Kirill Rogov

The Putin regime has overcome the turbulence associated with the transformation of the blitzkrieg in Ukraine into a protracted war, the shock of Western sanctions, and internal resistance to the war among elites and the population. Although potential crises related to economic imbalances, the situation on the front, and political tensions exist, the baseline scenario suggests the preservation of the regime in one form or another in the medium term. However, the threshold of 2030—the time of the next presidential elections—may prove to be more significant and problematic for the regime. Factors such as the physical aging of the leader, the preparation of the elites for an inevitable transition, the accumulated effect of sanctions, and a possible deterioration in the commodity export market will contribute to this trend. At the same time, Russia’s deep isolation from the West and dependence on China, as well as the effect of the regime’s stasis, will create inertia, increasing the likelihood of its preservation even after Putin’s departure. The main goal of the project is to discuss the state in which Russia will approach the 2030 threshold. Considering the current situation and existing trends, what will be the state of the country’s economic potential, public finances, military, governance system, elites, and society by that time? How will Russian public opinion and elite discussions develop? What will happen to human capital within the country and to the Russian opposition diaspora—will it be able to influence the situation in the country? What factors and circumstances might adjust the inertial scenario? Can external players, particularly the West, influence it? What are the main challenges and dilemmas in developing an optimal strategy for the West and, in particular, for Europe towards Russia?

 

The analysis of public opinion under authoritarianism poses a significant problem. The very structure of the object "public opinion" is significantly distorted by the institutional conditions of autocracy, and the interpretation of mass opinion survey data in the framework of the same models that are used in democratic and semi-democratic regimes leads to significant errors. The strength of official propaganda under such conditions is determined not so much by its effectiveness (plausibility) and not even by its monopolistic position, as by the costs incurred by citizens in trying to oppose the "official" picture of the world. Moreover, these costs are related both to threats emanating from the state and to threats of isolation emanating from the "imaginary majority". This "imaginary majority" plays a crucial role in the mechanisms of psychological repression of dissent.

Under the conditions of war there is an escalation of these mechanisms, repression, costs and political conflicts. Russian public opinion is currently in a state of shock and is simultaneously a space of "war" - a war for public opinion and the dominant picture of the world in this public opinion. The main issues of this research are both the commonalities and the differences between public opinion in an autocracy and public opinion in an aggressor state during wartime.

This Fellowship is part of the Progressive Int. Initiative.

The analysis of public opinion under authoritarianism poses a significant problem. The very structure of the object "public opinion" is significantly distorted by the institutional conditions of autocracy, and the interpretation of mass opinion survey data in the framework of the same models that are used in democratic and semi-democratic regimes leads to significant errors. The strength of official propaganda under such conditions is determined not so much by its effectiveness (plausibility) and not even by its monopolistic position, as by the costs incurred by citizens in trying to oppose the "official" picture of the world. Moreover, these costs are related both to threats emanating from the state and to threats of isolation emanating from the "imaginary majority". This "imaginary majority" plays a crucial role in the mechanisms of psychological repression of dissent.

Under the conditions of war there is an escalation of these mechanisms, repression, costs and political conflicts. Russian public opinion is currently in a state of shock and is simultaneously a space of "war" - a war for public opinion and the dominant picture of the world in this public opinion. The main issues of this research are both the commonalities and the differences between public opinion in an autocracy and public opinion in an aggressor state during wartime. 

The analysis of public opinion under authoritarianism poses a significant problem. The very structure of the object "public opinion" is significantly distorted by the institutional conditions of autocracy, and the interpretation of mass opinion survey data in the framework of the same models that are used in democratic and semi-democratic regimes leads to significant errors. The strength of official propaganda under such conditions is determined not so much by its effectiveness (plausibility) and not even by its monopolistic position, as by the costs incurred by citizens in trying to oppose the "official" picture of the world. Moreover, these costs are related both to threats emanating from the state and to threats of isolation emanating from the "imaginary majority". This "imaginary majority" plays a crucial role in the mechanisms of psychological repression of dissent.

Under the conditions of war there is an escalation of these mechanisms, repression, costs and political conflicts. Russian public opinion is currently in a state of shock and is simultaneously a space of "war" - a war for public opinion and the dominant picture of the world in this public opinion. The main issues of this research are both the commonalities and the differences between public opinion in an autocracy and public opinion in an aggressor state during wartime. 

This is a book project focused on the re-interpretation of post-soviet transition trajectories in a broad societal perspective. While in previous decades a normative approach prevailed in the interpretations of post-soviet states social development the one proposed in this book pretend to revise its foundations. All labeled as “post-soviet” ones in fact these countries were “soviet” in a very different ways and the diversity of their post-soviet trajectories in last thirty years are seen as the diversity of societal responses to the collapse of the soviet political order.