Soli Özel

As the existing world order unravels, how the new one will be forged is yet uncertain, as there is no consensus on how to identify the new or upcoming order. Many identifications have been suggested: the world is multipolar, apolar, asymmetrically multipolar, in entropy, or bipolar. We are in a second Cold War––or are we? The order forged by the West cannot be sustained unless a new consensus is built. For opponents of the Western-led order that are also revisionists, the decline of the West is irreversible, and the future belongs to a non-Western “civilization” or non-Western (one can perhaps call it the ex-colonial) world. In this period when the world order is in purgatory it is evident that regional powers––or what are more conveniently referred to as “middle powers,” such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Turkey not to mention India––will have a lot more leeway and room for maneuver. In this new configuration, will Europe, with its declining share in world income, aging population and inability to fend for its own security without the United States, be considered a “middle power” or continue to act as if it were a major or even hegemonic actor? With its rich history and legacy of order-building, however much this can be open to severe criticism in the post-colonial age, Europe has obvious advantages and skills to be in the thick of building the new order and its institutions. The question is, where will the necessary Ibn Khaldunian assabiyyah come from for the old continent to rise to the occasion?

Despite the different profiles that the last three American presidents presented to the world and despite the unsettled and unsettling state of domestic politics in the USA, the foreign and security shift by Washington is clear: A high degree of unilateralism combined with the zeal to contain China will lead the USA to engage in relative disengagement from many theaters and concentrate almost exclusively on the Indo-Pacific region. This choice and the attending policy choices will have a bearing on the Atlantic alliance, European security and the way Europe relates to its own “near abroad”.  As the world order is entering this new phase whereby the USA will highlight its own Pacific identity over its Atlantic one, and the international system is being forged anew, Turkey like many other countries will have to respond to the new conditions and will have to make certain definitive choices.

There will be structural determinants pushing it in a certain direction but whether or not its rulers will either fully comprehend the new setup or will be able to manage it to serve the best interests of the country is uncertain. How Turkey evolves and which path it chooses will have serious ramifications for Europe. The lack of dialogue and comprehension between the two parties that define the current state of their relations is untenable and detrimental to the security, stability and welfare of both especially at a time of climate disasters and refugee waves.