NO. 123 • SPRING / SUMMER 2019

IWMpost

Magazine of the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen / Institute for Human Sciences www.iwm.at

Ayşe Çağlar
Global Migration Compacts

Ilija Trojanow
Wege nach Utopia

Muriel Blaive
James Bond in Prague

Misha Glenny
Cyber Bobbies on the Beat

Democracy's Descent



Photo: CSA Images / iStock

Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen • Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Wien, Austria • GZ: 052036175 M • Postgebühr bar bezahlt • Verlagspostamt 1090 Wien

Contents

NO. 123 • SPRING / SUMMER 2019

Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen
Institute for Human Sciences

Imprint: Responsible for the content: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria, Phone: +43/1/313 58-0, Fax +43/1/313 58-60, iwm@iwm.at, www.iwm.at; **Editors:** Marion Gollner, Anita Dick; **Editorial Assistance:** Simon Garnett, Christina Pössel, Andrea Roedig, Benjamin D. Tendler, Kate Younger; **Design:** steinkellner/zotter, www.steinkellner.com. IWM*post* is published two times a year. Current circulation: 7,500, printed by Grasl FairPrint, 2540 Bad Vöslau, www.grasl.eu. An online archive of IWM*post* is available on the Institute's website at www.iwm.at.

Editorial

Dreißig Jahre sind seit dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs vergangen. Die Euphorie von damals ist der Ernüchterung der Gegenwart gewichen. Demokratische Errungenschaften werden zunehmend in Frage gestellt. Dementsprechend provokativ lautet der Titel des IWM-Sammelbandes „Wenn Demokratien demokratisch untergehen", der hier mit Auszügen von **Chantal Mouffe, Nadia Urbinati** und **Boaventura de Sousa Santos** vorgestellt wird. Mit anti-demokratischer Rhetorik setzen sich auch **Luiza Bialasiewicz** und **Sabrina Stallone** am Beispiel faschistischer Bewegungen in Italien auseinander. Migration – ein Kernthema der Populisten, ist Gegenstand von **Ayşe Çağlars** Beitrag, der die Wichtigkeit der Konzepte Schutz und Verantwortung für das Funktionieren einer globalen Migrationspolitik aufzeigt.

Inwiefern liberale Eliten nicht auch eine Gefahr für die Demokratie darstellen können, erläutert **Pavel Barša** im Gespräch mit **Ludger Hagedorn.** Der Frage, welchen Ausgang die Brexit-Verhandlungen nehmen könnten, hat sich **Luke Cooper** auf „spielerische Weise" genähert. Die sicherheitspolitischen Auswirkungen eines EU-Austritts Großbritanniens sind Gegenstand von **Misha Glennys** Beitrag über Cyberkriminalität – ein Problem, mit dem sich James Bond im Kalten Krieg noch nicht beschäftigen musste, wie **Muriel Blaive** am Beispiel osteuropäischer Stereotypen beschreibt. Um Klischees ganz anderer Art geht es im Beitrag von **Valentin Groebner,** der das Erfolgskonzept Reinheit ideengeschichtlich aufarbeitet. Auf eine künstlerische Spurensuche begibt sich **Clemena Antonova,** die nach dem Russischen in der Russischen Avantgarde fragt. Nicht die Künstler im Rampenlicht, sondern die vielen Akteure hinter dem Theatervorhang stehen im Mittelpunkt von **Zofia Smolarskas** Aufsatz. Welche ambivalente Rolle die neu geschaffene orthodoxe Kirche der Ukraine für die Souveränität des Landes spielt, hat **Katherine Younger** näher beleuchtet.

Während **Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro** und **Arthur Quesnay** danach fragen, wie die Proteste 2011 in Syrien in einen verheerenden Bürgerkrieg münden konnten, erklärt **Vinh-Kim Nguyen,** wie multiresistente Bakterien sich weltweit ausbreiten. Dass Konflikte sehr gut auf lokaler Ebene gelöst werden können, beschreibt hingegen **Tobias Berger** am Modell informeller Gerichte in Bangladesch. Positive Beispiele wie dieses sind für **Ilija Trojanow** ganz entscheidend, um die Passivität des Gegenwartspessimismus zu überwinden. Er lädt uns alle dazu ein, neue Wege zu beschreiten und uns nach Utopia aufzumachen. ◁

Thirty years have passed since the fall of the Iron Curtain. The euphoria of that time has given way to the disillusionment of the present. Democratic achievements are increasingly called into question with the rise of populist forces. Hence the provocative title of the anthology "Wenn Demokratien demokratisch untergehen" *(When democracies founder democratically),* published in 2019 by IWM and Passagen Verlag, presented here with excerpts from **Chantal Mouffe, Nadia Urbinati** and **Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Luiza Bialasiewicz** and **Sabrina Stallone** also deal with the rhetoric of anti-democratic movements through the example of fascist movements in Italy. Migration—a subject that populists are all too eager to stress—is the subject of **Ayşe Çağlar's** contribution, which highlights the importance of the concepts of protection and responsibility for the functioning of a global migration policy.

In an interview with **Ludger Hagedorn, Pavel Barša** explains how liberal elites can also pose a threat to democracy. **Luke Cooper** approaches the question of the outcome of Brexit negotiations "playfully". The security implications of Britain's withdrawal from the EU are in part the subject of **Misha Glenny's** contribution on policing cybercrime—a problem James Bond did not have to deal with in the Cold War, as **Muriel Blaive** describes through the example of Eastern European stereotypes. **Valentin Groebner's** contribution deals with clichés of a completely different kind and presents the history of the successful concept of purity from the Middle Ages to the present. **Clemena Antonova** sets out on an artistic search for traces, asking about what's Russian about the Russian avant-garde. Meanwhile it is not the artists in the limelight, but the many actors behind the theatre curtain that are the focus of **Zofia Smolarska's** essay. **Katherine Younger** takes a closer look at the ambivalent role that the newly created Orthodox Church of Ukraine plays for the country's sovereignty.

While **Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro** and **Arthur Quesnay** ask how the peaceful protests in Syria in 2011 led to a devastating civil war, **Vinh-Kim Nguyen** explains how multi-resistant bacteria not only pose a danger to war victims but are increasingly spreading across the globe. **Tobias Berger,** on the other hand, uses the model of informal courts in Bangladesh to describe how conflicts can be resolved at the local level. Positive examples like this, which show that another world is possible, are decisive for **Ilija Trojanow** in overcoming the passivity of contemporary pessimism. He invites all of us to break new ground and open ourselves up to Utopia. ◁

Anita Dick
Marion Gollner

Alle Wege führen durch Utopia

VON ILIJA TROJANOW

Die Zukunft steht gerade auf wackligen Füssen. Wir leben in politisch lethargischen Zeiten. Alles ist gut, aber nichts wird gut sein – so denken nicht wenige von uns in Mitteleuropa, besorgt um den Verlust dessen, was wir heute noch haben.

Photo: Sergio Larrain / Magnum Photos / picturedesk.com

Zur Ablenkung ergötzen wir uns an Dystopien, an Endzeitvisionen, die an Plausibilität gewinnen, je apokalyptischer sie daherkommen. Ob in der Romantrilogie „Die Tribute von Panem" oder in der Fernsehserie „Walking Dead", in populären Fiktionen wird brutal ums nackte Überleben gekämpft. So schlimm ist's bei uns dann doch nicht, entfährt uns ein behaglicher Seufzer. Eine erleichterte Flucht ins erfundene Grauen, damit wir den wirklichen Kämpfen, etwa gegen die Klimakatastrophe, aus dem Weg gehen können. Gerade jene, die das Privileg haben, keinen existentiellen Überlebenskampf führen zu müssen, lassen sich von Dystopien einlullen.

Je größer die drohende Katastrophe, desto mickriger die Alternativen, so scheint es momentan. Es mangelt nicht an Wissen über das, was in der Welt vorgeht. Niemand würde ernsthaft behaupten, es sei vernünftig, die Umwelt zu zerstören, Menschen zu entwurzeln, Ungerechtigkeiten zu vertiefen, Kriege zu entfachen. Auch sind überall auf der Welt engagierte Menschen mit der Ausarbeitung und Umsetzung konkreter Alternativen beschäftigt. Und trotzdem geht das Bewusstsein für die sich zuspitzenden sozialen und ökologischen Probleme und der Notwendigkeit ihrer Lösung viel zu oft einher mit Verzweiflung und Lähmung, vor allem bei jenen, die Nutznießer des globalen Ungleichgewichts sind, bei den Privilegierten (dazu gehören wir alle). Im politischen Diskurs herrscht das perfide Dogma der Alternativlosigkeit. Ausgerechnet jene Prinzipien, die die Katastrophendynamik beschleunigen – Profit, Wachstum, Machtkonzentration – gelten als heilig. Und trotz offenkundiger Mängel wird die freie Markwirtschaft als einziges effizientes Modell menschlichen Zusammenlebens präsentiert.

Nowhere oder die Kraft der Phantasie

„Kann das sein?" fragt sich seit je die Utopie. Kann es sein, dass das Vorherrschende die einzig mögliche Realität ist? Zeichnet die Menschheitsgeschichte nicht ein ganz und gar anderes Bild? Sind die weißen Flecken der geistigen Landkarten nicht auf erstaunliche Weise, oft nur eine Generation später, mit neuen, überraschenden Inhalten gefüllt worden?

„Erehwon" lautet der Name einer literarischen Utopie des britischen Autors Samuel Butler. Ein sinnfreier Kunstname, denkt man, bis man das Wort von hinten nach vorn liest und ein „nowhere" sichtbar wird, ein „Nicht-Ort", beschworen mit der kreativen Kraft der Phantasie. Das utopische Verfahren wird deutlich: die herrschenden Verhältnisse werden auf den Kopf gestellt, umgestülpt, die letzten Buchstaben werden die ersten sein, was im vertrauten Alltag gilt, ist im Gedankenexperiment außer Kraft gesetzt. Utopia ist somit viel mehr als eine Insel der Seligen, auf der Frieden und Gleichheit herrschen und Bildung als höchstes Gut gilt, Utopia ist die Vorwegnahme von Veränderung im Reich der Imagination, Utopia provoziert das freieste Denken, um Alternativen zu ersinnen.

Insofern ist der seit 1989 so oft verkündete „Untergang der Utopien" ein Totengräbergesang, der alle Träume begraben will, um universelle Friedhofsruhe durchzusetzen. Begleitet von der unbeweisbaren Behauptung, die Schrecken des 20. Jahrhunderts wären die Folge utopischen Denkens, obwohl man mit weitaus besseren Argumenten althergebrachte Mechanismen wie autoritäre Hierarchie, fanatischen Nationalismus, Rassismus, Nepotismus und exterminatorischen Imperialismus für den verheerenden Staatsterror verantwortlich machen könnte. Utopisches Denken war den Nazis nie gegeben, Lenin war ein wendiger Pragmatiker, der schon Ende 1917 feststellte: „Wir sind keine Utopisten … wir wollen die sozialistische Revolution mit den Menschen, wie sie gegenwärtig sind, den Menschen, die ohne Unterordnung, ohne Kontrolle, ohne Aufseher und Buchhalten nicht auskommen werden." Und Marx und Engels haben den „utopischen Sozialismus" zum Schimpfwort erhoben. Konservative und Liberale halten Utopien für gefährlich und extremistisch, behaupten, sie seien irrational und führten zu Gewalt. Dieser Vorwurf basiert auf einer Verwechslung von Utopie und Ideologie. Während Ideologie auf Deutungshoheit pocht, zielt Utopie auf die Befreiung der Fantasie aus ihrer auferlegten Unmündigkeit ab, wie bereits Karl Popper ausgeführt hat. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg sehnten sich Denker wie Popper verständlicherweise nach einer kleinen bescheidenen Parzelle Glück und Frieden. Das einzige, was den Menschen damals möglich erschien, war „das Leben etwas weniger furchtbar zu machen, und etwas weniger ungerecht." Die Gegenwart war so schrecklich, die Lebenden sollten nicht mehr zugunsten der Kommenden benachteiligt werden. „Keine Generation

Ausgerechnet jene Prinzipien, die die Katastrophendynamik beschleunigen – Profit, Wachstum, Machtkonzentration – gelten als heilig.

darf künftigen Generationen zuliebe geopfert werden.“ Die Lage hat sich völlig umgedreht. Durch den ökologischen Kahlschlag opfern wir zukünftige Generationen dem parasitären Wohlergehen der heute Gedeihenden. Wenn Popper der Utopie misstraute, weil sie im Interesse der Zukunft handele, so ist heute der herrschenden Alternativlosigkeit zu misstrauen, weil sie die Gegenwart auf Kosten der Zukunft privilegiert.

Was ist das Utopische?

Was seit Anbeginn der Moderne utopisch genannt wird, war einst gelebte Wirklichkeit, mal als Ausnahme, mal als Regel. Utopien erwachsen aus unserem kollektiven Gedächtnis. Die längste Zeit lebte die Menschheit in egalitären Gesellschaften, in denen es keine institutionalisierte Autorität gab, sondern die Rolle des Anführers oder der Anführerin – es handelte es sich in alten Zeiten nicht selten um Matriarchate – ging an die Weisen, die Intelligenten, die Charismatischen. Jüngste Ausgrabungen in China, Niger, Pakistan, Peru und Mali belegen, dass sich in den frühesten Zivilisationen keine Spuren zentralisierter Macht finden, keine architektonischen Manifestationen von Herrschaft und Unterwerfung, obwohl es bereits Arbeitsteilung und Spezialisierung gab. In einigen der ältesten religiösen Traditionen, im Judentum wie auch im Taoismus, wird das Gemeineigentum (heute würden wir *commons* dazu sagen) propagiert. Und die christliche Urgemeinde war eine Solidargemeinschaft gleichgestellter, freier und geschwisterlich verbundener Menschen. Selbst noch im Mittelalter herrschte eine dörfliche Ordnung der Allmende vor, so wie heute noch in Afrika, weswegen es den Investoren, die dort *land grabbing* im großen Stil betreiben, leichtfällt, kommunales Land spottbillig zu erwerben, indem sie die Dorfvorsteher bestechen.

Utopien als Triebkräfte sozialer Bewegungen

Auch hehre Ziele unterliegen einer Konjunktur. Mal sind sie verwirklicht, mal verwirkt. Die Sklaverei der Antike verschwand im Mittelalter in Europa fast völlig, bis durch die „Entdeckung“ Afrikas neue Rohstofflieferanten und aufgrund der Plantagen der Americas neue Märkte entstanden. Sklaverei wurde so selbstverständlich wie heute die Container-Schifffahrt und als Ende der 18. Jahrhunderts in England, in einer Epoche gewaltiger Umbrüche mit starkem utopischen Destillat (die Amerikanische Revolution, die Französische Revolution) die Sklaverei in Frage gestellt wurde, beteiligten sich an diesem neuen ethischen Bekenntnis nur wenige, denn der transatlantische Sklavenhandel war für Großbritannien sehr profitabel. Er sicherte Arbeitsplätze, er ermöglichte Vermögen, er garantierte Konsumgüter. Er war daher gerechtfertigt. Der Kampf um die Gleichberechtigung der Frau, die wohl größte und wichtigste Utopie, entwickelte sich in den USA aus der abolitionistischen Bewegung, weil Frauen, die jahrelang durch die Lande tourten, um Reden gegen die Sklaverei zu halten, sich durchsetzen mussten, überhaupt sprechen zu dürfen. Die *World Anti-Slavery Convention* verweigerte etwa den weiblichen Delegierten 1840 die Akkreditierung! Die Aktivistinnen, die oft radikaler waren als ihre männlichen Mitstreiter, denn sie forderten ein sofortiges, nicht ein graduelles Ende der Sklaverei, begannen sich auch für Frauenrechte einzusetzen. Die Diskriminierung, der sie ausgesetzt waren, veranlasste sie, sich zusammenzuschließen, zu einer eigenständigen Emanzipationsbewegung.

Immer wieder wurde „Utopismus“ als Vorwurf vorgetragen. Rousseaus Gesellschaftstheorie, die heute in jeder Schule und an jeder Universität gelehrt wird, geriet in Utopieverdacht, ebenso Kants Schrift „Zum Ewigen Frieden“. Die Idee eines liberalen Rechtsstaats galt den Konservativen noch Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts als utopisch, in Südafrika die Emanzipation der Nicht-Weißen. Als ich als Student in München in den achtziger Jahren davon sprach, dass die Diktaturen des Ostblocks eines Tages mit Sicherheit zusammenbrächen, vielleicht nicht morgen, aber spätestens übermorgen, wurde ich als weltfremder Träumer belächelt. Utopisten sind jene, die das Undenkbare aussprechen, um es vorwegzunehmen.

Krise als utopische Chance

Wie schon gesagt: Die utopischen Ideale leiten sich nicht aus theoretischen Überlegungen ab, sie existieren schon in Teilen als Ethik und gelebte Alternative.

Womit wir bei der Praxis wären. Als ich in den letzten beiden Jahren eine Vielzahl von Recherchereisen in Ländern und Regionen unternommen habe, die von Katastrophen unterschiedlichster Art heimgesucht worden sind fiel mir auf, dass just in Momenten der Katastrophe an der grundsätzlichen Möglichkeit einer Befreiung aus Zerstörung, Not und Unmündigkeit nicht nur geglaubt wird, sondern diese Befreiung konkret ausbuchstabiert und wenn möglich umgesetzt wird. Krise als utopische Chance. Oder: Ein Paradies, das in der Hölle entsteht.

Ist das Utopische wirklich diskreditiert, oder ist es vielmehr ins Private abgeschoben, wo eine wachsende Zahl von Selbstoptimierern von Herausforderung zu Herausforderung hastet. Der Einzelne soll sich vervollkommnen, soll das Optimum aus sich herausholen, ein durch und durch utopisches Moment. Bis hin zu der radikalsten aller Utopien, die Überwindung des Todes durch Kryostase (einfrieren und warten, bis die Zukunft einen von den Eistoten auferweckt). Jeder Mensch soll flexibel und dynamisch auf Belastungen und Zumutungen reagieren, nicht aber die Gesellschaft. Das ist die Cruz unserer Epoche. Der Ego-Wahn hat das Individuum in ein Labor der selbstexperimentellen Adaption – neudeutsch: Resilienz – verwandelt. Eher können wir uns vorstellen, den Menschen in einen Cyborg zu verwandeln oder durch Roboter und AI zu ersetzen, als die momentanen Rahmenbedingungen des Wirtschaftens in Frage zu stellen. Die Verbindung zwischen Selbstverbesserung und gesellschaftlicher Veränderung ist gekappt.

Gandhi hat gesellschaftliche und individuelle Transformation stets zusammen gedacht. Widerstand gegen Ungerechtigkeiten, gespeist aus spiritueller Hingabe und dem Geist der Gewaltlosigkeit, ist ein Experiment, bei dem utopische Ideale auf existierende gesellschaftliche Normen prallen. Dieser Prozess führt zur Veränderung, in der Gesellschaft wie auch im Individuum.

Es gibt Anzeichen, dass utopisches Denken heute eine Renaissance erfährt. In Zeiten, in denen der Überwachungskapitalismus, die oligarchischen Strukturen und die destruktiven Finanzmärkte Gegenentwürfe geradezu provozieren, wird der utopische Wind weiter aufbrausen und uns helfen, die entscheidenden Fragen entschieden zu stellen.

Ein Beispiel: Ist Demokratie mit Vermögenskonzentration vereinbar? Geld ist Macht, sagt der Volksmund seit Jahrhunderten, so als habe er geahnt, dass keines der Regulative der parlamentarischen Demokratie eine exzessive Konzentration des Vermögens in den Händen einer kleinen Elite verhindern kann. Materielle Ungleichheit bedingt politische Ungleichheit. Dagegen kann man eben nichts machen, denkt sich der Pessimist (also einer, dem es an Phantasie mangelt), die vielzitierte Schere klafft nicht nur immer weiter auf, sie schnippelt eifrig am Mittelstand, bis von diesem nicht mehr übrig geblieben sein wird als eine verängstigte Schicht zwischen Stigmatisierten und Selbstoptimierten. Die Utopie fragt: Wieso muss es extremen Reichtum überhaupt geben? Und ist nicht Reichtum das Gegenteil von Wohlstand, verstanden als richtiges Leben, als besseres Leben?

Jeder Mensch soll flexibel und dynamisch auf Belastungen und Zumutungen reagieren, nicht aber die Gesellschaft.

Es gibt Gründe genug, optimistisch zu sein. Trotz eines Systems, das Eigennutz und Gier belohnt, erleben wir täglich solidarisches Handeln, gegenseitige Hilfe, gemeinschaftliche Lösungen. Diese kleinen und großen Handreichungen tragen mehr zum Gleichgewicht in der Gesellschaft bei als das profitable Funktionieren all jener quantifizierbaren Prozesse, die allein dazu dienen, die Macht und den Reichtum einer zunehmend kleiner werdenden Schicht zu sichern.

Die Welt wird nie gut, aber sie könnte besser werden, hat Carl Zuckmayer einmal geschrieben, und leider nicht hinzugefügt, dass der Traum einer guten Welt die Grundlage für ihre Verbesserung bildet. Ohne Utopien droht uns die Hoffnungslosigkeit, und diese ist „die vorweggenommene Niederlage“ (Karl Jaspers).

Und selbst wenn wenig Konkretes bei unseren Kopfreisen durch die vielen konkreten und weniger handfesten Utopien herauskommt, „ein Leben im Traumland macht glücklich“. So schrieb einst Gandhi und wie recht er hatte. Ein Leben im Traumland immunisiert gegen die grassierende Zukunftsangst. Ich kann es Ihnen nur ans Herz legen. ◁

Ilija Trojanow ist Autor, Publizist, Übersetzer und Verleger. Von Januar bis Juni 2019 ist er ein Visiting Fellow am IWM. Am 12. Februar hat er das zusammen mit Thomas Gebauer verfasste Buch *Hilfe? Hilfe! Gegen Profit und Heuchelei: Für Hilfe, die wirklich hilft!* im Rahmen eines Monatsvortrags vorgestellt (siehe Video: www.youtube.com/IWMVienna). Das Thema Utopie war bereits Gegenstand der von Ilija Trojanow moderierten Debattenreihe „ANDERSWELTEN – Der utopische Raum“ beim Festival „Literatur im Herbst“. Sein aktuelles Projekt „Der utopische Raum“, ein Netzwerk verschiedener Organisationen und Institutionen, wie dem IWM, wird in den nächsten Jahren konkrete Utopien vorstellen und debattieren. Derzeit arbeitet er an einem utopischen Roman.

Trojanow trifft.

Nach der erfolgreichen ersten Saison wurde die von Volkstheater und IWM gemeinsam organisierte Gesprächsreihe *Trojanow trifft* im Jahr 2019 fortgesetzt. Der in Wien lebende, vielfach preisgekrönte Autor und Welterkunder lud dabei Gäste aus Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Kunst zu einem inspirierenden Gedankenaustausch in die Rote Bar des Volkstheaters. Die Videos der letzten Veranstaltungen sind nachzusehen auf: ⊙ www.youtube.com/IWMVienna

10. März 2019: „Wie konnte das passieren?“ – Das Gespenst des Rechtsrucks in Österreich, Josef Haslinger, Autor und Mitbegründer der Menschenrechtsorganisation SOS Mitmensch

13. Januar 2019: Nestor Machno – Erinnert Euch an mich!, Mark Zak, Autor und Schauspieler, **Hanna Mittelstädt,** Autorin, Mitgründerin und Verlegerin der Edition Nautilus

Videostills: Medienwerk.at

18. November 2018: Über jüdischen und muslimischen Humor, Paul Chaim Eisenberg (Bild links), ehem. Oberrabbiner der Israelitischen Kultusgemeinde Wien, **Toby Arsalan,** deutsch-pakistanischer Comedian

Konzept und Moderation: **Ilija Trojanow**

Envisioning a Global Order of Migration: The UN Compacts

BY AYŞE ÇAĞLAR

Two Global Compacts on migration recently released by the United Nations have become the focus of much attention and heated debate, particularly in European states with national populist governments. But why the silence concerning the precarity experienced by migrants and non-migrants alike?

In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed two important documents which provide a comprehensive framework for coping with the challenges and dilemmas of migration: the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). These Compacts offer building blocks for an architecture of a global politics of migration by redefining what migration is and what it should be, while also providing a basis for the global governance of migrants and refugees. Given the pervasiveness of the idea that migration is on the increase and of a refugee "crisis" in political imaginaries in Europe and beyond, these documents have acquired an immediate significance in public and academic debates.



© Yevheni Dubinko / iStock

Postwar Migration Flows

Amid today's heated debates on refugee and migration "crises," which are often dominated by images of refugees from the Middle East and Africa, it is important to remember that *the* "migration and refugee crisis" in postwar Europe actually followed the fall of the Iron Curtain and included the refugee flows stemming from the wars in Yugoslavia. This was an East-West migration within Europe. The dramatic increase in migration was to a large extent fueled by capital flows and market deregulation after the collapse of the Communist States. And it was this "crisis" that in fact prompted the search for new global governance mechanisms in Europe to limit and regulate migration. Several international organizations were then established and so it is not a coincidence that the IOM became a permanent organization in 1989. According to Guy Abel, it was during the period between 1990 and 1995 that global migration flows reached a historic peak. This period began with the fall of the Iron Curtain, included the outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan, and concluded with the Rwandan genocide.[1] The people seeking new lives in the West were from former socialist countries, which is to say, they came from those countries now displaying the highest resistance to migrants and refugees in Europe.

In today's political context, where issues surrounding migration have become so central and gained such urgency, one would expect international organizations to have long since been involved in migration matters. Yet these organizations have only shown an interest in migration and its governance relatively recently. In fact, migration was not on the agendas of many international organizations before the 1990s. As Kathleen Newland rightly points out, "attention to international migration in the 1990s was sporadic […] No UN agency had migrants or migration processes as priorities […] All of this changed quite suddenly around the turn of the millennium. Suddenly migration was everywhere one looked in the UN system and beyond."[2]

The largest global migration flows take place within individual regions rather than across continents.

Indeed, most of the international organizations that have intervened in today's migration debates and policy initiatives were established in the post-Cold War period of the 2000s. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), for example, launched its annual Dialogue on Migration as recently as 2001. The Global Commission on International Migration was only established in 2003. This was the same year that the first Global Forum on Migration and Development took place. Moreover, the first UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development was in 2006, the same year that several international organizations came together to establish the Global Migration Group. It was only as recently as 2004 that migration was even the topic of the ILO's International Labor Conference and not until 2009 that human mobility was the subject of the UNDP's Human Development Report.

It might be useful to question the demographic source data forming the basis of the endless declarations by the many UN agencies and international organizations about the number of migrants and refugees being at an "all-time high." It is therefore worth remembering that global migration flows have remained consistently low since the 1960s.[3] Even if in absolute terms the numbers of migrants and refugees has increased, the proportion of the world population who are migrants has remained at about 3% for more than half a century. In fact, as Guy Abel and Nikola Sanders of the Wittgenstein Center

for Demography in Vienna illustrate, overall global migration flows actually declined during the period from 2010 to 2015.[4] Most importantly, during that same period, migration into and across Europe also declined. Indeed, the largest global migration flows take place within individual regions rather than across continents and the majority of flows take place within the Global South. Moreover, UNHCR estimates show that there were 21.3 million refugees in 2015, as compared with 20.6 million in 1992—when the global population was around two-thirds of today's.[5]

We already know from Arjun Appadurai's seminal work, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger,* that declining migration figures would not be enough to quell growing anxieties towards minorities. However, it is important to note the contrast between the overpoliticization of migration numbers and their actual dynamics.

Defining migration at a global level

For all the intense discussion of the Global Compacts on migration, neither Compact is legally binding. No matter how many states endorse them, no state is obliged to implement them. Neither does the GCR afford much real protection to refugees, since 85% of refugees worldwide live in the Global South and more than half of these are either internally displaced (refugees in their own country) or stateless. They therefore fall outside of the Geneva Convention's narrow definition of refugees and are not entitled to protection under the GCR. What do the Compacts actually do then?

The significance of the Compacts lies in their power to establish a specific understanding of migration at a global level. They help to establish the cognitive structures for making migration legible within an envisioned global order. The cognitive structure and semantics of the Compacts provide a scripted space in which to define migration, migrants, and refugees, as well as possible solutions to the challenges that these people face and pose.[6] The Compacts therefore play a role in establishing a canon of texts about migration and scaling them within a distinctive global narrative. Here, the Compacts' architecture is determined by the way they connect different fields, actors, institutions, technologies and discourses, such that the mobility, agency and location of migrants and refugees in various societies, and above all economies, become meaningful.

These Compacts then aim to shape agendas for the management and utilization of migration. In this respect, they are built upon a set of shared assumptions: for instance, that migration is universal (beyond regions and individual countries) and central to the functioning of globalizing economies. Thus the logic of the Compacts suggest that it is a necessity for states to cooperate on migration governance in a manner which would be compatible with the protection of state sovereignty. This means striking a balance between the costs and benefits of migration in particular, since migrants are seen as a resource to each state and therefore the costs of migration can be reduced by the sharing of responsibilities among states. However, the stakeholders that play a role in the new management of migration are not only states but also, international and regional organizations, civil society actors and international financial institutions, as well as other private sector actors. The sharing of responsibility among these stakeholders and the resulting partnerships is central to the grammar of global migration governance as set out in the Compact. Yet issues of balancing responsibility with accountability, as well as unequal power relations among actors, remain inadequality addressed.

Neoliberal dynamics and geometries of power

On the issue of responsibility, the Compacts often imply that it is to be devolved to the local level and to migrants and refugees themselves. The contrast between the scales of power and responsibility in the Compacts is striking. Migrants/refugees are hailed as market-oriented economic actors, and entrepreneurship and self-reliance are prominent themes. The utilitarian framework of the Compacts recognises that different fields are related to one another, such as migrant and refugee protection, security and safety, and sustained development. While making connections between these fields, the Compacts disconnect others. The emphasis on the self-reliance and self-responsibility of migrants and refugees reflects the basic values and dynamics of a neoliberal order that these Compacts take for granted. Thus while migrants and refugees are conceived of as economic actors, they are not considered labouring subjects who are connected to the dynamics of the accumulation of capital and related frictions. The recognition of such a connection would have enabled the Compacts to break their well-guarded silence about the effects of empires and colonial structures, along with their associated legacies, on the dynamics of current migration and refugee flows as well as statelessness.

Instead, the Compacts actually create silences about the broader dynamics of political economy and the geometries of power involved in the generation of wealth and in the dispossession that underpins common conditions of precarity for migrants and non-migrants alike. These connections and disconnections, together with the resulting silences and blind spots, point to the style of the Compacts' architecture, which reflects the historical period and the specific site of their construction. For these Compacts were not produced in a void but in a world where neoliberal transformations, ideas and policies intersect with postcolonial politics in ordering the planet. The political nature of the Compacts lies in these silences and disconnections, which ironically instantiate a depoliticized understanding of migration.

The Compacts do to some extent recognize the mixed nature of migratory flows. They also acknowledge that efforts to differentiate migrants and refugees into endless categories are futile. However, these Compacts still make assumptions about migrants and refugees on the one hand and "natives" on the other, as if these categories were economically and politically poles apart. This creates impediments to seeing the commonalities of these groups of people. Today's world is deeply marked by the erosion of both livelihoods and welfare systems, as well as increasing inequality and precarity. These are the forces that not only create migrations, but also dispossess, displace and shape the precarity of people who choose to remain where they are. Yet narratives persist about how migrants and refugees pose a threat to the economic, demographic, biological and cultural security of citizens. Thus the framing of refugees/migrants as economic and social subjects who are supposedly categorically distinct from those who define themselves as "natives" obscures the location of migrants and refugees in societies and fuels the rise of anti-migrant, anti-refugee populism.

One way to go beyond such paralysing divides, which are also perpetuated in and by the Compacts, would be to develop ways of focusing on experiences and constraints that are shared by people who tend to be conceptually differentiated by scholars and policy makers as either migrant/refugee or native. However, this would require modifying our analytical lens so as to move beyond a reified migrant/native divide that has been presented as absolute. By making this effort, we could make visible not only common conditions of precarity and displacement, but also their shared claims for social justice. This might enable us to start seeing the ways in which the recent migration crisis is *made* to be a turning point in the political dynamics of the European project. ◁

No matter how many states endorse the compacts, no state is obliged to implement them.

The compacts actually create silences about the broader dynamics of political economy and the geometries of power.

1) Guido Mingles, "Global Migration? Actually, the World is Staying at Home," *Spiegel Online,* May 17, 2016.
2) Kathleen Newland, "The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes, and Institutions," *Global Governance* 16, no. 3 (2010): 331–334; here 331–332.
3) One reason for discrepancies among the conclusions drawn about migration flows is the nature of demographic source data used in calculating the relevant figures.
4) Mingles, "Global Migration?" However these migration flow figures only cover the period until July 2015.
5) Declan Butler, "Refugees in Focus," *Nature,* March 2, 2017.
6) Though the two Compacts differ in several respects, they can be considered together in terms of their overall architecture and architectural style.

Ayşe Çağlar is Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Vienna and a Permanent Fellow at the IWM. (see infobox below).

Ayşe Çağlar Becomes a New Permanent Fellow

Photo: Klaus Ranger

The IWM is pleased to announce that Ayşe Çağlar, Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology and Deputy Head of Department at the University of Vienna, joined the IWM as Permanent Fellow in October 2018.

Ayşe Çağlar received her PhD at McGill University, Department of Anthropology and Habilitation in Sociology and Social Anthropology at Free University, Berlin. Before joining University of Vienna she was a professor and the chair of Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, Budapest and a Minerva Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Goettingen. She has held visiting professorships at several universities including Stockholm University, IHS Vienna, Central European University, Budapest, Donauuniversität Krems, and Ethnologisches Seminar Zürich. Furthermore, she is a member of Academia Europaea and the Science Academy Society of Turkey. Çağlar has widely published on processes of migration, urban restructuring, transnationalization and the state, and of dispossession and displacement. Her research focus at the IWM addresses the location of migrants in city-making processes especially in disempowered cities (see below). Among her most recent publications are: *Migrants and City Making: Dispossession, Displacement, and Urban Regeneration* (co-authored with Nina Glick Schiller; Duke University Press, 2018) and *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants* (co-edited by Nina Glick Schiller; Cornell University Press, 2018).

On March 28, she organized a workshop at the IWM entitled "The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migrants and the Architecture of Global Politics of Migration." It explored the semantics, blind spots, as well as the political and social implications of these Compacts in dealing with the complex reality of global migration. The panel discussion in the evening, moderated by Luiza Bialasiewicz (Professor of European Governance, University of Amsterdam; IWM Visiting Fellow), addressed questions of responsibility and protection in the global politics of migration. The panelists included: Marian Benbow (Head of the IOM Country Office for Austria), Christoph Pinter (Head of UNHCR Austria), Ruth Wodak (emer. Distinguished Professor, Lancaster University; IWM Visiting Fellow) and Ayşe Çağlar. Video: ▶ www.youtube.com/IWMVienna

Migrants in City-Making and Urban Politics

How are migrants involved in making and re-making cities? Historically, how have they become part of the generation of wealth in cities and of the social fabric and politics of cities? How do migrants contribute to and challenge the sites and scales of participation and citizenship, of social justice claims and narratives, and of the politics of cities?

Concentrating on the contested location of migrants in the making and remaking of cities, this research focus addresses the dynamics and narratives of social and political inclusion and exclusion in cities. It explores the political alliances among city residents beyond historically and culturally established divides in imagining and fighting for urban futures. The aim is to examine the challenges that migrants pose to urban governance and to the struggle for social and historical justice in city-making processes. There is a particular focus on the displacements, dispossessions and contentious politics involved in the making and remaking of cities that were formerly industrial hubs and which are acquiring increasing prominence in debates on urban redevelopment and politics. These rustbelt cities have also become central to discussions about the increasing levels of populism in today's political climate. There will be studies of migrants in the cities of global powerhouses. However, the centerpiece of this research focus concerns those cities that migrants have helped to establish as industrial hubs but that have since been neglected and now often struggle with demographic anxieties. We study discursive and institutional continuities and discontinuities in histories and ethnographies of city-making as well as migrant emplacement in these cities. This involves comparative research on deindustrialized cities where "culture" and cultural industries have taken center stage in efforts to reinvent these places and their populations.

Why Liberal Elites Can be Dangerous to Democracy

INTERVIEW WITH PAVEL BARŠA BY LUDGER HAGEDORN

Pavel Barša, *a Jan Patočka Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2017, is one of the Czech Republic's foremost political scientists. Elaborating on a short lecture that he gave in response to Timothy Snyder's book* The Road to Unfreedom, *he explains to IWM Permanent Fellow* **Ludger Hagedorn** *why liberal elites can be as dangerous to democracy as populists and makes the case for a balance between the ideals of liberalism and solidarity.*

Ludger Hagedorn: We are witnessing the resurgence of anti-liberal and anti-democratic movements on a global scale. Yet, despite their many resemblances, each seems to be caused by quite particular factors. Or, to invoke the title of Timothy Snyder's book[1]: is there *one* road to unfreedom, or *many?*

Pavel Barša: First of all, we should acknowledge that some of these movements are illiberal but not necessarily anti-democratic, at least rhetorically: most of them invoke the territorialized people, its will and its sovereignty, against the global elites who live everywhere and belong nowhere. As such, this does not make them anti-democratic. Everything depends on how they define the people and what methods they use in their struggle. The reproach that elites are not representative of the people refers to the very basic principle of democracy. It may be wrong, but it is not illegitimate.

Having said that, the answer is yes: it is important to grasp the global resemblances of populist movements. There are many similarities between western neo-nationalist leaders and non-western challengers to liberal democracies such as Narendra Modi in India, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil or Rodriguo Duterte in the Philippines. Still, I would not place them in the same category as European populists. Similarly, Russian nationalist neo-imperialism is a category of its own. As regards the European and Central European neo-nationalists, it is a simple fact that many entered parliament or gained executive power without the help of Putin or even before Putin's neo-imperialist turn. To understand the sources of their success, we have to look at endogenous factors. On a very general level, the current wave of neo-nationalism in Europe is a reaction against the processes of globalization and trans-nationalization that have taken place over the last forty years.

Hagedorn: Pitting "the people" against "the elites" is an essential aspect of populist rhetoric, but it also functions as a characteristic pattern of nationalist debates. How dangerous is nationalism's resurgence?

Barša: Nationalism is not *a priori* anti-democratic. We could even claim the opposite: the rise of nationalism in the 19th century was connected to processes of democratization. Without the democratic idea of popular sovereignty, there could be no sovereignty of a particular people. In other words, collective sovereignty has both a democratic and a nationalistic aspect. So far, we have not seen any democracy which has not been embedded in the form of the territorial nation-state.

Illustration: MHJ / istock

But what is important is that not only nationalists or populists, but also liberals can represent a challenge to democracy. There have always been liberals—such as Friedrich von Hayek before the Second World War—who have defended transnational federalism against the nation-state, precisely because they feared the interference of the collective will of the people with the supposedly spontaneous self-organization of markets, which are the oligopolistic domain of economic elites. Hayek sided with the economic elites; other liberals sided with the cultural elites. John Stuart Mill famously suggested that the votes of the educated be given greater weight than those of the uneducated. In other words, members of the liberal elites can be as dangerous to democracy as the self-styled spokespersons of the people.

Members of the liberal elites can be as dangerous to democracy as the self-styled spokespersons of the people.

Hagedorn: You have emphasized that the difference between elites and the common people is not a fantasy of populist demagogues. Because elites are gifted with resources (economic, cultural, political), they tend to value meritocracy and individualism. People without these resources, on the other hand, tend to value collectivism and solidarity and demand the re-distribution of resources as an affirmation of their dignity. What does this imply for democracy?

Barša: It indeed has important consequences. Democrats, as I see it, should not fall into the trap of a Manichean opposition between meritocratic individualism and egalitarian collectivism, between civil society and the state, and between personal freedom and social solidarity. We should not uncritically follow a tradition that I would call anti-totalitarian liberalism. This is inclined to define liberal-democratic values by their opposition to collectivist values, which it in turn associates all too easily with totalitarian rule—whether it be buttressed by the ideology of the Far Left or the Far Right.

We have to look at the legacy of anti-totalitarian liberalism critically. We are living in an era that has been shaped by its hegemony in the 1990s and 2000s. Today's neo-nationalists and authoritarians challenge this hegemony. The anti-totalitarian movements of the 20th century can inspire us, and I consider myself an inheritor of their legacy. Yet their one-sided defense of freedoms and rights against the state also helped to de-regulate capitalism, which led to huge social inequalities and, ultimately, undermined democracy.

Hagedorn: How, then, do we account for the heavy use of the concept of "solidarity" that characterizes these anti-totalitarian movements?

Barša: Yes, that is a very interesting point. If you take a closer look, you can easily tell what is going on, namely that *social* solidarity, i.e. solidarity that is implemented within the borders of nation-states, has been replaced by *human* solidarity or *civic* solidarity, which is without borders and which concentrates on human rights and equal citizenship. These anti-totalitarian groupings belonged to what are sometime called "new social movements." The "old" social movements were the trade unions and social democratic parties that entered the political system in order to produce state policies. The new social movements operate within civil society, which they seek to defend against the state. These civic movements have occasionally been able to overthrow authoritarian regimes. But they are incapable

of building free and egalitarian societies. Their ideological and political victories in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from the fact that they stepped into the vacuum created by the demise of socialism and anti-colonial nationalism.

Hagedorn: So, would you say that a collectivist utopia was replaced by an individualistic one?

These civic movements have occasionally been able to overthrow authoritarian regimes. But they are incapable of building free and egalitarian societies.

Barša: Very much so. The utopias of class and national emancipation were carried out by the state, which had been captured by revolution. The new individualistic utopias of emancipation were to be realized *against* the state. The latter kind of emancipation is embraced by people endowed with the necessary resources (economic and cultural), which help them obtain self-realization in the global arena. Some anti-totalitarian liberals in Central Europe, such as György Konrád, openly claimed that the civil society of the post-communist era would be a society of the educated middle class. Konrád thought that the bourgeoisie should claim the mantle of the universal class from the proletariat. Those who did not belong to this class became the losers of globalization. After being abandoned by the socialist parties, which also became liberal and dropped their original re-distributive agenda in the 1990s, they have tended to vote for the populists, who promise them the restoration of the strong national state able to protect them from anonymous global forces. This is our situation today.

Hagedorn: It seems that you consider the nation state to be indispensable to social solidarity, without wanting to advocate nationalism. What, then, is *your* answer to the situation you have outlined?

Barša: Well, we should definitely not reply to it with the old anti-totalitarian ideology, because this once again confirms and strengthens the gap between the educated elites (winners of globalization) and the common people (who tend to be its losers). This plays into the hands of the populists, who are thriving precisely because of this gap and because of the huge social inequality produced by forty years of capitalist deregulation. If we really want to counter populism, we should do the opposite—bridge the gap. This entails that we do not pit individualism against collectivism, but try to conceive them as mutually conditioned. Our slogan should be that there is—and should be—no individual freedom and civil solidarity without collective re-distribution and social solidarity. ◁

1) Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom. Russia—Europe—America,* New York 2018.

The ideas developed in this interview were first presented by Pavel Barša in a public debate with Timothy Snyder at Charles University, Faculty of Arts, on November 22, 2018, under the title "One Road to Unfreedom, or Many?" The Lecture was part of a program at IWM that is generously supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affair of the Czech Republic.

Pavel Barša is Professor of Political Science at Charles University, Prague. From August to October 2017, he was a Jan Patočka Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Ludger Hagedorn is an IWM Permanent Fellow and Head of the Institute's Jan Patočka Archive.

Pavel Barša

Photo: Petr Hloušek

Cooperation with the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic

The interview on this page is part of IWM's Czech program and the related Patočka research focus. The program, generously supported by the Czech Foreign Ministry, consists of research projects, lecture series and visiting fellowships. In addition to activities at the IWM, it also includes a series of lectures in Prague, some of which are organized in cooperation with the *Institute of International Relations* (IIR). The program is run by IWM Permanent Fellow Ludger Hagedorn.

Following the lectures by historian Timothy Snyder in autumn 2018, the series in Prague will be continued with a number of events in spring/summer 2019. On May 28, IWM Permanent Fellow Ivan Krastev will take part in a public debate at Charles University analyzing the results of the European elections. Political economist Robert Skidelsky, currently a Visiting Fellow at the IWM for the second time, will speak on "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work" on June 3. The talk will be held at DOX, the Prague Centre for Contemporary Art.

Finally, IWM Visiting Fellow Chantal Mouffe will give a guest lecture at Charles University on June 20.

The Patočka Fellowships are awarded to outstanding Czech researchers in the humanities and social sciences. They enable up to 5 Junior and Senior Researchers several months to pursue their research projects at IWM. In 2019, the program has already hosted the well-known Czech essayist and legal scholar Jiří Přibáň (Cardiff Law School) who also gave a lecture on "Imaginaries of Democracy and Dissent." Junior Fellow Kateřina Kočí is currently at IWM to work on a research project on the significance of sacrifice from the perspective of feminist criticism. And philosopher Jakub Jirsa, a Senior Lecturer at Charles University, in his project examines the ancient foundations of contemporary moral thought.

Vorhang auf oder Schotten dicht? Was bleibt von 1989?

DEBATING EUROPE – EUROPA IM DISKURS

Im Frühsommer 1989 bekam der Eiserne Vorhang erste Risse. Im November 1989 fiel symbolträchtig die Berliner Mauer, bis Jahresende verschwanden die alten Regime in der DDR, in Polen, Ungarn, in der Tschechoslowakei, in Bulgarien und Rumänien. Es war eine historische Zäsur – politisch, wirtschaftlich, gesellschaftlich. Plötzlich schienen Freiheit und Demokratie überall möglich, und das geteilte Europa sah sich als wiedervereint. Was aber wurde aus diesem historischen Aufbruch? Darüber diskutierten am 17. Februar im Wiener Burgtheater: **Erhard Busek** (Ex-Vizekanzler und Vorsitzender des Instituts für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa), **Ludger Hagedorn** (Permanent Fellow und Leiter des Jan Patočka Archivs am IWM), **Basil Kerski** (Leiter des Europäischen Solidarność-Zentrums in Danzig), **Noémi Kiss** (ungarische Schriftstellerin), **Radek Knapp** (österreichischer Schriftsteller). Moderiert wurde die Sonntagsmatinee von Standard-Redakteurin **Lisa Nimmervoll.** Video der Veranstaltung auf: **www.youtube.com/IWMVienna**

Eine Kooperation von Burgtheater, ERSTE Stiftung, Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) und Der Standard; *Medienpartner: Ö1 und W24*

Unten von links: Basil Kerski, Erhard Busek, Noémi Kiss, Ludger Hagedorn

Photos: Robert Newald

Unlock the 007 in You: James Bond in Prague

BY MURIEL BLAIVE

When we think of the "Cold War", we spontaneously think of the period going from the end of the Second World War to the end of the communist regimes in Europe. The name evokes in us superpower competition, nuclear armament, and the so-called balance of terror. This fear culminated with the Cuban missile crisis (1962), during which the US and the USSR almost went into nuclear meltdown.

© Everett Collection / picturedesk.com

The Cold War is a Western concept

But 1962 is also the year of the first James Bond film, *Dr. No.* When reminiscing about the Cold War, Westerners will also think of cultural avatars such as the novel *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (John Le Carré, 1963), the film *Dr. Strangelove* (Stanley Kubrick, 1964), or to a multitude of cultural works centered on the iconic Berlin wall. The Iron Curtain and repressive communist regimes are a centerpiece of our imaginary of the Cold War, a history that is unfailingly painted in black and white with a touch of red. The Soviet bloc is almost always depicted as rainy or snowy, cold and drab, grey and sad. The sense of fashion is terrible and women have hairy armpits—unless they are beautiful and willing to be seduced by Western heroes such as James Bond, in which case they turn their back on their countries and betray them without a blink.

This folkloristic view might be our dominant vision of the Cold War today but it is in fact an exclusively Western one. When I started working in Vienna at the Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres in 2006, we endeavored to study the perception of the Cold War on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. I started my oral history study in the small town of České Velenice, across the border from Gmünd in Lower Austria, by asking people how they related to the concept of Cold War. Back then, "Cold War" had not fully penetrated the Czech public consciousness and my interviewees were at a loss. "The Cold War?", a middle-aged woman told me, more preoccupied by her degraded marital relationship than by international geopolitics, "I have it at home with my family." The Cold War was no more synonymous of this period for the former East than "life under communism" would have been for the Western countries. But here is a spoiler: spring and summer did unravel yearly in former communist countries, too, the sky was also occasionally blue, people also fell in love and laughed—and, as Slovaks and Austrians know, you cannot slide down a mountain from Bratislava to Vienna on a cello case as in *The Living Daylights* (James Bond no. 15, 1987) for the good reason that the area is as flat as a binding agreement with the communist secret police laid out on the table of an interrogation cell in the Bartolomějská prison.

Memories are being reconfigured

Time has elapsed since my study of České Velenice. In fact, I am willing to bet that the same interviewees would now know what to answer if I asked them what they think of the Cold War. I even started to suspect that the Czech public would be rather glad to adopt the "Cold War" as their national memory of the period, as if they could somehow appropriate the identity of the "good guys" and leave behind their communist years as unwillingly fought on the wrong side, an episode now deemed unfit to belong to Czech national history.

I was excited when the film *Skyfall* (James Bond no. 23, 2012) came out accompanied by an advertisement for Diet Coke that plays out in Prague. Entitled *Unlock the 007 in You,* this one-minute commercial seemed to confirm my intuition. It downplays the James Bond pump to an amusing, everyday life level: the hero is good-looking but ordinary and orders a Coke Zero at a bar. He notices a young and pretty woman, who is sitting with bad guys (we know they are bad because they look ugly and stupid) and he hums the James Bond tune to her. She hums back and looks at him with adoring eyes. Sensing danger, the villains push the unimpressive hero to the floor and snatch the heroine away. In a series of clumsy stunts, he runs after their washed-out Golf convertible on an old moped. Eventually the winning couple escapes by jumping into the Vltava and they share a Coke Zero on a James Bond musical background.

The scene departs from Café Slavia, the emblematic café where the dissidents used to meet under communism. I could not but be enthralled at this unwitting merging of Václav Havel's "power of the powerless" (the 1978 iconic essay that became the unofficial manifesto of dissident opposition, possibly written in this very café) and this quaint James Bond. The commercial could not have supported Havel's message better: everyone can achieve their goals at one's own modest level—everyone can "unlock their inner James Bond" and become a hero/dissident. Our Diet Coke drinker personified a new, common memory, equally fit for Eastern and Western consumption. To paraphrase Amy Jane Barnes, he became a new icon of ironic consumerism.

A deflated historian

I was pleased with my interpretation but just like pre-1989 Western historians of the Cold War, I soon had to revise my conclusions in view of new evidence. Intrigued by this amazing coincidence between the spirit of the times and my own reflection, I managed to track down the copywriter who wrote the scenario for the *Unlock the 007 in You* commercial. The winner of the Coke Zero campaign bid was no amateur historian of the Cold War as I had fantasized but an employee of the Paris branch of the Publicis agency that won the bid, Antonin Jacquot. His motivations were as distant from reuniting the Western and the Eastern memory of the Cold War as the fall of communism must have been to Havel's greengrocer character in the *Power of the Powerless:* the film was shot in Prague rather than Paris because it was cheaper; the Slavia was chosen as departure point because it is a type of building which the whole of Europe can identify with; the modesty of the hero's means was directed at the younger public, who was not familiar with the old James Bond films, in order to identify more easily with the lower-key character embodied by Daniel Craig.

So much for my intellectualized interpretation. But then I was saved by the proverbial Czech sense of humor. An article published in 2015 in *Právo* (a formerly communist daily) spared no effort for its readership to appropriate the James Bond culture by patriotically reminding every single allusion to the Czech nation present in James Bond films. With undisguised albeit amused pride, author Jiří Sotona notes that one of the languages allegedly spoken by Bond is Czech (along with French, German, Greek, Italian and Russian). The vials of poison mentioned in *Thunderball* (1965) come from Pilsen. Czechoslovakia is, by the way, usually better represented in the James Bond novels than Balkan countries such as Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, boasts the journalist—a tendency dubbed somewhat less romantically by Klaus Dodds as the "license to stereotype." Jiří Sotona is also absurdly impressed by the fact that one of the actors who auditioned for the part of Ernst Stavro Blofeld, the villain whose face was revealed in *You Only Live Twice* (1967), was none other than Czech exile actor Jan Werich—although he was not taken. Czechoslovakia is famously represented by the sinister chess player Kronsteen in *From Russia with Love* (1963), although this character "regrettably did not end very well", as well as by the cellist Kara Milovy ("clearly the scriptwriters were not familiar with Czech gender inflections") in The Living Daylights (1987)—the first film to be shown in Czechoslovakia after 1989 under the heading *The famous 007 agent in Bratislava.* Grand Hotel Pupp in Karlovy Vary greatly benefited from being represented in *Casino Royale* (2006) and quickly learned to manufacture the cocktail "Vesper" for an eager clientele. But the true revelation of the article is that one of the greatest Bond fans during the communist period was none other than singer Karel Gott, who smuggled tapes into the country and sang a song dedicated to James Bond. So now we know: if Bond doesn't merge with Havel in Czech popular culture, let him at least merge with Švejk. ◁

See Jiří Sotona, "James Bond left traces also in the Czech Republic", *Právo,* December 28, 2015.

Muriel Blaive is a socio-political historian of postwar, communist, and post-communist Central Europe, in particular of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. She is advisor to the director and in Charge of Research and Methodology at the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in Prague. From June 2018 to March 2019 she was a EURIAS Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

For similar reflections and much more, join us for our conference *The Bondian Cold War: The Transnational Legacies of a Cold War Icon,* Tallinn University, Estonia, June 20–21, 2019.

Smoke and Mirrors: On new-Fascist Urban Tactics

BY LUIZA BIALASIEWICZ AND SABRINA STALLONE

Over the past year, fringe Fascist groups in Italy have captured the attention of the international media, most prominently Rome-based CasaPound. *Their role should not be exaggerated, however. The impact of such groups does not lie in their numbers—still small—or in any significant political actions. Their extreme rhetoric and highly spectacular interventions deserve attention, rather, because they serve as a foil for more 'respectable' political forces.*

Less than two weeks before the Italian elections of March 4, 2018, the Guardian published a long-read article on *CasaPound,* a new-Fascist[1] group that in the words of the author had 'brought Mussolini back to the mainstream'.[2] The online version of the article opened with an image of *CasaPound* activists, flags held high, marching through the streets of Rome's Esquilino district. Other photos immortalized *CasaPound's* Roman headquarters photographed monumentally from below, its façade and signposts in faux-marble grandeur, and yet another march, with activists holding up a banner reading *'Prima gli Italiani':* 'Italians First'. Also featured were two portraits of the movement's leader Gianluca Iannone, swathed in cigarette smoke and *tricolore* flares, center-stage, larger than life. Just days later, a similar article on the front page of the New York Times warned readers that Fascist groups 'have been rallying in large numbers in Italian piazzas'.[3] In image as well as in text, *CasaPound* was made to appear as though it had occupied Italian streets, as it did the front pages of international newspapers.

Photo: Mimmo Frassinetti / AGF / picturedesk.com

***CasaPound* rally in central Rome, March 2018, with the slogan: 'Italians First'.**

Despite mediatized warnings of this supposed 'black wave', however, the feared entry of the new-Fascists into Parliament did not materialize. The two such groups running in this electoral contest—*CasaPound* and *Forza Nuova*—garnered tiny percentages of the vote, with the more highly represented *CasaPound* receiving less than 1% in elections for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, well below the 3% threshold necessary to enter into Parliament. The dominant forces emerging from the elections were the right-separatist *Lega* (the League, formerly the Northern League, *Lega Nord*) that swept the north and center of the country, and the anti-establishment *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (Five Star Movement, *M5S*) that claimed the entire Italian south (including all electoral districts in Sicily). These results were, indeed, a shock to the Italian political system—but different from the media's alarmed prognoses.

As the elections approached, the tones of the anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic *Lega* had become progressively more extreme and violent, with *Lega* representatives' not-so-veiled incitements to violence sparking actual violent acts, such as the shooting spree against African migrants in Macerata by former *Lega* activist Luca Traini just weeks before the vote. The favored slogan of *Lega* leader Matteo Salvini—also 'Italians First'—dominated the *Lega's* electoral propaganda, appearing on glossy brochures and slick social media profiles, not just homemade banners. Why was it, then, that in the lead-up to the elections most of the alarmed attention (in both mass media and political debate) lay less with the already violent tones and illiberal proposals of the *Lega* than with groups like *CasaPound* and their public performances of xenophobic activism?

Older histories, new tactics

The Rome-based new-Fascist group founded in the early 2000s has been the subject of scholarly attention for quite some time now (including a full-length book by Elia Rosati[4]), and has been described as "the most interesting, and atypical in some ways, right-wing enterprise of these recent years" that deserves attention if only "for the curiosity that it is generating abroad".[5] In many ways, the group emerges directly out of the genealogy of Fascist movements in the orbit of the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), the party created out of the ashes of the Fascist regime. *CasaPound's* founder and leader to date, Gianluca Iannone, was indeed previously the head of the MSI youth organization. The new group, however, grew more directly out of Iannone's militancy and his rock band ZetaZeroAlfa, well-known on the wider European 'identitarian music' scene. From its start, the new organization focused its sights on entirely new forms of organizing, distinct from previous 'institutional' Fascist youth organizations, and on capturing new audiences and spaces. Self-defined as 'Fascists of the Third Millennium', *CasaPound* adopted both the structure and the activist practices of 'left' social movements, including an explicitly Gramscian 'metapolitical' approach of broad-based cultural interventions that would lead the way to political transformation. In so doing, they very ably adopted what anthropologist Douglas Holmes terms an 'integralist' ideology "defying easy placement along a single axis, […] creat[ing] a space in which an entangled politics arises that is both right and left".[6]

Appropriating methods usually associated with left-autonomist movements, such as squatting and other direct actions, *CasaPound* activists have been able to enact a media-savvy 're-claiming' of the spaces of Italian cities. Two key sites for the group's interventions have been public housing provision and food drives (strictly for Italians only), both aimed at drawing public attention to an Italian working (and middle) class in need, left behind by the vagaries of neoliberal globalization and abandoned by the national and local state administration. The group not only provides housing for a number of families within its squatted 'headquarters' but has also become prominent for its physical blockades to prevent evictions and a phone hotline to assist those facing eviction or unable to pay their rent or mortgage. *CasaPound's* food drives have similarly captured popular attention, collecting shopping bags full of groceries in front of large supermarkets in central locations in Rome and other cities such as Lucca and Trieste.

Spectacularizing crisis

Through such actions—and through their multiplication by mass media outlets—*CasaPound* has succeeded in spectacularizing Italians' social precarity, while less-than-obliquely hinting at a logic of crisis induced by the presence of non-Italian Others. Mobilizing a range of visual symbols and discursive tools that draw upon longer repertoires of Italian Fascism, *CasaPound* has very ably woven a causal link between the rise in migration and the precarization of Italian citizens. Their interventions in urban spaces have rendered this discursive framing even more powerful by making it 'touch down' in real places, bringing attention (often highly spectacular, if not directly violent) fashion to those 'left behind' (the Italian working class) but also those responsible for the 'degradation' of Italian cities: the out-of-place migrant Others.

Unlike the image sketched by the international media leading up to March 2018, the impact of fringe Fascist groups like *CasaPound* does not lie in their numbers—still small—or in any significant political actions. Groups like *CasaPound* matter for reasons other than those highlighted in exaggerated journalistic renditions. They matter because their discursive and material practices work in concert with other, not-so-far-right forces, most prominently the *Lega.* Their direct-action, metapolitical interventions allow the equally perilous proposals of more 'respectable' policy-makers to appear normal, legitimate, even urgently needed. The spectacularized actions of movements like *CasaPound* must therefore be seen as part of a bigger picture: in drawing Italians' eyes to degraded urban spaces and a native population at risk, they pave the way for institutional political forces to mirror their agendas and put them into practice. ◁

1) We use the term 'new-Fascist' to call them by their true name (and ideological provenance), and not simply with the generic term 'far-right'.
2) Jones T (2018) The Fascist movement that has brought Mussolini back to the mainstream. *The Guardian* February 22.
3) Horowitz J (2018) Why Italy's Insular Election is More Important Than It Looks. *New York Times,* March 2.
4) Rosati E (2018) *CasaPound Italia: Fascisti del Terzo Millenio.* Milano: Mimesis Edizioni.
5) Mammone A (2015) *Transnational Neo-Fascism in France and Italy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 213.
6) Holmes D (2000) *Integral Europe: Fast-capitalism, multiculturalism, neofascism.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Luiza Bialasiewicz is Professor of European Governance and the co-director of ACES, the Amsterdam Centre for European Studies. From April to June, she will return to the IWM as a Visiting Fellow, where she was previously a Bronisław Geremek Fellow in 2015–2016 and 2018.

Sabrina Stallone is Junior Researcher at the Amsterdam School for Regional, Transnational and European Studies.

A fuller discussion of *CasaPound* and its mediatized representations can be found in Bialasiewicz, L and Stallone, S (forthcoming): *Focalizing new-Fascism: Right Politics and Integralisms in Contemporary Italy.* Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space.

Cyber Bobbies on the Beat: Policing in the Digital Age

BY MISHA GLENNY

The dramatic rise in cybercrime poses major challenges to law enforcement agencies worldwide. As star author Misha Glenny (Mc Mafia) *explains, the upcoming Brexit could further aggravate the security situation in Great Britain.*

© Adam Smigielski / iStock

For decades after the Second World War, the Conservative Party was known as the natural 'law and order party.' Successive leaders and prime ministers promised to shovel more public money into policing, build more prisons and stand firm against liberal demands to reform the criminal justice system.

This reputation even survived the exposure of several monumental miscarriages of justice from the wrongful prosecutions in the cases of the Birmingham and Guildford bombings by the IRA to the appalling coverup of the Hillsborough Stadium disaster when 96 Liverpool fans died in April 1989.

In the last eight years, however, austerity measures have broken that relationship between the Tories and the police. Together with the disruptive aspects of Brexit to European security, the cuts to law enforcement budgets across the UK, especially in England and Wales, have led to mistrust characterizing the relationship between government and the police.

In short, police are finding it hard to cope with the combined challenges of digitalization and austerity and increasingly they are demanding policy changes.

This breakdown between government and police could not have come at a worse time. In the short term, it underlines the growth of mistrust between public and politicians. In the mid-term, it represents one of the greatest challenges of Brexit. But the biggest problem is a long-term issue—how do you police in the age of digital transformation?

For reasons still unclear (although not difficult to guess), most Western governments responded to the banking crisis of 2008 as if it were a fiscal crisis. Essentially this meant that tax payers would pick up the tab for the speculative orgy of mainstream banks. The United Kingdom was saddled with an especially large problem in the shape of the Royal Bank of Scotland which it *de facto* nationalised for several years.

To pay for this, the government in London embarked on one of the toughest austerity programs in history. The impact has been greatest in two areas: local government (the primary mechanism for providing public services) and policing. At the moment, the government is suffering significant reputational damage because of the surge in knife crime and associated murder rates, especially in London. On average, the budgets of England and Wales's 43 regional police forces have been cut by 19% leading to a reduction in police numbers of almost 50,000 officers and workers to a current level of 198,000.

Crime is moving onto the Internet at great speed. Cyber-related crime now accounts for a quarter of victims every year.

In consequence, police chiefs around the country have been compelled to reduce the services offered to the public. This month, Ian Hopkins, the Chief of Police in Manchester, admitted that his officers were 'screening out,' 60% of reported crimes due to budget constraints. Around the country, the number of criminal investigations closed without identifying a suspect has risen from 1.9 million in 2015 to 2.14 million last year.

So police are now setting their own priorities, sometimes in clear disregard of official government policy. The West Midlands police, for example, have admitted that they routinely ignore small-scale cannabis offences. 'What would you prefer our officers to do?' asked a West Midlands police spokesman rhetorically, 'Help an old lady who has been burgled? Or arrest a teenager for £20 worth of marijuana and then spend the rest of the day processing the offence? Because those are the choices we have to make.'

Behind this, however, lies a still greater challenge. Crime is moving onto the Internet at great speed. According to Britain's latest figures, cyber-related crime now accounts for a

quarter of victims every year. Fraud accounts for most of those crime but identity theft and child pornography offences are also a significant issue. This does not take into account targeted attacks against business, such as DDOS attacks, the theft of data and copyright violations.

The police cannot cope. Citizens argue vocally for an increase in 'bobbies on the beat.' But what police forces really need is a new breed of officer who is technically literate to the level of a computer engineer. Pete O'Doherty, the head of cybercrime at the City of London, put it bluntly at a security conference last year. 'I have been a detective my whole career and the training I have been given has not equipped me with the skills and techniques that I need,' he said, 'to investigate cybercrimes involving multiple actors in multiple countries.'

Brexit and cyber security

Brexit has made this aspect of life notably more difficult. In the past five years, under a British director, Europol has become a much more useful tool in law enforcement, largely because of the creation of a specialist computer department, EC3. Officers here are now able to exchange information in real time (something hitherto impossible) to combat the increasingly international and technically aware organized crime groups.

If the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, its officers must clear their desks from Europol—it is an EU only operation. Given Chief Superintendent O'Doherty's observation, this is a particularly damaging consequence of Brexit but one which has not featured at all in the debate here in Britain.

The longer-term issue concerns the dearth of computer and cyber security engineers on the job market. As a consequence, competent engineers have no interest in joining the police. Their average salary in the UK private sector is €75,000 while even in the two highest paying forces, the Met and the City of London police, a cyber security specialist can expect to earn between €25–32,000 per annum. No contest.

Beyond fraud, the introduction of cyber into the global criminal economy has had the greatest impact in the illegal drugs market. Huge shifts in the global narcotics economy are provoking rapid and profound societal change that is placing immense stress on Western law enforcement capacity.

First there is the relationship between North America and marijuana. 9 US States and the District of Columbia have already legalized marijuana while it is available for medical use in a further 29 States. Were New York to join California in legalizing, as seems quite possible, then over a quarter of the US population will enjoy unfettered access to weed.

But the real game changer came last October when smoke shops opened their doors to customers across all Canada. The official Statistics Canada estimates turnover at over $8.2 billions but analysts agree the figure was arrived assuming the low price of $7.15 a gram. Pension funds, banks, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are punching and kicking to secure a place in the starting grid of investment into the new industry.

And with good reason. On sales of over $2 billions, Colorado, one of the earliest US adopters, collected $120 millions in tax from marijuana last year, twice as much as it derives from booze. An intense fiscal addiction like that becomes almost impossible to kick. Many other states are eyeing the extra cash enviously.

In the UK, an ever greater number of police chiefs are also now convinced that marijuana legalization is the most sensible path to take. Part of the reason for this is that more marijuana consumed in the UK is home grown and not imported.

This is a paradigm shift. Until now, Western law enforcement agencies engaged in the broader War on Drugs had two priorities: first, prevent the retail distribution of drugs; and second, arrest individual users. What they did not have to do is police the production of illegal narcotics. This usually took place in countries like Afghanistan or Columbia (where the levels of bloodshed associated with the policy were correspondingly much higher).

But with marijuana now easily grown across the Western world and the social harm caused by the drug considered much milder than that of alcohol consumption, many police officers feel it is both counterproductive and a waste of resources to continue to prosecute this.

Dealing the dark

Much more serious than this is the shift of drug distribution away from old networks to the darknet. In the UK, academic papers estimate that between 25–30% of all drugs consumed are now purchased online. You can buy any narcotic you care to imagine on darknet sites (by far the biggest ones are cater for the European markets) but the most popular is not heroin, cocaine or marijuana but mdma (or ecstasy as it is also known). The center of mdma manufacture is North Brabant in the southern Netherlands. Dutch police are fighting a losing battle against this trade which in some towns and cities have led to organized crime groups issuing death threats against mayors, police officers and journalists.

As the private sector steams ahead with technical innovation and digital transformation, the police is deprived of resources and unable to attract the requisite skills to deal with its evolving challenges. Underneath the devastating but short-term political crises like Brexit, social change is unfolding at a dramatic pace. Law enforcement agencies are barely able to map what is happening, let alone create effective measures to combat the new threats. ◁

Misha Glenny is a speaker, author and journalist. A former Digital Security Journalist of the Year, Glenny is an author and journalist with a rich background in cyber security, geopolitics, criminology and broadcasting. His best-selling non-fiction book *McMafia* has been adapted into a major TV drama series. In January he was a guest at the IWM.

Geopolitical Talks

NEW SERIES OF PUBLIC DEBATES

The Geopolitical Talks, *a new series of public debates initiated by IWM Permanent Fellow Ivan Krastev in cooperation with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defense, started in February 2018. Foreign policy experts and former politicians are invited to discuss the return of geopolitics, the political and economic ambitions of new global players as well as security risks and general threats to democracy.*

February 26
Robert John Sawers
Changing Politics and Geopolitics: What does it mean for Europe?
Robert John Sawers is Chairman and Partner of Macro Advisory Partners. Sawers was Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the UK's Ambassador to the United Nations (2007–2009), Political Director of the Foreign Office (2003–2007), Special Representative in Iraq (2003), Ambassador to Cairo (2001–2003), and Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Tony Blair (1999–2001). He is a Non-Executive Director of BP, a Visiting Professor at King's College London, a Senior Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, and a Governor of the Ditchley Foundation.

March 19
Ahmet Davutoğlu
Systemic Earthquake: National, Regional and the Global Dimensions
Ahmet Davutoğlu was the Prime Minister of Turkey and leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from August 2014 to May 2016. He previously served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014 and as chief advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2003 to 2009. He was elected as an AKP Member of Parliament for Konya in the 2011 general election and was re-elected as an MP in both the June and November 2015 general elections.

April 29
Shivshankar Menon
The New Asian Geopolitics
Shivshankar Menon served as national security advisor to the Prime Minister of India from January 2010 to May 2014, and previously as Foreign Secretary of India from October 2006 to August 2009. A career diplomat, he has served as Ambassador and High Commissioner of India to Israel (1995–1997), Sri Lanka (1997–2000), China (2000–2003), and Pakistan (2003–2006). Currently he is chairman of the Advisory Board of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi, and is a Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington.

Photos: IWM

The series will be continued on **June 6** with American policy analyst and government official **Wess Mitchell** as well as **William Joseph Burns,** former career Foreign Service Officer and President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in **September 2019** (further details on: **www.iwm.at/events**).

We wargamed the last days of Brexit. Here's what we found out

BY LUKE COOPER

Since the 2016 referendum, the UK is deeply divided on how it should exit the EU, and what its future relationship with the European Union should look like. What can we learn from running a simulation of Brexit, asks Luke Cooper.



Brexit: The Board Game by Paul Dallison and Dom McKenzie © www.politico.eu

Scenario planning plays an important role in modern politics. Political contestation is the art of out manoeuvring opponents. By attempting to anticipate the moves they will make in response to events and problems, party leaderships, or factions, can plan for possible eventualities. They seek to defeat the other side by outwitting them strategically. Simulation games can help these efforts. By building up a picture of how opponents behave they can help parties successfully achieve their political goals.

Interpretive hypotheses

Such games can hone strategic thinking, but they are, of course, necessarily imperfect, 'probabilistic' exercises. However well scenarios are prepared for there will always be too many variables for us to 'know' the future. There are simply too many possible events and factors that might occur, and interact in unique, complex and contingent ways, that we can never be entirely sure what the actual course of history will be. E.H. Carr made this point in his famous text, *What is History?* Carr argued that, by the middle of the twentieth century, historians had abandoned determinism and were now more modest in their goals. 'Content to inquire how things work', as he put it.[1] Rather than believing the goal of an enquiry into the past was to achieve certainty about the course of events in the future, Carr instead proposed a method based on hypothesis and interpretation. For Carr a good hypothesis constituted a 'tool of thought, valid in so far as it is illuminating, and dependent for its validity on interpretation'.[2] The logic of this principle was simple. History does not follow a strict determinism. But neither is anything possible. Drawing on Carr we might say that any study of a political process requires interpreting the mix of interests and circumstances in order to illuminate how exactly it evolved overtime.

Carr serves as a useful frame for a simulation game exercise. A group of us recently participated in a simulation game to model the future of the Brexit process. By assuming different roles amongst the forces in conflict over the future of the United Kingdom, we hoped to gain a greater understanding of the process and what might come next. We solicited the help of Richard Barbrook, an academic at Westminster University, and director of *Digital Liberties,* a UK-based cooperative that has pioneered the use of participatory simulations to anticipate political scenarios. His book, *Class Wargames,* applies the ideas of the French situationist, Guy Debord, who advocated the use of strategy games as performative, even theatrical, exercises to understand one's political opponents and their strategic thinking. Barbrook designed the game, which he called, *Meaningful Votes: The Brexit Simulation.*

The game successfully demonstrated the limitations placed on UK Parliamentary sovereignty by the fact *of its international relations.*

Collaborating on this initiative with the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) and the ERSTE Foundation in Vienna we assembled a group of participants in Vienna comprised of civil society, journalists, academics and intellectuals. They were a mixture of nationalities, from Austria, the Balkans, the United States and Britain, and held a plurality of political views from left to right. For Mainland European participants the game provided an opportunity to empirically rationalise a crisis that many had found to be inexplicable; for example, the hitherto refusal of the British parties to find a compromise on Brexit in Parliament is highly alien to those use to political systems (often with proportional representation), such as Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, with a culture of building consensus. Each participant took on the role of a faction within Parliament with the game beginning after the defeat of the heavy defeat of the First Meaningful Vote on January 15, 2019.

Simulating the factions

As Brexit has radically disrupted the existing British party system, the factional roles assumed by players

did not tend to align with a particular party leadership. Instead different Tory and Labour factions were represented within the game. Each player had a series of votes allocated in the British Parliament. Larger factions had two different vote allocations: 'waverers' and diehards. They could potentially cast these votes in different directions. Another element of the game design lay in a consciously British-centric approach. An assumption underpinning the game was that the EU side would act as, in gaming-terms, a 'dummy-player'. This refers to when an actor is present within a scenario, but they do not face choices that affect the overall arc of the decision pathway. With modifications to the Withdrawal Agreement persistently ruled out by the EU had players assumed this vantage point then they not have faced any choices. As a dummy-player, the umpire thus articulated the position of the EU-27 states at key decision-making points across the game.

Following the playful spirit of Debord's legacy, this really was a *game*. Players accumulated points in relation to different votes passing and goals being reached. Some had hidden objectives that were revealed at the end of the game, identifying a potential conflict between the public statements of factions and their underlying motivations. The 'winner' had the most points at the end of the game.

Towards 'no Brexit'?

So what happened? And what did we learn from this exercise?

The outcome of the game eventually resolved itself in a new referendum. By this stage the game had moved into the near future of early autumn 2019. The cross-party negotiations that had failed to reach a breakthrough acceptable to both leaderships. Softer members of the Tory Brexit Delivery Group then split away from the party leadership, crossing the floor to support a new referendum. Interestingly, this came as a surprise to the game designer, Barbrook, who had anticipated a stalemate and a further extension of Article 50 at the end of October 2019. If this suggests the game had a Remain bias, other moments in the scenario serve to refute this. At an earlier moment in the game a majority emerged in Parliament, in spite of opposition from Labour and the Remain parties, for the kind of technological solution to the Irish border question favoured by the ERG as an alternative to the troubled 'Irish backstop'. Assuming the dummy-player function, the EU then intervened via the umpire into the Parliamentary scenario to rule out an agreement without the backstop. With Parliament then voting against leaving without a deal, the political factions were confronted with the same problem they have at the current time.

The crux of this decision is ultimately a narrow one: few options remain available to parties making the outcome relatively straightforward to model. Leave on the deal May has negotiated with the EU, which is unpopular with Brexit voters and with Labour Remain voters who would like a second referendum. Or negotiate changes to the UK-future relationship document (the Withdrawal Agreement will not be reopened by the EU) to make the Brexit deal softer, making it more palatable for the Labour Party but even less acceptable to Brexit voters and Brexiters in the Tory party. As the changes are not legally binding on a future Tory prime minister even a Labour Party leadership wishing to 'deliver Brexit' has little incentive to support such a deal. This leaves only two further choices. Hold new elections in the hope they might produce a balance in the Parliament more conducive to striking a deal or move towards a new referendum, which includes the opportunity to remain in the EU.

Globalisation, Brexit and strategic choices

The outcome of the game is not an exact prediction of events in the near future. One player's calculation that at a certain stage the mainstream of the Tory party will have to try and 'move on' from Brexit by peeling off towards a referendum is what Carr called an interpretive hypothesis. It will be tested in the months ahead. Rather the game offers an insight into the interests that will shape this and the core contradiction underpinning the process: that there is not a tangible, pragmatic form of Brexit acceptable to the people that want Brexit. The vote in the game for 'technological solutions to the Irish border' was analogous with, though not identical to, Parliament's vote on the January 30, 2019 for the 'Brady amendment', which mandated the government to seek changes to the Irish backstop as a condition for passing the Withdrawal Agreement. Having passed by 317 votes to 301, Theresa May hailed it as demonstrating a 'substantial and sustainable majority' for leaving the EU. When the EU insisted on the Irish backstop, the refusal of the hard Brexiters and the DUP to compromise forces a logic of events that points increasingly to 'no Brexit'.

Underpinning this is a mistaken conception of how sovereignty operates in the twenty-first century. No state, however powerful, enjoys absolute sovereignty. All states are constrained by economic and political forces beyond their border. Larger states or geopolitical blocs, such as the European Union, China, or the United States, have significantly more power to 'shape' the way globalisation works and operates. Britain would have to make steep concessions to these larger blocs to get a trade deal. The game successfully modelled this geopolitical logic by demonstrating—through the existence of the EU as a 'dummy player'—the limitations placed on UK Parliamentary sovereignty by the *fact* of its international relations with the wider world. Leave campaign rhetoric about taking back control comes into contradiction with this material reality. In all Brexit scenarios, exiting the EU entails a loss of substantive sovereignty for Britain. Even the 'no deal' Brexit preferred by hardline Leavers would lead to Britain signing a deal on less advantageous terms in around ten days after an exit. Once the legal uncertainty and accompanying economic turmoil is experienced any government would be under huge pressure to end the chaos by striking an agreement with the EU. On the other hand, the Brexit process has also demonstrated the maximising-effect of EU membership for sovereign states: Ireland has been in a far stronger position to protect the open border with the North and the Good Friday Agreement because of the clear support of 26 other EU member-states.

It can often feel that the Brexit process has unleashed euphoric, unreal, deeply performative, and rhetorical politics. A politics that is incapable of being rationalised in terms of interests and goals. But the game assisted us in comprehending the micro-nationalities operating within the logics of this evolving situation. '[W]e achieve understanding by reenacting its history in miniature', as Debord argued.[3] Out-gaming the other side requires tactical insight into the assumptions underpinning their behaviour. While this could lead to the game becoming an end in itself, this political conflict still has to resolve itself on a normative set of assumptions: deciding on the best outcome desired for the country is the only basis from which rational compromises can be worked through in order to achieve the best possible scenario. The refusal of Brexiters to compromise, and their use of rhetorical devices to harden opposition to May's deal amongst Leave voters, reduces the scope for a compromise and risks triggering a decision tree that leads squarely to a 'no Brexit' situation.

Time plays an important role in this process. Although Barbrook had envisaged the game would end with a stalemate in October 2019 as Britain asked the EU for a further extension, the different outcome players arrived at illustrated how the micro-rationalities animating their decisions eventually had to break. Although it may seem like the Brexit impasse will last for time immemorial, eventually the passing of time requires one of the competing factions to splinter away from their preferred outcome. There does seem to be a prima facie case for assuming this will eventually be mainstream Conservative politicians. As the governing party, they feel the stresses of state-management and power politics in a way that the opposition simply do not.

Is Britain on a path to no Brexit? We will soon find out if this interpretive hypothesis has captured the logic of the country's ill-fated attempt to leave the EU. ◁

1) E.H. Carr, 2018. *What is History?* Penguin Modern Classics (epub version): New York, p. 223.
2) Ibid, p. 224.
3) Guy Debord, *The Game of War,* Unpopular Books: Poplar, p. 61.

Luke Cooper is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Anglia Ruskin University and a Visiting Fellow on the Europe's Futures programme at the IWM in 2018–2019. He is currently writing a book on the crisis of the European Union.

Photo: Christian Fischer

Europe's Futures – Ideas for Action

The three year project *Europe's Futures,* run by IWM Permanent Fellow Ivan Vejvoda, is generously supported by and conducted in a strategic partnership with ERSTE Foundation. Since its inception in 2017, it brings together renowned experts from politics, academia and civil society to work on three broad themes related to current European challenges: the state of democracy in Europe, the issues related to migration, asylum and borders and finally the question of the European Union's enlargement.

The first group of fellows, who were in residence at the IWM in September 2018, included: Rosa Balfour (Senior Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels), Piotr Buras (Director, European Council of Foreign Relations, Warsaw), Luke Cooper (Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge), Tim Judah (journalist and author, *The Economist,* London), Gerald Knaus (Director, European Stability Initiative, Berlin), Stefan Lehne (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe, Brussels/Vienna), Zsuzsanna Szelényi (former Member of the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest). As a prominent kick-off event all *Europe's Futures* Fellows were invited by the Austrian Federal President Alexander Van der Bellen to present and discuss the project at the Vienna Hofburg in September 2018.

Since then, numerous events have been organized by and (co)hosted by the project in Vienna and abroad. The fellows met for workshops in Warsaw (December 2018), for a joint conference with the London School of Economics and Political Science in London (February 2019); for an event and discussion with professor Francis Fukuyama in March at the ERSTE Campus on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the ERSTE Bank. Most recently *Europe's Futures* Fellows were speakers at the State of the Union two day event in Florence on May 2–3 organized by the European University Institute.

Beyond that, they have been involved in major European debates on the concerned issues, publishing articles, commentaries, participating in conferences, and giving numerous interviews in European and other media.

The following fellows will be invited for the next term in 2019/20: Isabelle Ioannides (Senior Associate Researcher, Institute for European Studies; Scholar, Dept. of Political Sciences, Vrije University Brussels), Leszek Jażdżewski (editor-in-chief, *Liberté* journal, Lodz), Nicole Koenig (Deputy Director, Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin), Peter Kreko (Director, Political Capital, Budapest), Niccolo Milanese (philosopher, author, Director, European Alternatives, Paris), Alida Vracic (Director, Think Tank Populari, Sarajevo; Visiting Fellow ECFR Berlin).

Photo: Christian Fischer

Brexit: Deal or No Deal?
What's next for Britain and the EU?

In June 2016, the majority of the British population voted in favor of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union. Since then, this decision has created enormous political waves within Great Britain—it has been in fact already termed as the biggest political crisis in the UK since World War II. It has also posed unprecedented challenges for the European Union—after years of enlargement. What will political and economic relations between Britain and the EU look like in the future and what are the implications for both sides? Will the EU remain at 27? And is there a danger of the UK falling apart? These questions were discussed by the participants of the second debate of the series *Debating Europe – Europa im Diskurs* on March 24: Mary Kaldor (Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics), Denis Staunton (London Editor of *The Irish Times*), Tessa Szyszkowitz (historian, journalist and author) and Tom Tugendhat (Member of the British Parliament). The debate was moderated by IWM Permanent Fellow Ivan Vejvoda, who is directing the *Europe's Futures* project initiated by IWM and ERSTE Foundation. Video on:
www.youtube.com/IWMVienna

A cooperation of Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation, IWM and *Der Standard*

Wenn Demokratien demokratisch untergehen

BEITRÄGE VON CHANTAL MOUFFE, NADIA URBINATI UND BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS

Demokratie ist die Regierungsform unserer Zeit. Dennoch erodiert ihre Legitimität gleichsam von innen heraus. Wenn Demokratien demokratisch untergehen *ist der (ent-)sprechende Titel eines soeben erschienenen Sammelbandes, der von Ludger Hagedorn, Katharina Hasewend und Shalini Randeria herausgegeben wurde. Die Publikation bildet den Auftakt der wieder aufgenommenen Kooperation des IWM mit dem Wiener Passagen Verlag (siehe S. 22). Die nachfolgenden Artikel von Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Nadia Urbinati und Chantal Mouffe sind Auszüge aus ihren Beiträgen für diesen Band. Sie analysieren eine Herrschaftsform im Wandel und beleuchten insbesondere das Phänomen des allgegenwärtigen Populismus und seinen Einfluss auf die Demokratie.*

Photo: wikipedia.org

Théodore Géricault ***Das Floß der Medusa*** **(1818/19)**

Vier Schritte, die Demokratie zu verlassen

VON BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS

Wir sind seit langem daran gewöhnt, dass es zwei wesentliche Typen politischer Ordnung gibt: die Demokratie und die Diktatur. Nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer im Jahre 1989 wurde die (liberale) Demokratie fast überall als einzig legitime politische Ordnung betrachtet. Ungeachtet dessen, dass es auch innerhalb dieser beiden Typen große Unterschiede gibt, schließen beide einander grundsätzlich aus: Sie können nicht in derselben Gesellschaft koexistieren, und das Optieren für die eine oder andere Ordnung setzt eine politische Auseinandersetzung in Gang, die wiederum eine Art Bruch mit der je anderen bestehenden Rechtsordnung mit sich bringt. Während des letzten Jahrhunderts wuchs die Überzeugung, dass Demokratien nur durch die abrupte und beinahe zwangsläufig gewalttätige Störung der konstitutionellen Legalität verschwinden können, das heißt durch einen militärischen oder zivilen *coup d'état* mit dem Ziel, eine Diktatur zu errichten.

Diese Annahme war im Großen und Ganzen korrekt, sie gilt aber nicht mehr. Zwar sind gewalttätige Zusammenbrüche und *coups d'état* auch weiterhin möglich, doch wird zunehmend deutlicher, dass die Gefahren, von denen die Demokratie heute bedroht wird, ganz anderer Art sind und dass sie – paradoxerweise – gerade im normalen Funktionieren der demokratischen Institutionen ihren Ursprung haben. Die antidemokratischen Kräfte sickern in das demokratische System ein und machen sich daran, es nach und nach zu kapern, indem sie es hartnäckig und mehr oder weniger verstohlen mit legalen Mitteln und ohne Verfassungsänderungen entkernen. Irgendwann kommt der Moment, in dem die bestehende politische Ordnung, ohne dass sie aufgehört hätte, formal weiter eine Demokratie zu sein, all das eingebüßt hat, was eine Demokratie inhaltlich ausmacht, und zwar sowohl auf das Leben der einzelnen Menschen bezogen, als auch auf die politischen Organisationen. Schließlich beginnen sich die Individuen wie auch die Organisationen so zu verhalten, als lebten sie unter einer Diktatur. Die folgende Darstellung beschreibt vier Hauptkomponenten dieses Prozesses.

1. Autokraten wählen

Von den USA über die Philippinen bis zur Türkei, Russland, Ungarn und Polen haben wir die demokratische Wahl autoritärer Politiker er-

lebt, die sich – obschon sie Ausbund des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Establishment sind – als anti-systemische und anti-politische Kräfte geben und ihre Widersacher beleidigen, weil diese angeblich korrupt und somit Feinde sind, die gestürzt werden müssen. Sie lehnen die Regeln der Demokratie ab, machen einschüchternde Vorschläge für die gewaltsame Lösung sozialer Probleme, protzen mit ihrer Verachtung für die Pressefreiheit und versprechen eine Aufhebung von Gesetzen, die die gesellschaftlichen Rechte von Arbeitern und von all jenen garantieren, die aus ethnischen, sexuellen oder religiösen Gründen diskriminiert werden. Kurz gesagt: Sie bewerben sich zur Wahl auf der Grundlage einer antidemokratischen Ideologie – und schaffen es dennoch, sich eine Mehrheit der Stimmen zu sichern. Autokratische Politiker hat es schon immer gegeben. Neu ist jedoch, wie oft es ihnen heutzutage gelingt, an die Macht zu kommen.

2. Der plutokratische Virus

Geld beeinflusst Wahlen und demokratische Prozesse in einem alarmierenden Maße. Man muss sich in vielen Fällen sogar fragen, ob Wahlen wirklich frei und fair sind und ob politische Entscheidungsträger von ihrer Überzeugung geleitet werden oder vom Geld, das man ihnen zahlt. Die liberale Demokratie beruht auf der Annahme, dass Bürger den Zugang zu einer wohlinformierten öffentlichen Meinung haben, auf deren Basis sie ihre politischen Herrscher frei wählen und deren Leistung beurteilen können. Damit das möglich ist, muss der Markt der politischen Ideen (das heißt der Werte, die von tiefsitzenden Überzeugungen getragen sind und in diesem Sinne keinen Preis haben) vom Markt der wirtschaftlichen Güter (das heißt der Werte, die einen Preis haben und auf dessen Basis ge- und verkauft werden) ganz und gar getrennt sein. Neuerdings sind diese beiden Märkte unter der Ägide der Ökonomie zu einem einzigen verschmolzen, sodass sich auch in der Politik alles kaufen und verkaufen lässt. Korruption ist zu einem endemischen Phänomen geworden.

Die antidemokratischen Kräfte sickern in das demokratische System ein und machen sich daran, es nach und nach zu kapern.

In der Welt von heute haben die Finanzierung von Parteien und Kandidaten in Wahlkampagnen sowie das Lobbying in Parlamenten und Regierungen in vielen Ländern eine zentrale Bedeutung für das politische Leben gewonnen. Mit seiner Entscheidung *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* von 2010 hat der US Supreme Court der amerikanischen Demokratie einen schweren Schlag versetzt und die unbegrenzte private Finanzierung von Wahlen und politischen Entscheidungen durch große Unternehmen und Superreiche erlaubt. Daher rührt das Phänomen *Dark Money,* das nichts anderes beschreibt als legalisierte Korruption.

3. *Fake News* und Algorithmen

Für eine Weile schien es, als ob das Internet und die sozialen Netzwerke, die es hervorgebracht hat, eine beispiellose Ausweitung der Bürgerbeteiligung an der Demokratie ermöglichen würden. Im Lichte dessen, was gegenwärtig in den USA und in Brasilien geschieht, lässt sich behaupten, dass sie – solange nicht richtig reguliert – eher die Totengräber der Demokratie sein werden. Ich spiele damit auf zwei besondere Phänomene an. *Fake News* hat es in tief gespaltenen Gesellschaften, gerade in Zeiten politischer Rivalität, immer gegeben. Heutzutage aber hat das destruktive Potential solcher Falschnachrichten durch Desinformation und die Verbreitung von Lügen schlicht alarmierende Ausmaße angenommen. Das ist besonders gravierend in Ländern wie Indien und Brasilien, wo soziale Netzwerke, vor allem WhatsApp (dessen Inhalte wegen der verwendeten Verschlüsselung die am wenigsten kontrollierbaren von allen sind), so weit verbreitet sind, dass sie die Haupt-, wenn nicht gar die einzigen Informationsquellen der Bürger sind (Brasilien hat 120 Millionen WhatsApp-Nutzer).

Dieser destruktive Effekt wird weiter verstärkt durch ein anderes Werkzeug: Algorithmen. Trotz ihrer scheinbaren Neutralität und Objektivität basieren Algorithmen auf subjektiven Meinungen, die diesen Kalkulationen versteckt zugrunde liegen. Wenn Unternehmen aber gezwungen werden sollen, solche Kriterien offenzulegen, berufen sie sich auf das Geschäftsgeheimnis. Im Bereich der Politik ermöglichen Algorithmen eine bewusste Resonanz und Verstärkung von Themen, die in den Netzwerken weit verbreitet sind und einfach deshalb als relevant eingestuft werden, weil sie populär sind. Es kann somit passieren, dass das, was vielfach verbreitet wird, das Resultat einer breit angelegten Desinformationskampagne ist, die von Roboter-Netzwerken und automatischen Benutzerkonten ausgeführt wird. Diese versenden Falschnachrichten und Kommentare zugunsten oder zuungunsten eines bestimmten Kandidaten an Millionen von Nutzern, womit sich ein Thema künstlich populär machen lässt. Ein Algorithmus unterscheidet nicht zwischen wahr und falsch, und die Effekte all dessen sind noch destruktiver in einer Umgebung, wo Menschen besonders anfällig sind für Lügen. Auf diese Weise wurden in jüngster Zeit die Wahlpräferenzen in 17 Ländern manipuliert, einschließlich der USA (zugunsten von Donald Trump) und Brasiliens (zugunsten von Bolsonaro). Das Ausmaß dieser Beeinflussung könnte sich als fatal für die Demokratie erweisen.

4. Das Kapern von Institutionen

Der Einfluss autoritärer und antidemokratischer Verfahren auf Institutionen erfolgt schrittweise, aber stetig. Die Präsidenten und Parlamente, die unter den Auspizien des eben beschriebenen neuen Schwindels (Schwindel 2.0) gewählt wurden, haben freie Hand, die demokratischen Institutionen zu instrumentalisieren, und sie machen großzügig Gebrauch davon, angeblich innerhalb der Grenzen des Gesetzes und der Verfassung, ganz egal wie offensichtlich die Verstöße und wie verdreht die Interpretationen auch sind. Brasilien hat sich neuerdings in ein gewaltiges Laboratorium für die autoritäre Manipulation der Rechtmäßigkeit verwandelt. Nur dieses Kapern der Institutionen hat es möglich gemacht, dass der Neo-Faschist Bolsonaro zum Präsidenten gewählt werden konnte. Wie schon in anderen Ländern war das Justizsystem die erste Institution, die gekapert wurde. Der Grund ist ein doppelter: Einerseits weil es die Institution ist, deren politische Macht am weitesten entfernt ist von der Wahlpolitik, andererseits weil diese souveräne Institution unter Verfassungsgesichtspunkten als „neutraler Schlichter" angesehen wird. Wie wird die brasilianische Demokratie aussehen, wenn ein solches Kapern des Rechtssystems durchgeht und in dessen Gefolge auch das Kapern anderer Institutionen möglich macht? Wird Brasilien noch eine Demokratie sein? ◁

Aus dem Englischen von Ludger Hagedorn.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos ist Professor für Soziologie an der Universität von Coimbra (Portugal) sowie Distinguished Legal Scholar an der University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Parteiendemokratie vs. Populistische Demokratie

VON NADIA URBINATI



© ÖNB / Sammlung Rainer Hubert

Lähmung des österreichischen Reichsrates durch absichtliche und massive Störungen der Sitzungen durch Mitglieder des Reichsrates, 8. Juni 1900 (Ausschnitt).

Parteien gehören zu den wichtigsten Neuerungen, zu denen die repräsentative Demokratie imstande war. Sie sorgen dafür, dass die Spielregeln funktionieren und Bestand haben. Sie vereinen und trennen Bürger gleichzeitig, je nach den politischen Vorhaben, die nicht notwendigerweise darauf beschränkt sind, hier und jetzt eine Mehrheit zu erlangen – so wie es Parteien nicht nur darum geht, zu regieren, sondern auch, repräsentative Forderungen und Vorhaben ins Parlament einzubringen. Parteien im Parlament oder im Kongress haben auch dann wichtige Funktionen, wenn sie in der Minderheit sind: Sie nehmen Einfluss auf Gesetzentwürfe, kontrollieren und überwachen die Mehrheit und streben danach, ihre Sache dahingehend zu vertreten, dass sie bei Bürgern und Wählern mehr Zustimmung finden. Zudem halten sie bei diesen die Aufmerksamkeit dafür wach, was Institutionen tun oder verabsäumen zu tun.

Doch die Parteiendemokratie steht auch für eine ganz bestimmte Konzeption von Politik: Eine, die sowohl bei der Auswahl der Prioritäten wie auch bei der Berücksichtigung der Entscheidungen und Verhaltensweisen der Gewählten parteiisch ist. Die Entstehung von Parteien ging nicht zufällig mit der Praxis des Wettstreits um Wählerstimmen einher. In diesem Sinne schrieb Elmer Eric Schattschneider: „Die Parteien schufen die Demokratie, oder vielleicht genauer: die moderne Demokratie ist ein Nebenprodukt des Parteienwettstreits."[1] Wegen dieser gleichzeitigen Entstehung von Parteien und repräsentativer Demokratie sind Parteien nicht nur eine Form politischer Vereinigung neben anderen, sondern eine, die nach Macht strebt, entweder nach einer Regierungsmehrheit oder nach der Kontrolle und Beeinflussung der Gesetzgebung.

Der Antiparteienaffekt des Populismus

Der Populismus ist eine Revolte gegen die pluralistische Struktur der Parteienbeziehungen, allerdings nicht im Namen einer „parteilosen Demokratie", sondern im Namen des „Parts", der bevorzugte Anerkennung verdient, weil er *objektiv gesehen* der „gute" Part ist – denn seine Identität ist nicht das Ergebnis ideologischer Konstruktion oder parteiischer Ansichten, sondern der Zusammenführung der Forderungen des Volkes. Dieses Argument macht den Unterschied zwischen Parteiendemokratie und populistischer Demokratie deutlich. Die populistische Bewegung nimmt für sich in Anspruch, eine simple und objektive Repräsentation der Bedürfnisse des „wahren" Volkes im Hier und Jetzt zu sein, während Parteien und Parteiführer ihre Programme und Lösungen in eine mehr oder weniger ferne Zukunft projizieren. Ökonomen und Politikwissenschaftler haben die „Unverantwortlichkeit" populistischer Anführer und „die tiefgreifende Verbindung zwischen den auf kurzfristigen Schutz ausgerichteten Merkmalen populistischer Politik und dem Angebot einer gegen die Eliten gerichteten Rhetorik" betont. Die „Unverantwortlichkeit" populistischer Anführer ist Ergebnis einer Antiestablishmentlogik, aber auch des Niedergangs organisierter Parteien. Sie übersetzt sich in eine unverantwortliche populisti-

Die „Unverantwortlichkeit" populistischer Anführer ist Ergebnis einer Antiestablishmentlogik, aber auch des Niedergangs organisierter Parteien.

sche Regierung, weil es in ihrem Programm an der Sorge um die künftigen Konsequenzen ihrer politischen Entscheidungen fehlt. Unter Verwendung eines Begriffs von Jürgen Habermas würde ich dieses Phänomen als „populistische Kurzfristorientierung" bezeichnen. Wenn der Populismus einen „utopischen" (im Grunde aber „myopischen") Kern besitzt, dann besteht dieser Kern gerade in der Verbindung von einem Antiparteienaffekt und der Politik der „objektiven" Realität des wahren Volkes hier und jetzt.

Für eine Revitalisierung politischer Parteien

Die repräsentative Demokratie lebt von individueller Autonomie, rationalen Problemerörterungen und deren Bewertung im Hinblick auf allen zustehende Rechte. Sie lebt auch von der Tolerierung und Akzeptanz eines Pluralismus von Ideen und Interpretationen. Keine Partei nimmt für sich in Anspruch, nur die Interessen des Teils zu vertreten, auf den sie sich unmittelbar stützt; und keine Partei verwechselt die Duldung anderer Parteien mit Laxheit, Gleichgültigkeit oder Unterstützung für deren Ziele. Toleranz (und damit Pluralismus) schließt Unnachgiebigkeit nicht aus. Die repräsentative Demokratie verlangt nicht nur rationale Debatten und die Akzeptanz entgegengesetzter oder schlicht anderer Ansichten (insbesondere auf institutioneller Ebene), sondern auch ein mehr als rationales Beharren oder funktionalistisches Berechnen der Interessen auf Seiten der Bürger. Sie beruht, so könnte man sagen, auf einer strukturellen Asymmetrie zwischen Rationalisierung und leidenschaftlicher Beharrlichkeit. Diese ermöglicht ein Gleichgewicht, das fragil ist und seinerseits von der Stärke parteiischen Engagements zeugt.

Die politischen Parteien waren die Akteure der Umwandlung dieser Asymmetrie in jenes komplexe System, das dafür sorgt, dass Gesellschaft und Regierung auch dank einer Pluralität repräsentativer Akteure interagieren und sich wechselseitig beeinflussen. Ziel dabei war es, plebiszitäre Formen von Politik zu vermeiden, ohne die Menschen aus der Politik zu drängen; zu Parteilichkeit zu inspirieren, ohne Loyalitäten zu fundamentalistischen Interpreten von Werten werden zu lassen, so als seien sie die Werte des Volkes insgesamt; und schließlich den Aufstieg personalisierter Führerschaft oder eine Celebrity-und-Publikum-Politik zu verhindern – eine Verhinderungsstrategie, die vor allem in einer parlamentarischen Demokratie von überragender Bedeutung ist. Parteien sollen deshalb nicht nur die Massen mittels Oligarchien im Zaum halten. Sie sind auch, und dies ist vielleicht noch wichtiger, ein Mittel, um solitäre Anführer zu zähmen und in ihre Schranken zu weisen, deren Machtstreben, wie Niccolò Machiavelli gezeigt hat, gleich destabilisierend sein kann wie führerlose Massen. Die Errichtung dieser komplexen Architektur ist das Meisterstück der Parteiendemokratie, die somit beschrieben werden kann als das eifrige Bemühen, eine Politik zu verhindern, die nur auf zwei Säulen ruht: dem Volk und dem Führer. Die Parteiendemokratie pluralisiert die politische Sphäre und artikuliert Gesellschaft, um genau diesen schlichten Dualismus zu verhindern. Ohne organisierte Parteien beziehungsweise mit Parteien, die nur über eine lockere Organisationsstruktur verfügen, tendiert die Wahldemokratie dazu, ein plebiszitärer Schritt hin zur Auswahl und Krönung eines Führers zu werden, der durch die breite Masse exorbitante Macht genießt und dem allein das Ausmaß seiner Popularität Grenzen setzt.

Wir haben keinen Grund zur Annahme, dass zur Neutralisierung des Populismus der Ausschluss populistischer Bewegungen aus dem politischen Wettstreit und dem Kampf um Wählerstimmen erforderlich wäre. Andererseits dürfen wir nicht schlussfolgern, dass nunmehr alle Parteien populistisch werden sollten oder dass nur ein Linkspopulismus in der Lage wäre, den Rechtspopulismus zu besiegen. Weder eine militant kämpferische Demokratie noch ein Hyperpopulismus können die Lösung sein. Die Lösung für das Problem der Schwächung von repräsentativer Demokratie und Parteienlegitimität kann nur aus einem Prozess der Revitalisierung und Rekonstruktion politischer Parteien erwachsen. ◁

1) Elmer Eric Schattschneider: *Party Government. American Government in Action*, New Brunswick—London, 2009.

Aus dem Englischen von Andreas Wirthensohn.

Nadia Urbinati ist Professorin für Politische Theorie an der Columbia University.

Populism and Its Progressive Potential

BY CHANTAL MOUFFE

To adequately address the question of populism, it is first necessary to discard the simplistic vision propagated by the media, presenting populism as mere demagogy and to adopt an analytical perspective. I propose to follow Ernesto Laclau, who in *The Populist Reason* defines populism as a way to construct the political frontier we/them by appealing to the mobilization of the 'underdog' against 'those in power'. It emerges when one aims at building a new subject of collective action—the people—capable of reconfiguring a social order lived as unfair. Populism, he insists, is not an ideology or a political regime, and it does not have a specific programmatic content. It is a way of doing politics, a strategy, which can take various forms, depending on the periods and the places and it is compatible with different forms of government.

Some populisms have led to fascist regimes but there are many other forms, and it is a mistake to affirm that all of them are incompatible with the existence of liberal democratic institutions. Indeed, this type of mobilization can have democratizing results. In fact, populism constitutes one important dimension of democracy since it refers to the dimension of popular sovereignty and the construction of a demos that is constitutive of democracy.

Post-politics as a threat to democracy

Scrutinizing the growth of a populist type of politics in Europe we ascertain that it is due to the convergence of several phenomena that, in recent years, have affected the conditions in which democracy is exercised in our societies. The first phenomenon that I call 'post-politics', refers to the blurring of political frontiers between right and left. It is the result of the consensus established between the parties of the center-right and center-left on the idea that there is no alternative to neo-liberal globalization. Under the pretext of 'modernization' imposed by globalization, social-democratic parties have accepted the *diktats* of financial capitalism and the limits they imposed to state intervention and their redistributive policies. The role of parliaments and institutions that allow citizens to influence political decisions has been drastically reduced. Elections no longer offer any opportunity to decide on real alternatives through the traditional parties of 'government' and citizens have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their democratic rights. Popular sovereignty, the notion that constitutes the very heart of the democratic ideal: the power of people has been declared obsolete, and democracy has been reduced to its liberal component. Politics has become a mere technical issue of managing the established order, a domain reserved for experts. The only thing that post-politics allows is a bipartisan alternation of power between the center-right and center-left parties. All those who oppose this 'consensus in the center' are disqualified as 'populists' and accused of being 'extremists'.

Elections no longer offer any opportunity to decide on real alternatives.

These changes at the political level have taken place within the context of a 'neo-liberal' hegemonic formulation, characterized by a form of regulation of capitalism in which the role of financial capital is central. We have seen an exponential increase in inequality affecting not only the working-class, but also a great part of the middle-classes who have entered a process of pauperization and precarization. We are clearly witnessing a process of 'oligarchization' of Western societies. Centre-left parties have abandoned the struggle for equality and their main slogans are now about 'choice' and 'fairness'. The two democratic ideals of equality and popular sovereignty have been relinquished and it can be said that now we live in 'post-democratic' societies. To be sure, 'democracy' is still spoken of, but only to indicate universal suffrage and respect of the majority rule.

This evolution, far from being a progress towards a more mature society, as it is sometimes claimed, undermines the very foundations of our Western model of democracy, usually designated as 'liberal democracy'. As C.B. MacPherson has shown, that model was the result of the articulation between two traditions. The first one is the liberal tradition of the rule of law, separation of powers and the affirmation of individual freedom. And the second one is the democratic tradition of equality and popular sovereignty. No doubt, these two political logics are ultimately irreconcilable and there will always be a tension between the principles of freedom and equality. But as I have argued in *The Democratic Paradox* that tension is constitutive of our democratic model because it provides the space the agonistic confrontation and it guarantees pluralism. Throughout European history, this tension has been negotiated through an 'agonistic' struggle between the 'right', which favors liberty, and the 'left', which emphasizes equality. In recent years with the hegemony of neo-liberalism the left/right frontier have been blurred and the space has disappeared where that agonistic confrontation between adversaries could take place. A characteristic of our post-democratic conditions is that democratic aspirations can no longer find channels of expression within the traditional political framework. The passion for equality, which according to Tocqueville, is the democratic passion par excellence does not find a political terrain where it can be channeled towards emancipatory goals.

Populism as a challenge

It is in such a context that various populist movements have emerged rejecting post-politics and post-democracy. They claim to give back to the people the voice that has been confiscated by the elites. Regardless of the problematic forms that some of these movements do take, it is important to recognize that they are the expression of legitimate democratic aspirations which unfortunately are expressed in a xenophobic vocabulary. This possibility for democratic demands to be constructed in a xenophobic way is something that most parties are unable to comprehend due to their essentialist approach. This is why I submit that, without adopting an anti-essentialist discursive approach, it is not possible to grasp the nature of the populist challenge. This challenge requires acknowledging that the 'people' as a political category can be constructed in very different ways and that not all of them are of a progressive orientation. Indeed, in several European countries, the aspiration for recovering the democratic ideals of equality and popular sovereignty, discarded under post-democracy, has been captured by right-wing populist parties. They have successfully mobilized common affects in view of constructing a people whose voice calls for a democracy aimed at exclusively defending the interests of those considered 'true nationals'. They construct the people through an ethno-nationalist discourse that excludes immigrants, considered as a threat to national identity and prosperity.

Towards a left-wing populism

It is urgent to realize that it is the absence of a narrative offering a different vocabulary to formulate these democratic demands which explains the success of right-wing populism in a growing number of social sectors. What is needed is another narrative embodied in an ensemble of practices providing the discursive inscriptions able to foster other forms of identifications. Disqualifying those parties as 'extreme-right' or 'neo-fascist' is an easy way to dismiss their demands, refusing to acknowledge the democratic dimension of many of them. Attributing their appeal to lack of education or to the influence of atavistic factors is of course especially convenient for the forces of the center. It permits them to avoid recognizing their own responsibility in their emergence. Their answer is to protect the 'good democrats' against the danger of 'irrational' passions by establishing a 'moral' frontier so as to exclude the 'extremists' from the democratic debate. This strategy of demonization of the 'enemies' of the bi-partisan consensus might be morally comforting, but it is politically disempowering.

Instead of denigrating those demands, the task is to formulate them in a progressive way, defining the adversary as the configuration of forces that strengthen and promote the neo-liberal project. The strategy to combat right-wing populism should consist in promoting a progressive populist movement, a left-wing populism that is receptive to those democratic aspirations, and that through the construction of another people will mobilize common affects toward a defense of equality and social justice. ◁

Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Westminster and a Albert Hirschman Visiting Fellow at the IWM. This articles is based on her Patočka Memorial Lecture 2017.

Translating the Rule of Law in Bangladesh

BY TOBIAS BERGER

In most of the world, state courts exist side by side with non-state justice institutions like informal courts. Recently, such informal courts have attracted the attention of international agencies who see them as possible sites for the promotion of international norms like the rule of law and human rights. Yet what happens when international norms enter a complex legal landscape in which the state is just one of many actors?

In most of the world, the majority of legal disputes are not actually addressed in state courts; or at least not in state courts alone. Instead, people appeal to a complex assemblage of state and non-state courts. These non-state courts have recently attracted the attention of international donor agencies. Donors consider non-state courts to be fast, efficient, and—above all—highly popular; they are legitimate in the eyes of the people who use them. At the same time, non-state courts are often criticized by human rights activists for their non-conformity with international human rights standards, their patriarchal biases, and their tendency to perpetuate rather than challenge local power relations. International donors now seek to rescue the seeming advantages of non-state courts from their perceived shortcomings.

Photo: Activating Village Courts in Bangladesh Phase II Project

Village Court Assistant (VCA) facilitates courtyard session for raising awareness on village courts among community people particularly women, poor and disadvantaged groups.

The largest attempt to use non-state courts to promote human rights and the rule of law as it exists anywhere in the world today is the project "Activating the Village Courts in Bangladesh", (AVCB) which started in 2010 and is currently in its second project phase. During the first phase, the European Union allocated 10 million Euros to "activate" 500 so-called village courts in Bangladesh. With technical assistance from UNDP, which developed training materials and various communications strategies, the project was implemented by four local NGOs working in four different regions of the country.

The village courts

The village courts were initially established in 1919 by the British colonial administration in what was then the Province of Bengal to tighten the control of the colonial state over the rural population while, at the same time, reducing the case load in the colonial courts. Although updated through the Village Court Acts of 1976 and 2006 as well as a further Amendment in 2013, the village courts never took root in the actual practices of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh. Until recently, the village courts have thus primarily exited on paper.

Designed as a semi-formal institution, the village courts are recognized by the state if they adhere to a number of procedural and substantial provisions. Although their verdicts in minor civil and criminal cases are recognized by the state and can be enforced through state agencies like the local police, their formal set-up strongly resembles the logic of informal courts in rural Bangladesh. The village courts are comprised of a five-member jury with a local elected politician—the *Union Parishad* Chairman—as its head. In addition, each of the conflicting parties nominates two representatives to help settle the dispute. Decisions passed by a 3:2 majority can be appealed in lower courts of the state; any other decision, for example if passed unanimously or by a 4:1 majority, cannot be appealed and is only subject to revision by the judges in the state's civil and criminal courts in case of a "failure of justice".

The international donors now turning to the village courts as possible sites for the promotion of human rights and the rule of law emphasize their reconciliatory character, because the village courts cannot issue punishments or fines, but only compensatory payments of currently up to 75.000 Thaka (approximately 750 Euro). To "activate" these courts, the four local NGOs employ over 1000 members of staff at grassroots level. In each village where a court was to be activated, one fieldworker was responsible for the dissemination of information about the village courts and one court assistant had the task of ensuring the proper functioning of the activated courts. In my research, I followed these fieldworker and court assistants in rural Bangladesh for a total of eight months to see what happens when international donors intervene in non-state justice institutions.

"The rule of law" in translation

My research showed that the work of the local fieldworker and court assistants results in two kinds of changes: on the one hand, they change the dynamics of local conflict resolution in favor of poor and marginalized people. Through the village courts, poor and marginalized people get access to local elites they would not have otherwise have had; and this access, in turn, significantly improves their standing in the resolution of conflicts.

On the other hand, they also change ideas about "the rule of law" in ways that resonate in rural Bangladesh. I have analyzed these changes as acts of translation. Three translations stand out.

Firstly, the fieldworkers and court assistants translate the institution of the village courts. Whereas international donors want to approximate the village courts to the lowest tier of the state judiciary and highlight the importance of adherence to all substantial and procedural requirements of the Village Courts Act, the grassroots level employees of the project integrate the village courts into the universe of informal justice institution in rural Bangladesh. They thus follow the socio-legal realities of rural Bangladesh more closely than the formal legal requirements of village court justice.

Secondly, they also translate a key practice associated with "the rule of law"—the production of written documentation of court proceedings. To ensure the orderly facilitation of village court, both international donor agencies and the Bangladeshi state rely on a myriad of forms. Whereas the state provides no less than eleven different forms for recording village court cases, the European Union and UNDP have provided an additional thirteen forms needed for project documentation. Together, the 24 forms constitute the bureaucratic backbone of the village courts. Yet, more than using these forms for the transparent documentation of village court proceedings, the fieldworkers know how to use them as symbolic capital. In rural Bangladesh, official documents, endowed with the insignia of the state—like ministerial emblems, stamps, and carefully crafted signatures of high- and low-ranking bureaucrats—are difficult to obtain. Transport costs to the nearest city, as well as intermediaries and occasional bribes have to be paid to obtain passports, birth certificates, land titles, or other official documents. By providing village courts claimants with official paperwork, the fieldworkers give access to official documents to people for whom such access would have been difficult. This, in turn, raises the claimants' status and significantly improves their standing in processes of conflict resolution.

Thirdly, the fieldworkers and court assistants translate the normative vocabularies in which "the rule of law" is embedded. Whereas international donor agencies understand the rule of law in ostensibly liberal terms, highlighting human rights and reconciliation between individuals, the fieldworkers and court assistants introduce the village courts in rather different normative vocabularies. They advocate specific interpretations of Islamic law to reduce the possibility of arbitrary divorce and improve the standing of women in family conflicts. They also advance specific interpretations of community harmony and reconciliation. Here, the notion of reconciliation changes: instead of reconciling two individuals, as international donors imagine based on their experiences with mechanisms of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Western Europe and North America, the fieldworkers and court assistants promote reconciliation at community level. Reconciling conflicts and thus recreating harmony among village communities is an ambiguous endeavor, as it constantly runs the danger of re-creating, and potentially even strengthening, hierarchical relationships. Yet it also often supports marginalized people in their demands for inclusion into the community that is to be reconciled.

Overall, the project thus succeeds in altering established patterns of conflict resolution in rural Bangladesh. But it does so only because the grassroots level employees of local NGOs alter notions of "the rule of law" in far more radical ways than their international donors anticipated. ◁

Tobias Berger is Juniorprofessor for Political Science with reference to the Transnational Politics of the Global South at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Freie Universität Berlin. In 2016 he was a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM. His book *Global Norms and Local Courts. Translating the Rule of Law in Bangladesh* was published by Oxford University Press in 2017.



Why Did Syrians Rebel?

BY ADAM BACZKO, GILLES DORRONSORO AND ARTHUR QUESNAY

Eight years after the beginning of the civil war in Syria, it is worth remembering how it started. To account for the initial protests in 2011 presupposes supplying answers to three linked questions: what was the situation in Syria and how did the regime function before 2011? How did a mass protest movement emerge? And how, finally, did it turn into generalized violence?

Photo: ARIS MESSINIS / AFP / picturedesk.com

Interpretations of the 2011 crisis largely depend on understanding the Syrian regime, especially its transformation during the 2000s. Did we see, as many experts suggest, a transition towards a less directly coercive, more accommodating power? And what was the level of support and acceptance of this domination within the population?

The Baathist State is one of the most violent contemporary regimes. In 1982, the Hama massacre (between 10,000 and 40,000 killed) had clearly shown a power waging war on its people. The tracking down, imprisonment and systematic torture of its opponents were the routine practices of an insecure regime. On the international scene, Damascus had a track record of colluding with violent networks (the terrorist Carlos, Palestinian factions, jihadists in Iraq) and of engaging in political assassinations (of the French ambassador Louis Delamare in 1981, the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005). Yet, the coming to power of Bashar al-Assad in 2000 had seemed like a turning point, at least on the socio-economic level. As part of a process of adapting to economic realities, the regime had initiated a relative liberalization, leading, as some would have it, to a control of society through a new political economy. In addition, various academics detected a contract (albeit implicit) that allowed certain social fields including the religious one a degree of autonomy. The prevailing hypothesis held that this was a form of control at once more indirect and more targeted in its violence.

"A state of barbary" or "upgraded authoritarianism"?

Consequently, the question of the acceptance of this regime was framed in new terms. The mechanisms by which this authoritarian regime penetrated and controlled society gave the impression of a stabilized system. Thus, the transgressive acts of the 1980s and 1990s described by Lisa Wedeen—derision, diversion or escapism—that continued under the presidency of Bashar al-Assad rarely excited active opposition. It could therefore be assumed that the regime had found a degree of acceptance and that the population co-produced the power that oppressed it. However, empirical verification of these hypotheses was problematic, since authoritarian societies are notoriously difficult to research and the internalization of domination is a complicated hypothesis to demonstrate in routine situations. A rational choice-based approach could explain the absence of challenge as stemming instead from an analysis of the risks created by repression. The theories of hegemony and rational choice converged for different reasons to reach the same conclusion. A revolt was unlikely in 2011, either because the regime and society had managed to find a *modus vivendi,* the State had established a hegemonic domination, or resistance was simply too risky. This was the consensus of Syria specialists on the cusp of the Arab spring.

Ultimately, the 2011 crisis allows *a posteriori* a better understanding of the functioning of the Syrian regime. Indeed, we witnessed mobilizations on a remarkable scale: hundreds of thousands of people marched for months in the face of repression; but, unlike other Arab Springs, the regime did not fall. This leads us to several observations. First, the rapid development of the protests shows that the regime had failed to impose a hegemonic relationship on the population. It also leads us to question the assumption of the regime's domination via the political economy. In fact, the repressive apparatus did retain a primary role, but as a deterrent. A rational choice theory would therefore seem a better explanation for the lack of opposition. However, this approach fails to account for the mobilization of the protesters in 2011 despite the heavy risks confronting them.

The 2011 protests and its repression

From our point of view, the peaceful protests and the transition to civil war can be explained via two models: the "mobilization through deliberation" explains the genesis of the protests and is followed by the "polarizing crisis", which accounts for the transition to civil war. Both models derive from the specific organization of pre-revolutionary Syrian society. Indeed, the autonomy of the various fields—political, trade union, economic, religious—was overwhelmingly restricted by a transversal dynamic: the all-pervasive grip of the security apparatus and patronage networks. Government control of the collective actors (unions, parties, associations) was therefore too restrictive for them to play a role in the genesis of the protests. Consequently, the first protests neither started in a specific field (union or political) nor were they relayed by any institution in particular.

The initial mobilizations were primarily the result of personal engagement and were relatively independent of social position and sectarian affiliations (both religious and ethnic). Informal discussions triggered by events in Tunisia and Egypt were at the root of the mobilization. These discussions led to a transformation in the perception of political opportunities, regardless of the actual evolution of the Syrian regime. The term "Arab Spring," jointly constructed by the media and the protesters, promoted the identification of the Assad regime with other Arab regimes that were overthrown. Even if this term glossed over significant differences between the regimes, it was performative and played an important role in individual engagement. Moreover, many of the debates took place in private or semi-private spaces (small groups, over the Internet) providing some degree of security. This site of deliberation was strategic, as it created not only spaces for exchanging information, but also for assessing risk and building a collective project. The continuous reevaluation of the context of any action, the emotional intensity of the discussions and the definition of collective good melded in a circular relationship. This model also explains how the protests could persist for months, with informal groups transforming over time into revolutionary networks.

During these deliberations, stakeholders defined the meaning of the conflict, often incorporating ideas and arguments from the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. These exchanges created a shared vision as to legitimate means and the nature of the claims. First, the agendas were nationwide, inclusive and humanist, transcending any local or sectarian solidarity. Refusal to accept socioeconomic concessions from the regime, as well as the political and moral slogans and symbols, suggest that the protesters were engaged in a "struggle for recognition" that for a time transcended sectarian and social divides. Personal or sectional interests faded from mobilizing rhetoric in favor of quite abstract collective goals. As in other revolutionary situations (Afghanistan in 1979 and Libya in 2011), sectarian and ethnic oppositions temporarily lose power because of individual commitments to universal ideas. The deliberation on ends is inextricable from a discussion of means. The reference to the Arab Spring assumed peaceful demonstration, a stance that would continue for months despite the violence of the repression.

Far from negotiating, ceding or managing the repression *a minima,* the regime exacerbated the crisis with a strategy of unbridled violence. This polarizing approach was made possible by the cohesion of institutions dominated by the security apparatus, which was tightening its grip on all fields. By designating the protesters as internal enemies, the regime legitimized its use of violence. By contrast, in Tunisia and Egypt, the protests succeeded in paralyzing institutions and toppling regimes. In Syria, lacking any institutional relay and faced with increasingly violent repression, the protesters were forced into armed struggle. ◁

Adam Baczko is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the ERC Programme Social Dynamics of Civil Wars at the Pantheon-Sorbonne University, Paris. In 2015 he was a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM. With **Gilles Dorronsoro** (Professor of Political Science and P.I. of the ERC Programme Social Dynamics of Civil Wars, Pantheon-Sorbonne University) and **Arthur Quesnay** (Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the ERC Programme Social Dynamics of Civil Wars at the Pantheon-Sorbonne University), he co-authored the book *Civil War in Syria* (Cambridge University Press, 2018). He has conducted field research in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo.



The New Bacterial Warfare

INTERVIEW WITH VINH-KIM NGUYEN BY JULIA SICA

Warzones in the Middle East have led to geopolitical instability, displacement and human suffering. An unnoticed side-effect of these conflicts that have destroyed medical infrastructure is an alarming surge of multidrug-resistant infections. These diseases affect not only civilian populations in Syria, Iraq and Yemen but also members of foreign armed forces, thus spreading globally. Vinh-Kim Nguyen is a practicing medical doctor and an anthropologist who draws on molecular epidemiology, global health, and social theory to argue for a paradigm shift in eliminating infectious diseases. In a conversation with IWM Rector Shalini Randeria, he discussed the causes and consequences of this emerging global threat in the wake of the wars in the Middle East at the Vienna Humanities Festival. This interview with Julia Sica was conducted during his stay in Vienna and published in Der Standard *on October 4, 2018.*



Acinetobacter baumannii is an opportunistic bacterium that takes advantage of patients' weakened immune systems to cause pneumonia, wound infection and sepsis.

Photo: Public Health Image Library / Janice Carr

Julia Sica: For a long time, your research focused on HIV infection, especially in West Africa. How did you come to analyze antibiotic resistance in the Middle East?

Vinh-Kim Nguyen: The story starts with one of my former students, Omar Dewachi, an Iraqi who works—also as both an anthropologist and a physician—in Beirut. Around ten years ago, when many Iraqis fled to Lebanon, he met a lot of wounded patients. Many of these had infections that couldn't be treated by antibiotics. That's when Omar asked me for help.

Sica: Which pathogens were involved?

Nguyen: The bacterium that we found in very many of these cases is called *Acinetobacter baumanii*. It's rather immobile—a very lazy, fat bacterium that just sits in the soil and absorbs resistance genes from other bacteria. It's not very aggressive, but when antibiotics are used it's often the only one that survives because it can draw on its archive of collected resistance genes. You could call it an opportunistic organism which only causes infections in people who are very sick or have very bad injuries.

Sica: Perhaps not a very surprising find among wounded and exhausted Iraqi refugees.

Nguyen: When we checked the literature, we found that it had often been described in the context of American military personnel who had picked up the infection in Iraq. That's why the bacterium was nicknamed *Iraqibacter,* which is a problematic term because it implies that the organism originated in Iraq, which is not the case. These soldiers got top medical care, so they survived terrible injuries that were caused, for example, by barrel bombs or IEDs. They survived long enough to get these infections. As a result of this infection a patient's condition can start to deteriorate again, and even lead to the loss of limbs or to death.

Sica: The bacterium also became more common in the Iraqi population.

Nguyen: That's why we began to ask ourselves if there might be a connection to the war or to the use of antibiotics for medical treatment—or if there were other factors, such as environmental ones. Maybe the bacteria were already resistant to antibiotics before they reached the infirmaries. We know from the environmental and veterinary sciences that antibiotics leak into the environment, via sewage or the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry, for example. This effect can be increased during wartime as a result of the destruction of infrastructure. When antibiotics reach the natural environment, the bacteria develop resistance. The ones with the fitting resistance genes survive and become the dominant population.

Photo: kollektiv fischka

Vinj-Kim Nguyen and Shalini Randeria at the Vienna Humanities Festival 2018.

Sica: This is a problem even in Austria.

Nguyen: Many patients from Iraq said that the war had poisoned the environment. There is a high incidence of cancer, and clear evidence that the Americans used depleted uranium in battles in Fallujah. Huge amounts of military ordnance were used, buildings were blown up. Some studies of environmental samples collected in these cities showed that there were more heavy metals in neighborhoods and streets where there had been fighting.

Sica: How do heavy metals affect potential pathogens?

Nguyen: We discovered that heavy metals themselves can increase antibiotic resistance. In other words: the genes which protect bacteria from heavy metals also allow them to resist antibiotics. The increased presence of heavy metals is thus another potential reason for increased resistances. Of course, the evidence is only circumstantial so far. The documented appearance of these effects is currently too closely associated with the war. We are now doing research to try and find out if this phenomenon perhaps pre-dated the war. But it really does seem to be a new development.

Sica: Is it something that can become a threat elsewhere?

Nguyen: What is particularly worrisome is that the genes that cause antibiotic resistance are spreading very rapidly around the world. The bacterium causes very few infections in Western countries, such as in Austria. A couple of years ago we had an outbreak in the hospital I work at in Montreal, and five patients died. That's a relatively small number, but it's still relevant, and we have evidence that *A. baumanii* plays an important epidemiological role.

Sica: What role is that?

Nguyen: The archive of resistant genes that this pathogen collects from other bacteria is a kind of reservoir present in the environment. Unfortunately, the bacterium isn't only able to absorb those genes—it seems that it is also passing them on to other organisms that are much more likely to cause infections in humans, such as E.coli or Pseudomonas.

Sica: What can we do to stop this spread?

Nguyen: The strategy that's generally adopted is called "antibiotic stewardship". It is a program of policies and practices that lead to a limited and very focused use of antibiotics. Instead of giving out antibiotics for a simple cold, they should only be prescribed when absolutely necessary. Their use should also be avoided in agriculture. But antibiotic stewardship is very complicated, because it has to overcome habits, economic interests, and so on. Another challenge is that the places with the poorest antibiotic stewardship are poor countries. There legally sold drugs are often counterfeit or impure, and therefore aid the development of resistances. That's why people tend to turn to the black market. But why should people living in poor countries get fewer antibiotics because we're worried about antibiotic resistance? Why should they be the ones that are penalized for the mistakes we've made? ◁

Vinh-Kim Nguyen studied biology, medicine and medical anthropology in Montreal. He is an emergency physician at the Jewish General Hospital in Montreal and a professor at the University Institute for International and Development Studies in Geneva at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology.

Julia Sica is a freelance science journalist, working for the Austrian daily newspaper *Der Standard,* among others. She studied biological anthropology and comparative literature at the University of Vienna.

„Mach mich rein!“ Aber wovon?

VON VALENTIN GROEBNER

Reinheit ist unverzichtbar – als Wunsch, als Ideal, als Forderung. Und sie ist imaginär: In der sozialen Wirklichkeit und in der Biologie ist sie Fiktion. Trotzdem ist Reinheit eine machtvolle religiöse und moralische Kategorie, im Mittelalter ebenso wie in der Gegenwart. Mit welchen Slogans, Bildern und Erzählungen sie wirksam gemacht wird, ist Gegenstand von Valentin Groebners Buch Wer redet von der Reinheit, *das – basierend auf seinen* IWM Lectures in Human Sciences *– in Zusammenarbeit von IWM und Passagen Verlag im Frühjahr 2019 erschienen ist.*

Auf praktisch jedem Produkt der modernen Warenwelt, das mit dem menschlichen Körper in Berührung kommt oder für den Verzehr bestimmt ist, findet sich auf der Packung ein Hinweis auf Reinheit. Von der Schokolade aus „reiner Alpenmilch“ bis zum Shampoo aus „reinen Bio-Ölen“ – die Liste ist potentiell endlos.

Reinheit ist aber nicht nur ein Slogan, sondern auch ein Wunsch – und ein Dienstleistungsangebot. Die meisten von uns unterziehen sich regelmäßig Ritualen, die sie für sich selbst als Reinigung auffassen: ob wir jetzt fasten oder laufen gehen oder in die Sauna, ob wir in den Bergen wandern oder eine Ayurveda-Kur buchen, ob wir zur Beichte gehen oder zum Gesprächstherapeuten. Wir wollen damit etwas zurückhaben, das wir als unser Eigenes auffassen, als unseren Ursprung oder eigentlichen, kohärenteren Selbstzustand.

Das ist ein bisschen paradox, denn unsere Körper sind (und waren) alles Mögliche, aber nicht rein. Sie und ich haben heute morgen geduscht, wir haben uns die Zähne geputzt und fühlen uns mehr oder weniger sauber. Aber auf jedem Quadratzentimeter meiner Haut – und auf Ihrer auch – wohnen mehrere zehntausend Bakterien, Milben und winzige Spinnentierchen. Jeder Mensch trägt mehrere Billionen Bakterien auf und in sich herum, um ein Vielfaches mehr, als wir an Körperzellen haben. Und nein, die gehen vom Duschen, Gurgeln und Einseifen nicht weg, zum Glück, denn sonst hätten wir sehr rasch ziemlich große Probleme.

Wir sind also nicht nur nicht rein, sondern auch nie allein. Der menschliche Körper ist ein Biotop auf zwei Beinen, eine sehr geräumige Wohngemeinschaft – „Mikrobiom“ ist der Ausdruck, den die Medizin dafür verwendet. Auch abstammungsmäßig sind wir nie rein gewesen. Nicht nur sind alle Menschen auf diesem Planeten ziemlich eng miteinander verwandt, die Vorstellung vermeintlich homogener Rassen ist seit Anfang der 1960er Jahre als wissenschaftlicher Mythos entlarvt. Genetisch gesehen sind wir außerdem noch mit anderen, sehr viel kleineren Lebewesen intensiv vermischt: In unserer DNA steckt ziemlich viel Erbgut, das unsere Vorfahren durch sogenannten horizontalen Gentransfer erworben haben, ohne Sex, sondern durch Bakterien und Retroviren.

Montage: PLAINVIEW / iStock und Jean Fouquet – Jungfrau und Kind / wikipedia

Unschuldig und rein

Die Sprache der Reinheit ist aber so wirkungsmächtig, dass wir uns selbst nicht als von fremden kleinen Körpern bewohnt beschreiben wollen – oder können. Wenn es um Reinheit geht, hat weder die Säkularisierung noch die Entzauberung der Welt stattgefunden, scheint es. Jede Apotheke und jede Drogerie offeriert auf ihren Regalen eine ganze Fülle von Produkten, die ihren Benutzern innere und äußere Reinheit versprechen. Sie heißen dann zum Beispiel *Pure Encapsulations* (ein Vitaminpräparat), *I AM PURE* in Großbuchstaben (ein *Detox*-Shampoo), *Pureté Thermale* (eine „pflegende Reinigungslotion“ in Hellblau oder eine „Reinigungsmilch“ in Weiß) und so weiter. Reden über Reinheit ist Reden über geträumte Anfänge und die Rückkehr dorthin. *Zurück zum Ursprung* heißt die Linie von Bioprodukten einer österreichischen Supermarktkette, und *innocent* nennen sich die naturreinen Obstsäfte eines anderen Anbieters, *bio und fair,* der seine Produkte auf dem Etikett mit einem unübersehbaren Heiligenschein versieht. Das Vokabular, bei dem sich die allermeisten dieser Metaphern bedienen, soll Konsum stimulieren, aber es kommt aus der religiösen Sphäre.

Von der Mutter- zur Schönheitsmilch

Die Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Narrative und visuellen Codes für Reinheit geht fast nahtlos über in ihre Fortsetzungen in der Warenwelt der Moderne. Das Weiße der Milch als Inbegriff der Reinheit wanderte im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung von der Brust auf die Haut. Der Gebrauch von Präparaten für eine möglichst weiße Haut hatte im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert in den Diskussionen um weibliche Schönheit und Frauenporträts eine große Rolle gespielt. Die Rezepturen der *Books of Secrets,* die ab dem Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts zahlungskräftigen Kunden besonders nützliche Anweisungen gaben, finden sich als „Geheimmittel“ in der Werbung für Körperpflege- und Pharmazieprodukte bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts wieder. Im 18. Jahrhundert wurde noch zwischen Mitteln für reine und weiße Haut – *cosmetica medicamenta* – und maskierender Schminke – *comotica ars* – unterschieden. „Kosmetik“ als neuer Begriff für beides zusammen setzte sich im Lauf des 19. Jahrhunderts durch, zusammen mit den ersten Hautcremen und Emulsionen, die als „Schönheitsmilch“ bezeichnet wurden. Sie beruhten auf Zinkoxid-Emulsionen, die am Ende der 1860er und am Beginn der 1870er Jahre auf den Markt kamen.

Im Gegensatz zu ihren jahrhundertelang verwendeten Vorläuferprodukten enthielten diese neuen Produkte keine giftigen Bleiverbindungen mehr. Was sie aber bruchlos übernahmen, war die traditionelle Farbsymbolik der Marienbilder, die Signalfarbe Blau und die Verbindungen zu den Marienwundern, die das Weiße des Körpers der Jungfrau nicht nur mit der Milch, sondern noch mit einer anderen sehr weißen und von Natur aus flüchtigen Substanz in Verbindung brachten: dem Schnee, den das berühmte römische Gnadenbild *Santa Maria della Neve* in der römischen Basilika Santa Maria Maggiore angeblich im August hat über der Hauptstadt der Christenheit schneien lassen – es war jahrhundertelang Ziel christlicher Rompilgerer, denen der Besuch der sieben römischen Hauptkirchen vollkommenen Ablass der eigenen Sünden versprach. (Deswegen gibt es auch ein schönes Altarbild von 1428 von Masolino di Panicale, das den Papst beim Schneeschaufeln zeigt.) 1911 entwickelte der Hamburger Chemiker Oscar Troplowitz den ersten Emulgator für Wasser-Öl-Verbindungen, der ungiftig und chemisch stabil war, im Auftrag der Firma Beiersdorf. Vermarktet wurde die daraus entstandene Crème in strahlendem Blau und mit einem Namen, der eben das Schneeweiße der reinen Hautcrème unübersehbar machen sollte. Sie kennen das Produkt seither als *Nivea.* Reinheit ist deswegen Reinheit, weil sie ihre eigene Vorgeschichte und jede Erinnerung an ihre eigene Herstellung erfolgreich gelöscht hat. Wer von sich sagt, dass er rein ist, behauptet auch, immer schon rein gewesen und sich seines unkontaminierten – weißen – Ursprungs sicher zu sein. Reinheit ist daher kein Zustand, sondern Arbeit – und zwar die der Spezialisten, die sich erfolgreich als Sprecher und Verkörperungen der Reinheit präsentieren, in Predigten, Texten und Bildern. ◁

Valentin Groebner ist ein österreichischer Historiker für mittelalterliche Geschichte. Seit März 2004 lehrt er als Professor für Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance an der Universität Luzern. Im Juni 2018 hielt er am Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen die *IWM Lectures in Human Sciences* zum Thema „Reden wir über Reinheit“ (siehe Video: www.youtube.com/IWMVienna). Das Manuskript seiner Vortragsreihe, auf dem dieser gekürzte und bearbeitete Auszug basiert, ist im März 2019 unter dem Titel *Wer redet von der Reinheit? Eine kleine Begriffsgeschichte* im Passagen Verlag erschienen (siehe Seite 22).

Publikationsreihe von IWM und Passagen Verlag

Im Rahmen der neu geschlossenen Kooperation zwischem dem Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) und dem Passagen Verlag erschienen im März 2019 die ersten beiden Bände, die sich mit der Zukunft der Demokratie und dem Konzept der Reinheit befassen. Auszüge der Beiträge von Chantal Mouffe, Nadia Urbinati und Boaventura de Sousa Santos sowie von Valentin Groebner sind auf den Seiten 15–17 bzw. 21 nachzulesen.

Ludger Hagedorn, Katharina Hasewend, Shalini Randeria (Hg.)
Wenn Demokratien demokratisch untergehen

Die weltweite Verbreitung wie Beliebtheit der Demokratie geht mit ihrer Krise einher. Im historischen Moment ihrer größten Ausdehnung scheint – aus dem Innern der Demokratie selbst heraus – eine demonstrative Missachtung ihrer grundlegenden Prinzipien und Institutionen um sich zu greifen. Demokratische Institutionen und Prozeduren wurden in Frage gestellt. Wie lässt sich diese Entwicklung verstehen?

Mit Beiträgen von János Kis, Ivan Krastev, Mark Lilla, Chantal Mouffe, Jan-Werner Müller, Claus Offe, Jacques Rupnik, Nadia Urbinati, Boaventura de Sousa Santos

Valentin Groebner
Wer redet von der Reinheit?
Eine kleine Begriffsgeschichte
(basierend auf IWM Lectures in Human Sciences 2018)

Reinheit ist unverzichtbar – als Wunsch, als Ideal, als Forderung. Und sie ist imaginär: In der sozialen Wirklichkeit und in der Biologie ist sie Fiktion. Trotzdem ist Reinheit eine machtvolle religiöse und moralische Kategorie, im Mittelalter ebenso wie in der Gegenwart. Mit welchen Slogans, Bildern und Erzählungen wird sie wirksam gemacht – und als Verkaufsargument eingesetzt?

Vorschau Herbst 2019

Ayşe Çağlar (Hg.)
Streitpolitik in der neoliberalen Stadt

Städtische soziale Bewegungen weltweit haben sich jüngst radikal gewandelt. Welche Zusammenhänge lassen sich zwischen scheinbar heterogenen Formationen der Streitpolitik in der neoliberalen Stadt ausmachen? Was sind die Folgen für unser Verständnis von politischem Handeln?

Mit Beiträgen von Arjun Appadurai, Ranabir Samaddar, Saskia Sassen, David Harvey, Susana Narotzky, Margit Mayer und Jaume Franquesa

Ivan Vejvoda (Hg.)
Brexit oder der Preis der Souveränität

Die Inselmentalität der Engländer sei eine Torheit, wofür von Zeit zu Zeit ein hoher Preis bezahlt werden müsse, stellte George Orwell einst fest. Im Falle des Brexit wird Europa diesen Preis mittragen müssen.

Mit Beiträgen von Misha Glenny, Mary Kaldor, Pankaj Mishra, Fintan O'Toole, Tessa Szyszkowitz, Piotr Buras, Timothy Snyder, Luke Cooper, Timothy Garton Ash

Subscribe now free of charge! www.iwm.at/publications

Books by IWM Fellows and Alumni

János Mátyás Kovács (Ed.)
Populating No Man's Land: Economic Concepts of Ownership under Communism
New York: Lexington Books, 2018



This edited volume opening the new series "Revisiting Communism: Collectivist Economic Thought in Historical Perspective" focuses on the concepts of ownership, the cornerstone of political economy in Soviet-type societies. The authors' main objective is to contribute to the still unwritten chapter on collectivism in the history books of modern economic thought.

Contributions by János Matyas Kovács; Oleg Ananyin; Roumen Avramov; Fan Shitao; Julius Horváth; Denis Melnik; Jože Mencinger; Gabriel Mursa; Vlad Paşca; Franz Rudolph; Vítězslav Sommer; Maciej Tymiński and Hans-Jürgen Wagener

Pieter Bevelander, Ruth Wodak (Ed.)
Europe at the Crossroads: Confronting Populist, Nationalist, and Global Challenges
Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2019

The extreme right wing is on the rise. And there are signs that part of the political mainstream in Europe, the US, and beyond is considering going along with far-right populist parties and their divisive, ethno-nationalist programmes. Europe at the Crossroads is an urgent scholarly response to the sociopolitical challenges that far-right programmes pose to the idea of a more egalitarian world.

Contributions by Adam Balcer, Beint Magnus Aamodt Bentsen, Pieter Bevelander, Floris Biskamp, Salomi Boukala, Gianni D'Amato, Maureen Eger, Bernhard Forchtner, Matthew Feldman, Heather Grabbe, Stefan Lehne, Sabine Lehner, Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak

Holly Case
The Age of Questions
Princeton University Press, 2018

In her book, Holly Case presents chapter by chapter, seven distinct arguments and frameworks for understanding the age. She considers whether it was marked by a progressive quest for emancipation (of women, slaves, Jews, laborers, and others); a steady, inexorable march toward genocide and the "Final Solution"; or a movement toward federation and the dissolution of boundaries. Or was it simply a farce, a false frenzy dreamed up by publicists eager to sell subscriptions? As the arguments clash, patterns emerge and sharpen until the age reveals its full and peculiar nature.

Martin Schürz
Überreichtum
Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2019

Wie Vermögen verteilt wird, ist keine private Frage. Sie geht alle etwas an. Martin Schürz führt uns die Zahlen vor Augen, erklärt, was problematisch am Überreichtum ist. Gerade Gefühlszuschreibungen sind für die Akzeptanz der Privilegien der Überreichen bedeutsam: Neid und Hass werden vorwiegend den Armen als Laster attestiert, Großzügigkeit und Mitleid den Überreichen als Tugenden. Wer eine gerechte Gesellschaft will, muss zuerst verstehen, wie Vermögenskonzentration wahrgenommen wird. Denn Überreichtum gefährdet die Demokratie und die politische Gleichheit.

Till van Rahden
Demokratie – Eine gefährdete Lebensform
Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2019

Die liberale Demokratie galt uns lange als selbstverständlich. Nun steckt sie in der Krise und es wird immer deutlicher, dass die Demokratie eine fragile Ordnung ist, die der Pflege bedarf. Till van Rahden rät in seinem Buch, dass wenn wir mehr sein wollen als unbeholfene Demokraten, dann müssen wir die öffentlichen Räume ausbauen, die Streitkultur stärken und die Umgangsformen pflegen, die es uns gerade im Alltag ermöglichen, Gleichheit wie Freiheit zu erleben und demokratische Tugenden einzuüben.

Carl Henrik Fredriksson, Klaus Nellen, Simon Garnett (Ed.)
Widening the Context: The Eurozine Anthology
Vienna: Eurozine, 2018

The book provides an insight into two decades of engagement with issues at the heart of the European debate. From the new nationalisms to Euro-Islam, from Paris and Prague to free speech and the role of intellectuals, from algorithms to post-truth politics and the masculinities of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

Contributions by Slavenka Drakulić, Jan-Werner Müller, Ida Börjel, Jacques Rupnik, Timothy Snyder, Barys Piatrovich, Tatiana Zhurzhenko, Marci Shore, Kenan Malik, Nilüfer Göle, Kathrin Passig and Achille Mbembe. With an introduction by *Eurozine* co-founders Carl Henrik Fredriksson and Klaus Nellen.

Paul Celan Translation Program

Benjamin Constant
Principes de politique [Principy politiky]
Translated by **Hana Fořtová** (French > Czech)
Praha: OIKOYMENH, 2018



The book is the translation into Czech language of Benjamin Constant's key political work Principes de politique in the 1806 manuscript version edited by Etienne Hofmann (Droz, Genève, 507 pages). This version is longer and more audacious then the version finally published by Constant in 1815. The translation is accompanied by author's notes and translator's notes. Constant defines here his conception of 'liberty', the 'limits of sovereignty' and the 'foundations of modern liberal state'. It is the first Czech translation of Principes de politique.

Ludwik Fleck
Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache
[ЯК ПОСТАЄ ТА РОЗВИВАЄТЬСЯ НАУКОВИЙ ФАКТ. ВСТУП ДО ВЧЕННЯ ПРО МИСЛЕННЄВИЙ СТИЛЬ І МИСЛЕННЄВИЙ КОЛЕКТИВ]
Übersetzt von **Stefaniya Ptashnyk** (German > Ukrainian)
Chernivtsi: Booksxxi, 2019

Ludwik Flecks Essay *Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache* wurde 1935 veröffentlicht. Heute ist Fleck als Erkenntnistheoretiker und Entwickler seines eigenen Systems der Wissenschaftssoziologie bekannt. Die internationale Forschungsgemeinschaft achtet besonders seine Konzepte von Denkkollektiv und Denkstil. Stefaniya Ptashnyk macht mit ihrer Übersetzung Flecks Ideen der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft in der Ukraine, dem Land, in dem Ludwik Fleck geboren wurde und in dem er bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg arbeitete, zugänglich.

Theatres: Romantic Fortresses or Models for Civic Society?

BY ZOFIA SMOLARSKA

Contemporary theatres can resemble romantic fortresses with a rigid hierarchy. But could they offer a model for a way of life based on solidarity instead? A dilemma that would have fascinated the Polish priest and philosopher Józef Tischner, whose legacy is waiting to be re-discovered.

Stage managers, stagehands and makers of men's costumes in photographs from the exhibition "The People of the Teatr Wielki," presented in 2014 in the Royal Łazienki Park, Warsaw and more recently in the Polish National Opera at the Teatr Wielki.

Photos: Teatr Wielki – Polish National Opera / Anna Fedisz

In *Die Burg,* a documentary by Hans A. Guttner that premiered last February in Vienna, the film camera looks into virtually every corner of the most prominent of all German-language theatre venues: the production hall where the sets are built, dressing rooms, rehearsal rooms, workshops of shoemakers, wigmakers and tailors, make-up rooms, the administrative office, audience spaces, even the toilets. Thus the film's creators promise us the experience of a theatre ecosystem in all of its complexity. However, when it comes to interviews, it turns out that the Burgtheater is only represented by those whose words already carry the most weight, whether performing in front of the audience (actors and actresses) or giving instructions (director, stage director, set designer, vocal trainer); those who usually work in silence, i.e. technicians and craftspeople, remain mute.

In one scene Nicholas Ofczarek, a leading actor at Burgtheater, talks in a sceptical tone about how difficult his job is and how seldomly he experiences true artistic satisfaction. At the edge of the frame, there is a make-up artist (we do not know her name) rushing around the star and powdering him with a sponge before he goes on stage. In front of our very eyes, her quick but precise movements transform him into a diabolical character, but we do not get the chance to hear a word from her about how she perceives her job.

The scene is particularly disturbing when we recall the work ethic crisis that the Burgtheater entered under Matthias Hartmann, the director from 2009 until he was fired in 2014 as financial inconsistencies at the theatre came to a head. His continuous abuse of power was revealed in an open letter signed by 60 Burg employees in early 2018. Among them were actors (including Ofczarek) as well as technicians, dressers, prompters, stage managers and make-up artists. The letter was proof of their courage, but also of a significant cross-class solidarity intended to lead, according to the signatories, to on open debate.

Heads over hands

If we share the belief that art has an important role in shaping our social awareness, then no artwork should reproduce the asymmetry in power relations that is omnipresent not only in theatre institutions but also in society more generally. In *The Craftsman,* sociologist Richard Sennett shows that one of the characteristics of Western civilization is "a deep-rooted trouble in making connections between head and hand, in recognizing and encouraging the impulse of craftsmanship."[1] This results in the depreciation of manual and material labor as something that does not required any intellectual skill.

Guttner's documentary depicts craftworkers in a way that is quite similar to many of the films and photos distributed by the theatre's PR departments. This kind of material often gives us the opportunity to observe their capable hands carefully handling pieces of clothing, their entire attention apparently focused on the objects they have created. However, we do not learn about their opinions, ideas, attitudes. As a result, virtues like patience, devotion, modesty become dangerously close to an introversion that almost seems to resemble an anti-social attitude.

The monthly salary for a technician employed by the Polish National Opera at the Teatr Wielki in Warsaw, the most generously funded theatre institution in Poland, averages around 460 euros net. This has triggered lasting disputes and tensions between "top" and "bottom." A photo exhibition at the open-air gallery in the Royal Łazienki Park

Photo: Renata Apostel

Józef Tischner 1931–2000

depicting backstage workers as part of the "family" did not help to overcome such conflicts. Around the time that the same workers went on strike in 2018, the photos were exhibited again in the National Opera's foyer—but all the audience got to see were images of craftspeople and technicians smiling silently. It seems that a certain nostalgia for simplicity, modesty, genuineness intermingles willy-nilly with the tendency to silence the claims of the "simple" workers.

Somewheres and Anywheres in theatre

The work of theatre craftspeople demands not only great manual skill, but also social intelligence and artistic talent, since the stage set or, more broadly, the performance is always the result of a collective effort. Over the course of the last four years I have conducted a series of interviews with employees of public theatres in Poland. The series show that technicians and craftspeople not only expect better pay but yearn even more for better communication and greater participation in decision-making processes. More than anything, it is the breakdown of trust and empathy that they find particularly painful on a personal level, as well as draining their institutions of creative energy.

In the last issue of IWM*post,* David Goodhart differentiates between "Somewheres"—people who are bound to a certain place—and "Anywheres"—people whose education and internationalization allows them to work anywhere. Goodhart's observation is made against the background of mounting polarization within British society, but it is also meaningful in our context. Craftspeople—as a non-mobile workforce—are for sure Somewheres. But theatres are places where Somewheres and Anywheres (directors, actors) not only come together but also have to collaborate closely in a very special environment.

Re-thinking Tischner's heritage

The values and expectations expressed by the craftspeople working in Polish theatres share a certain tone. They do not demand "transparency" or "openness," values that are crucial to liberal democracy, but they do wish that their employers would acknowledge their "dignity" by initiating "a dialogue." Obviously, not all of them experienced the social movement that emerged around Solidarność in the 1980s. But the words they use to express their disappointment are reminiscent of the language surrounding the work ethic in Solidarność.

One of the leading authors of the discourse of Solidarność was Józef Tischner, a Catholic priest, philosopher and founding president of the IWM. Thanks to his talents as an engaged thinker, he became one of the chief ideologists of the Solidarność movement. When addressing the union's members and supporters, published later in *Spirit of Solidarity* (1981), Tischner placed much emphasis on the "moral exploitation" and the dignity of workers. In one of these sermons, he stated that work is "a particular form of a person-to-person conversation." To enable true dialogue "one needs not only to overcome fear and dispel prejudice, but must find a common language. It cannot be the language of just any group, much less a language of insinuation, slander, nor even a language of accusations."

Dialogue should then be a space of total inclusiveness where the "superior" meets the "inferior" and where the oppressor meets the oppressed. His anti-Marxist message opened the door to broad social acceptance for the subsequent negotiations between Solidarność representatives and the communists who took their place at the Round Table Talks in 1989. Today many theatre craftspeople nostalgically look back at this moment when their theatres—meaning also their world, their reality—were like "one big family."

Another aspect of Tischner's thought helped to build such an inclusive community. This was his opposition to "political thinking," as he perceived all politics as inevitably polarizing a "them" and an "us." Previously, this anti-political discourse had been very effective in politically mobilizing millions despite their differences. Yet, paradoxically, in the new democratic era it resulted in falsely antagonistic relations between practicing politics and social solidarity.

Theatre—which came in for high praise from Tischner, a frequent theatergoer himself—could contribute to getting out of this trap by reshaping organizational culture and switching marketing strategies. The first step might be to bring craftspeople and technicians back to the "agora" by giving them a voice and a level of respect equal to those enjoyed by the other groups involved in the production process. Reading Tischner's powerful works (though not uncritically) would be another step in the right direction.

This brings me back the title of the documentary: *Die Burg* can mean a castle or a city. It is up to theatres to decide whether they want to resemble romantic fortresses with a rigid hierarchy and strict regimes of representation; or to serve instead as a model for civic society based on solidarity. ◁

1) Richard Sennet, *The Craftsman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 9.

Zofia Smolarska is research associate at the Aleksander Zelwerowicz National Academy of Dramatic Art in Warsaw. From February to June 2019 she is a Józef Tischner Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Krzysztof Michalski and IWM Archives

KRZYSZTOF MICHALSKI ARCHIVE

Krzysztof Michalski was the founding rector of the IWM. When he died in 2013, he left a rich literary bequest.

As announced in a previous issue of the IWM*post,* the IWM has been working on opening up its Krzysztof Michalski Archive to scholars interested in his work. Based on the bibliography established by Michalski himself, his papers have been catalogued and digitized in order to make his writings available for research and publication. Publication plans related to Michalski's oeuvre include a collection of his essays on his philosophical precursors and paragons, which will be edited by Ludger Hagedorn and Piotr Kubasiak. Moreover, the German translation of his *The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche's Thought* is currently being prepared for publication by former IWM Permanent Fellow Klaus Nellen.

Research on Krzysztof Michalski's work will extend the IWM's Patočka Archive, which is dedicated to collecting, exploring and disseminating the oeuvre of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Established in 1984, the Patočka Archive has since then provided the basis for international research and numerous editions of Patočka's works in various languages. Krzysztof Michalski considered himself a student of Jan Patočka, who in turn had studied with Husserl und Heidegger. In this way, the IWM harbors the writings of two Central European thinkers who were representatives of the second and third generations of phenomenologists.

Head of both the Patočka and Michalski Archives is Ludger Hagedorn, Permanent Fellow at the IWM. The setting up of the Michalski Archive was supported by Hana Fischer, former IWM librarian, and Piotr Kubasiak, who was an IWM Junior Fellow in 2016–2017 and a Krzysztof Michalski Junior Visiting Fellow in 2018. The latter's dissertation, entitled *Zwischen Existentialimus und Politik. Europa und Geschichte im Denken von Krzysztof Michalski* was defended at the University of Vienna in April 2019. It is the first monograph on Michalski's life and work.

The IWM is grateful to Krzysztof Michalski's daughters, Kalina and Julia, for entrusting the Institute with taking care of their father's intellectual bequest.

Along with setting up the Michalski Archive, the Institute will soon finalize the inventory of the records that document the IWM's research activities and history since its inception in 1982. This collection comprises materials of various kinds and in different formats, including correspondence, research projects and conference files, records of lectures, working papers, photo and audio archives, the IWM*post* and the journal *Transit,* as well as the IWM's publications. The IWM Archive is headed by Katharina Gratz, the Institute's librarian. The Institute papers will be made accessible to international researchers by 2020. There are already plans for projects related to the intellectual history of the IWM that will hopefully be realized in the coming years. Further details: **www.iwm.at** ◁

Photo: Klaus Wihnalek

If you are in possession of documents (especially correspondence) of potential relevance for research on Michalski's oeuvre or on the history of the IWM, we would be grateful if you considered donating these materials to the Institute's archives.

Eurasia in Global Dialogue

In November 2018, the "Eurasia in Global Dialogue" program (EiGD), part of Ivan Krastev's Research Focus "Democracy in Question", entered its fourth stage. The program, which is coordinated by Clemena Antonova (see p. 25), initially focused on Russia and subsequently broadened its scope to enable comparison between the illiberal regimes of Russia and Turkey. In its current phase, the program covers countries on the Eurasian continent in order to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamic between domestic and foreign policy, by promoting a dialogue between Eurasian countries and the West, and by developing new policy options for the EU towards Eurasia. Working constructively in this direction will help us face the challenges presented by the increasing isolation of a number of Eurasian countries.

In the period between November 2018 and May 2019, the EiGD Program hosted six fellows. An edited volume on Turkey and Russia is in the final stages of preparation for publication, while articles by EiGD Fellows are under consideration for publication in *Eurozine,* the online network of journals.

What's Russian about the Russian Avant-garde?

BY CLEMENA ANTONOVA

Among the avant-garde—the group of self-consciously radical artists at the beginning of the 20th century—the Russians stand supreme. What, if any, is the common quality that allows us to think of artists as diverse as Kandinsky, Malevich or Chagall as belonging together? By examining the testimony and writings of their contemporary critics, Clemena Antonova explores the role and significance of the iconic tradition in the construction of a common Russian identity.

Photo: Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam

Photo: Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow

***left:* The Corn Cutter,** 1911, Kazimir Malevich, Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam

right:* The *Old Testament Trinity, Andrei Rublev, 1425 (?), Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow

In 1895, Vasily Kandinsky, who was to become probably the most internationally successful of the Russian avant-garde, saw an exhibition of French Impressionist art in Moscow. This is how he described his response: "From that moment on, I looked at the art of icons with different eyes."[1] To most people today, it may not be immediately obvious that there is any connection between French Impressionism and medieval icons. To Kandinsky's Russian contemporaries, though, it was absolutely clear: Western modernism opened up the way for their appreciation of their own native tradition of the icon.

The Russian perception of Western modernism

That a whole generation of Russian artists described their artistic evolution in similar terms is quite remarkable. Natalia Goncharova, one of the most important women painters at the time, said of herself: "At the beginning of my development I learned most of all from my French contemporaries. They stimulated my awareness, and [then] I realised the great significance and value of the art of my own country."[2] Starting from an affiliation with Cubism, Futurism, etc., the Russian avant-garde subsequently transcended its initial Western orientation and committed itself to a profound reassessment of its own native tradition of art—and, *vice versa,* Russian artists believed that their familiarity with the art of the icon put them in a privileged position to appreciate Western avant-garde art. Alexander Benois, an influential art critic at the time, observed that "a fourteenth-century *Nicholas the Wonder-Worker* or *The Birth of the Virgin* can […] help us understand Matisse, Picasso, Le Fauconnier, or Goncharova. By the same token, through Matisse, Picasso, Le Fauconnier and Goncharova we have a much better feeling for the tremendous beauty of these 'Byzantine' pictures and the youthful, powerful, and life-giving force within them."[3] At the same time, Nikolai Punin expressed his belief that "icons, in their magnificence and living beauty, will help contemporary art accomplish achievements which differ from those that have been influencing European art for the last few years."[4] In other words, the icon tradition would allow the Russian avant-garde to find its own unique identity. The importance of the icon was so deeply felt that the Constructivist painter Naum Gabo claimed that "the whole history of Russian art had a greater influence on our generation than [Cubism, Futurism, etc.] taken together."[5]

What is interesting for me here is not the relative importance of Western modernism or the medieval icon for the evolution of the Russian avant-garde. Much more significant is, firstly, the Russian avant-garde artists' own awareness of the connection between Western modernist art and the icon tradition. Secondly, there was the related claim that the Russian avant-garde had a unique identity that distinguished it from any other modernist movement, and that its uniqueness lay exactly in its links to the native tradition of the icon.

The question of religion

What exactly was the artistic affinity between icons and avant-garde images? Avant-garde artists used icons not simply as part of the content of their works, but in much more radical and interesting ways. The icon became integral to the avant-garde image in terms of thorough-going structural and compositional principles, color relations, etc. See, for instance, Malevich's *The Corn Cutter* of 1911, which shows three figures sitting around a table. There are no other objects on the table itself except for the candle and the foot of one of the figures. The composition is a clear echo of the iconographical type of the *Old Testament Trinity,* which typically shows three angels sitting around a table, grouped—as in Malevich's work—with a central figure flanked by two others. It is highly likely that Malevich had a particular icon in mind, namely the famous image by Andrei Rublev, which had recently been cleaned and attracted enormous attention.

However, was the avant-garde artists' appropriation of icons purely formal, or did it signify an identification with their meaning? After all, the icon is a religious image and a helpmate in the process of prayer. It is, however, inescapable that many of the early 20th century avant-garde artists went out of their way to insist on the absence of any religious dimension in their works. Tatlin made the point bluntly and uncompromisingly: "It is unimportant to a true artist whether to portray a Madonna or a strumpet because he solves his own artistic problems through their creation."[6] This attitude is nowhere as striking as with Malevich, who is generally seen as having been more influenced by icons than anyone else of his generation. At the same time, Malevich was very clear that the religious meaning of the icon had no place in his work or in that of his contemporaries. He explicitly maintained that "the icon can no longer be the same meaning, goal, and means that it was formerly: […] it has already passed into the museum where it can be preserved under the new meaning, not of a religious conception but of art."[7] Malevich's painting *The Corn Cutter* may have been designed with Rublev's *Old Testament Trinity* in mind, but the subject completely excludes the function of an icon. Some of Malevich's other works, based on abstract geometrical shapes, are devoid of any figural elements and are, in this sense, even more foreign to the world of the icon. They do not depict anything or anyone, and certainly do not have the function of representing the deity. One of the most famous examples, *The Black Square,* was initially displayed in a corner of the hall at the First Suprematist Exhibition in 1915 in St. Petersburg. This arrangement, used by other avant-garde artists as well, intentionally evokes associations with the Russian tradition of *krasnii ugol'* (the 'red' or 'beautiful' corner), the corner of a room in which Russians frequently hung their icons. However, Malevich's image, even in the familiar—in the Russian context—corner position would still leave the average Christian believer confused. The very lack of any figural elements, especially of the face of a holy figure, excludes once and for all the religious function of the icon, at least in the Christian context.

To summarize, what was *Russian* about the Russian avant-garde was the debt—repeatedly acknowledged by practically every major artist at the beginning of the 20th century—to the icon tradition. However, the icon was important to these artists as a source of stylistic and artistic ideas, but not as a religious object. Ideologically, its role was to open the space for the claim for a unique Russian identity. It is worthwhile to place this notion against the background of the discourse of the Slavophile thinkers of the 19th century that had spilled over into the avant-garde period. ◁

1) Cited in Vezin, A. and L. Vezin (1992), *Kandinsky and der Blaue Reiter.* Paris: Editions Pierre Terrail, p.37.
2) Cited in Yablonskaya, M. N. (1990), *Women Artists of Russia's New Age.* London: Thames & Hudson, p.63.
3) Benois, A. (1913), "Letters on Art: Icons and Modern Art," Rech'.
4) Punin, N. (1913), "Directions in Contemporary Art and Russian Icon Painting," Apollon 5, pp.41–42.
5) Gabo, N. (2000), *Gabo on Gabo: Texts and Interviews,* eds. C. Lodder and M. Hammer. Forest Row, East Sussex: Artists Bookworks, p.165.
6) Cited in Zhadova, L. (1988), *Tatlin.* New York: Rizzoli Intl Publications, p.56.
7) Malevich, K. (1971), 'The Question of Imitative Art,' in T. Andersen, (ed.), *K. S. Malevich: Essays on Art, 1915–1933,* tr. X. Glowacki-Prus and A. McMillin. New York: George Wittenborn, p.170.

Clemena Antonova is the Research Director of the "Eurasia in Global Dialogue" Program at the IWM (p. 24). Previously, she held a two-year fellowship at the IWM, working for Charles Taylor's research focus "Religion and Secularism." She holds a PhD in Art History. This text is a revised version of her chapter, "The Icon and the Visual Arts at the Time of the Russian Religious Renaissance" in the forthcoming *Oxford Handbook of Russian Religious Philosophy.*

Faust Zyklus 2018: Ausstellung von Maxim Kantor

BY JULIA M. NAUHAUS

Der berühmte russische Maler, Schriftsteller, Essayist und Kunsthistoriker Maxim Kantor war im Februar 2018 als Fellow des Programms Eurasia in Global Dialogue *am IWM zu Gast. Nach seinem Aufenthalt in Wien schenkte er dem IWM großzügigerweise ein aufwendig gestaltetes Künstlerbuch* (livre d'artiste) *über die beiden Teile von Goethes Faust mit Dutzenden Lithographien, von denen 33 als gerahmte Drucke im IWM von September 2018 bis Januar 2019 präsentiert wurden. Die Ausstellung wurde am 28. September mit einer Einführung von Julia M. Nauhaus, Direktorin der Gemäldegalerie der Akademie der bildenden Künste, im Beisein des Künstlers offiziell eröffnet.*

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) arbeitete am *Faust*-Stoff von seinem 24. Lebensjahr bis zu seinem Tod. Er benutzte verschiedene Quellen wie die Volksbücher zur *Faustsage* aus dem 16. Jahrhundert und die Puppenspiele vom Doktor Faust, verwandelte diese Quellen aber in zwei Dramen, die weit über alle Vorlagen hinausgehen. Goethe interessierte Faust als Suchender nach Erkenntnis, auf der Suche nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen Mensch, Natur und Gott. Der erste Teil des *Faust* wurde 1808 gedruckt, der zweite Teil vom Autor versiegelt und für eine Veröffentlichung nach seinem Tod bestimmt. Diese geschah noch in Goethes Todesjahr 1832. Zuvor hatte er 1827 lediglich die vollendete Helena-Szene unter dem Titel *Helena. Klassisch-romantische Phantasmagorie. Zwischenspiel zu Faust* publiziert.

Goethes *Faust* regte neben Regisseuren, die den ersten Teil inszenierten und auf die Bühne brachten, sowohl Komponisten zur Vertonung als auch Maler und Zeichner zur Illustration an. Die meisten widmeten sich dem ersten Teil des *Faust*-Dramas. So entstanden noch zu Goethes Lebzeiten die berühmten Illustrationen von Eugène Delacroix (1798–1863), die allerdings in Frankreich keinen Anklang fanden, wohingegen Goethe selbst sie schätzte. Außer dem heute nicht mehr bekannten Dresdner Künstler Moritz Retzsch (1779–1857) schuf auch der Nazarener Peter Cornelius (1783–1867) Zeichnungen zu Goethes *Faust,* die 1816 erschienen. Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts wurden weitere illustrierte Ausgaben des Werkes herausgegeben.

Nur wenige bildende Künstler illustrierten *Faust. Der Tragödie zweiter Teil.* Das Frankfurter Goethe-Haus/Freies Deutsches Hochstift bewahrt 143 Federzeichnungen von Max Beckmann (1884–1950), die dieser im Amsterdamer Exil 1943/44 schuf. Eine Gesamtausgabe von Reproduktionen aller Zeichnungen Beckmanns erschien jedoch erst im Jahr 1970.

Der 1957 in Moskau geborene Maler, Zeichner, Druckgraphiker, Bildhauer und Schriftsteller Maxim Kantor, der heute auf der Île de Ré in Westfrankreich lebt, hat sich parallel zu seinem vielfältigen malerischen Werk immer wieder Druckgraphiken gewidmet. Das Künstlerbuch zu Goethes *Faust* kann zweifellos als „Opus Magnus" von Maxim Kantor angesehen werden. Es enthält auf mehr als 200 Seiten den ungekürzten Goethe'schen Text und eine Vielzahl von Illustrationen, von Initialen über kleine Vignetten bis zu ganzseitigen und doppelseitigen Zeichnungen, die der Künstler in einem aufwendigen Druckverfahren in einer Auflage von 35 Exemplaren vervielfältigt hat. Er hat sich durchaus an die mittelalterliche Buchkunst angelehnt. In jüngerer Zeit bekennt Maxim Kantor, neige er immer mehr der Kunst der Gotik zu. Dies korrespondiert mit der Zunahme von religiösen Bildern in der Malerei – vier Beispiele zeigte die Gemäldegalerie der Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien zu Gast im Theatermuseum in der Ausstellung „Bosch & Kantor. Maxim Kantor: Das Jüngste Gericht" vom 4. Oktober 2018 bis 20. Jänner 2019.

Photos: Joseph Krpelan

Zusätzlich zum gebundenen Künstlerbuch hat Maxim Kantor 33 doppelseitige Lithographien aus dem Buch separat gedruckt, die das IWM von September 2018 bis Jänner 2019 in seinen Räumlichkeiten präsentierte. Ihre Reihenfolge entspricht der Folge von Goethes Text. In den Illustrationen zum ersten Teil herrschen mittelalterlich-gotische Elemente (beispielsweise in der Architektur) vor, Faust und Mephisto wie auch Gretchen sind leicht zu erkennen. Textzitate sind in viele der Lithographien integriert. Einerseits folgt Maxim Kantor Goethes Text sehr genau, andererseits zeigen die Illustrationen seine unverwechselbare Handschrift und gliedern sich harmonisch in sein Gesamtwerk ein.

Kantors Bildsprache ist expressiv, kraftvoll und dynamisch und streift oft an Karikatur und Satire oder bezieht diese direkt ein. Auch Witz und Ironie sind Maxim Kantor eigen. Der Künstler ist ein hellsichtiger Beobachter seiner Zeit und scharfer Kritiker von Putin und seinen Oligarchen, aber auch von westlichen Liberalen und Intellektuellen. Kritische Anspielungen finden sich immer wieder in seinem künstlerischen Werk. Motive wie Bäume Stillleben (beispielsweise mit Tierschädeln), Schweine als Verkörperung menschlicher Dummheit und Niedertracht (Kantor sieht so auch bei den Gesichtern einiger russischer Diktatoren Ähnlichkeiten mit Schweinen), bebrillte „Esel-Gelehrte", Drachen und Ritter, Menschen und Tiere, die mit Armen und Beinen eingezwängt sind in hölzerne „Blöcke", in denen man im Mittelalter Straftäter an den Pranger stellte, finden sich häufig in seinem Œuvre. Die Blätter der Lithographien sind dicht gefüllt mit vielen Details, der Künstler kombiniert viele Motive miteinander und illustriert keine durchgängige Geschichte im Sinne einer Erzählung. Dies entspricht Goethes Textgestaltung, wobei der erste Teil des *Faust* eine durchaus stringente Erzählung enthält, wenn von Fausts Pakt mit dem Teufel, Mephistopheles, erzählt wird und von der Verführung Gretchens, das im Kerker endet.

Der zweite Teil entfaltet verschiedene Themenbereiche wie Macht, Schuld, Natur, Sehnsucht, Sinn oder Vergebung und galt lange Zeit als unspielbar auf dem Theater. Spätestens Peter Stein hat dies 2000/2001 in seiner Inszenierung widerlegt. In Kantors *Faust*-Illustrationen tauchen in denjenigen für den zweiten Teil viele klassisch-antike Motive auf. Goethe verband im dritten Akt des Dramas das Mittelalter mit der griechischen Mythologie mit dem Höhepunkt der Vermählung von Faust mit Helena, die als schönste Frau der Welt Auslöser für den Trojanischen Krieg war.

Eine Besonderheit in Maxim Kantors Werk ist, dass der Künstler von Beginn an immer wieder sich selbst und Mitglieder seiner Familie porträtiert. Die Geschichte der eigenen Familie ist ihm dabei Spiegelbild der „großen" Geschichte. So tauchen in den Illustrationen zu *Faust* sein Vater, er selbst und seine zweite Frau (als Gretchen) auf. Auch Max Beckmann nahm auf Zeitumstände Bezug und versah seinen Faust mit den eigenen Gesichtszügen.

Maxim Kantor bezeichnet sich selbst als einen Realisten, aber in dem Sinne, dass seine Realität auch Drachen, Monster und tierische Mischwesen einschließt; seine Bildsprache ist symbolisch. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass man jedes Detail auf seinen Bildern ausdeuten kann und soll, aber doch, dass es dem Künstler nicht um eine bloße Abbildung der Realität geht.

Auch wenn Kantor Goethes Text sehr genau folgt, so denkt und assoziiert er in seinen Illustrationen diesen weiter und verbindet ihn mit seiner persönlichen Sicht auf die heutige Welt, auf Politik und Gesellschaft. Selbstverständlich fließt auch Kantors große Belesenheit ein. Sein Vater, der Philosoph Karl Kantor (1922–2008) machte ihn mit der abendländischen Literatur und Philosophie vertraut, Dante wurde ebenso in der Familie gelesen wie die Bibel oder Kant.

Maxim Kantors Illustrationen zu Goethes *Faust* stehen in der heutigen Kunst als einzigartiges und ungewöhnliches Zeugnis einer tiefen Auseinandersetzung mit Goethes Denken, dessen Weltsicht und Literatur da. Sie zeigen Kantors unbändige Phantasie und Kreativität wie auch die große Souveränität in der Verwendung verschiedenster künstlerischer Ausdrucksformen. ◁

Dr. Julia M. Nauhaus

The Dilemma of Ukrainian Orthodoxy

BY KATHERINE YOUNGER

The newly-created Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) has been presented by the outgoing Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko as a guarantor of Ukraine's state sovereignty and by the church's leadership as a crucial step towards ensuring Ukraine's religious and political autonomy. But this assertion of sovereignty on the international stage has a paradoxical effect at home.

On Easter Monday 2018, Poroshenko paid a visit to Bartholomew, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, and asked the *primus inter pares* to support an independent Orthodox church for Ukraine, freeing Ukrainian Orthodoxy from Russian control.

Especially since the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas in 2014, it had become unpalatable to many in Ukraine that the only canonical Orthodox church in the country was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). This church is part of the larger structure of the Russian Orthodox Church and thus within an institution that is widely understood to be little more than an arm of the Russian state. The percentage of Ukrainians who self-identify as belonging to the UOC-MP has plummeted since 2014. Severing ties with the Russian Orthodox Church came to be seen as a concrete way to reduce Russian influence in Ukraine.

After half a year of negotiations, Constantinople came through. The highly-anticipated Tomos of Autocephaly, as the document granting autonomy to the OCU is known, was handed over to the freshly-elected head of the new church, Epifanii, in January 2019, and the church's first liturgy was celebrated in Kyiv on Orthodox Christmas Day.

The new OCU replaced two churches that were an established part of the Ukrainian religious landscape but were not recognized by the global Orthodox community: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Both have now been dissolved and their hierarchies assimilated into the OCU. But the creation of the OCU has by no means brought total unity to Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Despite its drop in support since 2014, the UOC-MP is still going strong, with nearly twice as many parishes as the OCU. As of spring 2019, fewer than 5% of UOC-MP parishes have opted to join the OCU, mostly in western and central Ukraine.

Even with this persisting division, both the government and the OCU leadership have attempted to present a clear narrative: the new church means Ukrainian religious emancipation from Russian Orthodoxy, which is a crucial component of the Ukrainian state's stability and security. But this marks an important departure from the religious rhetoric that has dominated the nearly three decades since Ukrainian independence, namely that one of Ukraine's strengths is that the church is linked not to the state, as in the Russian case, but to the people. With the creation of the OCU, and the accompanying rhetoric from both church and state, this established narrative has been disrupted. The OCU begins to resemble a state church—and as such, the justification for its existence undermines its own legitimacy.

Petro Poroshenko attends the enthronement of the newly elected head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine Epiphanius, Kyiv, February 3, 2019.

Photo: Efrem Lukatsky / AP / picturedesk.com

Religious autonomy as political sovereignty

The Ukrainian campaign for autocephaly relied on several arguments: historical, claiming that the Ukrainian church's subordination to Moscow was unjust and uncanonical; and moral, emphasizing the corruption of the Russian Orthodox Church and the need for an institution that could carry on the spiritual values of the Maidan. But most strikingly, there was also a geopolitical argument: that the very existence of the Ukrainian state depended on an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church.

Both the state and the church have forcefully employed this rhetoric. In October 2018 Poroshenko gave an address declaring that the creation of an autocephalous Ukrainian church "is a question of our independence. This is a question of our national security. This is a question of our statehood. This is a question of world geopolitics … Autocephaly is a component of our state's pro-European and pro-Ukrainian strategy."[1] And in a March 2019 interview, Epifanii echoed Poroshenko's rhetoric: "Without a unified, nationally independent Orthodox church, we cannot build a strong, powerful, European, independent Ukrainian state."[2]

Ukraine in European Dialogue

For Ukraine, intellectual exchange with the West is crucial for the success of ongoing reform efforts and for building a modern, sovereign state governed by the rule of law. Likewise, scholars, intellectuals, and activists from across Europe and North America have much to learn from their Ukrainian counterparts. In the five years since the Maidan, it has only become clearer that the Ukrainian experience offers valuable insights into our present political and social moment: the country foreshadows and exemplifies many of the most pressing concerns of our day.

In this spirit, the IWM's *Ukraine in European Dialogue* program was initiated in 2015 by Permanent Fellow Timothy Snyder. Continuing the IWM's long tradition of intellectual and practical solidarity with societies in transition, the program includes fellowship programs, workshops, conferences, and public events in both Vienna and Ukraine. Program fellows also contribute to a focal point in *Eurozine*. Since July 2018, the *Ukraine in European Dialogue* program is administered by Research Director Katherine Younger; she succeeds the program's inaugural director, Tatiana Zhurzhenko.

In the lead-up to the Tomos, this appeal to state sovereignty seemed to be resonating with the Ukrainian population. Throughout 2018, opinion polls consistently showed high levels of approval for the idea of autocephaly, and the term "Tomos" finished behind only "bitcoin" and "measles" in Google searches in Ukraine that year. Formerly obscure debates over the nature of canonicity came to be seen as a pressing political issue.

Yet as the new church takes shape, a problem with this approach has emerged. Presenting the OCU as a fundamental component of Ukraine's project of divorcing itself from Russia has created an association between church and state that is difficult to reconcile with Ukraine's multiconfessional reality. Popular enthusiasm is giving way to mistrust and apathy.

Notably, even the backers of the OCU are clearly aware of the risk of tying the church too closely to the state. When Poroshenko gave that address in October 2018, his administration released a statement highlighting the parts of the president's speech that stated that there was not, nor would there be, a state church, and that the Ukrainian government "guarantees full religious freedom."[3]

Perhaps just as damaging as this church-state nexus, the pursuit of autocephaly became associated not only with the state but specifically with Poroshenko's re-election campaign. The increasingly unpopular incumbent's campaign sought to harness patriotic sentiment by emphasizing his administration's efforts on behalf of the new church. But what was meant to be a patriotic appeal was perceived largely as a cynical election ploy. Capitalizing on this disillusionment, anti-Poroshenko propaganda has sought to undermine the new church by exaggerating the idea of the Ukrainian president as a new Henry VIII, seeking religious autonomy for his country to pursue his own personal aims. The church that he hoped would be the crowning achievement of his first term in office has been effectively turned into an argument against him.

Whither the OCU?

On the global stage, the creation of the OCU is a genuinely momentous step, bringing Ukrainian Orthodoxy the formal status it has sought for centuries. While some of the other Orthodox churches have been reluctant to recognize the OCU as canonical—due in large part to strong pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church not to do so—the backing of Constantinople makes it highly likely that this new church will endure.

Yet domestically, the creation of the OCU has done little to overcome the rivalries within Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Furthermore, its close association with an unpopular government has dampened the initial enthusiasm for an autocephalous church and raised concerns over too tight a link between church and state. To consolidate its internationally recognized status as the sole legitimate Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the OCU hierarchy will have to figure out a way to overcome this perception. ◁

1) Zaiava Prezydenta Ukrainy u zv'iazku iz rishenniam Synodu Vselens'koho Patriarkhatu, 11 October 2018. www.president.gov.ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-u-zvyazku-iz-rishennyam-sinodu-vs-50346
2) "Mytropolyt Epifanii: 'My ne maiemo prava rozpaliuvaty v Ukraini relihiinyi front'," 1 March 2019. www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-47408699
3) "Ukrains'ka vlada harantuie povne dotrymannia relihiinoi svobody dlia virnykh usikh konfesii – Hlava derzhavy," 11 October 2018.

Katherine Younger holds a PhD in history from Yale University. Her current book project, based on her dissertation, looks at the intersection of religion and power in 19th century Ukraine through the case of the Greek Catholic/Uniate Church. Since July 2018 she is Research Director of IWM's program *Ukraine in European Dialogue* (see Infobox).

Upcoming Events *05–09 2019*

May

May 24

Photo: Klaus Ranger

Krzysztof Michalski Memorial Lecture
The Light that Failed

Ivan Krastev
Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; IWM Permanent Fellow; Mercator Senior Fellow

Why did the West, after winning the Cold War, lose its political balance? On the occasion of this year's Krzysztof Michalski Memorial Lecture IWM Permanent Fellow Ivan Krastev presents the core theses of his new book *The Light that Failed* (co-authored by Stephen Holmes) that sheds light on the extraordinary history of our age of imitation. It will be published by Penguin Books in October 2019.

May 28

Photo: Klaus Ranger

Monthly Lecture
Migrants and City Making in Disempowered Cities

Ayşe Çağlar
Professor, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna; IWM Permanent Fellow

What do cities which have lost their economic, political, and cultural power and population reveal about the location of migrants in city-making and urban politics? What do they disclose about the fault lines of neoliberal urban re-development? Once we shift our focus to the entanglements between urban regeneration and their dispossessive forces that create common conditions of displacement and precarity for urban residents, we might see new ways of exploring solidarities for social and historical justice struggles in these cities.

June

June 5

Photo: Maria Camila Romero

IWM Lecture in Human Sciences II
Capitalism and Democracy

Wolfgang Streek
Emeritus Director, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne

The second IWM Lecture in Human Sciences will be delivered by German economic sociologist Wolfgang Streek, whose research focuses on the political economy of capitalism, austerity politics and what he terms the debt-state as a result of the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s. In his lecture at the IWM he will speak about the relationship between capitalism and democracy. The first IWM Lecture of this year was given by the economist Dani Rodrik (Harvard University) on May 3.

September

September 26

Photo: Philipp Steinkellner

Eröffnung Vienna Humanities Festival / Wiener Vorlesung im Volkstheater
Paradox Europa

Ágnes Heller im Gespräch mit Ludger Hagedorn
Ágnes Heller ist die wohl bedeutendste Philosophin der Gegenwart. Sie hat alle politischen Systeme erfahren, die uns auch heute beschäftigen: die beiden großen Totalitarismen, die Demokratie und jüngst den populistischen Anti-pluralismus.
In Ihrem aktuellen Buch *Paradox Europa* (Edition Konturen, 2019) engagiert sie sich für ein freies und solidarisches Europa. Wie sie im Gespräch mit IWM Permanent Fellow Ludger Hagedorn erläutert, steht sich dieses Europa jedoch selbst im Weg: Einerseits durch die ungelösten Konflikte zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie, andererseits weil man nicht wahrhaben will, dass die Demokratie in Europa keineswegs so verankert ist, wie viele glauben.

This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, colloquia and debates can be found on: www.iwm.at/events

Subscribe to our Youtube Channel!
Videos and live streams of all major events on:
www.youtube.com/IWMVienna

Summer School: Democracy and Demography

BURG FEISTRITZ, AUGUST 17–24, 2019

To exist in a democracy means to be counted, and ideally to feel as if what one does truly counts. The IWM Summer School 2019, which will take place at Burg Feistritz in Lower Austria from August 17–24, explores how the demography of a polity is presumed to impact its form of government. The summer school offers young academics from various disciplines the opportunity to work on these themes with leading scholars in the field including **Holly Case, Craig Calhoun, Dilip Gaonkar, Ivan Krastev, Jan-Werner Müller,** and **Shalini Randeria.** Besides lectures, discussions, and reading sessions, it also offers the possibility to pursue an optional writing component under the close supervision of long-time magazine editor John Palattella. The summer school is organized by the IWM in cooperation with the Centre for Transcultural Studies and the Center for Global Culture and Communication, and with the generous support of the MasterCard Foundation. Registration for this year's summer school is no longer possible. Announcements for 2020 will be made in due time. ◁

Photo: iStock

IWM SUMMER SCHOOL

ERC Mentoring Initiative

JUNE 14–15, 2019

Together with the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk, PAN) and generously supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego), the IWM has established a successful mentoring initiative for applicants for European Research Council (ERC) Starting and Consolidator Grants in the humanities and social sciences from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. This mentoring initiative is addressed in particular to researchers in the areas of history, anthropology, political science, sociology, science and technology studies, as well as cultural and literary studies.

Internationally established scholars, who have served as members of ERC evaluation panels, or who have held ERC grants themselves are acting as mentors. The aim is to give a small group of applicants individualized advice regarding the development of their projects' academic content through intensive discussion with each other and with the mentors. Moreover, the initiative is intended to contribute to the creation of a culture of open and collegial dialogue, as well as to the internationalization of junior researchers in the humanities and social sciences in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The initiative's workshops focus exclusively on the conception and design of the academic research projects and are meant to complement the work of the National Contact Points (NCPs) for the ERC program. The next workshop will take place on June 14-15, 2019. ◁

Vienna Humanities Festival: Unheil und Hoffnung

26.–29. SEPTEMBER 2019

Wir durchleben eine Zeit verketteter globaler Krisen. Die langgedienten Prinzipien rationaler Politik weichen zusehender Emotionalisierung; Demokratien scheinen sich angesichts autoritärer Regime selbst zu demontieren; ökonomische Ängste und Sorgen über neue Technologien und Automatisierung grassieren. Dreißig Jahre nach dem Ende des Kommunismus in Osteuropa ist die liberale, marktwirtschaftliche Demokratie längst nicht mehr das selbstverständliche gesellschaftliche Ziel. Bei so viel Unheil ist die Aussicht auf Hoffnung dringender denn je. Was sind die aktuellen Visionen für eine erstrebenswerte Zukunft? Und welche Lehren können wir aus historischen Beispielen des Widerstands ziehen? Das vierte Vienna Humanities Festival, eine gemeinsame Initiative von IWM, Wien Museum und Time to Talk, greift diese brennenden Fragen auf und verhandelt sie in rund 40 Veranstaltungen mit führenden Persönlichkeiten aus Wissenschaft, Kunst und Kultur. ◁

Illustration: Olaf Osten

Eintritt frei!
www.humanitiesfestival.at