The Hegelian Politics of Contradiction

Things are fundamentally different from their appearance because they are inherently contradictory; they do not embody what they appear to be. No entity is free from this ontological contradiction; indeed, an ideal and reconciled state is a fiction. According to Hegel, reality is characterized by disharmony, conflict, and the dialectical struggle of opposites. The prospect of permanently overcoming contradictions through a higher synthesis, he argues, is illusory. Hegel’s profound contribution as a philosopher lies in his recognition that any ambitious endeavor, whether social or existential, that attempts to impose an abstract ideal on the intricate structure of reality is destined to produce results contrary to its original intentions. The truth often turns out to be bitter and disappointing, and acknowledging this reality from the outset can prevent the most spectacular failures.

The affirmation of contradiction can evoke the semblance of a nihilistic-catastrophic stance, suggesting a foreshadowing of an inescapable apocalypse: if everything we engage with inevitably transforms into its antithesis, and if every action culminates in outcomes contrary to intentions, one might wonder whether resignation is the best course—merely to watch from afar as the world descends into chaos. This idea resonates with the imagery found in Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura:

‘Tis sweet, when, down the mighty main, the winds
Roll up its waste of waters, from the land
To watch another’s laboring anguish far,
Not that we joyously delight that man
Should thus been smitten, but because ‘tis sweet
To mark what evils we ourselves be spared

We can no longer be isolated from this malignancy; it is we who navigate alongside the sailor in the tumultuous storm. Blaise Pascal was right to say that we cannot remain distant spectators of catastrophe. As modern individuals, we are irrevocably aboard (embarqué), unable to escape or gaze from a safe distance at the calamities encircling us.

This brings us to the first lesson of the politics of contradiction. For Hegel, the intrinsic opacity and unpredictability of our actions implies that we cannot adhere to a singular pattern of change. Our political program must be plastic, as Catherine Malabou suggests, rather than merely flexible, reminiscent of the emancipatory projects of the 20^th century. This plasticity requires a constant metamorphosis of the essence, as opposed to superficial changes that leave the essence unchanged—a fundamental illusion of any ideology. What is crucial here is the shift from merely contemplating transformation to transforming our thought process itself. Hegel is not concerned with adapting a concept to reality, nor with distorting reality to fit a concept (an extreme manifestation of this is Stalinism), but with altering the concept itself, which is the greatest challenge for a philosopher. 

The second lesson of the politics of contradiction, then, is that in order to understand the shifts that occur within phenomena, we must transform the very frameworks through which we interpret them: the concepts or lenses shaping our worldview. Many theories (a word derived from the Greek théa—ways of seeing) become fixated on preserving their own theoretical integrity, striving to maintain coherence and identity even as they remain fragile, incoherent, and contradictory, much like the realities they seek to encapsulate.

This leads to political theory’s core dilemma, according to Slavoj Žižek: why do seemingly virtuous initiatives produce catastrophic, counterintuitive results? Why do progressive ideals morph into their stark opposites (modern freedom into market subjugation, human rights into a pretext for military intervention, liberal democracy into right-wing populism, and emancipatory revolutions into oppressive state terror)? One example is the history of 20^th century communism, which, in Hegelian fashion, ended twice: once as tragedy in the Stalinist era, and again as farce in the Gorbachev era. Hegelian dialectics provides a framework for dealing with this dilemma—by illuminating negativity as the underlying force that governs all concepts, it posits that contradictions at the ontological level drive the evolution of everything that exists, which is why entities invariably transform into their opposites; only through such contradictions can they exist at all!

This is a defeatist attitude, but therein lies its strength. First, the recognition of irreducible antagonism avoids two major pitfalls of progressive modern politics: transformism and reformism. The first, identified by James Scott, concerns “large-scale utopian social engineering projects” rooted in the “ideology of modernization,” which asserts the need to overcome the contradictions and conflicts internal to the social realm. Conversely and equally utopian from a Hegelian perspective is the moderate politics of minor reforms designed to maintain the status quo. This is exemplified by the prevailing mindset among contemporary elites who advocate “green capitalism” and altered consumption patterns as solutions to the climate crisis. They overlook the reality that such proposed solutions are part of the problem, for it is untenable to save the planet and capitalism at the same time; one must choose—this is the axial antagonism of our time. In their naivete, these elites assume that the mounting contradictions can be resolved and mediated in perpetuity. Yet Hegel challenges us to confront insurmountable antagonisms, suggesting that efforts to transcend them only serve to exacerbate their intensity—the prime example being the issue of the “rabble” in his Philosophy of Right, which represents an absolute recoil indelible from the modern state.

What positive or constructive outcomes might result from this dialectical politics? In Milton’s Paradise Lost, Satan observes: “What reinforcement we may gain from Hope / If not what resolution from despair.” The third lesson of the politics of contradiction underlines the hopelessness of our situation—humanity faces potential extinction through climate catastrophe, nuclear war, or an asteroid strike, among other threats. And yet it is precisely this despair that gives this politics its paradoxical strength. A radical transformation of our circumstances can emerge from more modest interventions: a redefinition of the signifiers that articulate our dire condition. For Hegel, this transformation is conservative in that it prioritizes the preservation of humanity as it is, rather than the fabrication of a new social ideal. It is also moderate in recognizing the inevitable side effects of any decision and accepting the new antagonisms that will result, in stark contrast to the finalist and totalizing aspirations of modern social engineering. One could even follow the dialectical fatalist Frank Ruda and suggest that real change requires the acceptance that the apocalypse has already happened—that all is irrevocably lost. But it does not mean an abstract negation of everything. Rather, it is the embodiment of a peculiar subversion, the affirmation of the existence of the impossible point that opens the horizon to the new. Hegel describes this act as “release” or “letting go” (Entlassen). We need to liberate ourselves from the compulsion to fight the crisis, to let go of our grasp in order to discover a new solution capable of truly subverting the crisis or, in Hegelian terms, moving it to another, less destructive level.

 Finally, we arrive at the fourth lesson of the Hegelian politics of contradiction: the essential task of philosophical inquiry is to articulate accurately the tensions and conflicts—the underlying antagonisms—of contemporary reality, such as the conflict between the planet and capitalism. Sometimes emphasizing a particular postulate or a single term within a political program can alter the course of a revolution—as Lenin famously asserted: “every little difference may become a big one if it is insisted on.” In a contingent universe, therefore, a desperate conservative’s adamant defense of the erosion of workers’ rights or of the dismantling of the welfare state may well become a genuine revolution. This is because such demands cannot be met within the constraints of the prevailing system.

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, trans. William Ellery Leonard,  (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1916), Book 2, lines 1–6 (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, BOOK II, line 1 (tufts.edu).

John Milton, Paradise Lost, Project Gutenberg, 2001,(www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/20), Book I, lines 222–223.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, (https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1904/onestep/).

Bartosz Wójcik is assistant professor at the Institute of Political Studies (Political Thought Research Group), Polish Academy of Sciences. He was a Józef Tischner Junior Fellow at the IWM in 2024.