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Timothy Snyder

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Editorial

Macht und Ohnmacht – das war nicht nur das Thema des diesjährigen Vienna Humanities Festivals, konfliktreiche Herrschafts- und Machtverhältnisse ziehen sich auch wie ein roter Faden durch die aktuelle Ausgabe der IWM*post*. Wie **Timothy Snyder** in seinem neuesten Buch *Der Weg in die Unfreiheit* zeigt, kann Demokratie sehr schnell in Tyrannei umschlagen. Das beschreibt **Michael Sandel** sehr eindringlich am Beispiel Donald Trumps in den USA. Dort hat auch die #MeToo-Debatte ihren Ausgang genommen, mit der sich **Elisabeth Holzleithner** und **Ulrike Lunacek** kritisch auseinandersetzen. **Ruth Wodak** hingegen fragt, wie es um die Gleichstellung der Frau im „post-faktischen Zeitalter" bestellt ist. Wie Medien mit sinkenden Verkaufszahlen und Glaubwürdigkeitsverlust umgehen, hat **John Palattella** analysiert.

Vor welchen Herausforderungen die EU aktuell steht, ist Gegenstand gleich mehrerer Beiträge. Während **David Goodhart** die immer größer werdende gesellschaftliche Kluft zwischen den so genannten *Somewheres* and *Anywheres* kritisiert, sieht **Anthony Barnett** die größte Stärke der EU in ihren Regulierungen und Verordnungen. Welche Strategien notwendig sind, um Europa aus der Krise in eine hoffnungsvolle Zukunft zu führen, haben die Fellows des Projekts *Europe's Futures* aus jeweils unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln beantwortet. Wirtschaftlich betrachtet geht **Lord Robert Skidelsky** in seinem Essay der Frage nach, ob der Mensch im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung und Automatisierung der Arbeitswelt über kurz oder lang überflüssig wird. Mit einem anderen Thema von globaler Brisanz beschäftigt sich **Shalini Randeria** in ihrem Text zur „demografischen Bulimie", der die niedrigen Geburtenraten vieler westlicher Gesellschaften der „Überbevölkerung" im Globalen Süden gegenüberstellt. **Tobias Bernet** wiederum zeigt in seinem Beitrag, dass Konflikte rund ums Mieten und Wohnen symptomatisch für die gesellschaftspolitischen Spaltungen der Gegenwart sind. Inwiefern der wachsende Einfluss der orthodoxen Kirche in Russland als Erfolg oder Alarmsignal zu werten ist, untersucht **Sergey Chapnin.**

Ein rechtlicher Schwerpunkt dieser Ausgabe beschäftigt sich mit den Leugnern des Völkerrechts im geopolitischen Wettstreit **(Paul Hahnenkamp)** und der prekären Lage der Rohingyas als weltweit größte staatenlose Bevölkerung **(Ranabir Samaddar).** Welche Rolle Österreich bei der Aufklärung von schwersten Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Syrien spielen kann, hat **Miloš Vec** im Interview mit **Tatiana Urdaneta Wittek** näher beleuchtet. ◁

Power and powerlessness—this was not only the theme of this year's Vienna Humanities Festival, conflict-laden power relations also run like a red thread through the current issue of the IWM*post*. As **Timothy Snyder** shows in his latest book *The Road to Unfreedom,* democracy can very quickly turn into tyranny. **Michael Sandel** describes this very vividly using Donald Trump's example in the USA. This is also where the #MeToo debate, with which **Elisabeth Holzleithner** and **Ulrike Lunacek** critically deal, began. **Ruth Wodak,** on the other hand, asks about the position of women in the "post-factual age". **John Palattella** has analyzed how media deal with declining sales figures and loss of credibility.

The challenges currently facing the EU are the subject of several articles. While **David Goodhart** criticizes the growing social divide between the so-called *Somewheres* and *Anywheres,* **Anthony Barnett** sees regulation at the heart of the EU's achievement.

The fellows of the project *Europe's Futures* have answered the question which strategies are necessary to lead Europe out of the crisis into a hopeful future from different perspectives. From an economic point of view, **Lord Robert Skidelsky's** essay explores the question whether people will sooner or later become redundant in the age of digitalization and automation of work. **Shalini Randeria's** text on "demographic bulimia", which contrasts the low birth rates of many Western societies with the "overpopulation" in the Global South, deals with another topic of global relevance. **Tobias Bernet,** on the other hand, shows in his contribution that conflicts over housing are symptomatic of the socio-political divisions of the present. **Sergey Chapnin** examines the extent to which the growing influence of the Orthodox Church in Russia can be seen as triumph or tragedy.

A legal focus of this issue deals with the deniers of international law in geopolitical competition **(Paul Hahnenkamp)** and the precarious situation of the Rohingyas as the world's largest stateless population **(Ranabir Samaddar).** In an interview with **Tatiana Urdaneta Wittek, Miloš Vec** has examined in more detail the role Austria can play in clarifying the most serious human rights violations in Syria. ◁

Anita Dick
Marion Gollner

Der Weg in die Unfreiheit

VON TIMOTHY SNYDER

Wenn wir nicht endlich aufwachen, dann wird die freie Welt vielleicht schon bald Vergangenheit sein, schreibt Timothy Snyder in seinem aktuellen Buch Der Weg in die Unfreiheit. Russland. Europa. Amerika, *das er bei der Eröffnung des diesjährigen Vienna Humanities Festivals im Rahmen einer Wiener Vorlesung im Rathaus präsentiert hat. Darin warnt der Historiker und IWM Permanent Fellow davor, dass Politik zukünftig durch Propaganda ersetzt wird und wir uns von einer Politik der Unausweichlichkeit zu einer Politik der Ewigkeit hinbewegen.*

Unausweichlichkeit und Ewigkeit verwandeln Fakten in Narrative. Wer sich von der Unausweichlichkeit getragen fühlt, sieht in jeder Tatsache ein kurzzeitiges Phänomen, das die Erzählung vom Fortschritt nicht grundsätzlich verändert. Wer zur Ewigkeit überwechselt, definiert jedes neue Ereignis als ein weiteres Moment einer zeitlosen Bedrohung. Beide geben sich den Anschein von Geschichte, beide schaffen Geschichte ab.

Unausweichlichkeitspolitiker lehren, dass die Spezifika der Vergangenheit irrelevant seien, da alles, was geschieht, nur Wasser auf die Mühlen des Fortschritts ist. Ewigkeitspolitiker springen von einem Zeitpunkt zum nächsten, über Jahrzehnte oder auch Jahrhunderte, um einen Mythos von Unschuld und Gefahr aufzubauen. Sie imaginieren Zyklen der Bedrohung in der Vergangenheit. Sie erschaffen ein imaginäres Muster, das sie in der Gegenwart Realität werden lassen, indem sie künstliche Krisen und tägliche Aufregergeschichten produzieren.

Unausweichlichkeit und Ewigkeit haben ihre je eigenen Propagandastile. Politiker der Unausweichlichkeit verschönern Fakten zu einem Kokon des Wohlgefühls. Politiker der Ewigkeit unterdrücken Fakten, um auszublenden, dass Menschen in anderen Ländern freier und wohlhabender sind, und sie unterdrücken die Idee, dass die Konzeption von Reformen auf Wissen basieren könnte. In den 2010er Jahren war vieles von dem, was geschah, im Rahmen einer politischen Fiktion inszeniert worden. Es waren spektakuläre Geschichten, die Aufmerksamkeit beanspruchten und auch den Raum, den man eigentlich gebraucht hätte, um nachzudenken. Aber wie auch immer die Propaganda auf die Zeitgenossen wirken mag, das endgültige Urteil der Geschichte ist damit nicht gesprochen. Es besteht eine Differenz zwischen der Erinnerung, den Eindrücken, die auf uns einwirken, und der Geschichte, den Zusammenhängen, die wir herausarbeiten – vorausgesetzt, der Wille dazu ist da.

In diesem Buch wird der Versuch unternommen, die Gegenwart für die Geschichte und damit die Geschichte für die Politik zurückzugewinnen. Es geht darum, eine Reihe von miteinander in Beziehung stehenden Geschehnissen unserer gegenwärtigen weltgeschichtlichen Lage zu verstehen, wobei die Spanne von Russland bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten reicht, und das zu einer Zeit, in der die Faktizität als solche infrage gestellt wird. Russlands Invasion der Ukraine im Jahre 2014 war ein Test für den Realitätssinn der Europäischen Union und der Vereinigten Staaten. Viele Europäer und Amerikaner fanden es einfacher, die Propagandaphantome der Russen zu akzeptieren, als die Rechtsordnung zu verteidigen. Europäer und Amerikaner vergeudeten viel Zeit mit der Frage, ob eine Invasion stattgefunden habe, ob die Ukraine ein Land sei und ob sie nicht irgendwie und überhaupt überfallen werden musste. Hier wurde eine umfassende Schwachstelle sichtbar, die Russland bald in Europa und in den Vereinigten Staaten ausnutzte.

Geschichtsschreibung entstand als wissenschaftliche Disziplin in der Konfrontation mit der Kriegspropaganda. In seinem Buch über den Peloponnesischen Krieg, einem der frühesten Werke der europäischen Geschichtsschreibung, unterschied Thukydides genau zwischen den Berichten der Befehlshaber und den tatsächlichen Gründen für ihre Entscheidungen. Heutzutage wird der investigative Journalismus immer unersetzlicher, weil wachsende Ungleichheit die politische Fiktion befördert. Seine Renaissance erlebte er während der russischen Invasion der Ukraine, als mutige Reporter aus der Gefahrenzone berichteten. In Russland und in der Ukraine waren journalistische Initiativen zu den Themen Kleptokratie und Korruption entstanden, dann berichteten Journalisten, die Erfahrungen auf diesen Feldern gesammelt hatten, über den Krieg.

Was in Russland bereits eingetreten ist, geschieht vielleicht auch in Amerika und Europa: die Etablierung massiver Ungleichheit, die Ersetzung von Politik durch Propaganda, der Übergang von der Politik der Unausweichlichkeit zur Politik der Ewigkeit. Das russische Führungspersonal konnte Amerika und Europa in die Ewigkeit einladen, weil Russland zuerst dort angekommen war. Man beobachtete bei Amerikanern und Europäern die Schwächen, die man im eigenen Land bereits erkannt und ausgebeutet hatte.

Auf die Ereignisse der 2010er Jahre waren viele Amerikaner und Europäer nicht vorbereitet: das Aufkommen antidemokratischer Politik, die Abwendung Russlands von Europa und die Invasion der Ukraine, das Brexit-Referendum, die Wahl Trumps. Die Amerikaner neigen bei Überraschungen zu zwei Reaktionen. Entweder reden sie sich ein, das unerwartete Ereignis gebe es in Wirklichkeit gar nicht, oder sie behaupten, es sei so vollkommen neu, dass es sich dem historischen Verständnis entziehe. Entweder wird alles irgendwie gut, oder es ist so schrecklich, dass man nichts dagegen unternehmen kann. Die erste Reaktion ist der Verteidigungsmechanismus der Politik der Unausweichlichkeit. Die zweite kommt mit dem ächzenden Geräusch, das kurz vor dem Zusammenbruch der Unausweichlichkeit entsteht, wenn sie den Weg für die Ewigkeit freigibt. Die Politik der Unausweichlichkeit erodiert das Verantwortungsbewusstsein der Bürger, und falls eine ernste Herausforderung kommt, mutiert sie zur Politik der Ewigkeit. Die Amerikaner zeigten beide Reaktionen, als Russlands Wunschkandidat Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten wurde.

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In den neunziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts und in der ersten Dekade des 21. ging der Einfluss von West nach Ost: mit der Übernahme von ökonomischen und politischen Vorbildern, der Verbreitung der englischen Sprache, der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union und der NATO. Inzwischen haben deregulierte Sphären des amerikanischen und europäischen Kapitalismus wohlhabende Russen in ein Reich gelockt, in dem es keine Ost-West-Geographie gibt, sondern Offshore-Bankkonten, Briefkastenfirmen und anonyme Deals, bei denen das Vermögen gewaschen wird, das dem russischen Volk gestohlen wurde. Auch aus diesem Grund drifte der Einfluss in den 2010er Jahren von Ost nach West, als die Ausnahme des Offshore zur Regel und die russische politische Fiktion außerhalb von Russland wirkmächtig wurde. Im *Peloponnesischen Krieg* definierte Thukydides „Oligarchie" als „Herrschaft von Wenigen" im Gegensatz zur „Demokratie". Aristoteles verstand unter „Oligarchie" die „Herrschaft der Wenigen, die reich sind". In dieser Bedeutungsvariante erlebte das Wort Oligarchie in den 1990er Jahren in der russischen Sprache seine Renaissance – und die Erklärung von der „Herrschaft der wenigen, die reich sind", *the rule of the wealthy few,* in den 2010er Jahren dann, aus gutem Grund, im Englischen.

Begriffe und Verfahrensweisen wanderten vom Osten in den Westen. Zum Beispiel das Wort *Fake* wie in *Fake News:* Das klingt wie eine amerikanische Erfindung, und Donald Trump reklamiert sie für sich, aber der Ausdruck wurde in Russland und in der Ukraine schon lange benutzt, bevor er seinen Siegeszug in den Vereinigten Staaten antrat. Er bedeutet, dass sich ein fiktionaler Text als journalistischer ausgibt, und zwar sowohl um Verwirrung über ein bestimmtes Geschehen zu stiften, als auch um den Journalismus als solchen zu diskreditieren. Politiker der Ewigkeit verbreiten zunächst selbst *Fake News,* dann behaupten sie, alle Nachrichten seien *Fake,* und schließlich, dass allein ihre eigenen Spektakel wahr seien. Die russische Kampagne, die die internationale Öffentlichkeit mit Fiktionen überschwemmen sollte, begann 2014 in der Ukraine und griff 2015 auf die Vereinigten Staaten über, wo sie 2016 dazu beitrug, den Präsidenten zu wählen. Die Technik war überall dieselbe, allerdings wurde sie mit der Zeit immer raffinierter.

Russland war in den 2010er Jahren ein kleptokratisches Regime, das entschlossen war, die Politik der Ewigkeit zu exportieren: Faktizität zu vernichten, Ungleichheit zu zementieren und ähnliche Tendenzen in Europa und in den Vereinigten Staaten zu beschleunigen. Das wird gut an der Ukraine sichtbar, wo Russland einen regelrechten Krieg führte, während es die Kampagnen zur Zerrüttung der Europäischen Union und der Vereinigten Staaten verstärkte. Der Berater des ersten pro-russischen amerikanischen Präsidentschaftskandidaten war der Berater des letzten pro-russischen Präsidenten der Ukraine gewesen. Russische Taktiken, die in der Ukraine scheiterten, waren nun in den Vereinigten Staaten erfolgreich. Russische und ukrainische Oligarchen versteckten ihr Geld so, dass der Aufstieg eines amerikanischen Präsidentschaftskandidaten davon profitierte. Das alles ist eine einzige, zusammengehörende Geschichte, die Geschichte unserer Gegenwart und unserer Entscheidungen. ◁

Timothy Snyder ist Richard C. Levin Professor of History an der Yale University und ein Permanent Fellow am IWM. Er hat u.a. den Hannah-Arendt-Preis und den Leipziger Buchpreis für Europäische Verständigung erhalten. Seine Bücher wurden in mehr als dreißig Sprachen übersetzt.

Der Weg in die Unfreiheit. Russland, Europa, Amerika, Verlag C.H.Beck: München, 2018

Macht und Ohnmacht
Vienna Humanities Festival

EIN PROJEKT VON IWM, TIME TO TALK UND WIEN MUSEUM

Das dritte Vienna Humanities Festival versammelte vom 27. bis zum 30. September 2018 wieder führende Köpfe aus Wissenschaft, Kunst und Kultur zu einem mehrtägigen urbanen Salon in Wien. Unter dem Motto „Macht und Ohnmacht" ging es im Gedenk- und Erinnerungsjahr 2018 u.a. um die Krise der Demokratie, den Aufstieg des Populismus, die #MeToo-Debatte und die Macht des Geldes. Das vom Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Time to Talk und Wien Museum veranstaltete Festival wurde mit einem Vortrag des US-amerikanischen Historikers und Bestsellerautors Timothy Snyder eröffnet. Zusammen mit IWM Rektorin Shalini Randeria stellte er sein neues Buch *Der Weg in die Unfreiheit* (siehe S. 3) im Rahmen einer Wiener Vorlesung im Rathaus vor. Die rund 40 Veranstaltungen rund um den Karlsplatz lockten an den darauffolgenden Tagen mehr als 5.500 BesucherInnen an. Neben der Österreich-Prämiere von Ruth Beckermanns Film „Waldheims Walzer" im Gartenbaukino standen dieses Jahr auch eine hochkarätig besetzte Podiumsdiskussion zur Zukunft der Medien am IWM (siehe S. 5) sowie ein Schwerpunkt zur hundertjährigen Geschichte der Republik Österreich im Wien Museum am Programm. Ein weiteres Highlight des Festivals war die Theaterperformance „The Iran Conference" vom gefeierten russischen Dramaturg und Regisseur Ivan Vyrpaev. Zu den geladenen Gästen zählten in diesem Jahr u.a. Marina Davydova, Franz Fischler, Ulrike Guérot, Michael Ignatieff, Maxim Kantor, Konrad Paul Liessmann, Ulrike Lunacek, Chantal Mouffe, Martin Pollack, Doron Rabinovici, Matthias Strolz und Ruth Wodak. Videos aller Vorträge sind auf **www.humanitiesfestival.at** verfügbar. ◁

Fotos: Rudolf Handl, Paul Plibernig, Kollektiv Fischka/Paulus Jakob, Kollektiv Fischka/Daniela Jakob

Signal or Noise? Power and Powerlessness in the Media

BY JOHN PALATTELLA

Photo: Montage of noLimit46 & -oqlpo- / iStock

One day in June 1996, I found myself in a cubicle with some of my editorial colleagues at *Lingua Franca.* Staring at a Macintosh connected to our one dial-up Internet line, we were awaiting the debut of a weekly online magazine about politics and culture. We had logged into the site at the appointed time, but nothing was happening. The pitch-black monitor was staring at us. Suddenly the black started to rise like a theater curtain, revealing the publication's name: *Slate.* We studied it for a few minutes, savoring the moment, and then went back to editing articles stored on floppy disks.

Slate was weird and familiar: a magazine on the Web, but edited by people of print. Moreover, while *Slate* was taking a risk by stepping into the unknown, the risk was hedged. *Slate* was bankrolled by Microsoft, which had also decided to publish *Slate on Paper,* a monthly collection of highlights sold exclusively at Starbucks. You could post news, but would a lot of people read it? After all, like *Slate's* editors, none of its potential readers were "digital natives." One reason was that in 1996, Americans with Internet access spent on average fewer than thirty minutes a month on the Web.

I have been thinking about this episode since organizing a roundtable at the IWM on 28 September about journalism's present crisis of authority and trust. The crisis has to do not with attempting something new but simply with doing journalism. If a debut like *Slate's* were to happen today, the scenario would be different. As the curtain rose, some in the audience would throw virtual garbage at it, simply for being a big target. Others would try to hack the sound system, using techniques perfected on older, bigger outlets. Immediately after the debut, the ruckus would spill into the digital street. The playwright would be attacked for having a hidden agenda, the actors berated for having trained in an academy instead of among people like those in the audience, the producers pilloried for profiting from sensation gussied up as art. Meanwhile, a handful of guerilla productions would be replaying the drama nearby, and with plot lines reshaped by willful misunderstanding, some turning tragedy into comedy, others into farce.

Today's crisis is not without strange contradictions, one being that while many readers distrust newspapers and magazines that they read online, editors have never known more about their readers. Editors can track interactions like unique page views and time spent on a page, and as a recent editorial in *n+1* noted, they can even track "scroll depth, the exact point at which readers give up" on reading an online story. At the same time, publications as different as *The New York Times* and *Jacobin* pay Facebook top dollar to promote their stories on a user's Facebook feed. Nevertheless, readers continue to spray abuse not only at publications but also at their fellow readers, while also not paying for subscriptions. So much for hedging bets. Little wonder that it takes a rich patron, if not an oligarch, to maintain a quality newspaper or magazine.

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At IWM, twenty-five magazine editors and writers from Europe and the United States discussed some of the possible roots of journalism's present crisis of authority and trust. One of the conversation's liveliest threads was about whether it's correct to assume that publications have created the crisis. Instead, publications have themselves become battlegrounds in a larger crisis of democracy caused by recent political events, among them the 2008 financial crash, the influx of migrants into the EU in 2015, Brexit, and the rise of illiberal politics in countries like Hungary, Poland, Italy, and the US.

Why has this crisis of democracy has been so volatile? One reason is that it has been fed by conspiracy theories that, thanks to hermetic filter bubbles, have lived many lives. While conspiracy theories may arise from genuine feelings of anger and powerlessness, they can also stifle self-criticism. Instead of exposing facts, conspiracy theories center on divulging secrets and so-called "hidden truths." A conspiracy theory promises a revelation, and its believers insist that something so shocking and terrifying could not possibly be false. For them, any newspaper that says otherwise is "fake news."

Another thread of the conversation was the question of what to do, which was difficult to answer. Modern journalism is a product of liberal democracy and depends on liberal democracy, and the discontent with both has become volatile. "One cannot live without the other," stressed Cathrin Kalwheit of *Süddeutsche Zeitung.* Katarzyna Wężyk of *Gazeta Wyborcza* emphasized a related danger: blurring the line between the journalist—"who is supposed to be impartial and objective and shouldn't, as much as possible, let their political views to be known—and the concerned citizen." This danger exists across the political spectrum, with journalists turning into "activists for the government or the opposition. This polarization is harming the standards of our profession."

Others argued that publications have no choice but to correct for their own filter bubbles while also trying to interact with readers in public forums in order to reinforce their trust or win it back. The idea, said Elisabeth von Thadden of *Die Zeit,* is to analyze published stories, explain how editors and reporters work, and defend the importance of fact. Jon Baskin of *The Point,* a little magazine based in Chicago, went in the opposite direction. "One thing we hear constantly from our readers," he said, "is how battered they feel by the tone of much of what they read online, with its insistence that the time to act is now, that time is running out, or that the good times have passed." Baskin wondered if today one worthy role for an intellectual publication would be to help readers see that what they think of vanishing time "can be their free time: if they can do anything with it, they might as well use it to think." ◁

John Palattella, contributing editor of *The Point* and editor-at-large of *The Nation,* was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM from June to August 2018.

In September 2018, he and IWM Permanent Fellow Ivan Krastev jointly organized an international editors' roundtable at the IWM including editors and freelance writers from the most prestigious non-academic intellectual journals worldwide. The roundtable concluded with a public panel discussion on the future of the media as part of the Vienna Humanities Festival. Elisabeth von Thadden (*Die Zeit*), Katarzyna Wężyk (*Gazeta Wyborcza*) and Thomas Chatterton Williams (*New York Times Magazine*) talked with John Palattella about how the media has been challenged by some of the features of junk time, such as fake news, political polarization, and reactionary politics.

Sexuelle Belästigung: Das letzte Tabu?

VON ULRIKE LUNACEK UND ELISABETH HOLZLEITHNER

Ob „Erl-König", Hollywood-Producer, Nationalratsabgeordneter, Sporttrainer, Oberster Richter oder amerikanischer Präsident – dies ist nur eine kleine Auswahl von mächtigen Männern, denen in den letzten beiden Jahren sexuelle Übergriffe vorgeworfen wurden. Manche von ihnen mussten abtreten, anderen haben die Vorwürfe kaum geschadet. Die #MeToo-Kampagne hat Debatten darüber aus dem Schatten ins grelle Licht der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit geholt. Ist damit das letzte Tabu im Geschlechterverhältnis gebrochen?

Eine Veranstaltung am IWM im April 2018 widmete sich genau dieser Frage – und das durchaus kontrovers. Ulrike Lunacek hatte im Zuge der Planungen diese Vermutung ausgesprochen: Alle anderen Themen wie Vergewaltigung in der Ehe, Gewalt in Nahbeziehungen (insbesondere von männlichen Partnern), gläserne Decke, Gender Pay Gap u.v.a. seien von Femi-

nistinnen ja schon – wiewohl gegen viel Widerstand – ins Zentrum des Interesses gerückt worden und hätten zu zahlreichen Gesetzesnovellen geführt. Sexuelle Belästigung sei demgegenüber bisher tabuisiert gewesen, so Lunacek. Elisabeth Holzleithner hielt dagegen, dass sexuelle Übergriffe in den letzten Jahren sehr wohl Gegenstand von öffentlichen Debatten wie #Aufschrei und vielen anderen Initiativen waren. Einigen konnten sich die beiden Autorinnen freilich darauf, dass es für die Betroffenen nach wie vor schwierig ist, über solche Vorkommnisse zu sprechen. Die Macht des Täters und das Wissen, dass die Täter häufig ein sehr verständnisvolles Publikum vorfinden, halten viele davon ab. Grund genug, sich diesem komplexen und umstrittenen Thema in einer Veranstaltung zu nähern.

Auf dem Podium diskutierte neben den Autorinnen dieser Zeilen auch die langjährige Gleichbehandlungsanwältin Sabine Wagner-Steinrigl. Vor dem Hintergrund der Frage, warum viele Frauen erst Jahre nach den Vorfällen an die Öffentlichkeit gehen, brachte sie zunächst eine ganz grundlegende rechtlich-definitorische Unterscheidung ins Spiel: Die Definition von sexueller Belästigung im Strafrecht sei eine ganz andere als jene im Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, auf die sich die Gleichbehandlungsanwaltschaft beziehe. Der Tatbestand der sexuellen Belästigung ist laut Gleichbehandlungsgesetz dann gegeben, wenn:

1. das Verhalten die sexuelle Sphäre betrifft (sehr weit interpretierbar; z.B. das Bild einer nackten Frau im Büro).
2. die Würde beeinträchtigt wird (grundlegender Eingriff in die Integrität der betroffenen Person)
3. die Handlung unerwünscht ist (subjektives Element, das selten Gegenstand des Rechts ist; in diesem Fall aber von zentraler Bedeutung; wenn die Handlung nicht unerwünscht ist, gibt es auch kein Problem, selbst wenn es um das Sexuelle geht)
4. das (Arbeits-)Umfeld negativ beeinträchtigt wird.

Die Europäische Grundrechteagentur hat 2014 eine Studie über Gewalterfahrungen von Frauen in allen EU-Mitgliedstaaten veröffentlicht. Frappierend daran ist, dass unglaubliche 35% aller Frauen, die sexuelle Belästigung erfahren haben, diese Erfahrung für sich behalten und es niemandem erzählt haben. Die Gründe dafür sind vielfältig: Zum einen fördern prekäre Arbeitsverhältnisse die Angst, den Arbeitsplatz zu verlieren; zum anderen haben viele das Gefühl, es würde ohnehin nichts bringen oder der Übergriff sei zu unbedeutend gewesen, um ihn zu melden bzw. anzuzeigen. Für viele schwingt aber auch sehr viel Scham und Schuldgefühl mit – v.a. wenn Frauen meinen, sie würden Mitschuld tragen, weil sie vielleicht zu Beginn auf eine Art ‚Flirt' oder eine ‚Annäherung' eingestiegen sind.

Die Gründe dafür liegen in der traditionell untergeordneten Rolle der Frau, an der sich bis heute wenig geändert hat, sowie der patriarchalen Kondition des nicht-öffentlichen Redens von Frauen: „Schweigen war die historische Kondition von Frauen", schreibt Rebecca Solnit in ihrem 2017 erschienenen Buch *Die Mutter aller Fragen.* Und schon 1977 hielt Audre Lorde vor der Modern Language Association eine viel beachtete Rede unter dem Titel „The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action" (veröffentlicht 1984). Darin ist zu lesen: „My silences had not protected me. Your silence will not protect you. … I had made contact with other women while we examined the words to fit a world in which we all believed, bridging our differences. And it was the concern and caring of all those women which gave me strength."

Ein weiterer Faktor für Scham und Schuldgefühle, für die Angst, sich lächerlich zu machen, ist die unterschiedliche Identitätsfindung von Frauen und Männern im Kindesalter: Im Allgemeinen lernen Buben, sich über sich selbst zu definieren und Dinge klar einzufordern, indem sie sagen „Ich will"; Mädchen hingegen lernen immer noch, primär für andere da zu sein und sich in erster Linie über Männer und/oder als Mütter zu definieren. Häufig gelten Frauen hierzulande als „Rabenmütter", wenn sie Kinder haben und frühzeitig einer bezahlten Beschäftigung außer Haus nachgehen. Haben sie jedoch keine Kinder, werden sie nicht als „richtige Frauen" angesehen. Wie damit umgehen? Solnit vermutet, dass es auf diese Frage keine gute Antwort gibt. Die Kunst würde möglicherweise darin liegen, sich der Frage zu verweigern.

Elisabeth Holzleithner, Sabine Wagner-Steinrigl, Ulrike Lunacek und Shalini Randeria

Foto: IWM

Eine Frage der Macht

Auch in der Aufteilung von Macht und Geld spiegeln sich Geschlechterklischees wie Realität wider: Es ist ein Teufelskreis: Die Strukturen begünstigen Männer, daher werden diese in Machtpositionen eher wahrgenommen; dort haben sie mehr Macht und Geld als Frauen und bevorzugen bei Postenvergabe wiederum Männer. Diese Haltung kommt im Bericht *Women in Political Decision-Making* des Europäischen Parlaments aus dem März 2012 klar zum Ausdruck: „… today an informal system of quotas is de facto in play, where men are privileged over women and where men choose men for decision-making positions, which is not a formalised system but nevertheless a systematic and very real deep-rooted culture of positive treatment of men."

Da ist das Brechen des Tabus der sexuellen Belästigung nur ein Faktor im ständigen Machtkarussell, dem Frauen hinterherlaufen und sich fortwährend fragen, ob es diese Anstrengung, diese Demütigung, dieses Lächerlich-Gemacht-Werden wirklich wert ist. Es wäre höchst an der Zeit, diese Machtverhältnisse neu auszuhandeln und Strukturen so einzurichten, dass die Ausübung von Macht nicht ins Toxische kippt. Denn wie Gleichbehandlungsanwältin Wagner-Steinrigl bei der Veranstaltung im April erzählte, sind auch Männer in untergeordneten Funktionen, etwa als Zivildiener, sexueller Gewalt ausgesetzt. Es seien nicht viele, aber überall dort, wo Machtverhältnisse nicht hinreichend reflektiert und transparent eingerichtet werden, gibt es auch sexuelle Übergriffe.

Denn Macht ist nicht *per se* negativ. Wer etwas umsetzen möchte, braucht dazu „Macht". Das gilt auch und gerade für Frauen und feministische Bewegungen, die angetreten sind, die gesellschaftlichen Machtverhältnisse auf andere Grundlagen zu stellen. Deshalb bedürfte es auch eines unverkrampften Verhältnisses zu Macht – auch jener Macht, die über Recht und Gesetz ausgeübt wird, so Elisabeth Holzleithner.

Die Frauenrechtsbewegung und ihre Folgen

Die Wahrnehmung von sexuellen Übergriffen (insbesondere am Arbeitsplatz) sowie deren Benennung als solche ist keine rein feministische Erfolgsgeschichte – dafür ist die Umsetzung dieser Gesetze zu mühselig.

Fortsetzung auf Seite 22

Fotos: Jan-Peter Boening / laif / picturedesk.com

„Geht's den Frauen gut, geht's uns allen gut!"

VON RUTH WODAK

Die Sprachwissenschaftlerin **Ruth Wodak,** *die noch bis Januar 2019 Visiting Fellow am IWM ist, wurde am 8. Oktober 2018 mit dem „Lebenswerk-Preis" ausgezeichnet.[1] Mit dem vom Frauenministerium vergebenen Preis werden herausragende Personen gewürdigt, die sich für die Verwirklichung der Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern eingesetzt haben. Wir gratulieren sehr herzlich!*

Sehr geehrte Festgäste, liebe Freundinnen und Freunde! Herzlichen Dank, dass Sie und Ihr heute alle gekommen seid, um mit mir diesen Preis zu feiern. Ich freue mich natürlich sehr und bedanke mich bei der Jury und selbstverständlich auch bei Ihnen, Frau Bundesministerin, für diese Auszeichnung. Außerdem bedanke ich mich bei all meinen FreundInnen, meinen LehrerInnen, MentorInnen, MitarbeiterInnen, SchülerInnen und vor allem bei meiner Familie für die jahrzehntelange solidarische Unterstützung.

Gleich vornweg: Ich höre sicherlich noch nicht auf, zu forschen und mich – wie immer weiterhin neugierig – mit neuen (und alten) Themen zu befassen; ich befinde mich – wie man so schön sagt – in „Halbpension". Denn gerade heutzutage, in einer recht wissenschaftsfeindlichen Zeit, in der immer häufiger Erkenntnisse und Einsichten zu bloßen Meinungen degradiert werden, ist es umso wichtiger, sich kritisch reflektierend, systematisch und interdisziplinär mit den vielen komplexen, ungelösten Problemen hier und anderswo auseinanderzusetzen.

Natürlich bin ich auch überrascht, diese Auszeichnung gerade jetzt zu erhalten – denn, wie Sie wahrscheinlich alle wissen, widersprechen meine Forschungsschwerpunkte und -interessen wie auch meine kritisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Position manchen Inhalten und Zielen der derzeit Machthabenden.

So wurde 2003 (während Schwarz-Blau I) mein Wittgenstein-Forschungszentrum an der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften trotz bester internationaler Evaluationen geschlossen, unter anderem aufgrund meiner Forschungen zu Identitätspolitik, Rassismus, Rechtspopulismus und Antisemitismus. Diese Themen, so befanden damals einige Mitglieder, passten nicht an die Akademie – wohl aber dann für 12 Jahre an die Lancaster University, in England.

Gerade diese Forschungen haben sich jedoch in den letzten 15 Jahren als besonders relevant erwiesen; mein diesbezügliches Buch „Politik mit der Angst: Zur Wirkung rechtspopulistischer Diskurse" wurde als Wissenschaftsbuch des Jahres 2017 im Bereich Kulturwissenschaften ausgezeichnet. So ändern sich also die Zeiten!

Ich bin ein „Kind der Rückkehr", ein Kind von Eltern, die von den Nazis vertrieben wurden und die aus ihrer Überzeugung für ein „Nie wieder", für eine bessere Welt nach 1945 kämpfen zu müssen, aus dem britischen Exil in dieses Land zurückgekehrt sind. Mit dem Eintreten für Gerechtigkeit und die Menschenrechte bin ich aufgewachsen und bin meinen Eltern für diese klare Positionierung sehr dankbar.

Besonders berührt und gerührt bin ich, dass die heutigen Preisverleihungen im Gedenken an Käthe Leichter stattfinden – an eine Sozialwissenschaftlerin, sozialistische Gewerkschafterin, Frauenrechtlerin und Kämpferin gegen den Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus. Käthe Leichter gehörte derselben Jugendorganisation an wie mein Vater, sie war als Vorbild bei uns zu Hause in Gesprächen immer wieder präsent.

Leider müssen wir feststellen, dass auch heute noch viele Vorurteile und Stereotype gegenüber Frauen und Minderheiten bestehen.

Erfolge und Rückschläge der Frauenbewegung

Auch eine 68-erin bin ich, d.h. ich hatte das Privileg in der Zeit eines gewaltigen Umbruchs zu studieren, in der die Modernisierung Österreichs vorangetrieben wurde. Die Universitäten öffneten sich endlich mehr Frauen gegenüber.

Insofern bin ich auch eine Feministin der ersten Stunde. Johanna Dohnal war unser Vorbild, 1975 haben wir die erste Frauengruppe an der Uni Wien gegründet mit dem Namen „Frauengruppe Uni-Wien". Zum Erstaunen unserer damaligen (männlichen) Chefs habilitierten sich alle Frauen aus dieser Gruppe; und wir publizierten 1975 – ebenfalls zum Erstaunen unserer männlichen Kollegen – zusammen ein Buch mit dem Titel „Das ewige Klischee". Leider müssen wir feststellen, dass auch heute noch viele Vorurteile und Stereotype gegenüber Frauen und Minderheiten bestehen und sogar ein vehementer Backlash auf uns zuzukommen scheint, ja teilweise schon stattfindet.

Übrigens: Meine erste Erfahrung mit der patriarchalischen Wissenschaft machte ich 1971 – ich begann damals mit meiner Dissertation im Fach Soziolinguistik, ein Fach, das in Österreich zu der Zeit so nicht existierte. Nur ein Professor in Graz wandte sich einigen sprachsoziologischen Fragestellungen zu. Also fuhr ich nach Graz, um mir Ratschläge für meine geplante Feldforschung zu holen. Freundlicherweise erklärte mir der Professor, dass ich mir zwei Sachen merken müsse – erstens, dass man bei der Feldforschung viel Schnaps trinken muss; und zweitens, dass man Frauen bei Vorträgen nur anschaue, Männern aber zuhöre. Diese Ratschläge waren nicht gerade hilfreich; aber mir wurde klar, dass solche Einstellungen verändert gehören und dass Kommunikation eine von vielen Dimensionen darstellt, an der Veränderungen notwendig sind.

Freundschaften aus dieser ersten Zeit an der Universität Wien sind mir heute noch außerordentlich wichtig. Es ist uns damals gelungen, die Gleichbehandlung an den Universitäten zu erkämpfen und endlich – auch als Wissenschaftlerinnen hörbar und sichtbar zu werden. An dieser Stelle will ich einer engen Freundin danken, die uns alle mit ihrer Leidenschaft angesteckt hat, nämlich der vor einigen Jahren verstorbenen Gender-Historikerin Edith Saurer.

Gehört werden

Uns war allerdings schon damals klar, dass „Frausein alleine kein Programm ist". Es kommt natürlich auf Werte, Einstellungen, Qualifikationen und Haltungen an, auf eine Vision einer gerechten Gesellschaft, in der eine anachronistische Geschlechterpolitik keine Rolle mehr spielen darf. Gerade deshalb wünsche ich dem Frauenvolksbegehren, das heute, am 8. Oktober zu Ende geht, viel Erfolg!

Sichtbar werden, gehört werden, ernst genommen werden – dieses Motto war damals wichtig und ist es bis heute geblieben. Sichtbar und hörbar werden bedeutet, dass kommuniziert werden muss, ob mündlich, schriftlich oder durch Bilder: „Sprachhandeln", explizit Position beziehen, Klarheit herstellen.

Dabei fällt man notwendigerweise manchmal unangenehm auf, besonders Frauen wurden und werden dann unter anderem als „karriere-süchtig, streng oder irritierend" charakterisiert. Geduld und Beharrlichkeit sind vonnöten, lang- und mittelfristiges Abschätzen von Folge- und Spätfolgewirkungen, wie wir es auch von Politikern und Politikerinnen erwarten.

Natürlich kann man schweigen und damit auf Sichtbarkeit und Haltung verzichten; auch Schweigen gilt als Kommunikation – dies hat der bekannte Kommunikationstheoretiker und Psychotherapeut Paul Watzlawick schon in den 1970er-Jahren schlüssig nachgewiesen. Allerdings verbleit eine solche Kommunikation oft vage und in alle Richtungen hin interpretierbar. Im Lateinunterricht haben wir doch gelernt, dass „Qui tacet, consentire videtur" (wer schweigt, scheint zu zustimmen). Umso erfreulicher, wenn sich die Verantwortlichen wenigstens ab und zu klarer positionieren…

So war Nachkriegsösterreich von einem Schleier des Schweigens umhüllt, sowohl Opfer wie Täter schwiegen, wenn auch aus unterschiedlichen Gründen. Erstere wohl, weil sie mit dem Überleben beschäftigt waren und sich und ihre Familien vor traumatischen Erinnerungen schützen wollten; letztere aus Schuld und Scham wegen ihrer verschiedenen Rollen als Täter, Mittäter oder Mitwisser. Doch 1968, 1986 und die sogenannte „Waldheim-Affäre", und 1995 wie 2001/2 – die beiden Wehrmachtausstellungen – durchbrachen abrupt das öffentliche Schweigen und ermöglichten damit wesentliche Auseinandersetzungen mit und Einsichten in Vergangenheiten, die die althergebrachten Muster der politischen Kommunikation veränderten. Die nachhaltige Wirkung dieser – auch diskursiven – Interventionen in die österreichische Gesellschaft haben wir in unseren interdisziplinären Forschungen zu all diesen Ereignissen klar dokumentiert.

Enttabuisierung und Hyper-Inszenierung

Und wo stehen wir jetzt? Weitere Forschungen zur politischen Kommunikation in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten deuten auf signifikante Veränderungen hin:

Foto: Privat / OTS

Erstens erleben wir immer häufiger ein Durchbrechen des Nachkriegskonsenses durch Enttabuisierung und Normalisierung ehemals tabuisierter Begriffe und ausgrenzender Ideologien. Die vielen sogenannten Einzelfälle, die ich nicht aufzählen will, belegen diese Tendenz deutlich. Dass dazu vielerorts geschwiegen wird, überrascht, verstört und macht traurig. Sind etwa die Ergebnisse jahrelanger Forschungen und Debatten obsolet geworden? Die sogenannte „Kampfrhetorik" in diesem Zusammenhang ist zwar nicht neu; aber es zeigt sich, dass Inhalte zugunsten wiederholter aggressiver *ad hominem* Argumente vernachlässigt werden.

Zweitens erleben wir eine mediale Hyper-Inszenierung von Politik. Wiederum auf Kosten von Inhalten. Der mediale Auftritt wird zur Priorität. So meinte die berühmte Philosophin Hannah Arendt schon in den späten 1960er-Jahren, dass Weltpolitik „vor allem Imagepflege sei", „Sieg in der Reklameschlacht um die Weltmeinung". Dies ist sicherlich in vielen Aspekten heute – mehr denn je – der Fall.

Drittens erleben wir einen qualitativ anderen Umgang mit Unwahrheiten und Lügen in der politischen Kommunikation.

Ein Zeitalter der „Schamlosigkeit"

Es handelt sich, wie ich behaupte – angelehnt an den israelischen Semantiker Daniel Dor –, nicht so sehr um ein „post-faktisches Zeitalter" (Unwahrheiten in der Politik hat es immer schon gegeben), son-

dern um ein Zeitalter der „Schamlosigkeit", wo man sich nicht einmal mehr wegen einer offensichtlichen Lüge entschuldigen muss und wo „bad manners" (also das bewusste Vernachlässigen aller Anstandsregeln und Konversationsmaximen) von manchen als attraktives Instrument gegen sogenannte Eliten eingesetzt werden.

Dass Politiker und Politikerinnen trotz aufgedeckter Lügen einfach zur Tagesordnung übergehen können, daran gewöhnt man sich also, es normalisiert sich; man kann sich ja nicht ununterbrochen empören und aufregen. Denken wir nur an Donald Trumps Behauptungen in Bezug auf seine Inauguration vom 20. Jänner 2017. Es scheint als würden parallele Welten und Wahrheiten nebeneinander bestehen; eindeutige Faktenchecks finden wenig Resonanz.

Insgesamt hat sich, so die Ergebnisse der Forschung, die Grenze zwischen Politik, Information, Entertainment und Werbung verschoben und ist fließend geworden. Und das nicht ohne Folgen: Mangelnde Information – ja sogar Desinformation –, mangelnde Kommunikation und Partizipation tragen zu Politikverdrossenheit bei. Der Vertrauensverlust in die Politik führt dazu, dass Demagogen immer mehr Einfluss gewinnen. Historische Beispiele belegen, dass derartige Entwicklungen liberale, pluralistische Demokratien gefährden und schädigen können.

Was tun?

Wir leben in einer Zeit der Enthistorisierung und rasanten Beschleunigung: WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, E-Mail, Instagram usw. Es braucht daher eine *reflektierte Entschleunigung:* Es braucht Freiräume, um nachzudenken, historische Zusammenhänge zu erkennen, zu diskutieren; gleichzeitig braucht es Mut und Risiko, um kreative Visionen zu entwickeln und wissensbasierte Entscheidungsoptionen abzuwägen.

Einfache Rezepte haben WissenschaftlerInnen selten zu bieten – wir suchen ja nach komplexen Zusammenhängen, nicht nach simplen Lösungen.

Dennoch wünsche ich mir, dass das für mich lebenswichtige Motto – sichtbar und hörbar Haltung zu vertreten, dabei neugierig zu bleiben, lernen zu wollen, andere Meinungen zu respektieren, Konflikt und Auseinandersetzung nicht zu scheuen, und Kompromisse zu suchen – allen Menschen in unserer Gesellschaft zur Handlungsmaxime wird. Als Frau (mit Lebenswerk) wird man sich ja noch etwas wünschen dürfen. In Abwandlung eines bekannten Zitats: Geht's den Frauen gut, geht's uns allen gut! ◁

Ruth Wodak

1) Die Rede von Ruth Wodak wurde bereits am 8. Oktober 2018 auf profil.at veröffentlicht.

Ruth Wodak ist Professorin em. für Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft an der Universität Wien. Seit September 2004 hat sie einen Lehrstuhl für Diskursanlyse an der Lancaster University. Von September 2018 bis Januar 2019 ist sie ein Visiting Fellow am IMW.

"What are the main challenges facing the European Union in the coming years and what strategies are needed to strengthen it both internally and externally?"

Photo: Christian Fischer

Piotr Buras

Head, European Council on Foreign Relations Warsaw office

The EU as we know it is under stress. It has been a victim of the *post-liberal* era as the hope in common values, progress and a better future which in the past provided anchoring the integration project is no longer given. We have also entered a *post-transformation* moment in Central Eastern Europe: the myth of the West and politics of imitation do not shape the politics in the ex-communist countries anymore. And the rejection of the Western paternalism and dominance takes sometimes radical forms. Lastly, we live also in a *post-Transatlantic* era: unlike in the past Europe—its security and unity—is no longer a priority of the American policy. But there is no consensus in the EU what conclusions we should draw from this fact. The EU will have to come up to terms with this new reality. Simply protecting the status quo will not be enough to mobilize citizens to defend the EU project. However, we need to be careful not to throw the baby with the bathwater by putting the blame for Europe's and its member states' troubles mainly on the EU which still remains the key instrument to tackle them. ◁

Photo: The German Marshall Fund of the US

Rosa Balfour

Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US; member, Steering Committee of Women in International Security, Brussels

The dominant paradigm for the EU's survival in a turbulent world is that the political center holds fort while the storm blows over. The announced reforms to supposedly save Europe (Eurozone, migration, and a 'European army') will not deliver—with the lack of alignment of actors and factors to make it happen as the main hurdle. Holding fort may avoid the EU sinking further in quicksand. Winds of discontent may die down—perhaps the 2024 European Parliament will usher in a new era of European cooperation. But to hold fort, that center needs to change.

Here is some homework to shake up a sterile debate. 1. A better diagnosis of what went wrong to find what to fix. 2. Think differently about European cooperation. Federalism and intergovernmentalism belong to the past, like it or not. 3. Draw inspiration from the positive global experiences and views of the EU as a force for peace and open societies. 4. Bridge the two parallel debates on the future of Europe and Europe's global role. The two are deeply connected. 5. Bring these debates in society. ◁

Photo: Christian Fischer

Luke Cooper

Senior Lecturer, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge

Europe is entering a period of greater fragmentation. The unprecedented challenges of recent years, from the Eurozone to far right populism, may be only a harbinger of the greater crises ahead. To address these challenges requires a strong civil society and an imaginative approach to reform of the Union.

The Europe of the future must be deeply embedded in the domestic lives of citizens and past mistakes must be acknowledged. In particular a culture that has prioritized an elite-driven process of technical integration over a citizens-led process has failed Europeans.

'Substantive democracy' can provide a means to rebuild trust between citizens and the institutions. This responds to the alienation of citizens by demonstrating how European institutions have the capacity to take measures that empower them.

A Europe that prioritizes the delivery of 'public goods' can give citizens greater control over their lives. This is the essence of the new social contract that we urgently need. ◁

Photo: Erdősi Tibor

Zsuzsanna Szelényi

Former MP, Hungary; political activist and foreign relations specialist

The democratic source of political legitimacy in Europe is born at national level. However, most challenges European countries need to cope with are transnational by nature. The political elite failed to increase the level of efficiency within the EU and is now facing the triumph of EU blaming sovereigntist-centered populist politics.

The sovereignty-centered concept propagated by some Central European member states is not merely aimed at enhancing the scope of their free action without being sanctioned by European institutions. This politics aims to sever the inherent link between the European Union and pluralist democracy, rule of law and human rights. With lower trust the EU becomes less capable of joining forces in crisis situations and more vulnerable when facing other global actors. That is a threat for the very existence of the Union. The future, by contrast, requires more cohesion and unity.

European society is strong as long as it relies on democratic pluralism and trans-national alliance networks. Political parties are responsible for ensuring that pluralism, anti-corruption and democratic competition create conditions for security, well-being and prosperity. ◁

Photo: Christian Fischer

Stefan Lehne

Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe; lecturer, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

The EU faces today a multipolar world where authoritarian leaders proliferate and where nationalism and power politics have returned. For the EU as a rules-based system of transnational cooperation this is a difficult environment. In response, it needs to become better able to protect its interest and values without relying on the assistance of others. This will demand serious investment in diplomatic and military capabilities. It will also require overcoming the deep divisions between member states and rebuilding solidarity among them.

At the same time, the EU also needs to step up its work together with likeminded countries across the world to defend multilateral cooperation. No other international actor is better positioned to build alliances for strengthening global governance. Developing the relevant networks and investing in the legal and institutional architecture of global governance should become one of the EU's most urgent priorities. ◁

Europe's Futures

We need platforms to renew and re-invent Europe. In cooperation with leading European organizations and think tanks IWM and ERSTE Foundation have launched the project *Europe's Futures,* directed by Ivan Vejvoda, to tackle some of the major challenges of our time: asylum and migration, rule of law and democracy, European enlargement and social inclusion. In recent months, renowned experts from politics, science and civil society have been invited to the IWM to develop concrete solutions and strategies. We have asked the *Europe's Futures Fellows* to share with us their visions for the future.

Photo: Christian Fischer

Tim Judah

Journalist and author; correspondent, The Economist

Near where I live is a builder. He is about sixty. When he began his company everyone else in the street was white British. Now they are Africans and Arabs and his competition are Poles. Despite being a staunch supporter of the UK out of the EU, his carpenters are Romanians. Things were good when they arrived, now they hate the Albanians for, to coming a phrase, coming over here and taking their jobs—and don't even start them talking about their fellow citizens here who happen to be Roma.

To a huge extent the EU is a victim of its own success. But freedom and mobility have come with a price—my vision of Europe is not the same as that of the builder or the carpenters.

Rapid demographic change, the dominance of what David Goodhart (see p. 10) calls the *Anywhere* classes over the *Somewheres,* the complacency of those who have prospered in recent decades and have believed that progress, at least in their eyes, was inevitable have all now come back to haunt us. Thinking about strategies of how to cope with security, Moscow's attempts to divide us or the problems of the euro are the easy part. The difficult bit is resolving the dilemma of how to win the culture wars, defeat the populists, and reconcile ever more divided societies. Europe begins at home. Europe cannot flourish unless our individual countries do. ◁

The EU is a Union of Regulation

BY ANTHONY BARNETT

The historic conception that government is exercised in three different forms: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary has been depassed. Regulation, reinforced by human rights, has become a new sphere of government. It is now as essential to modern society as are executive power, legislative authority and courts of law.

The way we experience regulation does not stem from the influence of politicians, the role of national or regional officials, or fear of justice. These familiar locations of power continue. But a new force has joined them as our health, diet, environment and metadata need ongoing rules. The famous frontispiece of Hobbes's Leviathan shows the people inhabiting the ruler. Today, alongside the claim we make on sovereignty or the 'body politic' as 'we, the people', rules have entered the bodies of us as people.

While it had roots in the 17th century, the separation of powers was fully conceptualised in the 18th century by Montesquieu. The key to his originality was that he looked at the nature of government not from the point of view of the ruler but from that of property owners. They needed a strong state to ensure their rights. But they also needed to preserve their privileges from the danger of a strong state becoming an arbitrary tyranny over them. Montesquieu's solution was to elaborate on the way government involves three forms of activity: the legislative, the executive and the judicial, and to insist that their separation is essential. Then, each would check the others, and thereby protect society from arbitrary power, thus preserving of liberty.

At the end of the 18th century the separation of the three functions of government were famously institutionalised in America's pioneering constitution. Abroad, as 'Commander in Chief', the president retained the despotic military powers of a king. But at home his executive authority was circumscribed by the independence of the legislature in Congress and the arbitration of the law by the Supreme Court. (When Trump claims he has the right to pardon himself, he seeks a monarchical authority, which still casts its shadow across America's founding document.)

The extreme nature of the separation of powers in the United States proved exceptional. Even there, they overlap and interact. But the practical reality of the three functions became the matrix for describing other law-based systems. The independence of the law and the need for the constitutional protection of minorities and rights became defining features of democracy as we know it.

Today there is a new kid on the block. In *The New Regulatory Space, Reframing Democratic Governance,* Frank Vibert argues that there is now such a wide use of regulation it can no longer be regarded as a subordinate activity deployed to address specific issues. Instead, regulation "needs to be seen as a system… the regulatory space performs a role of social coordination as basic as those provided in other domains."

Regulation itself goes back the first factory acts and was then deployed in the United States to rein in corporate power. Today is has taken on a different, widespread everyday form. The changes driving this are familiar. Science has created new substances and methods of production, not least in growing food, where chemicals beat back the competition of insect life. Containerised trade has hugely increased global supply lines. Corporate reach means many of our everyday things are bought from people who are insecure employees with no stake in the quality of what they are selling. In this situation of plenty, competition and insecurity, we need rules not just about what product's content but also in how it is made, the impacts of this on the environment, and the conditions of work.

The demand for regulation also comes from manufacturers, who do not wish to be undercut, as much as consumers. This poses the question of whose interests regulation serves. But from potentially catastrophic activities such as flying or the creation of atomic isotopes for medical diagnosis to supposedly everyday ones like walking in town, modern life needs regulations.

Although it is still wrongly regarded as a Cinderella activity, regulation is at the heart of the EU's achievement. In a recent lecture Ivan Rogers who was the UK's ambassador to the EU until Theresa May sacked him, points out: "The correct way to think of the EU in economic terms is as a regulatory union… The EU is a superpower in no other respect. But in this critical one, it is." He then adds, dryly, "leaving a regulatory union… is really much more difficult than leaving a free trade area". To give you some idea of its achievement and the difficulty, it seems that the EU has developed over 11,000 regulations, set over 60,000 standards and its different agencies have taken over 18,000 decisions on interpreting regulations and laws.

The way to think about the EU is as *the European union of regulation*. This is its core achievement and greatest success. It is so fundamental that whether or not the Euro survives, and however much the Union may fail on critical issues like migration, it is not going to break up. It has achieved an enormous, ongoing material and human advance in a now essential domain of government.

The significance of this development came home to me thanks to the battle over Brexit now raging in the United Kingdom. It has unleashed a peculiar force that baffles many not just around the world but also in Britain itself. It is a form of nationalism: the nationalism of the English, which takes the form of Britishness. At its heart there is a desire for independence—for not 'taking order' from foreigners and instead become a 'Global Britain', code for Great Britain.

Boris Johnson is the most high-profile leader of this nationalist Brexitism. To leave the EU means, he wrote in the Sun, "the freedom to bust out of the corsets of EU regulation and rules—to do things our way". While still Foreign Secretary he denounced his own government for trying to keep the UK "locked in orbit around the EU…and not having freedom with our regulatory framework". Nigel Farage, the right-wing bigot who made the initial running on leaving the EU, told the BBC that if there is any compromise, "we will finish up perhaps in an even worse place than we are now because we won't be free to de-regulate".

For all the talk of migration and trade, the clash over 'sovereignty' that Brexit nationalism has condensed upon is regulation. But the Brexiteers muddle the power of classic sovereignty with regulation. They assume that the rules for food or automobile safety or that ensure toys are not toxic, are in the same category as first order decisions about how to deploy of your airforce, levels of income tax or investment in roads.

At the same time, a good half of the UK population, people who in no way lack patriotism, do not share this existential angst. Instead, as a careful IPPR investigation recently showed, people overwhelmingly *support* shared EU regulations including a third of Leave voters.

They—perhaps I should write 'we'—like clean beaches, environmental protection, high food standards, safe cars, medicine that is scientifically checked, fair employment laws and ease of business. We don't want chlorinated chicken, or roaming charges, and we do want to be reimbursed if an airline cancels their flight.

Regulation has become reterritorialized. But this is not experienced as a loss of precious sovereignty, as if this was a vital fluid, but as a gain. A gain that underpins a cosmopolitan nationalism that seeks interdependence not independence.

There are enormously important questions about how regulation should be made answerable to the public. This not Brexit is the big challenge. Otherwise, our democracy could be replaced by hi-tech regulation and a networked 'social-credit' regime of the kind being pioneered in China. ◁

Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes (Montage) / wikipedia.org

Although it is still wrongly regarded as a Cinderella activity, regulation is at the heart of the EU's achievement.

Anthony Barnett is a British writer and a campaigner for democracy. He was the first Director of Charter 88 and co-founder of openDemocracy.net. Furthermore, he is the author of *The Lure of Greatness: England's Brexit and America's Trump*. In April 2018 he was a Guest at the IWM.

The 3 Hs and the Achievement Society

BY DAVID GOODHART

There are many explanations for the discontents in western societies that have led to the current political instability—from inequality and the delayed impact of the financial crash to politicians deemed incompetent and aloof. But there is one overarching explanation that encompasses most of the others: cognitive ability has become the gold standard of human esteem, and cognitive elites have come to shape society too much in their own interests. To put it more bluntly: smart people have become too powerful.

Photo: Rich Vintage / iStock

Sixty years ago when we lived in a less complex society the people running government and business were generally brighter and more ambitious than the average—as they still are today—but qualities other than analytical intelligence were held in higher esteem.

Today the "brightest and the best" trump the "decent and hard-working". Those other qualities like character, integrity, experience and willingness to toil hard, are not irrelevant but they command less respect.

A good society is one with a proper balance between the aptitudes of *head, hand* and *heart.* The modern knowledge economy, however, has produced higher and higher returns to the highly qualified and reduced the relative pay and status of many manual and caring jobs. An economic system that once had a place for those of middling and even lower cognitive abilities—in the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs of the industrial era, on the land, in the military—now favors the cognitive elites and the educationally blessed.

A good society is one with a proper balance between the aptitudes of head, hand *and* heart.

Other institutions that have stressed aptitudes other than cognitive ability have been in sharp decline across most of the west and especially in Europe: religion, family life, the military and traditional industrial employment.

Just as the move from an agrarian to an industrial society produced various social traumas and pathologies, so the move from an industrial to a post-industrial one is producing traumas of its own—less challenging materially but maybe more so psychologically.

For industrial society did not, at least initially, destroy traditional religious belief and it created new collective class identities and forms of recognition associated with labour.

Indeed, it may be that industrial society was better at distributing status than post-industrial society with its diminishment of many traditional roles and sources of unconditional recognition (family, religion, nation), its stress on meritocracy and the lack of status protection for the less able, and the greater social transparency of the media society.

Moreover, cognitive ability used to be more randomly scattered around. In recent decades a huge sorting process has hoovered up the young exam-passers and sent as many as possible into higher education—in Britain more than 40% of school leavers now head to university, reinforcing a precipitous decline in the prestige of so much non-graduate employment.

Hereditary meritocracy

This does not mean that we live in a true meritocracy. Family income in childhood is still highly correlated with educational success. This has been underlined by something described by the ugly phrase "assortative mating" meaning that people in high status jobs requiring high cog-

nitive ability are far more likely to pair up with similar people.

The children of these couples are far more likely to be brought up by two parents who are both well connected and understand what is required for children of even middling ability to enter good universities and higher professional jobs. They increasingly form a kind of hereditary meritocracy.

Why does this matter? Surely modern, technological societies simply need more clever people and so long as some of the biases just described can be ironed out, and people from all backgrounds get a fair rack at joining the cognitive elite, then all is well.

From the point of view of the efficiency of society, cognitive ability plus effort is a better selection criterion for high status jobs than inheritance of land or capital. But it is not necessarily any fairer or more humane. As Michael Young pointed out 60 years ago (in *The Rise of the Meritocracy*) those who rule based on cognitive merit often feel *less* obligation to those of below average intelligence than the rich have traditionally felt to the poor.

Economic inequality vs. political equality

It is one of the most difficult balancing acts of open, modern societies, though one that is seldom articulated: how to constrain meritocracy and prevent a disproportionate degree of status and prestige (and financial reward) flowing to high cognitive ability jobs—and away from the hand and heart jobs that are still so vital—without at the same time disincentivising the most able and ambitious people in our society.

A successful society must manage the tension between the *inequality* of esteem that arises from relatively open competition for highly skilled jobs and the ethos of *equality* of esteem that flows from democratic citizenship.

To put it another way: an achievement society that wants to avoid widespread disaffection in the democratic age must sufficiently respect and reward achievement in the lower cognitive ability hand and heart jobs and provide meaning and value for people who cannot or do not want to achieve.

In the current age of disruption it seems clear that we have not been getting the balance right. Many people on the left see this as mainly about income and wealth inequality.

Inequality has not, in fact, been rising sharply in many of the countries, including Britain, where there has been the biggest push-back against the status quo. It is true that slow or non-existent wage growth is harder to bear when a small minority, most notably bankers, seem insulated from austerity. But this misses an even bigger story about esteem and how valued you feel in the social order.

Modern virtues in the knowledge economy

For we have often almost unwittingly come to confuse cognitive ability with human value and human contribution more generally. There is no reason why people who complete certain mental tasks more efficiently than others should be more admirable people.

Yet there is a clear trend in modern liberal politics to tell us that this is indeed the case. High cognitive/analytical ability and success in the knowledge economy is highly correlated with support for the modern virtues of openness, mobility and hostility to tradition. And those who do not embrace these virtues are often regarded, especially in liberal circles, as social and intellectual dunces.

Anywheres vs. Somewheres

In my recent book *The Road to Somewhere* I talk about a value polarization in British society, revealed starkly by the Brexit vote, that has been exacerbated by this narrow focus on cognitive ability.

On the one hand is the group I call the Anywheres, making up about 20–25% of the population, who are well educated and usually live far from their parents and tend to favor openness, autonomy, social fluidity. On the other hand is a larger group of people, about half of the population, I call the Somewheres, who are less well educated, more rooted and value security/familiarity and place a much greater emphasis on group attachments (local and national) than the Anywheres.

Anywheres are generally comfortable with social change because they have so-called "achieved identities" a sense of themselves derived from educational and career achievements, which allows them to fit in pretty much anywhere. Whereas Somewheres have "ascribed identities" based more on place or group which means that their identity can be more easily discomforted by rapid change to those places.

Anywhere priorities of openness, mobility, individual autonomy, have come to completely dominate modern society and all the main political parties. And the Anywhere answer to everything from social mobility to improved productivity has been: more academic higher education.

Everyone is in favor of social mobility and bright people from whatever background travelling as far as their talents will take them but today's British Dream has become too narrowly defined as going to university and into a professional job. Not surprising when more than 90% of MPs are graduates.

Meanwhile, hand and heart aptitudes have become chronically undervalued in modern Britain unbalancing our society and alienating millions of people.

There has been some attempt in recent years to offer other options to school leavers with improved apprenticeships and technical qualifications. But they cannot compete with the prestige of the university route, leaving our economy starved of essential workers—last year fewer than 10,000 young people started proper construction apprenticeships while 40% of the building workers in London are from abroad.

Meanwhile heart jobs in social care, parts of the NHS, early years education and childcare continue to be undervalued (and paid) because they are roles that used to be performed in the private realm of the family, mainly by women. Hence, in part, the crisis in social care and in nurse recruitment.

We are encouraged to live increasingly "head" lives reinforced by most advances in technology that reduce opportunities for craft, and the need for human contact. (Even the need to develop good handwriting).

And joining the cognitive achievers, in Britain at least, usually means leaving your roots behind—thanks in part to mainly residential higher education and the tradition of leaving home to become a student.

There is no reason why people who complete certain mental tasks more efficiently than others should be more admirable people.

Many Somewheres cannot or do not want to leave their roots and join the Anywheres, and, in any case, half of the population will always, by definition, be in the bottom half of the cognitive ability spectrum. Yet all of us need to feel we have a valued place in society even if we are not mobile, high achievers.

The Anywhere political class has ruled too much in its own interests ignoring some of the basic political intuitions of the Somewheres: the importance of stable neighborhoods and secure borders, the priority of national citizen rights before universal rights, the need for narrative and recognition for those who do not easily thrive in more education-driven economies.

And this lack of empathy for the Somewhere worldview has now left us with the Brexit backlash and a country more divided than at any time since the 1970s. Is that not ample evidence of the limits of cognitive ability? ◁

David Goodhart is a British journalist, political analyst and author, founder and former editor-in-chief of *Prospect magazine*. His books *The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-war Immigration* (2013) and *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics* (2017) have fueled the polarized and heated debate in the UK on immigration, the social impact of globalization, and populism.

Politische Salons: Die Populistische Wende verstehen

Wie kommt es, dass eine ehemalige Labour-Abgeordnete und Mitglied des EU-Verfassungskonvents sich heute für einen Austritt Großbritanniens aus der Europäischen Union einsetzt? Und warum kritisiert ausgerechnet ein britischer Journalist, der selbst dem intellektuellen Establishment zuzurechnen ist, das Versagen und die Arroganz der Eliten?

Diese Fragen standen im Zentrum zweier Politischer Salons, die in Kooperation mit der österreichischen Tageszeitung *Die Presse* und dem *European Network of Houses for Debate—Time to Talk* 2018 am IWM veranstaltet wurden. Ziel der Debatten, die von Christian Ultsch und Ivan Krastev moderiert wurden, war es, einen offenen Dialog zwischen jenen politischen Lagern zu ermöglichen, die üblicherweise in ihrer eigenen ideologischen Blase agieren und kommunizieren. Um zu verstehen, warum populistische Bewegungen in weiten Teilen Europas an Zuspruch gewinnen, sei es notwendig die eigenen Vorurteile zu überwinden und sich ernsthaft mit den Argumenten der anderen Seite auseinanderzusetzen, so Mitinitiatorin Dessy Gavrilova. ◁

Videos auf: **www.youtube.com/IWMVienna**

Fotos: IWM

Gisela Stuart: Europe and Its Dissenters, 5 April 2018

David Goodhart: Dilemmas of Post-liberalism, 8 May 2018

Demographic Bulimia

BY SHALINI RANDERIA

Like the unattainable ideal weight of our individual bodies in the modern age, no national body appears to reach or maintain an ideal population size. I am puzzled by a perception of the world as both under-populated (in Europe) and over-populated (in Asia or Africa), says IWM Rector Shalini Randeria.



Advertising promotion by Robert/Boisen & Like-minded for Spies (Danish travel agency)

Growing up in New Delhi in the 1970s I was subjected to Indian governmental propaganda on billboards that cautioned at every traffic light, "Stop. Wait before having your next child! After the third never again!". Or given a more cheerful message, "A small family is a happy family". Imagine my surprise as a doctoral student in Heidelberg in the mid-1980s at the attempt of the German government to convince its citizens that, *"Kinder bringen mehr Freude ins Leben"* ("Children bring more joy to life") and *"Kinder machen glücklicher als Geld"* ("Children make one happier than money"). In India couples with such "backward" views were being told at the time by the Ministry of Family Planning, which paid premiums for sterilisation, that, "One is fun".

"Demographic bulimia" is Hans Magnus Enzensberger's term for this schizophrenic adherence to two contradictory sets of ideas on, and objectives of, population control in our "global village" in which the boat is seen as being too full but as not having enough Europeans in it. That differential rates of population growth in the global North and South pose a problem for Europe was precisely the view put forward in the well-known manifesto, *Weil das Land sich ändern muß* (1992) co-authored among others by Helmut Schmidt, the former German Chancellor and Gräfin Dönhoff, a leading liberal. Its first chapter titled "So that the Germans do not die out" warned that fertility rates were declining rapidly and the country's population was aging at an alarming rate. Urgent counter-measures by the state were, therefore, needed to stabilize the population, mitigate the demographic threat to Germany as well as to prevent the proportion of Europeans in the world population from being halved by 2020 or 2030. These pro-natalist recommendations were being made in the very same year as feminists the world over were campaigning in the run up to the UN World Conference on Population and Development in Cairo for the recognition of the freedom of women and men to decide on the number of their children free from interference by their governments. The final Cairo Conference Declaration (1994) not only secured these reproductive rights and freedom but also enjoined governments to abolish all demographic targets and incentives to either reduce or raise women's fertility.

The normalization of family size in modern Western societies to a two-child norm of so-called replacement level fertility, which has been more or less successfully diffused globally since 1945, obscures the fact that fertility and reproduction are always inherently political. By linking the size and composition of the body politic to body politics, the politics of procreation is inextricably entangled in questions of nationalism, migration, citizenship and gender relations. Thus the seeming facticity of demographic numbers hides the normativity that underlies state interventions to differentially reduce or increase the fertility of certain groups of women in every society. Fertility, mortality and mobility are always stratified along class, ethnic, and religious lines with respect to bio-political questions of who lives, dies and reproduces, within a given territory. Demographic designs thus never simply concern the quantity but always also the desired *quality* of the population that should constitute a particular nation-state. The Chinese government, for example, was explicit about its aim of raising the quality of its population and not only reducing its size when it launched its one-child policy.

Who is regarded as belonging to the nation, whose fertility is seen to pose a threat to it, are a matter of politics and the demographic imagination.

Fears of de-population

In his magisterial history of worldwide population control titled *Fatal Misconceptions,* Matthew Connolly traces how the quality of the population became an important issue on several continents at the end of the 19th century. He shows how eugenics and population control were linked historically through shared intellectual origins and embraced several constituencies: social hygienists, opponents of immigration, pro-natalists and neo-Malthusians, all of whom shared the aim of scientifically reforming and biologically improving society. With eugenic agendas intertwined with discourses of population control, the differential fertility rates of majority communities as compared to ethnic and religious minorities, or migrants, have been politicized for over a century. State policies to raise the fertility of the majority community, or reduce that of minority groups, have always been entangled with ethno-nationalist agendas to preserve the purity of the nation. Arjun Appadurai's apt phrase "the fear of small numbers" alerts us to one cause of the growing rage and resentment against minorities, who are a constant reminder of the failure of the modern national project with its fantasy of ethno-religious-linguistic homogeneity. It is this anxiety of an apparent loss of national identity, or racial purity, that right wing populists have instrumentalized politically with respect to electoral arithmetic. In the USA, for instance, the majoritarian fear of being outnumbered is turned against Blacks and Hispanics, just as in India it is used to target Muslims.

Fears of de-population are neither new nor confined to small eastern European societies today faced with massive out-migration together with a fall in birth rates. The French fear of dying out, and losing the demographic race to the Germans, has been a constant source of mortal panic since well over a hundred years. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the so-called "immigrant question" in France was formulated with respect to labour shortage as well as the reproductive value of potential foreigners. Demographers and politicians across the entire political spectrum supported immigration of men from so-called "demographically prolific nations" like Italy, Spain and Poland, who were considered hard-working, assimilable, and able to produce indisputably French offspring. Immigrants from these Catholic countries were said to embody traditional values, patriarchal authority, maternal virtue and selfless parenthood unlike individualistic French men and especially women, who in their hedonistic pursuit of pleasure were neglecting their duty to procreate in national interest. The "French race", whose very future was considered to be at stake, was in these discourses a rather dynamic construct, which could incorporate "compatible" Italian or Polish blood to sustain and even to regenerate it. Depopulation was described as the "plague of the white race" in the face of the "Yellow Peril" of fast breeding Asians, who were seen as dangerous as evident by the Boxer rebellion, the Russo-Japanese war and by the establishment of the Congress Party in India to struggle against British colonial rule.

"Kinder statt Inder"

Fast forward to Germany in 2000. Interestingly, the dilemma of the "cultural" assimilability of certain immigrants, whose skilled labour is required for economic reasons, seems to continue unchanged. Chancellor Schröder launched a Green Card initiative to increase the global competitiveness of the country by attracting highly qualified IT specialists from India. They however, preferred USA or Canada as destinations, where naturalisation was easier, salaries higher and the English language along with a large Indian diaspora provided a familiar environment. Yet the reaction of Jürgen Rüttgers of the CDU to this policy to attract highly skilled immigrants was telling. He argued that "*Our* children (should be) at the computers instead of the Indians". Faced by a barrage of criticism, he retracted the statement but not before right wing propaganda coined the memorable, if ambiguous, slogan *"Kinder statt Inder"* ("Children instead of Indians"), which juxtaposed migration with procreation, as an exhortation to Germans to invest in their own children and make Indian migrants superfluous.

Several countries in Eastern Europe, among them Bulgaria, Croa-

tia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Serbia and Ukraine are expected to experience population losses of 15% or more between 2015 and 2050. However, such seemingly neutral statistical calculations of population size overlook the fact that there is no natural continuity in the composition of the population of any of these countries, which has varied widely across the generations as borders have been redrawn, and people moved, forcibly or voluntarily. Who is regarded as belonging to the nation, whose fertility is seen to pose a threat to it, are thus a matter of politics and the demographic imagination. The new language of *demographic security* based on the political rhetoric of the impending "destruction of the gene pool" seeks to legitimize calls for pro-natalist population measures, and anti-migration policies, which would guarantee the purity of the nation. Though varied in content and implementation, these policies aim to promote the generation of the "demand" for more children, strengthen the institution of "the family" and "traditional" values by "protecting motherhood" in terms reminiscent of late 19th century France. The current backlash against reproductive rights, women's empowerment and even gender studies in Eastern Europe need to be situated in this larger context.

But current pro-natalist appeals are by no means limited to Eastern Europe. Concerned about the country's low birth rate Danish policy makers have started to offer sex education classes in schools focused on procreation rather than contraception. A Danish travel agency even launched a campaign called „Do it for Denmark!". Claiming that Danes had 46% more sex while on holiday, it encouraged couples to take more frequent holidays, which would boost the travel business along with the country's population. It may come as a surprise today that European colonial powers had also tried to stimulate population growth in the colonies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is only after decolonization in the mid-1940s that former colonies came to be regarded as overpopulated. As long as Asian and African societies were a source of cheap labor that posed little threat of immigration to Europe, they were objects of pro-natalist colonial interventions. The German government was just as concerned about unduly low birth rates in today's Tanzania as was the British administration in India about peasant households not reproducing enough. Although he did not say how he intended to go about doing it for Great Britain, Sir Richard Temple, the British governor of Bombay (1877–79), gave assurances to his superiors in London that he would do everything in his power "to increase the number of his Majesty's subjects in India."[1] ◁

1) Cited in S. Chandrasekhar, *Population and Planned Parenthood in India,* (2nd edition) London 1961, 93.

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Will the Population become Redundant?

BY ROBERT SKIDELSKY

Robotization has revived old fears about mass redundancy but also inspired visions of a symbiosis between humans and machines. Delivering this year's Patočka Memorial Lecture, Lord Robert Skidelsky surveyed both the pessimistic and optimistic traditions of economic thought on mechanization, drawing conclusions for future policymaking.



Illustration: Science Photo Library / picturedesk.com

A society, wrote Jan Patočka, is decadent if it encourages a decadent life, 'a life addicted to what is inhuman by its very nature'.[1] It is in this spirit that I want to explore the impact of technology on the human condition, and especially on work. Is technology making the human race redundant materially and spiritually—both as producers of wealth and producers of meaning?

Ever since machinery became an active part of industrial production, redundancy has been seen either as a promise or a threat. The former has been the dominant discourse in economics, with redundancy seen as a transitional problem, confined to particular groups of workers, like the handloom weavers of early 19th century Britain. Over time, part of the displaced workforce would be absorbed in new jobs, part of it in the greater leisure made possible by improved productivity.

However, the fear of the permanent redundancy of a large fraction of the workforce—that is, its forced removal from gainful employment—has never been absent. The reason is that the loss of human jobs to machines is palpable and immediate, whereas the gain is indirect and delayed: an immediate threat versus a long-term promise.

The fear of redundancy has two roots. The first is people's fear that machines will rob them of their livelihood; the second that it will rob them of their purpose in life. Sociologists stress the importance of work in giving meaning to a person's existence. Economists, on the other hand, see work as purely instrumental, a means for buying things people want. If it can be done by machines, so much the better—it may free up people for more valuable pursuits.

It is not surprising that fear of redundancy surfaces whenever there is a burst of technological innovation. We are living through such a period now with the spread of automation. The headlines tell us that robots are gobbling up human jobs at an unprecedented rate—that up to 30% of today's work will be automated within twenty or so years. And the jobs themselves are becoming ever more precarious. So the old question is being posed ever more urgently: are machines a threat or a promise?

Mechanization and the economists

The productive unit in the pre-modern economy was the household not the factory: work and life were not yet separated. The medieval economy comprised farms and 'manufactories' in small towns which were little larger than villages. The professions had their origin in the urban guilds of skilled workers. Yet everyone was skilled in the sense that their work involved knowledge of all stages of production, not just tiny bits of it, as in Adam Smith's pin factory. Temporary and permanent redundancy of the population there certainly was—but this was caused by harvest failures, wars, or plagues, not by competition from machines.

With the Enlightenment, the idea of work came to be associated not with the husbanding of nature, but with 'overcoming' it, the human project which has dominated western history ever since. It was human participation in this project, made possible by science, which was supposed to set the whole of humanity free, and not just that small minority of the wealthy and powerful. This was the democratic promise of work.

The particular form of progress which excited the 18th century imagination was the growth of wealth. 'The end of production is consumption' wrote Adam Smith. The more goods there were, the happier we

would all be. The new human project spurred invention. The accumulation of wealth required machinery, since human work alone could not wrest more than a limited amount of produce from the earth. The Industrial Revolution changed the human link to work in a profound way. It replaced the artisan by the mechanic and home production by factory production. We have entered the age of capitalism, the economists, and economic motives.[2]

The fact that work was held to be the necessary means to enjoyment did not mean that it was itself enjoyable. The economists' conception of labor shed any idea that it was natural or intrinsically satisfying. Work was not a curse, but it was a cost—

Photo: Klaus Ranger

the cost of consumption. As Lenin was to put it with his customary bluntness: under communism *Kto ne rabotaet, tot ne est:* 'Who does not work shall not eat.'

By the same token though, any reduction in this cost by the use of machinery opened up a brighter future: more output and therefore more money for less effort. The increase and improvement of machinery was inextricably linked both to the denial of satisfaction in work and to the promise of more and better consumption. Economists unanimously welcomed the dawn of the machine age. As David Ricardo explained in the first edition of his *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817):

If, by improved machinery, with the employment of the same quantity of labour, the quantity of stockings could be quadrupled, and the demand for stockings were only doubled, some labourers would necessarily be discharged from the stocking trade; but as the capital which employed them was still in being, and as it was the interest of those who had it to employ it productively, it appeared to me that it would be employed on the production of some other commodity useful to society, for which there could not fail to be a demand.[3]

Two features of Ricardo's argument have long been part of the economics of innovation: first, the treatment of supply (capital and labor) as malleable or fluid, based on the assumption of wage flexibility, geographic mobility and easy transferability of skills. Workers employed in producing stockings can be squeezed almost costlessly into the right shape for producing widgets. Second, the assumption of insatiability as the key motive driving forward the progress of wealth.

However, by the third edition of his *Principles* in 1821, Ricardo had somewhat changed his tune. The interval had seen the most intense period of the Luddite disorders. The Luddites, as is well known, were groups of English weavers who destroyed factory machinery—wide knitting frames and power looms—in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Scientific economic theory held the Luddite argument to be economically illiterate. But in 1821 Ricardo added a 31st chapter, entitled 'On Machinery'. It was heavily influenced by the work of a now unknown economist, John Barton, who argued that capitalists could just as well invest their profits in new machines as in additional labor.[4] In doing so, Barton displayed a clear understanding of the principle of substitution between labor and capital, way ahead of his time.[5]

Two conclusions from Ricardo's chapter 31 have been debated ever since: first, that the opinion prevailing in 'the labouring class, that the employment of machinery is frequently detrimental to their interests, is not founded on prejudice and error, but is conformable to the correct principles of political economy'.[6] Second, that to the extent this opinion is true, 'there will necessarily be a diminution in the demand for labor, the population will become redundant, and the situation of the laboring classes will be that of distress and poverty'.[7] It was the notion of the population becoming 'redundant' which still strikes fear into those who dread the coming of the robots.

Central to the economic debate after Ricardo was the concept of compensation. The workers made redundant by machines would lose their livelihoods and perhaps even the satisfaction that their work had brought them; but they would be compensated by increased consumption, and the alternative employment which the increased demand for goods and services opened up.

How quickly these compensations come into play depends crucially on how fluid capital and labor are between occupations and regions. The introduction of labor-saving technology will initially decrease the consumption of workers who are made redundant. Unless there is a quick employment response, the cheapening of production will be swamped by a fall in aggregate demand, leading to a rise in unemployment. This insight was the essence of the Keynesian Revolution.

As we know, Marx denied that any such compensatory processes were at work, either in the short-run or the long run. The sequence Marx envisaged was this: competition forces mechanization; mechanization depresses the average rate of profit (because businesses extract surplus value from humans not machines); restoration of the rate of profit requires an increasingly large 'reserve army of the unemployed'—Ricardo's redundant population. Thus, Marx was able to write that mechanization 'threw laborers on the pavement'. Marxist unemployment is essentially technologically-caused unemployment.

Through various mechanisms, however, the 19th century did not end up seeing a general 'redundancy' of the population. First, between 1890 and 1915 (the period of maximum emigration), about 40 million people left Europe for the New World. Second, the extra wealth brought by machines enabled voluntary retirement from the labor force, a possibility discounted by the earlier generation of economists, fixated on scarcity. From the mid-1800s, hours of work started to fall from a peak of 60–70 hours a week to about 55 hours by 1914, and then further throughout the 20th century, as workers took out some of their income gains in greater leisure.

Machinery enabled the economy to support a population that doubled in size at a substantially higher real income. Labor's share of GDP remained constant throughout the Industrial Age. Economists were surely entitled to say that the losses incurred in the meaning and quality of work and in the more unsettled conditions of life were more than compensated—in the long-run—by the vast gain in material wellbeing. Overall, the Malthusian bogey was obliterated so completely—in the West at least—that the dismal science became the cheerful science.

Automation and the future

The decisive new advance has been in automated technology and the digital economy, which thrusts mechanization far deeper into the world of human labor. The theorizing provoked by automation is in some respects different from the earlier response to mechanization. It can be summed up in the notion of 'complements'. This holds that there is no need for humans to race against machines, a race they are bound to lose. Rather they will race with machines to an ever more glorious future.[8] This theory replaces the old demand-side story of compensations with a supply-side story based on the stimulus machinery gives to the development of human capital.

But there are big flaws in the two components of the optimistic view: compensations and complements.

The two major weaknesses of the compensation theory are, first, that it accepts that for most people work has no value except as a means to consumption; and second, that it assumes insatiability, or permanent discontent with what is, whether natural or manufactured. Its vista is consumption without end.

The flaw in the theory of complements lies in its vast over-estimation of human capacity. There is no reason why human mental capacity in general should increase at the same rate as machine mental capacity. A minority will be able to race with the machines in the knowledge economy. But a substantial fraction will be 'left behind'. What is to happen to them? Already the 'left behind' symptoms, and reactions to them, can be seen in increasingly precarious employment, falling wages, and populist protests against both automation and one of its chief agents, globalization.

Thus, the idea that a supply shock like automation will automatically set in motion acceptable compensatory demand or complementary supply responses seems to me to be pure delusion. Policy must therefore pay much more attention to correlating the rate of change with the capacity of human society to absorb it. This will include slowing down the speed and spread of automation, ensuring its material fruits are equitably distributed, maintaining an adequate level of demand, and providing income guarantees to offset growing precariousness in the job market, as robotization presses wages downwards and eliminates jobs. This seems to me to be as much as policy can do. None of this, though, addresses the question raised by Patočka: how humans can be enabled to 'feel at home' in world governed by an inhuman and, if not intentionally, inhumane logic. ◁

1) Jan Patočka, *Heretical Essays the Philosophy of History,* 97.
2) See e.g. Richard Donkin, *The History of Work,* London 2010; Andrea Komlosy, *Work: The Last Thousand Years,* London 2018, ch.1; Keith Thomas, *The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England,* Oxford 2009, 91ff.
3) David Ricardo, *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,* 3rd ed., ed. D. Winch, 1973, 274.
4) John Barton, *Observations on the Circumstances which Influence the Conditions of the Labouring Classes of Society,* 1817.
5) Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis,* Oxford 1996, 681–2.
6) Ibid. 267.
7) Ibid. 266.
8) Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, *The Second Machine Age: Work Progress and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies,* New York 2014.

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Is Democracy in Peril? Politics in the Age of Trump

BY MICHAEL J. SANDEL

These are dangerous times for democracy. Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and other places that once offered democratic hope are now, in varying degrees, falling into authoritarianism. In the United States, Donald Trump poses the greatest threat to the American constitutional order since Richard Nixon.

One might think that Trump's inflammatory tweets, erratic behavior, and persistent disregard for democratic norms would offer the opposition an easy target. But for those who would mount a politics of resistance, the outrage Trump provokes has been less energizing than paralyzing. The hope that special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into the Trump campaign's possible collusion with Russia will lead to Trump's impeachment distracts Democrats from asking hard questions about why voters have rejected them at both the federal and state level. In addition, Trump's steady stream of provocations leaves his critics struggling to discriminate between the more consequential affronts to democracy and passing distractions.

Moral outrage can be politically energizing, but only if it is channeled and guided by political judgment. What the opposition to Trump needs now is an *economy of outrage,* disciplined by the priorities of an affirmative political project.

What might such a project look like? We must begin by facing up to the complacencies of establishment political thinking that opened the way to populism. Trump tapped a wellspring of anxieties, frustrations, and legitimate grievances to which the mainstream parties have no compelling answer. It is therefore not enough to mobilize a politics of protest and resistance; we need a politics of persuasion that starts from understanding the discontent that is roiling politics in the U.S. and in democracies around the world.

The failure of technocratic liberalism

Like the triumph of Brexit in the UK, Trump's election was an angry verdict on decades of rising inequality and a version of globalization that benefits those at the top but leaves ordinary people feeling disempowered. Some denounce the upsurge of populism as little more than a racist reaction against immigrants and multiculturalism; others see it as a protest against the job losses brought about by global trade and new technologies. Both views miss the fact that today's right-wing populism is a response to a political failure of historic proportions.

Today's progressive parties such as the Democrats in the US or Labour in Britain espouse a technocratic liberalism more congenial to the professional classes than to the blue collar and middle class voters who once constituted their base. The roots of the predicament go back to the 1980s when Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher argued that government was the problem and markets were the solution. The center-left politicians who succeeded them—Bill Clinton in the U.S., Tony Blair in Britain, Gerhard Schroeder in Germany—softened the harsh edges of unfettered markets, but did not challenge the central premise that market mechanisms are the primary instruments for achieving the public good. They embraced a market-driven version of globalization and welcomed the growing financialization of the economy.

Photo: Jay Lazarin / iStock

In the 1990s, the Clinton administration joined with Republicans in promoting global trade agreements and deregulating the financial industry. These policies mostly benefitted those at the top, and little was done to address the deepening inequality and the growing power of money in politics. Having strayed from its traditional mission of taming capitalism and holding economic power to democratic account, liberalism lost its capacity to inspire.

All that seemed to change when the moral energy and civic idealism of Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign offered a stirring alternative to the managerial, technocratic language that had come to characterize liberal public discourse. But when Obama assumed office in the midst of the financial crisis, he appointed economic advisors who had promoted financial deregulation during the Clinton years. With their encouragement, he bailed out the banks without holding them to account for the behavior that led to the crisis. Lingering public anger over this bailout fuelled a mood of populist protest that reached across the political spectrum—on the left, the Occupy movement and the candidacy of Bernie Sanders, on the right, the Tea Party movement and the election of Trump.

The populist uprising in the U.S., Britain, and Europe is a backlash against elites of the mainstream parties, but its most conspicuous casualties have been liberal and center-left political parties. The latter must learn from the populist protest that has displaced them—not by replicating its xenophobia and strident nationalism, but by taking seriously the legitimate grievances with which these ugly sentiments are entangled. They have to recognize that these grievances are not only economic but also moral and cultural, not only about wages and jobs but also about social esteem.

Four issues are key in addressing popular anger and resentment.

1. Income inequality

The standard response to inequality is to call for greater equality of opportunity—retraining workers whose jobs have disappeared; improving access to higher education; removing barriers of race, ethnicity, and gender. Anybody who works hard should be able to rise as far as their talents will take them.

But in today's economy, this is not easy—a special problem for the U.S., which prides itself on upward mobility. Americans' belief that it is possible to rise from rags to riches has been shaken. Of those born in the bottom fifth of the income scale, 43% will remain there, and only 4% will make it to the top fifth. This may explain why the rhetoric of opportunity fails to inspire as it once did. Progressives should reconsider the assumption that mobility can compensate for inequality and reckon directly with inequalities of power and wealth.

2. Meritocratic hubris

The relentless emphasis on creating a meritocracy, in which social positions reflect effort and talent, also has a corrosive effect on the way we interpret our success (or lack of it). The system's winners tend to consider their success their own doing, a measure of their virtue—and to look down on those less successful. Those who lose out may consider the system rigged, or they may see their failure as their own fault, proof they lack talent or drive.

These two sentiments' volatile brew of anger and resentment fuels populist protest. Though himself a billionaire, Donald Trump understands and exploits this. Unlike Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, Trump scarcely mentions the word "opportunity," and instead offers blunt talk of winners and losers.

3. The dignity of work

The loss of jobs to technology and outsourcing has coincided with a sense that society accords less respect to the kind of work the working class does.

New technologies may further erode the dignity of work. Some anticipate a time when robots and ar-

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Fight Fire with Fire: Leugnung und Normativität im Völkerrecht

VON PAUL HAHNENKAMP

Der Bruch mit elementaren Prinzipien des Völkerrechts stellt die Verbindlichkeit der internationalen Rechtsordnung in Frage. Erleben die Leugner des Völkerrechts dieser Tage eine Renaissance?

„We can't waterboard, but they can chop off heads". Darüber echauffierte sich Donald Trump bereits im Präsidentschaftswahlkampf 2016, als er das militärische Vorgehen gegen den Islamischen Staat in Syrien und Irak befeuerte. Schnell identifizierte er den Grund für den eigeschränkten „Handlungsspielraum" der US-Truppen: das Völkerrecht. Die Genfer Abkommen aus dem Jahr 1949, die unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg Mindeststandards für den Umgang mit Kriegsgefangenen, verwundeten Soldaten und Zivilisten im Krieg festlegten und bis heute zum Kernbereich des humanitären Völkerrechts zählen, bezeichnete er offen als „Problem" für das US-Militär.

Um auf die Verbrechen des IS „verhältnismäßig" reagieren zu können, stellte Trump nach seiner Wahl die Einführung des berüchtigten Waterboardings gemäß der Prämisse „to fight fire with fire" wieder in Aussicht. Euphemistisch als erweiterte Verhörmethode bezeichnet, sollen Betroffene durch simuliertes Ertrinken gefügig gemacht und zum Reden gebracht werden. Unter der Bush-Administration kam Waterboarding nach 9/11 zum Einsatz, erst unter Barack Obama wurde diese Praxis nach heftiger internationaler Kritik verboten, da sie nicht nur die Genfer Konventionen, sondern auch die UN-Antifolterkonvention und nationale Gesetze der Vereinigten Staaten verletzt.

Foto: FABRICE COFFRINI / AFP / picturedesk.com

Richterin Catherine Marchi-Uhel (links), Leiterin des internationalen, unparteiischen und unabhängigen Untersuchungsverfahrens zur Ermittlung schwerer Verbrechen im syrischen Bürgerkrieg, im Gespräch mit UN-Sprecherin Alessandra Vellucci bei einer Pressekonferenz am 5. September 2017 in Genf.

Völkerrecht als bloße Rhetorik

Die mögliche Wiedereinführung von Waterboarding ist jedoch nur einer von vielen Schatten, der sich in der jüngsten Vergangenheit über das Völkerrecht gelegt hat. Die Annexion der Krim durch Russland oder Handlungen entgegen internationaler Vertragsverpflichtungen wie etwa dem Pariser Klimaabkommen sind weitere Beispiele für nationale Alleingänge unter der Missachtung völkerrechtlicher Normen. Permanente Grenzverstöße, alltägliche Menschenrechtsverletzungen und der Einsatz geächteter Waffen im syrischen Bürgerkrieg (siehe Interview S. 17) wirken gar wie *alternative facts*. Verwandeln sich völkerrechtliche Normen angesichts der multipolaren Weltordnung im 21. Jahrhundert zu bloßen Moralvorstellungen oder Klugheitsregeln, wie sie einst von den sogenannten Leugnern des Völkerrechts bezeichnet wurden?

Empirisch gesehen halten sich Staaten nach wie vor zu einem überwiegenden Teil an internationale Verpflichtungen. Völkerrechtsbrüche erfolgen bloß punktuell. Außerdem werden Verletzungen stets von Rechtfertigungen begleitet. Schließlich möchte kein Staat auf der Seite des Unrechts stehen und politische Legitimität verlieren.

Während die meisten Akteure aus Politik, Wissenschaft und Zivilgesellschaft in dieser Kohärenz bereits den Beweis für die Bindungswirkung des Völkerrechts sehen, ist sie zugleich Einfallstor für eine fundamentale Entwertung der völkerrechtlichen Normativität. So sehen etwa die beiden US-amerikanischen Juristen Eric Posner und Jack Goldsmith im Völkerrecht vor allem ein rhetorisches Mittel und letztlich einen Spielball der Realpolitik. Der *rational choice theory* folgend sei das Völkerrecht niemals Mittel zur Beschränkung, sondern immer nur ein *Produkt* zwischenstaatlichen Verhaltens.[1]

Staatliches Handeln orientiere sich demnach nicht an der Verbindlichkeit völkerrechtlicher Normen, sondern am Machtstreben und der Interessensdurchsetzung einzelner Akteure. Auch sie sehen sich empirisch durch die Staatenpraxis bestätigt. Eine eigenständige normative Kraft sprechen sie dem Völkerrecht ab.

Das Primat der Gewalt

Die von Posner und Goldsmith postulierte Hegemonie der Realpolitik erinnert an die Argumentationslinie der so genannten Völkerrechtsleugner, die bereits vor mehr als 200 Jahren die zwischenstaatliche Rechtsordnung in Frage stellten.

Darunter fallen vor allem deutsche Gelehrte des 19. Jahrhunderts, welche den Staat als absolute, nicht beschränkbare Macht verstehen. Diese Entwicklung korreliert zeitlich mit der Gründung europäischer Nationalstaaten, die ihre militärische Machtfülle nicht durch ein übergeordnetes Rechtssystem eingeschränkt sehen wollen. Der Berliner Rechtsphilosoph Adolf Lasson etwa proklamiert 1871 im Jahr der deutschen Reichsgründung: „Mithin ist der Zustand, der zwischen den Staaten obwaltet, ein vollkommen rechtloser."[2] Alternativ qualifiziert Lasson zwischenstaatliche Regelungen als „Klugheitsregeln" und nimmt damit den Gedankengang von Posner und Goldsmith vorweg. Der bayrische Verfassungsjurist Max von Seydel drückt es zwei Jahre später ähnlich aus: „Zwischen den Staaten kann mithin kein Recht sein, zwischen ihnen gilt nur Gewalt. Es gibt darum kein Völkerrecht."[3]

Gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts führen eine Vielzahl multilateraler Verträge und die Gründung der ersten internationalen Organisationen jedoch zu einer kaum abzustreitenden Sichtbarkeit zwischenstaatlicher Regulierungen. Zwischen angesehenen Juristen wie Georg Jellinek, Franz von Liszt oder Lassa Oppenheim und den von ihnen bezeichneten *Leugnern* entwickelt sich ein intellektueller Schlagabtausch mit politischer Brisanz. Der allgemeine Vorwurf lautete: Mit einem unbegrenzten Verständnis von Souveränität und staatlicher Machtfülle lässt sich kein (Völker)Recht denken. Der diskursive Ausschluss und die damit verbundene Stigmatisierung der „Völkerrechtsleugner" führen – fernab pazifistischer Motive – interessanter Weise zu einer Verfestigung und willkommenen Institutionalisierung des Fachs.

Wie diese historische Auseinandersetzung zeigt, existiert Völkerrecht nicht bloß, weil es eingehalten wird, sondern weil JuristInnen sich darauf berufen, es bewusst als Recht bezeichnen und damit auch auf ideeller Ebene eine Limitierung von Gewalt und Autorität des Stärkeren verfolgen. Der (sprachliche) Diskurs erzeugt Normativität, die Entscheidung für das Recht wird zum politischen Akt.

Nach 9/11 versuchten juristische Vordenker der Bush-Administration Waterboarding und andere „erweiterte Verhörmethoden" als völkerrechtskonformes Mittel im *War on Terror* mit eigenen Rechtsgutachten – von anderen Juristen *Torture Memos* genannt – zu legitimieren. Doch spätestens seit den Enthüllungen über Folterungen in Abu Ghraib und Guantánamo Bay zeigte sich, dass sich die USA, einst Vorreiter und Hüter der internationalen Ordnung und Menschenrechte, vor den Augen der Weltöffentlichkeit elementarer Völkerrechtsgrundsätze entledigt hatte.

Das Völkerrecht als globale Rechtsordnung wird ständig mit Brüchen konfrontiert sein, so wie jede andere Rechtsordnung auch. Die Negation seiner Normativität durch alte wie neue Leugner entspricht jedoch einer Selbstaufgabe und öffnet jeglichem Verstoß Tür und Tor. Die Einhaltung des Völkerrechts zu fordern und damit sein Bestehen zu verteidigen, bedeutet nicht ein kritikloses Gutheißen all seiner politischen, ökonomischen und postkolonialen Machtgefälle. Es bedeutet, der politischen Gestaltungskraft des völkerrechtlichen Diskurses gerecht zu werden und sich für die Idee eines friedvollen Miteinanders einzusetzen. ◁

1) Goldsmith, Jack/Posner, Eric, *The Limits of International Law* (Oxford: University Press 2005).
2) Lasson, Adolf, *Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts* (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz 1871) S. 22.
3) Seydel, Max von, *Grundzüge einer allgemeinen Staatslehre* (Würzburg: A. Stuber 1873) S. 32.

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Späte Gerechtigkeit für syrische Folteropfer?

MILOŠ VEC IM GESPRÄCH MIT TATIANA URDANETA WITTEK

Es ist ein Signal an alle Diktatoren: Die Strafanzeige, die 16 syrische Folterüberlebende im Mai 2018 gegen mehrere syrische Geheimdienstfunktionäre des Assad-Regimes bei der Staatsanwaltschaft Wien eingereicht haben. Ihnen werden u.a. schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Kriegsverbrechen in den Jahren 2011 bis 2017 vorgeworfen. Da die internationale Strafjustiz derzeit keine Möglichkeit bietet, die Verbrechen in Syrien strafrechtlich zu verfolgen, wurden neben Deutschland, Schweden, Frankreich nun auch in Österreich Ermittlungen auf nationaler Ebene eingeleitet. Grundlage dafür ist auch das so genannte Weltrechtsprinzip, das es in bestimmten Fällen erlaubt, strafbare Handlungen im Ausland zu verfolgen. Was das für die nach Österreich geflüchteten Opfer, aber auch für die Bevölkerung Syriens und die Aufarbeitung der Verbrechen während des Bürgerkriegs bedeutet, war am 29. Mai 2018 Gegenstand einer Podiumsdiskussion am IWM, bei der nicht nur syrische Folterüberlebende, sondern auch MenschenrechtsaktivistInnen und VertreterInnen jener Organisationen teilnahmen, die an der Einbringung der Strafanzeige maßgeblich beteiligt waren (eine vollständige Dokumentation der Veranstaltung ist sowohl auf Deutsch als auch auf Arabisch verfügbar: *www.youtube.com/IWMVienna*). Miloš Vec, Jurist und Permanent Fellow am IWM, hat sich mehrere Monate nach der Veranstaltung erneut mit Tatiana Urdaneta Wittek vom Center for the Enforcement of Human Rights International (CEHRI) getroffen, um in Erfahrung zu bringen, was seit der Anzeige passiert ist.

Vec: Unsere gemeinsame Veranstaltung hatte nicht nur die BesucherInnen, sondern auch mich persönlich sehr berührt. Es war beeindruckend zu sehen, mit welcher inneren Stärke die Folteropfer an die Öffentlichkeit gegangen sind und geschildert haben, was Ihnen während des Kriegs in Syrien angetan wurde. Wie geht es den Opfern heute?

U. Wittek: Die Folterüberlebenden haben die Strafanzeige sehr begrüßt, da sie dadurch erstmals eine Art Gerechtigkeit erleben – hier in Österreich, aber auch international. Sie haben Willkür, Haft und schwerste, lebensbedrohende Folter überlebt. Der einzige Weg zur Gerechtigkeit steht ihnen momentan in Europa offen. Sowohl in Frankreich als auch in Deutschland wurden bereits Haftbefehle gegen hochrangige Funktionäre des Geheimdienstes erlassen.

Vec: Wie groß waren die Schwierigkeiten, solche Verbrechen tatsächlich nachzuweisen?

Photo: ECCHR / IWM

Debatte mit Anwar al-Bunni, Hanada Al Refai, Karoline Krause (Moderation), Wolfgang Kaleck und Tatiana Urdaneta Wittek.

U. Wittek: Heute besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass sich in den Strafvollzugsanstalten Syriens schwerste Menschenrechtsverbrechen ereignet haben und auch heute noch stattfinden. Aufgrund der vielen Aussagen von aus der Haft geflohen Menschen, wissen wir, welche Strukturen und Foltermethoden der syrische Geheimdienst einsetzt, um die Bevölkerung zur absoluten Regimetreue zu zwingen. Politische Opponenten haben kaum eine Möglichkeit, die Haft zu überleben. Dies führt soweit, dass Ärzte schwerstverletzte Häftlinge nicht versorgen – aus Angst, selbst Repressionen zu erleiden.

Ich bin kein Einzelfall. Bis heute werden tausende Frauen und Männer gefoltert. Mit dieser Anzeige will ich dazu beitragen, dass Gerechtigkeit geschieht.

Hanada Al Refai, Aktivistin und Folterüberlebende aus Syrien

Nebst den Zeugenaussagen haben die sogenannte „Caesar"-Fotos und die dazugehörigen Daten Beweismaterial geschaffen. Zudem bieten öffentlich zugängliche Berichte und Dokumente Beweismittel. Die Verbrechen in Syrien wurden durch internationale und syrische Menschenrechtsorganisationen seit vielen Jahren sorgfältig untersucht und dokumentiert. Wir haben diese Strafanzeige in engster Zusammenarbeit mit dem ECCHR erstellt, das seit sieben Jahren mit zwei syrischen Menschenrechts-NGOs zum Thema Menschenrechtsverbrechen in Syrien zusammenarbeitet. Genaue Zahlen der Todesopfer in syrischen Haftanstalten gibt es nicht. Es liegen Untersuchungen vor, die von 17.723 Todesopfern zwischen 2011 und 2015 sprechen. Die Anzahl der Personen, die seit 2011 nicht aus der Haft zurückgekehrt sind, wird auf 70.000 geschätzt – wobei sich die Opfer des Bürgerkrieges auf mehr als 500.000 belaufen dürften. Die deutschen Ermittlungsbehörden haben ca. 2800 Hinweise auf in Syrien verübten Menschenrechtsverbrechen erhalten. In 300 dieser Fälle war es den Zeugen möglich, die Namen der Straftäter zu nennen. Bis Mai 2017 haben 200 Zeugen in den sogenannten Strukturermittlungsverfahren in Deutschland ausgesagt.

Es geht nicht nur um Syrien, sondern auch um Europa und den Rest der Welt. Die Anzeige ist ein Signal an alle Diktaturen.

Anwar al-Bunni, Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research

Vec: Bei der Anzeigenstellung wurde auch ein Datensatz mit tausenden Bilddateien eingebracht. Woher stammen diese?

U. Wittek: Es handelt sich dabei um die so genannten „Caesar Fotos". Caesar, dieser Name ist ein Pseudonym, ist ein ehemaliger Militärfotograf aus Damaskus, der damit betraut war, Leichen von Häftlingen zu fotografieren, die in Hafteinrichtungen des Regimes gestorben sind. Die Fotos wurden im Anschluss in Ordnern archiviert. Caesar hatte zwei Jahre lang, sein Leben aufs Spiel setzend, das gesamte Bildmaterial kopiert und im Jahre 2013 zehntausende dieser Fotos auf seiner Flucht ins Ausland mitgeführt und den europäischen Ermittlungsbehörden zur Verfügung gestellt. Dass sich die verschiedenen Anzeigen in Europa neben den Zeugenaussagen auf dieses Bildmaterial stützen können, ist von unschätzbarem Wert.

Vec: Sie haben die Anzeigen nach dem Weltrechtsprinzip gestellt. Stößt der Umstand, dass österreichische Strafverfolgungsbehörden auch dafür zuständig sind, auf allgemeine Akzeptanz?

U. Wittek: Die Einbringung der Strafanzeige wurde durchwegs positiv aufgenommen. Die Tatsache, dass in Syrien brutal gefoltert wurde und wird, ist auch in Österreich bekannt. Zudem sind die in Syrien verletzten Menschenrechte in Österreich soweit Wirklichkeit geworden, dass der Einzelne diese als normativ anerkennt. Die Menschen erkennen, dass eine internationale Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte notwendig ist – gerade, wenn auf lokaler, nationaler Ebene Straflosigkeit vorherrscht. Im Zuge der polarisierenden Migrationsdebatte hat die Strafanzeige klar vor Augen geführt, warum Folterüberlebende und deren Angehörige aus Syrien unsere entschiedene Solidarität benötigen.

Vec: Einerseits werden Menschenrechte international verwirklicht, andererseits besteht in vielen Bereichen nationale Straflosigkeit. Wie kann man sich das im Falle Syriens vorstellen? Halten sie ihre Taten für moralisch gerechtfertigt oder glauben sie, es gäbe einen rechtsfreien Raum?

U. Wittek: Die vermeintliche Straflosigkeit, die derzeit von syrischen Folterschergen und anderen Menschenrechtsverbrechen angenommen wird, ist durch unsere Arbeit und die von vielen anderen NGOs sowie durch die ergangenen Haftbefehle in Frankreich und Deutschland widerlegt. Nationalstaaten können gegen Völkerrechtsverbrechen vorgehen, auch wenn internationale Institutionen am Tatort selbst (noch) keine Zuständigkeit begründen können. Zudem hat die UN spezifische Institutionen für die Beweissicherung der in Syrien verübten Verbrechen eingerichtet. Der internationale Strafgerichtshof, der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, die Mechanismen der Vereinten Nationen etc. zeigen auf, dass Menschenrechtsverbrechen weltweit nicht mehr unbemerkt passieren können. ◁

Das Interview in voller Länge ist nachzulesen auf: **www.iwm.at/transit-online**

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The Rohingya: A Stateless Population

BY RANABIR SAMADDAR

The case of the Rohingya, the world's largest stateless population, illustrates the failure of Myanmar and its regional neighbors to take responsibility for the fate of this 'rightless' group. But perhaps more importantly, it also shows that existing international mechanisms to end statelessness are ineffective in addressing the current rise in both de jure *and* de facto *statelessness around the world.*

Photo: Joel Carillet / iStock

Population groups can become stateless for a variety of reasons, including inequitable laws (such as marriage laws), transfers of territory between countries, flawed or discriminatory administrative practices, lack of birth registration, and withdrawal of citizenship rights. Most situations of statelessness are the direct consequence of discrimination based on ethnicity, religion or gender. Conservative estimates suggest that between eleven to 15 million people are currently living without a nationality—in legal limbo.

The world's largest stateless population is in Myanmar, where more than one million Rohingya have been refused nationality. Statelessness affects the enjoyment of all the rights which most of us take for granted, for instance the right to vote, of equality and protection under the law, or a child's right to education. Stateless people often live on the margins of society where they are vulnerable to exploitation.

The Rohingya became stateless in 1982 with the introduction of the revised Myanmar Citizenship Law that excluded them from the list of 135 national ethnic groups. Although their families had been living in Rhakine State for generations, they suddenly became "resident foreigners". The 1982 law based citizenship on the principle of *jus sanguinis;* very few Rohingya have a chance of fulfilling such requirements. In 1989, color-coded citizens scrutiny cards (CRCs) were introduced: pink cards for full citizens, blue for associate citizens, and green for naturalized citizens. The Rohingya were not issued any cards. In 1995, in response to the UNHCR's intensive advocacy efforts to document the Rohingya, the Burmese authorities started issuing them white temporary registration cards (TRCs) pursuant to the 1949 Residents of Burma Registration Act. The TRC, however, does not mention the bearer's place of birth and cannot be used to claim citizenship.

The Rohingya are in a position of what Hannah Arendt called "rightlessness". Not only Myanmar, but also Bangladesh and India have periodically threatened to evict them. The rise of ethnic or religious "majorities" who claim to constitute the "nation" has resulted in the citizenship laws of the postcolonial states of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, too, moving from *jus soli* to *jus sanguinis.* Ethnic bias, cultural, linguistic and religious prejudices, gender discrimination, and political concerns of the emerging ruling elites shape the policies for granting as well as denying citizenship.

Illustration: Kosmozoo / iStock

The word 'Rohingya' probably derives from Rohang, an ancient name for Myanmar's westernmost province, now officially known as Rakhine State. With an area of more than 36,000 square kilometers, the province is a narrow strip of coastal region that includes coastal planes and swamps as well as steep mountains in the east. Located at the junction of Myanmar, India and Bangladesh, it sits along the border between Asia's Islamic and Buddhist cultures. In pre-dominantly Buddhist Myanmar, the Muslim population that settled in today's Rakhine State from Bangladesh repeatedly suffered attacks and discrimination, but in 2017, ethnic nationalism and a frenzy of developmental investment resulted in a military campaign aimed at driving out the Rohingya from Myanmar altogether. Denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982, the one million Rohingya form the largest group of stateless people in the world.

The Rohingya are in a position of what Hannah Arendt called 'rightlessness'.

A question of responsibility

The international community's engagement with the problem of statelessness is comparatively recent. In 2014 the UNHCR launched a campaign to end statelessness by 2024. The 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, framed in a European context in the aftermath of World War II, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are incapable of addressing the current problems of increasing *de facto* statelessness. The major weakness of international protection mechanisms for stateless persons is the non-applicability of international law within the sovereign jurisdiction of states. When stateless groups are forced to leave one state, they are faced with other states' immigration laws, policies, and practices, which mostly make no distinctions between stateless persons and other migrants. We have here clearly a question of responsibility, and of responsibilities shirked: the responsibility of both the state that forces displacement and the state that has to give shelter, but also the responsibility of the region, and finally of the institutions in charge of global governance.

Meanwhile, analysts agree that as questions of nationality get increasingly ethicized and securitized, the phenomenon of statelessness will affect ever larger numbers of peo-

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The Momentous 'Eight' in Czecho-Slovak History

BY JACQUES RUPNIK

Czechoslovak history of the 20th century provides us with abundant and difficult options in connecting its momentous eights in the search for a usable past and a narrative for the 21st century. In his keynote speech at the IWM, Jacques Rupnik pointed out that these historical dates—ranging from the national independence and formation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 to the 'Velvet Revolution' of 1988/89—mark turning points in both national and European history.

Photo: Alice Fox / iStock

Anniversaries can be an occasion or a pretext to look back and reflect upon the past and present in Czech (and Slovak) society in 2018. This is even more the case when—as with the Czechoslovak "Eights," i.e. years ending in '8'—we are faced with a combination of several historical turning points to be examined simultaneously, and questions about their interplay are to be confronted. Each generation, aware of the debates of the previous one (or in reaction to them), tends to reformulate these questions in the light of new evidence and new concerns.

Commemoration, as we know, tends to be more revealing about those who commemorate than about the actual events commemorated. The Czechoslovak eights provide an occasion for government and state institutions to formulate their 'memorial policy' and define how it fits into the dominant historical narrative. For historians, drawn into this process, it is an opportunity to revisit the subject with the benefit of hindsight, like 'a distant country' (Jean Racine). It can also provide some with the Warholian fifteen minutes of fame, when they are summoned by the media to provide short and definitive judgments, and thus it also entails some risks. It may be worth to take these risks, as long as the distinction between history-writing and memory politics of today remains intact, i.e. as long as the need for public debate is differentiated from the uses and abuses of historical arguments in political competition.

Commemoration tends to be more revealing about those who commemorate than about the actual events commemorated.

Czechs' ambivalence about what it is that they are actually commemorating as a nation-state now constrained by its entanglements within the European Union, reveals certain anxieties associated with the crises of the past and conflated with those about the future—not exactly what you expect in a quiet, fairly prosperous and somewhat self-absorbed country in the middle of Europe.

The number eight lends itself to this mindset rather well: put horizontally it becomes the symbol of infinity. But, it also refers to the so-called Möbius strip, a surface with only one side and only one edge. It can be made using a strip of paper by gluing the two ends together with a half-twist. The twisting is possible in two directions; so there are two different (mirror-image) Möbius strips. A bug crawling along the centre-line of the loop would go around twice before coming back to its starting point. Jacques Lacan[1]—if a reference to psychoanalysis is permitted in this context—wrote insightfully on this and the gist is that the double loop bringing you back to the starting point is important for understanding the 'anxiety of repetition'.

This anxiety about the past is no doubt also an anxiety about the future. It points to the idea of cycles, of the 'eternal return,' and in the Czecho-Slovak narratives it contrasts moments of hope and eupho-

ria (as in 1918, during the Prague Spring of 1968 or the 'Velvet Revolution' twenty years later), followed by tragic set-backs, defeats and self-defeats, which breed collective depression and strategies of survival.

There are two caveats to this tale: First, it is a Czecho-Slovak 20th-century trajectory and therefore at each turning point you get a different reading in Prague and Bratislava from politicians and historians, and more generally in public perception. This is a story of a country that became two. Postwar surveys asking periodically Czechs and Slovaks to identify the most glorious period of their history reveal rather contrasting readings of their history.

Second, and no less important, perceptions change over time. Thus, on the eve of 1948 (in 1946) Czechs valued most the Hussite period (15th century), followed by the reign of Charles IV. (14th century). In 1968 they valued most the 1st Republic (1918–1938) followed by the Hussite period and Charles IV. By 2008, they put the Charles IV era on first rank, followed by the 1st Republic and then the 19th century 'national revival'.[2] That is most likely to remain the dominant perception today.

I will not attempt here to provide a potted history of 20th-century Czechoslovakia through its greatest hits, known as the 'eights'. Nor would I try to do the opposite: to fit the Czecho-Slovak experience into a 'global history': i.e. view a small, 20th-century central European country from the perspective of the global century we now live in. Patrick Boucheron has recently published a collective volume entitled *Histoire Mondiale de la France* ('A Global History of France') which provoked a widespread debate about the purpose and fate of national narratives and attempts to deconstruct them.

I propose, more modestly, and hopefully with some relevance for historians and the broader public, an in-between approach: the connection/the interaction between the Czech (Czecho-Slovak) and European dimensions. Put another way: The Czechoslovak 'eights' as a barometer, a seismograph, 'un révélateur' of the European predicament at crucial junctures of the 20th century.

I'll confine myself to the 20th century though one could—and perhaps should—connect them to another 'eight': 1848, the Spring of Nations, the first time Czechs, moving from culture to politics, explicitly confronted the question of the relationship between the nation and democracy. They (wisely) opted for Palacky's version of 'Austroslavism' at a safe distance from both the Russian tsar's combination of autocracy and pan-Slavism and the parliament in Frankfurt whose guiding spirits tended to confuse the progress of democracy with that of Germanization. Or should we look as far back as 1618 when the Thirty Years War—a truly European war!—starts in Bohemia, with the Prague defenestration…?

The famous Czechoslovak eights are an integral part of all the key turning points of 20th-century European history, revealing major European dilemmas: between East and West, between capitalism and socialism, between democracy and totalitarianism. To examine the way these issues played out in the Czech context can thus provide with insights into Czech ways of belonging to Europe and, more generally, for understanding European history of the past century.

During the Prague Spring of 1968 the Student paper conducted a survey where they asked leading protagonists of the reform movement the following philosophical question: 'Where from, where to, with whom?' To which Ivan Sviták the philosopher and *enfant terrible* of 1968, gave the most concise answer: 'From Asia to Europe. Alone'! This sense of uniqueness and isolation is perhaps the sharpest contrast with the 'Velvet Revolution' twenty years later, where the Czechoslovak 'return to Europe' was very much part of a collective, Central European endeavour. As Timothy Garton Ash put it: 'Poland ten years, Hungary ten months, East Germany ten weeks, Czechoslovakia ten days'!

On the eve of the 100th anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Academy of Sciences presented a collective study entitled *Cesko na Ceste*[3] ('Czechia on the road'). It was not meant as a narrative inspired by Jack Kerouac, a wandering, meandering journey from Czechoslovakia to Czechia. Rather, the title suggests that the country is heading somewhere, though most authors seemed to refrain from actually spelling out the European or Western destination, as if to suggest that some of the questions concerning its geopolitical orientation remain open. And indeed they do just like those concerning its founding principles.

A historian approaching the subject should thus try to avoid two traps: that of romantic historiography which inherited from the 19th century the idea of Czech democratic exceptionalism of which the new First Republic of 1918 to 1938, was the embodiment. And, conversely, the opposite inclination which is 'presentism': you read the past from the perspective of your present concerns and since the Czechoslovak state was unable to sustain itself both in 1938 (mainly under external pressure) and in 1992 (for internal reasons) it was doomed from the onset to become a 'failed state'.[4] ◁

This text is the introductory part of his keynote speech delivered at the workshop "The Momentous '8': Rethinking the 'Philosophy of Czech History'" in March 2018 (see infobox below). Video on: www.youtube.com/IWMVienna

1) Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre X, Paris, Seuil 2004.* lien entre réel, symbolique, imaginaire
2) Stepanka Pfeiferova, Jiri Subrt, 'Verejné mineni o problematice ceskych dejin', Praha, *Naše společnost* 2 (2009) pp 16–23.
3) Pavel Baran and Petr Drulak (eds.) *Cesko na ceste,* Academia, 2017.
4) Mary Heimann, *Czechoslovakia the state that failed, New Haven,* Yale UP, 2009.

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Photo: IWM

The Momentous '8': Rethinking the "Philosophy of Czech History"

The year 2018 calls upon us to revisit the iconic moments of Czechoslovak history of 20th century, which we can designate as the *Momentous '8':* The national independence and formation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, the Munich Agreement of 1938 allowing Nazi Germany the annexation of the 'Sudetenland' and subsequently the occupation of the whole country, the seizing of complete power by the Communist Party in 1948, the world-wide observed crushing of the 'Prague Spring' in 1968 and, finally, the 'Velvet Revolution' of 1988/89—all of these historical dates not only carry an almost emblematic significance in the national context but indicate turning points for European history.

This European dimension might be especially visible for the year 1918 witnessing the end of the Hapsburg Empire which was tantamount to a fundamental restructuring of European power constellations and not any less for the events of 1968 which fundamentally changed European societies, but entailed different messages and underwent quite diverging perceptions in East and West. As Milan Kundera once nicely put it, the 1968 protests in Paris were regarded as the enthralling outbreak of "revolutionary lyricism," while Prague Spring—simultaneously, yet reversely—signalled the onset of "post-revolutionary skepticism." The 50th and 100th anniversaries of both historical caesuras and the spell of the momentous '8' invite us to rethink the "philosophy of Czech history" which Jan Patočka considered as a unique phenomenon in European historiography of fascinating quality. In this spirit, the IWM hosted a workshop entitled The Momentous '8': Rethinking the "Philosophy of Czech History" from March 8–9, 2018. The conference, conceptualized by IWM Permanent Fellow Ludger Hagedorn and organized within a program that is supported by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, brought together leading international experts on Central European history. Further details on: www.iwm.at

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ple—*de jure,* but even more *de facto,* caused by the vast numbers of displaced persons around the world. One may ask: When will international law recognize the crisis of *de facto* statelessness? When will states move beyond humanitarianism and attempt a regional or at least a series of bilateral solutions?

Finding sustainable solutions

Population movements, in particular forced population movements, often have regional dimensions. In the case of the Rohingya, the relevant region is defined above all by the seas across which so many of them have tried to flee—the Andaman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. In one single year (2014–2015) about 25,000 Rohingya left Myanmar and Bangladesh by boat, of which around 8,000 were stranded at sea. Approximately 400 of them died. As in the Mediterranean, these refugees are at the mercy of people traffickers. On 1 May 2015, a mass grave containing the remains of more than 30 bodies was discovered in the Sadao district of Thailand, a few hundred meters from the Malaysian border. Four days later, three Thai officials and a Myanmar national were arrested in Thailand for suspected involvement in human trafficking. Thereafter, boats began to be intercepted. Thai, Malaysian, and Indonesian authorities reportedly pushed boats of asylum seekers back out to sea. Boatloads of people were abandoned on the high seas. An estimated number of 6,000 Rohingya and Bengalis were stranded in international waters by 12 May without food or drinking water. Some were rescued by Indonesian and Malaysian local officials and fishermen, or swam to shore. On 26 May, Malaysian policemen found the remains of approximately 140 bodies, perhaps migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh, in abandoned jungle camps near the Thai border. In short, the regional response was not only inadequate but detrimental. Policing was thought to be the main way to tackle the crisis. However, as in the Mediterranean, it only served to aggravate it.

When images of rickety boats carrying Rohingya, with little or no food and drinking water, hit newspapers in May 2015, Malaysia and Indonesia responded to international pressure and said they would no longer turn away migrant boats. Instead they offered to take in a wave of asylum-seekers, provided they could be resettled or repatriated within a year. By contrast, Australia declared that while it stood ready to assist in other ways, none of those fleeing would be allowed to settle in Australia. As is well known, Australia's so-called "Pacific solution" in practice means offshore internment and has resulted in severe human rights violations, mostly suffered by stateless persons or by persons made *de facto* stateless as a result of Australia's policy.

Nevertheless, regional initiatives and policies have in the past been successful in finding solutions for displaced stateless populations. Examples include several stateless groups who were rehabilitated and resettled in India, the case of Tamil plantation workers in Sri Lanka, and the protection of Afghan refugees in India, Pakistan, and Iran. In these instances, a bilateral framework and a spirit of regional understanding worked. Why have the states of South and Southeast Asia, along with other Asian Pacific countries, failed in their deliberations on the issue of the rights of the Rohingya?

So far, it has been difficult to get Myanmar to even discuss the crisis, but its involvement is obviously essential to any successful solution.

Between eleven to 15 million people are currently living without a nationality.

We may recall how the issue of Balkan refugees and ex-Yugoslav stateless groups was resolved within the framework of Europe. In the wake of the growing international focus on the Rohingya issue, the Royal Thai government on 29 May 2016 called for a regional meeting on the migrant crisis. This involved 15 nations, including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, as well as Australia and the United States. While several countries wanted to discuss the root causes of migrant flows, the Myanmar government said that in that case it would boycott the meeting. It also accused other countries of being soft on human trafficking. As the current migrant crisis came under further regional and international scrutiny, Myanmar was asked to recognize that its transition to democracy would be judged by how it treated its minority communities.

Situations such as the plight of the stateless Rohingya require a two-pronged approach, on the international and the regional level. The international community has to develop more effective legal tools to avoid or end statelessness, and states need to accept their responsibility and cooperate on a regional level to find sustainable and humane solutions, instead of kicking the stateless around like a ball nobody wants to catch.

The attention of the international community remains on the Mediterranean boat crisis, and the ongoing plight of Rohingya and others in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean is ignored. Today, in the din of the maritime security, the human rights of the migrants at sea are drowned. Sovereignty games continue around the politics of boat migration. Yet the persistent attempts by the migrants to take to the seas challenge the anonymity of death in the waters. ◁

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The Revival of the Orthodox Church in Russia: Triumph or Crisis?

BY SERGEY CHAPNIN

The common assumption that the Russian Orthodox Church is a mere tool of the Russian state masks the more complex story of the church's post-Soviet development. For Sergey Chapnin, a former church insider, optimism over the church's revitalization in the 1990s–2000s has now given way to alarm over the church's profound spiritual and institutional crisis.

Photo: Mikhail Tereshchenko / Tass / picturedesk.com

Once the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was freed from Soviet pressure in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it began to grow rapidly. The number of parishes increased from 8.500 in 1988 to 36.800 in 2017, and monasteries from 20 to 1.000 over the same period. But although this growth is impressive, it is far from the only indicator of the church's health. The gains seem much more modest when looking at areas such as catechism and religious education, theological studies and charitable activities.

Even so, over this period the ROC has become the largest non-governmental organization in Russia, while also cementing its status as the largest of all the local Orthodox churches in the world today.

In many ways, this has dictated the nature of the ROC in the last decade and a half. By first moving closer to the state in order to solve the problems of constructing a new national identity, and then directly contributing to the pursuit of certain political goals set by the government, the church suffered a huge blow to its authority as an independent institution.

Over the past five years, the revival of the Orthodox Church in Russia and across the post-Soviet space has been the main theme of my research and publications.

In 2013, I argued that the post-Soviet revival of the ROC was complete and that we already had a certain degree of historical distance from it. We could analyze church revival as a completed process, with a beginning and an end.

I was mistaken. The events of 2017–2018 have prompted me to radically reconsider my understanding of the revival of the ROC. Today I admit that church revival is still ongoing. Furthermore, my overall assessment of this period is changing: positive tendencies have now given way to clearly negative ones.

Church revival as triumph or tragedy

Starting from my conviction that church revival was complete, I previously proposed two narratives to understand that revival. Roughly speaking, they can be deemed "triumphalist" and "tragic." They allow us to view events from diametrically opposed points of views.

The triumphalist narrative of a dynamic revival begins in 1988, when the millennium of the Baptism of Rus' was celebrated widely in the Soviet Union—and, for the first time in 70 years of state atheism, fairly freely. This version of the narrative comes to an end in 2008, with the sudden death of Patriarch Alexy II (Ridiger). As he became patriarch in June 1990, church revival is inextricably linked with him: it coincides with the era of his patriarchate.

This narrative allows us to speak of church revival as the *successful and continuous* development of all aspects of church life: parishes, monastic life, missions, education, charity, church administrative institutions and—last but not least—the relationship between the church and the Russian state.

Triumphalism plays a key role in the ROC's self-presentation. This is closely linked to the dominant narrative in contemporary Russian society: if the main question posed by post-Soviet Russian society is "Who are we?", only the church offers a way to trace the line back a millennium, to St. Vladimir. The church is the only institution that preserved continuity with the institutions of pre-Soviet, imperial Russia. And this means that Russia's entire symbolic capital is concentrated in the hands of the church—and, more concretely, in the hands of the patriarch himself.

Herein lies the secret of the state's recognition of the church. If the state wants to link itself to the Russian Empire (or even to Kievan Rus'), rather than to the Soviet Union, it cannot make do without the Orthodox Church. And thus Orthodoxy finds itself at the very core of Russians' post-Soviet identity.

In the face of a societal identity crisis, the church helped formulate a series of concepts that were then coopted by the state—above all the idea of the "russkii mir" ("Russian world") and the rhetoric of "traditional values."

The second, "tragic" narrative, allows us to view the period of ecclesiastical revival from a radically different perspective.

This narrative begins on 9 September 1990, when one of the most vivid pastors, preachers and spiritual writers of the last quarter of the 20th century, Alexander Men, was murdered (a case which is still unsolved). The end date would be 5 August 2013, when a second prominent cleric, Pavel Adelheim, was murdered.

This tragic periodization indicates that violence remains a serious political, social and spiritual problem in Russia, which neither the state nor the ROC have proven able to solve over the years of church revival.

To be sure, it is not impossible that these were chance killings. But the men who were killed were leading pastors, and this says much about the atmosphere in the church. It is difficult for priests with vivid personalities in such a church, where one of the most acute problems is the complete lack of rights that the clergy have vis-à-vis the episcopate. There are no mechanisms to protect priests from the arbitrary administrative and financial tyranny of bishops.

These killings speak to a broader problem: a tolerant attitude towards violence in all its manifestations. This includes the church's favorable attitude towards the mercenaries who went to fight in the Donbass, believing that they are defending the ideas of the "russky mir" from "Ukrainian fascists." It also includes the aggressive acts of the "God's Will" movement: In 2012–2015, activists from groups operating under Orthodox slogans attacked supporters of the group Pussy Riot, tried to break up performances that offended their religious sentiments, and even destroyed several works in an exhibit of the artist Vadim Sidur at the Manege Museum in Moscow. The examples here are many.

Is the church's revival a good thing?

A clear majority of historians, sociologists, political scientists and theologians have deemed the church revival in post-Soviet Russia to be *unquestionably positive*—in spite of some clearly negative developments, like the "young sages" movement; the panic over tax numbers, which were seen as the "mark of Satan"; or the "tsarebozhniki" ("tsar-god") heresy, which presented Nicholas II as the co-redeemer of Russia. But the positive always outweighed the negative.

In recent years, however, the signs of crisis are mounting rapidly:

- The current patriarch, Kirill, has concentrated all ecclesiastical authority in his own hands;
- The conflict between the Moscow Patriarchate and Constantinople is growing;
- Church teaching is perceived by society, especially young people,

as merely a form of state propaganda;

• Evidence of the ROC episcopate's involvement in major corruption scandals and the younger bishops' luxurious lifestyle has come to light;

• Frank confessions of former clerics who have left the priesthood are being published.

And this is far from a full list of the problems the church is dealing with.

The positive elements of church life have vanished, leaving only scandals, at least in the public sphere. Everything positive has been reduced to the level of the individual parish—and to some degree church-adjacent organizations, especially charitable ones. But this has little to no impact on the image and authority of the Moscow Patriarchate.

What we are witnessing is a profound systemic crisis, with roots not so much in the era of church revival as in an earlier period. Kirill's activities should be understood not as an exception, but as the *organic continuation* of the policies of the patriarchs of the Soviet period and, after that, the policies of the (post-)Soviet episcopate in the era of church revival.

Of course, Kirill is operating under new conditions and has achieved results of which his predecessors could not even have dreamed. But his plan of action is the very same as his predecessors'. The primary focus is on seeking the state's support for the church and an obvious willingness to serve state interests in pursuit of that support. One of the consequences of such policies is utter neglect of the interests not only of civil society, but even of his own flock—both laypeople and clergy.

Kirill's efforts towards creating a "state church"—or, if you prefer, an "imperial church"—are a direct continuation of the church revival. But what is being revived is not faith, not parish life, not the church in the traditional understanding of the concept, but ecclesiastical bureaucracy and "Orthodox ideology." This is a revival in the most negative sense of the word.

It is entirely possible that the post-Soviet revival of the ROC will go down in history not as a rare chance to modernize the church, not as a search for theological answers to the challenges of modernity, but as a postmodern historical reconstruction, the invention of "ancient traditions" and sectarian insularity.

"Negative" church revival has plunged the ROC into a deep crisis. The way out must lie in rethinking the principles by which the church lives and is constructed: a severe restriction of the episcopate's authority, as well as clear definitions of the canonical status of laypeople and of how autonomy is granted to parish communities. There is still a long way to go to resolve these issues.

And that means that church revival in Russia continues. ◁

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Das letzte Tabu?
Fortsetzung von Seite 6

Aber es gibt doch eine „grimmige Befriedigung", dass seit den 1960er Jahren einiges gelungen ist: Etwa die Familienrechtsreform mit der Einführung des Prinzips der Partnerschaftlichkeit in der Ehe oder der Entkriminalisierung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs – beides Meilensteine aus dem Jahr 1975. Vier Jahre später wurde in Österreich ein erstes Gleichbehandlungsgesetz für die Privatwirtschaft erlassen; erst 1993 folgte der öffentliche Dienst, dann aber immerhin mit dem Paukenschlag der Quotenregelungen.

1993 war auch das Jahr, in dem sexuelle Belästigung erstmals als Form sexistischer Diskriminierung rechtlich verpönt wurde. Es waren feministische Anwältinnen in den 1970er Jahren, allen voran Catharine MacKinnon, die den Terminus „sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz" prägten und damit dem Phänomen endlich einen Namen gaben. Die Definition war wichtig, damit Frauen begriffen, dass sexuelle Belästigung kein naturwüchsiges Frauenschicksal ist, sondern ein Übergriff, den sie nicht erleiden müssen. 2015 wurde auf Initiative der damaligen Frauenministerin Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek §218 Strafgesetzbuch novelliert, um sexuelle Belästigung nun auch strafrechtlich ahnden zu können.

Freilich scheint diese Erfolgsgeschichte auf halbem Weg steckengeblieben zu sein – ansonsten müssten wir im Jahr 2018 nicht mehr über #MeToo als letztes Tabu reden. Nicht zuletzt ist die Umsetzung der einschlägigen Gesetze immer noch mangelhaft. Was also können Feministinnen vom Recht erwarten? Selbst MacKinnon war und ist hier ambivalent: Recht ist nötig, um gegen Unrecht vorgehen zu können, aber es stärkt auch die Institutionen, die Frauenanliegen nicht sehr entgegenkommen (Polizei, Justiz, etc.). Und: Institutionalisierte Frauensolidarität ist eine Illusion; Richterinnen und Staatsanwältinnen sind nicht unbedingt auf der Seite der Frauen. Dazu kommt, dass Rechtsgüter wie sexuelle Integrität in Studium und Ausbildung nicht adäquat vermittelt werden. So hat eine Dissertantin erst unlängst erhoben, dass es für RichterInnen und StaatsanwältInnen in diesem Bereich in ganz Osterreich keine Fortbildungsangebote gibt.

Wenn das Delikt der sexuellen Belästigung dann doch vor Gericht kommt, exponiert das Sprechen über sexuelle Übergriffe die betroffene Person sehr. So schwierig es schon ist, mit Freundinnen und Freunden darüber zu reden, wie unangenehm ist es dann, diese Übergriffe den VertreterInnen rechtlicher Institutionen zu schildern? MacKinnon spitzte dies drastisch zu, als sie in ihrem Buch *Nur Worte* meinte: Vor Gericht eine sexuelle Belästigung oder eine Vergewaltigung zu schildern, wäre wie „Live Porno mit dem Opfer als Star". Diese Problematik lässt sich freilich nicht einfach aus der Welt schaffen.

Und in der Tat: Das Recht ist kein Allheilmittel. Um eine echte Änderung der Situation herbeizuführen, müssen nicht zuletzt Männer in alltäglichen Situationen die Initiative ergreifen und gegenüber ihren Geschlechtsgenossen Verantwortung übernehmen. Sie dürften nicht mehr mitspielen, wenn sexistische Witze erzählt werden und sollten dann eingreifen, wenn einer Kellnerin beispielsweise an den Po gegrapscht wird.

Es gibt aber auch institutionelle *best practice*-Beispiele. Ein Feld, in dem sich unabhängig von gesetzlichen Verbesserungen einiges bewegt, ist der Sport: Nicht nur die frühere Schirennläuferin Nicola Werdenig hat mit ihrem mutigen Schritt, von selbst erlebten sexuellen Übergriffen zu erzählen, einen Ball ins Rollen gebracht. Auch die Plattform „Frauen im Sport" forderte und initiierte verpflichtende Module in der österreichischen TrainerInnenausbildung zum Thema Umgang mit Macht und Prävention gegen sexuelle Gewalt im Sport. Mitglieder der Plattform unterrichten seit mehreren Jahren AnwärterInnen in der Grundausbildung. Die Salzburger Initiative „Safe Sports", finanziell unterstützt vom Land Salzburg, ist eine weitere Anlaufstelle für Betroffene von sexueller Gewalt im Sport.

Auch im Europaparlament hat sich einiges getan. Seit 2016 finden sich couragierte Frauen zusammen, die es gewagt haben, sexuelle Übergriffe von Abgeordneten, anderen Vorgesetzten oder Kollegen öffentlich zu machen. Die Grüne Europaabgeordnete Terry Reintke startete mit anderen eine Petition und im Oktober 2018 initiierten mehrere Frauen die Gründung eines Blogs (metooep.com), der andere Betroffene ermuntern soll, ihre Erfahrungen zu teilen. Denn selbst von Seiten des Europaparlaments geschieht immer noch zu wenig, um gegen sexuelle Belästigung vorzugehen und den Opfern zu helfen.

Für all diese Initiativen braucht es jedoch Geld. Wenn wir den Blick auf die aktuelle Situation in Österreich richten, so hat das Frauenministerium gerade einmal zehn Mio. Euro für Projekte zur Förderung von Gleichstellung und Gewaltprävention zur Verfügung – kaum ein Tropfen auf dem heißen Stein. Dabei bräuchte es – neben männlichen Verbündeten, die sich aus der sexistischen Männerbündelei ausklinken – heute mehr denn je Informationskampagnen, Schulungen, Initiativen zur Durchsetzung jener rechtlichen Vorgaben, die bereits existieren. Damit beim nächsten #Aufschrei sexuelle Belästigung nicht wieder als „letztes Tabu" thematisiert werden muss und #MeToo mehr als eine Fußnote der Geschichte von Gewalt gegen Frauen bleibt. ◁

Ulrike Lunacek war bis Ende 2017 Vizepräsidentin des Europäischen Parlaments und Europa-Abgeordnete der österreichischen Grünen sowie Spitzenkandidatin für die NR-Wahl 2017. Nach dem Ausscheiden der Grünen aus dem Nationalrat war sie im ersten Halbjahr 2018 Visiting Fellow am IWM und ist heute freiberuflich tätig.

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Den Passagen Verlag und das Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) verbindet das Streben, politische und philosophische Diskurse einer breiten Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen und einen Raum für intellektuellen Austausch und Begegnung zu schaffen. Im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Kooperation erscheinen ab Frühjahr 2019 in wechselnden Reihen des Passagen Verlags Texte, die die Forschungsschwerpunkte, Programme und Veranstaltungen des IWM reflektieren und spannende Einblicke in eine Vielzahl aktueller Themen und Debatten gewähren.

An die Grenzen der Demokratie

Demokratie ist *die* Regierungsform unserer Zeit – und doch erodiert ihre Legitimität. Stößt die Demokratie derzeit an ihre Grenzen oder braucht es Grenzverschiebungen in Denken und Praxis der Demokratie, um sie neu zu gestalten?

Die weltweite Verbreitung wie Beliebtheit der Demokratie geht mit ihrer Krise einher. Im historischen Moment ihrer größten Ausdehnung scheint – aus dem Innern der Demokratie selbst heraus – eine demonstrative Missachtung ihrer grundlegenden Prinzipien und Institutionen um sich zu greifen. Demokratische Institutionen und Prozeduren werden in Frage gestellt. Wie lässt sich diese Entwicklung verstehen? Und was lässt sich tun, um einer zunehmenden Erosion demokratischer Grundsätze entgegenzuwirken? Renommierte WissenschaftlerInnen analysieren die Symptome einer Herrschaftsform im Wandel und skizzieren Ansätze, wie eine erhöhte Widerstandsfähigkeit und Attraktivität der Demokratie zu gewinnen wäre. ◁

Mit Beiträgen von Nancy Fraser, Janos Kis, Ivan Krastev, Mark Lilla, Chantal Mouffe, Jan-Werner Müller, Claus Offe, Jacques Rupnik, Nadia Urbinati u.a.

Wer redet von der Reinheit? Eine kleine Begriffsgeschichte.

Reinheit ist unverzichtbar; als Wunsch, als Ideal, als Forderung. Und sie ist imaginär: In der sozialen Wirklichkeit ist sie Fiktion. Trotzdem ist Reinheit eine machtvolle religiöse und moralische Kategorie, im Mittelalter ebenso wie in der Gegenwart. Mit welchen Slogans, Bildern und Erzählungen wird sie wirksam gemacht – und als Verkaufsargument eingesetzt?

Von den Predigten der Bettelorden bis zu den Werbekampagnen von heute gibt es kaum ein Feld, das ohne Berufungen auf Reinheit auskommt. Vom reinen Gewissen bis zum naturreinen Bio-Saft dient der Begriff dazu, Ursprünglichkeit und Auserwähltheit, moralische Überlegenheit und vermeintliche Unvermischtheit zu behaupten. Der Historiker Valentin Groebner begibt sich auf die Suche nach den Ursprüngen dieser Schlagworte. ◁

Valentin Groebner, geboren 1962 in Wien, lehrt als Professor für Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance an der Universität Luzern. Im Juni 2018 hielt er eine dreiteilige Vortragsreihe am IWM im Rahmen der renommierten Serie IWM Lectures in Human Sciences.

Landlords vs Commoners: Housing Conflicts and Political Divides

BY TOBIAS BERNET

A capitalist economy geared towards the interests of property-owners presents an enormous obstacle to the democratization of housing provision. However, the idea of collective property rights has an increasing transnational appeal, writes Tobias Bernet.

Photo: Michael Körner / Action Press / picturedesk.com

Words can be telltale. If you rent an apartment and you use the English language, you have a *landlord*. This is a forceful reminder of how quasi-feudal relations permeate our contemporary capitalist economies. These are hardly the "meritocracies" that the (neo-)liberal narrative makes them out to be, something that the issue of housing illustrates like few others. Income from real property, the "ground rent," corresponds to no productive economic activity *per se*—as the founders of modern economics knew. Yet we still allow the privileges that come with ownership of land to exert immense influence over our increasingly urbanized societies. This article examines the role of housing in today's global political situation, addressing both the capital-driven rise in housing costs in many metropolitan areas, as well as the supposed urban-rural dichotomy equated with a conflict between "cosmopolitan" worldviews on the one hand, and the nativist and reactionary attitudes of "new" right forces on the other.

It is worth recalling that a bubble in the highly financialized US housing market was one of the main triggers of the 2008 financial crash. Ten years on, the world economy is superficially booming, yet with all sorts of government-sponsored patches that make most critical experts extremely uneasy. As David Harvey argues, both the cyclical nature of capitalist crises and states' roles as lenders of last resort are closely intertwined with the spatiality of the global order. In short, endeavors to resolve a crisis of "over-accumulation" often include incentives—such as low interest rates—to redirect capital into the built environment. This results in apparent paradoxes, such as the German housing market being regarded as a "safe haven" for capital immediately after the American market had blown up. Indeed, the return on real estate in Europe's largest economy—mostly in cities—has surpassed most other types of investment.

Those who do not live off other people's need for shelter must unite to create commons-based systems of housing provision.

Unsurprisingly, German tenants and prospective home buyers are less enthusiastic. Housing costs have risen sharply to the point where many centrally located neighborhoods are becoming unaffordable, not only for those in precarious economic positions, but for the middle class as well. Political responses have been muted at best; consequently, many German cities have seen large housing-related protests. In Berlin, especially, there is a feeling that the city risks becoming "another Paris or London." Germany is of course by no means the only country facing a housing affordability crisis. Yet even a cursory observation reveals that this problem doesn't play out in the same manner everywhere. To better understand the particularities of different housing economies, it is helpful to employ a framework of *varieties of housing provision.*[1]

Anglo-Saxon vs German tradition

From this angle, the US and Germany represent two distinct traditions. The US has a deeply commodified system of housing in which the individually or family-owned home—supplied through a specific, highly debt-based market—is the dominant form of tenure. Owning one's own home has been part and parcel of the "American Dream" since colonial times. During the New Deal era, the US government began subsidizing mortgages; but the practice of "redlining" non-white neighbor-

hoods excluded African American and other ethnic minority communities from this vital mechanism of wealth accumulation. Public and other social housing has always been residual at best and—by way of ethnic segregation—punitive at worst.

In Germany, by contrast, homeownership rates have traditionally been low, especially in urban areas. Rented housing is strongly regulated (with sudden rent hikes and terminations being prohibited in most cases) and provided by a wide variety of institutions. There still are considerable amounts of public housing in many cities, in spite of a wave of privatizations in the 1990s and early 2000s. The cooperative model of democratically controlled, collective ownership has proven more resilient towards recommodification, and cooperatives continue to provide another important segment of non-profit housing. Yet due to a decrease in subsidies (including the expiry of earlier programs), the amount of truly inexpensive units continues to shrink, while large stock corporations have made inroads into the rental sector.

The American variety of housing provision is, broadly speaking, Anglo-Saxon; and the most successful implementations of the German model can in fact be found in Austrian and Swiss cities, with their large public and cooperative housing stocks. Greece represents a third variety, where condominium ownership is common and often intertwined with family relations: in many cases, several generations or branches of a family own apartments within the same multi-story building. Here, equating private homeownership with commodification is complicated by the logic of kinship—which might be considered typically "Mediterranean."

If we broaden the perspective to include the Global South, vast informal settlements and heightened precariousness of property rights enter the picture. Yet from an economic point of view, what is often perceived as a qualitative difference can be conceptualized as one of degree, if affordability is defined as the relation between average housing costs and average household incomes. In many Asian, African and Latin American urban areas, housing costs amount to well over 100% of the latter. According to a standard definition of affordability, roughly 30% would be acceptable; yet even in poor US neighborhoods, 80% is far from uncommon. People hence resort to informal settlements wherever the formal sector fails to provide homes that are at least marginally affordable.

Housing rights movements

What can be done about this global housing crisis? A hint might come from the semantics of rental relationships mentioned at the start. In the quasi-feudal world of housing, the landlords' counterparts can be called tenants, but also commoners: The "common" class that does not own the land on which it lives, but also those engaged in "commoning", referring to the notion of the *commons*. Here lies, perhaps, a formula for housing rights movements the world over. Those who do not live off other people's need for shelter must unite to create commons-based systems of housing provision. These can take different forms. Yet the historical record (in both market and command economies) suggests that the bottom-up, self-help model of the cooperative is better suited to producing and maintaining a stock of de-commodified housing than state-controlled entities.

The idea of "commoning" housing provision does not entail a dismissal of any kind of individual or family homeownership. For Brazilian families in informal settlements, getting their titles recognized is doubtlessly an achievement in and of their own; the same goes for US homeowners with "underwater" mortgages for fending off evictions. But in many places, private, individual ownership can only go so far in permanently securing access to affordable housing for all but the wealthiest households. Of course, the power of landlords small and large, and a capitalist economy which works in their favor, present enormous obstacles to the democratization of housing provision. Studying successful cooperative models in western Europe won't yield an immediate cure for the hardships of informal settlers in the Global South. But the knowledge exchange already taking place demonstrates the transnational appeal of the idea of collective property rights.

Conflicts over housing increasingly intersect with other societal fault lines. The common can also be read as the civic and thus the urban. The anti-modernism of right-wing movements has always been anti-urban—fearing the mingling that urban space facilities, the potential for solidarity across ethnic and other divides. It therefore seems appropriate to describe the rise of far-right movements in many parts of the world as an "anti-cosmopolitan" backlash. The fact that this takes places within urban areas as well (consider, for instance, the strong urban base of India's Hindu nationalists) doesn't make this narrative less compelling.

The problem with this binary view is, rather, that it postulates a more or less unified, "liberal" urban camp, based on the assumption that the supposedly "new", "cultural" core conflict largely overrides the "old", economic left-right axis. Yet the issue of housing shows that there are important differences between leftist and neoliberal policy prescriptions, and also that urban development and ethno-nationalist authoritarianism are often highly compatible. It is by no means coincidental that the housing economy is a favorite sphere of activity of the politically powerful, the ultra-rich, and the professionally criminal (anything but mutually exclusive categories), and hence awash with all kinds of illicit money. Virtually all of the authoritarian characters who have risen to prominence in recent years have been involved in dubious real-estate dealings—with Donald Trump personifying gilded ground-rent neofeudalism like no other.

There is increasing acknowledgement that if cosmopolitan urbanity is to be an effective antidote to reactionary anti-egalitarianism, it cannot remain blind to economic issues, especially the allocation of the wealth that is urban land. Vice versa, there can be no meaningful commoning movement that isn't intersectional. And it probably won't succeed if it doesn't address the discrepancy between cities' economic and cultural importance, and their relative lack of political power in a world order still based on the sovereignty of nation states.

The power of landlords and the capitalist economy present enormous obstacles to the democratization of housing provision.

Authors such as Benjamin Barber have long argued that cities are the more appropriate building blocks for a planetary polity capable of tackling the challenges of the 21st century. Demographic data unequivocally tell us that mankind's future lies in cities. The heightened rivalry for urban space is also due to people voting with their feet. Rightwing politicians perpetuate anti-metropolitan provisions in electoral systems, sensing how big a threat internal migration might be to their power and the "purities" they strive to uphold. The antagonism between the national and the municipal has taken on new urgency in a range of conflicts between rightwing national governments and progressive majorities in larger cities. Two prominent examples are American "Sanctuary Cities" that refuse to assist in the deportation of undocumented migrants, and the "municipalist" electoral alliances in Spain that have made a former housing activist, Ada Colau, mayor of Barcelona.

The vision of a world of progressive municipalities is still blurry. Yet it opens up ways of thinking about the future that are far more hopeful than anything nationalism's "storied pomp"—repackaged by a caste of shady landlords—has to offer. ◁

1) See, for example, research carried out over the last four decades by Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Jim Kemeny, Michael Harloe, Peter A. Hall, David Soskice, Herman Schwartz, and Leonard Seabrooke.

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tificial intelligence will render many of today's jobs obsolete. They propose paying everyone a basic income as a way to soften the transition to a world without work. Whether such a world is a prospect to welcome or to resist is a question that will be central to politics in the coming years. Political parties will have to grapple with the meaning of work and its place in a good life.

4. Patriotism and national community

Free trade agreements and immigration are the most potent flashpoints of populist fury. While these are economic issues, the passion they evoke suggests something more is at stake.

Workers who believe their country cares more for cheap goods and cheap labor than for the job prospects of its own people feel a sense of betrayal that often finds ugly, intolerant expression—a hatred of immigrants, a strident nationalism that vilifies Muslims and other "outsiders," a rhetoric of "taking back our country."

Liberals reply by insisting on the virtues of mutual respect and multicultural understanding, but this principled response, valid though it is, fails to address an important set of questions implicit in the populist complaint. What is the moral significance, if any, of national borders? Do we owe more to our fellow citizens than we owe citizens of other countries? In a global age, should we cultivate national identities or aspire to a cosmopolitan ethic of universal human concern? The populist uprising highlights the need for democratic public discourse to address the big questions people care about, including moral and cultural questions. We need to rethink a central premise of contemporary liberalism: that the way to a tolerant society is to avoid engaging in substantive moral argument in politics.

Revitalizing public discourse

The insistence that citizens leave their moral and spiritual convictions outside the public square seems to avoid the danger that the majority may impose its values on the minority and to prevent the possibility that a morally overheated politics will lead to wars of religion. It seems to offer a secure basis for mutual respect. But it ill-equips us to address the moral and cultural issues that animate the populist revolt. For how is it possible to discuss the meaning of work and its role in a good life without debating competing conceptions of the good life? How is it possible to think through the proper relation of national and global identities without asking about the virtues such identities express, and the claims they make upon us?

Liberal neutrality flattens questions of meaning, identity, and purpose into questions of fairness. It therefore lacks the moral, rhetorical, and sympathetic resources to understand the cultural estrangement, even humiliation, that many working class and middle class voters feel; it ignores the meritocratic hubris of elites.

Donald Trump is keenly alive to the politics of humiliation. When he withdrew the U.S. from the Paris climate change agreement, Trump argued that he was doing so to protect American jobs. But his decision's real political rationale was contained in a seemingly stray remark: "We don't want other countries and other leaders to laugh at us anymore." This resonates with Trump voters, even those who care about climate change. For those left behind by three decades of market-driven globalization, the problem is not only wage stagnation and the loss of jobs; it is also the loss of social esteem.

Mainstream liberal and social democratic politicians who think the problem with globalization is simply a matter of distributive justice miss this dimension of politics. Despite liberal thinkers' claim to the contrary, there is a philosophical affinity between the neo-liberal faith in market reasoning and the principle of liberal neutrality. Market reasoning seems to offer a way to resolve contested public questions without engaging in contentious debates about how goods are properly valued. When two people make a deal, they decide for themselves what value to place on the goods they exchange. Similarly, liberal neutrality seems to offer a way of defining and justifying rights without presupposing any particular conception of the good. But the neutrality is spurious in both cases. Markets are not morally neutral instruments for defining the common good, and liberal public reason is not a morally neutral way of arriving at principles of justice.

The assumption that it is possible to outsource moral judgment to markets, or to procedures of liberal public reason, has created an empty, impoverished public discourse. Such a vacuum of public meaning is invariably filled by narrow, intolerant, authoritarian alternatives—whether in the form of religious fundamentalism or strident nationalism.

That is what we are witnessing today. Three decades of market-driven globalization and technocratic liberalism have hollowed out democratic public discourse, disempowered ordinary citizens, and prompted a populist backlash that seeks to cloth the naked public square with an intolerant, vengeful nationalism.

To reinvigorate democratic politics we need a morally robust public discourse that honors pluralism by engaging with our moral disagreements, rather than avoiding them. Disentangling the intolerant aspects of populist protest from its legitimate grievances is no easy matter, but it is important to try. Understanding these grievances and creating a politics that can respond to them is the most pressing political challenge of our time. ◁

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