The concept of freedom is undoubtedly central to Spinoza’s philosophy. Indeed, as one distinguished commentator has noted, “the only evaluative distinction finally recognized in his philosophy, other than the distinctions between true and false, and between adequate and inadequate, ideas, is the distinction between freedom and servitude.”
And yet, despite its centrality, Spinoza’s account of freedom and activity is still rather poorly understood, on the whole. It is perhaps not surprising that Spinoza’s readers should find his account of freedom to be somewhat perplexing, not only because he rejects traditional ways of conceiving of the problem of freedom, but also because his own metaphysical positions severely constrain the sort of account that he could offer. In this paper I will explore the challenges that Spinoza faces as an austere naturalist and the way in which he meets these obstacles. Ultimately, I will show that Spinoza has a rather rich, multi-leveled conception of freedom, which may be expressed in a wide variety of ways.
After sketching the contours of this graduated account, I will indicate the relevance of my interpretation for understanding Spinoza’s notion of civil liberation. However, before launching into his account, it would be somewhat instructive to begin by surveying some conceptions of freedom that would have figured prominently into the context in which Spinoza was writing.
