhunderts und die bebaute Geschlechterdifferenz, aber auch deren Unordnung ein, während Friederike Hassauer die Grenzen des „guten Patriarchen" in Schriften der spanischen Aufklärung des 18. Jahrhunderts aufzeigte.

Das Unterfangen des Workshops erwies sich als enorm produktiv. Die Diskussion zeigte allerdings, wie hartnäckig patriarchale Strukturen in allem Wandel fortbestehen, wie verstrickt Frauen in sie sind, aber auch, dass es Handlungschancen und Befreiungsmöglichkeiten aus diesen Herrschaftsformen gibt.

Und was machen feministische Wissenschaftlerinnen, um sich von den Mühen der Patriarchatsanalyse zu erholen? Sie schauen sich Machos an – ein wilder Zusammenschnitt aus Mafiafilmszenen dargeboten von Ruth Sonderegger und Andrea Roedig. ◁

# Der Preis neoliberaler Modernisierung

VON ERNA APPELT

*Sorgearbeit ist ein hochpolitisches Thema. Wie Erna Appelt am Beispiel des österreichischen Care-Regimes zeigt, haben die Reformen der letzten Jahrzehnte zwar zu einer gewissen Anerkennung von Pflegeleistungen geführt, gleichzeitig haben neoliberale Modernisierungsmaßnahmen bestehende Hierarchien verfestigt und neue Ungleichheiten geschaffen.*

Der Dokumentarfilm „Hilfe aus dem Osten" von Béla Batthyány (2013) thematisiert den Alltag von drei Frauen, die ihre Familien in Polen bzw. Ungarn zurücklassen, um in der Schweiz als 24-Stunden-Pflegerinnen zu arbeiten.

Photo: Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen (SRF)

In einem Artikel der Neuen Züricher Zeitung vom 9. November 2013 wird Österreich als „Meister der Transferzahlungen" bezeichnet. Tatsächlich lag der Anstieg der Sozialausgaben in Österreich in den letzten zweieinhalb Jahrzehnten über jenem des Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Wie ist das zu erklären? Ist Österreich ein Abweichler vom neoliberalen Pfad der Modernisierung?

Zwei Fragen beschäftigen mich in diesem Zusammenhang: Der österreichische Wohlfahrtsstaat wird in der Literatur durchwegs zu den konservativen Welfare-Regimen gezählt. Ist diese Klassifikation nach wie vor zutreffend? Können wir von einer – wie auch immer gearteten – Modernisierung des österreichischen Welfare-Regimes sprechen? Im Zentrum der neoliberalen Offensive steht die „Befreiung des Markts" von jeglichen staatlich auferlegten Fesseln. Als unumstößliches Dogma gilt der Ab- und Rückbau des Staates. Aus Wohlfahrtsstaaten sollen Wettbewerbsstaaten werden, deren primäre Aufgabe es ist, die Standortqualität der jeweiligen Staaten zu sichern bzw. womöglich zu verbessern. Meine zweite Frage lautet daher, in welcher Weise diese Programmatik in Österreich realisiert wurde?

Neoliberale Modernisierung als Programm im Sinne der Chicagoer Schule (Milton Friedman u.a.) idealisiert Marktfreiheit als Zunahme von Wahlmöglichkeiten. Staatliche Regulierung – gleichgesetzt mit Herrschaft und Zwang – führe zu einer falschen Verteilung der Ressourcen (Fehlallokation). Ungleichheit ist explizit erwünscht, da diese die Effizienz erhöhe, während jede egalisierende Politik eine Behinderung des Wettbewerbs bedeute. Die Programmatik des Wettbewerbsstaates zielt daher auf eine Zuspitzung ungleicher Macht- und Besitzverhältnisse ab.

Entspricht der Umbau des österreichischen Sozialstaates bzw. des österreichischen Care-Regimes diesen Modernisierungsvorstellungen? Der Begriff *Care* wird hier als Sammelbegriff für die Betreuung, Versorgung, Pflege und Begleitung von Menschen verstanden, die nicht, noch nicht bzw. nicht mehr für sich selbst sorgen können. Der Begriff könnte und müsste wohl auch wesentlich weiter gefasst werden. Im Fokus der Überlegungen stehen hier jedoch jene Leistungen, ohne die eine Gesellschaft nicht als menschenwürdig (im Sinn der Einhaltung der Menschenrechte) angesehen werden kann.

### Familialisierung, Institutionalisierung und Kommodifizierung

In Österreich wenden Frauen im Durchschnitt zwei Drittel ihrer Gesamtarbeitszeit für Familienarbeit auf. Auch bei gleichermaßen erwerbstätigen Paaren führen mehrheitlich Frauen den Haushalt. Berufstätige Mütter, die mit ihrem Partner zusammenleben, haben laut Statistik Austria eine Gesamtarbeitsbelastung von 71,8 Stunden pro Woche.

Das hohe Ausmaß der privaten Haus- und Betreuungsarbeit wird in Österreich nicht zuletzt durch Transferzahlungen und in letzter Zeit auch durch den Ausbau sozialer Rechte für Angehörige sichergestellt. Zu den wichtigsten Transferleistungen im Care-Bereich zählen das Pflegegeld und das Kinderbetreuungsgeld. Die Einführung eines aus Steuermitteln finanzierten, nicht an Erwerbstätigkeit und Versicherungszahlungen gebundenen Pflegegeldes im Jahr 1993 stellte einen markanten Bruch mit dem österreichischen Sozialsystem dar. Abgelöst wurde ein Modell, in dem die Betroffenen bzw. ihre Familien für die mit einer Pflegebedürftigkeit verbundene finanzielle Belastung aufzukommen hatten. Die Auszahlung des Pflegegeldes erfolgt heute an die pflegebedürftigen Personen. Obwohl die pflegenden Angehörigen aus dieser Transferleistung keine Ansprüche ableiten können, ist an das Pflegegeld dennoch die Erwartung geknüpft, dass Angehörige die Betreuung und Pflege so lange wie möglich zu Hause übernehmen.

Auch die Einführung des Kinderbetreuungsgeldes (KBG) 2002 stellte einen Systembruch dar. Die Entkoppelung des KBG von der Erwerbstätigkeit der betroffenen Frauen zielte explizit auf eine Aufwertung des Ernährer-/Hausfrauenmodells ab und verstärkte die Abhängigkeit von Müttern (als Hausfrauen bzw. als Teilzeit- oder prekär Beschäftigte) von ihren Partnern. Das 2010 in Kraft getretene novellierte Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz (KBGG) bietet jedoch Eltern vier pauschale Bezugsvarianten des Kinderbetreuungsgeldes (KBG) an. Der Anteil der Väter liegt bei ca. 5%.

### Ausbau sozialer Rechte

In der österreichischen Diskussion hat das Konzept der „sozialen Staatsbürgerrechte" traditionell keine Rolle gespielt. Das System der sozialen Sicherung beruhte auf erwerbsabhängigen sozialen Rechten einerseits, auf Fürsorge andererseits. Erst seit den letzten Jahren gibt es gegenläufige Tendenzen. Das hat gute Gründe: Seit der Pensionsreform 2003 ist die lebenslange Durchrechnung der Erwerbszeiten eine der Grundlagen für die Höhe des Pensionsbezugs. Da eine optimale Pensionsabsicherung nur über 40 Jahre Vollzeiterwerbstätigkeit erreicht werden kann, ist die Anerkennung von Care-Zeiten im Rahmen der Pensionsversiche-

rung essenziell, um Altersarmut zu verhindern.

Zu den schrittweise eingeführten sozialen Rechten zählen die kostenlose Weiterversicherung für Pflegende, die (kurzfristige) Freistellung für Pflegetätigkeiten bei Weiterbezug des Entgeltes, die Familienhospizkarenz als Rechtsanspruch auf Herabsetzung, Änderung oder Freistellung von der Normalarbeitszeit für ArbeitnehmerInnen zur Begleitung sterbender Angehöriger ohne sozialstaatliche Transferleistungen sowie die 2014 eingeführte Pflegekarenz mit einkommensbezogenem Karenzgeld.

Kinderbetreuungsgeld, Pflegegeld und der Ausbau sozialer Rechte für pflegende Angehörige stellen eine gewisse Anerkennung der gesellschaftlichen Bedeutung von Betreuungsarbeiten dar. Nicht existenzsichernde Transferzahlungen verstärken jedoch die geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung. Das gilt letztlich auch für den Ausbau von sozialen Rechten als Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Sorgetätigkeit innerhalb der Familie weiterhin zum allergrößten Teil von Frauen übernommen wird.

Die institutionelle Kinderbetreuung wurde in Österreich in den letzten Jahren vor allem durch das 2009 eingeführte Gratiskindergartenjahr, das an eine Pflicht zum halbtägigen Kindergartenbesuch im letzten Jahr vor dem Schuleintritt gekoppelt ist, ausgebaut. Zudem wurde in den letzten Jahren die institutionelle Betreuung im Krippenbereich systematisch erweitert.

Die Langzeitpflege von alten und pflegebedürftigen Menschen wurde laut Sozialministerium im Jahr 2011 zu 53% von Angehörigen, zu 29% von mobilen Diensten – meist in Kombination mit Angehörigen –, zu 16% stationär und zu 20% als 24-Stunden-Betreuung geleistet. Trotz der Verpflichtung der Bundesländer, die Infrastruktur für Langzeitpflege bedarfsgerecht auszubauen, herrscht nach wie vor ein Mangel an Heimplätzen. Die Betreuungszeiten der mobilen Dienste sind meist kurz bzw. nur auf körperliche Bedürfnisse ausgerichtet. In der Nacht gibt es zu wenig Angebote für die Pflege. Auch die Kurzzeitpflege in Heimen ist schwach ausgebaut, innovative Wohnformen für alte bzw. pflegebedürftige Menschen selten.

Das Pflegegeld deckt bis zu einem gewissen Grad den Bedarf an Pflegemitteln ab, ermöglicht jedoch nicht, Pflege- und Betreuungsleistungen zu Marktpreisen zuzukaufen. Damit bleibt die Zuständigkeit in erster Linie bei den Angehörigen oder sie wird an MigrantInnen delegiert. Die (fast ausschließlich von Migrantinnen geleistete) 24-Stunden-Betreuung wurde 2007 als selbständige wie auch als unselbständige Tätigkeit durch gesetzliche Rahmenbedingungen legalisiert. Beide Modelle werden staatlich gefördert. Bei der Legalisierung der gängigen Praxis lag das Hauptaugenmerk jedoch nicht auf der angemessenen Bezahlung und dem arbeits- und sozialrechtlichen Schutz der Pflegepersonen. Hingegen erfuhren die NutznießerInnen der vorher illegalen Praxis durch weitreichende Amnestien eine großzügige Behandlung.

Wie sich herausgestellt hat, wird nahezu ausschließlich (98–99%) das Selbstständigen-Modell gewählt. Der Österreichische Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) hat errechnet, dass Pflegerinnen aus Osteuropa Österreich damit eine Milliarde Euro ersparen. Der Vorschlag des ÖGB, diese Form der Scheinselbständigkeit zu verbieten und auf ein Unselbständigen-Modell (Anstellung bei Wohlfahrtsverbänden) mit adäquaten Löhnen umzustellen, stieß bei Sozialministerium, Wirtschaftskammer, aber auch bei Caritas und Sozialem Hilfswerk unter Verweis auf die damit verbundene Kostensteigerung auf einhellige Ablehnung (Wiener Zeitung, 5. April 2013).

Das österreichische Care-Regime wurde in den letzten Jahrzehnten mehrfach reformiert. Die simple Klassifizierung Österreichs als Wohlfahrtstaat Bismarck'schen Zuschnitts übersieht, dass durch die vorgenommenen Reformen zahlreiche Elemente des sozialdemokratischen wie auch des liberalen Modells übernommen wurden. Dabei werden Geschlechter-, Klassen- und Migrationshierarchien genutzt und verfestigt. Gleichzeitig hat die neoliberale Modernisierung jedoch nicht zu jenem sozialpolitischen Kahlschlag geführt, der von so manchen linken und feministischen KritikerInnen heraufbeschworen wurde.

Neoliberale Modernisierung bedeutet nicht einfach Rückbau des (Sozial-)Staates. Ein genauerer Blick auf das österreichische Beispiel belegt die Janusköpfigkeit von Staat, Politik und Markt: Der Staat ist beides, verselbständigte bürokratische Herrschaft *und* Garant für Daseinsfürsorge. Daseinsfürsorge ist ein hoch umkämpftes politisches Terrain. Dies zeigt sich im Kampf um Legitimität und v.a. auch um Wählerstimmen. Im Dienste der Standortsicherung nimmt die Daseinsfürsorge eine Schlüsselstellung ein, da stagnierende bzw. niedrige Löhne kompensiert werden müssen. Der Markt schließlich ist nicht nur effizienter Bereitsteller von Gütern und Dienstleistungen; in seiner neoliberal entfesselten Variante ermöglicht er einen geradezu obszönen Vermögenstransfer, von dem das oberste Prozent bzw. Promille der Bevölkerung profitiert. Den Preis dafür zahlen die unter(st)en Einkommensschichten und hier wiederum mehrheitlich Frauen und MigrantInnen, deren Bedürfnisse nach einem selbstbestimmten Leben verletzt werden. ◁

**Erna Appelt** ist Professorin für Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Innsbruck, wo sie die interfakultäre Forschungsplattform „Geschlechterforschung: Identitäten – Transformationen – Diskurse" leitet. Von Oktober 2013 bis Januar 2014 war sie Visiting Fellow am IWM. Dieser Beitrag beruht auf einem Seminar, das Erna Appelt am 20. November am IWM gehalten hat.

# Szilárd Borbély 1963–2014

BY JÁNOS MÁTYÁS KOVÁCS

*Szilárd Borbély, noted contemporary poet, writer and literary historian, died on February 19, 2014. From September to December 2013 he had been a Paul Celan Visiting Fellow at the IWM, translating Klaus-Michael Bogdal's* Europa erfindet die Zigeuner. Eine Geschichte von Faszination und Verachtung *into Hungarian. Filled with deep sorrow at the loss of such a remarkable but unassuming man, we would like to commemorate him and his literary oeuvre with an obituary by János Mátyás Kovács and two of his texts which permit us to glimpse both his exceptional talent and the two souls within his chest.*

On February 16, I received an email from Szilárd, in which he wrote the following: "(…) We are commuting between Vienna and Debrecen, (…), next week I will be in Debrecen, then back and forth again. (…) Slowly, we are awaiting spring and sunshine." On February 19, he committed suicide.

I had not known him in person before he came to the IWM. I had only read his most recent novel, *Nincstelenek* (*The Dispossessed,* see excerpt p. 17) published last year, a sad and unsettling work which brought enormous success to its author. When he left the Institute in December, he complained about depression impeding his work on the translation.

After his death, the obituaries were full of references to his illness. About a year ago, he also talked about it in an interview:

"The schism between the individual and the environment leads to depression which can be healed if we reconstruct our personality on a different level and find a new relation to the outside world. I had to do this more than once. It is an extremely difficult process, but it is one of the best ways to handle such a conflict. My reaction was childhood depression and—even though this might sound paradoxical—it helped me. Back then no one realized it, of course, the adults around me were happy that the child was quiet. It is due to suppression and expression that I learned to deal with the whole situation and to survive it. In short, depression helped me. But these processes can never be finally concluded."

I think I also belong to these insensible adults. When he stopped at the doorstep of my office (without ever entering it), I saw an extremely modest, polite and smart man who was perhaps a little sad but whose style was not devoid of irony. I would like to remember him this way with the help of an excerpt from a short essay entitled *Lob der Quitte: Ein Ungarnbild* (p. 17) he wrote in 2005. ◁

**Szilárd Borbély was born in Fehérgyarmat, Hungary in 1964. After finishing his military service he studied Hungarian language and literature in Debrecen. He worked in a wide variety of genres, including essay, drama, and short fiction. His first collection of poetry, Adatok, was published while he was still a student. Borbély has been working as a teaching assistant and lecturer at the faculty of old Hungarian literature since 1989. He received his doctoral degree in literary studies in 1998 and worked as a translator from German and English. Among other distinctions, he has been awarded some of the most important Hungarian literary prizes, including the Tibor Déry Prize (1996), the József Attila Prize (2002) and the Palladium Prize (2005).**

**János Mátyás Kovács** is IWM Permanent Fellow and External Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

In Memoriam
Szilárd Borbély
1963–2014

Photo: Lenke Szilágyi

# Lob der Quitte: Ein Ungarnbild

VON SZILÁRD BORBÉLY

Wer noch nie Quittenbrot gegessen hat, der ist gewiss kein Ungar. Oder nicht Ungar genug. Dem fehlt etwas am Ungarsein. Wer nun sein Ungarbewusstsein weckt, indem er an mit unsauberen Händen gepresstes Fruchtmus denkt, ist auf dem Holzweg. Die Quitte ist ein Teil des ungarischen Charakters, denn sie ist hart und herb. Bekanntlich haben die Ungarn sie von ihren Wanderschaften mitgebracht. Der Quittenbaum (Cydonia oblonga) ist ein edles Gewächs. Es zeigt Haltung. Es beugt sich nicht in die schnell wechselnden Windrichtungen. Zum Vorteil gereicht ihm dabei auch sein Wuchs, der eher niedrig als hoch aufgeschossen ist. Die Quittenbäume schlafen im Stehen. Ihr Stamm ist, wie die Unterschenkel reitender Völker, gekrümmt. Die Quitte wächst häufig in Gruppen. Hin und wieder stecken zwei Büsche die Köpfe zusammen. In seinen Zweigen baut der Zaunkönig sein Nest. Die Quitte kommt aus dem Osten. Sie ist eine Pflanze aus Kleinasien, die Wärme liebt. Ihre Blätter sind ledern. Sie ähneln eher dem mediterranen Lorbeer als einer verkümmerten, assimilierten Kulturpflanze des Karpatenbeckens. Das beweist uns, das die Ungarn nicht finnisch-ugrischen Ursprungs sein können. Wer die Ungarn kennt, kann bezeugen – und schlichtet damit den uralten Streit –, dass die Ungarn nicht nach Fisch riechen. Dem Geruch nach ähneln sie eher den milden Quitten. In den Gärten der Ungarn gab es, den alten Chroniken zufolge, neben Pflaumenbäumen immer auch Quitten.

Die alteingesessenen Quitten, die auf kleinen Tatarenpferden die Karpatenhänge überquerten, haben ihre Eigenschaften bis heute bewahrt. Man begegnet ihnen aber nur noch selten, denn sie leben im Verborgenen. Nach der Niederschlagung der Revolution von 1848 zitterte die österreichische Herrschaft vor den Quittenbäumen. Soldaten wurden in Marsch gesetzt, um die edlen Bäume zu fällen. Sobald die Behörden erfuhren, dass Quittenbäume in bestimmte Gärten geflohen waren, traten sie sofort in Aktion. Doch die Ungarn gaben nicht auf. Sie versteckten ihre geliebten Bäume. Wenn einer zuweilen doch einen Nachbarn verriet, dann tat er es nur für eine ansehnliche Summe. Womit die Verräter der kaiserlichen Schatulle ein erhebliches Defizit verursachten. Das später dann natürlich mit der Steuer von den übrigen Ungarn wieder ausgeglichen wurde. Die Quittenbäume wurden gut versteckt. Nur diesem Umstand ist es zu verdanken, dass einige diese schwere Zeit überlebten. Mit dem Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts kam dann das Zeitalter der Wiedergeburt des Quittenbaums. Die Forscher begannen, die Bäume auszuhorchen. Ihr Blätterrascheln wurde anfangs auf Wachsplatten, später mit einem tragbaren Mikrofon aufgezeichnet. Das war die Zeit, in der man diese edlen Bäume zu demokratisieren begann (…). ◁

*Übersetzung: Hans Skirecki*

# Die Mittellosen: Ist der Messias schon weg?

VON SZILÁRD BORBÉLY

Wir gehen und schweigen. Dreiundzwanzig Jahre trennen uns. Die Dreiundzwanzig kann man nicht teilen. Die Dreiundzwanzig ist nur durch sich selbst teilbar. Und durch eins. Diese Einsamkeit liegt zwischen uns. Man kann sie nicht in Teile zerlegen. Man schleppt sie als Ganzes mit sich. Wir bringen das Mittagessen. Wir gehen auf der aufgeschütteten Erde. Wir sagen Feldrücken. Ogmands Feldrücken. Wir gehen immer hier entlang, wenn wir Holz aus dem Wald holen. Manchmal gehen wir auch über die Szamoga-Senke, um den Rainweg nehmen zu können. Weil der nicht so schlammig ist. Wir sagen dazu pfützig. Andere Male nehmen wir den Pallóweg, durch den Grafenforst. Meine Mutter trägt ein Kopftuch. Wir sagen Flor. Frauen müssen den Kopf immer eingebunden tragen. Die Alten knoten es unter dem Kinn zusammen. Ihres muss schwarz sein. Das Kopftuch meiner Mutter ist bunt. Sie bindet es hinten zu, unter ihrem Dutt. Im Sommer trägt sie ein leichtes dreieckiges Kopftuch. Mit blauen Punkten auf weißem Grund. Vater hat es ihr geschenkt, letztes Jahr auf dem Markt in Kölcse. Ihr Haar ist kastanienbraun. Rotkastanienbraun. Nicht alle Kastanien sind rot. Ich sammele sie immer im Herbst mit meiner Schwester. Es gibt nur einen Kastanienbaum im Dorf. Er steht an der Stelle der Barkóczy-Meierei. Die anderen wurden nach dem Krieg gefällt. In der ständig feuchten Erde hält es nur die Pappel aus. Und natürlich die Weide. Wir nennen sie Felbe. Daraus im Frühling eine Pfeife zu schnitzen ist leicht, eine Felbpfeife. Wir dudeln dann herum, um unsere Mutter zu ärgern. Und die Hunde und die Nachbarn.

Im Herbst büchsen wir immer aus zum einzigen Kastanienbaum hinter der Kepecwiese. Vorbei an den Gärten schleichen wir uns davon. Am Ende des Sommers fallen die fünffingrigen trockenen Blätter des riesigen Baums herab. Es ist, als lägen abgeschnittene Hände von Riesen im Laub. Ihre Blüte im Frühling ist eine weiße Kerze. Die grüne Schale ein Igel. Aus Streichhölzern machen wir für sie Beine. Wir bitten meine Mutter um die verbrauchten. Nur unsere Mutter darf die Streichhölzer anfassen, sie sind nicht für Kinder.

„Messer, Gabel, Schere, Licht sind für kleine Kinder nicht“, wiederholt meine Mutter ständig.

„Denn wir sind die Herren. Heute hat das Volk das Sagen. Die Ausgebeuteten von gestern. Jetzt werden wir die Kulaken ausbeuten … Ob's denen passt oder nicht! Und damit punktum“, sagen die ehemaligen Tagelöhner.

„Die haben leicht reden, die haben nicht mal einen Eisennagel mit ins Kollektiv gebracht“, sagt Großvater, der am meisten seinen Pferden hinterher trauert. „Die nehmen sich nur.“

„Die leben auf Kosten anderer“, murmelt er angewidert.

„Alles nur verprassen, das können sie“, sagt er. „Alles verprassen. Vermehren, das können sie nicht. Alles geht den Bach runter.“

Die Bauern trauerten am meisten ihren Pferden hinterher. Mehr als dem Boden.

An ihrer Stelle quälte man die Pferde in der Genossenschaft. Man schindete sie zu Tode.

„Sie sind umgefallen. Verendet vor der Zeit. Und was hat's gebracht?“, sagte mein Großvater immer.

Die neuen Herren waren ungeduldig und aggressiv. Sie redeten jeden mit Genosse an. Sie erfanden ein neues Grußwort.

„Schon ihre Väter waren zu nichts nutze. Auch die lauerten nur darauf, was sie kriegen konnten“, brummt er.

„Vorwärts!“, sagen die Genossen statt Grüßgott. Und sie reden ständig von Fortschritt.

„Man muss mit der Zeit gehen, Genossen, fortschrittlich sein! Wir produzieren, was uns gefällt. Wenn russischen Löwenzahn, dann eben russischen Löwenzahn. Wenn Reisbrei, dann Reisbrei. Was die Partei will, geschieht. Was Genosse Stalin und Genosse Rákosi sagen, ist heilig. Die Natur, Genossen, gehört bezwungen“, wiederholten die Brigadeführer bei den morgendlichen Anweisungen vor den fröstelnden Menschen die Parolen. Zwischendurch kippten sie ein oder zwei Schnäpse.

„Einen feuchten Dreck bin ich dein Genosse“, murrt dann mein Großvater unter seinem Schnurrbart, so dass es keiner hört. Oder dass man es gerade noch hört. Und wenigstens weiß.

Na, na, passen Sie auf Ihr Mundwerk auf“, murren die neuen Herren. Doch auch sie wollen keine Scherereien. Es hat genug davon gegeben. Die Kulaken haben sie schon aus den Lagern entlassen. Die meisten sind dann fortgezogen. Sie konnten es im Dorf nicht länger aushalten. Leid tat es niemandem, man musste ihnen nicht länger in die Augen sehen.

Die Zierbäume wurden gefällt, die Gebäude des Meierhofs abgerissen. Anstelle der Kastanienallee wurde das Haus der Partei errichtet. Von dem Gutshof spricht keiner mehr. Es herrscht tiefes Schweigen.

„Die Bauern verstehen sich aufs Schweigen“, sagt meine Mutter immer.

Über die Vergangenheit darf man nicht reden. Die alten Zeiten, so sagen die Alten. Worüber wir schweigen, das existiert nicht. Macht endlich Schluss mit dem, was war …, singen sie unter der Leitung des Kantors, wie auf Beerdigungen. ◁

*Szilard Borbély:* Die Mittellosen
*Aus dem Ungarischen von Heike Flemming und Laszlo Kornitzer. Berlin: Suhrkamp, Herbst 2014*



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# European Islam: Lessons from the Balkans

BY INA MERDJANOVA

Islam in Europe" is a topic that attracts a great deal of attention in Europe, particularly in the media and in policymaking and academic circles. The growth of the Muslim population in Western Europe to an estimated 17 million has brought to the fore issues such as the building of mosques, Islamic education and the wearing of the *hijab* by public sector employees. These debates have been connected to concerns about Muslims' lack of economic, political and cultural integration and to doubts about their ability to adapt to a predominantly secular society.

Muslims in Europe are suspected of pursuing foreign Islamic agendas, of being influenced by Islamic networks and being supported by foreign funds. After 9/11 and the bombings in Madrid and London, Muslims in Europe came to be perceived as a security threat. Anti-Muslim attitudes have been exacerbated further by anti-immigrant sentiments and images linking local Muslims to the violence in the Middle East. None of this has been conducive to objective study or accurate representation of Muslim communities in Europe.

When speaking about Islam in Europe, people often forget completely that Southeast Europe, or the Balkans, has been home to Muslim communities for more than six centuries. My recent book *Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2013) challenges representations of Islam and Muslims as alien to Europe. It discusses the dynamics of identity-building among Balkan Muslims and the national and transnational factors involved, and looks at successful models developed by Muslims living in secular polities, often as minorities among majority Christian populations.

Photo: Joel Carillet

## Who are the Balkan Muslims?

The massive expansion of Islam in Southeast Europe was a result of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan Peninsula in the 14th and 15th centuries, which added a new community to the Eastern Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Jews who already lived in the region. The rise of nationalism in the 19th century and the national liberation struggles triggered the emergence of modern states from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. In these predominantly Christian states (Albania is the exception), Muslims lost the privileged legal and social status they had enjoyed as followers of the dominant faith in the Empire. From this moment they embarked on a long process of defining their place and identities under shifting political and social circumstances. While both Islam and Christianity were suppressed under communism, the end of the Cold War has brought new opportunities for religious and cultural revitalization, as well as for political mobilization.

Today, some 8.5 million Muslims live in different countries throughout the Balkan region. Geographically, they are distributed unevenly: the largest community is in Albania (around 2,300,000), the smallest in Slovenia (49,000). Linguistically, Balkan Muslims are divided into Albanian speakers (close to 4.5 million), Slavic speakers (over 2.5 million), Turkish speakers (around one million), and Roma (an estimated 500,000, though the real number might be higher). Most Balkan Muslims are Sunni and follow the Hanafi *madhhab* (school of law), while Sufi Islam is represented through a number of *tariqas* (religious brotherhoods) such as Bektashiyya, Naqshbandiyya, Khalwatiyya, Qadiriyya and Rifa'iyya.

Depending on the country in which they lived, Balkan Muslims followed different historical paths, on the one hand dealing with nationalist projects, on the other hand developing their own ethno-national identities. In Bulgaria, Muslims are a minority population divided into a larger community of ethnic Turks and a smaller community of Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks with more fluid ethnic identifications. The Turkish Muslims are predominantly Sunni, though a small number of them are Alevis. Muslim identities in Bulgaria underwent complex transformations resulting from the policies of the communist state. After initial attempts to marginalize Islam by encouraging ethnic Turkish identities, the Bulgarian government attempted to form a homogeneous nation by erasing ethno-cultural differences. The traditional Turco-Arab names of the Pomaks, Muslim Roma and Turks were forcefully changed to Bulgarian ones in the 1970s and 1980s; only after the fall of communism were Muslims able to take their former names. In Albania, where the Muslims make up the majority of the population, Albanian national identity prevails over religious identity. Among Muslim Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, on the other hand, religion has played a stronger role, the result of conflicts with Orthodox Serbs and Orthodox Macedonian Christians respectively. For Bosnian Muslims, who shared a common language and Slavic origins with Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Islam was a key element in nation-building. Overall, the divergent historical trajectories and identity-building strategies of Muslims in the region defy sensationalist talk of a unified Islam penetrating Europe through the Balkan Peninsula.

Some writers and policy-makers have expressed fears about transnational Islamic links and influences among Balkan Muslims, a factor related to the influx of aid and foreign fighters during the post-Yugoslav wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and to the channeling of funds to Muslim communities throughout the Balkans from Iran and various Arab countries. In my book, I describe the ambivalent reaction to this foreign assistance by the local Muslims, who saw it as a challenge to their "traditional Islam". After 2000, with Turkey's increasing "soft-power" and influence among Muslim communities in the region, the role of Arab Islam has subsided considerably. References to Islamic solidarity notwithstanding (most often expressed through the political symbol of the *umma,* the worldwide community of the faithful), a pan-Islamic platform in the region has never materialized. Without stereotyping "Balkan Islam" as a model of peace and tolerance, or claiming that the Balkans have been spared the threat of religiously-inspired extremism, I point to a number of factors that have hindered radicalization among Balkan Muslims. Alongside certain geopolitical and national developments, these factors include strong intellectual and grassroots traditions that affirm the values of peaceful coexistence in a pluralist society.

## Lessons for Islam in Europe

Obviously, there are major differences between Muslims in the Balkans and in Western Europe, in terms of historical, geographic, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds, as well as cultural specificities and ideological orientations. However, what Balkan and Western European Muslims do have in common is their struggle with the question of what it means to be a Muslim in Europe.

The notion of a "European Islam" has emerged in connection with political efforts for the social integration and administrative institutionalization of Islam throughout the continent. Cautiously embracing the project, Balkan Muslim leaders and theologians have claimed a representative status for "their" Islam as a centuries-old presence on European soil. They have emphasized that Balkan Islam is civic, tolerant, democratic and pluralistic, and that local Muslim communities have developed inclusive and participatory institutions that accept the secular state and secular laws. Balkan Muslim scholars such as Džemaludin Čaušević, Husein Đozo, Ahmed Smajlović, and Fikret Karčić have made important contributions to debates on how to reconcile Islam and European modernity, engaging on issues such as the reform of Shari'a, women's equality and the modernization of educational and religious institutions. Most of them (with the exception of Karčić) have not been translated into English and remain largely unknown in Western Europe.

In short, Balkan Muslims' adaptation to modernity, secularism and national identity, together with their positive attitude towards religious and cultural pluralism, confound the unqualified presentation of Islam as an exclusionary faith that is incompatible with European democracy. Balkan Muslims' experience shows that multiple identities and forms of belonging are more conducive to peace than the straightjacket of rigid identities that privilege group boundaries over personal choice and force people to self-define in strict categories. The history of Islam in the Balkans shows that the future of "European Islam" depends on the ability of public institutions in Europe to articulate inclusive, pluralist and participatory social models that respect Muslims' individual rights. ◁

**Ina Merdjanova** is Senior Researcher and Adjunct Assistant Professor in Religious Studies at Trinity College Dublin. Her most recent publications include *Religion as a Conversation Starter: Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans* (with Patrice Brodeur; Continuum, 2009), and *Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2013). This article is based on a lecture given at the IWM in March 2014 within the series *Colloquia on Secularism*.



# Books, Articles and Talks *10 2013–03 2014*

## Books by Fellows and Alumni

**Mihai Goțiu**
*Afacerea Roșia Montană*
[The Rosia Montana Affair]
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Tact, 2013




Relying on previously unknown documents and testimonies, it builds a case against the highly controversial and largest open pit project in Europe that the Canadian-based Gabriel Resources has been trying for more than ten years to launch in the Apuseni Mountains. In February 2014, the book received the CriticAtac Award.

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**Ludger Hagedorn** und **Zbigniew Stawrowski** (Hg.)
*Romano Guardini – Józef Tischner. Dramat odpowiedzialności / Drama der Verantwortung*
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2013


Verantwortung ist ein Drama, immer neu und immer wieder, unersetzlich die Bedeutung der Person und die Rolle der Menschen, die darin verwickelt sind. Verantwortung ist kein Algorithmus und kein Programm. Sie hat zu tun mit Wahrheit, doch keiner, die fest gegeben und abrufbar wäre. Zu erfahren ist sie in konkreten Schicksalen, wie sie literarisch greifbar werden – im Drama des Handelns wie auch in den Handlungen des Dramas.

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**Ivan Krastev**
*Democracy Disrupted—The Politics of Global Protest*
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014


Since the financial meltdown of 2008, political protests have spread around the world like chain lightning—from the "Occupy" movements of the United States, Great Britain, and Spain to more destabilizing forms of unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Russia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine. In his latest book Ivan Krastev proposes a provocative interpretation of these popular uprisings—one with ominous implications for the future of democratic politics.

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**Michał Łuczewski**
*Odwieczny naród. Polak i katolik w Żmiącej*
[Eine Nation von jeher. Polen und Katholiken in Żmiąca]
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2012


In his award-winning book Michal Luczewski embarks the reader on an exciting journey from the Middle Ages all the way to the present day, where we will learn about how Poland became a nation and how said nation became catholic. It received the Foundation for Polish Science Prize (2012), the Rector of Warsaw University Prize (2012), the Józef Tischner Prize for the best essay in the humanities 2013, and the Stanisław Ossowski Prize for the best book in sociology 2013.

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**Krzysztof Michalski**
*Eseje o Bogu i śmierci*
[Essays About God and Death]
Warszawa: Kurhaus Publishing, 2014


*Essays About God and Death* is a collection of Krzysztof Michalski's last essays. They were written over a period of a few years and inspired by the passing of three important people and close friends: Józef Tischner, Leszek Kołakowski and John Paul II. In thirteen texts the author familiarizes the reader with the perspective of death and explains the metaphysics of life.

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**Marci Shore**
*Der Geschmack von Asche. Das Nachleben des Totalitarismus in Osteuropa*
München: C.H. Beck, 2014


Die Jahrzehnte kommunistischer Herrschaft in den osteuropäischen Ländern haben in praktisch jeder Familie Fragen aufgeworfen, die nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs irgendwie beantwortet werden müssen. Diese „posttraumatischen" Störungen in Ländern und Gesellschaften, die nach ihrer Identität suchen, sind das Thema dieses Buchs.

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**Alfred Stepan** and **Charles Taylor** (eds.)
*Boundaries of Toleration*
New York: Columbia University Press, 2014




How can people of diverse religious, ethnic, and linguistic allegiances and identities live together without committing violence, inflicting suffering, or oppressing each other? In this volume contributors explore the limits of toleration and suggest we think beyond them to mutual respect.

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**Kristina Stoeckl**
*The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights*
London/New York: Routledge, 2014



This book examines the key 2008 publication of the Russian Orthodox Church on human dignity, freedom, and rights. It shows how the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church has shifted from outright hostility towards individual human rights to the advocacy of "traditional values."

**Michael Staudigl** und **Christian Sternad** (Hg.)
*Figuren der Transzendenz. Transformationen eines phänomenologischen Grundbegriffs*
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014


Der Begriff der Transzendenz ist fraglos ein klassischer Topos der Philosophiegeschichte. Als dieser philosophische Grundbegriff ist er jedoch keineswegs eindeutig bestimmbar, sondern nur aus seinen begriffsgeschichtlichen Transformationen heraus zu verstehen.

## Paul Celan Translation Program

**Maurice Merleau-Ponty**
*Phénoménologie de la perception* [Az észlelés fenomenológiája]
Translated by **Sajó Sándor** (French > Hungarian)
Budapest: L'Harmattan Kiadó, 2014.




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**Edward W. Said**
*Humanism and Democratic Criticism* [Гуманізм і демократична критика]
Translated by **Anton Vodianyi (Artem Chapeye)** (English > Ukrainian)
Kyiv: Medusa, 2014.


**Boris Buden**
*Zone des Übergangs. Vom Ende des Postkommunismus* [Зона переходу. Про кінець посткомунізму]
Translated by **Nelia Vakhovska** (German > Ukrainian)
Kyiv: Medusa, 2013.


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**Michael Stewart**
*The Time of The Gypsies* [Vremea Romilor]
Translated by **Miruna Voiculescu** (English > Romanian)
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Institutului pentru Studierea problemelor Minorităților Naționale, 2014.




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**Agata Lisiak** and **Natalie Smolenski** (eds.)
Vol. XXXIII
*What Do Ideas Do?*
Vienna: IWM, 2014.




The 2013 *Junior Fellows' Conference* discussed the interplay between human thought and human action, given the inadequacy of the great ideological systems which have remade (and continue to remake) Central and Eastern Europe over the past century. In this issue, IWM Junior Fellows approach the question of the relationships between our mental constructs and our worlds—and what we choose to do about them.

### *Transit – Europäische Revue*

**Heft 45** (Sommer 2014)
Verlag Neue Kritik, Frankfurt a.M.

*Maidan: Die unerwartete Revolution*

**Timothy Snyder**
*Europa und die Ukraine: Vergangenheit und Zukunft*

**Katja Mishchenko**
*„Es gab keine Grenze mehr zwischen Traum und Realität."*
Interview, geführt von Timothy Snyder und Tatiana Zhurzhenko

**Oksana Forostyna**
*Land der Kinder*

**Mykhailo Minakov**
*Moses und Prometheus: Die Ukraine zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit*

**Mykola Riabchuk**
*Eine Ukraine?*

**Tatiana Zhurzhenko**
*Im Osten nichts Neues?*

**Serhii Leshchenko**
*Hinter den Kulissen: Eine Typologie der ukrainischen Oligarchen*

**Anton Shekhovtsov**
*Svoboda: Aufstieg und Fall einer Partei*

**Cyril Hovorun**
*Die Kirche auf dem Maidan*

**Nikolay Mitrokhin**
*Die Rolle der Kirchen in der Ukraine*

**Volodymyr Sklokin**
*Die „Nationalisierung" der Vergangenheit und die Aufgaben der Geschichtsschreibung in der Ukraine*

## Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

**Andrey Evdokimov**

"Right to Health Care, Duty to Keep Health Safe and 'Freedom' of Madness" [in Russian], in: *Questions of Philosophy,* 2014.

*

"Critique", *6th International Forum of Russian-Speaking Writers 'Literary Vienna',* Union of Russian-Language Writers in Austria, Vienna, October 15–20, 2013.

"Public Financial Law and Values", 2nd International Conference *Enterprise and the Competitive Environment,* Mendel University, Brno, March 6–7, 2014.

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**Mihai Gotiu**

"The Rosa Montana Case Is not a Failure of the System, It's the System Itself" [in Romanian], in: *Observator Cultural,* January 22, 2014.

Numerous posts [in Romanian] on the Blog *VoxPublica.ro*

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"Transformers MMXX. The Power of Culture in Social Change", Conference *Rosia Montana Day,* Vienna, February 6, 2014; Meeting with Mihai Gotiu, *Berlin Against Rosia Montana Cyanide Mining and Fracking,* Berlin, February 17, 2014.

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**Ludger Hagedorn**

*Drama der Verantwortung / Dramat Odpowiedzialności.* Romano Guardini und Józef Tischner [bilingual German-Polish, ed. with Zbigniew Stawrowski], Kraków: Instytut Mysli Jozefa Tischnera / Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, November 2013.

„Drama, Komödie, Inferno. Tischner und Guardini auf den Spuren Dantes", in: *Drama der Verantwortung / Dramat Odpowiedzialności.*

# Books, Articles and Talks *10 2013–03 2014*

Romano Guardini und Józef Tischner, Berlin 2013.

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"History of Wars. War as History", Workshop *Heretical Europe,* New School for Social Research, New York, November 15, 2013.

"Reflections on the Idea of a 'Christianity Unthought'", Conference *Pathways in the Phenomenology of Religion,* Phenomenology Research Center, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, November 18–19, 2013.

"History of Wars. War as History", Conference *The Reasons of Europe, History and Problems of a Philosophical Concept,* Sapienza Università di Roma, December 13–14, 2013.

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**Mariya Ivancheva**

"A People Divided: Violent Clashes Emerging in Bulgaria", in: *LeftEast,* November 2013.

„Eine Kluft im Land", in: *MALMOE,* Dezember 2013.

„Armut war kein Thema", Interview in: *Analyse und Kritik,* Januar 2014.

*

"Crisis and Social Protests in South East Europe: From Slovenia to Bulgaria", Beirat für gesellschafts-, wirtschafts– und umweltpolitische Alternativen *(Beiwegum),* Vienna, November 2013.

"The Bulgarian Protests of 2012–2013: Part of a Global Protest Wave?", City University of New York, Center for Place, Culture and Politics, November 2013.

"Thinking Beyond Europe: Emancipatory Projects and Global Hierarchies after Socialism", Association of Slavic, Eastern European and Eurasian Studies, Boston, November 2013.

"EuroMaidan Protests: What is at Stake?", IWM, Vienna, December 2013.

"Communism in the Ruins of Communism: The Bulgarian Protest Wave of 2012–2013", Conference *From Maribor to Taksim: Protest Movements in the Balkans,* University of Graz, December 2013.

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**Aliaksei Kazharski**

"Eurasian Regionalism as an Identitary Enterprise: Representations of the European Other in Russian Discourse on Eurasian Integration", in: *CEURUS EU-Russia Papers,* No. 12, December 2013.

"Eurasian Integration", in: Viacheslav Morozov and Karmo Tüür (eds.), *Russian Federation 2014: Short Term Prognosi,* University of Tartu Press, 2014.

**Cornelia Klinger**

2. Auflage: Cornelia Klinger und Gudrun-Axeli Knapp (Hg.): *Über-Kreuzungen. Fremdheit, Ungleichheit, Differenz,* Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2008.

*

Ute Gerhard und Cornelia Klinger im Gespräch über Care, Fürsorgliche Praxis und Lebenssorge. In: *Feministische Studien: Sorgeverhältnisse,* 31. Jg., Nr. 2, November 2013.

*

„Geschlecht in gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen", Eröffnungsvortrag für die Internationale Tagung der Sektion Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung der deutschen Gesellschaft für Erziehungswissenschaft *Geschlecht in gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen,* Bergische Universität Wuppertal, 2.–4. Oktober 2013.

„Lebenssorge in sozialphilosophischer Perspektive", Vortrag auf dem Herbst-Workshop *In der Philosophie zu Hause,* Universität Paderborn, 18. Oktober 2013.

„Wanderungen zwischen Singular und Plural: Zwischen Gender und/oder Diversity?", Vortrag *Forschungsplattform Gender Studies,* Universität Salzburg, 4. November 2013.

„Das Interieur als Entfaltungsraum der modernen Subjektivität", Symposium *Innenräume – zwischen Wohnung, Praxis und Atelier* aus Anlass der Ausstellung *Lucian Freud: privat,* Sigmund Freud Privatstiftung, Wien, 21. November 2013.

„Auswirkungen des turn to diversity auf die Geschlechtertheorie und -forschung", Festvortrag *Rückblick – Einblick – Ausblick. 15 Jahre Essener Kolleg für Geschlechterforschung,* Essener Kolleg für Geschlechterforschung, 29. November 2013.

„Th. W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie", Seminar, Institut für Philosophie an der Universität Tübingen, 10.–12. Februar 2014.

*

Frauenlebenswerkpreis, verliehen vom Bundesministerin für Frauen und Öffentlichen Dienst, 23. Oktober 2013.

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**Ivan Krastev**

"The European Dis-Union. Lessons from the Soviet Collapse", in: *Eurozine,* October 29, 2013.

"Who Lost Ukraine?", distributed by *Project Syndicate,* December 12, 2013.

"The Transparency Delusion", in: *Eurozine,* February 20, 2014.

*

"Further comments and articles on Ukraine were published in *Foreign Affairs, Le Monde, Krytyka Polityczna* etc., for details see: www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/media-clippings/krastev

*

"Majoritarianism versus Pluralism: Democracy in Question?", *4th Istanbul Forum,* Center for Strategic Communication, Istanbul, October 4, 2013.

"How Should Europe Move Forward?", Conference, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin, October 18, 2013.

*Plans for France in 10 Years and What is Desirable for Europe,* Workshop, Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la prospective, Paris, November 5, 2013.

"Transparency, Trust and Chances for Solidarity", Debate with Zygmunt Bauman and Berhard Schlink, Central European Forum, Bratislava, November 16, 2013.

"The West Today: Calculated Power or Complete Paralysis?", *Halifax International Security Forum,* November 22, 2013.

"In Mistrust We Trust: Can Democracy Survive When We Don't trust Our Leaders", *Amsterdam Conversation on Europe,* Amsterdam, November 29, 2013.

"Europe's Zeitgeist Today", Conference *GreenAcademy: European Zeitgeist 1914–2014,* Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin, January 24, 2014.

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**Agata Lisiak**

"Navigating Urban Standstill: Hip Hop Representations of Jeżyce, Poznań", in: *CITY,* Vol. 18, No.3, 2014.

*

"The Master Plan and Cultural Memory: The Case of Berlin's Museum Island", Conference *Cultural Memory,* Center for Culture and Cultural Studies, Skopje, September 5–7, 2013.

"Immigrant Mothers as Agents of Change", Conference *What Europe? Ideals to Fight For Today,* Bard College Berlin, the Hannah Arendt Center at Bard College and ICI Berlin, Berlin, March 27–28, 2014.

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**Ewa Majewska**

*Art as Appearence. Censorship and Other Paradoxes of Cultural Politics* [in Polish], Kraków: Korporacja Ha! Art, 2013.

"Love in Translation. Neoliberal Availability or a Solidarity Practice?", in: Anna Ferguson and Ann Jonasdottir (eds.), *Love: A Question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century,* New York: Routledge, 2013.

"Antigone, encore. Démocratie, genre et la vie précaire au temps du néoliberalisme", in: A. Leder and G. Rabinovitch (eds.), *L'Homme de la démocratie,* 2014.

"Between Nostalgia and (Political) Solidarity. Some Notes on Shipyard Ruins", in: Widok: *Theories and Practices of Visual Cultures,* Warsaw: Polish Academy of Science, 2014.

*

"Differencing the Canon: Feminism, Marxism and Psychoanalysis in Griselda Pollock's Art Theory", Museum of Modern Art, Warsaw, January 2014.

Collaboration, exhibition *MARTHA ROSLER Guide for the Perplexed: How to Succeed in the New Poland,* Centre for Contemporary Art, Warsaw, February 14, 2014.

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**Dinara Nevaeva**

"Population Ageing and Social Policy: Interrelation and Consequences" [in Russian], 4th International Sociological Conference, Moscow, February 27–28, 2014.

"Social Exclusion of Older People", Conference *Enterprise and the Competitive Environment,* Mendel University, Brno, March 6–7, 2014.

"Population Ageing: Implications for Society" [in Russian], *First International Scientific Congress for Social and Human Sciences,* 'East West' Association for Advanced Studies and Higher Education, Vienna, March 10, 2014.

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**Christina Plank**

„Land Grabbing – kritische Perspektive auf die neue Landnahme", in: Johann Bröthaler, Michael Getzner, Rudolf Giffiner, Alexander Hamedinger, Andreas Voigt (Hg.): *Jahrbuch Raumplanung,* 2013.

*

"The Financialisation of Farmland in Ukraine", Conference *Momentum 13 Fortschritt,* Hallstatt, October, 2013.

"The Vicious Cycle", *3rd Vienna Workshop on Sustainable Development for Doctoral Students,* BOKU, Vienna, November 20, 2013.

„Zur Lage des Marxismus", *Workshop on Political Ecology,* Assoziation für kritische Gesellschaftsforschung, Berlin, 13.–15. Dezember 2013.

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**Roumiana Preshlenova**

"Liberation in Progress. Bulgarian Nationalism and Political Economy in 1878–1912", Workshop *The Balkans as Europe II, 1878–1914,* IWM, Vienna, January 30–February 1, 2014.

*

„Die Geschichte endet nicht am Bosporus". *Dimensionen – Die Welt der Wissenschaft: ‚Kleineurasion' und das Osmanische Erbe in Europa,* Ö1, 22. Januar 2014.

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**Mykola Riabchuk**

„Maidan 2.0.: Sich wandelnde Werte und stabile Identitaeten", in: Simon Geissbuehler (Hg.): *Kiew – Revolution 3.0. Der Euromaidan 2013/14 und die Zukunftsperspektiven der Ukraine,* Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag, 2014.

„Zerstörte Illusionen", in: Claudia Dathe und Andreas Rostek (Hg.): *Majdan! Ukraine, Europa,* Berlin: edition. fotoTAPETA_Flugschrift, 2014.

„Dreizehn schlimmere Orte auf der Welt", in: Jurij Andruchowytsch (Hg.): *Euromaidan. Was in der Ukraine auf dem Spiel steht,* Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014.

»Chérir l'ambivalence – le discours de l'Etat et de la politique en Ukraine«, in: Birgitte Gautier (ed.): *L'Europe centrale et orientale depuis 1989. Changer le monde avec des mots,* Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013.

"Eight Jews in Search of a Grandfather", in: Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern and Antony Polonsky (eds.): *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry,* Vol. 26, 2013.

"After the Crash", in: *New Eastern Europe,* No. 1, 2014.

„Alle Wege führen nach Westen", in: *Internationale Politik,* No. 2, 2014.

*

Further comments and articles on Ukraine were published in *The New York Times, Neue Züricher Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* etc., for details see: www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/media-clippings/riabchuk

*

"Poland, Ukraine and Europe: Between Imagination and Reality" [in Polish], Inaugural Lecture, King's Castle, Warsaw, October 10, 2013.

"Hybrid Regimes in the Former Soviet Republics", Guest Lecture, Masaryk University, Brno, November 19, 2013.

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**Marci Shore**

"Can We See Ideas? On Evocation, Experience, and Empathy", in: Darrin McMahon and Samuel Moyn: *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

"Meaning without Wholeness" [in Polish], in: *Krytyka Polityczna,* Vol. 34, October 2013.

"Surreal Love in Prague", in: *The Times Literary Supplement,* January 10, 2014.

„Der lange Schatten des Totalitarismus", in: *Die Presse,* 3. Dezember 2013.

"The Lingering of the Past", interview in: *New Eastern Europe,* December 10, 2013.

*

"Phenomenological Encounters: Stories from the Other Europe", Institut für Neuzeit- und Zeitgeschichtsforschung, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, February 10, 2014.

"Roman Ingarden's Friendships—or, a Step Towards a Central European History of Philosophical Encounters", Graduate Institute, Geneva, February 25, 2014.

"The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", *The Annual Joseph Conrad Lecture,* Conrad Festival, Kraków, October 26, 2013.

"Citizen Amnesia", Central European Forum, Bratislava, November 15, 2013.

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**Natalie Smolenski**

"The Father Lemański Affair: Personal vs. Institutional Sanctity in Contemporary Poland," in: *Journal of Religion in Europe,* Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2014.

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**Timothy Snyder**

Several Articles on Ukraine, in: *The New York Review of Books:* www.nybooks.com/contributors/timothy-snyder-2/

Further comments and articles on Ukraine were published in *The New York Times, The New Republic, Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* etc., for details see: www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/media-clippings/snyder/

*

"Nations, Empires, Unions: European Integration and Disintegration since 1914", lecture held at the House of Literature (Litteraturhuset), Oslo, February 8, 2014.

"Space as a Category in a Global History of the Holocaust", lecture given at the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, February 13, 2014.

"Witold Pilecki—The Auschwitz Volunteer", Polish Institute, Vienna, January 28, 2014.

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**Kristina Stoeckl**

"The Theology Blind Spot", in: *The Immanent Frame,* February 13, 2014. Republished in *Tr@nsit_online:* www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/transit-online/theology-blind-spot/

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**Anita Traninger**

*The Emergence of Impartiality,* Leiden: Brill 2014.

*

„Erzähler und persona. Rhetorik und Narratologie zwischen Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit", in: Gert Ueding und Gregor Kalivoda: *Wege moderner Rhetorikforschung. Klassische Fundamente und interdisziplinäre Entwicklung,* Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013.

„Disputative, non assertive posita. Zur Pragmatik von Disputationsthesen", in: Friedrich Vollhardt (ed.): *Religiöser Nonkonformismus und frühneuzeitliche Gelehrtenkultur,* Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2014.

*

„Allons, allons! Les chiens sont rois! Funktionen der Jagd in Zolas Rougon-Macquart-Zyklus", Gastvortrag, Institut für Romanistik, Universität Rostock, Dezember 2013.

„Kreativitätsmaschinen: Topos/Topik", Gastvortrag im Rahmen der Vorlesung *Der Text als Medium. Rhetorische Positionen der Literaturtheorie,* Prof. Dr. Frauke Berndt, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Januar 2014.

"Principles of Cultural Dynamics", *11th Annual Meeting of the Asian New Humanities Net,* Tung Hai University, Taichung, March 7–8, 2014.

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**Charles Taylor**

"How to Define Secularism", in: Charles Taylor and Alfred C. Stepan (eds.), *Boundaries of Toleration,* New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.

"Après L'Âge Séculier", in: Sylvie Taussig (ed.), *Charles Taylor. Religion Et sécularisation,* Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2014.

"The Space of Exchange", in: Michael J. Harris, Daniel Rynhold and Tamra Wright (eds.), *Radical Responsibilty. Celebrating the Thought of Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks,* Jerusalem: Maggid Books, 2013.

"Forward", in: Brother Émile of Taizé (ed.), *Faithful to the Future: Listening to Yves Congar,* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

"Retrieving Realism", in: Joseph K. Schear (ed.), *Mind, Reason, and being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate,* New York: Routledge, 2013.

# The Liberalism of Small Nations

BY JAROSŁAW KUISZ

*Taking the "small nation perspective" is one of the greatest challenges for liberalism in Central Eastern Europe today, says Jarosław Kuisz, editor-in-chief of the Polish weekly* Kultura Liberalna. *Established in 2009 by a group of young academics, artists and students, the online journal aims at transcending a narrow, strictly economic understanding of liberalism.*

Building of the old Warsaw stock exchange

Photo: fotopolska.eu

In the heart of old Warsaw, on Królewska Street, it was once possible to see an impressive, classicist building. It was neither pretty nor exceptionally ugly. The portico, with its richly decorated frieze, was supported by six massive columns. At the beginning of the Second World War, the building was destroyed by German bombs, like many others on that street. For a long time, the ruins of Warsaw stock exchange served as a *memento* of the old financial world. It has never been rebuilt.

For half a century, the average citizen of a Central Eastern European "people's democracy" would have had no idea what a stock exchange was, or what stocks were. In 1991, when most people were still dizzy with their new freedom, Warsaw's politicians and businessmen made a crucial decision. Many chuckled over the symbolism. The cunning of history dictated that the new stock exchange in Warsaw be established in the "White House", the former communist party headquarters. Stock prices were watched carefully by the whole country. The top five companies became household names, celebrated as if they were eternal deities. Faith became more important than knowledge of the rules of the free-market. Other stock exchanges were established in Budapest (1990) and Prague (1992). It seemed that the communist economic experiment was being left behind once and for all.

## Reality Dawns

Two decades later, the period is considered the *belle époque* of Central Eastern European liberalism. The "triumph" of liberalism in the region began to seem doubtful to historians very early on.[1] Today, many of those who once proudly referred to themselves as liberals are now conservatives, some of them even Eurosceptics. This raises the central question in any consideration of the history of liberalism in Central Eastern Europe after 1989. How could politicians like Viktor Orbán or Václav Klaus, once in power, rebrand themselves as nationalists? (Even Donald Tusk, the pro-European Polish prime minister, has become a traditionalist). Does this transformation have a banal explanation as the typical trajectory of ageing statesmen, as *Realpolitik* prevails over idealism? Or are the causes deeper?

When we look at what the generation of liberals that emerged towards the end of communism wrote and said, the term "liberalism" seems little more than a label. At the beginning of the 1990s, liberalism was primarily a vehicle for disposing of the remnants of the old economy and for copying solutions from the West. Indeed, the greatest strength of the liberal "revolution" might have been the ignorance of the revolutionaries. They knew hardly anything about party politics or the functioning of the free market. The former dissident Jacek Kuroń, for example, confessed that neither the opposition nor the communists ever actually understood the term "unemployment".[2]

Long before the fall of communism, the old utopia of Marx, Engels and Lenin had been replaced by pictures from popular movies representing the West as a veritable Aladdin's cave. The popular imagination created a new utopia. The unfulfilled promises of the socialist economy caused a backlash: private initiative flourished and real-life experience seemed to confirm the philosophy of "not-counting-on-the-state". Meanwhile, what was left of the communist state was hardly working in the late 1980s. In Poland, an act on the freedom of private business was passed in 1988, when the communists still had full power.

*Blindly imitating the West, individual freedom was too often equated with the liberty of* homo oeconomicus.

Therefore it is incorrect to say, as many do today, that the reform period was influenced solely by Anglo-Saxon neo-conservatism. Moreover, contrary to current opinion, capitalism was not the choice of the elites alone. It was the people who wanted improvements in living conditions and more prosperity as fast as possible. They were even ready to accept severe austerity measures in order to achieve this. In 1992, Václav Havel told a western audience that he had come from a country full of impatient people: "To my horror, I have realised that my impatience with re-building democracy had something communist in itself […]. I wanted to speed up history, like a child that pulls up a plant to make it grow faster."[3]

Faced with the reality of Central Eastern European society, "liberal" politicians soon had to correct their manifestos. They promised the moon and tried to create jobs from above. Even Leszek Balcerowicz, known for his libertarian views on economics, admitted that state intervention was needed in some areas.

## Liberalism Misconstrued

The liberal watchwords that were popular at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s had little in common with the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill or with that of 20th-century thinkers such as John Rawls. Nevertheless, no one really cared about doctrinal purity. It was under the liberal banner that numerous abuses were committed (such as the privatization of state enterprises). From this perspective, politicians' gradual embrace of conservatism does not seem to be accidental. Sociolo-

gists at the time were writing extensively about anomie and the disintegration of social norms. The attitude of *laissez faire* was the one element of the liberal agenda able to attract individuals unreservedly. In 1988, Marcin Król, a supporter of liberal reforms, nevertheless expressed concern about the renaissance of *laissez faire,* familiar from early 19th-century writings.[4]

The liberal program around 1989 consisted of more than merely taking power away from the communists together with a vague plan for economic reform. Nevertheless, in social memory, liberalism has been confused with *laissez faire*—a meaning it never possessed in any classical theory of liberalism. People presenting themselves as liberals made no attempt to develop their own political language. Blindly imitating the West, individual freedom was too often equated with the liberty of *homo oeconomicus.*

*Taking the "small nation perspective" is one of the greatest challenges for liberalism in Central Eastern Europe.*

The language of the dissidents, born out of experience, offered the chance for a new foundation of individual freedom in Central Eastern Europe. Sadly, attempts to develop this language were, by and large, regarded as unimportant. Instead, ideological concepts formed under completely different conditions were imported from the West. However, the liberal languages of East and West were fundamentally dissonant. For instance, the language of Western liberalism could never possibly have described Central Eastern European "as-if" politics. The whole political strategy of transformation from communism to liberal democracy was therefore beyond the experience of western politicians. As Tony Judt put it: "You simply behaved as though you were treating the law, the language of communism, the constitution of the separate states and the international agreements they had signed as though they were operational and could be trusted."[5]

This actually meant even more than the British-American historian had in mind. Even if deriving from noble reasons, it was still just a game, with politics, the state, and the law. But it was also pointing to the challenges of conformism, which individuals had to face, and it was a way of surviving the two totalitarian regimes before.

## The Liberalism of Small Nations

Central Eastern Europe is a region of small nations. Even before postmodernism dawned, intellectuals such as István Bibó or Milan Kundera noted how the 20th century had made them realize their own contingency. It was not only centuries-old cultures that were threatened, but the physical existence of whole peoples. The Shoah still overshadows the memory of the region.

However, the experience of Nazism and communism is not the sole issue. What is at stake is the identity of small communities. In 1930, the writer Dezső Kosztolányi, a Hungarian born under Austrian rule, wrote an open letter to Antoine Meillet¸ a professor at the Collège de France. The latter had published a highly-acclaimed book in which he argued that Europe should build a universalist civilization by sacrificing the languages of small nations. Kosztolányi was deeply against a vision of progress that included giving up one's native tongue.[6]

In the case of "small nations" constantly in fear of having their identity blurred, reducing liberalism to the concept of *homo oeconomicus* is a poor guarantee of individual freedom. It suffices to mention issues such as freedom of conscience, minority rights and contraception. Surrendering anthropology runs counter to classical liberalism and leads directly to local mutations of neo-conservatism and old-fashioned social conformism under new banners.

Taking the "small nation perspective" is one of the greatest challenges for liberalism in Central Eastern Europe. If the theories of the classical liberal thinkers developed within specific historical circumstances, then the liberalism of Central Eastern Europe should be understood in its own context too. If individual freedom (as opposed to the freedom of nations or financial markets) lies at the heart of liberal thought, then studying the biographies of individual persons should be the most important source of inspiration for the next generation of liberals. The lives of people who made their own way to liberal values have much to tell us. It would be difficult to find a better manifesto for the struggle against social apathy and conformism than Havel's text "The Power of the Powerless".

Inspiration is the issue here, not imitation. The heritage of engagement consists of more than one type of experience. On the one hand, there were people like Leszek Kołakowski, Andrzej Walicki or Zygmunt Bauman, who went from disillusionment with Marxism to cautious praise for liberal democracy. On the other hand, there were those, like Miroslaw Dzielski, who wanted not to reconstruct the pre-war radical Right, but to embrace local versions of Catholic liberalism or post-communist ordo-liberalism. They were united by their affirmation of individual freedom, scepticism about human nature, a reluctance to espouse radical solutions to social questions and, most importantly, a self-imposed duty to become active in public life. The experience of the 20th century has taught us that, in small nations, silent passivity is not an option for intellectuals.

## Universal Problems, Local Solutions

The reduction of individual freedom to the concept of *homo oeconomicus* is accompanied by another threat: the "politics of fear" and the state's temptation to extend its reach in the name of the security of its citizens. The most urgent problem we must address today as liberals is the elimination of privacy and its consequences for the traditional distinction between the public and private spheres. Other areas in which policy responses must be developed are the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis and the shifting of the burden of public debt onto future generations; the problems of climate change and environmental damage; and immigration after the alleged "failure" of multiculturalism. The absence of any coherent foreign policy from the Central and Eastern Europe an liberal perspective is another pressing concern.

These are problems that Central Eastern Europe shares with the rest of the continent. It is therefore worth emphasizing that local dissidents have not only expressed scepticism about "brave new regimes". They have also expressed hope—not only in the preservation and development of individual freedom, but, as Timothy Garton Ash has noted, in the vital force behind the project of a united Europe.[7]

These models of dissidence are all the more important given that the crisis of political participation is only superficial. Party politics "from above" is to some extent being replaced by an urban politics "from below". Young people are taking over the backyards and streets, overcoming post-communist indifference to the space around them. They are becoming active in the NGO sector, thereby re-enacting the social engagement of the generation before them. Individual free choice may well mean working for the community.

## Rediscovering the Liberal Tradition

In the mid-1990s, a conference was held not far from the old Warsaw stock exchange. Among the speakers were distinguished intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas and Richard Rorty. During the debate, the foreign guests clashed with the local intellectuals. The American philosopher warned against the fundamentalism of democratic societies. He asked whether it was legitimate to put concepts like "truth" or "reason" at the centre of a political culture. The Polish academics, united in their experience of communism, were unanimous in their opposition. One claimed that the citizens of post-communist states had completely different fears than those Rorty had spoken of. The erosion of dogmatic Marxism and communist fundamentalism had resulted in a need for epistemological and moral certitude.[8]

If one forgets this, it is impossible to understand modern Central Eastern Europe and its post-totalitarian need for a more comprehensive, rooted liberalism. Liberal concepts, together with the idea of public participation, have tangible points of reference in the works and biographies of Central Eastern European dissidents. These local aspirations to liberal universalism are waiting to be re-discovered and developed by a new generation. ◁

1) See Jerzy Szacki: *Liberalism After Communism,* Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 1995.

2) Jacek Kuroń: *Spoko: Czyli Kwadratura Koła,* Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992.

3) André Glucksmann, Nicole Bacharan and Abdelwahab Meddeb: *La plus belle histoire de la liberté de Václav Havel,* Paris: Seuil, 2009, p. 183.

4) Marcin Król: "Interes własny, interes ogółu…," in: *Res Publica Nova,* May 1988, p. 7–8.

5) Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder: *Thinking the 20th Century,* New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

6) Alain Finkielkraut: *L'Ingratitude,* Paris: Gallimard, 2000, p. 22–24.

7) Timothy Garton Ash: "The Crisis of Europe", In: *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 91 No. 5, September/October, 2012.

8) Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Leszek Kołakowski: *Stan Filozofii Współczesnej,* ed. J. Niżnik, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 1996, p. 32–33.

Further Reading:
*Rescuing Polish Liberalism.* Interview with Karolina Wigura (co-editor, *Kultura Liberalna;* former Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM) conducted by John Feffer as part of an Open Society Foundation fellowship: *www.johnfeffer.com/rescuing-polish-liberalism/*

**Jarosław Kuisz** is the editor-in-chief of the Polish internet journal *Kultura Liberalna* and Assistant Professor at the University of Warsaw. Furthermore he teaches at the Institut d'histoire du temps présent, *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* (CNRS), Paris. In 2014 he was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM as well as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Chicago.

# Varia

We are happy to announce that **Svetla Marinova,** Associate Professor at St. Kliment Ohridski University Sofia and Paul Celan Visiting Fellow in 2014, was awarded the yearly prize of the Bulgarian Association of Interpreters and Translators for the translation of Sigmund Freud's *Totem und Tabu.*

Furthermore, we congratulate **Dragan Prole,** Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Novi Sad and Paul Celan Visiting Fellow in 2010, on his book *The foreign country within* [Unutrašnje inostranstvo] which received the Stevan Pešić Prize as well as the Prize of the Association of Writers of Vojvodina for the best book of the year 2013.

We welcome our new colleague **Tatjana Zhurzhenko** at the IWM. In close cooperation with the research focus *Democracy in Question* directed by Ivan Krastev, she has taken charge of the project "Russia in Global Dialogue", supported by Open Society Foundations.

**Julian Pokay,** who joined the IWM in February 2014 as PR-assistant, will leave the Institute for a doctoral scholarship at Harvard University. We thank him for his dedicated work and strong commitment and wish him all the best for the future.

In the academic year 2014/15, the IWM will launch two new fellowship programs: the **Krzysztof Michalski Fellowship Program** commemorating the Institute's founding Rector, and the **Jan Patočka Fellowship Program** in honor of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka and his legacy. Further details will be announced on the IWM website: www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs

*Carl Henrik Fredriksson*
*continued from page 5*

not make the differences between Turkish and Austrian publics any less relevant. When the decision to open accession negotiations was taken in Luxembourg in 2005, Turkey had already been an associate member of the European Economic Community, a predecessor of the European Union, for 42 years. Turkey was one of the first countries to become a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and is a founding member of the OSCE. The futures of Turkey and Austria—and every other European country—are inevitably intertwined. But their public spheres are not. Not yet. Equally divergent perspectives are the rule, not the exception, all over Europe.

## The European Public Sphere: a Complex Task of Translation

The Europeanization of identities and frames of reference still seems like a far-off dream. But the long-term prospects for a more meaningful European community hinge on the emergence of those very trends. Notwithstanding that identity is constructed, it would not only be futile but also dangerous to try to prescribe to Europeans a certain potentially hegemonic narrative that should fit all contexts and account for what is in fact a multitude of social, economic, political and historical experiences. However, divergent historical narratives remain one of the most difficult challenges facing anyone who wants to contribute to the emergence of a European public sphere.

EU enlargement in 2004 made the narrative gap painfully visible. In Western Europe, 1945 constitutes both a starting point and an ending point: Never again! That was the founding impetus of the European integration project, beginning with the Coal and Steel Community. In Eastern Europe, however, 1945 was neither an ending nor a starting point; it was an intermediary moment between two oppressive systems, signifying little more than the transition from Nazi rule to Soviet rule. "The future of European solidarity," writes Timothy Snyder, "depends on a rethinking of the immediate European past. Without historical knowledge of the East, European mass publics will be swayed by simple arguments flowing from national prejudice. European leaders, whether they know the facts or not, will be tempted to resort to such arguments in the whirl of domestic political competition."

But instead of a Grand European Narrative dictated from above, the only way to bridge this gap goes via the public sphere. What Jan-Werner Mueller has described as the "humdrum" task of European intellectuals—to be a little bit more curious and "see the rewards in the work of translation and mediation"—is in fact the new democratic *raison d'ëtre* of the battered press.

For decades, pundits lamenting the lack of a European public sphere have put their hopes in the emergence of new, pan-European media. In vain. Jürgen Habermas, the most prominent advocate of the idea that the public sphere plays a pivotal role in the legitimation of any democratic system, has been one of them. However, in a speech to a social democratic conference in Berlin earlier this year, Habermas claimed that "for a supranational democracy that is still rooted in nation-states, we do not need a European 'people', but individual citizens, who have learnt that they can be both national citizens and European citizens in one person. And these citizens can very well competently participate in European decision-making in their own national public spheres, if the media only would meet their responsibilities."

This means that the media must fulfill "a complex task of translation", Habermas concluded, which involves mutually reporting on the discussions taking place in other countries, representing different perspectives.

It is not difficult to imagine what such "translation" could achieve. What would the answers to the euro crisis have looked like if the Germans had known a little bit more about the Greek civil war and how state bureaucracy was used to reconcile a deeply divided society? Would the euroskeptic party Alternative for Germany (AfD) still have won seven seats in the European Parliament? And, to continue to speak with Jan-Werner Mueller, what if the Greeks would have known a little bit more about the historical roots of German Ordoliberalismus and German politicians' innate fear of inflation?

If the fourth estate should remain a pillar of the democratic system, it urgently needs to take on this "complex task of translation" to open up to 'foreign' perspectives. Politics is no longer limited to the nation-state, while the standpoint of the media—including the value system on which journalists base their coverage—is still almost exclusively national. Such a media landscape can never provide the foundations for a united society.

How much in common must a community have? we asked at a recent *Eurozine* conference. As it turns out: quite a lot. At least a common public sphere—even if this is just a series of nationally based but interconnected media spaces. Because without it, Europe's publics will be easy prey for those who know how to play the strings of history to further polarize European societies. In Vienna and Istanbul, in Paris and Budapest there are plenty of those, and they claim that they are playing the tune of the future. ◁

**Carl Henrik Fredriksson** is co-founder and editor-in-chief of *Eurozine,* the European network of cultural journals. He was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM in spring 2014.

# Upcoming Events *09–12 2014*

**September 23**

### The Dilemmas of Protest Politics

**Ivan Krastev**
IWM Permanent Fellow; Chairman, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

Since the financial meltdown of 2008, political protests have spread around the world like chain lightning, from the "Occupy" movements of the United States, Great Britain, and Spain to more destabilizing forms of unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Russia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine. In this lecture, based on his most recent book *Democracy Disrupted: The Politics of Global Protest,* Ivan Krastev proposes a provocative interpretation of these popular uprisings—one with ominous implications for the future of democratic politics.

**October 3**

### Ende des Säkularismus? Phänomenologie und der Begriff der Religion heute

Theoretische Diskussionen zur Rolle der Religion in der Gegenwart werden in verschiedenen Disziplinen geführt. Dieser Workshop – eine Kooperation des IWM mit der Forschungsplattform „Religion and Transformation in Contemporary European Society" der Universität Wien und dem Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien – beabsichtigt eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme gegenwärtiger Religionsbegriffe.

**October 20/22/27**

### The Climate Question

**Dipesh Chakrabarty**
Lawrence A. Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago

Starting from a discussion of how once Hans-Georg Gadamer and Carl Schmitt understood the problem of European legacy in the context of a globalizing world, this lecture series will develop a distinction between globalization and global warming in order to think about the future that a warming planet may hold for a globalizing world.

**November 16**

### Gerecht verteilt – unsere Gesellschaft zwischen Mangel und Überfluss

Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Menschheit könnte der überwiegende Teil der Weltbevölkerung mit ausreichend Lebensmitteln und Gütern versorgt werden. Warum ist das Problem der Verteilung aber bis heute ungelöst? Die Debatte im Wiener Akademietheater fragt nach den Ursachen und weitreichenden Konsequenzen dieser Verteilungsproblematik.
*In Kooperation mit der Columbia University und dem Social Science Research Council*

**November 18**

### Urban Stages of Protest: the City as Medium

**Ivaylo Ditchev**
Professor of Cultural Anthropology, University of Sofia

In his lecture, Ivaylo Ditchev will focus on urban spaces as a medium in the communication between groups and individuals to produce significations of domination, power, unity, misery and rebellion. By reflecting on two types of protests—those in countries undergoing a period of crisis (like Spain and Greece) and those countries with booming economies (such as Turkey and Brazil)—he analyzes them in a double perspective: as events staged locally, but with one eye on the potential global audience.

**December 4**

### Schutz, Macht und Verantwortung. Protektion im Zeitalter der Imperien und danach

**Jürgen Osterhammel**
Professor für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte, Universität Konstanz

„Schutz" ist eine der widersprüchlichsten Kategorien im Vokabular der internationalen Politik. Sie erlebte im 20. Jahrhundert eine tiefgreifende Umdeutung. Imperien haben ihre machtpolitische Expansion immer wieder als Schutzherrschaft über „zivilisierungsbedürftige" Andere gerechtfertigt. Heute erkennt die Staatengemeinschaft eine „Schutzverantwortung" (responsibility to protect) an. Der Vortrag beschreibt und kommentiert diesen Wandel des Protektionsgedankens in historischer Perspektive.

### Monthly Lectures
**Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.**

### Conferences and Workshops
**The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.**

### IWM Lectures in Human Sciences
**This series of public lectures was launched in 2000 on the occasion of the 100th birthday of Hans Georg Gadamer, supporter of the Institute since its inception. Selected lectures are published in English, German and Polish.**

### Debates at the Burgtheater
**This series brings leading politicians, scholars and intellectuals together on stage to discuss pressing questions of European relevance.**

### Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture
**Since its foundation in 1982, the IWM has promoted the work of the Czech philosopher and human rights activist Jan Patočka (1907–1977). Since 1987, the Institute regularly organizes lectures in his memory, a selection of which has been published by Passagen Verlag, Vienna.**

***This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, seminars and debates can be found on: www.iwm.at/events***

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