The Enduring Strength of Bulgaria’s Deep State

Bulgaria is veering toward a sixth round of parliamentary elections in three years—a trend wryly described by the German Ambassador to Sofia as a ‘sign of instability.’ Stability was Boyko Borissov’s favorite word as prime minister, and for a decade he took special pride in being able to provide it for his center-right partners in Europe, foremost among them German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In return he was spared excessive scrutiny. Bulgaria was left alone, notwithstanding the largely ineffectual Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, the European Commission’s retrospective attempt at instigating judicial and anti-corruption reform after Bulgaria and Romania had become EU members.

Times change though, and so do political actors. After many years in power, Mrs. Merkel left office, and in 2021 Borissov was finally undone by incessant corruption scandals, a combative president, and general weariness with his rule. He resigned and was eventually replaced by a duo of youngish Harvard MBAs boasting avowedly Western values: Kiril Petkov and Asen Vassilev. Both had previous experience as ministers in caretaker cabinets appointed by President Roumen Radev.

Petkov and Vassilev were quick to assemble their own electoral vehicle, We Continue Change (PP), and allied themselves with an older opposition formation, Democratic Bulgaria (DB). This new coalition pushed for swift judicial reforms, prosecution of corrupt politicians, and providing Ukraine with lethal aid—the only political force to openly take that position at the time. PP–DB’s main goal was, and is, to finally free Bulgaria of its deep state and place it at the center of EU and NATO affairs.

Once in power, Petkov–Vassilev humiliated Borissov by subjecting him to a very public arrest. The former prime minister found himself fighting not just for his political survival but also for his freedom from prosecution and possible indictment. But it was a poorly thought-out move, and the investigation into his alleged misdeeds was squashed by the Prosecutor General’s Office, even though they read like a Corruption 101 syllabus.

The Petkov–Vassilev duo proved much better at winning power than at holding it. Their first attempt at government was propped up by a motley coalition of center-right reformists, old-style socialists, and the populist formation of an ex-television showman. It lasted nine months. Military aid to Ukraine proved especially contentious and the newcomers were rudely unseated. They clawed their way back in June 2023, this time at the helm of an even unlikelier crowd. Attempting to emulate the grand coalitions that ruled Germany and Italy, the reformists embraced their sworn enemies in GERB, whose leader, Boyko Borissov, they had recently tried to indict. In getting him on board they also got saddled with a far greater liability in Delyan Peevski.

Believed by many to be the core from which political and business rot emanates, Peevski has been called ‘a successful young man’—a sarcastic media reference to his meteoric rise, first under the wing of tsar-turned-prime minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, then in alignment with long-time eminence grise Ahmed Dogan, and finally as an influential wheeler-dealer in his own right. Peevski has come to control large swathes of the economy and almost all the national media. In 2013 he was close to being appointed head of the State Agency for National Security, a move that triggered year-long mass protests. His name has come up in countless scandals, most prominently the hijacking and subsequent closure of a commercial bank.

Peevski’s pivotal role in keeping Bulgarian politics and business in thrall to shady interests eventually earned him US sanctions under the Magnitsky Act. The Dogan–Peevski power center exerts control over a wide range of businesses and institutions, from energy to media to the Prosecutor’s Office and the secret services. Their leanings towards Russia are particularly worrying. Dogan, Peevski and Borissov had involved themselves in various Russian projects, some of which, particularly in the energy infrastructure sector, were of strategic importance to Moscow. There was always circumstantial evidence of cooperation between Borissov and Peevski, from concerted parliamentary action to business favors and government appointments. But the extent of their relationship came to the fore only recently.

Petkov and Vassilev thus entered into an alliance with the very people they were supposed to be pursuing. Many supporters of PP–DB found the logic behind this move unfathomable. The leadership argued, not without reason, that their own rather modest electoral showing and the low voter turnout made it impossible to carry out constitutional reform or to wrestle back control of the judiciary. A coalition culture, they claimed, would first need to develop and majorities won if Bulgaria was to be reformed. Their electorate mostly agreed, though many could still not bring themselves to accept the rationale behind this hitherto unthinkable alliance. In the meantime, work got underway on curtailing the powers of the president—a common goal for Borissov and his new partners.

Overhauling the Prosecutor General’s Office proved much more problematic. By deliberately failing to prosecute Borissov and Peevski and by targeting their opponents, the Office had made it impossible to investigate high-level crime. As the linchpin of informal networks of power and influence, it can ruin careers, businesses, and whole organizations—and has. Whereas constitutional reform proved less contentious, ceding informal control over the judiciary and the secret services proved too hard to swallow for Borissov and Peevski. Given the latter’s influence over the former, the coalition’s days were all but numbered.

The informal agreement between PP–DB and GERB involved a rotating premiership, with PP–DB governing first. Power was supposed to be transferred to GERB’s choice for prime minister, former European commissioner Maria Gabriel, in February. Under pressure from Borissov and Peevski, she refused to form a government. Amid a barrage of bitter mutual recriminations, her decision made new elections inevitable. Modest successes like Bulgaria’s partial acceptance into the Schengen zone and a substantial raise in salaries and pensions did little to lift the spirits of the reformist politicians or voters in general. Meanwhile, the important goal of eurozone membership fell victim to rising inflation.

Worst of all was the sense of futility that overcame the reformists. In a bare-all interview on 19 April, Petkov lifted the lid on the workings of Bulgaria’s deep state. His claims shocked the public and had the Sofia commentariat up in arms. He admitted to the virtual powerlessness of the executive, or at least its elected members, in the face of an administration completely beholden to vested interests. He admitted that as prime minister he could not fire anyone he distrusted because the separation of powers made it impossible to do so. He alleged that his bodyguards had spied on him, and that some of his deputy ministers had subverted the government’s agenda.

It was a sad litany of sabotage and obstruction, and testimony to the enduring strength of the deep state. According to Petkov, even Borissov is beholden to it, despite all his experience in power and proven ability to accommodate powerful interests. Given the weakness of the party system, voter apathy and institutional infighting, the interview raised fundamental questions about Bulgaria’s democracy. Eleven years after the mass protests in support of transparency and good governance, and the emergence of new parties willing to fight corruption, the political landscape remains murky. The developments that led to the elections on 9 June have thrown these problems into sharp relief.

Yavor Siderov is a journalist and political commentator. He was a visiting fellow at the IWM in 2023–2024.