NO. 115 • SPRING / SUMMER 2015

IWMpost

Magazine of the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen / Institute for Human Sciences www.iwm.at

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Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen • Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Wien, Austria • GZ: 052036175 M • Postgebühr bar bezahlt • Verlagspostamt 1090 Wien

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Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen
Institute for Human Sciences

Imprint: Responsible for the content: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria, Phone: +43/1/313 58-0, Fax +43/1/313 58-60, iwm@iwm.at, www.iwm.at; **Editorial Committee:** Ivan Krastev, Klaus Nellen; **Editor:** Marion Gollner; **Editorial Assistance:** Anita Dick, Simon Garnett, Elisabetta Gianesini, Julian Pokay, Christina Pössel; **Design:** steinkellner/zotter, www.steinkellner.com. IWM*post* is published three times a year. Current circulation: 7,500, printed by Grasl FairPrint, 2540 Bad Vöslau, www.grasl.eu. An online archive of IWM*post* is available on the Institute's website at www.iwm.at.

Editorial

Das Jahr 2015 markiert einen Neubeginn für das IWM. Wie die aktuelle Ausgabe der IWM*post* zeigt, ist das Institut seiner inhaltlichen Ausrichtung trotz einiger personeller Veränderungen treu geblieben. Ich hatte das große Glück, als neue Rektorin des IWM mit sehr viel Herzlichkeit und Offenheit empfangen worden zu sein. Es war mir eine Freude, das engagierte Team des IWM kennenzulernen, das in diesem Jahr um drei neue Kollegen erweitert wird, die ich herzlich willkommen heiße. Knut Neumayer hat mit März 2015 die Position des Geschäftsführers von Susanne Fröschl übernommen, der ich für ihr langjähriges Engagement meinen großen Dank ausspreche. Für den Neustart am Freiburger Öko-Institut, dessen Geschäftsführung sie fortan angehört, wünsche ich ihr alles Gute. Carl Henrik Fredriksson, früherer Chefredakteur von *Eurozine,* ist nun für die Publikationen des IWM zuständig. Ludger Hagedorn übernimmt das Patočka-Archiv. Ich freue mich auf die Zusammenarbeit mit dem gesamten Team inklusive der Permanent Fellows und die Herausforderung, wissenschaftliche Reflexion, politisches Engagement und kritischen Diskurs auch weiterhin zu fördern.

Mein aufrichtiger Dank gilt auch Dieter Simon, der bis zu seinem Rücktritt im Dezember 2014 mehrere Jahre lang Präsident des Vereinsvorstandes war. Bis zur Wahl eines neuen Vorstandes Ende Mai 2015 hat Annette Laborey diese Funktion dankenswerterweise übernommen. Für ihre derzeitige Unterstützung und Bereitschaft, im Vorstand zu bleiben, bin ich ihr ebenso zu Dank verpflichtet wie Aleksander Smolar, der dem IWM als Vorstandsmitglied und Vizepräsident des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats erhalten bleibt. Meine tiefe Wertschätzung gilt auch Cornelia Klinger, die das Institut mitgegründet und nach Krzysztof Michalskis vorzeitigem Tod gemeinsam mit Michael Sandel interimistisch geleitet hat. Ich wünsche ihr für den Neustart in Hamburg alles Gute und freue mich, dass Sie dem IWM als Vorstandsmitglied und im Zuge diverser Projekte verbunden bleibt.

Abschließend möchte ich mich bei all unseren Kooperationspartnern, fördergebenden Institutionen sowie der ständig wachsenden Alumni-Community bedanken, deren kontinuierliche Unterstützung es dem Institut überhaupt erst ermöglicht, seine Arbeit fortzusetzen und weiter auszubauen. ◁

Shalini Randeria
Rektorin

The year 2015 marked a new beginning at the Institute of Human Sciences. This issue of the IWM*post* reflects the thematic continuity at the IWM despite several personnel changes. I have been privileged to receive a warm and enthusiastic welcome in Vienna since taking office as Rector in January this year. It has been a pleasure to get to know, and work with, the excellent and dedicated administrative and academic staff at IWM which has been expanded through the incorporation of Carl Henrik Fredriksson from *Eurozine* as the new Head of Publications and of Ludger Hagedorn, who is now in charge of the IWM's Patočka Archives. I would like to extend a warm welcome to Knut Neumayer, who has taken over as Executive Director from Susanne Fröschl. For her many years of service to the IWM I thank her and wish her the best for a new start at the Öko-Institut Freiburg, where she is a member of the Executive Board. I look forward to working with the entire IWM team including the Permanent Fellows to realise our mission to support critical scholarly reflection, foster political engagement and contribute to public debate.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dieter Simon, who served for several years as the President of the IWM's Board of Trustees till he resigned in December 2014. Annette Laborey graciously agreed to replace him as President of the Board until a new Board of Trustees will be constituted in May 2015. I am indebted to her for her support as well as for accepting to continue as a Member on the Board in the future. I am equally grateful to Aleksander Smolar for agreeing to remain a Member of the Board and Vice Chair of the Institute's Academic Advisory Board. I would also like to express my deep appreciation to Cornelia Klinger, one of the three founding members of the Institute, who took over as IWM's Acting Rector—together with Michael Sandel—after Krzysztof Michalski's untimely death in 2013. She retired at the end of last year as Permanent Fellow but continues to be a Member of the Board. I not only wish her a fruitful new start in Hamburg but also look forward to realising projects with her in Vienna in the future.

Last but not least I am extremely grateful to our many partner institutions in academia and the media, funding organisations and a growing circle of alumni, whose support enables the IWM to maintain and diversify its work. ◁

Shalini Randeria
Rector

Entrechtung & Verrechtlichung: Entpolitisierung der Demokratie?

VON SHALINI RANDERIA

Das alltägliche, leise Leid und die strukturelle Gewalt in Verbindung mit Prozessen der Verrechtlichung, die beinahe unbemerkt die Lebensgrundlage von Millionen von Menschen vernichten, stehen im Mittelpunkt von Shalini Randerias Forschung. Warum sich der Widerstand gegen die neoliberale Privatisierung von Gemeingütern und die Patentierung von kollektivem Wissen heute immer häufiger von den Parlamenten in nationale wie transnationale Gerichtssäle verlagert, war Gegenstand ihrer Antrittsvorlesung als neue Rektorin des IWM am 3. März 2015 im Wiener Rathaus.

Photo: Survival International

Für die Errichtung des Kanha-Tigerreservats im indischen Bundesstaat Madhya Pradesh wurden indigene Gruppen wie die Baiga und Gond im Namen des Artenschutzes zwangsumgesiedelt.

Wir leben in paradoxen Zeiten. Die globale Ausbreitung der Demokratie geht Hand in Hand mit der Aushöhlung ihrer Substanz. Immer mehr innenpolitische Angelegenheiten werden dem Zugriff nationaler Parlamente entzogen. Gleichzeitig werden durch die Verlagerung von Entscheidungskompetenzen auf die Exekutive die Partizipationsmöglichkeiten von BürgerInnen eingeschränkt. Der Gang zum Gericht erscheint manchmal als der einzige Weg, um willkürliches staatliches Handeln einer öffentlichen Kontrolle zu unterwerfen. Die Folge ist, dass während das Vertrauen in Politik und Politiker schwindet, in vielen Ländern das Ansehen von Richtern und Gerichten steigt – eine Entwicklung, die nicht nur die Kompetenzen der Judikative erweitert, sondern auch deren Politisierung mit sich bringt.

Obwohl heute mehr denn je von Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht die Rede ist, beobachten wir die Tendenz, dass sich internationale Finanz- und Handelsorganisationen, transnationale Konzerne sowie Staaten und NGOs zunehmend ihrer Verantwortung entziehen. Die neue Architektur der *Global Governance,* die durch Rechtspluralismus und überlappende Souveränitäten charakterisiert ist, hat dieser Entwicklung Vorschub geleistet. Internationale Institutionen stehlen sich aus der Verantwortung für unliebsame Maßnahmen, indem sie sich als machtlose Diener und Berater ihrer souveränen Mitgliedsstaaten präsentieren. Nationalstaaten wiederum rechtfertigen unpopuläre Maßnahmen, indem sie externe Faktoren und Akteure dafür verantwortlich machen – sei es das Diktat des globalen Kapitals, die Brüsseler Bürokratie, die Vorschriften des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Weltbank oder die Bestimmungen der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO).

In Indien wurden seit 1947 ca. 500 000 Menschen aufgrund von Infrastrukturprojekten jährlich zwangsumgesiedelt. Seit der Unabhängigkeit des Landes sind über 60 Millionen Menschen zu sogenannten „Entwicklungsflüchtlingen“ im eigenen Land geworden.

Die Leidtragenden dieser Entwicklungen, welche die Zerstörung der Lebensgrundlage von zahllosen Menschen durch Enteignungen und Entrechtungen bewusst in Kauf nehmen, sind meist marginalisierte Bevölkerungsgruppen. In Indien werden beispielsweise ganze Dörfer oder Slums zwangsumgesiedelt, um Infrastruktur- oder Bauprojekte mit ausländischen Investoren zu realisieren. Rechtliche Regelungen werden umgeschrieben, um den Abbau von Rohstoffen durch Privatkonzerne zu ermöglichen.

Die auf diese Weise überflüssig gemachten Menschen verlieren,

ohne adäquate staatliche Entschädigung, den Zugang zur Allmende *(commons)* in Gestalt von Wald und Weideland. Kleinbauern, Landarbeiter und Subsistenzwirtschaft betreibende Waldbewohner werden so zur Migration gezwungen und zu städtischen Slumbewohnern gemacht. Eine weitere Folge ist, dass Dorfgemeinschaften und Verwandtschaftsnetzwerke, die mangels Sozialversicherung häufig die einzige ökonomische Sicherheit darstellen, ebenfalls zerschlagen werden. Der extensive Landraub für die Errichtung von Sonderwirtschaftszonen vertreibt und enteignet die lokale Bevölkerung, deren Lebensraum per Gesetz zu Ausnahmezonen erklärt wird – extraterritoriale Gebiete innerhalb von Staatsgrenzen, wo weder nationales Steuerrecht noch Arbeits- und Umweltrecht gilt. Im Zuge der Umsetzung globaler Umweltnormen wie die der Biodiversität werden nationale Naturschutzparks errichtet, die eine andere Art der Einhegung *(enclosure)* darstellen: Zugangs- und Nutzungsrechte lokaler Bewohnerwerden werden beschnitten, auch wenn sie nicht physisch vertrieben werden. Auf diese Weise geht die Verrechtlichung von immer mehr Lebensbereichen paradoxerweise mit Enteignung und mit der Erosion von Bürgerrechten einher.

Als Antwort auf die wachsende Bedeutung des Rechts im Alltagsleben findet auch der Widerstand dagegen mit juristischen Mitteln statt. Auf transnationaler Ebene ist es für BürgerInnen mitunter leichter, politische Verfehlungen der eigenen Regierung zu bekämpfen, als selbst Repräsentation in internationalen Organisationen zu erlangen. Und selbst dort wo Kollektivbeschwerden vor Instanzen wie dem *Inspection Panel* der Weltbank eingebracht werden, bedeutet dies bei weitem nicht, dass diese auch erfolgreich genutzt werden können. Oft mangelt es schlicht an den nötigen finanziellen Ressourcen, an Rechtsexpertise, dem Zugang zu Medien oder transnationalen Netzwerken.

Gemeingüter und geistiges Eigentum

Die Idee von Gemeingütern *(commons)* erfreut sich in der kritischen Theorie wie unter AktivistInnen wachsender Beliebtheit – nicht zuletzt seit Michael Hardt und Antonio Negris Buch *Commonwealth*. Letztere haben zu Recht darauf hingewiesen, dass *commons* nicht nur natürliche Ressourcen wie Wälder, Flüsse, Wasser und Luft umfassen. Auch gemeinsam genutzte von Menschenhand geschaffene Produkte wie Computerprogramme sollten unter diese Kategorie subsumiert werden. Je zentraler Gemeingüter aller Art für die kapitalistische Produktionsweise von Saatgut, Medikamenten, Biotechnologien oder Informationstechnologien sind, so Hardt und Negri, desto schneller werden sie kapitalistischen Eigentumsverhältnissen unterworfen und zu Waren gemacht. Was wäre notwendig, um den vereinfachenden Gegensatz zwischen privat und öffentlich bei der Verwaltung von Gemeingütern, seien es Flüsse oder Computer-Codes, zu überwinden? Meines Erachtens bedarf es einerseits einer Infragestellung der Gleichsetzung bzw. Reduzierung von allem „Öffentlichen" auf den Staat, ohne ihn aus seiner Verantwortlichkeit für das Gemeinwohl zu entlassen. Andererseits muss man die verklärte, romantisierte Sicht auf lokale Gemeinschaften überwinden, welcher Art auch immer sie seien. Ebenso notwendig ist es – wie das nachfolgende Beispiel zeigt – den Gegensatz zwischen Natur und Kultur zu hinterfragen, der für das moderne europäische Denken so zentral ist und welcher der Patentierung von Lebewesen zu Grunde liegt.

Ein globales Netzwerk von AktivistInnen focht das Patent eines US-amerikanischen Chemieunternehmens an, das sich das lokale Wissen zur Herstellung von Neemöl sichern wollte, einem natürlichen Pestizid, das von Bauern in Südasien seit Jahrhunderten verwendet wird. Das Europäische Patentamt in München lehnte es ab, das traditionelle, kollektive Wissen der Bauern anzuerkennen; stattdessen wurden die Einwände eines indischen Fabrikbesitzers anerkannt, der noch vor dem US-amerikanischen Konzern ein ganz ähnliches Verfahren zur Gewinnung von Neemöl erfunden hatte.

Werden Rechtsmittel im Widerstand gegen die Enteignung biogenetischer Ressourcen gewählt, engt die Sprache des angloamerikanischen Rechts und dessen Spielarten die Wahl der Argumente ein, wie das Beispiel zeigt: Denn nur individuelle Eigentumsrechte werden gesetzlich anerkannt und einzig eine moderne technische Leistung gilt als Erfindung bzw. Innovation. Neue Governance-Modelle für Gemeingüter müssen daher diese strikte Trennung zwischen Kultur und Natur überwinden, um gegen diese neue Art von Einhegung vorgehen zu können. Kritiker biogenetischer Patente, die sich an nationale oder internationale Gerichte gewandt haben, sind in dem Widerspruch gefangen, genau jene individuelle Eigentumsdefinition und absolute Unterscheidung zwischen Natur und Kultur akzeptieren zu müssen, die sie im speziellen Fall – sei es beim Neemöl, der südafrikanischen Hoodia-Pflanze oder beim Basmati-Reis – anfechten.

Biodiversitätsschutz

Zu einem neuen globalisierten Naturverständnis gehört nicht zuletzt auch die Idee der biologischen Vielfalt. Das Konzept der Naturschutzgebiete, das zum Kernbestand des globalen Umweltregimes gehört, wurde von der Weltnaturschutzunion (IUCN) eingeführt. Es beruht auf dem US-amerikanischen Vorbild der Nationalparks, die heute unbewohnte Naturreservate sind. Wurden früher in den Kolonien Waldgebiete von imperialen Mächten klassifiziert und ausgebeutet, so werden heute im Namen von Biodiversität ganze Gebiete im globalem Süden von privaten Akteuren neu klassifiziert und normiert. Der *World Wide Fund For Nature* (WWF) hat inzwischen weltweit 232 „Biodiversitäts-Krisenherde" wissenschaftlich identifiziert und aufgelistet. Der Schutz dieser Gebiete, der die Lebenswirklichkeit der dort in Einklang mit der Natur lebenden Menschen völlig außer Acht lässt, wird durch mächtige internationale NGOs vorangetrieben, die zu selbsternannten „Hütern der globalen ‚Artenvielfalt'" avanciert sind. Im Verlauf der letzten 25 Jahre hat sich die Fläche dieser Gebiete vervierfacht. In Indien erreichte ihre Ausdehnung im Jahr 2010 rund 6% der gesamten Fläche des Subkontinents mit einer Gesamtbevölkerung von ca. drei Millionen Menschen, die in diesen neu umzäunten Gebieten *(enclosures)* leben.

In diesem neuen globalen Naturschutzregime wird Natur als eine sich selbst regulierende, unberührte Wildnis dargestellt, die durch den verschwenderischen Ressourcenverbrauch der lokalen Bevölkerung bedroht sei. Daher werden deren traditionellen Zugangs- und Nutzungsrechte eingeschränkt und ihr Wissen über die Natur als nichtwissenschaftlich disqualifiziert. Die koloniale wie postkoloniale Transformation von Landschaften in „Umwelt", „natürliche Ressourcen", „biologische Vielfalt" und „Naturschutzgebiete" entzieht diese Natur der Nutzung der *mit* ihr lebenden Bevölkerung. Diese Transformation ist daher ein eminent politischer Prozess der Beschneidung von Rechten.

Enteignung und Entrechtung können das kollektive und individuelle Handlungsvermögen gleichermaßen korrodieren. Ein angemessenes Verständnis von Armut muss diese in Relation zu anderen Lebensbedingungen setzen wie der Möglichkeit demokratischer Teilhabe, dem Zugang zu öffentlichen Gütern und Infrastruktur auf der einen und der Verweigerung von Bürgerrechten, Zwangsumsiedelungen und der Beraubung von Existenzgrundlagen auf der anderen Seite. In jeder dieser Konstellationen lassen sich sowohl die verschiedenen Erfahrungen mit Armut und Entrechtung erkennen, als auch die unterschiedlichen Möglichkeiten politischen Handelns, die als Versuch verstanden werden können, mit allen verfügbaren Mitteln einen anderen Alltag mitzugestalten.

„Listige Staaten"

Um die ambivalente Rolle des Staates innerhalb dieser Entwicklungen adäquat analysieren zu können, scheint mir das Konzept des „listigen Staates" hilfreich, das den Fokus vom Unvermögen des Staates auf die Analyse seiner Strategien verlagert. Staaten des globalen Südens, deren Bewohner von Entrechtung und Enteignung hauptsächlich betroffen sind, sollten nicht als strukturell defizitär, sondern als Produkt ihrer Geschichte mit einer nach wie vor asymmetrischen Stellung in der internationalen Ordnung betrachtet werden. Dennoch sind sie nicht bloße Opfer ihrer Vergangenheit bzw. gegenwärtiger Globalisierungsprozesse. Der Gestaltungsspielraum von Staaten, die bei internationalen Finanzinstitutionen verschuldet sind, ist hinsichtlich der Planung und Implementierung ihrer politischen Programme zweifelsohne eingeschränkt. Dennoch schiene es mir ein Fehler, die Selbstdarstellung dieser Staaten hinsichtlich ihrer „Schwäche" als gegeben hinzunehmen, anstatt ihre politischen Wahlmöglichkeiten und Manövrierräume zu erkunden. Während Wohlfahrtsstaaten einst Risiken und Ressourcen in der Bevölkerung umverteilten, suchen „listige Staaten" heute die Verantwortung umzuverteilen. Während schwachen Staaten die Fähigkeit fehlt, die Interessen ihrer BürgerInnen zu schützen, zeigen „listige Staaten" entweder Stärke oder Schwäche, je nachdem welche Interessen auf dem Spiel stehen. „List" verweist in diesem Zusammenhang nicht auf das staatliche Leistungsvermögen, sondern auf eine neue Art von Beziehung zwischen nationalen Eliten (häufig in Abstimmung mit internationalen Institutionen) und BürgernInnen.

Indem BürgerInnen ihre Regierungen nun umgehen und sich direkt an supranationale Institutionen wenden, erweitern sie ihre eigenen rechtlichen wie politischen Handlungsspielräume. Gleichzeitig führt die Autorität und Legitimität, die soziale Bewegungen und NGOs internationalen Institutionen verleihen, paradoxerweise auch zu einer weiteren Schwächung der Nationalstaaten, die sie eigentlich in die Verantwortung nehmen möchten.

Die genannten Beispiele veranschaulichen auch das Dilemma von AktivistInnen, die zu kurzlebigen und wechselnden Allianzen mit, aber auch gegen den Staat gezwungen sind. Listige Staaten wiederum schaffen es, immer weniger Verpflichtungen gegenüber ihren BürgerInnen einzugehen. Zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure stehen daher vor dem Problem, dass sie die Machtbefugnisse ihrer Staaten gleichzeitig beschränken und erweitern wollen. So haben soziale Bewegungen als einstmals scharfe Kritiker des Staates den Nutzen staatlicher Souveränität wiederentdeckt, wenn es beispielsweise um die Regulierung mächtiger Konzerne und Banken geht. Das Resultat dieser selektiven pragmatischen Partnerschaften mit dem Staat ist eine „fuzzy" Politik, die post-ideologische Züge trägt. Eine Sache haben internationale Institutionen, Staaten und transnationale Bürgerbündnisse am Ende aber gemein: Sie alle müssen mehrere Öffentlichkeiten an unterschiedlichen Orten gleichzeitig ansprechen, gegensätzliche Interessen befriedigen, lokale Prioritäten mit einer Vielzahl von globalen Agenden in Einklang bringen sowie ihre Anliegen in eine weltweit verständliche Sprache übersetzen. Daraus ergeben sich zentrale Fragen hinsichtlich der Rechenschaftspflicht dieser drei Akteure vor dem Hintergrund einer äußerst ungleichen Machtverteilung in der neuen Architektur der *Global Governance,* in der Konzerne und Finanzmärkte immer mehr Einfluss auf die Politik gewinnen. ◁

Bei diesem Text handelt es sich um Auszüge der *Wiener Vorlesung,* welche Shalini Randeria im Wiener Rathaus am 3. März 2015 gehalten hat. Wir danken dem Wissenschaftsreferenten der Stadt Wien und Koordinator der Wiener Vorlesungen, Herrn Univ-Prof. Hubert Christian Ehalt, für die Erlaubnis zum Abdruck. Eine Langfassung des Textes ist im aktuellen Heft von *Transit – Europäische Revue* (Nr. 46) nachzulesen (siehe S. 23).

Photo: Stefanie Bug

Shalini Randeria ist seit 2015 Rektorin des Instituts für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Darüber hinaus ist sie Professorin für Sozialanthropologie und Soziologie am Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Genf. Ihre zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen umfassen: *Anthropology, Now and Next: Diversity, Connections, Confrontations, Reflexivity* (2014); *Critical Mobilities* (2013); *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (2013).

Three Photos

BY JÁNOS MÁTYÁS KOVÁCS

Personal Good-Bye Reflections on Future Friends

Susanne Fröschl

Cornelia Klinger

Dieter Simon

Three photos, three smiling faces, three former leaders of the Institute for Human Sciences. Cornelia Klinger was a co-founder of the IWM in 1982 and a Permanent Fellow for about three decades before becoming the Institute's interim Rector in 2013. Susanne Fröschl joined the IWM in 2000, serving as the Institute's Executive Director from 2002 onwards. Dieter Simon guided the affairs of the IWM association *(Verein)* as its President since 2001. They all resigned some weeks ago, happy in the knowledge that they were handing over the Institute to their successors in good order. Shalini Randeria and Knut Neumayer took office as Rector and Executive Director, respectively, early this year, and the new President will be elected by the Board of the association soon. Those on the photos have worked hard to ensure continuity.

To a few people in Vienna and beyond, this smooth transition seemed hardly possible when the founding Rector of the IWM, Krzysztof Michalski, passed away in February 2013. With sincere anxiety or sheer gloat, they envisioned a potential decline of the Institute as well as a fall in its intellectual quality and social prestige. The "Michalski Institute", they thought, may be helpless without a new Michalski.

Why conceal the fact that as a long-time insider, I also could not entirely free myself from such worries, although it was clear to me that under Krzysztof's more than thirty-year-long rectorship, he created a *modus operandi* that could not have been eradicated easily even if someone had wanted to do so. Actually, with the help of his close associates, he had built up not only an institute but also an institution.

Otherwise Cornelia would not have embarked, I suppose, upon this two-year long mission to connect the past with the future. True, witnessing for three decades how her partner Krzysztof directed the IWM, and forging cooperation with Austrian academic institutions, she must have learned the art of leadership. Nevertheless, I did not think that she would be ready to take over the rector's job, and manage the Institute for two minutes, not for two years. A woman of letters, a professor in Tübingen, she enjoyed discussing burning problems in philosophy, aesthetics and gender studies rather than negotiating with politicians or foundation officials during the day and eating out with journalists in the evening. These are regular activities of an academic administrator, which she pursued—a little reluctantly—with Krzysztof together if he asked her to do so. However, I hold another image of Cornelia in my mind. Our offices were next to each other for more than two decades but with the exception of the past two years, we barely met each other in the building. When we did, she always carried a minimum of three books under her arm. The IWM library, admired by so many in the Viennese social sciences and humanities community, was her brainchild. Who can remember better than I—guilty of keeping books in my office for far too long—Cornelia's witty disciplinary instructions? Normally, however, she read and wrote behind her closed door all the time. By the way, this is exactly how Krzysztof would have liked to spend his time as well.

Joining the IWM back in 1987, I saw a delicately reserved young woman regarded by some a walking paradox—a scholar not particularly interested in Eastern European matters in an Institute whose origin was closely related to that very region. Undoubtedly, Cornelia's occasional sarcastic remarks made in the small circle of Permanent Fellows about Polishness misled me, too, but only for a moment. Her irony was actually complementing Krzysztof's self-mocking Polish patriotism. As a matter of fact, she would probably have contributed to the development of the Institute less if she had turned her research interests exclusively towards Eastern Europe than she did by reinforcing the "universal" pillars of the IWM's academic endeavors. Initiating a long-term research program in philosophy, which followed an unprecedented road leading from inquiries into romanticism and the avant-garde through gender studies to research on social inequality, Cornelia created a home for prominent visiting scholars from all over the world, including also the ex-communist countries, of course. All in all, I liked her acumen and sense of humor but considered her unapproachable, and did not insist on developing my sympathy into friendship.

When Cornelia agreed, in deep grief but with a clear mind, to serve as an interim Rector of the IWM, she set two simple conditions: 1. an interim must not become permanent (therefore she started looking for an apartment in her favorite city, Hamburg, before entering office); 2. a Co-Rector of world fame needed to be invited to retain the international position of the Institute (she therefore convinced an old friend of the Institute, Michael Sandel to share the rectorship with her). In other words, Cornelia resisted the attraction of power that just fell in her lap, and began to relax the hierarchy created by Krzysztof during the 1980s. She remained a *primus* (more exactly, *prima*) *inter pares* in her relationship with the Permanent Fellows and the staff but reduced power distance to her colleagues, and increased the number of consensual decisions. More importantly, she started searching for her successor from the first minute of rectorship. No one could have blamed her if she had left Vienna right after the death of her partner …

She took the thankless task of a caretaker seriously, accepted the role of the "lame duck", and did not take major decisions that would constrain her successor's room for maneuver. At the same time, she did her best during the transitional period to protect the identity of the IWM as an independent institute for advanced study, a non-partisan place of reflection, a home for many disciplines and regions with a resolute commitment toward Eastern Europe, which, despite all temptations, avoids turning into a political think-tank.

Cornelia would not have been able to accomplish all this if she had not received strong support from Susanne and Dieter. The former resisted the enticement of the managerial labor market that would have snatched her up right away if she had sent out an "I am free" signal. The latter, just recovered from an operation, also provided the two Co-Rectors with the solid backing of authority from the very start. The four of them could not expect to enjoy much of the "bearable lightness" of power and fame, not to mention other rewards. On the contrary, they had to be prepared for carrying the burden of risk and responsibility for some time.

Encountering Susanne one and a half decades ago, my first impression was her girlish smile. Instead of fake *Gemütlichkeit,* she radiated sincere curiosity. I was amazed to learn that she was the mother of an adolescent boy, and in her early thirties already had a long educational history and professional career behind her. She studied journalism, political science and cultural management in Salzburg, Ohio and Vi-

Photos: IWM

enna, spoke English like her mother tongue, *Oberösterreichisch,* and developed her management and advisory skills in NGOs, an international organization and in the field of party politics. Although she possessed the necessary knowledge and experience to influence academic life within the Institute, she preferred to ask questions; questions that were often smarter than our answers. Her friendly manner made her popular among the Visiting Fellows and the staff; and the prudent finances of the Institute earned wide recognition among the funders and auditors. Without much ado, she became the "Austrian voice" of the IWM, a master in communicating with members of the Viennese cultural and political elite. However, what I as an inhabitant of *Spittelauer Lände 3* appreciated equally was that for fifteen years no sound of cry or scream emerged from the staff offices, just laughter. (Here I keep generously silent about the cigarette smoke covering Susanne's smile every now and then—a surprising habit for a dedicated biker, rower and mountaineer.)

Dieter is a renowned scholar of the history of law, an expert on Byzantium, former chairman of the *Wissenschaftsrat* of Germany, a long-time President of the Brandenburg Academy of Science, and a member of a whole series of national academies and honorary professor of numerous universities. We saw each other at the meetings of the Board every year. Before our first encounter, I expected to meet an old-fashioned, pedantic scholar who bores one with circumstantial legal argument. Instead, I got to know a cheerful, energetic man with a self-ironic *Pfälzer* ego, wearing impertinently colorful ties and telling semi-profane jokes. Although we both study intellectual history, we managed to set a world record in *not* exchanging a single word about our research for fifteen years. Rather, we swapped ironic anecdotes of our lives from time to time. This man, close to eighty, did not think it below his dignity to be involved with minor administrative decisions, or to represent the Institute in negotiations with Austrian dignitaries—doing all these by commuting between Berlin and Vienna. (For those who may want to know how one can talk about law and science (as well as hospitals) with a sharp mind and a fine humor, I suggest to read his blog: www.mops-block.de/ds-tagebuch.html).

A Rector, an Executive Director and a President. Currently, all of them live in Germany. Hamburg, Freiburg, Berlin—isn't it a nice triangle in which one may try to expand the IWM microcosm? All the more so because Cornelia decided to remain a member of the Board of the IWM association. In saying good-bye to them, I (an inexcusable *Spätzünder*) realize with regret that I have missed a great many chances for converting our amicable acquaintance into veritable friendship.

Three photos, three former colleagues, three future friends. ◁

János Mátyás Kovács
Permanent Fellow, IWM

Welcome to the IWM

THREE NEW COLLEAGUES

The Institute for Human Sciences is pleased to announce that three new colleagues have joined the Institute.

Photos: Matthias Wurz, IWM, Markus Schwarze

Carl Henrik Fredriksson

In April 2015, Carl Henrik Fredriksson joined the IWM as Head of Publications. "The IWM is today one of Europe's most interesting and exciting intellectual institutions," says Fredriksson. "It has this position not least because it manages to combine the features of a research institute with those of a truly public space, where discourses of many different types meet, and informed opinions and theories about the world are put to the test. The ambitions of the Institute have always gone way beyond just disseminating research results. I look forward very much to getting the chance to develop this further."

Fredriksson comes to the IWM from *Eurozine,* which he co-founded in 1998. In 2001, he left the Swedish cultural journal *Ord&Bild* to become the organization's first editor-in-chief. Since then, the *Eurozine* network, which has its editorial office in Vienna, has expanded from six founding magazines—including the IWM's journal *Transit*—to almost 100 partner journals and associated publications in over 30 countries. Fredriksson will remain President of the *Eurozine Association.*

In 2014, Carl Henrik Fredriksson was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM, working on the project "'Vienna Has Fallen!' Diverging Historical Narratives and the Prospects of a European Public Sphere". He is a Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Media and Communication in Berlin and writes regularly on literature, media and politics for international newspapers and magazines. ◁

red

Ludger Hagedorn

Ludger Hagedorn is the new Head of the IWM's Patočka Archive and the related Research Focus. He has taken over from Klaus Nellen, who was in charge of the archive since the Institute's inception in 1982. This change comes with a thematic shift. While research on and publication of Patočka's work will remain a key element, the new program will also focus on the philosophical idea of Europe and its meaning in today's globalized (post-European) world.

Hagedorn has contributed significantly to the development of the IWM's Patočka-Archive into a place for research and exchange with international renown. Since the 1990s, he has been involved in several IWM projects related to Patočka's thought, acting as Research Associate and later Research Director. He took his doctorate from the Technical University Berlin in 2002. From 2005 to 2009, he was a Purkyne Fellow at the Czech Academy of Sciences and in 2010 a Guest Professor at Södertörns Högskola, Stockholm. His research interests include phenomenology, political philosophy, modernity and secularization. He has taught at the Gutenberg-University of Mainz, the Charles University of Prague and more recently at NYU Berlin. ◁

red

Knut Neumayer

Knut Neumayer, former Program Director of ERSTE Foundation, joined the IWM as new Executive Director on March 1, 2015. He takes over the management of the Institute from Susanne Fröschl, who was with the IWM for 13 years.

"Finding unconventional solutions for complex processes at the interface between science, art and communications is a challenge I have welcomed throughout my professional career," says Neumayer. "I look forward to building on this experience in what will be an inspiring collaboration with the new Rector and the IWM team."

After studying management at the Vienna University of Business and Economics, Neumayer led the newly founded *Österreichische Kulturservice ÖKS* (as head manager) and the marketing department of the *Standard Verlagsgesellschaft.* In his most recent position in the management of the ERSTE Foundation, he was responsible for two of the three programs: "Europe" and "Social Development".

His wide experience both in the strategic and operational development of a foundation and in the conception of innovative programs is sure to provide the Institute with new stimulus. Neumayer is closely acquainted with the research activities and aims of the IWM. Since 2014, he has sat on the jury of the Milena Jesenská Fellowship Program for journalists, which is supported by the ERSTE Foundation. ◁

red

Security versus Freedom: A Misleading Trade-Off

BY ILIJA TROJANOW

In the wake of the technological revolution, principles of self-organization and collaboration might be expected to replace established hierarchies and concentrations of power. Instead, writes Ilija Trojanow, the technologies of surveillance now available to states have never been more intrusive. If we want to grasp the new totalitarian threat, we must understand that it is no longer about the oppression of the individual but the total and absolute control of society as a whole.

Photo: AP / Francisco Seco

Over the past few years a supposedly rational discourse has been cultivated across Europe on the need to balance freedom and security. There is hardly a public discussion, political speech or newspaper column, where the apparent truism has not been reiterated that a balance has to be struck between these two noble ideals. While the importance given to freedom or security varies considerably, what seems to be generally accepted is that the current situation is essentially the result of a rational, carefully considered weighing of the needs of both individual citizens as well as of society as a whole. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, a completely new logic prevails today. Yet those who participate in the debate, insofar as they say anything of consequence, frame the issue using old, established paradigms.

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When I was a child, our cramped flat in Sofia was bugged as part of a grand technological operation. It was upon the suggestion of the director of the 3rd Subdivision of the 2nd Department of the 6th Directorate of the Bulgarian Committee for State Security (CSS), an officer named Panteleev, that several microphones were installed in our flat in order to gather evidence for the strategic investigation into the object of suspicion, known as G.K.G. (my uncle).

The action was carried out one sunny day in spring. To this end all residents were removed for some hours from our building, which housed several families. My uncle's boss was instructed to send my uncle on a business trip (one agent was to confirm that he boarded the train as planned, another to confirm that he disembarked from the train at the correct destination). The caretaker at the house was informed of the plan and instructed to provide a list of the residents, 17 names in all. My aunt and my grandmother were summoned to the Ministry of Interior, where they were kept waiting for a very long time. Our neighbours on the floor below us, named Tchervenovi (which translates as "the Reds"), were called in for protracted meetings at the local Popular Front office, in recognition of their conformity with the system. A pensioner named Stambolova was invited to a pensioners' club, where an employee of the secret service was to observe her, just in case she decided to make her way home earlier than expected.

Thus each resident was kept away from the building, so that the taskforce of five from the 4th Department, which was responsible for installing the microphones, could force their way into the flat. Meanwhile, two further agents maintained contact with the control room. Positioned before the front door was a protection and surveillance unit of three, who could reach all the units involved in the operation by radio and coordinate any measures to be taken, should unexpected guests be sighted. Simultaneously, the office for state security in the provincial town of Blagoevgrad was instructed to observe my uncle's parents in case they made a surprise visit to Sofia. Lastly, an order was given for the aptly named "Disturbance Management Unit" to be active until the microphones were successfully installed. In all, a total of 24 employees of the Bulgarian secret service were involved in the operation.

Complete anonymity where the state is concerned, complete transparency when it comes to citizens: this is the current state of affairs.

The concepts of "security" and "freedom" are so variable that they cannot be forced into an equation. Security is a project that—and this is the only thing on which everyone agrees—can never reach completion. "There is no such thing as absolute security": this mantra is repeated *ad nauseum,* in order to lower citizens' expectations. Security is all about a real and an insoluble absence: we are never secure enough, there is always more to be done for our security, the only thing that is certain is that nothing is certain, etc.

By contrast, freedom is a fundamental idea and a central tenet of the Enlightenment. We assume that people are born into freedom; political, religious and other constraints limit an absolute right to freedom but at the end of the day "no one can take our freedom away from us, if we do not allow it", as the truism goes. Complex theories have been developed to explain why, despite their freedom, individuals continuously have to bow to the dictates of the state. In principle at least, freedom for many of us continues to be the essence of the individual, whereas security is a goal of a society, one among its many goals.

As such, therefore, freedom and security are not comparable to one another. And the demand for the one to be limited for the other to be attained is conceptual nonsense. But why should philosophy matter when terrorism lurks around the corner? Instead of talking about "freedom" and "security", it would be more honest to speak of "fear" and "surveillance".

In the wake of the recent attacks in Paris, the headline in the leading Viennese daily newspaper *Der Standard* read: "Freedom requires security". The article never spelt out the headline's perfidious logic:
Freedom requires security
Thus, freedom requires eavesdropping
Thus, freedom requires handcuffs.
In other words:
We don't need freedom.
A more precise and honest wording would have been:
Fear/insecurity breeds surveillance.

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Our apartment in Sofia was bugged at the beginning of the 1970s. It would need ridiculously few re-

sources to accomplish the same today, if those subjected to surveillance were to themselves use mobile phones and computers connected to the Internet. With a few keyboard commands our extended family of six would become digitally transparent. It isn't even necessary to consider a hypothetical scenario: this is exactly what is happening today, right now, in countless apartments around the world. And yet, most of us are probably more shocked by the old-fashioned scenario in Sofia that I have described: the classic mixture of deception, coercion and conspiracy orchestrated by the state, this blatant infringement of our private sphere against which there is little protection. However, surprisingly today's more perfidious, invisible intrusions and attacks on our privacy merely leave many of us cold.

There are two stickers on the doors of Vienna's underground trains. One is green and depicts a security camera, the other is blue and depicts an infant's pram. The statement is clear and simple: we would like to inform you that you will be under surveillance from the cradle to the grave. This should be clear to anyone who has paid attention to the media coverage of Edward Snowden's revelations over the course of the last two years. Countless articles have highlighted the virtually limitless extent of possible and actually practiced surveillance. Public discourse on the issue has meanwhile shifted dramatically. The existence of mass surveillance is no longer disputed, as it was just a few years ago, when Juli Zeh and I were often accused of exaggeration and hysteria following the publication of our book *Attack on freedom,* which pointed to the illusion of security, the existence of the surveillance state and increasing dismantling of civil rights.

We now know that the NSA keeps between three and four billion people under surveillance, that is, every citizen on the planet who is digitally active. We know that it is almost impossible to escape this surveillance, even if we encrypt our communications, since the programmes available on the market all contain a tiny back-door through which the security services can enter. No one disputes any longer the extent to which data and meta data is gathered. What is debated instead is whether or not such authoritarian control causes any damage to democracy. The debate focuses on individual victims, on innocents, implying both an outdated understanding of repression and a lack of imagination. The damage to society as a whole is, by contrast, usually disregarded.

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In capitalism, no one would dare endanger a successful business model with reasonable or idealistic arguments. According to a market research by ASD-Reports in 2013, the annual turnover of the global security-industrial complex totalled 415.53 billion US dollars. And it is expected to continue to rise: a turnover of 544.02 billion US dollars is forecast for 2018. At a time when economic growth is slow, such an expansion is breathtaking. Since profit is the oxygen of the system, citizens are required to refrain from polluting the air with too much freedom.

Quality controls otherwise so widespread, therefore, are hardly, if at all, applied to the security sector. And we are yet to see an assessment of whether the recently introduced surveillance mechanisms have brought us any closer to achieving the declared goal of greater and lasting security. While every alimentary product sold in the supermarket must carry a detailed description of its nutritional value, the claim of a "foiled terrorist attack" apparently suffices in the "security" sector. If investigative journalists were to subject such recurring claims to closer scrutiny, it would become apparent that the cases concerned are isolated and few, mostly thwarted by pure chance or by the use of conventional methods of policing, or have involved active and decisive participation of undercover agents, as has been the case on many an occasion. The efficiency of anti-terrorist programmes is never evaluated, even though a number of former employees of the security and secret services (and not least a leading NSA employee, William Binney) have repeatedly questioned whether total surveillance may not in fact be counterproductive.

The principles of the rule of law that are supposed to protect our rights as citizens are overridden by the counter-argument *par excellence,* namely national security! This frees those who attempt to control everything from any control whatsoever in turn. Transparency is the greatest enemy of those who profess to protect freedom. Complete anonymity where the state is concerned, complete transparency when it comes to citizens: this is the current state of affairs. However, there is a decisive error of thought in this attempt at legitimation. Were those who place such absolute trust in the beneficial effects of total surveillance to take this approach to its logical end, they would have to ensure that those undertaking the surveillance were also themselves subjected to similar surveillance. Selective paranoia is not paranoia at all. It would be advisable to mistrust those who daily combat subversion for they are eager to live out their fantasies of omnipotence (inherent to all secret services). It is also advisable to mistrust those who consider paranoia a professional asset. Surely their secretiveness and evasiveness justifiably fuels the suspicion that they themselves have something to hide. This in turn points to their guilt, in accordance with the logic that they themselves postulate. I do not say this in a light vein. To allow the secret services to use all available means to hold society under surveillance without the secret services themselves being subject to any monitoring, implies that you trust the state more than the individual, that you have hibernated during the 20th century, that you suffer from an epidemic condition called subservience.

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The relations between individuals and institutions are currently undergoing fundamental change. Old-fashioned phenomena like "trust" or "reciprocity" are a thing of the past.

There is no longer any reason to convince or integrate citizens. Keeping them under surveillance will suffice.

In times of total surveillance, there are only digital underlings who, in addition to being subject to thorough investigation in real time, may also have their actions anticipated by algorithmic oracles. There is no longer any reason to convince or integrate citizens. Keeping them under surveillance will suffice. Those in power have only to see to it that every person, every object and every machine is part of the same network. In other words: the only relevant freedom is the free flow of information, the complete transparency of data. Fortunately, the leading information companies have already taken care of this. The bottom line is that Facebook and Google are functions of state control. If you refuse to do your digital service, you are guilty by implication; you are liable to be subjected to preventative measures.

Surveillance inevitably leads to self-censorship, the most elegant and efficient form of censorship of all.

In *The New Digital Age,* which he co-authored with Jared Cohen, the former CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, asserts this new reality in surprisingly blunt terms: "To be sure, there will be people who resist adopting and using technology, people who want nothing to do with virtual profiles, online data systems or smart phones. Yet a government might suspect that people who opt out completely have something to hide and thus are more likely to break laws, and as a counterterrorism measure, that government will build the kind of 'hidden people' registry we described earlier. If you don't have any registered social-networking profiles or mobile subscriptions, and on-line references to you are unusually hard to find, you might be considered a candidate for such a registry. You might also be subjected to a strict set of new regulations that includes rigorous airport screening or travel restrictions."

Thinking this through just one step further, it becomes evident that someone who refuses to be observed is a terrorist.

"The Internet is the largest experiment involving anarchy in history", write Schmidt and Cohen at the beginning of their book. In the wake of this technological revolution, it would make sense for the principles of self-organization and collaboration to replace hierarchy and the concentration of power. Can the state authorize such a development if, at the same time, it has the most intrusive technologies of surveillance ever at its disposal?

There can be no individual victims, if we are all victims. This is particularly true in the case of digital technology, which for all its intrusiveness, leaves behind no physical trace. In every film, repression is portrayed in the form of the hero or heroine dragging themselves home with defeat written all over their face. Seldom do we see a user with a traumatized gaze saying: The government stooge read all my Facebook posts. As homo sapiens we still inhabit, with our instincts and our imagination, an overwhelmingly analogue space. Thus, being subjected to complete surveillance strikes us as far less aggressive than the blows of the police officer's truncheon. The goal of the cybernetic form of government has been formulated time and again: it is not to destroy niches of resistance as used to be the case when this was considered absolutely necessary, but instead to regulate these in a manner that makes the supposedly unforeseeable manageable. The future itself is thus sought to be rendered transparent. Since the beginning of the year, the Bavarian State Police have been testing Precob, a predictive software from the United States. Touchingly, the senior officer responsible Karl Geyer has reassured citizens, saying: "We shall not blindly rely on the system." An experienced officer will verify every alert. In Los Angeles, the level of automation is already more advanced: the software that calculates probabilities in real time determines the movements of the police patrol cars.

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If we wish to grasp the new totalitarian threat, we must understand that it no longer simply concerns the oppression of the individual but the total and absolute control of society through the processing of its data. The individual becomes irrelevant as soon as one can use profiles and patterns to undermine the self-determined future of groups and organizations, neighbourhoods and cities, by regulating the flow of time in the desirable direction. Once this becomes a reality, the individual may even imagine herself to be free.

The question, therefore, is not primarily one of efficiency. Consequently public discourse overlooks a core aspect of the current paradigmatic change: i.e. that it is above all about an administocratic and pervasive control of society using new technologies. It remains a moot point as to whether this is linked to a self-fulfilling prophecy by the authorities (a grey man from the catacombs of the security services is on record as saying: "We must be allowed to use all available technologies"), or to the expectation that, as the divide between rich and poor continues to grow, measures necessary to safeguard social peace will have to become more repressive.

It is well known that citizens of the former East Bloc countries continued to whisper critical remarks to one another for years and, in some places, for decades after 1989. How will our behaviour change once we have internalized that even the slightest whisper can be detected and its content disclosed? Will the German saying that "thoughts are free, no one can guess them" hold true in an age in which our Internet browser history, our whereabouts, our reading habits, our library borrowing habits and much more reveal—to say the least—the thematic orientation of (our) thoughts, if not their very character? Will we stop thinking? Surveillance inevitably leads to self-censorship, the most elegant and efficient form of censorship of all: for the individual controls herself and remains, therefore, unsusceptible to alien interference in her thoughts. What is fatal here, however, is that—once self-regulation successfully takes effect—the individual feels free, since there is no one talking her into anything, no one forcing her to do something. But do we really want to live in a world in which all that remains of the private sphere slumbers in a dark corner of our brains, as unheard as it is inaccessible, such that we ourselves cannot be certain whether in fact we are capable of cultivating free thought? ◁

This article is based on a keynote lecture given on April 17 at a reception, hosted by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, on the occasion of the annual meeting of the European Institutes for Advanced Study (EURIAS) at the IWM in Vienna.

Ilija Trojanow is a Bulgarian-German writer, essayist, translator, editor, and filmmaker. Born 1965 in Sofia, he fled the country in 1971 with his parents via Yugoslavia and Italy and obtained political asylum in Germany. He lives in Vienna. In 2013, he was denied entry to the United States after having criticized the NSA's surveillance program. He is the author of more than 20 books, including *Angriff auf die Freiheit* (Attack on Freedom). In 2006 he received the Leipzig Book Fair Prize for his novel *Der Weltensammler.* In August 2015, Trojanow's new novel *Macht und Widerstand* will be published by S. Fischer.

How much Transparency Does Democracy Need?

SUMMARY BY SIMON GARNETT

The belief that trust in democratic institutions can be restored only through greater transparency is expressed in growing demands for freedom of information around the world. Indeed, the new technologies for collecting, analyzing and distributing data have made radical transparency feasible. So how can citizens access and make use of the big data collected by government and business? At the same time, the more we know about what our governments and corporations are doing, the more suspicious we become. Does more transparency lead to greater political mobilization, or does it erode belief in democracy still further? These were among the issues discussed by **Júlia Király, Evgeny Morozov, Shalini Randeria, Aruna Roy** *and* **Max Schrems** *at the Vienna Burgtheater on March 15.*

Randeria: I would like to start with your professional and personal trajectories, since it struck me that in all four biographies there are interesting paradoxes. Aruna Roy, having began as a member of India's elite civil service, you have become one of the main figures spearheading the campaign for transparency

For us, Facebook and the Internet are not a danger, they are a possibility to fight official anti-transparency policy.

Júlia Király

in the country, which resulted in the Right to Information Act in 2005. What led you to the conviction that transparency and the freedom of information are fundamental rights in a country like India?

Roy: When I went to rural India for the first time as a young civil servant, I saw poverty of a kind I had never seen before. I was shocked by the audacity of people who sat in meetings and talked about how they cheated their own government. We also had the Official Secrets Act, which was left by the British, according to which if you even shared a list with somebody you would be shot. When I became an activist, I went to a development officer and asked her for a public record of people declared to fall below the poverty line. "I am giving it to you because you are a woman," she said to me, "but come in the evening, when no one is around. Take it, have a look, and bring it back in the morning." I said to her, "I am a former civil servant, much senior to you, and this is a published document." She said, "No, no, I am very scared." There's a kind of psychosis within the service that prevents you sharing information, and at the same time we have that fantastic constitution, created by some of the best minds in India, with Mahatma Gandhi in the background, saying that everything should be shared. So we went on strike, we starved ourselves. Finally we got what we wanted, but you can't go on a hunger strike every time you are denied information. That's when we felt that we *had* to get those records.

Randeria: Júlia Király, in 2013 you resigned as deputy governor of the Hungarian Central Bank in protest against the rubber-stamping of policies by the new governor and the damage that this would cause to the Hungarian economy, which is among the most indebted in Europe. What surprised me was that, as central banker, you should be demanding greater transparency, since I would guess that in order for a bank to function, some degree of secrecy would be necessary.

Király: A crucial aspect of public transparency is to make your decision-making open, to say what you do and do what you say. This also goes for monetary policy. Take inflation targeting. This means that a central bank sets a long-term target and tries to control government, whose main interest is always to raise inflation. In doing so, the central bank needs to be credible, accountable, and therefore transparent. That is the big difference between central banking now and in the past. When Mario Draghi said in 2012 that the ECB would do everything to keep the Eurozone together, the markets believed him, because he was being transparent. A central bank should be transparent about its efforts to control the government, which should be transparent too. That is what's missing in Orbanomics: decisions can never be understood in depth. When the government says something, it is not necessarily what they do, and when they do something, you can never understand where the decision comes from. Orbán famously says that Hungary is fighting an economic fight for freedom. A fight for an economic freedom in which the government has sent home the IMF and entered into a long-term loan contract with Russia? On the other hand, transparency means you understand the risks of any decision. Today, the Hungarian parliament passes laws without making any studies on possible consequences. That was the main reason I resigned. If you don't understand the risks of a decision, and if you don't explain it to people, then the probability increases that the decision is a very bad one.

Randeria: Evgeny Morozov, your professional career has been on the net, about the net, against the net. In your writings, you have moved from a critique of the politics of the

I do not want to live in a world in which Google will convince us that we can breathe for free if we only watch an advertising.

Evgeny Morozov

internets—in the plural—to fundamental skepticism about the political economy of the net. How did you get from the one position to the other?

Morozov: Originally, I used to be very enthusiastic about the potential of digital media and spent several years trying to put that potential to use in the former Soviet Union and in other parts of Eastern Europe. Talking to activists, bloggers and opposition politicians, I became extremely skeptical of the ability of people outside this context to grasp the dynamics that would set the course for the use of those technologies. The default assumption among Western policy makers was that young people in countries like Belarus would go to Wikipedia, start reading about human rights violations, pour onto the streets and organize a revolution. Instead, all they did was download the same videos of cats and pornography. In my book *The Net Delusion,* I tried to predict the consequences of America's embrace of the so-called Internet Freedom Agenda. You executives from the Silicon Valley going to places in the Middle East and Latin America posing as ambassadors of America. It seemed absurd, since in 2010 and 2011 it was already clear that America was extremely active in things like cyber warfare. Several years later, I noticed that what I saw in foreign policy was also happening at the level of the state. If left unchecked, many of the state's functions would be taken over by a bunch of companies in Silicon Valley, which don't do evil and which care about making the world more transparent, connected, innovative and entrepreneurial. What they didn't mention was this was also better for their business models. For me the entire process seemed like a process of commodification. This is the kind of future that might emerge if we let Silicon Valley connect everything to everything under the name of greater dialogue and transparency. That's not to say that an alternative program using sensors, algorithms and data gathering devices wouldn't benefit society. But we need to establish some sort of control, both over the information infrastructure and the data that it generates. This will require drastic legal intervention.

Randeria: Max Schrems, the lawsuit that you and 25,000 others are bringing against Facebook is about forcing the company to release and to put a price on the information that it has collected on you. What strikes me is that, as a young lawyer, you could be earning a hundred times more, rather than risking liability and possibly bankruptcy.

Schrems: I've been running the Europe versus Facebook initiative for three years now without getting a single cent for it. Recently, we got a response to our class action from the Viennese lawyers of Facebook, claiming that I am a commercial debt collection service! The problem in Europe is that the laws are

We should not forget that the majority of the world's population is still without access to the Internet.

Shalini Randeria

there but we aren't enforcing them. When I was studying in California, we had people from big US companies, including Facebook, saying that Europeans are cute with privacy and fundamental rights, because you can ignore the rules and nothing happens. We point our fingers at the bad guys in Silicon Valley, but we aren't doing anything to enforce our privacy rights. The interesting thing is the relationship between transparency and privacy. A lot of people on the transparency side feel that privacy and transparency are incompatible. However, in our case, we aren't only asking for damages, but also for information on the profits Facebook makes on each individual user. In Europe and worldwide, the question needs to be whether all the big guys are going to get the information and

Photos: Matthias Cremer

power, or whether we are going to redistribute it, so that companies, international organizations and states become more transparent.

Randeria: We have a large set of issues on the table here. Aruna Roy, let me start by asking how the demand for transparency from the streets, in public protests, and through court cases, changes the actual workings of government.

Roy: Indians know very well that information is power. For us, the state has a huge obligation towards its people to disclose information.

You can't go on a hunger strike every time you are denied information.

Aruna Roy

The Right to Information Act was planned by the people, not by the government. There was a huge dialogue between lawyers, professionals, grass roots activists and the parliament. Finally, we got them to pass a fairly decent law. We now know that laws can be designed by people, and that we are not "mobs", as they usually call us. We are reasonable people. We have minds, intelligence and a hell of a lot of common sense. What you lose when you get into the system of governance is common sense. However, we also know that just by demanding a law and getting it passed is not the end of the matter: we have to see that it is put in place. One of the big struggles we have had has been over so-called public hearings. Once we obtained the information, people came to testify whether it was right or wrong. That information then became the basis for a legal case, a criminal suit or even a fight with the system. The fight for the right to information has made us understand that you can engage with governments, bureaucrats, civil servants, politicians, political parties. We know it isn't easy, since as soon as you win one battle they are ready with other ways of breaking you. You have to keep fighting. What it has really made us do is look at law.

Randeria: Bureaucracy is very good at giving lots of irrelevant information, which is one way of circumventing the demand for transparency. Júlia Király, could you say something from the Hungarian experience, both as an academic and a banker?

Király: Listening to Aruna made me more and more sad, because unlike Hungary, India is a country that is becoming more democratic and transparent. Formally, Hungary has European legislation, but in everyday life, checks and balances are getting weaker and weaker. Some forms have been banished entirely; others, like the supreme court, the central bank and the competition authority, are run by the government or former members of the governing party. One of the major debates in Hungary is currently whether we need a new atomic power plant. The government has concluded a contract with the Russian Atomic Energy Corporation and the Russian state on a long term loan and on building a new plant. When the government was asked to publish details about the contract, it passed a law making it a state secret for thirty years. So we are in a binding contract with Russia whose details are unknown even by the director of the Hungarian company that will build the new plant. What can you do under such circumstances? Your only possibility is to protest wherever you can, including on the internet. Our right to the net is an elementary right. In Hungary, the biggest demonstration in the past five years was against the government's attempt to levy a tax on the internet. For us, Facebook and the net are a way to fight official anti-transparency policy.

Randeria: I think the kind of forum in which one pushes for more transparency can depend very much on whether it is governments or corporations that one is protesting against. Max Schrems, why have you preferred to use the courts?

Schrems: When the *Bild Zeitung,* the biggest tabloid in Europe, published the story, Facebook gave absolutely no response. Normally no company can just ignore a huge newspaper making a scandal out of it. But Facebook and the other big tech companies can say, "We know you all hate us, but you have not other option." That's why politics and the courts are the only route. Whenever we have a tiny monopoly in the real economy, the EU goes after it. But as soon as we have an online monopoly like Facebook, the European Union looks the other way. That's another reason why you have to go through the courts. To return to the issue of enforcing laws in practice: Not once, when exercising my right to freedom of information, have I received complete information. Often, I could find out more through Google than the government provided. The same is true for the right to access, which covers your own personal information. Yes, we have all these laws, but the biggest problem is their enforcement. In this regard, Austria is very underdeveloped, however you can get all the information you need by what I call the "freedom to call someone who has the stuff and gives it to you." At European level, it works in exactly the same way. The new data protection and regulation act in Europe is probably the most lobbied law in Brussels ever. For the first time, we witnessed a wave of US lobbying. In very many cases, changes in drafts of the law repeated the wording contained in lobby papers given to MEPs. When we put a list of these MEPs online, their behavior quite quickly changed. This shows how important this kind of transparency campaigning is at the European level.

Randeria: Evgeny Morozov, you describe how value is created through the alienation of data I give away about myself. So the question is not only about commodification, but also about the ownership of data. You propose that we "socialize the data", but what does that mean, since you obviously don't mean that the state should be owning all of it?

Morozov: Not everybody realizes the extent to which social and economic activities can be reconstructed and reinterpreted through the lens of information. Banking and insurance are ultimately information businesses, but many other sectors, such as policing, education and health, also have a very strong informational component. Google recognized this a long time ago. So far, regulative hurdles have preventing it from entering these sectors, but this is changing. To oppose this development, we have to ask profound questions about who owns the underlying infrastructure and the data that is generated in the process. Journalism was the first industry to suffer from Google's expansion, but others will follow. Values such as civic responsibility and critical thinking will become secondary to the logic of the market. This integration of social domains under the logic of information has profound political

Each time I exercised my right to freedom of information, I could find out more information through Google than the government provided.

Max Schrems

and economic consequences. This is something that is very hard to get at when you pursue activism solely through legal means—as important as this is, since political parties have accepted that the informational infrastructure is provided by the market. When I talk about socializing the data, I don't envisage an environment that is the opposite of Silicon Valley, where we all become individual entrepreneurs who sell and transact data on a daily basis. To me, that is the extreme end of the same neoliberal logic Google and Facebook operate on. I don't want us to accept that the information we generate is a commodity that has a monetary value. Why can't I build my own app to satisfy my own needs? Because Google towns the data and the infrastructure within which such innovation can happen. So what I mean is that we need to figure out a way for people—activists, NGOS, entrepreneurs—to come in and take advantage of this infrastructure to build their own solutions. ◁

A video of the debate in full length can be found on: www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch

Photos: Matthias Cremer

Debating Europe / Europa im Diskurs
January 11 / March 15 / April 26, 2015
Burgtheater, Vienna

How much Transparency Does Democracy Need?, Debate on March 15, 2015

Photo: Matthias Cremer

Since 2008, the matinée series *Debating Europe* brings leading politicians, scholars and intellectuals together on-stage to discuss pressing questions of European relevance. The public debates are jointly organized by the *Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation,* and the daily *Der Standard.*

Sunday, January 11, 2015

The Return of Geopolitics in Europe

After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the subsequent reordering of Europe, it seemed that a new era of stable and peaceful development lay ahead. In recent months, however, Europeans have experienced increasing insecurity. Peace and security can no longer be taken for granted. Borders and national entities have been called into question. Sanctions against Russia are affecting economic relationships—also in Austria. This debate discussed the geopolitical changes we might expect in the near future and how Europe should respond to these challenges.

Carl Bildt
Former Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

Ana Palacio
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain

Ivan Krastev
IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

Fyodor Lukyanov
Editor-in-chief, *Russia in Global Affairs*

Chair:
Alexandra Föderl-Schmid
Editor-in-chief, *Der Standard*

Sunday, March 15, 2015

How much Transparency Does Democracy Need?

The demand for more public transparency is not new. Thanks to new technologies for the collection, storage, analysis and distribution of data, radical transparency has today become feasible. But how can citizens deal with big data collected by government and business? Will more information mean more truth? Can greater transparency stop the decline of democratic participation, or will it further accelerate the erosion of trust? (see p. 9)

Júlia Király
Head of Department, International Business School Budapest; Former Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Hungary

Evgeny Morozov
Writer and Journalist (*The Net Delusion* and *To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism*)

Aruna Roy
Indian social activist fighting corruption

Max Schrems
Austrian lawyer and privacy activist; founder, *Europe versus Facebook* group

Chair:
Shalini Randeria
IWM Rector; Professor of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva

Sunday, 26. April 2015

Der Wiener Kongress und die Folgen

Vor zweihundert Jahren fand der Wiener Kongress statt und damit die Neuordnung Europas. Es begann, was Henry Kissinger als die längste je gekannte Friedensperiode in Europa bezeichnet hat. Das „Europäische Konzert" war Vorläufer der heutigen EU: Konfliktlösung im Geiste der Verständigung und Zusammenarbeit zwischen Staaten in Europa in allen möglichen Bereichen. Die dritte Debatte nahm das historische Ereignis zum Anlass, um über Lehren aus der Vergangenheit und aktuelle Herausforderungen nachzudenken.

Heinrich August Winkler
Professor für Neueste Geschichte, Humboldt-Universität Berlin

Hazel Rosenstrauch
Englisch-österreichische Kulturwissenschaftlerin

Sebastian Kurz
Österreichischer Bundesminister für Europa, Integration und Äußeres

Johannes Hahn
EU-Kommissar für Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik

Adam Krzemiński
Polnischer Journalist und Publizist

Moderation:
Alexandra Föderl-Schmid
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

Videos zu den Debatten auf: www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/video/

Modern Slavery and the Long Reign of Hypocrisy

BY PAWEŁ MARCZEWSKI

Contemporary capitalism shows some disturbing similarities with slave-holding economies.

According to the 2014 Global Slavery Index, 35.8 million people are currently enslaved worldwide. 61% of modern-day slaves are held in five countries: India, China, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. However, while the first statistic is likely to raise a few eyebrows, the second probably brings sighs of relief. The fact that slavery is concentrated in Asia—or partly so, in the case of Russia—means that the conscience of the average, affluent, well-meaning western citizen can be put to rest.

India and Pakistan? Explanations aren't hard to find. With all that poverty and social conflict, combined with population growth and the legacy of colonialism, it's hardly surprising that their economies depend on unfree labor. China? Well, given that it's a huge undemocratic country trying to catch up in civilizational terms by means of turbo-capitalism, slavery seems inevitable. Russian neo-imperialism, meanwhile, has a long history of exploiting migrant workers, so a population of slaves exceeding a million doesn't come as much of a surprise. And what about Uzbekistan? A huge no man's land of conflicting interests, with a few former American outposts, and a world-leading cotton exporter—the comparison with the slave-holding states of the American South seems obvious.

With all these stereotypes and loose associations, it's easy to blame the persistence of slavery in these countries on their socio-economic circumstances, and to label modern slavery as a problem predominantly affecting the developing world. Squeezed into this neat and reassuring category, slavery can be seen as something that economic and political progress will consign to the dustbin of history.

However, the Global Slavery Index report contains one figure that makes this image difficult to maintain. Of all the 167 countries included in the report, only three make any effort to "prevent the use of forced or slave labor in their supply chains, and in the supply chains of businesses operating on their territory". Apart from the US, Brazil and Australia, no other country implemented such anti-slavery measures. It is worth noting that the measures implemented by the three countries in question differ significantly. For example, US Executive Order 13627, issued by President Obama in 2012, aims at "strengthening protections against trafficking in federal contracts" and is not binding for private companies. The Brazilian "National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labour" from 2005 addresses private and public sectors, but is a voluntary agreement which does not have the legal standing comparable to that of an executive order. Even countries fighting enslavement on their own territory, such as Austria, do nothing to limit the import of goods and services produced by people enslaved elsewhere.

India remains top of the list with an estimated 14.29 million enslaved people, followed by China (3.24m), Pakistan (2.06m), Uzbekistan (1.2m), and Russia (1.05m).

Photo: Nguyen Huy Kham / Reuters

Illustration: www.globalslaveryindex.org

According to the estimates of the International Labor Organization, annual global profits from forced labor amount to 150 billion US dollars. The goods produced and services provided by modern-day slaves are used and consumed all over the world, including those countries that have done the most to eradicate slavery in their own societies. In other words, the persistence of slavery in our day and age is not just an Asian problem. Nor is it a Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Russian, or Uzbek problem. Rather, it is a characteristic of the global networks of supply and demand, and this is what makes it very difficult to tackle.

However, there is yet another factor working in favor of world slavery: the hypocrisy that surrounds it. This hypocrisy is as old as modern capitalism itself. Today's average, well-meaning western citizen who is all too eager to blame the persistence of slavery on local problems and historical legacies, has some influential predecessors.

Many political thinkers and travel writers of the Enlightenment offered a simple explanation for why slavery continued to exist in regions such as Eastern Europe or the West Indies after it had long been abandoned in the West. The reliance on archaic modes of production and an inability to develop large-scale local industry based on free labor was caused by natural backwardness, they claimed. Why had some societies managed to develop commerce and industry while others still practiced antiquated modes of accumulation? The latter had to be inherently flawed.

Today, explanations for the fact that some countries prosper while others lag behind avoid the concept of nature and focus on historical processes. Yet popular perceptions of modern-day slavery have at least one thing in common with the simplistic and racist explanations offered by some of the Enlightenment thinkers. They ignore the fact that slavery outside the West was and is sustained by western capitalism.

The fact "that the most advanced capitalist countries, notably England and Holland, should have sparked an archaic mode of production [based on slavery] at the very moment of the ascendancy of their more advanced mode" was, according to the historian Eugene D. Genovese, a paradox specific to modern capitalism.[1] However, it is one that escapes the attention even of many progressive, concerned citizens of the global West. They may be deeply troubled by the fact that unfree labor is still widespread around the world, yet still fail to recognize that their own economies contribute to its creation.

Overcoming the hypocrisy surrounding slavery is not merely a question of accepting the historical role of western capitalism in the creation of slave-holding economies in places such as Eastern Europe or the Caribbean. It is also a matter of raising awareness and extending sensibilities today. It is worth mentioning that the governments of the UK and the Netherlands, historically the first and most advanced capitalist countries, are among those named by the Global Slavery Index as taking the most action to end modern-day slavery. But neither has implemented measures to prevent the use of slave labor by companies operating in their territories. British and Dutch societies continue to consume goods and services produced by bonded labor elsewhere.

Reflecting on the slave-holding economies of the Caribbean, the historian Winthrop D. Jordan wrote that "the islands were not where one really lived, but where one made one's money."[2] Indeed, absenteeism was a prominent feature of the life of a West Indian sugar planter. He treated his land and his enslaved laborers merely as sources of wealth, which he could ruthlessly exploit, while telling himself that he was civilizing human beings at a lower stage of development. This was made easier by the fact that his real life was back home, in the metropolis.

Slaveholder absenteeism was a peculiar feature of Caribbean slavery. It had no equivalent in the slave-holding societies of Eastern Europe or the American South, where owners treated their latifundia and workforce as the foundation of their culture and identity. Today, when affluent countries fight slavery at home but do little to address domestic roots of enslavement in distant parts of the world, a form of absenteeism seems to be reemerging.

In a recent Norwegian reality-TV show, a group of teenage fashion bloggers were sent to work in a Cambodian sweatshop to see how the garments were actually produced. "We are rich because they are poor", said one participant in the final episode. All those who believe that modern-day slavery is a problem limited to developing countries could do with a similar reality check. Just as Norwegian teenagers would have nothing to blog about were it not for heavily underpaid Cambodian seamstresses working in terrible conditions, so many western consumers would have to pay much more for many products if their governments took action to ban goods manufactured by modern-day slaves.

However, insufficient consumer awareness is only part of the problem. The CEOs of companies benefiting from the contemporary slave economy need not even to spend a few months a year on a plantation. They will probably never set foot in a Chinese factory or an Uzbek cotton field. Their absenteeism is absolute. They are no less hypocritical than the sugar planters of the Caribbean. ◁

1) E. D. Genovese *The World the Slaveholders Made,* New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 22.

2) W. D. Jordan, "American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Definition of Mulattoes in British Colonies", *William and Mary Quarterly,* 1962, No. 2, 196.

Paweł Marczewski is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Warsaw and a Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Events in Retrospect *09–12 2014*

September

September 17

Recurrent Totalitarianism? Understanding Putin's Politics in Ukraine

Lev Gudkov
Director, Levada Center, Moscow; Editor-in-chief, *Russian Public Opinion Herald*

September 22

East and West European Far Right Parties and the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine

Andreas Umland
Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kiev
Anton Shekhovtsov
PhD researcher, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London

September 23

The Dilemmas of Protest Politics

Ivan Krastev
IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

October

October 2

Illiberal Democracy

Venue: Old University Library, Warsaw
Ivan Krastev
IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Marcin Król
Professor of History of Ideas and Dean, Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of Warsaw
Shalini Randeria
IWM Rector; Full Professor and Chair, Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Timothy Snyder
IWM Permanent Fellow; Bird White Housum Professor of History, Yale University
(see p. 15)

October 3

Ende des Säkularismus? Phänomenologie und der Begriff der Religion heute

In Kooperation mit der Forschungsplattform „Religion and Transformation in Contemporary European Society" und dem Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien

October 9

Antigone in Spain: The Drama of Trauma Politics

Natan Sznaider
Full Professor of Sociology, Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo, Israel

October 20/22/27

The Climate Question
Lecture I:
Between Globalization and Global Warming: Towards a History of the Present
Lecture II:
Climate Change and the Question of Scale in Human Affairs
Lecture III:
Climate and the Human Condition

Dipesh Chakrabarty
Lawrence A. Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago (see p. 14)

October 22

Collaborators, Bystanders or Rescuers? The Role of Local Citizens in the Holocaust in the Nazi Occupied Belarus

Olga Baranova
Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary European History, Gonzaga University, Florence

October 29

Art Cinema

Rochona Majumdar
Associate Professor of South Asian Languages and Civilizations, Cinema and Media Studies, University of Chicago

October 29

Russia between Modernization and De-Modernization: The Political Economy of Resource Nationalism

Kirill Rogov
Senior Research Fellow, Gaidar Institute of Economic Policy, Moscow; Member, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP)

November

November 5



The Rise and Decline of a Country. The Experience of Slovenia

Jože Mencinger
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Slovenia; Former Rector, University of Ljubljana

November 5

Die Garagen von Chervonograd

Eröffnung der Fotoausstellung von **Anatoliy Babiychuk** im Rahmen der Initiative *Eyes On – Monat der Fotografie Wien*

November 11

Siberia: Decolonization of Historical Memory

Mikhail Rozhanskiy
Director, Center for Independent Social Research and Education, Irkutsk

November 12

Psychiatry: A Blind Spot of Polish Democracy

Łukasz Andrzejewski
PhD candidate in Philosophy, University of Wrocław

Monthly Lectures
Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

Tischner Debates
This series of public debates in Warsaw was jointly launched by the IWM and the University of Warsaw in 2005 in memory of IWM's founding President Józef Tischner.

Books in Perspective
Books written or edited by fellows or related to the Institute's research fields are presented to a wider public.

Conferences and Workshops
The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.

Fellows' Seminars
In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.

For further information about our fellows and guests see p. 16. More information about all past and upcoming events on: ***www.iwm.at/events***

Events in Retrospect *09–12 2014*

November

November 13

The Kremlin's New Ideology: Forceful but Fuzzy

Maria Lipman
Former editor-in-chief, *Pro et Contra,* Carnegie Moscow Center

November 18

Urban Stages of Protest: The City as Medium

Ivaylo Ditchev
Professor of Cultural Anthropology, University of Sofia

November 19

Politics of Informality: Navigating Statehood in Post(Socialist) Central and Eastern Europe

Karla Koutkova
PhD candidate in Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest

November 26

Marc Chagall, the Loser— Thoughts about His Forgotten Vitebsk Period (1914–1920)

Victor Martinovich
Writer; Associate Professor, European Humanities University, Vilnius (see p. 20)

November 27

Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent – Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa

Philipp Ther
Professor, Institut für Osteuropäische Geschichte, Universität Wien
Ferdinand Lacina
Ehem. Österreichischer Finanzminister
János M. Kovács
IWM Permanent Fellow; External Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften
In Kooperation mit dem Suhrkamp Verlag und der Buchhandlung Orlando

December

December 2

With Russia's Economy Plunging into a Crisis— What Should We Expect?

Vladislav Inozemtsev
Director, Centre of Post-Industrial Studies, Moscow; Professor, Higher School of Economics

December 3

The State Capitalism Alternative: Insights from the Analysis of Real Life Socialist Systems

Paul Dragos Aligica
Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University

December 4

Schutz, Macht und Verantwortung – Protektion im Zeitalter der Imperien und danach

Ort: Wien Museum
Jürgen Osterhammel
Professor für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte, Universität Konstanz
In Kooperation mit dem Karl-Renner Institut (see p. 15)

December 9

The Missing Political Theory of Money

Stefan Eich
PhD candidate in Political Theory, Yale University

December 10

The Populist Challenge to Representative Democracy

Nadia Urbinati
Kyriakos Tsakopoulos Professor of Political Theory and Hellenic Studies, Columbia University

December 11

Dimensions of Modernity

Junior Fellows' Conference

December 17

The Origins of Foucault: A Glimpse into his Course Notes from the 1950s

Aner Barzilay
PhD candidate in History, Yale University

Seminars Faces of Eastern Europe

This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

Russia in Global Dialogue

This lecture series, supported by Open Society Foundations, aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.

Photos: IWM, fotodienst / Anna Rauchenberger

Climate Change: Thinking in the Face of Extremity

REPORT ON DIPESH CHAKRABARTY'S IWM LECTURES IN HUMAN SCIENCES 2014 BY MAGDALENA NOWICKA

In the face of global warming, are we now witnessing the end of the world as we know it? The planetary processes may remain unpredictable; the crucial goal for us, however, is not to overlook the forthcoming revolution in our thinking about the earth and humanity. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Professor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago, addressed the relation between globalisation and climate change in the context of the history of modernity in a series of lectures held at the IWM in October 2014. Chakrabarty discussed climate change not as a natural scientist, policy maker or activist; what he had to offer were not ready-made solutions but interdisciplinary reflections on how the question of climate challenges our narratives on globalization and the epoch we live in.

In his first lecture, *Between Globalization and Global Warming: Towards a History of the Present,* Chakrabarty developed a framework deriving from the European academic tradition. The legacy of German philosophers—Karl Jaspers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger—served him as a 'tool-box' to trace the axes and ruptures in our thinking about the planet. In the following two lectures, *Climate Change and the Question of Scale in Human Affairs* and *Climate and the Human Condition,* he presented the discourse of climate change, developed in the 1980s and 1990s, as a "child" of the Cold War, the space war and the anti-nuclear movement, and at the same time as a form of *epochal consciousness,* referring to Karl Jaspers' concept as discussed in his works *Man in the Modern Age* (1933) and *The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man* (1958). Epochal consciousness reflects the way in which in a certain period of time people shape the world according to their needs, interfere with nature, and "play God" deciding what shall exist and what shall not exist. In this series of lectures, Chakrabarty became a 'tracker' of intellectual, and sometimes very profound, tensions between the natural sciences, which present themselves as a source of universal knowledge, and European thought, which has come to terms with its own particularity or even parochialism in the wake of the climate crisis.

The Fallacy of Epochal Consciousness

Following Jaspers, Chakrabarty argued that the discourses of globalization and of climate change emerged from two different forms of epochal consciousness: the human-centred or the planet-centred one. One can grasp these two lines of thinking only by distancing oneself from departmental thinking, "evolved by university departments, where a philosopher thinks like a philosopher, an economist thinks like an economist," etc. Epochal consciousness precedes departmental as well as political thinking and as such should be criticised from the standpoint of a layman rather than from that of a clerk. Accordingly, Chakrabarty compared himself to a listener of various specialized discussions in which he has not enough competence to participate. What he can and did try to do was to reconstruct the contemporary intellectual mood underlying the debates over climate change.

The modern epochal consciousness is based on the fallacious promise that our reason enables us to capture the whole picture of our existence on earth. This belief stems to a certain degree from the idea that European forms of knowledge claim to be universal. What is more, in his well-known work *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (2000), Chakrabarty noted that "today the so-called European intellectual tradition is the only one alive in the social science departments of most, if not all, modern universities." On the eve of climate change, he argued in 2014, humanity needs to think about the limits of the European legacy, and respond to post-Europeanization of the world. The post-European, multi-civilizational order was born, according to Hans-Georg Gadamer, in 1914 when the provincializing of Europe, discussed in Chakrabarty's book, began. Gadamer asked how European thought "can acquire some relevance on planetary scale" in the technological age that has led to the uniformity of mankind, detaching it from its cultural roots. For Chakrabarty, the question of climate change "marks a continuity and rapture" in diagnosing human fears and hopes. Can the "human capacity for rational thinking" solve planetary troubles without uprooting the human being?

Homo Knows What *Anthropos* Does

One on the most profound ironies in the history of modernity is the Janus-faced image of humans as a collective entity. On the one hand, we live in the Anthropocene, the age of the *anthropos*—the human species' acting as a geophysical force exerting immense influence on the planet. On the other hand, with modernity humanity acquired more self-awareness and intentional agency. When the *anthropos* gains agency he becomes the *homo*—a free agent in a self-projecting human entity. "In the politics of climate change the *homo* comes to be where the *anthropos* was," Chakrabarty noted, pointing to the ethical dimension of human rationality. In other words, "the *homo* knows what the *anthropos* does," and bears responsibility for his deeds towards the planet.

The discourse of climate change raises insoluble ethical problems logically independent of the question of justice. Both for European and non-European societies entering modernity was conditioned by the discovery of electricity. "Cheap energy" from fossil fuel gave a sort of freedom to those who were deprived of agency. Thanks to the massive use of fossil fuels humanity "overcame the fear of the night"; more and more people are mobile and have access to education. Chakrabarty argued that globalisation gave us "a certain kind of social justice in consumption," and in that sense Marxist claims that injustice and capitalism caused the climate crisis turned out to be false. Are the Western activists fighting for reductions in carbon dioxide emissions justified in demanding that developing countries scale down of their industries? Is it not those countries' turn to flourish? Still, the question of historical justice must be confronted with the matter of humans' responsibility and culpability towards the Earth, measured not on the human time scale but on the planetary scale.

A Farewell to Anthropocentrism?

What humanity needs in the face of the climate crisis is supra-political thinking and going beyond the *homo* framework. Referring to climate scientists, such as James Lovelock, David Archer and Jan Zalasiewicz, Chakrabarty invites us to take a step forward in our epochal consciousness "haunted" by the human-centred perspective. According to climate science, climate can be compared to a 'wildcat' or a violent, unpredictable beast, whose moves cannot be fully explained by theoretical modelling and prevented by risk management strategies. Consequently, the challenge for the *homo* is "attuning oneself to the … shock of the planet's otherness." Humanity ignores the fact that even if the Earth is hospitable to life, it can be hostile to people. Embracing the fact that in the planetary time scale we are rather "in the position of passing guests than possessive hosts", we should transcend our anthropocentric climate policy that privileges human uniqueness against life itself. But are we truly exceptional if we cannot control many processes taking place in nature?

Weakening anthropocentrism raises scientific interests in zoocentric conditions of planetary well-being, inscribing the flourishing of human life into the flourishing of life in general. Are we witnessing the birth of a new epochal consciousness with a shift towards zoocentrism? Chakrabarty seemed sceptical, since being non-anthropocentric is for a human being like "jumping out of one's skin." "Overlapping but distinct discourses of globalisation and climate warming" create "the tension between our everyday anthropocentric view of reality and the zoocentric view that the climate crisis invites is to take. However, this choice is a false option. We can only inhabit the tension between the two," he acknowledged. If we want to respond to the question of climate crisis we have to "put something else" in the place of Jaspers' faith in reason, which remains the source of the anthropocentric claims made on the planet. Aligning the human history with the planetary time scale will be for us only a starting point. ◁

Magdalena Nowicka is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Łódź and a Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Photos: IWM, iStock / Spod

Schutz, Macht und Verantwortung: Protektion im Zeitalter der Imperien und danach

Patočka Memorial Lecture von **Jürgen Osterhammel,** 4. Dezember 2014

Photo: fotodienst / Anna Rauchenberger

In der Jan Patočka Gedächtnisvorlesung 2014, die in Kooperation mit dem Karl-Renner Institut im Wien Museum stattfand, setzte sich der deutsche Globalhistoriker Jürgen Osterhammel mit einer der ambivalentesten Kategorien im Vokabular der internationalen Politik auseinander – dem Schutzbegriff. Imperien haben ihre machtpolitische Expansion immer wieder als Schutzherrschaft über „zivilisierungsbedürftige" Andere gerechtfertigt, so Osterhammel. Heute erkennt die Staatengemeinschaft eine „Schutzverantwortung" *(responsibility to protect)* an. Der Vortrag, nachzulesen in der aktuellen Ausgabe von *Transit – Europäische Revue* (Heft 46, siehe S. 23), verfolgte den Wandel des Protektionsgedankens vom 17. Jahrhundert bis heute. *(Video auf: www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/video/)* ◁

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Jürgen Osterhammel ist Professor für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte an der Universität Konstanz. Für seine umfassende Globalgeschichte *„Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts"* erhielt er zahlreiche Auszeichnungen, darunter den NDR-Sachbuchpreis (2009), den Leibnizpreis der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (2010) sowie den Gerda Henkel Forschungspreis (2012).

Patočka Memorial Lecture

Since its foundation in 1982, the IWM has promoted the work of Czech philosopher and human rights activist Jan Patočka (1907–1977). In his memory, the Institute annually organizes lectures, a selection of which has been published in German by Passagen Verlag, Vienna. Speakers include Zygmunt Bauman (2015), Jürgen Osterhammel (2014), Nancy Fraser (2013), Martin Walser (2012), Pierre Rosanvallon (2011) and Claus Offe (2010).

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences

The IWM launched this series of public lectures in 2000 on the occasion of the 100th birthday of Hans-Georg Gadamer, supporter of the Institute since its inception. The lectures are published in English (Harvard University Press, Cambridge), German (Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin) and Polish (Kurhaus Publishers, Warsaw). In recent years, renowned scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2014, see p. 14), Jan-Werner Müller (2013), Peter Brown (2012) and Vincent Descombes (2010) delivered the IWM Lectures in Human Sciences.

Tischner Debates

The Józef Tischner Debates, a series of public events in Warsaw, were jointly launched by the IWM and the University of Warsaw in 2005 in memory of the Polish priest and philosopher Józef Tischner, founding president of the IWM. The first 20 debates took place between 2005 and 2010. Outstanding intellectuals and important public figures such as Giuliano Amato, Anne Applebaum, Ralf Dahrendorf, Joschka Fischer, Bronislaw Geremek, Danuta Hübner, Simon Peres, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Adam Zagajewski and others debated the future of Europe, climate change, the public role of religion and much more. The debates were always chaired by Marcin Król and Krzysztof Michalski, founding Rector of the IWM. After Krzysztof Michalski's death, this tradition is continued in 2014 and 2015 with Shalini Randeria as the Institute's new Rector.

Illiberal Democracy

Tischner Debate, October 2, 2014

Photo: Maciej Spychal

In recent years we have been witnessing a disturbing trend: support for illiberal democracy is growing. Countries such as Hungary, Russia and Turkey have engaged in constitutional experiments and seem to have no regrets. For their leaders, the term "illiberal democracy" does not imply a critique. Moreover, they are being observed with growing interest by Eurosceptic and far-right parties elsewhere in Europe. Where are European governments heading in the 21st century? Will the changes in the political orders of Hungary or Turkey affect Central and Eastern European countries? Will Putin's Russia be successful in its effort to export illiberal democracy to Western Europe? Will the Indian path be different from that chosen by the EU and its closest neighbors?

These were some of the questions discussed during the 21st Tischner Debate "On Illiberal Democracy", held at the University of Warsaw in October 2014. Among the panellists were **Ivan Krastev** (IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia), **Marcin Król** (Professor of History of Ideas and Dean of the Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of Warsaw), and **Shalini Randeria** (IWM Rector; Professor of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva). The discussion was moderated by **Timothy Snyder** (IWM Permanent Fellow; Bird White Housum Professor of History, Yale University), and opened by **Anna Giza** (Vice-Rector, University of Warsaw) and **Karolina Wigura** (political editor, *Kultura Liberalna*). ◁

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The debate was jointly organized by the University of Warsaw, Kultura Liberalna, *and the IWM, and generously supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.*

Fellows and Guests *09–12 2014*

Nadia Al-Bagdadi
Visiting Fellow (September–October 2014)

Professor and Head, Department of History, Central European University, Budapest

Borders of Faith: Religion and Modernity in the Mediterranean Region

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Paul Dragos Aligica
Research Associate (December 2014)

Senior Research Fellow, F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Arlington

Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz: A Comparative History of Economic Thought under Communism

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Łukasz Andrzejewski
Józef Tischner Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2014)

PhD candidate in Philosophy, University of Wrocław

Psychopolitics: The Discourse of Psychiatry and Modernization Processes in Post-1989 Poland

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Assaf Ashkenazi
Junior Visiting Fellow (October–December 2014)

PhD candidate in Romance and Latin-American Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The Impact of the "Prague Spring" on Jewish and Arab Intellectuals in Israel

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Zaven Babloyan
Guest (September 2014)

Executive Director, *Oko* Publishing House, Kharkiv

Vicissitudes of Ethics in War and Authoritarianism: Psychoanalytic Interpretations. The Ukrainian Case (1952–1984)

Olga Baranova
EURIAS Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014–June 2015)

Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary European History, Gonzaga University, Florence

Historiography and Politics of Memory of World War II and the Holocaust in the Soviet Union

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Aner Barzilay
Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2014)

PhD candidate in History, Yale University

A Journey into the Limits of Reason: French Nietzscheanism

Magdalena Błędowska
Visiting Fellow (July–September 2014)

Editor, *Krytyka Polityczna* Publishing House, Warsaw

25 Years of Polish Transformation: Conditions of Mainstream Journalism and Challenges for the Future

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Dipesh Chakrabarty
Guest (October 2014)

Lawrence A. Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the College and the Law School, University of Chicago

Between Globalization and Global Warming: Towards a History of the Present

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Benjamin Cunningham
Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (August–October 2014)

Freelance journalist, Prague

Roma and the New Nationalism

Maria Dammayr
Guest (September 2014)

Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin, Institut für Soziologie, Johannes Kepler Universität Linz

Leistung und Gerechtigkeit in der Selbst- und Fürsorge. Eine deutsch-österreichische Studie zur Arbeit in der Altenpflege

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Ivaylo Ditchev
Visiting Fellow (November–December 2014)

Professor of Cultural Anthropology, University of Sofia

Urban Stages of Protest. Balkan Cities as Symptom

Stefan Eich
Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2014)

PhD candidate in Political Theory, Yale University

Moments of Monetary Politics

Christian Ferencz-Flatz
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (August–October 2014)

Researcher, Alexandru Dragomir Institute, Romanian Society for Phenomenology, Bucharest

Walter Benjamin: *Das Passagen-Werk* (German > Romanian)

Michał Filipczuk
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (July–September 2014)

Freelance translator, Cracow

Judith Butler: *Parting Ways. Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism* (English > Polish)

Ludger Hagedorn
Visiting Fellow (September–December 2014)

Lecturer in Philosophy, New York University Berlin

Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka's Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

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Jakub Homolka
Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2014–April 2015)

PhD candidate in Sociology, Charles University, Prague

Jan Patočka's Concept of "Rational Civilization"

Vladislav Inozemtsev
Visiting Fellow, Russia in Global Dialogue (November–December 2014)

Director, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies; Professor of Economics, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Russia in Search for a New Model of Democracy

Doris Kaltenberger
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014–February 2015)

Doktorandin der Religionswissenschaft, Universität Wien

Phenomenology of Religion 2.0: A Chance for a Contemporary Method in the Science of Religions?

Karla Koutkova
CEU Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2014–January 2015)

PhD candidate in Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest

Politics of Informality: Navigating Statehood in (Post)Socialist Central and Eastern Europe

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Maria Lipman
Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (November 2014)

Former editor-in-chief, Pro et Contra, Carnegie Moscow Center

The Kremlin's New Ideology: Forceful but Fuzzy

Rochona Majumdar
Guest (October 2014)

Associate Professor, Departments of Cinema and Media Studies, South Asian Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago

Art Cinema

Paweł Marczewski
Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2014–July 2015)

Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Warsaw

Enlightened Sarmatians: Polish Noble Republicanism and the Quest for Alternative Modernity

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Victor Martinovich
Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (October–December 2014)

Writer; deputy editor-in-chief, *BelGazeta,* Minsk

Marc Chagall: Long Way Home

Michał Maciej Matlak
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014)

PhD candidate, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence

The (De-)Politicization of Religion and Secularism in the Process of European Integration

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Magdalena Nowicka
Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2014–July 2015)

Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Łódź

Public Acts of Self-Critique in Poland and Central Europe: From Totalitarian Regimes to Mediacracy

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Halyna Petrosanyak
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (October–December 2014)

Freelance translator, author, Iwano-Frankiwsk

Elisabeth Freundlich: *Die Ermordung einer Stadt namens Stanislau. NS-Vernichtungspolitik in Polen 1939–1945* (German > Ukrainian)

Svitlana Potapenko
Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014–June 2015)

Senior Researcher, M. Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv

The Elite of Sloboda Ukraine and the Russian Empire-Building: Integration and Transformation

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Jurko Prochasko
Visiting Fellow (October 2014–July 2015)

Researcher, Iwan Franko Institute, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; Institute for Psychoanalysis, Lviv

Krieg und Mythos

Kirill Rogov
Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (October 2014)

Senior Researcher, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, Moscow

Russia between Modernization and De-Modernization

Mikhail Rozhanskiy
Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (November 2014)

Historian and sociologist; Director, Center for Independent Social Research and Education, Irkutsk

Siberia: Decolonization of Historical Memory

Anton Shekhovtsov
Junior Visiting Fellow (June–December 2014)

PhD researcher, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London

The Two Faces of the Kremlin: Supporting the Far Right, Manipulating the Far Left

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Sławomir Sierakowski
Bronisław Geremek Visiting Fellow (July 2014–April 2015)

Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Warsaw; founder, *Krytyka Polityczna*

Accursed Answers: Communism, Capitalism, Nationalism. The Intellectual Biography of Czesław Miłosz

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Konstantyn Skorkin
Guest (August–September 2014)

Historian, writer and journalist; co-founder, Ukrainian arts and literature group STAN, Luhansk

A History of Suicide

Yfaat Weiss
EURIAS Visiting Fellow (September 2014–January 2015)

Full Professor, Department of the History of the Jewish People and Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

German Tradition and Jewish Knowledge: The Cultural History of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Stanislav Zakharkin
Alexander Herzen Junior Fellow (September 2014–February 2015)

Post-graduate student of Sociology, Novosibirsk State Technical University

Social Networks as a Tool of Developing Civil Society and Democracy in Russia

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Marcin Zaremba
Bronisław Geremek Visiting Fellow (September 2014–June 2015)

Professor of History, University of Warsaw

The Decade of Gierek: The Social Origin of Solidarity Revolution

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Renate Zöller
Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (July–September 2014)

Freelance journalist, Hürth

Longing for *Heimat*

Fellows and Guests

The IWM offers a place for research and scholarly debate across borders and disciplines. Its various fellowship programs are thus a fundamental part of the Institute's work. Each year, 50–60 Visiting Fellows and Guests—mainly from Eastern and Western Europe as well as from North America—are awarded fellowships to pursue their individual research projects at the IWM. Since its inception in 1982, the IWM has hosted more than 1,000 scholars, journalists and translators.

The Disconnect between Religion and Culture

BY OLIVIER ROY

The 'return of the sacred' is a consequence of a process of secularization that is disconnecting religious faith from the values of the dominant culture, says the political scientist Olivier Roy.

Photo: Ali Jasim / Reuters

Destroyed statue of the second Abassides Caliph and builder of Baghdad, Abu Jaafar al-Mansour, after a bombing in 2005.

We Europeans live in secular societies and not in pre- or post-secular societies. Secularization has prevailed globally, even in Muslim countries. Of course, that does not mean that people have become irreligious. A society can consist of a majority of believers and still be secular, as in the United States.

In order to explain this assertion, which might sound paradoxical when the world is being shaken by the rise of the "Islamic State", it will be necessary to discuss the changing nature of the link between culture and religion, and particularly the "de-culturation" of religion.

There are many different ways to define secularization. As a social phenomenon, it is not an abstract process; it is always the secularization of a given religion, whose nature changes as secularization unfolds. Common definitions of secularization include three elements.

The first is the separation of state and religion, of politics and confession, without necessarily entailing a secularization of society. The US is a good example: although there is a strong separation of church and state, levels of religiosity among the population are still high. The First Amendment of the American Constitution stresses both secularity and religious freedom.

The second element in definitions of secularization is the decline in the influence of religious institutions in societies. Activities such as healthcare and education are now managed by the state or the private sector. In Europe, the churches have clearly withdrawn from the "management of society".

The cultural mainstream of the societies we live in, is no longer inhabited by religion. This is also true for most Muslim countries.

The third element in definitions of secularization is what Max Weber called *Entzauberung*—the disenchantment of the world. This does not mean that people become atheists, but that they care less about religion. Religion no longer plays a major role in our everyday lives, even if we still consider ourselves part of a religious community. In this sense, secularization corresponds to the marginalization of religion in society, rather than its exclusion.

In terms of the separation of politics and religion, all contemporary states are secular—including theocratic states. A secular theocracy might sound like a contradiction in terms, but it is important to recognize that a secular state is one that defines what religion is, not vice versa. In one of the few theocratic states in the world today, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the head or the "guide" is a politically appointed figure; no such institution ever existed in Islam. The guide is elected by means of a complex constitutional process, not because he is the highest religious authority.

Iran provides a clear illustration of the contradictions that necessarily exist in any religious state. The law of the land is the religious law and sovereignty is supposedly with God. Yet the problem is: God does not speak. If God is sovereign, who knows what God is saying? And what precisely is the religious law? In Iran, parliament may pass no law that contradicts Islam. The Council of Guardians in turn can say "no, this law is not in conformity with Sharia", but it has no right to legislate. So what if parliament approves a law and the Council of Guardians declares it to be un-Islamic?

The solution was to create a third instance, the "discernment council", whose task is to broker an agreement or overcome the stalemate. And what is this third instance? It is a political institution, made up of all the hierarchs of the regime. It cannot be otherwise. In all states that claim to have an Islamic constitution, or have no constitution at all because there is no constitution in Islam, the last instance of power is always political.

In Saudi Arabia, an Islamic state without a constitution, it is the king who decides in the last resort—although there is no king in the Koran and the king is not entitled as a religious man. In Afghanistan, the Taliban placed the Islamic judges in charge and declared Sharia the law of the state. They decided that the country needed no supreme court or constitution and that every judge should implement Sharia directly. Of course, this did not work,

since every judge had his own conception of Sharia. In the end, decisions were taken by the head of the regime, Mullah Omar, a self-proclaimed *amir al muminin* or "commander of the believers".

It is only a matter of time before the "Islamic State", which has seized a huge territory between Iraq and Syria, encounters the same difficulties. It has benefitted from favorable local circumstances, primarily the support of Arab Sunnis who have been excluded from state power, yet it disregards the social fabric. Instead, IS implements a harsh, superficial and literalist conception of Sharia alien to the local culture.

The jihadi espouse a Salafist conception of Islam (although the majority of Salafi are not jihadi). Salafism is presented as the reaction of traditional society and culture to westernization and modernization. However, this is very far from being the case. Salafism is a perfect example of a religious confession that no longer defines itself via culture, but via a set of norms, even against the dominant culture of the place its adherents find themselves in. The Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia are destroying the old city of Mecca and replacing it with a very western commercial mall, where sharia norms—closing during prayer, the veil—are applied to a modern material culture.

It is no coincidence that the first target of the Salafi are the traditional Islamic cultures. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, the first thing they destroyed were elements of the traditional Afghan way of life. They forbade all kinds of games: kite-flying, animal-fights, and so on. They did, however, allow soccer. Did they find soccer more *halal* than traditional Afghan games? IS is perfectly modern in its culture: gore and violence borrowed from video games and contemporary movies, recruitment among uprooted and disenfranchised western Muslims and converts, manipulation of western media, coupled with the destruction of historic buildings.

It is not surprising that fundamentalist movements contain many converts. People who convert frequently want "the real thing"—they are not attracted by religion as a cultural form. The Europeans who convert to Islam and go on jihad rarely bother to learn Arabic or Turkish. They use French, German, English, which they dot with Arabic. Nor do they dress like traditional Egyptians or Saudis; instead, they create their own combination of visual markers: white garb and Nike shoes is apparently the symbol of conversion.

Foreign jihadi never integrate into the society for which they are supposedly fighting: failure to convince local tribesmen to give them their daughters means they resort to rape and kidnap. Tensions soon arise, and ultimately they must use coercive methods to maintain their grip on the local population. The religious dimension gives way to sheer relations of power.

Secularization has prevailed. We are all living in secular societies. By this I mean that everywhere religion has been evicted from the dominant culture. And where religious forms have not been evicted, it is religious fundamentalists themselves who are doing the job of secularization, since they consider the dominant culture not only to be profane, but also pagan.

American evangelicals, Egyptian Salafi, Israeli Haredim, conservative Spanish bishops: all consider the dominant culture in their own country to be secular and hostile to "true" religion, even if the majority of the people are religiously observant. Take the two Catholic Popes before the incumbent Pope Francis. They were clearly worried by the fact that contemporary European culture is no longer a Christian culture. Benedict even used to say it was "a culture of death".

It is not only the Catholic Church that considers the dominant culture materialist—a culture where the human being has replaced God, where freedom has replaced duty. In a sense, religious fundamentalists are right about this. Since the 1960s, the old moral order has indeed been replaced by a new dominant culture. This culture is based on freedom, particularly sexual freedom, and materialism; for the most part it is in total contradiction to the teachings of the Church, of the Koran or the Torah. And for this reason you get religious preachers in the US, in Saudi Arabia and in Israel who all say the same thing: "We are in the minority."

The dominant culture, the cultural mainstream of the societies we live in, is no longer inhabited by religion. This is also true for most Muslim countries. When the Arab Spring began, no one referred to religion. People went on the streets for democracy, freedom and human rights, against corruption and despotism. True, the Islamists won the elections in Tunisia and in Egypt; but they were removed after two years. They failed because they thought they had the recipe for building an Islamic State. However, attempts to build a purely religious state are doomed. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood lost the monopoly on Islamic politics. Their demise was to a large extent caused by the emergence of other groups, in particular the Salafi.

Egypt is an example of a Muslim country in which the dominant culture is no longer religious. Or more precisely: it is no longer religious in one way only. Even if the new military regime claims to be fighting for the restoration of traditional values, it is clear that there has been a "secularist" backlash. In Tunisia, the opposition to the Nahda Islamist movement openly espoused secular values.

The religious field is diversifying and secularism and even atheism are becoming options for a youth that rejects patriarchal authoritarianism. The younger generation do not defer to religious hierarchies but use the internet to discuss among themselves. What we are observing in Egypt is an opening up of the religious field; however, this democratization of religious thinking is not necessarily of a liberal kind.

The disconnect between religion and culture has been indirectly reflected by the recent debate on freedom of religion, both in the West and in the Muslim world. In the US, Evangelicals and Catholics protest against "Obamacare", which could force employers to pay for employees' contraception. For many religious people, and not only Muslims, the French *laïcité* seems like a way to expel religion from public sphere. Even in countries where religious freedom is constitutionally guaranteed, a debate has emerged on the meaning of this freedom. With faith communities and mainstream society ceasing to share the same moral culture, new conflicts arise around conceptions of family, gender and procreation.

Nevertheless, there are two ways of looking at freedom of religion. One is to see it as a collective right, and more precisely as a minority right. The Muslim Brotherhood has no problem with this: they believe that Christians have the right to be Christians, as a collective. However, freedom of religion can be also seen as an individual right, and this is more problematic in countries and regions where one religion dominates. The German state of Bavaria, for example, bans the veil for school teachers while maintaining the right of a teaching nun to wear Christian garb. Italy, while recognizing the freedom of religion, also refuses equal rights.

In Muslim countries, the issue is about conversion from Islam to Christianity: conservative *ulamas* see this as an infringement of the divine law and therefore something to be prohibited by the state. Here one can observe a link between democratization and the right to renounce Islam. As soon as one accepts the idea that religious belonging is an act of free will, one can accept democracy, and vice versa. In my view, this debate is now taking place in Muslim countries. The new Tunisian constitution is the first constitution in an Arab country to guarantee freedom of consciousness and freedom of religion. The latter is defined as a collective right, the former as an individual right.

I anticipate that acceptance of this freedom will grow in the Middle East. For the first time, you have people in Tunisia and Egypt who describe themselves as secularists and even atheists. Today, it is not something one dares not to say. In Morocco and Algeria, a movement is rising of people who openly break Ramadan. Under what law would you arrest them? "Public disturbance", perhaps—but who decides what "public disturbance" is? Once again, the state.

This rise of pluralism in attitudes towards religion is a clear sign of a new tolerance and acceptance of individual differences. It is a sign of secularization. Fasting is no longer seen as a duty but as an individual preference, religion less as a part of the dominant culture than a personal choice. This de-culturation of religion enables the democratization of society.

It is no longer possible to contrast a "secular" West with a "religious" East. Secularization and the de-culturation of religion are taking place in both East and West. The difference is the political forms that the de-culturated religions take. Jihad in the Middle East is certainly not identical with the Tea Party, which in turn is not to be equated with the Catholic conservative backlash against same-sex marriage. But all are the consequences of the same eviction of religion from mainstream culture. ◁

Religious fundamentalists are doing the job of secularization, since they consider the dominant culture not only to be profane, but also pagan.

With faith communities and mainstream society ceasing to share the same moral culture, new conflicts arise around conceptions of family, gender and procreation.

Photo: IWM

Interview with Olivier Roy

Kristina Stoeckl: How do you see your thesis of the disconnect between religion and culture confirmed in the emergence of the Islamic State and in actions undertaken by this regime, such as the destruction of archaeological sites and artefacts?

Olivier Roy: The Islamic State is not only ignoring culture, which could be considered "normal", but it is destroying culture. They are destroying culture because they think that artefacts of culture like these archaeological sites are not only irrelevant, but a threat. A threat, because by their mere existence they secularize the public space, they show that one can have norms, values, feelings and reasons that are not connected with religion. And for these kinds of "pure" religions, everything has to be religious. Culture for them is not only profane, it is pagan. It stands in contradiction to religion and therefore it has to be destroyed.

Kristina Stoeckl: In your lecture you spoke about the impossibility of a theocratic state. How do you explain your thesis in the context of the rise of the Islamic State?

Olivier Roy: The impossibility of the Islamic State is, globally speaking, the impossibility of any religious state. As I said in my lecture, in a religious state it is not religion that dictates what the state is, it is the state that dictates what religion is. For a very simple reason: God does not speak. So somebody has to say what is the will of God, and somebody has to impose what he thinks is the will of God. It is a question of interpretation and of power, a question of politics. If you proclaim a religious state that has no roots other than religion, then you cut off a society from all other kinds of possible modes of self-identification, for example tribalism, as in the societies where IS is currently acting, or nationalism. IS claims to create a sharia-state, implementing Islamic law. But this law is silent on most issues of modern life. There is nothing in Sharia on how to manage the electricity-system in a city of 200.000 inhabitants, and therefore laws governing these areas of administration are laws of force, with no democratic mechanisms in place to control them. The IS cannot really rule or govern, and therefore they justify their rule by power, war and expansion.

This article is based on a lecture given on April 7, 2014, at the IWM as part of the series "Colloquia on Secularism". It was organized in collaboration with the "ReligioWest" research project at the European University Institute, Florence, and sponsored by the European Research Council.

Olivier Roy is Professor at the European University Institute, Florence, and Director of the "ReligioWest" project at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies.

Kristina Stoeckl (see interview on this page) is APART Fellow of the Austrian Academy of Sciences at the University of Vienna, Department of Political Sciences. At the IWM she directs the research project "Religious Traditionalism and Politics" with the related lecture series "Colloquia on Secularism".

Out of Sight, Roma Need not Be out of Mind

BY BENJAMIN CUNNINGHAM

Almost everybody in Central and Eastern Europe is materially better off than during communism, but not the Roma. Confronting this is impossible until a critical mass admits a problem exists.

Photo: Pauline Ho / Flickr

Though some claim otherwise, more than a quarter century after the fall of communism the statistics make it unmistakable. The vast majority of people who live in the Central and Eastern European countries that have gone on to join the European Union are materially better off. In Slovakia, to take but one example, two-thirds of people claim they can buy less with their wages than they could in the old days. In truth, a basket of 10 staple foods cost 25% less in real terms and incomes have grown 497% in the past 25 years.

People's perception does not match with reality in this case, but nor does their field of vision account for those who are actually worse off—the region's Roma minority, who are poorer, less educated and more isolated than they were under totalitarianism. While communism treated everybody badly, it held equal contempt for all individuals. Today, according to the UNDP, 90% of Europe's Roma households live below the poverty line and just a third of Roma have paid employment. Statistics related to housing, education and health are equally damning.

This extreme, and growing, gap between the have and have-nots has parallels elsewhere in the world and is troubling in its own right. Even more urgent though is the obvious correlation with racial and ethnic identity and how it dovetails with the popu-

lism, nationalism and outright racism that are increasingly common in Europe today. In addition to the sociological, economic and educational challenges that are part of any rational approach to combating endemic generational poverty, when it comes to Roma there is the added irrationality of bigotry.

Today 90% of Europe's Roma households live below the poverty line and just a third of Roma have paid employment.

Words and deeds

Whether it be strong election showings or poll numbers for the far right and radical left, or just generally poisonous rhetoric, there is a palpable feeling that diversity and multiculturalism now serve as straw men for a number of social ills. Attacks on Jews in France, Belgium, Denmark and elsewhere are ample evidence that words can eventually lead to deeds. As far back as 2013, well before the recent violence in Paris, a survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights found that 46% of French Jews were considering emigration. In Bulgaria, 83% of Roma say they want to move.

Anti-Semitism is despicable and dangerous, but so too is the less conspicuous discrimination against Roma. Murders in the streets of Paris rightly draw condemnation and disgust from heads of state, but equally deserving of condolences was the 2008–09 racist slaying spree in rural Hungary that killed six Roma, including a 5-year-old child. The distinction comes largely as a result of different settings, with one tragedy taking place in broad daylight in a global capital, and the others by cover of night in rural Central Europe. The same logic translates on a more localized level as Roma disproportionately live in segregated communities (some 60% of Hungary's Roma) with little everyday interaction with their non-Roma neighbors. Out of sight really does mean out of mind—and hearts.

For better or worse, democratic politicians do tend to reflect the people they represent. When it comes to Roma, this translates into isolating the problem with security policies designed to limit inconvenient encounters. Rather than contending with deep socio-economic issues, public policy pushes them aside and does all that is possible to isolate them. A 2013 incident, and its continuing aftermath, near the eastern Slovak town of Moldava nad Bodvou is a fitting example.

Some 63 police officers raided an informal Roma settlement claiming they had arrest warrants for seven people that lived there. They found none of them. Chaos and mass beatings ensued, and 15 Roma men were taken to the police station. At least one of them contends that he underwent two more severe beatings at the police station itself. A second alleges he left the station bleeding from his rectum. A local NGO took photos depicting the bruises and physical injuries that resulted. None of the Roma were ever charged with a crime. At the same time, no police officer was ever disciplined and an internal investigation found all the officers had done their job flawlessly.

The official name of that police operation, "Repressive Search Action 100", is an indication of the ethos behind it. In an interview at the time, Interior Minister Robert Kalinak confirmed as much when he said such "showings of force" were both common and necessary. After UN officials began inquiring into the incident, the Slovak government was forced to task a prosecutor with conducting an independent review. At the time of writing, that investigation is focused on putting the Roma men through psychological examinations.

Out of sight

In short, heavy-handed policing was meant to prevent Roma poverty, unemployment and misery from infringing on neighbors. The Roma must kept in their place and contained, but the optics of the policies themselves must also be kept out of view. Once confronted with their visceral brutality the public might actually expect elected officials to come up with alternative, real, policies for addressing the complexities of Roma deprivation.

Delaying this reckoning is simpler and Mr. Kalinak was right about at least one thing: such state-sanctioned racism is common, and not just in Slovakia. In neighboring Hungary, Roma are being forcibly removed from their homes in the city of Miskolc to make way for a football stadium parking lot and the extremist Jobbik party is the third largest party in parliament. Similar stories come out of Bulgaria, Romania and elsewhere monthly.

Way back in 1993, Vaclav Havel said the so-called "gypsy problem" was a defining civil society challenge for post-communist Europe. "[People] find themselves in a state of uncertainty, in which they tend to look for pseudo-certainties," he said. "One of those might be submerging themselves in a crowd, a community, and defining themselves in contrast to other communities."

It might be more correct in the 21st century context to say something slightly different. Rather than communities defining themselves as different than others, many prefer to pretend that the Roma community—and the overt and covert racism directed towards it—does not even exist. ◁

Benjamin Cunningham is a Prague based correspondent for *The Economist*. He was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM from August to October 2014.

Marc Chagall: Vitebsk's Unwanted Son

BY VICTOR MARTINOVICH

Internationally recognized as one of the most famous artists of the 20th century avant-garde, but denied by his Russian (now Belarussian) hometown Vitebsk, where he founded an art school in 1918, Marc Chagall had to fail before he became a world famous genius known for his unique style combining fauve, cubist, expressionist and suprematist influences.

Marc Chagall left his hometown of Vitebsk at the age of twenty to attend art classes in Saint Petersburg. After that, he settled in Paris, in an art community called *La Ruche* (The Hive). In June 1914, Chagall returned to Vitebsk to marry Bella Rosenfeld, the daughter of a wealthy Vitebsk jeweler who owned a chain of shops in the city. The initial plan was to return to Paris together, but 1914 turned out a bad time for travelling in Europe. Two weeks after the wedding, the Vitebsk authorities confiscated Chagall's French passport. To avoid conscription, he accepted help from the Rosenfelds, who secured for him a minor clerical position in the military committee in Petrograd in 1915. Two years later the Russian revolution happened and Chagall's life changed all over again.

In September 1918, Chagall was appointed plenipotentiary of Moscow's ministry of culture in all matters concerning visual propaganda and arts in Vitebsk and its region. Western biographers often state that it was Anatoly Lunacharsky who proposed him for the job and even signed his mandate. However, the copy of the document held in Vitebsk's regional archive reveals the mandate to have been signed by a minor Ministry official, one commissar Punin. Moreover, evidence suggests that it was Chagall himself who applied for the post, as the only way for him to fulfill his idealistic plan to introduce contemporary European arts to Vitebsk. The memoirs of his contemporaries portray Chagall during this period as an active and enthusiastic Soviet bureaucrat dressed fashionably in a leather jacket, his leather attaché case with him at all times. He was even accompanied by a bodyguard named Valentin Antoschenko-Alenev, who in the 1970s became a famous Kazakh artist.

The first task handed to Chagall was the decoration of the city for the first anniversary of the Russian Revolution. With less than two months at his disposal, he needed to work fast. He gathered together all the city's artists and proposed that they suspend their activities and work for him. Most were shop decorators and sign painters. Obviously, they could not carry out the complicated street designs by themselves. So, together with David Jakerson and Alex Romm, Chagall created colorful paper sketches that were enlarged by his helpers using a primitive technique invented in the Middle Ages and described by Vasari.



Photo: wikipedia.org

Marc Chagall, 1911, *I and the Village*, oil on canvas, Museum of Modern Art, New York

As Chagall's case clearly illustrates, being a genius in Paris will earn you misunderstanding in Vitebsk.

The master didn't limit his aesthetic ambitions to those befitting a small city on the edges of the Soviet Republic. Instead, he acted as if it really were his aim to decorate Paris or any other capital of Europe. Photographs and even film material reveal that the design was more avant-gardist than Soviet. Parrots, harlequins, clowns, proletarians in colorful dress, reams of red cloth combined with ornaments made of pine needles—this was Chagall's perception of the Soviet revolution, as a symbol of liberation from oppression of any form, including aesthetic dictates. Of course, his message wasn't well received. The masses laughed at his parrots, the newspapers were critical and the city authorities accused him of wasting resources on his unintelligible saturnalia. The next big Soviet holiday on 1st May was organized without Chagall; according to reports, the city was decorated "with flowers only".

The Vitebsk Art School

Chagall now shifted his attentions to the foundation of an art school in Vitebsk. He hoped to attract publicity by inviting the famous Russian art-nouveau artist Mstislav Dobuzhinsky to become its director. Dobuzhinsky agreed but very soon left after a conflict with Chagall. Dobuzhinsky had used his position to obtain food, which he sent to his relatives in starving Petrograd. Central Russia had been devastated by the revolution and Soviet maladministration; Vitebsk was relatively wealthier. It was a big disappointment for Chagall to learn that the only thing attracting metropolitan celebrities to his art school was good nutrition and the availability of wood and other necessities. They didn't share his ideas about broad art education for masses. Actually, no one did.

In February 1919, as head of the city's fine arts commission, Chagall attempted to concentrate all assignments for picture or design work, whether commercial or not, under his authority. His idea was to create a kind of workshop that would receive and redistribute all work amongst its members. However, Vitebsk's artists were disinclined to place themselves under the command of this repatriate emigrant. There were two reasons for this: first, Chagall had not lived in the town for a while; second, as the son of a local herring trader, he hailed from less than noble origins. The artists published a complaint in Vitebsk's official press accusing Chagall of attempting to introduce artistic censorship. Chagall's idea was blocked and the workshop was never created.

In September 1919, after the birth of their child, Chagall and Bella decided to swap their one-room apartment for three rooms in the Art School building on Bukharinskaya street. He was still one of the principals of the school and its founder. Yet his wish to live in the building met with resistance from his old friend, Alexander Romm, whom Chagall had invited to head the drawing department. Romm had also been hoping to get an apartment in the building. Immediately after Chagall's relocation, Romm lodged a complaint with the municipality insisting that the flat be expropriated and given to the modern art museum. The Soviet city mayor Sergievsky supported Romm, seeing Chagall as a representative of Moscow whose friendship with Lunacharsky and other party bosses constrained local power. After one written warning, Chagall was evicted, together with wife and newborn daughter.

These events were accompanied by the arrest of Chagall's mother-in-law and two searches of the apartments of the Rosenfelds by the NKVD, who confiscated all the valuables they found. Chagall's activities were harshly criticized in Vitebsk's press. Nevertheless, he stayed in town because he still had his art school. His dream to introduce the European avant-garde to the children of Vitebsk's working class remained alive. But he had very little time left.

Marc Chagall and Kazimir Malevich

On the 5th November 1919, Kazimir Malevich came to teach at the school in Vitebsk together with Lazar Lissitsky, a Jewish artist and dedicated follower of Chagall. Importantly, it was Lissitsky and not Chagall who had invited Malevich. On 25th May 1920, six months later, Chagall's pupils signed a petition stating their wish to join Malevich's suprematist workshop. Even Lissitsky changed his name from "Lazar" to the suprematist "El" so as to become a proper disciple of Malevich.

The reason for this collective betrayal was simple: Chagall taught young people to paint, Malevich taught them not to paint. Malevich saw the artist more as a thinker or philosopher. Artists were to stop "following nature by copying it". "The brush is too soft to create meaning," he wrote; "one needs the pen to sharpen meaning." Three months spent in Malevich's workshop was enough to learn the key precepts; after that, the trainee was proclaimed a proper artist, equal to the teacher himself. For Chagall, it took a long time before visible progress could be achieved. He used a teaching method taken from Paris, in which only three colors were allowed for figure drawing—green, yellow and blue, and no palette to mix them. It proved too much for the pupils of a small provincial city.

Malevich came from Moscow and was seen as a real celebrity, while Chagall was more or less a local. From June 1919 onwards, because of a conflict with the authorities over what was seen as his lack of accountability, Chagall received no salary as art plenipotentiary. His only income was what he earned as director of the art school. According to the payrolls, in April 1920 this amounted to 4000 rubles. Using his influence on Vera Ermolaeva, who was not only in charge of the school's finances but also a faithful suprematist, Malevich received a personal wage of 120,000 rubles—in other words 30 times that of the director of art school. Chagall was deeply insulted; as he wrote in his resignation paper: "Not only am I suffering financially, I am morally offended." The story ended with Malevich taking the flat in the school building that Chagall had wanted. This time nobody objected.

Oblivion

Chagall's paintings were going missing even while he was the director of the school. There are three separate written references, in the memoirs of Chagall's students and

Photo: ADAGP, 2013 / CHAGALL, Archives Marc et Ida Chagall, Paris

The more troubles he encountered, the more intense his colors became.

Photo: wikipedia.org

Departure of Malevich and his pupils from Vitebsk's train station to the first UNOVIS exhibition in Moscow in 1920. Chagall was present, but missing on the photo.

in the diaries of Alexander Romm, to pupils simply stealing the master's paintings from the wall safe on the second floor. Their aim was not to re-sell them, but, as one of them stated, "because we didn't have our own canvases to paint."

After his departure from Vitebsk in 1922, Chagall's heritage was eliminated yet further. An inventory composed in 1929 stated that the entire collection of contemporary art in the modern art museum he had created was missing. Twenty-six paintings by Kandinskiy, Ermolaeva, Chagall and Malevich had disappeared, most likely destroyed or repainted. Between 1920 and 2012, not a single painting by Chagall existed in his native country.

The last mention of Chagall's name in the Soviet Belarusian press was in 1928. Between then and 1987 there was no painter named Chagall in the history of art in Vitebsk. Encyclopedias and monographs devoted to the Soviet arts in 1920s describe the key events of this decade, such as the establishment of the art school and the first anniversary of the revolution, as if everything had been done by the local authorities. With Perestroika in 1987, the process of rehabilitating Chagall began, with numerous publications by poets, writers and journalists appearing in the Moscow journals *Ogoniek* and *Literaturnaja gazeta*.

However, this didn't improve Chagall's standing in Vitebsk. On the contrary, the communist press in Minsk reacted with hostility to the praise from Moscow. Until 1987, Chagall had been forgotten about; after 1987, he was vilified. The magazine *Politicheskij sobesednik* published an article claiming that Chagall had stolen the antique furniture from the house used for the art school. Another author accused him of selling places in the art school to save young people from conscription.

In 1988, a group of enthusiasts in Vitebsk organized an exhibition of photocopies of Chagall's pictures published in Moscow's magazines. The exhibition was stopped by the local communist authorities, together with another devoted to the founders of the Vitebsk art school. Chagall was removed from a sculpture of the school's three founders, alongside Ilia Repin (who never founded any art institution in the city) and Kazimir Malevich (who stole the art school from Chagall).

The Soviet elites of the late Belarusian Republic were anti-Semitic, highly conservative and unwilling to carry out any of Gorbachev's changes. Their backwardness prompted the writer Ales Adamovich to call the country the "Vendee of Perestroika", after the French province that opposed the French revolution and remained monarchist even after the monarchy fell. Little changed after the collapse of the Soviet regime and Belarusian independence: the elites remained the same even after the victory of Lukashenka in 1994.

Hostile publications, the cancellation of exhibitions, even the firing of those who defended Chagall continued for another decade and a half. Irina Shilenkova, the editor of the Belarusian encyclopedia, was fired for trying to publish a proper article on Chagall; the film director Arkadi Ruderman made a documentary about the incident and the film was banned. Although most of Chagall's enemies among the party elites had died of old age by the the mid-2000s, there still is no Chagall Street in Minsk, and no monument to him can be found in the Belarusian capital.

The first signs of a recognition appeared in 2012, when the local Gazprombank bought paintings of Chagall at Christie's and organized an exhibition, not only popularizing Chagall, but also demonstrating Gazprom's noble intention to foster Belarusian culture, memory and artistic heritage.

In the context of cultural globalization, Vitebsk's exclusion from the outside world could conceivable translate into artistic originality. Certainly, some extraordinary talents can be found there. But the huge cultural gap separating the province from continental culture has another aspect. As Chagall's case clearly illustrates, being a genius in Paris will earn you misunderstanding in Vitebsk. And vice versa: Vitebsk's leading realist painter and the city's most celebrated person in the 1920s, Yehuda Pen, would have been seen as too old-fashioned and unoriginal to be worth attention in any major cultural capital. By taking everything he could from the Vitebsk and transferring back to Paris, Chagall probably chose the right path.

Inspiration

Chagall wasn't only an official, he was also an artist. However, not a single interview was conducted with him during his second Vitebsk period. Hence there is no record in the documents of his aesthetic inspiration. It seems, however, that his time in Vitebsk was not miserable in artistic terms, and that he had the intensive inner life of a creator. The more troubles he encountered, the more intense his colors became.

Prior to his return to Vitebsk, he was a secondary painter failing to discover his figurative language. His pictures of this period, for example *Nu assis au fleur* (1911), show him adopting the techniques invented by the cubists and fauvists. Between 1910 and 1914, one can hardly tell Chagall's paintings from those of Henri Matisse, so closely did he follow the latter. Chagall's palette was pale and predictable, his plastics copied the curves and geometry of cubism.

In Vitebsk, the iconography of his works changed permanently. A range of new, original images and symbols was introduced. Lovers started floating in the air precisely during his second Vitebsk period (Promenade, 1917). Introverted Jews, pendulum clocks, violins, donkeys, and curling paved roads all entered his canvasses here. Chagall lost much, including a number of his paintings, but he also gained much. What he lost was easily retrievable: He recreated most of his paintings when he returned to Paris. What he gained—the unique iconography and the almost inexplicable brilliance of his colors—could not be taken from him. This was what turned the provincial and secondary artist into a world famous genius, whose name resounded so loudly that they tried to suppress it in his native city. ◁

Victor Martinovich, born in 1977, is a writer, art historian and journalist. He is the deputy editor-in-chief of *BelGazeta,* a Russian-language weekly newspaper published in Belarus, and an Associate Professor at the European Humanities University in Vilnius. A graduate of Belarussian State University, he finished his doctoral study about the Vitebsk Art School precisely at the time when the official Belarussian press started a campaign to discredit the Jewish artist Marc Chagall who founded the art school in 1918. Martinovich failed to defend his thesis because the university simply did not set a date. In 2006, he moved to Vilnius, Lithuania where he finally defended his PhD at the Academy of Fine Arts and continued his studies focusing on Chagall's personality. As a novelist, Martinovich recently gained international recognition for his debut work *Paranoia,* which received critical acclaim and has been translated into English, German, Swedish and Finnish. This article is based on his latest book *Rodina. Marc Chagall in Vitebsk in 1914–1920,* which will be published in Russian in 2015. It is the result of almost 15 years of careful archive research trying to reconstruct Marc Chagall's little-known activities in Vitebsk. The book was finished in December 2014 at the IWM, where he spent three months as a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow, supported by ERSTE Foundation.

Books, Articles and Talks *09–12 2014*

Books by Fellows and Alumni

Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Christina Garsten and **Shalini Randeria** (eds.)
Anthropology Now and Next. Essays in Honor of Ulf Hannerz
London/New York: Berghahn Publishers, 2014

The contributions of this volume, co-edited by IWM Rector Shalini Randeria, honor Ulf Hannerz' legacy by addressing theoretical, epistemological, ethical and methodological challenges facing anthropological inquiry on topics from cultural diversity policies in Europe to transnational networks in Yemen, and from pottery and literature to multinational corporations.

Timothy Snyder
Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning
Tim Duggan Books (forthcoming, September 2015)



In this epic history of extermination and survival, Timothy Snyder presents a new explanation of the great atrocity of the 20th century, and reveals the risks that we face in the 21st. Based on new sources from Eastern Europe and forgotten testimonies from Jewish survivors, *Black Earth* recounts the mass murder of the Jews as an event that is still close to us, more comprehensible than we would like to think, and thus all the more terrifying.

Peter Brown
The Ransom of the Soul. Afterlife and Wealth in Early Western Christianity
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015



Marking a departure in our understanding of Christian views of the afterlife from 250 to 650 CE, *The Ransom of the Soul* explores a revolutionary shift in thinking about the fate of the soul that occurred around the time of Rome's fall. The book is based on the IWM Lectures in Human Sciences which Peter Brown gave in 2012. It describes how this shift transformed the Church's institutional relationship to money and set the stage for its domination of medieval society in the West.

Ivan Krastev
Demokracja: przepraszamy za usterki [Polish Translation of: *Democracy Disrupted: The Politics of Global Protest*]
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyka Polityczna, 2015

Since the financial meltdown of 2008, political protests have spread around the world like chain lightning, from the "Occupy" movements of the United States, Great Britain, and Spain to more destabilizing forms of unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Russia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine. In this book, Ivan Krastev proposes a provocative interpretation of these popular uprisings—one with ominous implications for the future of democratic politics.

Sergey S. Horujy
Practices of the Self and Spiritual Practices. Michel Foucault and the Eastern Christian Discourse
Edited with an introduction by Kristina Stoeckl
Grand Rapids (Michigan): Eerdmans (forthcoming)



In this book, Sergey Horujy undertakes a novel comparative analysis of Foucault's theory of practices of the self and the Eastern Orthodox ascetical tradition of Hesychasm, revealing great affinity between these two radical "subject-less" approaches to anthropology.

Tom Junes
Student Politics in Communist Poland: Generations of Consent and Dissent
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015

This book tackles the topic of student political activity under a communist regime during the Cold War. It discusses both the communist student organizations as well as oppositional, independent, and apolitical student activism during the forty-five-year period of Poland's existence as a Soviet satellite state.

Daniela Kalkandjieva
The Russian Orthodox Church (1917–1948) From Decline to Resurrection
London: Routledge, 2014

Daniela Kalkandjieva tells the remarkable story of the decline and revival of the Russian Orthodox Church in the first half of the 20th century and the astonishing U-turn in the attitude of the Soviet Union's leaders towards the church.

Paul Celan Translation Program

Judith Butler
Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism [Na rozdrożu: Żydowskość I krytyka synjonizmu]
Translated by **Michał Filipczuk** (English > Polish)
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2014

In this book, Judith Butler engages Jewish philosophical positions to articulate a critique of political Zionism and its practices of illegitimate state violence, nationalism, and state-sponsored racism. At the same time, she moves beyond communitarian frameworks, including Jewish ones, that fail to arrive at a radical democratic notion of political cohabitation.

Eric Voegelin
The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Selected Essays [Zkušenost a symbol: Texty z let 1960–1977]
Translated by **Jan Frei** (English > Czech)
Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (CDK), 2015



This translation aims at providing Czech readers a deeper insight into Voegelin's philosophy in general—into his differentiating between symbols and their engendering experiences; between linguistic expressions of truth and truth experienced; between existential deformations and existence of truth, i.e. between ideology and philosophy.

Selected Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

Olga Baranova

"The Nazi Treatment of the Soviet Prisoners of War during WWII", International Conference *Prisoners of War in the 20th Century—Actors, Concepts and Changes,* Universidade Nova de Lisboa, November 2014.

"Collaborators, Bystanders or Rescuers? The Role of Local Citizens in the Holocaust in Nazi Occupied Belarus", International Conference *The Holocaust and the European Societies. Social Process and Social Dynamics,* Center for Holocaust Studies, Institute of Contemporary History, Munich, October 2014.

"Was Belarus a Partisan Republic? Resistance in Nazi Occupied Belarus during WWII", International Conference *Partisan and Insurgency Movements during the Second World War,* Collegium Carolinum and Institute of Contemporary History Munich-Berlin, Bad-Wiessee, November 2014.

Stefan Eich

"The Currency of Justice: Aristotle on the Ambivalence of Money", Kolloquium *Politische Theorie,* Universität Freiburg, December 2014.

Ludger Hagedorn

"Lightness of Being, Gravity of Thought. (Dis-)Orientations in Nietzsche and Kundera", in: M. Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Tora Lane (eds.): *Dis-Orientations: Philosophy, Literature and the Lost Grounds of Modernity,* London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

"Quicquid cogitat: On the Uses and Disadvantages of Subjectivity", in: Ľubica Učník, Ivan Chvatík, Anita Williams (eds.): *The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematisation and the Question of Responsibility: Formalisation and the Life-World, Series: Contributions to Phenomenology,* Vol. 76, Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, 2014.

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"The Devil's Embodiment. Brothers Karamazov Read Phenomenologically", International Conference *Leib und Leben,* Castle Liblice, September 2014.

„Nietzsches Schatten. Religion nach ihrer Aufhebung", Workshop *Ende des Säkularismus?,* IWM, Wien, Oktober 2014.

Cornelia Klinger

„Feministisch-kritisches Denken im 21. Jahrhundert. Ein Gespräch mit Ulrike Knobloch", in: Irisch Bischel, Ulrike Knobloch, Beat Ringger, Holger Schatz (Hg.): *Denknetz Jahrbuch 2014: Kritik des kritischen Denkens,* Zürich: edition 8, 2014.

János M. Kovács

"Travelling Back in Time? Job Quality in Europe As Seen from Below", in: Miroslav Beblavy et al. (eds), *The Future of Labour in Europe,* Brussels: CEPS, 2014

Ivan Krastev

"The New European Disorder" (with Mark Leonard), in: *Vedomosti,* December 17, 2014 and *ECFR Essay,* November 20, 2014.

"The Crisis of the E/xceptional/ U/nion", in: *Italian Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 49, December 12, 2014.

"Russia's Aggressive Isolationism", in: *The American Interest,* Vol. 10, December 10, 2014.

"Putin Will Regret Interfering in the Donbass" (with Stephen Holmes), in: *Kyiv Post,* November 28, 2014.

"Russia's Revolt against Globalisation", in: *Eutopia,* November 24, 2014.

"Putin on Ice" (with Stephen Holmes), *Project Syndicate,* November 17, 2014.

"From Politics to Protest", in: *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 25, October 2014

Magdalena Nowicka

Dyskurs elit symbolicznych [Discourse of the Symbolic Elites] (co-edited with Marek Czyżewski, Karol Franczak and Jerzy Stachowiak), Warsaw: Sedno, 2014.

"Radical, Nomad, Non-radical: Edward W. Said and the Uprooted Humanism" [in Polish], in: Tomasz Majewski, Agnieszka Rejniak-Majewska, Wiktor Marzec (eds.): *Migracje modernizmu* [Migrations of Modernism], Łódź: Wydawnictwo Officyna, 2014.

"The Debate on J.T. Gross' 'Golden Harvest'. Between a Choreographed Performance and a New Opening of the Debate on Collective Memory" [in Polish], in: *Jewish History Quarterly,* No. 3, 2014.

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Discussion Chair "Pamiętać Foucaulta, zapomnieć Foucaulta" [Remember Foucault, Forget Foucault], Conference *Pamiętać Foucaulta* [Remember Foucault], Łódź, December 2014.

Svitlana Potapenko

"This Old but Nice, with a Pure Heart Child…: Colonel Andrii Opanasovych Krasovs'kyi in Taras Shevchenko's St. Petersburg Entourage" [in Ukrainian/ Russian], in: *The Materials of the XIV International Scientific Seminar "Taras Shevchenko and His St. Petersburg Entourage",* May 13–17, Nizhyn: ChP Lycenko N.M., 2014.

"What Makes Kharkiv Ukrainian?", in: *The Ukrainian Week,* No. 39 (359), September 25, 2014.

Timothy Snyder

„Russlands neokoloniales Projekt", in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 16. März 2015.

„Als Stalin Hitlers Verbündeter war", in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 18. Dezember 2014.

"Putin's New Nostalgia", in: *New York Review of Books,* November 10, 2014.

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"Ukraine: From Propaganda to Reality", Lecture at the *Chicago Humanities Festival,* November 2014.

"Russia's War, Ukraine's History, and the West's Options", Lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, October 2014.

"Inaugural Lecture for the 20th Academic Year", Ukrainian Catholic University, September 2014.

"Europe after 1914: Integrations and Disintegrations", Lecture at the Visual Culture Research Center, Kyiv, October 2014.

Kristina Stoeckl

"Muslim Soldiers, Muslim Chaplains: The Accommodation of Islam in Western Militaries" (with Olivier Roy), In: *Religion, State and Society* 43, No. 1, 2015.

Stanislav Zakharkin

"Virtuality as a Basic Concept of Postrealism", in: *Bulletin of the Young Scientists of Siberia, Part 11,* Novosibirsk, 2014.

Tatiana Zhurzhenko

"A Divided Nation? Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis", in: *Die Friedenswarte,* Vol. 89, No. 1–2, 2014.

Guest Editor: *Transit – Europäische Revue,* No. 45, *Maidan – Die unerwartete Revolution,* Summer 2014.

„Im Osten nichts Neues?", in: *ibid;* English version: "From Borderlands to Bloodlands", in: *Eurozine,* September 2014.

*

"Russia's Never Ending War against 'Fascism': The Memory of WWII in the Ukraine Crisis", International Workshop *Remembrance of the Holocaust and Nazi Crimes in Post-1989 Europe,* Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, December 2014.

"Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands: The End of Ambivalence?", Conference *Negotiating Borders: Comparing the Experience of Canada, Europe, and Ukraine,* University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, October 2014.

Transit – Europäische Revue *Heft 46*

Aufnahme von Petra Gerschner aus der Serie "History is a Work in Process", Photoessay, *Transit* Heft 46

Photo: Petra Gerschner

Seit 1990 setzt sich die am IWM herausgegebene Zeitschrift *Transit – Europäische Revue* mit den neuen Herausforderungen für den alten Kontinent auseinander. *Transit* will ein Ort zur Selbstverständigung der Europäer nach der Wiederentdeckung ihrer gemeinsamen Geschichte und Zukunft sein. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zwei Mal jährlich im *Verlag Neue Kritik* in Frankfurt am Main.

Heft 46
(Winter 2014/2015)

Krise Kritik Kapitalismus

Jürgen Osterhammel
Schutz, Macht und Verantwortung: Protektion im Zeitalter der Imperien und danach

Thomas Schwinn
Multiple Modernen: Überlegungen im Anschluss an Max Weber

Shalini Randeria
Entrechtung und Verrechtlichung: Entpolitisierung der Demokratie?

Ivan Krastev
Von der Politik zum Protest

Ivaylo Ditchev
Ohnmächtige Empörung: Beobachtungen zu neuen Formen des Protestes

Petra Gerschner
History is a Work in Process: Bilder aus Frankfurt und Istanbul

Nancy Fraser
Krise, Kritik und Kapitalismus: Ein Leitfaden für das 21. Jahrhundert

Sighard Neckel
Burnout. Das gesellschaftliche Leid der Erschöpfung

Timothy Snyder
Kommemorative Kausalität: Gedenkkultur vs. Geschichtsschreibung

Sergey A. Ivanov
Das Zweite Rom aus Sicht des Dritten: Russische Debatten über das „byzantinische Erbe"

Sławomir Sierakowski
Heimliche Sehnsucht: Czeslaw Miłosz und der Roman

Czesław Miłosz
Die Geschichte des Astronauten

Heft 45
Maidan: Die unerwartete Revolution

Heft 44
Zukunft der Demokratie

Heft 43
Demokratie und Krise/ Balkan

Tr@nsit online
In addition to the printed version of *Transit*, its internet sister *Tr@nsit online* offers a multilingual online supplement with further contributions and comments related to the topics and issues discussed at the Institute.

70 Years After: Russia's Uses of the Past

- **Tatiana Zhurzhenko** *Russia's Never-ending War against "Fascism"*
- **Timothy Snyder** *When Stalin was Hitler's Ally*
- **Dietmar Müller** und **Stefan Troebst** *Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939 in der europäischen Geschichte und Erinnerung*

Hans Ruin
Life after Death

Thomas Nowotny
Towards Democracy and Competitive Economies: Divergent Pathways, Shifting Goals and Looming Reversals. Review on Philipp Ther's *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent*

Yfaat Weiss
German or in German? On the Preservation of Literary and Scholarly Collections in Israel

Ivan Krastev and **Stephen Holmes**
The Ukrainian School of War

Wolf Lepenies
After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: New Tensions between North and South in Europe—and New Opportunities

Katya Gorchinskaya
A Deadly Game of Hide-and-Seek: Why a Diplomatic Solution in Russia/Ukraine War is nowhere in Sight

Jan-Werner Mueller
Putinism, Orbanism … But Is There an "Ism"?

Varia

We congratulate **Charles Taylor,** Permanent Fellow at the IWM and Professor em. of Philosophy at McGill University, Montreal, on receiving the *Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion 2014.* He was honored for his "profound and influential scholarship as well as his many contributions to public discourse and political life".

Furthermore, **Timothy Snyder,** IWM Permanent Fellow and Bird White Housum Professor of History at Yale University, was recently awarded an *Andrew Carnegie Fellowship* from the Carnegie Corporation of New York for his research project "The End of Europe". Snyder is among 32 fellows who will receive awards of up to $200,000 each, which will enable them to take sabbaticals in order to devote time to their research and writing.

We are pleased to announce that **Leon Botstein,** President of Bard College and Leon Levy Professor in the Arts and Humanities, has been appointed as Non-Resident Permanent Fellow of the IWM. Professor Botstein is the music director and principal conductor of the American Symphony Orchestra as well as the chairman of the CEU Board of Trustees.

Congratulations to **Philipp Ther,** Professor and Head of the Department of Eastern Europe History at the University of Vienna and a former Körber Fellow at the IWM, who was awarded the *Leipziger Sachbuchpreis 2014* for his publication *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent. Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europas.*

We are happy to announce that **Łukasz Andrzejewski,** who was a Józef Tischner Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2014, has successfully defended his dissertation on "Psychopolitics: The Discourse of Psychiatry and Modernization Processes in Post-1989 Poland" at the University of Wrocław.

Furthermore, we warmest congratulate **Paweł Marczewski,** Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow, and his wife **Agnieszka** on the birth of their daughter **Lucyna Maria.**

It was with deep regret that we received the news about the sudden and unexpected passing away of Professor **Ulrich Beck,** one of Germany's most prominent sociologists and public intellectuals, on January 1, 2015. For many of us he was not only a great source of inspiration but also a supportive mentor and a faithful friend who will be missed sorely. (An obituary by Sławomir Sierakowski can be found on www.iwm.at)

With deep sadness we also learnt that Professor **Elemér Hankiss,** a prominent Hungarian scholar in human sciences and a long-time friend of the IWM, passed away on January 10, 2015. He was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM from 1993 to 1995, taught at one of our Cortona Summer Schools in the 1990s and took part in many workshops and conferences organized by the Institute. He also served on the advisory board of our journal *Transit.*

Upcoming Events *06 2015*

June

June 8



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Overregulated Government: Sources of Inefficiency in Russian State Agencies

Ella Paneyakh
Researcher, Institute for the Rule of Law, and Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Sociology, European University, St. Petersburg; IWM Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue

The Russian government overregulates itself to the extent where the production of public goods is practically paralyzed regardless of funding, and corruption becomes the only stimulus for higher level bureaucrats and law enforcers to remain loyal employees despite overload and high prosecution risks.

June 11

Photo: Christian Mikes

Varieties of Inequality: What Can be Done About Them and Why it Must Be Done

Claus Offe
Professor of Political Sociology, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin; Member, IWM Academic Advisory Board

This year's conference *Solidarity IX: On Distribution,* jointly organized by Columbia University, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), IWM and generously supported by ERSTE Foundation, will be opened with a public keynote speech by Claus Offe on the topic of inequality.

June 17

Photo: Giorgio Fochesato / iStock

Imagining State Socialism without Communists: Post-Socialist Nostalgia in the Czech Republic

Veronika Pehe
PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, University College London; Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM

This talk will discuss, using the Czech example, the place of nostalgia amongst other narratives of dealing with the socialist past. Drawing on sources from literature, film, television, and material culture, Veronika Pehe will demonstrate that apparent nostalgia and an anti-communist rejection of the past are not necessarily at odds with one another.

June 24

Photo: Daniel Vogel

Resilient Neoliberalism? Policy Responses and Innovation after the Great Recession in Europe's Periphery

Dorothee Bohle
Professor of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest

In this lecture, Dorothee Bohle contributes to the debate on economic crisis, policy change, and the resilience of neoliberalism by comparing the policy responses of a selected group of peripheral European countries (East and West). Looking at recent reforms targeting indebted house owners and the housing regime, as well as the financial sector, she will identify three policy responses to the Great Recession.

June 27

Photo: IWM

Illiberal Democracy

Stephen Holmes
Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law and Faculty Co-director of the Center on Law and Security, New York University

Stephen Holmes will give the keynote speech of the conference *HUNGARY 2015: Mapping the "System of National Cooperation",* jointly organized by the IWM and the CEU, focusing on the uneasy relationship between the European Union and the Hungarian government.

Generously supported by Grüne Bildungswerkstatt, Green European Foundation and The Greens/EFA.

Fellows' Seminars
In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.

Conferences and Workshops
The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.

Seminars Faces of Eastern Europe
This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

Monthly Lectures
Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, seminars and debates can be found on: www.iwm.at/events

IWM Participates in *The School of Kyiv* Biennale 2015



© The School of Kyiv

Recalling the important school experiments of Kazimir Malevich and Alexandra Exter, *The School of Kyiv* is a large-scale public event co-organized by Ukrainian and international civil society this autumn in Kyiv. The Biennale will simultaneously open *Departments* across Europe and Russia. Offering a view of Ukraine that differs from its current self-image and the picture propagated by the media of a traumatized country increasingly dominated by hostile and identitarian constructs, *The School of Kyiv* proposes an art biennale of a new format. It will integrate exhibitions, artistic presentations and *Schools*—ongoing classes open to the general public related to the present crisis in Ukraine and Europe and the geopolitical rupture this crisis marks. Carried out in cooperation with a wide range of local and international institutions and initiatives, *The School of Kyiv* aims at keeping translocal channels of artistic and intellectual exchange open in a moment of closure.

The Biennale will present international and Ukrainian contemporary art, often revolving around works by historical artistic personalities born on the territory of today's Ukraine—and their paradigmatic significance for the international avant-gardes up to today. These artists' and writers transcultural biographies elude any identitarian appropriation by a nationalistic discourse. Their work has been shaped by the contradictions and tensions of European history: Michail Bulgakov, Paul Celan, Alexander Dovzhenko, Alexandra Exter, Maya Deren, Kazimir Malevich, Ilya Repin, Bruno Schulz and others. The wide-branching pathways, influences and conflicts that mark their biographies will shed light on the role played by Kyiv and the region as a relay between various European cultural realms, resonating from here to Russia and Western Europe but also beyond: from political abstraction in South American art all the way to contemporary Asian realism.

Integrated in the exhibition circuit are stages of reflection that refer to the traumatic Ukrainian present and its international consequences. These Schools are open to all visitors. In them, artists, filmmakers, writers and theatre groups will work together with intellectuals, political scientists and cultural historians as well as civic stakeholders and students in debates, lectures and workshops, as editors of an exhibition newspaper, but also on the production of works of art. A special focus will be placed on maintaining the currently jeopardized cultural dialogue between Russia, Europe and Ukraine. "The School of Abducted Europe" for instance, tries to transgress the neo-colonial mode of relationship between the European metropolis and its peripheries, imagining the potential for transforming the European project by learning from Ukraine. "The Plein Air School of Landscape" tells how the territory that today belongs to Ukraine lies on a centuries-old geopolitical fault line, how its inhabitants have been the witnesses and victims of ongoing partitions, pogroms, purges, political struggles, ecological disasters and ethnic conflicts, of ideological and economic projections. But this School will also be a place for imagining a non-identitarian idea of the state. The "School of the Displaced" brings together displaced persons and artists with art initiatives that are addressing this problem as well as artists who have become displaced for political reasons.

In recent protests in Ukraine, the Arab world, Turkey, Hong Kong, South America, and Russia artists played a key role. "The School of the Lonesome" will involve the audience in developing micro-scenes dealing with the unexpressed emotions of post-revolutionary dissolution. As approaches to realism in the history of Ukrainian art have been as important as controversial, and the motif of realism plays a role in many political debates in present-day Ukraine, "The School of Realism" revolves around the new topicality of (pictorial) realism in theory and practice. Finally, "The School of Image and Document" involves filmmakers and media activists who use film work as a tool for critical analysis of the image wars around the Ukrainian crisis.

Curators Hedwig Saxenhuber and Georg Schöllhammer together with Vasyl Cherepanyn, Director of the Ukrainian partner institution, the Kyiv based Visual Culture Research Centre, underline that the project will create a space where people will be able to reflect on their precarious conditions by means of art and knowledge: "The political potential of art is needed today more than ever before. We imagine the project as a metaphor for the conjunction of culture and knowledge in the production of the coming world. There will be places for miracles and places for debates, for acting out controversies, spaces for thinking and spaces for production, as well as spaces for remembrance, contemplation, and consideration." ◁

The IWM will participate in the Biennale by contributing to its Schools and by hosting one of its international Departments.

Further Information: www.theschoolofkyiv.org