The ancient Greeks and many who have taken inspiration from them have understood human life as fulfilled in participation in political life, which, of course, includes public discussion, voting, and holding political office. Further, the bemoaning of sophistical, improper participation in public discourse is not new either. Think of Alcibiades’ use of his superstardom; the sycophants and demogogues clogging the law courts and the Assembly.
That such activity should be curtailed for the sake of the health of the community is a common classical theme. However, establishing the conditions under which one can fulfill one’s telos as a political animal is not the same has having what in modern and contemporary terms we would call an obligation. New issues concerning the obligation to obey certain limits in one’s participation in public discourse in light of the plurality of moral worldviews and the persistence of disagreement under modern democratic conditions has caught the attention of contemporary liberal theory.
These new issues focus around deontological principles of reasonableness and reciprocity rather than the ends of human nature. In relation to these new issues there is still some interest in what might be called the health of the political community, in the form of a concern for the stability of liberal society. However, the conception of a stable liberal society is, in many ways, a much “thinner” conception than the classic vision of the healthy political community.
